Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/20/06 (reposted same date to correct trial judge designation)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE KIBLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S131641
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E035085
NORTHERN INYO COUNTY
LOCAL HOSPITAL DISTRICT et al.,
Inyo
County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. CVCV02-32216

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets out a procedure for striking
complaints in harassing lawsuits that are commonly known as SLAPP suits
(strategic lawsuits against public participation), which are brought to challenge the
exercise of constitutionally protected free speech rights.1 Is this procedure
available in a lawsuit brought by a hospital staff physician and arising out of a
disciplinary recommendation by the hospital’s peer review committee? We
conclude that it is, and therefore affirm the Court of Appeal.
I
Beginning in 1979, Northern Inyo Hospital, an acute-care facility in
Bishop, California, granted staff privileges to Dr. George Kibler, a physician and
surgeon. On December 20, 2001, after a series of hostile encounters between

1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
1

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Kibler and other staff members, the hospital brought an action against Kibler,
seeking an injunction under section 527.8 against workplace violence. The next
day, the hospital’s peer review committee summarily suspended Kibler from its
medical staff based on his “continuing and recently escalating unprofessional
conduct of extremely hostile and threatening verbal assaults, threats of physical
violence, including assault with a gun, and related erratic actions of a hostile
nature toward nursing and administrative personnel . . . .”
On January 3, 2002, Kibler entered into a written agreement with the
hospital reinstating his staff privileges. The agreement specifically required that
Kibler refrain from hostile, violent, intimidating, or demeaning conduct toward
hospital personnel, and that he not keep or carry a firearm on the premises. In
addition, the agreement included a general release by Kibler of “all damages of
any and all kind and nature” arising out of his summary suspension from the
hospital’s staff. On January 22, 2002, based on a stipulation by the hospital and
Kibler, the trial court entered a permanent injunction requiring Kibler to attend
anger-management classes and barring him from bringing any firearm to the
hospital.
On December 13, 2002, Kibler filed this action against the hospital, and
against certain physicians and nurses, seeking damages under a variety of theories
including defamation, abuse of process, and interference with Kibler’s practice of
medicine.2 In less than a week, the hospital responded by moving under section
425.16 to strike Kibler’s complaint as a SLAPP suit, that is a lawsuit brought
solely to harass the defendants. The hospital argued, and the trial court agreed,

2
For simplicity’s sake, we refer to defendants collectively as “the hospital”
or “defendant hospital.”
2

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that Kibler’s lawsuit arose out of the hospital’s peer review proceeding against
Kibler and that hospital peer review was an “official proceeding” qualifying for
the anti-SLAPP statute’s motion to strike. Accordingly, the trial court struck
Kibler’s complaint and dismissed his lawsuit. The Court of Appeal affirmed. We
granted Kibler’s petition for review to decide whether a hospital peer review
proceeding is an “official proceeding authorized by law” within the meaning of
section 425.16 and thus subject to a special motion to strike as a SLAPP suit.
II
Enacted in 1992, section 425.16 sets out the procedure for filing a special
motion to strike certain lawsuits that are “brought primarily to chill the valid
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1992, ch. 726, § 2,
p. 3523.) Because section 425.16 allows for the early dismissal of SLAPP suits, it
is often called the “anti-SLAPP” statute. In enacting that statute, the Legislature
declared that “it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in
matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled
through abuse of the judicial process.” (Ibid.) To achieve that goal, the
Legislature stated, the anti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
Recently,
in
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180,
192, we discussed the anti-SLAPP statute’s effect on SLAPP suits: “Because
these meritless lawsuits seek to deplete ‘the defendant’s energy’ and drain ‘his or
her resources’ (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1074),
the Legislature sought ‘ “to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and without
3

