Filed 12/2/04 (this opn. should precede companion case filed same date, S112943)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT GRAHAM et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Respondents,
S112862
v.
Ct.App. 2/1 B152928
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, )
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. BC 21564
In this case defendant offered to repurchase a truck that had been marketed
with false statements about its towing capacity. This offer came after a lawsuit
plaintiffs filed against defendant seeking this repurchase remedy, but before any
kind of court judgment was rendered. Plaintiffs were awarded substantial attorney
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.1 Defendant raises several
issues regarding those fees. The first is whether we should reconsider the catalyst
theory, recognized by this court in Westside Community for Independent Living,
Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348 (Westside Community). Under the catalyst
theory, attorney fees may be awarded even when litigation does not result in a
judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of,
and in the manner sought by, the litigation. We conclude the catalyst theory
1
All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.
1
should not be abolished but clarified. In order to be eligible for attorney fees
under section 1021.5, a plaintiff must not only be a catalyst to defendant’s
changed behavior, but the lawsuit must have some merit, as discussed below, and
the plaintiff must have engaged in a reasonable attempt to settle its dispute with
the defendant prior to litigation. Because these limitations on the catalyst theory
are to some degree new and were not addressed by the parties or the trial court, we
remand for reconsideration of the trial court’s award of attorney fees in this case.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in concluding that the present
lawsuit substantially benefited a large group of people or the general public, as
required by section 1021.5. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in making that conclusion. Finally, defendant, while conceding that a
plaintiff could be awarded attorney fees for attorney fee litigation, contends that
these fees should not be enhanced beyond the “lodestar” amount. We do not
endorse such a categorical rule, but we explain below that fees for fee litigation
usually should be enhanced at a significantly lower rate than fees for the
underlying litigation, if they are enhanced at all. We therefore will remand the
cause to the trial court to recalculate the amount of the fee in light of the principles
discussed below, assuming it finds on remand that plaintiffs are eligible for some
attorney fees.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts, taken largely from the Court of Appeal’s opinion, are as follows:
DaimlerChrysler incorrectly marketed its 1998 and 1999 Dakota R/T trucks
as having a 6,400-pound towing capacity when they could actually tow only 2,000
pounds. The error occurred because the Dakota R/T was a sporty version of an
existing truck model, which could tow 6,400 pounds. However, to obtain a sporty
2
design, DaimlerChrysler lowered the suspension on the Dakota R/T, thus reducing
its towing capacity.
The reduced towing capacity was a potential risk factor. The lowered
suspension meant that towing more than 2,000 pounds would cause the suspension
to bottom out, stressing the frame and increasing fatigue and wear. The
DaimlerChrysler response team considered this a potential safety issue.
Buyers who wanted to tow more than 2,000 pounds were told they could do
so only if their Dakota R/T was modified with a trailer hitch costing $300. The
factory installed some of these hitches, while other buyers who wanted to tow had
dealer-installed or after-market hitches attached.
Nationwide, DaimlerChrysler sold or leased fewer than 7,000 of the Dakota
R/T’s in the two relevant years. Fewer than 1,000 affected R/T’s were sold in
California during the two years.
By February 1999, DaimlerChrysler set up a response team to address the
problem. By June 1999, DaimlerChrysler had taken steps to replace the incorrect
marketing materials, owners manuals, and engine and door labels for not-yet-sold
Dakota R/T’s, although public agency investigation revealed that brochures
misrepresenting the trucks’ towing capacity were still being distributed as of
August 1999. DaimlerChrysler also had notified existing buyers of the error, told
them not to attempt to tow more than 2,000 pounds, and provided them with the
same modified materials. Simultaneously, DaimlerChrysler began to address
remedial measures for customers who had bought or leased their Dakota R/T’s
under the incorrect marketing program.
Many Dakota R/T buyers never intended to tow more than 2,000 pounds.
When informed by DaimlerChrysler of the error, most of those customers were
satisfied with DaimlerChrysler’s offers of cash and merchandise.
3
Initially, DaimlerChrysler offered $300 refunds to buyers who had
purchased hitches of that amount. By the summer, DaimlerChrysler authorized
dealers to repurchase or replace Dakota R/Ts on a case-by-case basis, but only for
customers who demanded such a remedy.
On July 29, 1999, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney contacted
DaimlerChrysler about the problem, threatened legal action, and requested
DaimlerChrysler’s input before acting. On August 10, 1999, the California
Attorney General notified DaimlerChrysler it had joined the Santa Cruz County
District Attorney. The public agencies requested a response by the end of August
1999.
Plaintiffs filed their case on August 23, 1999, in Los Angeles County
Superior Court. Plaintiffs alleged they all bought 1999 Dakota R/T’s from various
DaimlerChrysler dealers. Only Graham lived and bought his truck in California.
Plaintiffs alleged DaimlerChrysler marketed, sold, and warranted their 1998 and
1999 Dakota R/T’s as capable of towing 6,400 pounds when the trucks actually
could tow only 2,000 pounds. Plaintiffs alleged DaimlerChrysler acknowledged
the error by letter to all purchasers dated June 16, 1999. Plaintiffs alleged they
notified DaimlerChrysler of their 1) trucks’ failure to comply with the warranted
towing capacity, and 2) revocation of their acceptance of their trucks on July 19,
1999. Plaintiffs sought (but never obtained) class certification for all those who
bought Dakota R/T’s nationwide. Plaintiffs alleged a single breach of express
warranty cause of action. Plaintiffs sought return of their purchase or lease
payments, compensatory damages, and attorney fees. Also on August 23, 1999,
the Detroit News contacted DaimlerChrysler’s legal counsel about plaintiffs’ case.
DaimlerChrysler’s counsel claimed DaimlerChrysler had responded appropriately
to the marketing error, including offering buybacks to customers who requested it.
4
Plaintiffs faxed their complaint to DaimlerChrysler the same day. The next day,
August 24, 1999, DaimlerChrysler’s employee newsletter ran an article on
plaintiffs’ case.
DaimlerChrysler’s response team met throughout August 1999. The team
knew about both public agency inquiries and the response deadline. Indeed,
DaimlerChrysler wrote the public agencies that its internal approval process
prohibited a response by August 31, but promised a response by September 8,
1999. On September 10, 1999, DaimlerChrysler issued its offer to all previous
Dakota R/T buyers of repurchase or replacement. In response to later inquiries,
response team members conceded they were aware of the class action lawsuit filed
in California before DaimlerChrysler’s September 10, 1999, letter offering
repurchase or replacement to all Dakota R/T buyers.
DaimlerChrysler demurred to the complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, acknowledging DaimlerChrysler’s offer of, among other remedies,
repurchase or replacement of the trucks for all previous buyers. The trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case, finding it
was moot because DaimlerChrysler already had offered all purchasers the relief
plaintiffs sought. Meanwhile, the public agencies continued to pursue legal action
against DaimlerChrysler, pointing to the fact that the erroneous marketing of the
Dakota R/T continued as late as September 1999. In late 2000, DaimlerChrysler
settled the public agency investigations by paying a $75,000 fine and agreeing to
ensure that the marketing error did not reoccur. Nationwide, 2,549 Dakota R/T
buyers opted for repurchase or replacement. Another 3,101 buyers opted for
service contracts and parts coupons. The total value of these offers exceeded $15
million. Fewer than 1,000 of the R/T buyers were Californians.
5
Although plaintiffs’ case was dismissed, the parties continued to litigate
plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney fees. DaimlerChrysler insisted throughout that
plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney fees, contending plaintiffs had no effect on
DaimlerChrysler’s recognition of the problem and decision to offer all buyers
repurchase or replacement. For over a year, there were hotly contested discovery
and other motions to clarify the facts described above. The court held a lengthy
evidentiary hearing on October 18, 2000. DaimlerChrysler contended that the
Dakota R/T response team was not even aware of the litigation until after
September 10, 1999, when its repurchase offer was made, a position that the trial
court found to lack credibility.
The trial court filed its final order awarding attorney fees on July 6, 2001.
The court concluded after its review of the declarations and documentary evidence
presented that DaimlerChrysler’s “position that the lawsuit was not a catalyst was
largely a transparent fabrication . . . .” It rejected DaimlerChrysler’s argument that
plaintiffs’ action was unnecessary because of the enforcement action of the Santa
Cruz County District Attorney and the California Attorney General. The trial
court found that these agencies “had only made an inquiry and had not
commenced any proceeding when plaintiffs filed this action. Further [those
agencies] were only concerned with DaimlerChrysler’s false advertising materials
and never sought any remedies on behalf of the consumers who acquired these
vehicles while they were being misrepresented.”
In addition to finding that plaintiffs were the successful party, the trial court
found the other requirements of section 1021.5 had been met. It found that the
lawsuit “resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest, . . . the protection and enforcement of consumer rights, including
highway safety,” and that “as a result of the lawsuit, thousands of consumers
6
received pecuniary benefits and enhanced safety. Thousands more are likely to
benefit from it if DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are deterred from
similar conduct in the future.”
The court also concluded that “DaimlerChrysler should pay plaintiffs
attorneys fees in the interest of justice. Plaintiffs’ attorney fees will otherwise go
unpaid. Fees cannot be paid out of the benefits conferred upon the consumers
because DaimlerChrysler . . . distributed the benefits of [its] offer to the consumers
without any discussion with plaintiffs or their attorneys. Justice is served by
encouraging lawyers to bring meritorious consumer cases, of which this action is
an example.”
The trial court found the lodestar fee amount was $329,620 through the
October 18, 2000, hearing, with a multiplier of 2.25 for the fees incurred until the
October 18, 2000, hearing, including fees for litigating attorney fees, and applied
no multiplier for time thereafter. The court awarded no fees for work after April
23, 2001. The total award was $762,830.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It observed that the United States Supreme
Court had recently rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for attorney fee awards
under various federal statutes in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598
(Buckhannon). But the court declined to follow the United States Supreme
Court’s lead, noting that the catalyst theory has been long recognized in
California. The court also rejected arguments that the litigation was not in the
public interest and that it did not benefit a substantial number of people. Further,
the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees
for seeking fees, and in permitting those fees to be enhanced over the basic
lodestar amount. We granted review.
7
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Catalyst Theory Should Be Abolished
An important exception to the American rule that litigants are to bear their
own attorney fees is found in section 1021.5.2 As we have stated: “The
Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the private attorney general
doctrine of attorney fees developed in prior judicial decisions. [Citation.] Under
this section, the court may award attorney fees to a ‘successful party’ in any action
that ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate,
and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if
any.’ . . . [T]he private attorney general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that
2
In its entirety, section 1021.5 provides: “Upon motion, a court may award
attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public
entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and
(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
With respect to actions involving public entities, this section applies to allowances
against, but not in favor of, public entities, and no claim shall be filed therefor,
unless one or more successful parties and one or more opposing parties are public
entities, in which case no claim shall be required to be filed therefor under Part 3
(commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government
Code.
“Attorneys’ fees awarded to a public entity pursuant to this section shall not
be increased or decreased by a multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as
discussed in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.”
8
privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the
fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and
that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private
actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter
frequently be infeasible.’ Thus, the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to
encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial
attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1281, 1288-1289 (Maria P.).)
In order to effectuate that policy, we have taken a broad, pragmatic view of
what constitutes a “successful party.” “Our prior cases uniformly explain that an
attorney fee award may be justified even when plaintiff’s legal action does not
result in a favorable final judgment. (Westside Community for Independent
Living, Inc. v. Obledo, [supra,] 33 Cal.3d 348, 352; see also Press v. Lucky Stores,
Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 [although their action had become moot, plaintiffs were
awarded fees under § 1021.5 because they had achieved the relief they sought
through preliminary injunction].) It is also clear that the procedural device by
which a plaintiff seeks to enforce an important right is not determinative of his or
her entitlement to attorney fees under section 1021.5. (In re Head (1986) 42
Cal.3d 223, 228-229.) Similarly, a section 1021.5 award is not necessarily barred
merely because the plaintiff won the case on a preliminary issue. (Woodland Hills
Resident Assn., Inc. [v. City Council (1979)] 23 Cal.3d [917,] 938.) In
determining whether a plaintiff is a successful party for purposes of section
1021.5, ‘[t]he critical fact is the impact of the action, not the manner of its
resolution.’ (Folsom [v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982)] 32 Cal.3d at
[668], 685 (Folsom).) [¶] The trial court in its discretion ‘must realistically assess
the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action
9
served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award’ under
section 1021.5. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 938.)”
(Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1290-1291.)
The catalyst theory is an application of the above stated principle that
courts look to the practical impact of the public interest litigation in order to
determine whether the party was successful, and therefore potentially eligible for
attorney fees. We specifically endorsed that theory in Westside Community,
supra, 33 Cal.3d 348. The plaintiffs in that case sued to compel the Secretary of
the Health and Welfare Agency to issue regulations implementing Government
Code section 11135, which bars state funded programs from engaging in various
forms of discrimination. Shortly thereafter, the defendant issued proposed
regulations, thereby mooting the case. Plaintiffs filed for private attorney general
fees pursuant to section 1021.5. (Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp.
351-352.) The defendants argued that there was no evidence the plaintiffs were
successful parties because the litigation had not reached a “final judgment.” (Id. at
p. 352.) We rejected that argument and cited with approval Fletcher v. A.J.
Industries, Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 313, 325 (Fletcher), in which the Court of
Appeal upheld an attorney fee award in a shareholder derivative action under the
theory that the plaintiffs were successful in conferring a substantial benefit to the
corporation, even though the litigation “was resolved through a settlement. That
court held that ‘[i]t was not significant that the “benefits” found were achieved by
settlement of plaintiffs’ action rather than by final judgment.’ ” (Westside
Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 352, quoting Fletcher, supra, 266 Cal.3d at
p. 325.)
We further observed that “[n]umerous federal decisions have reached the
same conclusion, holding that attorney fees may be proper whenever an action
10
results in relief for the plaintiff, whether the relief is obtained through a
‘voluntary’ change in the defendant’s conduct, through a settlement, or otherwise.
(See, e.g., Sullivan v. Com. of Pa. Dept. of Labor, etc. (3d Cir. 1981) 663 F.2d
443, 447-450; Robinson v. Kimbrough (5th Cir. 1981) 652 F.2d 458, 465- 466;
American Constitutional Party v. Munro (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 184, 187-188.)
[¶] Thus, an award of attorney fees may be appropriate where ‘plaintiffs’ lawsuit
was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought . . . .’
(Robinson, supra, 652 F.2d at p. 465, italics added.) A plaintiff will be considered
a ‘successful party’ where an important right is vindicated ‘by activating
defendants to modify their behavior.’ ” (Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at
pp. 352-353.)
