Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S104477
Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler


Filed 5/27/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSEMARIE GAVALDON et al.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S104477
v.
Ct.App.
4/3
Nos. G026626, G027036
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, )

) Orange
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 785866

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (hereafter sometimes the Act or
the Song-Beverly Act), Civil Code section 1791 et seq.,1 provides, in section
1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), that when a manufacturer does not repair a motor
vehicle to conform to an express warranty after “a reasonable number of
attempts,” the buyer may opt to have the item replaced, or may return the item and
obtain restitution for its cost (hereafter sometimes the replacement/restitution
remedy). In the present case, the trial court found that plaintiff Rosemarie
Gavaldon’s Dodge Caravan minivan was substantially impaired because of a
defective transmission that defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation and its
representatives (hereafter DaimlerChrysler) had been unable to repair after
numerous attempts. The court found that the defect arose after the expiration of

1
All statutory citations are to this code unless otherwise indicated.



Gavaldon’s 3-year/36,000-mile warranty. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
Gavaldon was entitled to section 1792.3, subdivision (d)’s replacement/restitution
remedy because the transmission defect was covered by Gavaldon’s 7-
year/70,000-mile service contract, and that, for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act,
a service contract was a type of express warranty. The trial court therefore
awarded Gavaldon the purchase price of the vehicle, minus the value attributed to
its past use (see § 1792.3, subd. (d)(2)(C)), for a total of $13,623.63, plus attorney
fees provided under the Act. The Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed the trial
court’s award. Gavaldon’s petition for review calls on us to decide whether a
service contract is an express warranty within the meaning of the Act. We
conclude that it is not.
Gavaldon also contends that even if a service contract is not an express
warranty, section 1794, governing remedies available under the Act, authorizes the
replacement/restitution remedy for breaches of service contracts. As explained
below, we conclude Gavaldon misreads the statute. Gavaldon also contends that
she may prevail on the theory that she properly revoked acceptance of the vehicle,
and is therefore authorized to be reimbursed for the vehicle under section 1794,
subdivision (b), which expressly incorporates various Commercial Code remedies
into the Act. We conclude the Court of Appeal is correct that she did not properly
raise this issue below, and we will not consider it here. We also conclude that
Gavaldon did not properly raise in the Court of Appeal the issue of whether the
judgment in her favor could be sustained on the theory that DaimlerChrysler’s
breach of the service contract entitled her to damages based on the diminution in
the value of the automobile.
2

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts below are taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinion.
Gavaldon bought her new Dodge Caravan minivan in June 1993. The vehicle
came with DaimlerChrysler’s standard factory warranty under which the owner
could choose either a 3-year/36,000-mile basic warranty (the 3/36 warranty) or a
12-month/12,000-mile basic warranty plus a 7-year/70,000-mile power train
coverage. Gavaldon stipulated, and the trial court found, that the 3/36 warranty
applied.
When Gavaldon purchased the minivan, she also purchased a service
contract, issued by DaimlerChrysler, for an additional $890. The service contract
provided it was to “protect [the buyer] against major repair bills should a
component covered by the Plan fail in normal use.” The stated coverage was:
“The plan will pay the total cost (parts and labor) less a $25 deductible per visit, to
correct any of the following part failures, due to a defect in materials or
workmanship, not covered by the vehicle limited warranties.” Covered
components included power train parts such as the engine and transmission. The
service contract advised the buyer that the vehicle might also be covered by a
manufacturer’s limited warranty, that only vehicles covered by one of
DaimlerChrysler’s standard limited warranties are eligible for the service contract,
and that it did not cover “[r]epair or replacement of any component covered by the
vehicle’s factory warranty or recall policies.” It provided that coverage for repairs
would not start until the vehicle limited warranties expired, and would end “7
years after the factory warranty start date or when the vehicle has accumulated
70,000 total miles of service (whichever occurs first).” The service contract
warned the buyer, “Important! The maximum reimbursable amount should a
3

covered component fail will be the Total Cost of the Repairs Less the Deductible
or, If Less, the Cash Value of the Vehicle!”
After she had driven the minivan about 22,000 miles, Gavaldon began to
notice the transmission was “slipping.” Although she took the vehicle to the
dealer for regular service at 25,854 miles, 30,868 miles and 34,467 miles, she
made no mention of any transmission problems.
At 39,361 miles, and again at 43,686 miles, Gavaldon took the minivan to
the dealer for regular service and complained the transmission was shifting “hard”
and getting stuck in gear. On both occasions, the dealer investigated but found no
problems.
At 44,346 miles, the vehicle’s transmission became stuck in “limp-in
mode” and was towed to the dealership. In limp-in mode, the vehicle gets locked
in second gear to protect the transmission from further damage while permitting
the car to be driven at a reduced speed to a repair facility. The transmission was
removed, overhauled, and the torque converter replaced. The repairs were
covered by the service contract.
At 47,901 miles, Gavaldon took the minivan to the dealer, complaining it
was stalling at stops and surging as if running out of gas. The throttle position
sensor, spark plug wires, and transmission controller were replaced. These repairs
were covered by the emissions systems warranty.
At 48,644 miles, the vehicle was towed to the dealer because of
overheating. The water pump, water pump gasket, and a heater hose were replaced
and the repairs were covered by the service contract. Although the dealer records
made no mention of complaints about the transmission, Gavaldon testified the car
was stuck in limp-in mode and she complained about the transmission.
4