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great cost to the SLAPP target” ’ (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 65).” Section 425.16 sets out a procedure for the trial court
to evaluate the merits of the lawsuit, “using a summary-judgment-like procedure at
an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th
at p. 192.) “In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending
against [a SLAPP suit]. (See Equilon Enterprises, at p. 65 [noting that the ‘short
time frame for anti-SLAPP filings and hearings’ and the ‘stay of discovery’
pending resolution of the motion evidences the Legislature’s intent to minimize
the litigation costs of SLAPP targets].)” (Ibid.)
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 defines
the phrase “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in
connection with a public issue’ ” to include: “(1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.” (Italics added.) A defendant who invokes either subparagraph (1)
4

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or subparagraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute,
need not “separately demonstrate that the statement concerned an issue of public
significance.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th
1106, 1123.)
At issue here is the meaning of the statutory phrase “any other official
proceeding authorized by law,” which appears in both subparagraphs (1) and
(2) of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. These two
subparagraphs (both defining acts in furtherance of the rights of petition and of
free speech) differ in that subparagraph (1) is limited to oral and written
statements and writings actually made in the course of certain specified
proceedings, while subparagraph (2) includes statements made “in connection
with” those proceedings. Here, the trial court found that Kibler’s lawsuit against
the hospital arose out of oral or written statements or writings made “in connection
with” (but not during the course of) the hospital’s peer review proceeding that
resulted in Kibler’s summary suspension. Therefore, we are concerned here solely
with subparagraph (2) of subdivision (e) of section 425.16, and not with
subparagraph (1) of subdivision (e). As we explain below, a hospital’s peer
review qualifies as “any other official proceeding authorized by law” under
subparagraph (2) of subdivision (e) and thus a lawsuit arising out of a peer review
proceeding is subject to a special motion under section 425.16 to strike the SLAPP
suit.
In construing the language of section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, we
apply well-established principles of statutory construction. Our goal is to
determine the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute “ ‘so that we may adopt
the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.’ ” (City of Burbank v.
State Water Resources Control Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 613, 625.) In doing so, we
look first to the statutory language, which generally is “ ‘the most reliable
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indicator of legislative intent.’ ” (Ibid.) Moreover, we give the words of the
statute “ ‘their ordinary and usual meaning,’ ” construing them in their statutory
context. (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 812, 818.)
The Legislature has decreed that courts “broadly” construe the anti-SLAPP
statute to further the legislative intent of encouraging “continued participation in
matters of public significance” by preventing the chilling of such participation
“through abuse of the judicial process.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) Here, the trial court
and the Court of Appeal concluded that a hospital’s peer review procedure
qualifies as an “official proceeding authorized by law” under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2) because that procedure is required under Business and
Professions Code section 805 et seq., governing hospital peer review proceedings.
We agree.
Peer review is the process by which a committee comprised of licensed
medical personnel at a hospital “evaluate[s] physicians applying for staff
privileges, establish[es] standards and procedures for patient care, assess[es] the
performance of physicians currently on staff,” and reviews other matters critical to
the hospital’s functioning. (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 10 (Arnett).)
As we recognized in Arnett, supra, 14 Cal.4th at page 12, peer review serves a
hospital’s self-interest: For example, a hospital may remove a physician from its
staff as a means to reduce its exposure to possible malpractice liability. But peer
review of physicians also serves an important public interest. Hospital peer
review, in the words of the Legislature, “is essential to preserving the highest
standards of medical practice” throughout California. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 809,
subd. (a)(3).)
To this end, the Business and Professions Code sets out a comprehensive
scheme that incorporates the peer review process into the overall process for the
licensure of California physicians. Under California Business and Professions
6