Robinson v. Kimbrough, supra, 652 F.2d 458 (Robinson), cited with
approval in Westside Community, provides a useful example of the catalyst
theory’s application. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging that
Harris County, Georgia jury commissioners had compiled jury lists, from which
grand and petit juries were summoned, with disproportionately low percentages of
Blacks and women, resulting in their underrepresentation on the county’s juries.
One month after the complaint was filed, the jury commissioners, in a
nonadversarial proceeding that did not involve the plaintiffs, requested a county
judge to order them to recompile jury lists to obtain a more representative cross-
section. The court order was required because the jury commissioners were not
authorized to revise jury lists other than biennially, and the regular revision had
been recently completed. The court granted the order and the jury lists were
revised. The district court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit as failing to raise a
substantial constitutional question. The plaintiffs appealed and the court of
appeals held that, in light of the revised jury lists and certain statutory changes
11
during the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiffs’ challenge was moot. The
plaintiffs therefore never received judicial relief. (652 F.2d at pp. 460-462.)
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in subsequent proceedings affirmed that
plaintiffs may be entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988). Rejecting the argument
that the plaintiffs were not a “prevailing party,” the court agreed with other federal
appellate courts that recovery of attorney fees under the Act “is not dependent
upon plaintiffs’ ability to secure formal judicial relief by way of injunction or
otherwise. Rather, these opinions have focused upon the type of relief obtained
from the defendants as a result of the lawsuit. [Citations.] Common to these
decisions is the recognition that plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees if their
lawsuit is a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in motivating the defendants
to end their unconstitutional behavior.” (Robinson, supra, 652 F.2d at pp. 465-
466.) The court therefore remanded the case for “the purpose of determining
whether plaintiffs’ lawsuit was a substantial factor or significant catalyst in
bringing about an end to the unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks and
women in the Harris County jury lists.” (Id. at p. 467.)3
3
There have been a number of other federal cases in which attorney fees
were granted or found potentially available, despite the absence of a judicial
decree altering the legal relationship between the parties. (See, e.g., Baumgartner
v. Harrisburg Housing Authority (3d Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 541 [lawsuit causes
housing authority to consult with plaintiffs-tenants regarding newly restrictive
residence rules]; DeMier v. Gondles (4th Cir. 1982) 676 F.2d 92 [lawsuit was
significant factor behind sheriff’s cessation of blanket strip search policy];
Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas (5th Cir. 1993) 981 F.2d 225 [fees warranted
where lawsuit triggered immediate and extensive improvements to substandard jail
conditions]; Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City School District Board
of Education (6th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 255 [lawsuit spurred revision of policy
regulating speakers at school board meetings]; Zinn v. Shalala (7th Cir. 1994) 35
(footnote continued on next page)
12
The
Westside Community court, although endorsing the catalyst theory
found in Robinson and other federal cases, nonetheless went on to conclude that
no attorney fees were owed in that case because there was no demonstrable causal
connection between the lawsuit and the government’s action. (Westside
Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 353-354.)
We continue to conclude that the catalyst theory, in concept, is sound. The
principle upon which the theory is based that we look to the “impact of the
action, not its manner of resolution” (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 685) is
fully consistent with the purpose of section 1021.5: to financially reward attorneys
who successfully prosecute cases in the public interest, and thereby “ ‘prevent
worthy claimants from being silenced or stifled because of a lack of legal
resources.’ ” (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 683.) We therefore reaffirm our
endorsement of the catalyst theory.
DaimlerChrysler argues that we should reevaluate that endorsement in light
of the rejection of the catalyst theory by the United States Supreme Court in
(footnote continued from previous page)
F.3d 273 [lawsuit spurs defendants to repeal contested Medicaid eligibility rules];
DeGidio v. Pung (8th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 525 [lawsuit prompted officials to take
corrective action regarding prison tuberculosis epidemic]; Foremaster v. City of St.
George (10th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2d 1485 [plaintiff’s suit contributed to City’s
decision to discontinue 44-year-old practice of subsidizing Mormon Temple’s
electrical bills]; Luethje v. Peavine School District of Adair County (10th Cir.
1989) 872 F.2d 352 [lawsuit prompted school board to amend rule impermissibly
curtailing employees’ free speech rights]; Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity, et al. v. Carroll (C.D.Cal. 2001) 182 F.Supp.2d 944, [plaintiff
environmental groups caused Army Corps of Engineers to conduct biological
assessment of dam project pursuant to the Endangered Species Act]; S.D. v.
Faulkner (S.D.Ind. 1989) 705 F.Supp 1361 [lawsuit prompted correctional school
officials to remedy allegedly abusive treatment programs].)
13
Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. 598. At the outset we state what hardly needs
stating: that United States Supreme Court interpretation of federal statutes does
not bind us to similarly interpret similar state statutes. Indeed, in the realm of
attorney fees for private attorneys general, this court has markedly diverged from
United States Supreme Court precedent. In Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25
(Serrano III), an opinion that predated the effective date of section 1021.5 (see
Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 624, fn. 1 (Serrano IV)), this court
rejected the holding of Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S.
240 that attorney fees cannot be awarded on a private attorney general theory
absent express statutory authorization. (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 46-
47.) More recently, we unanimously declined to follow the United States Supreme
Court’s rejection of the use of a contingency fee multiplier in calculating private
attorney general fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1137-1139
(Ketchum).) We reaffirmed that the “ ‘fashioning of equitable exceptions’ to the
California rule that parties must bear their own costs ‘is a matter within the sole
competence of this court.’ ” (Id. at p. 1137.) As explained below, we do not find
the reasoning of the five-to-four majority in Buckhannon persuasive, and decline
to apply its holding to section 1021.5.
In
Buckhannon, the plaintiffs sued alleging that certain state law
requirements imposed on its assisted living facility violated the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). After the state legislature
changed the requirements in a way that vindicated the plaintiffs position, the
plaintiffs sought attorney fees under the relevant statutes, both of which permit
attorney fees for the “prevailing party.” (See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) [“[T]he
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s
14
fee and costs”] and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 [“[T]he court . . . , in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation
expenses, and costs”].)
A good deal of the Buckhannon court’s reason for rejecting the catalyst
theory turns on the definition of “prevailing party.” The Buckhannon majority
found the term “ ‘prevailing party’ ” to be “a legal term of art,” defined according
to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) at page 1145 as “ ‘[a] party in whose
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded <in
certain cases, the court will award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party>.--Also
termed successful party.” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 603.) This
definition, together with prior court decisions, led the Buckhannon majority to
conclude that a “prevailing party” must be a party that has brought about a
“ ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,’ ” (id. at p. 604) which
could include both a “judgment[ ] on the merits,” and a settlement agreement
“enforced through a consent decree.” (Ibid.)
The
Buckhannon majority concluded that “the ‘catalyst theory’ falls on the
other side of the line from these examples. It allows an award where there is no
judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. Even under a
limited form of the ‘catalyst theory,’ a plaintiff could recover attorney’s fees if it
established that the “complaint had sufficient merit to withstand a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” [Citation.] This is not the type of legal merit that our prior decisions,
based upon plain language and congressional intent, have found necessary. . . . A
defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what
the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial
imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the
15
term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a
corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” (Buckhannon,
supra, 532 U.S. at p. 605.)
We agree with DaimlerChrysler that the terms “prevailing party” and
“successful party,” as used in section 1021.5, are synonymous. (Schmier v.
Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 873, 877; Urbaniak v. Newton (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 1837, 1843, fn. 4; see also Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1291-
1292 [using the two words interchangeably].) We also agree that in the context of
section 1021.5, the term “party” refers to a party to litigation, and therefore
precludes an award of attorney fees when no lawsuit has been filed. (See Black’s
Law Dict. (4th rev. ed. 1968) at p. 1278 [“ ‘Party’ ” is a technical term having a
precise meaning in legal parlance; it refers to those by or against whom and
lawsuit is brought . . . , the party plaintiff or defendant . . . .”]; see also Flannery v.
Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578 [the word “party” as part of a prevailing party
fee statute refers to litigant or litigant’s attorney].) But we are aware of no judicial
construction or legislative usage in California that limits the terms “prevailing
party” or “successful party” to the meaning found in the most recent edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary to the exclusion of other meanings, as DaimlerChrysler,
following the Buckhannon majority, argues. (Cf. Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 302 [the Legislature uses the phrase “ ‘action or
proceeding’ . . . virtually as a term of art” “whenever it wishes to refer
comprehensively to all the judicial remedies available under our law”].)4
4
Moreover, if DaimlerChrysler is arguing that Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “successful party” as a term of art, identical to “prevailing party,” and that
the Legislature was aware of the definition, then the definition that should be
consulted is not from the most recent edition of the dictionary, but the one current
(footnote continued on next page)
16
We therefore turn to the “usual and ordinary meaning” of the statutory
language in order to discern legislative intent. (Lenanne v. Franchise Tax Bd.
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268.) The term “successful party,” as ordinarily understood,
means the party to litigation that achieves its objectives. We agree with the
dissenting opinion in Buckhannon: “In everyday use, ‘prevail’ means ‘gain
victory by virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph.’ Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 1797 (1976). There are undoubtedly
situations in which an individual’s goal is to obtain approval of a judge, and in
those situations, one cannot ‘prevail’ short of a judge’s formal declaration. In a
piano competition or a figure skating contest, for example, the person who prevails
is the person declared winner by the judges. However, where the ultimate goal is
(footnote continued from previous page)
when the Legislature adopted section 1021.5 in 1977. (Stats. 1977, ch. 1197, § 1,
p. 3979.) Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed., supra, at page 1352, employs a number
of alternative definitions of “prevailing party.” “That one of the parties to a suit
who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it,
prevailing on the main issue, even though not to the extent of his original
contention. [Citation.] [¶] The one in whose favor the decision or verdict is
rendered and judgment entered. [Citations.] The party ultimately prevailing when
the matter is finally set at rest. [Citation.] The party prevailing in interest, and not
necessarily the prevailing person. [Citation.] To be such does not depend upon
the degree of success at different stages of the suit, but whether, at the end of the
suit, or other proceeding, the party who has made a claim against the other, has
successfully maintained it. [Citation.] Thus, where the court grants defendant a
new trial after verdict for plaintiff, defendant is the ‘prevailing party’ on that trial,
and entitled to costs, although the plaintiff again gets verdict on retrial.
[Citation.]” Only one of the alternate definitions set forth above specifies that a
“prevailing party” is the one for whom the verdict or judgment is rendered. The
above definitions do not exclude the possibility that a party may be considered to
be prevailing “when the matter is finally set at rest” by means other than a
judgment or verdict. (Ibid.)
17
not an arbiter’s approval, but a favorable alteration of actual circumstances, a
formal declaration is not essential. . . . [¶] A lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to
achieve actual relief from an opponent. Favorable judgment may be instrumental
in gaining that relief. Generally, however, ‘the judicial decree is not the end but
the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or
cessation of action) by the defendant . . . .’ [Citation.] On this common
understanding, if a party reaches the ‘sought-after destination,’ then the party
‘prevails’ regardless of the ‘route taken.’ [Citation.] (Buckhannon, supra, 532
U.S. at pp. 633-634 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).)
This practical definition of prevailing or successful party is consistent with
our construction of the meaning of “prevailing party” within the context of Civil
Code section 1717, which provides that when a contract specifically provides for
attorney fees for one party, fees are to go to the prevailing party “whether he or
she is the party specified in the contract or not.” In Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17
Cal.4th 599, we held that although a defendant who has received the benefit of a
voluntary dismissal of an action against it is not necessarily a prevailing party, it
may be under some circumstances. In discussing the meaning of the term
“prevailing party” when it is undefined by contract, we stated that “a court may
base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which
each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, settlement,
or otherwise.” (Id. at p. 622, italics added.) If, as is clearly the case, a defendant
can be a prevailing or successful party after a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed
the case against it, it is difficult to fathom why a plaintiff cannot be considered a
prevailing or successful party when it achieves its litigation objectives by means of
defendant’s “voluntary” change in conduct in response to the litigation. When a
creditor sues a debtor to collect a debt, and the debtor pays the debt before a
18
judgment is entered against it, the creditor has been a “successful party” by any
conventional understanding of that term.
DaimlerChrysler also contends that the catalyst theory must be rejected
because section 1021.5 requires that the party achieve success in an “action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right.” It points to Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “enforcement” as “[t]he act or process of compelling
compliance with a law, mandate, or command” (Black’s Law Dict., 7th ed., supra,
p. 549), and also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1998) at page 383,
which defines “enforce” as to “constrain, compel,” or “to carry out effectively.” But
neither definition requires the compulsion or constraint inherent in the term
“enforcement” to entail a judicial decision. For example, in Belth v. Garamendi
(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, the government initially refused the plaintiff’s California
Public Record Act request and complied only after the plaintiff filed a writ of
mandate. The Court of Appeal held that attorney fees should be awarded under
Government Code section 6259, subdivision (d), which mandates an award to
plaintiffs who “prevail in litigation” under the Public Records Act. (Belth, supra, 232
Cal.App.3d at p. 902.) It appears plain that the plaintiff in that case had “enforced” its
right of access to public records, compelling the public agency to do what it would not
do short of litigation. It would be perverse, and contrary to the basic public interest
objectives of section 1021.5, to hold that a plaintiff who obtains a final judgment has
“enforced” a right, but not a plaintiff whose litigation position is so strong that it
achieves the same result by compelling the defendant to change its conduct rather
than face a probable judgment against it.5
5
Both sides cite legislative history in support of their position. The
legislative history is inconclusive. DaimlerChrysler cites legislative testimony by
some of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5’s proponents, but we generally
(footnote continued on next page)
19
DaimlerChrysler also makes a number of policy arguments. Like the
Buckhannon majority, it argues that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not
result in a second major litigation,” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 609), and
that the catalyst theory would require a complex causal determination. “Among
other things, a ‘catalyst theory’ hearing would require analysis of the defendant’s
subjective motivations in changing its conduct, an analysis that ‘will likely depend
on a highly factbound inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences from the
nature and timing of the defendant’s change in conduct.’ ” We find persuasive the
argument of the Buckhannon dissent that although some time may be expended in
fact finding under the catalyst theory, it is at least as likely as not that that the
catalyst rule “ ‘saves judicial resources,’ [citation] by encouraging ‘plaintiffs to
discontinue litigation after receiving through the defendant’s acquiescence the
(footnote continued from previous page)
will not consider such evidence in determining legislative intent. “Material
showing the motive or understanding of an individual legislator, including the
bill’s author, his or her staff, or other interested persons, is generally not
considered. [Citations.] This is because such materials are generally not evidence
of the Legislature’s collective intent.” (Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Imperial
Irrigation Dist. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1426.) Plaintiffs cite an earlier
version of section 1021.5 that provided for attorney fees only “if judgment is
entered in” the plaintiff’s favor. Later the provision was completely rewritten.