At 50,989 miles, Gavaldon brought the car in, complaining the transmission
was slipping in and out of limp-in mode. The solenoid pack, which controls the
transmission’s hydraulic fluid, was replaced, as were a throttle positioning sensor
and wiring harness.
At the same time in February 1997, Gavaldon wrote to the dealer, and then
directly to DaimlerChrysler, complaining of the vehicle’s chronic transmission
problems and asking that it be repurchased or replaced. Her request was denied.
At 54,922 miles, Gavaldon brought the car to the dealer complaining about
the transmission’s hard shifting and slipping. The dealer determined that the front
and rear brakes were in disrepair, that they had been worked on by another repair
shop, and that it could not authorize its service personnel to drive the vehicle
without first repairing the brakes. Gavaldon did not authorize that work. The
dealer was unable to verify or diagnose the transmission complaint.
In July 1997, at 56,922 miles, the minivan again got stuck in limp-in mode
and was towed to the dealer. The transmission was completely replaced. The
service contract covered the cost of the repairs. This new transmission was itself
replaced at 57,589 miles under a parts warranty because it was leaking.
Gavaldon testified that these measures did not solve her transmission
problem, and she continued to experience hard shifting and slipping. She did not
present the minivan for further repairs. In October 1997, she filed her complaint
alleging DaimlerChrysler had breached its obligations under section 1793.2,
subdivision (d), by failing to promptly replace or repurchase the minivan when it
was unable to conform the vehicle to the applicable express warranties after a
reasonable number of attempts. She also alleged DaimlerChrysler breached the
express warranty under the Act and common law. Gavaldon alleged the vehicle
was covered by the 3/36 warranty, a defect arose while that express warranty was
5

still in effect, and DaimlerChrysler breached the express warranty by failing to
remedy the defect. At trial, Gavaldon was permitted to amend her complaint to
allege breach of the service contract as well.
A jury trial ended in a mistrial when the judge became ill. A second trial,
this time a bench trial, commenced. Before it began, the trial court ruled the
service contract was not an express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act.
On August 17, 1999, the court issued a tentative ruling in favor of
DaimlerChrysler. It concluded the minivan’s transmission was defective, but that
the defect arose after the applicable 3/36 warranty had expired. It concluded the
service contract was not an express warranty. Thus, the court stated, the “only
remedy available to plaintiff[ ] is the repairs under the service agreement.” A
judgment for DaimlerChrysler was entered on August 24.
On September 10, Gavaldon filed a notice of intention to move for a new
trial. At a hearing on September 14, the court noted that its August 17 ruling was
only a tentative ruling and it had now reached a different conclusion about the
nature of the service contract. The court stated the August 24 judgment had been
entered by mistake; the court had not intended that a final judgment be entered
because it had not yet finished deciding the case; and vacated the August 24
judgment.
On September 15, the court issued a new tentative ruling in favor of
Gavaldon. In response to DaimlerChrysler’s request, the court issued a formal
statement of decision on October 6, which included answers to questions posed by
DaimlerChrysler. The court concluded that the service contract constituted an
express warranty, a conclusion it believed to be compelled by the holding in
Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139 (Reveles). Given that
conclusion, and given the trial court’s finding that “plaintiffs suffered damages
6

[from] having purchased an automobile that was substantially impaired,” the trial
court ruled that Gavaldon was entitled to the replacement/restitution remedy set
forth in section 1793.2, subdivision (d). The court concluded that
DaimlerChrysler was entitled to an offset for the use of the vehicle until the time
Gavaldon first delivered it for correction, pursuant to section 1793.2, subdivision
(c), which it determined to be at 44,388 miles, when the transmission first became
stuck in limp-in mode. Further, the trial court found that Gavaldon was entitled to
costs, including attorney fees, but not to civil penalties. In response to the
question “whether [Gavaldon] would have the remedy under the Song-Beverly . . .
Act if the service contract purchased at additional cost is not considered an express
warranty under the [Act],” the trial court replied: “Not at the time this decision
was brought.”
A judgment awarding Gavaldon $13,612.63 (purchase price minus a
deduction for actual use of the vehicle) was entered on November 5, 1999.
DaimlerChrysler appealed the November 5 judgment. A postjudgment order
awarded Gavaldon $75,000 in attorney fees and costs. DaimlerChrysler appealed
that order as well and the two appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing the statutory language and
legislative history of the Song-Beverly Act, it concluded that the service contract
could not be considered an express warranty under the Act. It further concluded
that Reveles was distinguishable on various grounds. It also rejected Gavaldon’s
contention that the judgment could be upheld on the alternative ground that it was
an appropriate award for breach of the service contract, holding that the trial court
had rejected that theory and sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s ruling.
The court rejected as not properly raised below Gavaldon’s further claim that she
was entitled to the damages award under a provision of the Commercial Code
7

because she had revoked acceptance of the vehicle. It also reversed Gavaldon’s
award of costs and attorney fees. We granted review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Is a Service Contract an Express Warranty Within the Meaning of
the Song-Beverly Act?
The Song-Beverly Act, in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), provides in
pertinent part that “[i]f the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable
to service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either
promptly replace the new motor vehicle . . . or promptly make restitution to the
buyer . . . . However, the buyer shall be free to elect restitution in lieu of
replacement, and in no event shall the buyer be required by the manufacturer to
accept a replacement vehicle.” Gavaldon argues that a service contract is an
“express warranty” within the meaning of that section and the Song-Beverly Act
generally, and therefore she is entitled to the replacement/restitution remedy, as
the trial court concluded. DaimlerChrysler contends that the Court of Appeal is
correct in holding that a service contract is not an express warranty, and the
judgment cannot be sustained. We conclude that DaimlerChrysler is correct.
DaimlerChrysler essentially advances two arguments as to why a service
contract cannot be considered an express warranty: (1) a service contract, as
defined by statute, does not fit the statutory definition of “express warranty”; and
(2) aside from the definitions, the terms “service contract” and “express warranty”
are used together in the statute in such a way as to make clear that they are
mutually exclusive terms. We find the second persuasive. The legislative history
of the Act provides additional support for DaimlerChrysler’s interpretation.
8