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Code section 809, subdivision (a)(8), acute-care facilities, such as the hospital
here, must include in their bylaws a provision for conducting peer review. And a
hospital must report to the Medical Board of California (Medical Board), which
licenses physicians, any hospital action that “restricts or revokes a physician’s
staff privileges as a result of a determination by a peer review body.” (Arnett,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 11, citing Bus. & Prof. Code, § 805, subd. (b) [requiring
notice to the Medical Board within 15 days of the action].)3 Similarly, a hospital
granting or renewing a physician’s staff privileges must request a report from the
Medical Board indicating whether the physician has at some other medical facility
“been denied staff privileges, been removed from a medical staff, or had his or her
staff privileges restricted.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 805.5, subd. (a).) The failure to
comply with this requirement is a misdemeanor. (Id., § 805.5, subd. (c).) And the
Medical Board itself must maintain a historical record for each of its licensees that
includes, among other things, the “[d]isciplinary information” reported to the
Medical Board resulting from actions by hospital peer review committees. (Id.,
§ 800, subd. (a)(4).)
As explained in Business and Professions Code section 809, subdivision
(a)(5), “[p]eer review, fairly conducted, will aid the appropriate state licensing
boards in their responsibility to regulate and discipline errant healing arts
practitioners.” Because a hospital’s disciplinary action may lead to restrictions on
the disciplined physician’s license to practice or to the loss of that license, its peer

3
Under Business and Professions Code section 805, subdivision (b), the
hospital here would have been required to report to the Medical Board its
December 20, 2001 summary suspension of Dr. Kibler’s staff privileges 15 days
thereafter, on January 4, 2002. But on January 3, 2002, one day before that
deadline, the hospital and Kibler entered into an agreement reinstating his staff
privileges. (See p. 2, ante.)
7

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review procedure plays a significant role in protecting the public against
incompetent, impaired, or negligent physicians. (See Arnett, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
pp. 7, 11.)
There is another attribute of hospital peer review that supports our
conclusion that peer review constitutes an “official proceeding” under the anti-
SLAPP law. A hospital’s decisions resulting from peer review proceedings are
subject to judicial review by administrative mandate. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 809.8.) Thus, the Legislature has accorded a hospital’s peer review decisions a
status comparable to that of quasi-judicial public agencies whose decisions
likewise are reviewable by administrative mandate. (See Western States
Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 566-567 [adjudicatory
decisions of the California Air Resources Board reviewable by administrative
mandamus]; McGill v. Regents of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th
1776, 1785 [Regents’ quasi-judicial decisions reviewable by administrative
mandate].) As such, hospital peer review proceedings constitute official
proceedings authorized by law within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(2).
As we mentioned earlier, the Legislature has granted to individual
hospitals, acting on the recommendations of their peer review committees, the
primary responsibility for monitoring the professional conduct of physicians
licensed in California. In that respect, these peer review committees oversee
“matters of public significance,” as described in the anti-SLAPP statute.
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).) As noted in the joint amicus curiae brief of Catholic
Healthcare West and The Regents of the University of California filed on behalf of
defendant hospital, membership on a hospital’s peer review committee is
voluntary and unpaid, and many physicians are reluctant to join peer review
committees so as to avoid sitting in judgment of their peers. To hold, as plaintiff
8