The new language made no reference to a “judgment” but instead referred to a
“prevailing plaintiff.” (Compare Sen. Bill No. 664 (1975-1996 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Mar. 31, 1975, § 1, and as amended Sept. 11, 1975, § 2.) Plaintiffs
argue that this change shows that no judgment is required for a plaintiff to be
considered a prevailing party. The argument does not especially advance
plaintiffs’ position. “Unpassed bills, as evidence of legislative intent, have little
value.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1379, 1396.) This is particularly true when, as here, the bill was rewritten so
extensively. Nor do we find other legislative materials cited by the parties, none
of which focus on the question at issue, particularly helpful.
20
remedy initially sought.’ ” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 640 (dis opn. of
Ginsburg, J.).)
Nor are we persuaded that cases decided under a catalyst theory will
inevitably give rise to complex and time-consuming litigation over the issue of
causality. Case law, as well as our own judicial experience, suggests that catalyst
theory cases may be resolved by relatively economical, straightforward inquiries
by trial court judges close to and familiar with the litigation. (See, e.g., Southwest
Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Carroll, supra, 182 F.Supp.2d at
pp. 951-952 (opn. of Moreno, J.).) Moreover, the defendant in such cases knows
better than anyone why it made the decision that granted the plaintiff the relief
sought, and the defendant is in the best position to either concede that the plaintiff
was a catalyst or to document why the plaintiff was not. We are unpersuaded that
DaimlerChrysler’s inability or unwillingness to do either in the present case,
thereby prolonging the litigation, is necessarily attributable to the inherent
difficulty of catalyst theory cases.
DaimlerChrysler further argues that overall, the benefits that the catalyst
rule are supposed to possess are dwarfed by the harms the rule will engender. It
contends the evil to which the catalyst rule is addressed that meritorious
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys will be deprived of attorney fees by a favorable
settlement will be a relatively rare occurrence. It quotes the Buckhannon
majority that “ ‘[I]t is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice’ unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” (Buckhannon, supra, 532
U.S. at p. 609.) On the other hand, DaimlerChrylser argues the catalyst rule could
encourage nuisance suits by unscrupulous attorneys hoping to obtain fees without
21
having the merits of their suit adjudicated. It quotes with approval from Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Buckhannon, joined by Justice Thomas: “If the [catalyst
theory] sometimes rewards the plaintiff with a phony claim (there is no way of
knowing), [its absence] sometimes denies fees to the plaintiff with a solid case
whose adversary slinks away on the eve of judgment. But it seems to me the evil
of the former far outweighs the evil of the latter. There is all the difference in the
world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon of attorney’s fees to some
plaintiffs who are no less ‘deserving’ of them than others who receive them, and a
rule that causes the law to be the very instrument of wrong—exacting the payment
of attorney’s fees to the extortionist.” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 618
(con. opn. of Scalia, J.).)
We, of course, have no way of quantifying the magnitude of the potential
and actual abuses by plaintiffs under a catalyst rule or by defendants under its
absence. DaimlerChrysler and the Buckhannon majority’s prediction that
defendants’ change of behavior depriving worthy plaintiffs of attorney fees will be
relatively rare is one we cannot verify. But as plaintiffs argue, what is
objectionable about elimination of the catalyst theory is not only that in a given
case an attorney will be unjustly deprived of fees, but that attorneys will be
deterred from accepting public interest litigation if there is the prospect they will
be deprived of such fees after successful litigation. (See Chemerinsky, Closing the
Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants (2003) 5 U.Pa. J.Const.L. 537, 547.)
As matters stand now, public interest attorneys often take a considerable risk that
they will not be paid at all because they will not prevail in the litigation or because
they will be deemed ineligible for fees under section 1021.5, as when the suit is
adjudged not to be sufficiently in the public interest. Abolition of the catalyst
theory will increase an already considerable risk. As plaintiffs’ attorney succinctly
22
states: “[I]t defies common sense to think attorneys who take meritorious public
interest cases with the expectation that they will be compensated if they obtained
favorable results for their clients will not be deterred from doing so if the
defendant can litigate tenaciously, then avoid paying their fees by voluntarily
providing relief before a court order is entered.”6
Nor do we believe that avoiding this increased risk of public interest
litigation must inevitably come at the expense of rewarding a significant number
of extortionate lawsuits. We can adopt sensible limitations on the catalyst theory
that discourage the latter without putting a damper on lawsuits that genuinely
provide a public benefit. Our starting point in this endeavor is the observation that
the Legislature has assigned responsibility for awarding fees under section 1021.5
“not to automatons unable to recognize extortionists, but to judges expected and
instructed to exercise ‘discretion.’ ” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at 640 (dis.
opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) These judges are in a good position to make the
determination, as one court has expressed it, that the lawsuit have achieved their
result “ ‘by threat of victory,’ not ‘by dint of nuisance and threat of expense.’ ”
(Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 628 (dis. opn of Ginsburg, J.), quoting
Marbley v. Bane (2d Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 224, 234-235.) In order to make this
6
The dissent theorizes that under the private attorney general doctrine,
plaintiffs already have a “great advantage” over defendants in settlement
negotiations because plaintiffs face merely the risk they will not be compensated
for attorney fees whereas defendants face the near certainty of incurring such fees.
(Dis. opn, post, at p. 19.) This assertion substantially oversimplifies a complex
matter. The prospect of attorney fees is only one factor in determining settlement
advantage, and other factors often weigh in defendants’ favor in public interest
litigation, including the possession of superior information about their own
conduct (see Farmer & Pecorino, Issues of Informational Asymmetry in Legal
Bargaining, in Dispute Resolution: Bridging the Settlement Gap (Anderson edit.,
1996) 79-80.), as well as greater material resources.
23
determination, the court is to inquire not into a defendant’s subjective belief about
the suit but rather to gauge, objectively speaking, whether the lawsuit had merit.
(See Tyler v. Corner Const. Corp., Inc. (8th Cir. 1999) 167 F.3d 1202, 1206.) A
number of circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, prior to Buckhannon,
adopted a version of the catalyst theory that required not only a causal connection
between the lawsuit and the relief obtained but also a determination that
defendant’s conduct was required by law. (Nadeau v. Helgemoe (1st Cir. 1978)
581 F.2d 275 (Nadeau); see also Powder River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt
(10th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1477, 1486; Zinn v. Shalala, supra, 35 F.3d 273, 274 ;
Sablan v. Dept. of Finance for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 1317 (Sablan); Premachandra v. Mitts (8th Cir.
1984) 727 F.2d 717, 721-722.) Generally speaking, the “required by law” prong
was tantamount to a finding that the lawsuit was “not frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless.” (Stivers v. Pierce (9th Cir. 1995) 71 F.3d 732, 752, fn. 9.)
This court has not explicitly adopted the above two-pronged test. (See
Wallace v. Consumer Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 836,
843-844 [noting that some federal circuits focus only on the causal prong and that
this court had not considered the Nadeau test].) We now do so. The trial court
must determine that the lawsuit is not “frivolous, unreasonable or groundless”
(Stivers v. Pierce, supra, 71 F.3d at p. 752, fn. 9), in other words that its result was
achieved “by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense.”
(Marbley v. Bane, supra, 57 F.3d at pp. 234-235.) The determination the trial
court must make is not unlike the determination it makes when asked to issue a
preliminary injunction, i.e., not a final decision on the merits but a determination
at a minimum that “ ‘the questions of law or fact are grave and difficult.’ ” (Wilms
24
v. Hand (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 811, 815; 6 Witkin Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997)
Provisional Remedies, § 357, p. 288.)
Although the catalyst rule is sometimes formulated to permit an award of
attorney fees as long as a lawsuit can survive a motion to dismiss or for judgment
on the pleadings (see Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 605), we see no reason to
limit a trial court’s inquiry regarding the merits of the case to an examination of
whether the pleadings state a cause of action. When a lawsuit has been mooted by
a defendant’s change in conduct, some development of the factual record is
required in order to prevail on a catalyst theory. At the very least, a plaintiff must
establish “the precise factual/legal condition that [it] sought to change or affect” as
a prerequisite for establishing the catalytic effect of its lawsuit. (Folsom, supra,
32 Cal.3d at p. 685.) Sometimes this factual background will have been developed
in the course of litigation. (See, e.g., DeGidio v. Pung, supra, 920 F.2d 525;
Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, supra, 981 F.2d 225) When the suit is mooted
early in its prosecution (as occurred in the present case), it may generally be
established during the attorney fee proceeding by declarations, or, at the discretion
of the trial court, by an abbreviated evidentiary hearing. (See Sablan, supra, 856
F.2d at pp. 1322-1323; Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont. Ed. Bar, 2d ed.
1998 & 2003 supp.) § 14.39, pp. 444-445.) The trial court may review this factual
background not only to determine the lawsuit’s catalytic effect but also its merits.
Attorney fees should not be awarded for a lawsuit that lacks merit, even if its
pleadings would survive a demurrer. We believe that trial courts will be able to
conduct an abbreviated but meaningful review of the merits of the litigation
designed to screen out nuisance suits without significantly increasing attorney fee
25
litigation costs.7 On the other hand, the abolition of the catalyst theory, thereby
giving plaintiffs the incentive to prolong the litigation until a judicial
determination is made, is not necessarily a recipe for judicial efficiency.
In addition to some scrutiny of the merits, we conclude that another
limitation on the catalyst rule proposed by the Attorney General, appearing as
amicus curiae, should be adopted by this court. The Attorney General proposes
that a plaintiff seeking attorney fees under a catalyst theory must first reasonably
attempt to settle the matter short of litigation. (See Grimsley v. Board of
Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966-967.) We believe this requirement is
fully consistent with the basic objectives behind section 1021.5 and with one of its
7
The dissent states that plaintiffs “have not shown that DaimlerChrysler was
legally required to offer a full refund in addition to the steps it had already taken
regarding plaintiffs, which included full disclosure, prospective correction, and
offers to pay for a hitch that, so far as this lawsuit demonstrates, would have cured
all harm.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 24.) The trial court is obviously not bound by the
dissent’s characterization of the facts. Moreover, the dissent appears to interpret
our requirement that a lawsuit have merit as further requiring that the settlement or
the action taken by defendant to moot the lawsuit must be legally required. But no
such scrutiny of settlement terms has ever been required, not even under
Buckhannon. For example, Buckhannon acknowledges that a consent decree is a
valid basis for awarding private attorney general fees. (Buckhannon, supra, 532
U.S. at p. 604, citing Maher v. Gagne (1980) 448 U.S. 122.).) In a consent decree,
“[t]he parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus
save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the
agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving
of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have
won had they proceeded with the litigation.” (United States v. Armour & Co.
(1971) 402 U.S. 673, 681.) In other words, a consent decree gives effect to a
compromise that is not necessarily required by law. So too, with regard to a
settlement that does not result in a consent decree, or unilateral action that moots
pending litigation, it is not necessary to determine that the precise remedy chosen
was required by law in order for a plaintiff to be eligible for attorney fees under
section 1021.5. Rather, a plaintiff’s suit must have merit, as that term is defined
above.
26
explicit requirements the “necessity . . . of private enforcement” of the public
interest. Awarding attorney fees for litigation when those rights could have been
vindicated by reasonable efforts short of litigation does not advance that objective
and encourages lawsuits that are more opportunistic than authentically for the
public good. Lengthy prelitigation negotiations are not required, but a plaintiff
must at least notify the defendant of its grievances and proposed remedies and
give the defendant the opportunity to meet its demands within a reasonable time.
(See, e.g., S.D. v. Faulkner, supra, 705 F.Supp at p. 1363 [letter notifying
defendants of plaintiffs grievances, plus discussions over two-month period].)
What constitutes a “reasonable” time will depend on the context.
Applying the catalyst rule, as discussed above, to the present case, the trial
court applied the first prong of the rule to conclude that the lawsuit was in fact a
substantial causal factor in DaimlerChrysler’s change in policy with respect to its
willingness to repurchase or replace the Dakota R/T or to offer consumers
substantial discounts. DaimlerChrysler does not contend that the trial court’s
ruling on that point is unsupported by substantial evidence. But it is unclear
whether the trial court considered the merits of the suit, and the trial court did not
consider whether plaintiffs attempted to reasonably settle the matter short of
litigation. We therefore remand the matter for a determination of whether
plaintiffs are eligible for attorney fees under the catalyst rule as articulated above.8
8
The dissent contends that plaintiffs have “failed to satisfy” these two latter
prongs of the catalyst rule. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 23.) The dissent does not point
to any trial court finding indicating that the court considered and ruled on either of
these questions, probably because, as explained above, our previous iterations of
the catalyst theory did not clearly established that either were at issue. Remand is
therefore appropriate so that the parties may litigate and the trial court may
determine these two issues.
27
B. Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding the
Substantial Benefit And Public Interest Prongs of Section 1021.5
Were Met
DaimlerChrysler also contends that the attorney fee award must be
overturned in its entirety because it failed to confer “a significant benefit . . . on
the general public or large class of persons” as required by section 1021.5. This
contention need not detain us long. We will uphold the trial court’s decision to
award attorney fees under section 1021.5, unless the court has abused its
discretion. (Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 499, 544.)
It is well settled that attorney fees under section 1021.5 may be awarded for
consumer class action suits benefiting a large number of people. (Beasley v. Wells
Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417-1418 [upholding an award of
section 1021.5 attorney fees for class action against bank charging excess credit
card fees].) As Beasley recognizes, section 1021.5 requires both a finding of a
significant benefit conferred on a substantial number of people and a
determination that the “subject matter of the action implicated the public interest.”
(Beasley, supra, at p. 1418.)
In the present case, the trial court found that the problem addressed by the
lawsuit implicated an issue of public safety, and that the lawsuit benefited
thousands of consumers and potentially thousands more by acting as a deterrent to
discourage lax responses to known safety hazards. In light of the facts reviewed in
the first part of this opinion, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the lawsuit met the substantial benefit and public interest
requirements of section 1021.5.9
9
The dissent appears to question the rule stated in Beasley that a consumer
class action suit conferring significant benefits on a large number of people
vindicating a right of substantial societal importance can be the basis of an award
(footnote continued on next page)
28
C. Whether There Should Be A Multiplier for Attorney Fees for
Litigating Attorney Fees
In the present case, a large percentage of the attorney fees were awarded for
litigation to obtain fees under section 1021.5. As noted, the lodestar amount
calculated by the trial court was $329,620, and that amount was multiplied by an
enhancement of 2.25, for a total $762, 830. The trial court based the enhancement
on “the contingency nature [of the litigation], the delay in payment and the quality
of the result.” DaimlerChrysler argues that there should be no enhancement for
fees for fee-related litigation, or “fees on fees.” Assuming the trial court
concludes on remand that plaintiffs are entitled to some attorney fees, we address
for its benefit whether it appropriately awarded enhancements for fees on fees.