1. The Definitions of “Express Warranty” and “Service Contract”
An express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is defined in section
1791.2 in pertinent part as follows: “(a) . . . A written statement arising out of a
sale to the consumer of a consumer good pursuant to which the manufacturer,
distributor, or retailer undertakes to preserve or maintain the utility or performance
of the consumer good or provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or
performance; . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (b) It is not necessary to the creation of an express
warranty that formal words such as ‘warrant’ or ‘guarantee’ be used, but if such
words are used then an express warranty is created. An affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely an opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. [¶] (c) Statements or
representations such as expressions of general policy concerning customer
satisfaction which are not subject to any limitation do not create an express
warranty.”
Section 1791, subdivision (o) provides: “ ‘Service contract’ means a
contract in writing to perform, for an additional cost, over a fixed period of time or
for a specified duration, services relating to the maintenance, replacement, or
repair of a consumer product, except that this term does not include a policy of
automobile insurance, as defined in Section 116 of the Insurance Code.”

DaimlerChrysler argues that an express warranty “arises out of the sale of a
consumer good” (see § 1791.2, subd. (a)) because “it is a representation integrally
included in the purchase price; a service contract does not because it offers
additional performance purchased for ‘additional cost.’ ” (See § 1791, subd. (o).)
Moreover, it argues, section 1794.4 addresses the “sale of a service contract,”
implying that a service contract is sold separately from the consumer good, and
therefore cannot be said to “arise out of” the sale of the latter. Gavaldon points
9



out, however, that the purchase of her automobile and her service contract were
part of the same transaction, concluded at the same time, and therefore the service
contract would be reasonably understood to “arise out of” the sale of the
automobile. (See Reveles, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1155-1156.)
We need not decide which party has the better argument. As discussed
below, another reason supports the conclusion that DaimlerChrysler’s position is
correct.

2.
The Use of the Terms Together in the Statute
The terms “service contract” and “express warranty” are used together in
several sections of the Song-Beverly Act in such a way as to indicate,
DaimlerChrysler argues, that the Legislature conceived of them as distinct entities.
Section 1794.41, subdivision (a)(3), for example, provides: “The [service] contract
is applicable only to items, costs, and time periods not covered by the express
warranty. However, a service contract may run concurrently with or overlap an
express warranty if (A) the contract covers items or costs not covered by the
express warranty or (B) the contract provides relief to the purchaser not available
under the express warranty, such as automatic replacement of a product where the
express warranty only provides for repair.” (Italics added.)
Section 1794.4, subdivision (a) provides that “Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to prevent the sale of a service contract to the buyer in addition to, or
in lieu of, an express warranty if that contract fully and conspicuously discloses in
simple and readily understood language the terms, conditions and exclusions of
that contract . . . .” (Italics added.) And section 1794, subdivision (a) provides:
“Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any
obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service
10



contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and
equitable relief.” (Italics added.)
The above three statutes indicate that the Legislature not only conceived of
service contracts as distinct from express warranties, but intended the two
categories to be mutually exclusive. Section 1794.41, subdivision (a)(3), does not
permit a service contract to cover the same items as an express warranty. Section
1794.4 specifies that service contracts are sold in addition to or in lieu of express
warranties. And section 1794 refers to express warranties and service contracts in
the alternative. If express warranties and service contracts were intended to
overlap, then these sections would have been phrased differently, by modifying
the term “express warranty” to at least leave open the possibility of overlap. For
example, section 1794.4, subdivision (a) might have read: “Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to prevent the sale of a service contract to the buyer in
addition to, or in lieu of, an express warranty that is included in the original price
of the consumer good if that contract fully and conspicuously discloses in simple
and readily understood language the terms, conditions and exclusions that contract
. . . .” Without such a modifier to the term “express warranty,” it is difficult to
escape the inference that the Legislature considered service contracts to be
categorically distinct from express warranties.
The legislative history of the Song-Beverly Act supports this interpretation.
As originally enacted, the Song-Beverly Act’s sole reference to service contracts
was the provision in section 1794.4 allowing service contracts to be sold “in
addition to or in lieu of” express warranties. (Stats. 1970, ch. 1333, § 1, p. 2482.)
The Act was amended in 1971 to, among other things, specify in section 1791,
subdivision (a), that the term “consumer goods” with which the Act was
concerned signified “new” goods. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1523, § 2, p. 3001.) At the
11

same time, section 1795.5 was added to extend the Song-Beverly Act’s application
to used consumer goods sold with express warranties. It provided that,
notwithstanding the definition of consumer goods as new goods, the obligation of
a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods in a sale in which an express
warranty is given “shall be the same as that imposed on the manufacturer under
this chapter,” with certain enumerated exceptions. (Stats. 1971, ch. 523, § 17,
p. 3008.)
In response to concerns about the prospective enactment of section 1795.5
from the Northern California Motorcar Dealers Association, Inc., Senator Song’s
staff assured the association that the proposed remedies with respect to express
warranties on used vehicles would not apply to used vehicles with service
contracts. That response is perhaps the clearest window we have into the
Legislature’s reason for distinguishing between a service contract and an express
warranty. It stated: “You may be correct that the distinction between a warranty
and a service contract is purely one of semantics, but such is often the most
important kind. I believe the words ‘guarantee’ and ‘warranty’ possess a meaning
that ‘service contract’ does not share. . . . . We think that an ‘as is’ sale, with or
without a service contract, will better inform the public as to what they are
actually buying than a sale accompanied by the express warranties presently used
in the used car trade.” (Richard Thomsen, Admin. Asst. to Sen. Song, Letter to
Wallace O’Connell, Apr. 16, 1971, p. 2.)2