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Kibler would have us do, that hospital peer review proceedings are not “official
proceeding[s] authorized by law” within the meaning of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2), would further discourage participation in peer review by
allowing disciplined physicians to file harassing lawsuits against hospitals and
their peer review committee members rather than seeking judicial review of the
committee’s decision by the available means of a petition for administrative
mandate.
According to the California Medical Association (CMA), amicus curiae on
behalf of plaintiff Kibler, the phrase “any other official proceeding authorized by
law” in section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), pertains only to proceedings before
governmental entities and thus does not include a hospital’s peer review
proceedings. In support, the CMA cites Hackethal v. Weissbein (1979) 24 Cal.3d
55 (Hackethal), a four-to-three decision of this court (Newman, J., joined by Bird,
C. J., Mosk, J. and Manuel, J.; Tobriner, J. dissenting, joined by Clark, J. and
Richardson, J.). In Hackethal, the majority held that the phrase “any other official
proceeding authorized by law” appearing in subdivision (b)(3) of Civil Code
section 47 (the “official-proceedings” privilege), a statute different from the one
involved here, was limited to “government agencies.” (Hackethal, supra, at
p. 61.) The CMA asserts that the same construction governs here. We are not
persuaded.
The statutory construction rule the CMA invokes here, that identical
statutory language should be interpreted the same way, applies only when the
statutes in question cover the “the same or an analogous subject” matter. (Estate
of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 915-916; accord, Walker v. Superior Court
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 132.) That cannot be said of the official-proceedings
privilege (Civ. Code, § 47) involved in Hackethal, supra, 24 Cal.3d 55 and the
anti-SLAPP statute (§ 425.16), which is at issue here. The official-proceedings
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privilege is a substantive rule of law, whereas the anti-SLAPP statute is a
procedural device to screen out meritless claims. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 737.)
Moreover, Hackethal itself did not consider whether the official-
proceedings privilege was available at the hospital peer review proceedings
required under Business and Professions Code section 809, subdivision (a)(8).
Rather, the issue in that case was whether a private medical society hearing
qualified as an official proceeding authorized by law. (Hackethal, supra, 24
Cal.3d at p. 58.) Thus, contrary to amicus curiae CMA’s argument, Hackethal is
not authority for the proposition that hospital peer review is not an “official
proceeding” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).
Similarly unpersuasive is amicus curiae CMA’s further reliance on the
Legislature’s amendment of Civil Code section 47 to reject the holding of
Hackethal, supra, 24 Cal.3d 55. That amendment added subdivision (b)(4) to
Civil Code section 47, to clarify that Civil Code section 47’s official-proceedings
privilege applied to those proceedings authorized by law that are reviewable by
administrative mandate, such as hospital peer review.4 (See p. 8, ante.) Amicus
curiae CMA argues that, in omitting from subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP
statute (§ 425.16) the language (referring to judicial review by administrative
mandate) that was added as subdivision (b)(4) to the official-proceedings privilege
statute (Civ. Code, § 47), the Legislature indicated its intent that the anti-SLAPP

4
As relevant here, Civil Code section 47 now states: “A privileged
publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . . [¶] (b) In any (1) legislative
proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized
by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law
and reviewable pursuant to [administrative mandate].”
10

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provisions not apply unless the proceeding is before a government entity. We
disagree.
The legislative history pertaining to the addition of subdivision (b)(4) to
Civil Code section 47 (the official-proceedings privilege) reflects the Legislature’s
agreement with the dissenting justices in Hackethal that the Civil Code 47
privilege applied to “quasi-judicial proceedings conducted by a medical ‘peer
review’ authority.” (Hackethal, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 62 (dis. opn. of Tobriner,
J.); see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background Information on Assem. Bill No. 478
(1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) May 14, 1979, p. 2 [“In the recent case of Hackethal v.
Weissbein, the Supreme Court decided that . . . the absolute privilege of Section
47 [was] unavailable in the context of private, quasi-judicial hearings. [¶] This
proposed amendment to Section 47 would clarify that the legislature had no such
intent.”]; Governor’s Off., Enrolled Bill Report on Assem. Bill No. 478 (1978-
1979 Reg. Sess.) June 25, 1979, p. 1 [This bill “codifies Justice Tobriner’s strong
dissent in Hackethal.”].) Thus, in the Legislature’s view, Civil Code section 47 as
originally worded (without the addition of the reference to administrative
mandate) included within that statute’s official-proceedings privilege the
proceedings of a medical peer review committee. To clarify that point, the
Legislature amended Civil Code section 47 to add subdivision (b)(4), which refers
to administrative mandate. But the history of that amendment reveals that in the
Legislature’s view, no specific language mentioning administrative mandate was
necessary to bring medical peer review within the official-proceedings privilege.
“The Legislature is a pragmatic political body; its primary concern is not to study
and refine the language used in judicial decisions, but to accomplish practical
results. As such, it is unlikely to analyze and rewrite broad judicial language as an
abstract exercise; it is far more likely to revise the ‘bottom line.’ ” (Harris v.
Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1157.)
11

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In short, nothing in the legislative history of the Legislature’s 1979
amendment of the official-proceedings privilege in Civil Code section 47 supports
amicus curiae CMA’s contention here that the Legislature’s 1992 enactment of the
anti-SLAPP statute intended the phrase “other official proceeding authorized by
law” in subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 to be limited to proceedings before
governmental entities.5
Because we conclude that defendant hospital was entitled under section
425.16, subdivision (e)(2), to file its special motion to strike plaintiff Kibler’s
complaint as a SLAPP suit, we need not decide whether that remedy would
likewise have been available under subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 on the
theory that hospital peer review proceedings qualify as “conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