We conclude that, while fees for attorney fee litigation under section 1021.5 may
be enhanced under some circumstances, that enhancement should generally be
lower than fees awarded in the underlying litigation.
We first review some general principles regarding the calculation of
attorney fees in public interest litigation. As we recently explained, under our
decision in Serrano III, “a court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone
(footnote continued from previous page)
of section 1021.5 attorney fees. Its cites in support of its position Flannery v.
California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 635-636, a case involving
a single plaintiff’s lawsuit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. But
Flannery merely held that a plaintiff who enforces a statutory right is not
necessarily entitled to section 1021.5 fees when the primary effect of the suit is to
vindicate an individual economic interest. Flannery does not contravene the rule
in Beasley. Nor does the dissent’s reweighing and recharacterization of the
evidence persuade us that the trial court’s conclusion that the lawsuit itself
furthered the public interest by resulting in extensive consumer remedies, which
served as a deterrent to future conduct jeopardizing public safety was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
29
or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and
reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation
of the case.’ [Citation.] We expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates
as a basis for the lodestar, noting that anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to
the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of approaching the problem that
can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar
and the courts.” ’ [Citation.] In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, we
indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours
expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject
to compensation. [Citation.]
“Under
Serrano III, the lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal
services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors
including . . . : (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the
skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature
of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the
fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines,
retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required
extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order
to approximate the fair market rate for such services. The ‘ “experienced trial
judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court,
and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ ” (Ketchum,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131-1132.)
One of the most common fee enhancers, and one used by the trial court in
the present case, is for contingency risk. We reaffirmed the propriety of a
30
contingency risk enhancement in Ketchum: “The economic rationale for fee
enhancement in contingency cases has been explained as follows: ‘A contingent
fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are
performed. The contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal
services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on
such a loan is higher because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which
cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of
conventional loans.’ (Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (4th ed. 1992) pp. 534,
567.) ‘A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal
services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the
second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be
reluctant to accept fee award cases.’ ” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 1132-1133.)
Turning to the question of compensation for fee-related litigation, we first
note it is well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may recover attorney
fees for fee-related matters. (Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633, 639.)
As we stated: “the [private attorney general] doctrine will often be frustrated,
sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated
proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim.” (Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d
at p. 632; see also Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141.)
While DaimlerChrysler does not dispute that fees for fee-related litigation
may be awarded, it asks this court to hold that there should be no multiplier for
fees on fees. It cites to several out-of-state cases that have disallowed such
multipliers, principally because fee litigation is tangential to the primary litigation
and of less social value. (See City of Birmingham v. Horn (Ala. 2001) 810 So.2d
667, 684 [“While the law clearly allows for a fee award with respect to [fee
31
litigation], we do not consider this time to be vital to the true purpose of the
litigation”]; Bakinski v. Northwestern University (Ill.Ct.App. 1992) 595 N.E.2d
1106, 1114 [“the fee litigation in this case is not part of the class action litigation,
and . . . confers no benefit on the class” and is therefore “not the type of litigation
warranting the application of multiplier”]; see also Indiana Hospital Licensing
Council v. Women’s Pavilion of South Bend (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) 486 N.E.2d 1070,
1080.) DaimlerChrysler argues that as a policy matter, enhancements of fees will
serve only to encourage a “satellite” litigation of dubious social utility. (See
Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437; see also id. at p. 442 (conc. opn.
of Brennan, J.) [referring to attorney fee litigation as “one of the least socially
productive types of litigation imaginable”].)
As plaintiffs point out, our Court of Appeal adopted a contrary position in
Downey Cares v. Downey Community Development Com. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d
983 (Downey Cares). In that case, the plaintiffs overturned an amendment to the
city’s general plan that had been brought about by a conflict of interest on the part
of one of the city council members. The trial court awarded attorney fees under
Government Code section 91003 and applied a 1.5 multiplier to the entire lodestar
amount, including fees for fee litigation. The Court of Appeal upheld the
judgment. After reviewing the justification stated above for awarding fees for fee
litigation, it stated: “Considering the numerous factors a trial court might
legitimately weigh in determining the multiplier [citation], it is certainly
conceivable that some of these factors might apply to the main litigation but not to
the fee litigation. For instance, the underlying suit might involve complex issues,
lengthy proceedings, and unusual skill, while at the same time the fee related
motions might be routine and short. Under such circumstances, a trial court would
not abuse its discretion if it chose to distinguish the two categories and apply a
32
different multiplier to each. [Citation.] On the other hand, a trial court would not
necessarily abuse its discretion if it chose not to distinguish the two categories but
to apply the multiplier to the whole lodestar. For instance, if the contingency of
receiving any fee and the long delay in receiving the fee . . . were important to the
trial judge’s calculation, they seem equally applicable to the award for fee-related
services.” (Downey Cares, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at pp. 997-998.) Echoing
Downey Cares, plaintiffs argue that there is no principled basis for categorically
precluding appropriate enhancements for fees for fee litigation.
We noted the holding in Downey Cares in Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
page 1141, footnote 6. But in Ketchum, we declined to apply the contingency fee
enhancement to fees for fee litigation. We reasoned that under the statute
authorizing attorney fees at issue in that case, section 425.16, subdivision (c), the
fees were mandatory once a party prevailed on the underlying anti-SLAPP motion,
and there was at that point no contingent risk to the pursuit of attorney fees that
would justify an enhancement for the fees on fees. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 1141-1142.) We had no occasion to decide whether fees for fee litigation
should be enhanced under section 1021.5.
In light of the above discussion, we reject DaimlerChrysler’s argument that
fees for fee litigation can never be enhanced. Such a rule does not appear
harmony with the principle that the awarding of attorney fees and the calculation
of attorney fee enhancements are highly fact specific matters best left to the
discretion of the trial court. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131-1132.)
Although we agree with DaimlerChrysler that the reduction of attorney fee
litigation is a desirable objective, it is not clear that a categorical rule barring
enhancements for fee litigation will accomplish that objective. It is not clear that
the unnecessary prolongation of fee litigation is a significant problem, given that
33
trial courts have the capacity to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable
attorney fee charges and the discretion to disallow the latter. Nor is it clear that, if
there is such a problem, it is caused mainly by avaricious plaintiffs rather than
recalcitrant defendants.
Furthermore, “[w]hen the Legislature has determined that the lodestar
adjustment approach is not appropriate, it has expressly so stated. Thus, in 1993,
it amended Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 to provide that attorney fees
awarded to a public entity under the section ‘shall not be increased or decreased by
a multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as discussed in [Serrano III,
supra,] 20 Cal. 3d 25, 49.’ (Stats. 1993, ch. 645, § 2, p. 3747.) Its express
restriction on the use of fee enhancements therein ‘can be read as an implicit
endorsement of their use in other contexts.’ ” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p.
1135.) One of those “other contexts” is for fees for fee litigation, as recognized
six years prior to the 1993 amendments in Downey Cares.
Nonetheless, building on the discussion quoted above in Ketchum and
Downey Cares, we recognize that the enhancement justified for fees in the
underlying litigation may differ from the enhancement warranted in the fee
litigation, and that a lower enhancement, or no enhancement, may be appropriate
in the latter litigation. In fact, a closer examination of the enhancement factors set
forth in Serrano III leads to the conclusion that in most cases, the enhancement for
the fee litigation should be lower than the enhancement for the underlying
litigation, if one is applied at all.
This is especially true of the “results obtained” factor that the trial court
relied on in part to justify its multiplier. “The ‘results obtained’ factor can
properly be used to enhance a lodestar calculation where an exceptional effort
produced an exceptional benefit.” (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92
34
Cal.App.4th 819, 838.) While the trial court may have legitimately concluded that
the underlying litigation had produced an exceptional benefit for consumers in the
present case, the same cannot be said of the fee litigation itself, which simply
produced fees to compensate plaintiffs’ attorneys for their efforts. We conclude
fees for fee litigation should not be enhanced on that basis.
Moreover, while this factor often takes into account the exceptional skill
exhibited by the attorney (Leaolo v. Beneficial Cal. Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19,
50; Edgerton v. State Personnel Bd. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1363; City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 78, 85), an enhancement on
that basis is rarely justified for fee related litigation. This litigation, as discussed
above, is for the most part simpler than litigation on the merits. On the other hand,
while attorney fees may not be used to punish defendants (Ketchum, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 1141), fees for fee litigation may be enhanced when a defendant’s
opposition to the fee motion creates extraordinary difficulties. (See e.g. Edgerton
v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363; Crommie v. P.U.C.
(N.D.Cal. 1994) 840 F.Supp. 719, affd. sub nom. Mangold v. P.U.C. (9th Cir.
1995) 67 F.3d 1470 [lodestar enhanced in part by increased difficulty due to
defendant’s “excessively vexatious and often unreasonable opposition”].)10
Courts awarding attorney fees under section 1021.5 also may generally
differentiate between the contingency risk undertaken during the litigation on the
merits and the risk undertaken for litigation on fees. The risk that an attorney
takes in the underlying public interest litigation has two components: the risk of
not being a “successful party,” i.e., of not prevailing on the merits, and the risk of
10
In the present case, the trial court expressly stated that it was not enhancing
the fees because of the “novelty or difficulty of the issues.”
35
not establishing eligibility for an attorney fee award. (Serrano III, supra, 20
Cal.3d at p. 49.) As discussed, in Ketchum we declined to award a contingency
enhancement for fee litigation because under section 425.16, award of the fee was
mandatory once a party had prevailed on the underlying motion, and therefore
neither of the two risk components were implicated. Generally speaking, by the
time of the commencement of fee litigation in section 1021.5 cases, the first and
perhaps most substantial component of risk, that of not being a successful party,
has been eliminated. What remains is the second component, that plaintiffs may
not be able to establish eligibility for fees, i.e., to establish that the litigation
confers “a ‘significant benefit’ . . . ‘on the general public or a large class of
persons’ ” (Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1417-
1418) or that there was the “ ‘necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement,’ ” making the award appropriate (Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 115, 121). Although in the present case, as in other catalyst theory
cases, plaintiffs had not established themselves as the successful party at the
beginning of the fee litigation, and some enhancement for that risk may be
justified, the achievement of their litigation objective before fee litigation would
reduce somewhat the uncertainty over their “successful party” status. The fact that
the risk of fee litigation is generally less than the risk of litigation on the merits of
the suit justifies a lower attorney fee multiplier for the former, if one is given at
all. We do not believe a lower multiplier on fees for less risky fee litigation will
deter attorneys from accepting worthwhile public interest cases. (See Ketchum,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133, 1141-1142.)
36
One enhancement factor that would be as applicable for fees on fees as for
fees on the merits is a significant delay in the payment of the fees. (See Serrano
III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) “Court-awarded fees normally are received long
after the legal services are rendered. That delay can present cash-flow problems
for the attorneys. In any event, payment today for services rendered long in the
past deprives the eventual recipient of the value of the use of the money in the
meantime, which use, particularly in an inflationary era, is valuable. A percentage
adjustment to reflect the delay in receipt of payment therefore may be
appropriate.” (Copeland v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 641 F.2d 880, 893.) But
this enhancement, which is tantamount to an interest rate, is by itself quite small
and may be reduced or eliminated if the lodestar rate is based on the present
hourly rate rather than the lesser rate applicable when the services were rendered.
(Id. at p. 893, fn. 23, see also Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards, supra, § 13.10,
p. 390.)
In the present case, the trial court made its initial decision regarding the fee
multiplier before our decision in Ketchum and then, after further briefing, reduced
the multiplier from 3.0 to 2.25, not differentiating between the fees in the
underlying litigation and the fees on fees. It appears the court over-enhanced the
fees on fees by inappropriately using the “results obtained” factor to arrive at the
multiplier. On remand the court should also reexamine its use of the risk factor.
While it was not required to explain how it calculated that factor, and we will
generally presume the attorney fee award was correct “ ‘on matters as to which the
record is silent’ ” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140), it would be appropriate
for the trial court to reassess its calculation of a risk enhancement for fees on fees
in light of this opinion’s conclusion that the risk multiplier for those fees generally
should be lower than for fees in the underlying litigation. The trial court is
37
therefore directed on remand to recalculate the proper multiplier if it concludes
that plaintiffs are eligible for some attorney fees.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the award of attorney fees
in the present case is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings
consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
38
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.
I dissent.
Plaintiffs filed a simple seven-page complaint alleging a single cause of
action for breach of warranty after the defendant had already acknowledged its
marketing mistake and was taking steps to correct it, and while the Santa Cruz
County District Attorney and the California Attorney General were investigating
the matter and preparing to take appropriate action. The complaint constituted
plaintiffs’ entire legal effort regarding the underlying lawsuit. They obtained no
judicial ruling of any kind in their favor. Nevertheless, to date, plaintiffs have
parlayed this complaint into an award of attorney fees of $762,830, most of it for
work unrelated to the underlying lawsuit. Now the majority remands the matter
for yet more litigation. I disagree for several reasons.
This court has never awarded attorney fees to a party with no judicial ruling
in its favor. We should not start now. Relying solely on federal cases that have
been overruled and California cases that either denied attorney fees or involved a
plaintiff with a judicial ruling in its favor, the majority permits an award of
attorney fees to the plaintiffs as the “prevailing” or “successful” party. To do so, it
adopts the so-called catalyst theory, a theory that was once prevalent in federal
courts, but that the United States Supreme Court has now repudiated. We should
not resurrect it.
1
Moreover, plaintiffs do not qualify for attorney fees even under the
majority’s catalyst theory. Their lawsuit was unnecessary when filed, it was moot
within days of its filing, and it conferred no substantial public benefit. Plaintiffs
have also failed to show their suit had any merit in light of the corrective steps
defendant had already taken. The majority implicitly recognizes that plaintiffs
failed to justify their award of attorney fees, but it inexplicably remands the matter
for yet more litigation, which will undoubtedly increase plaintiffs’ attorney fee
demand to a truly astronomic amount. I disagree here also. No reason appears to
give plaintiffs a second chance to try to prove what they failed to prove the first
time. Courts should seek to resolve litigation, not perpetuate it.