2
Although in subsequent years the Legislature enacted more protection for
consumers who purchased service contracts, there is no indication from
subsequent amendments or their legislative history that the Legislature ever sought
to blur or abandon this distinction between service contracts and express
warranties. For example, in 1985, Assembly Bill No. 2285 amended section
(Footnote continued on next page.)
12



It is true that, functionally speaking, warranties and service contracts appear
to have the same purpose  to guarantee the repair or replacement of certain
products or parts of products for a specified period of time. But, as the above
passage suggests, the Legislature apparently conceived of an express warranty as
being part of the purchase of a consumer product, and a representation of the
fitness of that product that has particular meaning for consumers. In contrast, it
apparently thought of the purchase of a service contract as distinct from the
purchase of the product, and not as a representation of fitness but only an
agreement to provide repair services, a kind of insurance. Hence, one difference
between express warranties and service contracts is that the latter is generally
purchased “for an additional cost.”3 (§ 1791, subd. (o).)

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

1794.4 and enacted section 1794.41 to add certain disclosure and cancellation
requirements for motor vehicle service contracts. Commenting on these changes,
an analysis by the Department of Consumer Affairs, included in Governor
Deukmejian’s enrolled bill file, demonstrates that service contracts and express
warranties continued to be thought of separately: “Existing law regulates implied
and express warranties on consumer goods, including motor vehicles, sold in
California. Existing law does not specifically regulate service contracts on
consumer goods, other than to require that all of the terms and conditions be
disclosed in the contract.” (Dept. of Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on
Assem. Bill No. 225 (Sept. 20, 1985) p. 1.)
3
We say “generally” because the phrase “for an additional cost” was not part
of the original definition of “service contract,” and is set to be deleted from its
future definition. When section 1791, subdivision (o) was originally enacted in
1976, it did not contain the phrase “for an additional cost.” (Stats. 1976, ch. 416,
§ 1.5, p. 1068.) That phrase was only added in 1998. (Stats. 1998, ch. 196, § 2.)
An amendment enacted in 2002, but not effective until 2008, deletes the phrase.
(Stats. 2002, ch. 405, § 62.) It is unclear from the legislative history why the
phrase was added, and why it is to be deleted. In light of these amendments, it
may be the case that some instruments will be considered service contracts despite
(Footnote continued on next page.)
13



In arguing that express warranties and service contracts do indeed overlap,
Gavaldon points to language in the definition of express warranty in section
1791.2 stating that “[i]t is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that
formal words such as ‘warranty’ or ‘guarantee’ be used, but if such words are used
then an express warranty is created.” Therefore, a service contract that is
denominated an “extended warranty,” as service contracts are sometimes called,
will also be an express warranty under section 1791.2, and therefore subject to the
replacement/restitution remedy.
This argument does not assist Gavaldon. As discussed above, the
Legislature apparently believed that the terms “warrant” or “guarantee” had
particular significance to consumers. And because the Legislature generally
conceived of service contracts and extended warranties as falling into distinct
categories, it also provided that a manufacturer that confused those categories by
labeling service contracts as warranties should assume the obligations imposed on
manufacturers that issued express warranties. DaimlerChrysler did not so label its
service contract in the present case.
Gavaldon also argues that sections 1794.4 and 1794.41 are antifraud
provisions, designed to protect a consumer who pays for an express warranty, as
part of the price of the vehicle or other consumer good, from paying extra for a
service contract that partly provides the same coverage as the warranty. Assuming

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

the fact that they were not purchased for an additional cost. Nonetheless, the
“additional cost” factor appears to be an important, if not infallible, means of
distinguishing between express warranties that are an integral part of the purchase
of a product, and service contracts that are not.
14



she is correct, such purpose is nonetheless wholly consistent with the Legislature’s
view that service contract and express warranty should be considered distinct
entities.
In sum, reading the various portions of the Act, together with relevant
legislative history, it appears that the Legislature thought of service contracts and
express warranties as mutually exclusive categories, except when the manufacturer
chooses to use the terms “warrant” or “guarantee” in a service contract. When, as
here, the manufacturer has not used those terms in its service contract, the breach
of its service contract does not make it subject to the replacement/restitution
remedy reserved in section 1793.2, subdivision (d) for purchasers of motor
vehicles sold with “express warranties.”
3. The Reveles Case
Gavaldon argues that the above conclusion conflicts with the Court of
Appeal’s holding in Reveles, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 1139. The Court of Appeal in
the present case usefully summarized Reveles: “In that case, the plaintiff
purchased a used vehicle from a dealership. The sale was ‘as is,’ i.e., without an
express warranty, so he also purchased a ‘vehicle service agreement’ covering
‘repair of mechanical failures’ of various parts for two years or 24,000 miles. Two
months later, the front end of the car suddenly dropped, and the dealer’s mechanic
told the plaintiff the vehicle had significant preexisting frame damage and could
not be repaired. Nonetheless, the dealer refused the plaintiff’s demand it replace
the vehicle or refund his purchase price, insisting repairs would be made.
([Reveles,] at p. 1145.)
“The plaintiff sued the dealer for breach of contract, rescission and
restitution, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, breach of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act (§ 1750 et seq.) and breach of the Song-Beverly Act. After
15