5
Recently, the Court of Appeal in Fontani v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 719 (Fontani) addressed the anti-SLAPP statute in a
lawsuit arising in connection with proceedings of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), which “is the primary regulatory body for the
[securities] broker-dealer industry” (Sparta Surgical v. Nat. Ass’n of Sec. Dealers
(9th Cir. 1998) 159 F.3d 1209, 1210) and “a regulatory surrogate” for the federal
Securities and Exchange Commission (Fontani, supra, at p. 729). Fontani simply
assumed, refraining from deciding, that to qualify as an “official” body under the
anti-SLAPP statute, (§ 415, subd. (e)(1)), the entity must be one that exercises
governmental power. (Fontani, supra, at p. 729.) In addition, Fontani
distinguished the NASD in several respects from a hospital peer review committee
in concluding that “the NASD is the type of regulatory body before which
communication is routinely protected by the anti-SLAPP law.” (Fontani, supra,
p. 730.) We express no view on the court’s assessment of the NASD, but we
disapprove Fontani v. Wells Fargo Investments, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th 719, to
the extent it conflicts with our conclusion here.
12

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

13

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 126 Cal.App.4th 713
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S131641
Date Filed: July 20, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Inyo
Judge: Edward Forstenzer*

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Donald W. Odell for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Catherine I. Hanson, Gregory M. Abrams and John D. Harwell for California Medical Association as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Jon B. Eisenberg, Jeremy D. Rosen; DiCaro, Coppo & Popcke, Carlo
Coppo, Srinivas Hanumadass; and Douglas Buchanan for Defendants and Respondents.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Barry S. Landsberg, Terri D. Keville and Doreen Wener Shenfeld for Catholic
Healthcare West and the Regents of the University of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and Respondents.

Stephan, Oringher, Richman & Theodora, Harry W. R. Chamberlain II, Robert M. Dato and Brian P.
Barrow for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and Respondents.

Lois Richardson; Foley & Lardner, Lowell C. Brown, Sarah G. Benator and Patricia M. Kosich for
California Hospital Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

*Judge of the Mono Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Donald W. Odell
3420 South State Highway 395
Post Office Box 128
Lone Pine, CA 93545
(760) 876-5829

John D. Harwell
225 27th Street
Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
(310) 546-7078

Jon B. Eisenberg
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA 91436-3000
(818) 995-0800

Barry S. Landsberg
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips
11355 W. Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064
(310) 312-4259