Finally, the majority permits qualifying plaintiffs to receive not only (1)
attorney fees for litigating the underlying lawsuit, but also (2) a multiplier on those
fees, and also (3) attorney fees for litigating their entitlement to attorney fees, and
also (4) a multiplier on the fees for litigating entitlement to fees. I disagree on the
final point. Surely, awarding fees for the underlying litigation, with a potential
multiplier, plus fees for litigating entitlement to fees, is sufficient. A multiplier for
litigating fees on fees is excessive and can only lead to outrageously inflated
awards like the one here, where a simple complaint is transformed into an award
of over three-quarters of a million dollars.
The majority today goes farther than this court has ever gone before—
indeed, so far as I can tell, further than any other court has ever gone—in
permitting plaintiffs to win large attorney fee awards. I cannot agree. Lest
California truly become a mecca for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout
the country, we need to be at least somewhat in step with the rest of the country.
2
I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DaimlerChrysler) incorrectly marketed its
1998 and 1999 Dakota R/T trucks as having a 6,400-pound towing capacity when
they actually could tow only 2,000 pounds. The error occurred because the
Dakota R/T was a sporty version of an existing truck model, which could tow
6,400 pounds. However, to obtain a sporty design, DaimlerChrysler lowered the
suspension on the Dakota R/T, thus reducing its towing capacity. During these
two years, DaimlerChrysler sold or leased fewer than 7,000 of the Dakota R/T’s
nationwide, including fewer than 1,000 in California.
DaimlerChrysler became aware of the mistake by early 1999. By February
1999, it had set up a response team to address the problem. By June 1999,
DaimlerChrysler had replaced the incorrect marketing materials, owners manuals,
and engine and door labels for not-yet-sold Dakota R/T’s. DaimlerChrysler had
also notified existing buyers of the error, told them not to attempt to tow more than
2,000 pounds, and provided them with the same modified materials. It told buyers
who wanted to tow more than 2,000 pounds they could do so only if their Dakota
R/T was modified with a trailer hitch costing $300. DaimlerChrysler also began to
address remedial measures for customers who had bought or leased their Dakota
R/T’s under the incorrect marketing program. Many R/T buyers never intended to
tow more than 2,000 pounds. When informed by DaimlerChrysler of the error,
most of those customers were satisfied with DaimlerChrysler’s offers of cash and
merchandise. Initially, DaimlerChrysler offered buyers who had bought the
hitches refunds of the $300 cost. By the summer 1999, DaimlerChrysler
authorized dealers to repurchase or replace Dakota R/T’s on a case-by-case basis
for customers who demanded such a remedy.
3
On July 29, 1999, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney contacted
DaimlerChrysler about the problem, threatened legal action, and requested
DaimlerChrysler’s input before acting. On August 10, 1999, the California
Attorney General notified DaimlerChrysler that it had joined the Santa Cruz
County District Attorney. The public agencies requested a response by the end of
August 1999.
On August 23, 1999, plaintiffs filed the seven-page complaint underlying
this appeal. They alleged that they had bought 1999 Dakota R/T’s from various
DaimlerChrysler dealers. One of the plaintiffs lived and bought his truck in
California. Plaintiffs alleged a single cause of action for breach of express
warranty based on the mistake regarding the trucks’ towing capacity. They
alleged that DaimlerChrysler acknowledged the error by letter to all purchasers
dated June 16, 1999. They alleged that they had previously notified
DaimlerChrysler of their trucks’ failure to comply with the warranted towing
capacity and that they were revoking their acceptance of their trucks. They
sought, but never obtained, class certification for all buyers of Dakota R/T’s
nationwide. They also sought return of their purchase or lease payments,
compensatory damages, and attorney fees. Nothing in the complaint referred to
any threat to public safety or requested any remedy related to public safety.
The day the lawsuit was filed, the Detroit News contacted
DaimlerChrysler’s legal counsel about the lawsuit. DaimlerChrysler’s counsel
claimed DaimlerChrysler had responded appropriately to the marketing error,
including offering buybacks to customers who requested them. Plaintiffs faxed
their complaint to DaimlerChrysler the same day. The next day, August 24, 1999,
DaimlerChrysler’s employee newsletter ran an article on the plaintiffs’ case.
DaimlerChrysler’s response team met throughout August 1999. The team knew
4
about both public agency inquiries and the response deadline. DaimlerChrysler
wrote to the public agencies that its internal approval process prohibited a
response by August 31, but promised a response by September 8, 1999. On
September 10, 1999, DaimlerChrysler informed all buyers of Dakota R/T’s that,
among other options, DaimlerChrysler would repurchase or assist in replacing
their 1998 or 1999 Dakota R/T. Evidence showed that the response team was
aware of plaintiffs’ lawsuit before September 10, 1999.
DaimlerChrysler demurred to the complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, acknowledging DaimlerChrysler’s offer of, among other remedies,
repurchase or replacement of the trucks for all previous buyers. The trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case as moot
because DaimlerChrysler had already offered all purchasers the relief plaintiffs
sought.
The public agency investigation continued. That investigation revealed that
some brochures containing the error were distributed as late as August 1999. In
late 2000, DaimlerChrysler settled the public agency investigation by paying a
$75,000 fine and agreeing to continue to assure that the marketing error did not
reoccur.
Although the court dismissed plaintiffs’ case, the parties continued to
litigate plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney fees. As the Court of Appeal described
it, “Over a year of hotly-contested discovery and other motions occurred to clarify
the facts described above.” The trial court held three contested hearings on the fee
request. On October 18, 2000, the court held a lengthy evidentiary hearing and
made factual findings rejecting DaimlerChrysler’s claim that it had at least
decided to offer all buyers repurchase or buybacks before plaintiffs filed their
case. The court found plaintiffs’ case was a catalyst for DaimlerChrysler’s
5
eventual offer. It found that this action was necessary despite the public agency
investigation because the public agencies had not yet commenced any actual
proceeding against plaintiffs, and they “were only concerned with
DaimlerChrysler’s false advertising materials and never sought any remedies on
behalf of the consumers . . . .” It also found that plaintiffs’ action enforced
“consumer rights, including highway safety,” and conferred a significant public
benefit, including pecuniary benefits for consumers and “enhanced safety.” It
found an additional benefit “if DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are
deterred from similar conduct in the future.”
The court found the “lodestar” fee amount (i.e., the number of hours of
work multiplied by a reasonable hourly compensation; see Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132) was $329,620 through the October 18, 2000,
hearing. It awarded a 2.25 multiplier for the fees until the October 18, 2000,
hearing to account for risk and success. Ultimately, it awarded a total of $762,830
in attorney fees. It did not distinguish how much of this total was due to the
underlying litigation and how much of it to litigating entitlement to attorney fees.
However, DaimlerChrysler states and, at oral argument, plaintiffs agreed that
roughly 90 percent of this award was for fees plaintiffs generated while seeking
fees.
DaimlerChrysler appealed limited to the question of attorney fees. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and we granted DaimlerChrysler’s
petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. California should not adopt the catalyst theory.
“California follows what is commonly referred to as the American rule,
which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney
6
fees. [Citations.] The Legislature codified the American rule in 1872 when it
enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, which states in pertinent part that
‘Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and
mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement,
express or implied, of the parties . . . .’ ” (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274,
278-279.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, enacted in 1977, provides an
exception to this American rule. As relevant, it states that, “[u]pon motion, a court
may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing
parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest if” certain requirements are met.1 Although not at
issue here, Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), part of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act, is similar. That section provides as relevant:
“In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the
1
In its entirety, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides today:
“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one
or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large
class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or
of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to
make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice
be paid out of the recovery, if any. With respect to actions involving public
entities, this section applies to allowances against, but not in favor of, public
entities, and no claim shall be required to be filed therefor, unless one or more
successful parties and one or more opposing parties are public entities, in which
case no claim shall be required to be filed therefor under Part 3 (commencing with
Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code.
“Attorneys’ fees awarded to a public entity pursuant to this section shall not
be increased or decreased by a multiplier based upon extrinsic circumstances, as
discussed in Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.”
7
prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness
fees, except where the action is filed by a public agency or a public official, acting
in an official capacity.” (Ibid.)
The issue here is what it takes to be a “successful” or “prevailing” party
within the meaning of these statutes. (I agree with the majority that these terms
are synonymous for these purposes.) (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.) Although
plaintiffs did not obtain any judicial ruling in their favor, they claim entitlement to
attorney fees as the successful party because their lawsuit was a “catalyst” that
caused DaimlerChrysler to offer the relief they sought. We have never awarded
attorney fees predicated on the catalyst theory, but we have discussed it. As we
explained in Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983)
33 Cal.3d 348 (Westside Community) (a case that reversed an award of attorney
fees), “Numerous federal decisions have . . . [held] that attorney fees may be
proper whenever an action results in relief for the plaintiff, whether the relief is
obtained through a ‘voluntary’ change in the defendant’s conduct, through a
settlement, or otherwise. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, an award of attorney fees may be
appropriate where ‘plaintiffs’ lawsuit was a catalyst motivating defendants to
provide the primary relief sought . . . .’ [Citation.] A plaintiff will be considered a
‘successful party’ where an important right is vindicated ‘by activating defendants
to modify their behavior.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 352-353.)
Although, as we explained in Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d 348,
lower federal courts had generally recognized the validity of the catalyst theory,
the United States Supreme Court recently rejected it as a basis for awarding
attorney fees to a “prevailing party.” (Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources (2001) 532 U.S. 598
(Buckhannon).) In that case, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc.
8
(Buckhannon), operated care homes that provided assisted living to their residents.
It failed a state inspection because some of the residents were incapable of “self-
preservation” as required under state law. (Id. at p. 600.) After receiving cease-
and-desist orders requiring closure of its facilities, it brought suit in federal court
against the State of West Virginia and others claiming that the “self-preservation”
requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C § 3601
et seq.) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C § 12101 et
seq.). The defendants agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist orders
pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery. In the meantime,
the West Virginia Legislature enacted legislation eliminating the “self-
preservation” requirement. The district court then dismissed the case as moot.
Buckhannon requested attorney fees under two statutes that permitted the court to
award attorney fees to the “prevailing party.” (Buckhannon, supra, at pp. 600-
601; see 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) [“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs”]; 42 U.S.C. § 12205
[“[T]he court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs”].) Buckhannon argued, as
plaintiffs argue here, “that they were entitled to attorney’s fees under the ‘catalyst
theory,’ which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired
result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s
conduct.” (Buckhannon, supra, at p. 601.)
The high court began its analysis by noting that in the United States parties
ordinarily must bear their own attorney fees, but Congress has authorized the
award of such fees to the “prevailing party” in numerous statutes. (Buckhannon,
supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 602-603.) “In designating those parties eligible for an
award of litigation costs, Congress employed the term ‘prevailing party,’ a legal
9
term of art. Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines ‘prevailing party’
as ‘[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded <in certain cases, the court will award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party>. —Also termed successful party.’ This view that a ‘prevailing
party’ is one who has been awarded some relief by the court can be distilled from
our prior cases.” (Id. at p. 603.) “In addition to judgments on the merits, we have
held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as
the basis for an award of attorney’s fees. [Citation.] Although a consent decree
does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant [citation], it
nonetheless is a court-ordered ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the
plaintiff] and the defendant.’ [Citations.] These decisions, taken together,
establish that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent
decrees create the ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’
necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 604, fn.
omitted.)
The court recognized that some of its cases contain dicta supporting the
catalyst theory but noted that its holdings have never applied it; its cases awarding
attorney fees involved a judgment on the merits or at least a consent decree.
(Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 603-604 & fns. 5, 7.) It concluded that “the
‘catalyst theory’ falls on the other side of the line from these examples. It allows
an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of
the parties. . . . A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the
necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against
holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” (Id. at
10
p. 605.) In response to the dissent’s suggestion that it suffices if the plaintiff
shows that the lawsuit stated a “colorable” and not “groundless” claim (id. at p.
627 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.)), the court disagreed “that the term ‘prevailing
party’ authorizes federal courts to award attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who, by
simply filing a nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it will
never be determined), has reached the ‘sought-after destination’ without obtaining
any judicial relief.” (Id. at p. 606.)
In response to the policy arguments that the catalyst theory was necessary
to prevent defendants generally from unilaterally mooting actions before judgment
to avoid paying attorney fees and to not deter those plaintiffs with meritorious but
expensive cases from bringing suit, the court cited contrary policy arguments. It
noted “the disincentive that the ‘catalyst theory’ may have upon a defendant’s
decision to voluntarily change its conduct, conduct that may not be illegal.” (Id. at
p. 608.) It also noted “that ‘[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a
second major litigation,’ [citation], and [the court has] accordingly avoided an
interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have ‘spawn[ed] a second
litigation of significant dimension,’ [citation]. Among other things, a ‘catalyst
theory’ hearing would require analysis of the defendant’s subjective motivations in
changing its conduct, an analysis that ‘will likely depend on a highly factbound
inquiry and may turn on reasonable inferences from the nature and timing of the
defendant’s change in conduct.’ [Citation.] Although we do not doubt the ability
of district courts to perform the nuanced ‘three thresholds’ test required by the
‘catalyst theory’—whether the claim was colorable rather than groundless;
whether the lawsuit was a substantial rather than an insubstantial cause of the
defendant’s change in conduct; whether the defendant’s change in conduct was
motivated by the plaintiff’s threat of victory rather than threat of expense [citation
11
to the dissenting opinion]—it is clearly not a formula for ‘ready administrability.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 609-610.) Ultimately, “[g]iven the clear meaning of
‘prevailing party’ in the fee-shifting statutes,” the court did not “determine which
way these various policy arguments cut.” (Id. at p. 610.) It concluded that “the
‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under”
these statutes. (Ibid.)
I agree with the majority that we are not required to follow the high court’s
interpretation of these federal statutes in interpreting California’s statutes. (Maj.
opn., ante, at p.14.) But federal decisions have persuasive value. “Since both this
court and the Legislature have relied on federal cases in framing the private
attorney general theory, we regard the federal precedent in this area as
persuasive.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290.) Because this court
has never awarded attorney fees on a catalyst theory, but only recognized the
existence of the federal rule, I see no reason suddenly to go an independent route
for the first time after the federal courts have abandoned that theory.
In the companion case of Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles
(December 2, 2004, S112943) ___ Cal.4th ___ (Tipton-Whittingham), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to this court questions
similar to the one presented in this case. (See Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los
Angeles (9th Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 1058.) In its certification order, it summarized
our cases in this regard: “California cases preceding Buckhannon, while
containing dicta that endorses the catalyst theory for the award of prevailing-party
attorneys’ fees, have involved circumstances where there has been a judicially
enforceable change in the legal relationship between the parties. See Maria P. v.