rejecting the plaintiff’s repeated offers to settle for $9,300, on the morning of trial
the dealer announced it would settle for that amount. The plaintiff settled but
reserved his right to move for attorney fees and costs to which he argued he was
entitled under various statutes, including the Song-Beverly Act. The trial court
eventually found the plaintiff was the prevailing party and awarded him $19,000
in attorney fees, plus expert witness fees and costs. (Reveles, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-1148.)”
The Court of Appeal affirmed the award, concluding in part that the
plaintiff was the prevailing party under the Song-Beverly Act, and was therefore
entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to section 1794, subdivision (d).
(Reveles, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1149, 1158.) In so deciding, the court had
to address the argument that the Act’s remedies do not apply to used vehicles sold
“as is.” As discussed ante, the Act generally applies to the purchase of “consumer
goods” which are generally defined as being “new” goods. (§ 1791, subd. (a).)
Notwithstanding that definition, section 1795.5 provides, as noted ante, that the
Act also applies to “used consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is
given.” The plaintiff’s used car was sold “as is,” but he had purchased a service
contract. The court was faced with the issue of whether that service contract was
an express warranty, in which case the used car purchaser would be afforded the
Act’s protection under section 1795.5.
In addressing the problem, the Reveles court reviewed the patchwork of
relevant amendments to the Act. As noted above, the Act as originally passed in
1970 hardly mentioned service contracts, but subsequent amendments have
increased protection for service contract purchasers. Section 1796.5, added in
1978, provides that any entity “which engages in the business of providing service
or repair to new or used consumer goods has a duty to the purchaser to perform
16

those services in a good and workmanlike manner.” (Stats. 1978, ch. 991, § 13, p.
3066.)
Subdivision (b) of section 1794.4, added in 1988, states that “[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided in the service contract, every service contract shall
obligate the service contract seller to provide to the buyer of the product all of the
services and functional parts that may be necessary to maintain proper operation of
the entire product under normal operation and service for the duration of the
service contract and without additional charge.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 581, § 2,
p. 2136, as amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 1265, § 13, pp. 7422-7423, italics added.)
Additionally, section 1794.4, subdivision (c), added at the same time, requires the
service contract to contain substantial information, including a “step-by-step
explanation of the procedure which the buyer should follow in order to obtain
performance of any obligation under the service contract . . . .” (See § 1794.4,
subd. (c)(5); Stats. 1988, ch. 581, § 2, p. 2137.) Subdivision (d) was also added to
section 1794.4, providing: “Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this section are applicable
to service contracts on new or used home appliances and home electronic products
entered into on or after July 1, 1989. They are applicable to service contracts on
all other new or used products entered into on and after July 1, 1991.” (Stats.
1988, ch. 581, § 2, p. 2137, as amended by Stats. 1990, ch. 127, § 1, p. 1141,
italics added.)
Section 1794 was added in 1982, enumerating the remedies available to a
consumer for breach of the Act. It states in part: “Any buyer of consumer goods
who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or
under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for
the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” (§ 1794, subd. (a);
17

Stats. 1982, ch. 385, § 2, p. 1716, as amended by Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 4, p.
4562, italics added.)
The
Reveles court therefore confronted an apparent statutory anomaly, in
which, under sections 1794.4 and 1796.5, buyers of any service contract, for either
a new or used good, were entitled to the proper enforcement of the contract as well
as various statutory protections, but the remedies provided under the Act, in
sections 1794, and 1795.5, seemed not to include remedies for breaches of service
contracts for used goods.
The
Reveles court reasoned that “[i]f ‘express warranty’ under section
1795.5 is interpreted to exclude the vehicle service agreement, Reveles has no
Song-Beverly Act remedy for [the dealership’s] breach of sections 1794.4,
subdivisions (b) and (d) and 1796.5, and they would thus be rendered
meaningless.” (Reveles, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) But the fact that
equating “express warranty” and “service contract” would solve an apparent
statutory anomaly does not free us to so interpret the statute, when such
interpretation would be at variance with the statutory language and the legislative
history reviewed above. Although we will not interpret a statute literally if it leads
to an absurd result, we cannot say that the statute’s failure to explicitly provide a
remedy under the Act for breaches of service contracts on used vehicles is an
absurd result. We need not decide whether the result in Reveles  that attorney
fees under the Act may be awarded for breach of a service contract on a used
vehicle  is correct under a different rationale. But we disapprove of its
conclusion that a service contract is a type of express warranty under the Song-
Beverly Act.
For all the above reasons, we conclude that the service contract in the
present case, which was sold for an additional cost and which does not use the
18

words “warrant” or “guarantee,” is not an express warranty for purposes of the
Act.

B. Section 1794 Does Not Provide a Replacement/Restitution
Remedy for Breach of a Service Contract

Gavaldon argues that even if we reject the argument that her service
contract was an express warranty, section 1794, which concerns consumer
remedies under the Song-Beverly Act, makes clear that the replacement/restitution
remedy applies to a breach of a service contract as well as a breach of an express
warranty. We conclude that Gavaldon is incorrect.
Section 1794 states in pertinent part that “(a) Any buyer of consumer goods
who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or
under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for
the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief. [¶] (b) The measure
of the buyer’s damages in an action under this section shall include the rights of
replacement or as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2.”
Gavaldon contends that subdivision (b) signifies that anyone injured under
subdivision (a) may obtain the replacement/restitution remedy. But the statute on
its face does not so read. The right to replacement or restitution is qualified by the
phrase “as set forth in subdivision (d) of section 1793.2.” It is most reasonable to
assume that this qualification means that the remedy is subject to the provisions
set forth in section 1793.2, subdivision (d) (section 1793.2(d)), otherwise the
reference to section 1793.2(d) would be superfluous. Gavaldon argues in effect
that only some of the provisions of section 1793.2(d) apply, but not the provision
stating that the replacement/restitution remedy is available only for breach of an
express warranty. Gavaldon advances no principled basis for incorporating into
19