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/20/2006	S131641A

Disposition
Jul 20 2006	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Feb 22 2005	Petition for review filed   counsel for appellant George Kibler
Feb 23 2005	Record requested
Mar 10 2005	Answer to petition for review filed   by counsel for resp. (Nothern Inyo Co. Local Hosp. Dist.)
Mar 11 2005	2nd record request   via email
Mar 15 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Mar 18 2005	Reply to answer to petition filed   appellant George Kibler, M.D.
Apr 14 2005	Time extended to grant or deny review   to May 23, 2005.
Apr 27 2005	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Apr 27 2005	Note:   records sent to Cal-Coord. Office: RT=1, CT=3, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, manila folder (containing misc. docs.)
May 10 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for (Northern Inyo Co. Local Hosp.)
May 13 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   appellant George Kibler
May 18 2005	Issues ordered limited   Review was granted in this matter on April 27, 2005. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Is an action arising out of the hospital peer review mandated by Business and Professions Code section 809, subdivision (a)(8) subject to a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. ? 425.16, subd. (e))?
May 20 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   appellant George Kibler, M.D.
Jun 1 2005	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. requests extension of time to July 19, 2005, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jun 7 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including July 19, 2005.
Jul 19 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for (No. Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., et al.,)
Aug 3 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   appellant George Kibler, M.D.
Aug 31 2005	Request for extension of time filed   Calif. Medical Assoc. requests extension of time to September 12, 2005, to file application for permission to file amicus curiae brief.
Sep 2 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California Hospital Association [in support of respondents]
Sep 6 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Association of Southern California Defense Councel & request for judicial notice [rule 40.1]
Sep 6 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Catholic Healthcare West and Regents of University of California [in support of respondents] [rule 40.1]
Sep 9 2005	Extension of time granted   California Medical Association's time to serve and file the application for permission to file an amicus curiae brief is extended to and including September 12, 2005.
Sep 12 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California Medical Assoc. in support of aplt.
Sep 13 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Catholic Healthcare West and the Regents of the University of California
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Catholic Healthcare West and the The Regents of the Univ. of Calif. in support of respondents. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 13 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Calif. Hosp. Association in support of respondents.
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Calif. Hosp. Association in support of respondents. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 13 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Cali. Medical Assoc. in support of appellant.
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Calif. Medical Association in support of appellant. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 13 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Association of Southern California Defense Counsel in support of respondents.
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Association of Southern Calif. Defense Counsel in support of respondents. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 23 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for resp. (Northern Inyo Co.Hosp. Dist., et al.,) 7- day extension of time to October 10, 2005, to file the answer to amicus curiae brief of Calif. Med. Assoc.
Sep 26 2005	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the response to amicus curiae brief of California Medical Association is extended to and including October 10, 2005.
Oct 11 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by counsel for Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. District, et al., to amicus curiae brief of Calif. Medical Association.
Oct 11 2005	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by counsel for Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., et al.,
Feb 9 2006	Received:   from counsel for (Northern Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., et al.,)) Unavailability for oral argument on March 6-10 and co-counsels unavailability Feb. 27 thru March 8, 2006.
May 2 2006	Case ordered on calendar   June 1, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
May 8 2006	Association of attorneys filed for:   John D. Harwell as co-counsel for AC California Medical Association.
May 11 2006	Application filed to:   divide oral argument time. Donald Odell, counsel for appellant Kibler, asking to share 20 minutes of time with counsel for amicus curiae California Medical Association.
May 11 2006	Application filed to:   divide oral argument time. counsel for respondents Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District et al., asking to share 10 minutes of time with counsel for amici curiae Catholic Healthcare West & U.C. Regents
May 17 2006	Order filed   The request of counsel for respondents in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of respondents to allocate to amici curiae Catholic Healthcare West et al. 10 minutes of respondents' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 17 2006	Order filed   The request of counsel for appellant in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellant at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae California Medical Association 20 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 19 2006	Request for judicial notice granted   Respondent's request for judicial notice is granted as to documents relating to the legislative history of Civil Code section 47, and of Business and Professional Code sections 805 and 809 et seq., but is otherwise denied. Association of Southern California Defense Counsel's request for judicial notice of legislative history of Civil Code section 47 is granted.
May 19 2006	Supplemental brief filed   counsel for respondent.
May 19 2006	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   counsel for respondent (2nd motion)
May 22 2006	Letter brief filed   counsel for aplt. George Kibler, M.D. ***supplemental letter brief.l***
May 22 2006	Received:   from (amicus curiae) Calif. Medical Assoc. Notice of Intention to Cite Additional Authorities at Oral Argument
May 31 2006	Filed:   letter from counsel for resps. re: anticipation of parties finalizing a settlement agreement which calls for plaintiff to dismiss this action.
Jun 1 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 9 2006	Filed:   Letter re Settlement Negotiations No. Inyo County Local Hosp. Dist., et al., respondents Jon Eisenberg, counsel
Jun 29 2006	Filed:   counsel for Norther Inyo Co. Local Hosp Dist. Letter re: Full and Final settlement conclusion.
Jul 20 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Majority opinion by Kennard, J. -------------------joined by: George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ.
Aug 22 2006	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Sep 5 2006	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA 4/2

Briefs
May 20 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 19 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 3 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 13 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 11 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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