Riles, 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1290-91 (1987) (determining plaintiffs qualified as
prevailing parties under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1021.5 on the basis of
12
their preliminary injunction against defendants); In re Head, 42 Cal.3d 223, 225
(1986) (awarding attorneys’ fees after petitioners prevailed on their habeas corpus
claims); Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, 32 Cal.3d 668, 675-76
(1982) (awarding attorneys’ fees where the court entered partial summary
judgment and an injunction against one defendant); Northington v. Davis, 23
Cal.3d 955, 960 (1979) (upholding plaintiffs’ fee award where the trial court
granted summary judgment against the defendants).” (Id. at p. 1062.)
The majority says we “endorsed” the catalyst theory in Westside
Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d 348. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) But, as the Ninth
Circuit recognized, any such endorsement was dictum, because we denied attorney
fees in that case. (Westside Community, supra, at p. 355.) Moreover, our dictum
did not endorse the rule so much as merely recognize what “federal decisions”
(since overruled) had done. (Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 352.)
Indeed, as I explain in my separate dissent in Tipton-Whittingham, supra, ___
Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 4] (which, like Westside Community, involves a governmental
entity as defendant), Westside Community reversed an award of attorney fees in
part for reasons that argue against the catalyst theory as a whole, not merely its
application in that case. Now that we have occasion to examine the question
ourselves, we should not make the catalyst theory our own.
In Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. 598, the high court relied on the plain
meaning of the word “prevailing” to reject the catalyst theory. Here, the language
of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 militates much more strongly against
the catalyst theory. The federal statutes simply give trial courts discretion to allow
the “prevailing party” attorney fees. (See Buckhannon, supra, at p. 601.) Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5, however, permits an award only to a “successful”
(which is synonymous with “prevailing”) party in an action “which has resulted in
13
the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest . . . .” (Italics
added.) The italicized words means that the plaintiffs must have compelled the
defendant’s conduct to protect some “right.” (See Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p.
549 [defining “enforcement” as “[t]he act or process of compelling compliance
with a law, mandate, or command”].)
But voluntary action is not compelled action. Without some judicially
enforceable order, there is no way to know whether the action was voluntary or
compelled. Persons and entities act voluntarily in response to a lawsuit for many
reasons, some unrelated to the lawsuit’s merits: to avoid the expense of litigation
or bad publicity, to foster good public relations, to make an improvement or take
other useful action not required by law, perhaps simply to put the litigation behind
and move on. The pressure to yield voluntarily to a lawsuit’s demands, even if not
legally required, is exacerbated by the circumstance that historically attorney fee
awards have not gone in both directions. Although the statutes do not prohibit
awards to prevailing defendants, the private attorney general doctrine has
generally resulted only in attorney fee awards to the prevailing plaintiffs and not
also to the prevailing defendants. Thus, unlike the plaintiffs who can hope to be
reimbursed for their attorney fees, the defendants generally cannot expect to
receive compensation from the plaintiffs for their attorney fees. Those defendants
who choose to fight a lawsuit lose even when they win; they must pay their
attorneys themselves, which can be very expensive even for the victor. This
circumstance places the defendants under great pressure to settle a lawsuit, even if
unmeritorious, as soon as possible.
A “judicial imprimatur” (Buckhannon, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 605) on a
defendant’s change in conduct is thus necessary to show that the plaintiff actually
enforced a legal right. Merely eliciting a voluntary action is not enforcing a legal
14
right. But the catalyst theory simply assumes the defendant’s action was required
to right a legal wrong; it assumes the defendant had acted unlawfully. This
assumption is contrary to the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5.
The majority, as well as plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae, argue that
not adopting the catalyst theory might discourage lawsuits like this one, and
lawsuits like this one are so beneficial to society that courts must not do anything
that might discourage them. They claim the catalyst theory is necessary to provide
plaintiffs a full incentive to undertake the cost of public interest litigation. (E.g.,
maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) I agree that the private attorney general doctrine serves a
valuable purpose. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23
Cal.3d 917, 933.) But it can also impose a substantial cost in a litigious world,
especially as extended by the catalyst theory. The majority confidently asserts that
the catalyst theory requires only “relatively economical, straightforward
inquiries . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) It bases this assertion partly on “our
own judicial experience,” although it does not identify what that judicial
experience might be. (Ibid.) Our only judicial experience with the catalyst theory
consists of this case and Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d 348. Our
experience in this case is far from comforting and does not support the majority’s
confident assertion. Here, plaintiff filed a seven-page complaint stating a single
cause of action. Then, after a year of “hotly-contested discovery,” various
contested hearings, and a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court awarded
plaintiffs $762,830 in attorney fees, about 90 percent of which was for litigating
the catalyst theory. And we are not done yet, as the majority remands the case for
yet more litigation. Our experience in Westside Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d 348,
is also not very comforting. There we reversed a grant of attorney fees predicated
15
on the catalyst theory in our own hotly contested four-to-three decision, which
also hardly suggests the doctrine is as easy to apply as the majority asserts.
In Tipton-Whittingham, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 3], the majority
summarizes its catalyst theory requirements: “In order to obtain attorney fees
without such a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the
parties, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the
defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and
achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat
of expense . . . ; and, (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the
litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.” These requirements can be complex, not
straightforward.
The first of these requirements—causation—can itself be difficult to
establish. The mere coincidence of lawsuit followed by action is not enough under
the majority’s catalyst theory. “[I]n order to justify a fee award, there must be a
causal connection between the lawsuit and the relief obtained.” (Westside
Community, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 353 [reversing the award of attorney fees for
want of causation].) This requirement generally forces an inquiry into the
motivation behind the defendant’s actions, actions often undertaken by public or
corporate officials. (See Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32
Cal.3d 668, 686 [phrasing the question as “ ‘whether or not the local politicians
would have done what they have done absent the lawsuit’ ”].) The Attorney
General persuasively argues that the catalyst theory should never be based on a
change in legislation because of the difficulty and impropriety of delving into
legislators’ subjective motivation in enacting legislation. (See County of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 721, 726-727 & fn. 5.) But similar
concerns apply to actions of public officials in the executive branch or even
16
corporate decision makers and other persons. “Obviously it can be difficult to
prove causation where as here plaintiff seeks to recover on a catalyst theory.”
(Californians for Responsible Toxics Management v. Kizer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
961, 968.) In this case, for example, to show causation, plaintiff had to establish
that DaimlerChrysler adopted its policy, announced on September 10, 1999, due to
this lawsuit and not due to the ongoing efforts of the response team it had already
created to address the problem or the investigations of the Santa Cruz District
Attorney and California Attorney General that had begun before the lawsuit.
The second of these requirements forces a court that has entered no judicial
ruling in the plaintiff’s favor (otherwise the catalyst theory would not come into
play) to make some sort of ruling regarding the merits of the underlying lawsuit.
It is not clear to me exactly what the majority means in this regard, or how the trial
court is supposed to go about making this determination, but here, after more than
a year of litigating the catalyst theory, no court has yet made the ruling the
majority demands. Future courts will have to struggle mightily to decide how to
determine whether a moot lawsuit had merit when filed. Finally, the majority
requires the plaintiffs to establish that they attempted to settle the litigation
without a lawsuit (a requirement that, as I explain below, has long existed). This,
too, is a factual question of some complexity, as today’s remand for yet more
litigation demonstrates.
Thus, permitting attorney fees on a catalyst theory, with no objective
manifestation, in the form of judicial action, that the lawsuit vindicated a legal
right, may, as here, “ ‘result in a second major litigation.’ ” (Buckhannon, supra,
532 U.S. at p. 609.) “[T]he catalyst theory of fee recovery engenders confusion
and unnecessary litigation. . . . Too frequently, legal battles over attorneys’ fees
merely add another round of protracted litigation to what already has been
17
protracted litigation on the merits of a claim. . . . This collateral litigation over
attorneys’ fees is often more heated, more arcane, and over far higher monetary
stakes than the underlying lawsuit. The relationship of all of this activity to the
larger public good is becoming increasingly difficult to discern.” (S-1 By and
Through P-1 v. State Bd. of Educ. (4th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3d 160, 171 (dis. opn. of
Wilkinson, J.).)2
I can perceive of few things less useful to society than generating great
amounts of attorney fees litigating the catalyst theory. In another attorney fee
case, we stated that “scarce judicial resources should not be used to try the merits
of voluntarily dismissed actions merely to determine which party would or should
have prevailed had the action not been dismissed.” (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17
Cal.4th 599, 621.) In this case, scarce judicial resources should not be used to
litigate the various requirements of the catalyst theory.3
2
The Fourth Circuit adopted this dissenting opinion after in bank review. (S-
1 and S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C. (4th Cir. 1994) 21 F.3d 49, 51 (in bank).)
The high court later cited the in bank decision with approval. (Buckhannon,
supra, 532 U.S. at pp. 602, 608.)
3
The majority suggests that Santisas v. Gooden, supra, 17 Cal.4th 599,
supports adoption of the catalyst theory. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 18-19.) That case
does not do so. It involved the interplay of several statutes and certain contractual
language not relevant here. The issue was under what circumstances, if any, a
defendant might be considered a prevailing party when the plaintiff voluntarily
dismisses the action. When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action, the court
ultimately issues the order, which is a judicial action favorable to the defendant.
We had to decide whether it was the type of favorable action that supported an
award of attorney fees. To simplify a complex analysis (and one irrelevant here),
we held that it might be so in some circumstances. We relied in part on a statute
that defines “prevailing party” as including “a defendant in whose favor a
dismissal is entered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); see Santisas, supra,
at p. 621.) No equivalent statute exists for a plaintiff in whose favor no order of
any kind is entered.
18
The majority argues the catalyst theory is needed to eliminate risk in public
interest litigation. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) But there will always be risk.
Indeed, one of the requirements for any plaintiff seeking attorney fees is that the
plaintiff must have attempted to settle the dispute without litigation. (Grimsley v.
Board of Supervisors (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 960, 966; see maj. opn., ante, at pp.
25-26.) Carried to its logical conclusion, however, the majority’s catalyst
rationale should extend to attorney fees expended in seeking relief short of
litigation. If the threat of litigation causes the prospective defendant to provide the
relief sought, why should attorney fees be denied merely because no lawsuit was
needed? Denying attorney fees when the desired result is obtained without a
lawsuit can deter those plaintiffs who will have to expend attorney fees that they
may never recover. Yet even the majority is forced to admit that no one can be
deemed to be a successful party without a lawsuit. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16.)
The private attorney general doctrine inherently contains both a risk and a
cost. A line must be drawn somewhere to balance this risk and this cost. I would
hold that the statute here draws the necessary line by requiring some kind of a
judicial imprimatur before a plaintiff can be considered to be a successful or
prevailing party that enforced an important public right.
The potential for awards of this kind can also greatly increase the
possibility of undue pressure to settle meritless claims. If DaimlerChrysler had
simply paid the requested fees at the outset rather than litigate the question, it
could have spared itself most of the award (as well as its own attorney fees, which
are no doubt substantial). But surely plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorney fees was,
and is, not so clear that DaimlerChrysler could not, and cannot, reasonably litigate
it. The threat of a huge award of attorney fees generated while litigating the
catalyst theory permits the plaintiffs to extort attorney fees from businesses no
19
matter how weak their entitlement to them may be. With this case as a warning,
future defendants may surrender to attorney fee demands, no matter how
unmeritorious, rather than risk a substantial award of attorney fees down the road.
Indeed, the private attorney general doctrine, even without the catalyst
theory and multipliers on fees on fees (see pt. II. C.), gives the plaintiffs a great
advantage in settlement negotiations. The defendants generally have to pay their
own attorney fees. Thus, those defendants who litigate rather than sell out as
cheaply as possible as soon as possible face not the risk, but the near certainty,
that they will incur attorney fees they will not recover. They also risk incurring a
potentially substantial award for the opponents’ attorney fees. The plaintiffs, by
contrast, merely face the possibility they will not be compensated for their own
attorney fees; they run little risk of having to pay their opponent’s attorney fees.
And to compensate for even this possibility, the private attorney general doctrine
permits courts to add a multiplier to the plaintiffs’ attorney fees, which can be very
rewarding, as this case illustrates. The plaintiffs thus have relatively little
incentive to settle, defendants a very strong need to settle. I see no need for the
catalyst theory to provide yet more incentive to plaintiffs.
For all of these reasons, I would not adopt the catalyst theory as a basis for
awarding attorney fees. I would conclude that before a party can be considered to
be a successful or prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5
or Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), there must be some court-
ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in
the plaintiff’s favor.
20
B. Plaintiffs have not established entitlement to attorney fees even
under the majority’s catalyst theory.
Even accepting the majority’s catalyst theory, plaintiffs have failed to
establish entitlement to attorney fees for several reasons.
For any plaintiff (including those who actually win their lawsuit) to receive
attorney fees, the action must have “resulted in the enforcement of an important
right affecting the public interest . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.) “A decision
which has as its primary effect the vindication of the litigant’s personal rights is
not one which brings into play the attorney fees provision of [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 1021.5.” (In re Head (1986) 42 Cal.3d 223, 228.) Plaintiffs’
complaint was solely for breach of warranty. It sought only class certification
(which plaintiffs never obtained), an award of “compensatory damages for breach
of warranty,” and attorney fees. This action was, at most, a vindication of
personal rights, not an important right affecting the general public.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court and the majority of this
court claim that the lawsuit “implicated an issue of public safety, and that the
lawsuit benefited thousands of consumers and potentially thousands more by
acting as a deterrent to discourage lax responses to known safety hazards.” (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 27.) Neither the trial court nor the majority gets more specific, but
they must be referring to the incorrect advertising, not any failure to fully
compensate the consumers for their damages; whether the consumers were made
whole does not implicate public safety. I agree there is some evidence that
DaimlerChrysler’s mistake regarding the towing capacity implicated public safety
at one time. (See id. at p. 3 [“The reduced towing capacity was a potential risk
factor.”].) I also agree that the public agency investigation revealed that brochures
containing the mistake were distributed as late as August 1999. (Ibid.) But
entirely missing is any relationship between public safety concerns and this
21
lawsuit. The plaintiffs expressly alleged that in June 1999, DaimlerChrysler
admitted its error in a letter sent to owners of the affected trucks. They alleged
nothing regarding any continuing misrepresentations or any other public safety
concerns, whether in the past or present. The only remedies the lawsuit sought
were individual damages and attorney fees. No evidence whatever supports the
conclusion that this lawsuit affected any public safety concerns. All that this
lawsuit implicated was the truck owners’ parochial financial interests.
Maximizing plaintiffs’ pecuniary gain does nothing to enhance public safety.