section 1794, subdivision (b) some of the provisions found in section 1793.2(d)
but not others.
Any ambiguity that might obscure this statutory language is dispelled by
the relevant legislative history. The current version of section 1794, subdivision
(b) came into being in 1987, when Assembly Bill No. 1367 (1987-1988 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1367) amended the section to include the current
language providing that “[t]he measure of a buyer’s damages under this section
shall include the rights of replacement or reimbursement as set forth in subdivision
(d) of section 1793.2.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 4, p. 4562.) An uncodified
provision, section 2 of the enactment, states that “the amendment of subdivision
(b) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code . . . does not constitute a change in, but is
declaratory of, existing law.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 9, p. 4567.)
The analysis by Senator Robbins, chairman of the Senate Insurance, Claims
and Corporations Committee, states that before the amendment section 1794 did
not “specifically mention that the buyer has the specific remedy of replacement of
the product or restitution for the product. However, section 1793.2 of the Civil
Code provides a replacement or restitution remedy for the buyer under specified
conditions. . . . This bill was spawned when an automobile manufacturer in a
court case argued (unsuccessfully) that the buyer can only sue for the remedy
specifically enumerated in section 1794 of the Civil Code, which does not include
replacement or restitution remedies.” (Sen. Insurance, Claims and Corporations
Committee, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1367, July 1, 1987.)
If Assembly Bill No. 1367 had been intended to extend the
replacement/restitution remedies to service contracts, that would have constituted
a significant change in the law. The uncodified section 9 of the 1987 enactment
amending the Act and the legislative history recited above make clear that no such
20

change was contemplated. Rather, the amendment of section 1794, subdivision
(b), was intended to foreclose the then-current argument that, because the
replacement or restitution obligation imposed on manufacturers for violation of
express warranties in section 1792.3(d) was not included in the remedies section
of the Song-Beverly Act, section 1794, such remedy was not available to service
contract consumers. Accordingly, the legislative history confirms that the only
reasonable reading of section 1794, subdivision (b), is that the
replacement/restitution remedy applies only if the conditions of section 1793.2(d)
are met.

C. Alternative Theories of Recovery
In addition to the replacement/restitution remedy discussed above, section
1794 provides, in subdivision (b)(1): “Where the buyer has rightfully rejected or
justifiably revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any right to cancel the
sale, Sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the Commercial Code shall apply.”
Gavaldon claims that even if she is not entitled to restitution pursuant to section
1793.2(d) or section 1794, subdivision (b), her $13,612.63 damages award is
nonetheless justified as a remedy for revoking acceptance of her automobile,
pursuant to Commercial Code section 2711.
Commercial Code section 2608 provides the grounds on which a buyer can
revoke acceptance of goods. It states in pertinent part: “(1) The buyer may revoke
his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially
impairs its value to him if he has accepted it [¶] (a) On the reasonable assumption
that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or [¶]
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller’s
assurances. [¶] (2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time
21



after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before
any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.”
As can be readily observed, revocation of acceptance requires more and
different actions of the buyer than is required under section 1793.2(d). Whereas
revocation of acceptance must take place “within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it (Comm. Code, § 2608, subd.
(2)),” the replacement/restitution remedy under section 1793.2(d) only requires
that the defect or defects be covered by an express warranty and that there be a
failure to repair after a reasonable number of attempts. Revocation of acceptance
must be done before “any substantial change in condition of the goods” (Comm.
Code, § 2608, subd. (2)), whereas section 1793.2(d) has no such requirement.
Therefore, a conclusion that a buyer is entitled to a remedy under section
1793.2(d) is not necessarily a conclusion that he or she is entitled to revoke
acceptance of goods purchased and obtain the corresponding damages remedy.
As the Court of Appeal concluded, the revocation of acceptance theory was
not presented at trial. Although Gavaldon’s attorney did briefly argue, during the
reply portion of his closing argument at trial, that a revocation of acceptance
theory would apply, Gavaldon did not plead revocation of acceptance, nor did she
move to amend her pleading, and the presentation of that theory appears to have
been nothing more than an afterthought. We cannot say that Gavaldon properly
raised the theory below, especially given the considerable difference between that
theory and her main theory at trial, that she was entitled to a section 1793.2(d)
replacement/restitution remedy. She may not do so now on appeal. (See Gibson
Properties Co. v. City of Oakland (1938) 12 Cal.2d 291, 299-300 [plaintiff
22

generally may not raise on appeal theory of damages different from theory at
trial].)
Gavaldon also argues her damages award may be justified by the
diminution in value of the automobile as a result of DaimlerChrysler’s breach of
the service contract by its failure to repair the automobile after a reasonable
number of times. Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (b)(2) provides that
“[w]here the buyer has accepted the goods, Sections 2714 and 2715 of the
Commercial Code shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the cost
of repairs necessary to make the goods conform.” Commercial Code section
2714, subdivision (2) provides as follows: “The measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount.” Although DaimlerChrysler’s service contract limited remedies to the
cost of repairs or replacement if less than the cost of repairs, Commercial Code
section 2719, subdivision (2) provides that alternative remedies may be sought if
the remedy provided by contract “fail[s] of its essential purpose.”
Gavaldon raised the diminution of value issue late in the trial when it
became apparent that the trial court was inclined to rule against her on the express
warranty issue. Gavaldon did not raise the diminution of value argument in the
Court of Appeal, instead taking the position that breach of the service contract
should yield a refund of the service contract price, a position she did not take at
trial. The Court of Appeal briefly referred to the diminution of value issue in
dicta. As a general rule, we address only issues that have been raised in the Court
of Appeal. (Cedar Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1,
6.) Although we sometimes depart from that rule, we decline to do so in this case,
23

in which resolution of the issue depends upon a developed evidentiary record and
the issue was a subsidiary one scarcely litigated at trial. (Cf. ibid. [court addresses
question not raised below of whether to recognize tort of intentional first party
spoliation of evidence when it is “an issue of law that does not turn on the facts of
this case”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
BROWN,
J.
24



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 95 Cal.App.4th 544
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S104477
Date Filed: May 27, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Leonard H. McBride*
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Anderson & Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, Martin W. Anderson and Ivy Tsai for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Norman Taylor & Associates, Norman F. Taylor and Bret A. Shefter for Consumers for Auto Reliability
and Safety as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron & Ogilvie, Bryan Kemnitzer, Alison A. Lawton; Rosner Law & Mansfield,
Alan M. Mansfield and Lilys D. McCoy for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf
of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, John A. Taylor, Jr., Jon B. Eisenberg; Even, Crandall, Wade, Lowe &
Gates, Gates, O’Doherty, Gonter & Guy, Douglas D. Guy and Matthew M. Proudfoot for Defendant and
Appellant.

Manning, Leaver, Bruder & Berberich and Halbert B. Rasmussen for California Motor Car Dealers
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Bowman and Brooke, Brian Takahashi and Ronald G. Akasaka for The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Barger & Wolen, Steven H. Weinstein and Alena K. Hacopian for National Association of Independent
Insurers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

*Retired judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.
25

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Martin W. Anderson
Anderson Law Firm
2070 North Tustin Avenue
Santa Ana, CA 92705
(714) 516-2700

John A. Taylor, Jr.
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA 91436-3000
(818) 995-0800
26


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 05/27/2004S104477

Parties
1Golden, Alan R. (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Alan R. Golden
Attorney at Law
16830 Ventura Blvd., Suite 351
Encino, CA

2Gavaldon, Rosemarie (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Martin William Anderson
Anderson Law Firm
2070 North Tustin Avenue
Santa Ana, CA

3Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by John A. Taylor
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Blvd., 18th Floor
Encino, CA

4Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Douglas D. Guy
Gates, O'Doherty, Gonter & Guy
15635 Alton Pkwy., Suite 260
Irvine, CA

5Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Lisa Perrochet
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Blvd., 18th Floor
Encino, CA

6Daimlerchrysler Corporation (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Matthew Millard Proudfoot
Gates, O'Doherty, Gonter & Guy
15635 Alton Parkway, Suite 260
Irvine, CA

7Gavaldon, William (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Martin William Anderson
Anderson Law Firm
2070 N Tustin Ave
Santa Ana, CA

8Norman Taylor & Associates (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Norman F. Taylor
Norman Taylor & Associates
425 W Broadway, Suite 220
Glendale, CA

9Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Bryan Kemnitzer
Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron & Ogilvie, LLP
445 Bush St 6FL
San Francisco, CA

10Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alison Lawton Baker
Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron & Ogilvie, LLP
445 Bush St 6FL
San Francisco, CA

11Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alan M. Mansfield
Rosner Law & Mansfield
10085 Carroll Cyn Rd 1FL
San Diego, CA

12Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Lilys Doris Mccoy
Rosner Law & Mansfield
10085 Carroll Cyn Rd 1FL
San Diego, CA

13California Motor Car Dealers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Halbert B. Rasmussen
Manning, Leaver Et Al
5750 Wilshire Blvd #655
Los Angeles, CA

14Consumers For Auto Reliability And Safety (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Bret A. Shefter
Norman Taylor & Associates
425 W Broadway #220
Glendale, CA

15National Association Of Independent Insurers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Steven Henry Weinstein
Barger & Wolen
515 S Flower St 34FL
Los Angeles, CA

16Alliance Of Automobile Manufacturers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brian Takahashi
Bowman and Brooke LLP
19191 S. Vermont Ave., Suite 1000
Torrance, CA


Disposition
May 27 2004Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Feb 19 2002Request for depublication filed (initial case event)
  by attorney Alan R. Golden (non-party).
Feb 19 2002Received document entitled:
  Supplement To Request For Depublication from Attorney Alan R. Golden.
Feb 27 2002Received document entitled:
  Proof of service by mail of request for depub dated 2/15/02 and of the supplement to request for depub dated 2/15/02 from attorney Alan R. Golden .
Mar 1 2002Opposition filed
  by defendant and appellant (DaimlerChrysler Corp.).
Mar 4 2002Request for depublication filed (another request pending)
  by attorney William R. McGee (non-party).
Mar 4 2002Petition for review filed
  appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon & William Gavaldon
Mar 6 2002Opposition filed
  By Toyota Motor Insurance Services Inc.to request for depublication filed by the Law Office of Alan R. Golden.
Mar 11 2002Record requested
  records reqtd via e-mail
Mar 12 2002Opposition filed
  by counsel for defendant and appellant (DaimlerChrysler). Opposition to depub request by attorney William R. McGee filed 3/4/02.
Mar 12 2002Record requested
 