In trying to distinguish this lawsuit from the public agency investigation,
and thus respond to DaimlerChrysler’s argument that this was an unnecessary
“tagalong” lawsuit, the trial court said that the public agencies “were only
concerned with DaimlerChrysler’s false advertising materials and never sought
any remedies on behalf of the consumers who acquired these vehicles while they
were being misrepresented. Private enforcement was needed.” But it was the
false advertising, not plaintiffs’ ability to maximize their monetary recovery, that
implicated public safety. Plaintiffs (and the majority here) cannot have it both
ways. They cannot assert that this lawsuit was more than a tagalong lawsuit
because the public agencies were solely interested in public safety, and then also
claim that plaintiffs conferred a substantial public benefit in enhancing public
safety. The public agency investigation took care of public safety. The private
attorney general doctrine is not necessary when the real Attorney General was
protecting the public interest.4
4
The majority says I question the rule of Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417-1418, that Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5 requires a finding that the lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on a
substantial number of people and that the action’s subject matter implicated the
(footnote continued on next page)
22
The trial court also said that the Santa Cruz District Attorney and the
Attorney General “had only made an inquiry and had not commenced any
proceeding when plaintiffs filed this action.” But the private attorney general
doctrine should not reward someone merely for winning the race to the
courthouse, especially given the long-standing requirement that the plaintiff must
have attempted to settle the matter before filing the lawsuit, which the public
agencies were doing.
The trial court and majority also suggest the attorney fee award was
appropriate because this action served as a deterrent to others who might otherwise
have a lax response to safety concerns. This suggestion fails for two reasons, one
legal, one factual. First, “Carried to its logical conclusion, the reasoning adopted
by the trial court and espoused by plaintiff would make the private attorney
general doctrine applicable in every case in which a plaintiff successfully sued a
public agency [or, as here, a large business] for some wrongful conduct, because
every such lawsuit would communicate a message to the losing party. Such an
expansive reading of the statutory requirement is untenable.” (Flannery v.
(footnote continued from previous page)
public interest. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29, fn. 9.) I do not question that rule.
Instead I question the majority’s assertion that this lawsuit implicated public
safety, the only ground it provides for awarding plaintiffs attorney fees.
The majority also accuses me of “reweighing and recharacteriz[ing]” the
evidence. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29, fn. 9.) However, no evidence exists that this
lawsuit implicated public safety that can be reweighed or recharacterized. The
majority has not even attempted to identify any such evidence. It merely refers the
reader to unspecified “facts reviewed in the first part of this opinion.” (Id. at p.
27.) But the majority’s factual recitation shows that the public agencies, not
plaintiffs, addressed public safety concerns. (See id. at p. 3 [the “public agency
investigation revealed that brochures misrepresenting the trucks’ towing capacity
were still being distributed as of August 1999”].)
23
California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 636.) Second, even if the
deterrence rationale could be used in some cases, this is not one of those cases.
The public agencies, not plaintiffs, took steps to ensure that this mistake will not
recur. The public agencies, not plaintiffs, forced DaimlerChrysler to pay a
$75,000 fine. For plaintiffs to seek credit for what the public agencies did proves
the truth of DaimlerChrysler’s claim that, for purposes of the private attorney
general doctrine, plaintiffs’ lawsuit was, indeed, merely a tagalong action.
In addition to erroneously seeking and obtaining credit for what the public
agencies did, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy two other requirements: (1) they have
failed to show that the lawsuit had any merit; and (2) they have failed to show that
they reasonably attempted to settle the matter short of litigation.5 The majority
implicitly recognizes this failure. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-25.) But, determined
to reward these plaintiffs no matter how unwarranted the reward may be, it
remands the matter for yet more litigation. It does so by a clever bit of judicial
sleight-of-hand. It says that “these limitations on the catalyst theory are to some
degree new.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2, italics added.) Implicit is the argument that
it would be unfair to deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove newly minted
requirements.
I agree that, because the majority adopts the catalyst theory for the first
time today, it has just invented some of the rules—in particular, the rule that a
court that has never ruled on the merits should do so as part of the attorney fee
litigation. Accordingly, to some degree, the limitations are new. But one critical
requirement—that plaintiffs show the lawsuit was actually necessary—is not new.
5
Indeed, as noted, the trial court awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in part
because they filed their lawsuit while the public agencies were trying to settle the
matter short of litigation.
24
The majority tries to obfuscate this circumstance by saying the “Attorney General
proposes” this rule. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.) It hopes, no doubt, that the reader
will infer that the Attorney General is proposing something new. But the Attorney
General is not proposing something new. Rather, he is merely citing a
requirement that has long existed. “[A]ttorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5, will not be awarded unless the plaintiff seeking such fees had
reasonably endeavored to enforce the ‘important right affecting the public
interest,’ without litigation and its attendant expense.” (Grimsley v. Board of
Supervisors, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 966 [denying attorney fees for failure to
satisfy this requirement even though the plaintiff had won a final judgment].) This
language is quite clear, and it was written in 1985, long before the events of this
case. Accordingly, plaintiffs have always been on notice of this requirement. I
see no reason, and the majority supplies none, to permit plaintiff to relitigate this
question.
Even in the course of the proceedings in this court, plaintiffs have not
attempted to show their action had any merit. They have not shown that
DaimlerChrysler was legally required to offer a full refund in addition to the steps
it had already taken regarding plaintiffs, which included full disclosure,
prospective correction, and offers to pay for a hitch that, so far as this lawsuit
demonstrates, would have cured all harm. The majority suggests that the “precise
remedy chosen” need not be legally required and hypothesizes the existence of
some other remedy that plaintiffs sought and that DaimlerChrysler was legally
required to provide, and for which the actual remedy of a full refund was a
“compromise.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26, fn. 7.) I cannot imagine what that
remedy might be, and neither plaintiffs nor the majority suggests any, but I
suppose plaintiffs can attempt to prove one on remand if they choose. But for the
25
lawsuit to have any merit there must be some “primary relief sought” (Tipton-
Whittingham, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 3]) that DaimlerChrysler was
required to provide. Plaintiffs will have to make this showing on remand, and the
trial court will have to make this determination.
The court will also have to determine whether plaintiffs can show that they
attempted to settle the matter short of litigation. Because at least waiting until
DaimlerChrysler had responded to the public agencies’ inquiry before filing a
complaint would have been eminently reasonable, plaintiffs will not be able to
make this showing, which is no doubt why they have not yet tried to do so despite
the long-standing existence of Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 169
Cal.App.3d 960. I also hope that on remand, the court will reconsider its
contradiction in (1) finding this lawsuit different from the public agency
investigation and (2) predicating the actual award of attorney fees on what the
public agencies had accomplished. The court should look instead to what this
lawsuit accomplished, which had nothing to do with public safety.
I can only hope that future courts apply the catalyst theory with more care
than the majority does its own creation.
C. Plaintiffs should not receive a multiplier for litigating fees on fees.
The majority also holds that a plaintiff may recover, as attorney fees, not
only its fees incurred prosecuting the underlying litigation, with a multiplier, and
its fees incurred litigating its entitlement to attorney fees (i.e., fees on fees), but
also a multiplier on fees on fees. I appreciate the majority’s attempt to limit the
size of such multipliers. The majority’s efforts might help reduce the instances of
the tail wagging the dog like here, where the fee for litigating fees on fees is nine
times greater than the fee for litigating the underlying lawsuit. But I would hold
that a multiplier is never appropriate for litigating fees on fees. The majority
26
disagrees with courts from other states that have considered this question and,
tellingly, cites no out-of-state cases supporting its conclusion. (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 30.) If, as the majority claims, the private attorney general doctrine is intended
to encourage societally useful lawsuits (like the majority finds this one to be), and
not merely to swell attorneys’ coffers, permitting fees for work expended on the
actual lawsuit plus a multiplier, and permitting attorneys to be paid for their efforts
in obtaining those fees plus that multiplier, is a sufficient incentive. A multiplier
on fees generated litigating fees, which, as here, can make the overall reward truly
absurd compared to the effort regarding the underlying litigation, is not necessary.
Permitting this second multiplier further stacks settlement leverage in the
plaintiffs’ favor. Not only must a defendant be concerned about paying its own
attorney fees, and about having to pay for the plaintiffs’ attorney fees incurred in
the underlying litigation, with a potential multiplier, and about having to pay
attorney fees the plaintiff incurred in seeking fees, it must also worry about paying
a multiplier on that amount. All this greatly increases the pressure on the
defendants to buy their way out of lawsuits as cheaply as possible no matter how
meritless they may be.
I must also comment on the irony, no doubt unintended, of the majority’s
statements that a multiplier often takes into account the attorney’s “exceptional
skill,” and that litigating fees on fees “is for the most part simpler than litigation
on the merits.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.) Plaintiffs exhibited no exceptional skill
in litigating the underlying lawsuit. Because DaimlerChrysler had long since
voluntarily informed plaintiffs of its mistake, plaintiffs had to undertake little or
no investigation. Plaintiffs’ attorneys merely filed a simple seven-page complaint
alleging a single cause of action and containing largely boilerplate language.
Ironically, these attorneys’ best lawyering came when litigating their entitlement
27
to attorney fees, including their ability to convince the trial court both to find that
their action was distinct from the public agency investigation and to credit them
with what the public agencies had accomplished. Although I hesitate to suggest
this lest the court on remand take me seriously, in a perverse way, under the
majority’s analysis, plaintiffs’ effort while litigating their entitlement to fees might
be entitled to a larger multiplier than their effort regarding the underlying lawsuit.
Thus is the topsy-turvy world of catalyst theory and fees plus multipliers
plus fees on fees plus more multipliers for fees on fees.
III. CONCLUSION
At a time when Californians are increasingly concerned about extortionate
lawsuits against businesses, large and small, and worried that the legal climate in
California is so unfriendly to businesses that many are leaving the state and others
are deterred from coming here in the first place,6 today’s ruling goes in exactly the
wrong direction. And it goes further in that direction than this court has ever gone
before. We should interpret and apply California’s private attorney general
statutes sensibly to encourage responsible litigation while also keeping attorney
fee judgments within reasonable bounds and maintaining some semblance of
balance between the litigation positions of the plaintiffs and the defendants.
6
On November 2, 2004, for example, the voters approved Proposition 64,
which places limitations on private enforcement of California’s unfair competition
law. The supporting ballot argument urged a yes vote to “protect small businesses
from frivolous [shakedown] lawsuits” that “make businesses want to move to
other states where lawyers don’t have a legal extortion loophole. When businesses
leave, taxpayers who remain pick up the burden.” (Ballot Pamp., General Elec.
(Nov. 2, 2004) argument in favor of Proposition 64, p. 40.)
28
Because the majority does not do so, I dissent. I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
BROWN,
J.
29
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Graham V. Daimler-Chrysler
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 12/6/02 - 2d Dist., Div. 1
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
_________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S112862
Date Filed: December 2, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Bruce Mitchell, Temporary Judge*
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., DoHoang T. Duong, Gregory D. Brown, Dominic
Lanza; Bryan Cave, Sheldon Eisenberg, Charles A. Newman, John W. Rogers; Robert E. Norton II and
Mary E. Waldrup for Defendants and Appellants.
Somach, Simmons & Dunn, Timothy M. Taylor, Nicholas A. Jacobs, Christian C. Scheuring for Western
Placer Waste Management Authority as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Ruth Sorensen and Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Fred J. Hiestand for Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and
Appellants.
Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar; Latham & Watkins, Jennifer F. Ziegaus and Daniel P. Brunton for
Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Law Offices of Richard M. Pearl, Richard M. Pearl; Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron & Ogilvie, Andrew J.
Ogilvie, Mark F. Anderson and Bryan A. Kemnitzer for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward G. Weil, Deputy
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
*Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21.
1
Page 2 - counsel continued S112862
Attorneys for Respondent:
F. Paul Bland, Kerry-Ann T. Powell, Victoria W. Ni and Arthur H. Bryant for Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, AARP, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties, ACLU of
Southern California, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, Bet
Tzedek-The House of Justice, California League for Environmental Enforcement Now, California
Women’s Law Center, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc.,
The First Amendment Project, The Impact Fund, Law Offices of Joaquin G. Avila, Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Center for
Youth Law, Prison Law Office, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Public Advocates, Inc., Public Citizen,
Public Counsel, Public Interest Law Project, Rosen, Bien & Asaro, Western Center on Law and Poverty,
Western Law Center for Disability Rights and Youth Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
Esner & Chang, Stuart B. Esner; Rohde & Victoroff and Stephen F. Rohde for Los Angeles County Bar
Association and Beverly Hills Bar Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Chavez & Gertler, Mark A. Chavez and Kim E. Card for The Bar Association of San Francisco as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant; Ian Herzog; Michael Adler; Sharon J. Arkin; Stuart B.