Mar 13 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  blue plastic file/file jacket
Mar 14 2002Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for defendant and appellant (Daimlerchrysler Corp.).
Mar 15 2002Request for depublication filed (another request pending)
  by counsel for plaintiffs and appellants (Rosemarie Gavaldon et al.). (Oversize request filed w/permission.)
Mar 19 2002Reply to answer to petition filed
  by counsel for plaintiffs and appellants (Gavaldon et al)
Mar 25 2002Opposition filed
  by defendant and appellant (DaimlerChrysler Corp). Opposition to depub request filed on 3/15/02 by plaintiffs and appellants.
Mar 27 2002Request for depublication filed (another request pending)
  by Norman Taylor (non party). (received in LA)
Mar 27 2002Opposition filed
  by defendant and appellant (DaimlerChrysler Corp). Opposition to depub request filed on 3/27/02 by Norman Taylor (non party).
Apr 3 2002Received:
  Late opposition from Toyota Motor Insurance Services Inc. to request for depub filed by William R. McGee on 3/4/02. (19 days late)
Apr 29 2002Time extended to grant or deny review
  to and including June 6, 2002.
May 15 2002Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  Votes:George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
May 21 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  1-box
Jun 4 2002Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for appellant {DaimlerChrysler Corporation}.
Jun 12 2002Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by appellants (Rosemarie Gavaldon et al.)
Jun 12 2002Request for extension of time filed
  by appellants (Rosemarie Gavaldon et al.) asking to July 14, 2002 to file opening brief on the merits.
Jun 13 2002Extension of time granted
  to and including July14, 2002 for appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. to file opening brief on the merits.
Jul 15 2002Request for extension of time filed
  appellants (Gavaldon et al.) asking to Aug. 14, 2002 to file opening brief on the merits. **granted-order being prepared**
Jul 18 2002Extension of time granted
  to and including August 14, 2002 for appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. to file the opening brief on the merits.
Aug 15 2002Request for extension of time filed
  appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al., requesting to 9/13/02 to file opening brief/merits. **ok to grant to August 29, 2002 only - order being prepared.*
Aug 21 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al., and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including August 29, 2002.
Aug 29 2002Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellants (R. Gavaldon and W. Galvadon) requesting a six-day extension to September 4, 2002 to file the opening brief on the merits.
Sep 3 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Sept. 4, 2002. No further extensions permitted.
Sep 4 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
  appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon, etal
Sep 4 2002Request for Judicial Notice received (in non-AA proceeding)
  appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon, etal
Oct 1 2002Request for extension of time filed
  appellant DaimlerChrysler requesting to Nov. 18, 2002 to file answer brief on the merits. **granted-order being prepared**
Oct 2 2002Received:
  opposition to request for judicial notice from appellant DaimlerChrysler.
Oct 3 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including November 18, 2002.
Oct 4 2002Received document entitled:
  Notice of Lodgment of original declaration of Eric Wendell in support of Daimlerchrylser's opposition to request for judicial notice of "Mercedes-Benz extended limited warranty brochure" - from appellant DaimlerChrysler.
Oct 10 2002Filed:
  with permission Notice of Lodgment of original declaration from appellant Diamlerchrysler Corp.
Oct 10 2002Filed:
  with permission Opposition to Request for Judicial Notice by appellant Daimlerchrysler Corp.
Nov 13 2002Application to file over-length brief filed
  by DaimlerChrylster re answer brief on the merits.
Nov 14 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
  (with permission) by appellant DaimlerChrysler Corp.
Nov 14 2002Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by appellant DaimlerChrysler Corp.
Dec 4 2002Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellants (RoseMarie Gavaldon et al.) asking to Jan. 3, 2003 to file reply brief on the merits. (ok to grant - order being prepared)
Dec 6 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants RoseMarie Gavaldon et al., and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including Jan. 3, 2003.
Jan 3 2003Request for extension of time filed
  Appellants RoseMarie Gavaldon et al., asking to January 17, 2003 to file reply brief on the merits.
Jan 6 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including Jan. 17, 2003.
Jan 17 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  with permission by counsel for appellants.
Jan 17 2003Application to file over-length brief filed
  by counsel for appellants (Rosemarie Gavaldon et al.) re reply brief on the merits.
Feb 10 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by amicus curiae Consumer Attorneys of California requesting to March 3, 2003 to file amicus brief in support of appellants RoseMarie & William Gavaldon.
Feb 13 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of amicus Consumer Attorneys of California and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the amicus curiae bief in support of appellants Gavaldon is extended to and including March 3, 2003. An answer may be filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief.
Feb 13 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by amicus California Motor Car Dealers Assn [in support of aplt] extension to 3-3-03
Feb 14 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  National Assn of Independent Insurers
Feb 14 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Feb 18 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Feb 20 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of amicus curiae California Motor Car Dealers Association and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of appellant Daimlerchrysler Corporation is extended to and including March 3, 2003. An answer may be filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief.
Feb 25 2003Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant requests to file on or before March 23, 2003 a consolidated answer brief to amicus briefs filed by Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety & Consumer Attorneys of California. (granted - order being prepared)
Feb 26 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  National Assn of Independent Insurers
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of National Association of Independent Insurers for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Feb 26 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Feb 26 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Feb 28 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file a consolidated answer to amicus curiae briefs in support of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. is extended to and including March 23, 2003.
Mar 3 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  from Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellants Gavaldon et al.
Mar 3 2003Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  California Motor Car Dealers Association
Mar 11 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Consumer Attorneys of California
Mar 11 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of Consumer Attorneys of California for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. is hereby granted. Answer due within 20 days.
Mar 11 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Motor Car Dealers Association
Mar 11 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  On application of California Motor Car Dealers Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation is hereby granted. Answer due within 20 days.
Mar 18 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by appellants (Gavaldon et al.) requesting to March 31, 2003 to file a consolidated answer to amicus briefs filed in support of appellant (DaimlerChrysler).
Mar 21 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file a consolidated answer to amicus curiae briefs in support of appellant DaimlerChrysler Corporation is extended to and including March 31, 2003.
Mar 24 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for appellant DaimlerChrysler Corp.
Apr 1 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by counsel for appellants Rosemarie Gavaldon et al.
Feb 10 2004Case ordered on calendar
  3-10-04, 9am, S.F.
Mar 1 2004Request for judicial notice granted
  Appellant's request for judicial notice, filed on November 14, 2002, is granted.
Mar 1 2004Supplemental brief filed
  by counsel for appellant DaimlerChrysler Corp. New legislation and authorities. (40k)
Mar 10 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
May 27 2004Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Opinion by Moreno,J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin,& Brown, JJ.
Jun 11 2004Request for modification of opinion filed
  By counsel for appellant {DaimlerChrysler}.
Jun 23 2004Opinion modified - no change in judgment
 
Jun 30 2004Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Jul 9 2004Received:
  Receipt for remittitur - from CA4/3.

Briefs
Sep 4 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 14 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 17 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Feb 26 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 11 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 11 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Mar 24 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 1 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website