Enser; Brian S. Kabateck, David A. Rosen; Daniel U. Smith; Christine D. Spagnoli; Lea-Annn Tratten;
Steven B. Stevens; and Scott H. Z. Sumner for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Mark Savage for Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Fazio & Micheletti, Jeffrey L. Fazio and Dina E. Micheletti for Friends of the Earth, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Claudia Center, Elizabeth Kristen; and Linda Kilb for The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center and
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
333 South Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 229-7000
Richard M. Pearl
Law Offices of Richard M. Pearl
1816 Fifth Street
Berkeley, CA 94710
(510) 649-0810
3
Date: | Docket Number: |
Thu, 12/02/2004 | S112862 |
1 | Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Sheldon Eisenberg Attorney At Law 120 Broadway #300 Santa Monica, CA |
2 | Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Theodore J. Boutrous Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 333 S Grand Ave Los Angeles, CA |
3 | Daimlerchrysler Motors Corporation (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Sheldon Eisenberg Attorney At Law 120 Broadway #300 Santa Monica, CA |
4 | Daimlerchrysler Motors Corporation (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Theodore J. Boutrous Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 333 S Grand Ave Los Angeles, CA |
5 | Graham, Robert (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Andrew J. Ogilvie Kemnitzer Anderson Barron & Ogilvie LLP 445 Bush St 6FL San Francisco, CA |
6 | Graham, Robert (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Richard M. Pearl LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD M. PEARL 1816 5th St Berkeley, CA |
7 | Trekell, Truman (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Andrew J. Ogilvie Kemnitzer Anderson Barron & Ogilvie LLP 445 Bush St 6FL San Francisco, CA |
8 | Trekell, Truman (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Richard M. Pearl LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD M. PEARL 1816 5th St Berkeley, CA |
9 | Hawkins, Daniel (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Andrew J. Ogilvie Kemnitzer Anderson Barron & Ogilvie LLP 445 Bush St 6FL San Francisco, CA |
10 | Hawkins, Daniel (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Richard M. Pearl LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD M. PEARL 1816 5th St Berkeley, CA |
11 | Western Placer Waste Management Auhority (Amicus curiae) Represented by Timothy Taylor Somach Simmons & Dunn 813 6th St 3FL Sacramento, CA |
12 | Bar Association Of San Francisco (Amicus curiae) Represented by Kim E. Card Chavez & Gertler LLP 42 Miller Ave Mill Valley, CA |
13 | Friends Of The Earth, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Jeffrey L. Fazio Fazio Micheletti LLP 1900 South Norfolk Street, Suite 350 San Mateo, CA |
14 | Friends Of The Earth, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Dina Elizabeth Micheletti Fazio Micheletti LLP 1900 South Norfolk Street, Suite 350 San Mateo, CA |
15 | Beverly Hills Bar Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Stuart B. Esner Esner & Chang 523 W 6th St #524 Los Angeles, CA |
16 | Beverly Hills Bar Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Stephen F. Rohde Rohde & Victoroff 1880 Century Park East, #411 Los Angeles, CA |
17 | Los Angeles County Bar Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Stuart B. Esner Esner & Chang 80 South Lake Avenue Suite 720 Pasadena, CA |
18 | Washington Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae) Represented by Daniel Popeo Washington Legal Foundation 2009 Massachusetts Avenue., NW Washington, DC |
19 | Washington Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae) Represented by Jennifer Faith Ziegaus Latham & Watkins 701 B Street #2100 San Diego, CA |
20 | Consumers Union Of The United States, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Mark Savage Consumers Union Of US Inc 1535 Mission Street San Francisco, CA |
21 | California State Association Of Counties (Amicus curiae) Represented by Jennifer Bacon Henning California State Association of Counties 1100 K Street, Suite 101 Sacramento, CA |
22 | Trial Lawyers For Public Justice (Amicus curiae) Represented by Victoria Wei-Chi Ni Trial Lawyers Publ Justice 555 12TH Street # 1620 Oakland, CA |
23 | American Association Of Retired Persons (Amicus curiae) Represented by Arthur H Bryant Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 1 Kaiser Plz #275 Oakland, CA |
24 | Civil Justice Association Of California (Amicus curiae) Represented by Fred James Hiestand Attorney at Law 1121 L St #404 Sacramento, CA |
25 | Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae) Represented by James C. Sturdevant The Sturdevant Law Firm 475 Sansome Street, Suite 1750 San Francisco, CA |
26 | Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center (Amicus curiae) Represented by Claudia Center Employment Law Ctr 1663 Mission St #400 San Francisco, CA |
27 | Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center (Amicus curiae) Represented by Elizabeth Kristen Legal Aid Soc-Emp Law Ctr 600 Harrison Street, Suite 120 San Francisco, CA |
28 | Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (Amicus curiae) Represented by Linda D. Kilb DREDF 2212 6th St Berkeley, CA |
Disposition | |
Dec 2 2004 | Opinion: Reversed |
Dockets | |
Jan 15 2003 | Petition for review filed appellants DaimlerChrysler Corporation, etal |
Jan 16 2003 | Received: certificate of word count |
Jan 17 2003 | Received Court of Appeal record 1 doghouse |
Feb 5 2003 | Answer to petition for review filed by plaintiffs/respondents (Robert Graham, Truman C. Trekell and Daniel Craig Hawkins) CRC 40k |
Feb 6 2003 | Received: Respondent's Certificate of Word Count |
Feb 13 2003 | Received letter from: Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher [Appellants DaimlerChrysler], dated 2/13/2003 (letter received in L. A. Office) |
Feb 19 2003 | Letter sent to: All Counsel enclosing a copy of the grant order and the Certificate of Interested Entities or Persons form. |
Feb 19 2003 | Petition for Review Granted (civil case) Votes: George, C.J.,Kennard, J.,Baxter, J.,Werdegar, J.,Chin,J.,Brown, J.,and Moreno,J. |
Feb 20 2003 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse - 2 of 2. |
Feb 20 2003 | 2nd record request Additional record -- Vol. 2 of 2 sent overnight Received Appellant's Appendix Vols. 2 thru 6. |
Feb 28 2003 | Received letter from: |
Mar 6 2003 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed cousel for appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation |
Mar 13 2003 | Request for extension of time filed appellant Daimlerchrysler Corp., and DaimlerChrysler Motores Corp. asking to April 20, 2003. |
Mar 14 2003 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by Respondents Graham et al |
Mar 24 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Appellants' Opening Brief on the Merits is extended to and incuding April 20, 2003. |
Apr 18 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed appellant, DaimlerChrysler Corp., and Daimlerhrysler Motors Corp |
Apr 18 2003 | Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding) appellant, DaimlerChrysler Corp., and DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., |
May 13 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by counsel for Respondents to file Answer Brief on the Merits. |
May 14 2003 | Extension of time granted Respondents granted to and including June 23, 2003 to file answer brief on the merits. |
Jun 19 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by plaintiffs/respondents to July 23, 2003 to file their answer brief on the merits. |
Jun 23 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of respondents and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including July 23, 2003. |
Jul 14 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief (in Sacramento) Western Placer Waste Management Authority in support of defendants/appellants |
Jul 17 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Western Placer Waste Management Authority for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants and appellants is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Jul 17 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: Western Placer Waste Management Authority in support of defendants and appellants. |
Jul 22 2003 | Request for extension of time filed (Third) for a final seven-day extension to 7-30-2003, to file respondent's opening brief/merits |
Jul 24 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of Resopndent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Answer Brief on the Merits is extended to and including July 30, 2003. |
Jul 31 2003 | Received: Untimely (one day late) Respondents' Answer Brief on the Merits with application to file brief in excess of length limit (containing 68 pages and 17,723 words.) CRC rule 29.1(c) -- 50 page limit or 14,000 words See also Corrected Table of Authorities |
Aug 1 2003 | Order filed Respondents' application to file their Answer Brief on the Merits containing 17,723 words, in excess of the word count limit of 14,000 words (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.1(c)), is hereby GRANTED. |
Aug 1 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed Respondents' |
Aug 4 2003 | Received: Respondents' Proof of Service of the answer brief on the merits, etc. sent to Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. |
Aug 6 2003 | Request for extension of time filed Respondents' answer to amicus curiae brief of Western Placer Waste Manaement Authority to be at the same time that responses to other amici will be due. If not granted, respondents request an extension to August 18, 2003. |
Aug 11 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of respondents and good cause apeparing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Respondents' Response to the Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Western Placer Waste Management Authority in support of defendants and appellants is extended to and including 8-18-2003. |
Aug 13 2003 | Request for extension of time filed to file aplnt/DaimlerChrysler/DaimlerChrysler Motors corp. for Reply Brieg/Merits [to Sept.4th] |
Aug 18 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by respondents for an additional seven (7) days to 8/25/2003, to file their answer to Western Placer's Amicus Brief |
Aug 19 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file appellants' reply brief on the merits is extended to and including September 4, 2003. |
Aug 21 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of respondents and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Respondents' Answer to the Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Western Placer Waste Management Authority in support of appellants is extended to and including August 25, 2003. |
Aug 26 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Respondents' Answer to Amicus Curiae Brief of Western Placer Waste Management Authority (40K/FedEx) |
Sep 4 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) appellants DaimlerChrysler Corp. and DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp. |
Sep 16 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by the Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF) to file the application and amicus curiae brief in support of respondents to November 10, 2003. |
Sep 17 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of Amicus Curiae Bar Association of San Francisco (BASF) and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of respondents herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Sep 23 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed by the Attorney General in support of plaintiffs and respondents (Graham, et al) |
Sep 24 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by Friends of the Earth, Inc. [FoE] to file the application and amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent Graham to and including November 10, 2003. |
Sep 26 2003 | Request for extension of time filed Los Angeles County Bar Assn & Beverly Hills Bar Assn to file ac brief to 11-10-03 |
Sep 26 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Friends of the Earth, Inc. (FoE), and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of respondent Robert Graham herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Sep 30 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Beverly Hills Bar Association and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of Respondents Robert Graham et al. herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An Answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Sep 30 2003 | Request for extension of time filed (in San Diego) Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation to file their application and amicus curiae brief in support of Appellants Daimler Chrysler Corporation et al., to and including Nov. 10, 2003 |
Sep 30 2003 | Request for extension of time filed Amicus Curiae Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. in support of Respondents Robert Graham et al., to and including November 10, 2003, to file their brief |
Oct 1 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Los Angeles County Bar Association and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of respondents Robert Graham et al. herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 2 2003 | Request for extension of time filed (in Sacramento) by amicus California State Association of Counties to file the application and amicus curiae brief, asking to and including Nov. 10, 2003. |
Oct 3 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Washington Legal Fouindation and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of Appellants DaimlerChrysler Corporation et al. herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 3 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of Respondents Robert Graham et al. herein is extended to and includng November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 6 2003 | Request for extension of time filed to and incuding 11-10-2003, to file the application and amicus curiae brief by Civil Justice Association of California (CJAC) in support of appellants. (CRC40k/FedEx) |
Oct 6 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief Amici Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, AARP and several other entities, in support of respondents. (amici brief separate) |
Oct 8 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae California State Associciation of Counties and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of appellants herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 14 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by plaintiffs and respondents to file their Response to the Attorney General's amicus curiae brief at the same time responses to all other amici curiae briefs are due. If not granted, respondents are requesting an e.o.t. to 11-10-2003. |
Oct 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, AARP, and several other entities for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Respondents Robert Graham et al. is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, AARP, and several other entitles in support of Respondents Robert Graham et al. |
Oct 14 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of Amicus Curiae Civil Justice Association of California and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of appellants herein is extended to and including November 10, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Oct 14 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by defendants and appellants (DaimlerChrysler) for 48 calendar days, to and including 11-30-2003, to file their response to the Attorney General's amicus curiae brief. |
Oct 17 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of both counsel for appellants and respondents, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file both parties' Responses to all Amici Curiae Briefs filed is extended to and including November 30, 2003. |
Nov 10 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief ac Beverly Hills Bar Association [in support of respondents] |
Nov 10 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief of California State Association of Counties in support of Appellants. Application and Brief under same cover. |
Nov 10 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief of Consumer Attorneys of California in support of Respondent. Application and brief under same cover. |
Nov 10 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief of Washington Legal Foundation in support of appellants. Application and brief under same cover. |
Nov 10 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief by The Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center and Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund in support of respondents. *Submitted late - was due by 10/4/03.* |
Nov 10 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by amicus Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. requesting 2 day extension, to Nov. 12, 2003, to submit application and amicus brief. (**granted - order being prepared) |
Nov 12 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Consumers Union of U.S., INC., in support of Respondent. Application and brief under separate covers. |
Nov 12 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Of Friends of the Earth, INC., in support of Respondent. / 40(K). Application and brief under same cover. |
Nov 12 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief of The Bar Association of San Francisco in support of respondents. / 40(K). Application and brief under same cover. |
Nov 12 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief of The Civil Justice Association of California in support of Appellants. / 40(K). Application and Brief under same cover. |
Nov 12 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of amicus curiae Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of respondents herein is extended to and including November 12, 2003. An answer may be filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Consumer Attorneys of California in support of respondents. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Consumer Attorneys of California in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Beverly Hills Bar Association in support of Respondents. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Beverly Hills Bar Association in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The Civil Justice Association of California in support of Appellants. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed The Civil Justice Association of California in support of Appellants. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Washington Legal Foundation in support of Appellants. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Washington Legal Foundation in support of Appellants. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Friends of the Earth, Inc., in support of Respondents. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Friends of the Earth, Inc., in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding) By AC Friends of the Earth, Inc., |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted California State Association of Counties. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed California State Association of Counties in support of appellants. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. in support of Respondents. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The Bar Association of San Francisco in support of Respondents. |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed The Bar Association of San Francisco in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days. |
Nov 14 2003 | Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding) By AC Bar Association of San Francisco. |
Nov 17 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center and the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
Nov 17 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center and the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund in support of respondent. |
Dec 1 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed consolidated response to ac briefs>>appellants DaimlerChrysler |
Dec 1 2003 | Request for extension of time filed by counsel for plaintiffs/respondents (Graham et al) for e.o.t. to 12/22/2003, to file respondents' response to all amicus curiae briefs. Order prepared granting e.o.t. as requested. No further e.o.t. will be granted. |
Dec 4 2003 | Extension of time granted On application of respondents and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Respondents' Response to Various Amicus Curiae Briefs is extended to and including 12-22-2003. No further extensions of time will be granted. |
Dec 23 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Respondents' Consolidated Response to Briefs of Amicus Curiae (40k/FedEx) |
Jan 14 2004 | Notice of substitution of counsel received Filed "Substitution of Attorney" for Jeffrey L. Fazio/Dina E.Micheletti (Fazio &n Micheletti) in place of Hancock Rothert & Bunshoft as counsel for Amicus Friends of the Earth |
Feb 23 2004 | Received letter from: Fazio & Micheletti, LLP, counsel for Amicus Friends of the Earth, Inc. dated February 20, 2004. |
Aug 4 2004 | Request for judicial notice granted The requests for judicial notice of defendants and appellants DaimlerChrysler Corporation et al., filed April 18, 2003, of amicus curiae Friends of the Earth, Inc., filed November 14, 2003, and of amicus curiae Bar Association of San Francisco, filed November 14, 2003, are granted. |
Aug 11 2004 | Case ordered on calendar 9-8-04, 9am, S.F. |
Aug 18 2004 | Note: Mail returned (unable to forward) |
Aug 20 2004 | Change of contact information filed for: Arthur Bryant and Victoria Ni, counsel for AC Trial Lawyers for Public Justice. |
Aug 27 2004 | Filed: Additional Authorities>>appellants DaimlerChrysler Corporation, etal |
Sep 8 2004 | Cause argued and submitted |
Dec 2 2004 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed Opinion by Moreno, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, & Werdegar, JJ. Dissenting opinion by Chin, J. -----joined by Baxter, & Brown, JJ. |
Dec 20 2004 | Change of contact information filed for: ESNER & CHANG ( Amicus Curiae LA County Bar Assoc.) to Pasadena. |
Dec 27 2004 | Filed: late request for modification>Planning & Conservation League, etal |
Dec 27 2004 | Filed: request for modification of opinion ( amicus curiae The Impact Fund) |
Dec 30 2004 | Order filed Finality of the opinion in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including January 28, 2005. |
Jan 7 2005 | Filed: Respondent's ( Graham) response to requests for modification of opinion. |
Jan 12 2005 | Opinion modified - no change in judgment |
Jan 12 2005 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
Jan 20 2005 | Returned record |
Jan 28 2005 | Returned record |
Feb 3 2005 | Received: complete record from LA - four doghouses |
Briefs | |
Apr 18 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
Jul 17 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
Aug 1 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
Aug 26 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
Sep 4 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
Sep 23 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Oct 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 14 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Nov 17 2003 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
Dec 1 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
Dec 23 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |