Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S127432
Garcia v. Super. Ct.

Filed 8/9/07


Super. Ct. No. 02CF1970
Real Party in Interest.

Jose Antonio Garcia filed a motion for discovery of law enforcement
personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
(Pitchess). In support, he filed a declaration under seal asserting, inter alia, that
the declaration contained information protected by the attorney-client1 and work
product privileges.2 The question here is whether he is permitted to do so, and if

1 See generally Evidence Code section 954; People v. Gurule (2002) 28
Cal.4th 557, 594. All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.
2 Penal Code section 1054.6 “expressly limits the definition of ‘work
product’ in criminal cases to ‘core’ work product, that is, any writing reflecting
‘an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.’
Thus, the qualified protection of certain materials under Code of Civil Procedure
[section 2018.030, subdivision (a)], applicable in civil cases, is [not] available in
Footnote continued on next page

so, whether release of the declaration to the police department’s attorney, subject
to a protective order, provides a sufficient safeguard. We conclude that the trial
court may permit a defendant to file a Pitchess declaration under seal if the court
determines that such a filing is necessary. A declaration filed under seal must be
redacted before being served on the city attorney. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Garcia was involved in an altercation with officers while being booked in the
Santa Ana City jail. He ultimately brought the Pitchess motion at issue here,
accompanied by a “Sealed Declaration of Defense Counsel.” He served the City
of Santa Ana (City) with a redacted copy of the declaration. The City opposed the
Pitchess motion, asserting as relevant here that it could not adequately respond
because the declaration was sealed.
The trial court reviewed the sealed declaration in camera. It concluded
certain portions were privileged and ordered them redacted. It found other
portions could be provided to the City under the safeguard of a protective order,
relying on City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 255
Garcia sought writ review of the order directing release of the unredacted
portions of the declaration under a protective order, contending these contained

Footnote continued from previous page
criminal cases.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 382, fn. 19,
italics omitted (Izazaga).) We have held the “work product doctrine is not
constitutionally founded.” (Id. at p. 381.)
3 The trial court’s specific rulings on the precise scope of the asserted
privileges is unclear from this record. However, the correctness of the underlying
privilege rulings is not at issue here.

attorney-client and work product information. The City in turn asserted that it
should be permitted to review the entire declaration under a protective order. The
Court of Appeal granted Garcia’s writ petition, and held as follows. Defense
counsel may file a Pitchess declaration under seal. If, after in camera review, the
trial court agrees with the privilege claim, the declaration should be redacted
before being served on the City. Disagreeing with Davenport, supra, 96
Cal.App.4th 255, the Court of Appeal concluded that a protective order would not
sufficiently protect Garcia’s interests.
We granted the City’s petition for review.4
A. Background
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, “we recognized that a criminal defendant
may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in [a] law
enforcement officer’s personnel file that is relevant to the defendant’s ability to
defend against a criminal charge. ‘In 1978, the California Legislature codified the
privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as “Pitchess
motions” . . . through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7[5] and 832.8 and
4 Following oral argument in this case, Garcia withdrew his Pitchess motion
and pleaded guilty. Although technically this action renders the City’s petition
moot, we have exercised our inherent authority to retain this case in order to
resolve the conflict and in view of the recurring nature of these issues. (See In re
Sheena K
. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879; People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855,
859, fn. 1; In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23.)
5 Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part:
“Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by
any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from
these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil
proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the
Evidence Code.”
Evidence Code sections 1043[6] through 1045.’ (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81 (Santa Cruz) . . . .) By providing that the trial court
should conduct an in camera review, the Legislature balanced the accused’s need
for disclosure of relevant information with the law enforcement officer’s

6 Section 1043 provides:
“(a) In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or
custodial officer personnel records or records maintained pursuant to Section
832.5 of the Penal Code or information from those records, the party seeking the
discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or
administrative body upon written notice to the governmental agency which has
custody and control of the records. The written notice shall be given at the times
prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Upon receipt of the notice the governmental agency served shall immediately
notify the individual whose records are sought.
“(b) The motion shall include all of the following:
“(1) Identification of the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is
sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer
whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control
of the records, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or
disclosure shall be heard.
“(2) A description of the type of records or information sought.
“(3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought,
setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending
litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency
identified has the records or information from the records.
“(c) No hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held
without full compliance with the notice provisions of this section except upon a
showing by the moving party of good cause for noncompliance, or upon a waiver
of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the records.”
Section 1046 provides: “In any case, otherwise authorized by law, in which
the party seeking disclosure is alleging excessive force by a peace officer or
custodial officer, as defined in Section 831.5 of the Penal Code, in connection with
the arrest of that party, or for conduct alleged to have occurred within a jail
facility, the motion shall include a copy of the police report setting forth the
circumstances under which the party was stopped and arrested, or a copy of the
crime report setting forth the circumstances under which the conduct is alleged to
have occurred within a jail facility.”

legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel records.” (People
v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219-1220 (Mooc).)
To obtain Pitchess information, the defendant must file a written motion.
(§ 1043, subd. (a).) It must describe “the type of records or information sought”
and include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure
sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the
pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency
identified has the records or information from the records.”7 (§ 1043, subd. (b)(2)
& (3).) This good cause showing is a “relatively low threshold for discovery.”
(Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) Assertions in the affidavits “may be on
information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge [citation],
but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to
preclude the possibility of a defendant’s simply casting about for any helpful
information.” (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) If the defendant establishes
good cause, the court must review the records in camera to determine what, if any,
information should be disclosed. (Ibid.; § 1045, subd. (b).)
We discussed what constitutes a good cause showing of materiality in
Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011 (Warrick). The supporting
affidavit “must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges.” (Id. at p.

7 Here, counsel filed a declaration, not an affidavit. Code of Civil
Procedure section 2015.5, with exceptions not relevant in the Pitchess context,
“allows use of ‘unsworn’ declarations made under penalty of perjury whenever
state law ‘require[s] or permit[s]’ facts to be evidenced by affidavits or other
‘sworn’ statements. A valid declaration has the same ‘force and effect’ as an
affidavit administered under oath.” (Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial
. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 610.) Because the statute speaks in terms of an
affidavit, we generally use that term except when discussing the declaration filed
in this case.

1024.) To show the requested information is material, a defendant is required to
“establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending
charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a
defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.” (Id. at p. 1021.)
The information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the
defendant’s request is “limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the
misconduct asserted by the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Counsel’s affidavit must also describe a factual scenario that would support a
defense claim of officer misconduct. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-
1025.) “That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may
consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.” (Ibid.) “In other
cases, the trial court hearing a Pitchess motion will have before it defense
counsel’s affidavit, and in addition a police report, witness statements, or other
pertinent documents. The court then determines whether defendant’s averments,
‘[v]iewed in conjunction with the police reports’ and any other documents, suffice
to ‘establish a plausible factual foundation’ for the alleged officer misconduct and
to ‘articulate a valid theory as to how the information sought might be admissible’
at trial.” (Id. at p. 1025.) Corroboration of or motivation for alleged officer
misconduct is not required. (Ibid.) Rather, “a plausible scenario of officer
misconduct is one that might or could have occurred.” (Id. at p. 1026.) A scenario
is plausible when it asserts specific misconduct that is both internally consistent
and supports the proposed defense. (Ibid.) “A defendant must also show how the
information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible at trial.”
(Ibid.) A defendant who meets this burden has demonstrated the materiality
requirement of section 1043. (Warrick, at p. 1026.)
B. Analysis
1. Whether a Pitchess declaration may be filed under seal
We first consider whether a Pitchess affidavit may be filed under seal.
Nothing in the relevant statutes precludes such a filing. Indeed, a trial court has
inherent discretion to allow documents to be filed under seal in order to protect
against revelation of privileged information. (See Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
p. 383, fn. 21.) The courts have recognized the efficacy of similar procedures to
protect the interests of both the accused and law enforcement. For example, in the
context of a subpoena duces tecum, “declarations and other supporting evidence
may be submitted to the trial court for in camera examination” to protect a
defendant’s constitutional rights. (City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 1118, 1130 (Alhambra).) Likewise, the “Legislature and the courts
have . . . sanctioned the procedure of sealing portions of a search warrant affidavit
that relate facts or information which, if disclosed in the public portion of the
affidavit, will reveal or tend to reveal a confidential informant’s identity.” (People
v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 963, italics omitted (Hobbs).)
While the trial court has discretion to permit filing of a Pitchess affidavit
under seal, it is not “bound by defendant’s naked claim of confidentiality.”
(Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 1130.) The Pitchess process itself
requires the balancing of an accused’s need for disclosure and the officer’s
expectation of privacy. Likewise, a ruling on a request to file under seal involves
balancing an accused’s interest in protecting privileged information against
opposing counsel’s right to effectively challenge the discovery motion. In ruling
on a request to file under seal, a trial court must carefully weigh these competing
We note that particularly after Warrick,8 a litigant in the vast majority of
cases will be able to obtain Pitchess discovery without revealing privileged
information. Thus, filing under seal will usually be unnecessary. The Legislature
has required only a minimal showing before a court reviews an officer’s personnel
record. Essentially, the defendant must propose a potential defense to the pending
charge, articulate how the discovery might lead to or constitute evidence providing
impeachment or supporting the defense, and describe an internally consistent
factual scenario of claimed officer misconduct. Depending on the circumstances
of the case, the scenario may be a simple denial of accusations in the police report
or an alternative version of what might have occurred. (Warrick, supra, 35
Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026.) Because counsel need not disclose the source of the
information asserted or how it was obtained, counsel generally is not required to
reveal any attorney-client or work-product information.
In relatively few cases, counsel may conclude that privileged information
should be included in the supporting affidavit. Even so, if other options short of a
sealed filing exist, the trial court has discretion to request an amended affidavit.
For example, in some cases, instead of providing defendant’s statement of how
events unfolded, the affidavit could simply deny the incident happened as
described in the police report.
Therefore we hold that when counsel wishes to file a Pitchess affidavit under
seal, the following procedure should be adhered to. Counsel should give “proper
and timely notice” of the privilege claim (Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1131), and provide the court with the affidavit the defense seeks to file under
seal, along with a proposed redacted version. The proposed redacted version

8 The declaration in this case was filed before the Warrick, supra, 35
Cal.4th 1011, decision.

should be served on opposing counsel. The trial court must then conduct an in
camera hearing on the request to file under seal. At that hearing, counsel should
explain how the information proposed for redaction would risk disclosure of
privileged material if revealed, and demonstrate why that information is required
to support the motion. Opposing counsel should have an opportunity to propound
questions for the trial court to ask in camera. (See Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p.
973.) If the court concludes that parts of the affidavit do pose a risk of revealing
privileged information, and that filing under seal is the only feasible way to protect
that required information, the court may allow the affidavit to be so filed.
We also note that the Pitchess process generally does not implicate the Sixth
or Fifth Amendment. Thus, the minimal showing required, along with the
safeguards provided in this opinion, should ensure that a criminal defendant will
not be forced to choose between pursuing discovery efforts by revealing privileged
information or forgoing discovery to maintain a privilege.
These constitutional implications must be reviewed in the context of changes
to California’s related procedure for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. As for
the Sixth Amendment, in Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033
(Alford), this court held that the prosecutor is not entitled to information disclosed
after a Pitchess motion, which we characterized as “essentially a third party
discovery proceeding.” (Alford, at pp. 1045-1046.) “We are not suggesting that”
notice of the motion to the prosecutor “include the affidavits and/or any other
information in support of the Pitchess motion. (Cf. People v. Superior Court
(Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1320-1321 [party seeking discovery of
materials in possession of third party by means of subpoena duces tecum not
required to provide opposing party with notice of theories of relevancy of
materials sought].)” (Alford, at p. 1045, fn. 5.) In the context of a subpoena duces
tecum, “the defense is not required, on pain of revealing its possible strategies and
work product, to provide the prosecution with notice of its theories of relevancy of
the materials sought, but instead may make an offer of proof at an in camera
hearing. (People v. Superior Court (Barrett), supra, at pp. 1320-1321.) A
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in the preparation
of a case for trial likewise encompasses the assistance of, and confidential
communication with, experts in preparing a defense. [Citation.] The right
logically extends to the opportunity to investigate and develop evidence generally,
such as impeachment evidence of the kind at issue here.” (Alford, at pp. 1045-
Alford relied on Barrett, which itself relied on cases preceding the 1990
passage of Proposition 115. (People v. Superior Court (Barrett), supra, 80
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320-1321.) Proposition 115 amended the California
Constitution, and dramatically changed the criminal discovery landscape. One
purpose of Proposition 115 was “[t]o provide that no discovery shall occur in
criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory
provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1054, subd. (e).) In Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 379, we held the
reciprocal pretrial discovery provided for under Proposition 115 was congruent
with the Sixth Amendment, and observed “that the Supreme Court has never
struck down a discovery scheme as violative of the right to effective assistance of
counsel.” Thus, while privileged material may be filed under seal, Alford should
not be read as concluding that a Pitchess affidavit stating theories regarding the
relevance of the materials sought, or possible trial strategies, must be filed under
seal and reviewed in camera.9
A defendant seeking Pitchess discovery need satisfy only a “relatively low
threshold for discovery.” (Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.) This procedure
is unlike other contexts in which we have been cognizant of possible self-
incrimination and fair trial issues, such as advance disclosure of intended penalty
phase evidence that might jeopardize a guilt phase defense. (People v. Superior
Court (Mitchell) (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1229, 1237, 1239.) Generally, as with
Proposition 115’s compelled discovery provisions, nothing in the minimal
Pitchess showing “would penalize exhaustive investigation or otherwise chill trial
preparation of defense counsel such that criminal defendants would be denied the
right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” (Izazaga,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 379.)
Nor, in most cases, are a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights implicated.
The defendant need not make any statement to the court in support of a Pitchess
motion, or sign an accompanying affidavit. The statements in counsel’s affidavit
can be made without further attribution. Under both the federal and state
Constitutions, a defendant in a reciprocal discovery scheme has no valid self-
incrimination claim against compelled disclosure of an alibi defense or defense
witnesses. (Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 83; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d
at pp. 366-372.) It follows that no such federal or state right generally exists when
a defendant seeks discovery of confidential records, and the showing required may
be made by his attorney on information and belief.

9 The City’s petition for review raised only the question of information
falling under the attorney-client or work product privilege. We limit our
discussion to that question.

Defendant relies on the Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, holding that
in the context of a subpoena duces tecum, “declarations and other supporting
evidence may be submitted to the trial court for in camera examination” to protect
a defendant’s constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 1130.) The court observed, “Those
constitutional rights have been characterized in Prudhomme v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 325-326, as prohibiting the compelled discovery of any
defense information that conceivably might lighten the load the People must
shoulder in proving their case-in-chief. This is based upon the defendant’s right
against self-incrimination which ‘forbids compelled disclosures which could serve
as a “link in a chain” of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal
offense. . . .’ (Id. at p. 326.) See also, In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 546-
551.) We recognize that both Prudhomme and Misener are prosecutorial
discovery cases while the case at bench involves the scope of permissible defense
discovery. However, the same concerns regarding the defendant’s privilege
against self-incrimination are involved in either setting and the governing
principles are unchanged.” (Alhambra, at p. 1130, fn. 13.) The court also noted,
“It is conceivable that if too much is required of a defendant, he could be forced to
reveal anticipated defense strategy.” (Id. at p. 1131.)
While Alhambra correctly held that an affidavit containing privileged
material may be filed under seal, its constitutional analysis is overly broad in light
of the subsequent enactment of Proposition 115. In Izazaga, we observed, “The
concept of ‘reciprocal’ discovery mandated by article I, section 30(c) [of the
California Constitution, added by Proposition 115] is inherently inconsistent with
the roadblock to prosecutorial discovery created by our earlier interpretations of
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as developed in the
Prudhomme line of cases.” (Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 371.) “Therefore, to
the extent that the Prudhomme line of cases impeded reciprocal discovery, article
I, section 30(c) must be seen as abrogating those cases, and limiting the scope of
the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination as it relates to
reciprocal discovery.” (Izazaga, at p. 371.)
2. Redaction or a Protective Order
If a court permits portions of an affidavit to be filed under seal, the question
remains whether this sealed information can be revealed to the city attorney under
a protective order.
In Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at page 258, the defendant seeking
Pitchess discovery filed an affidavit under seal. When the trial court refused to
allow the city attorney to review the document, the city attorney suggested that
defense counsel provide a copy of the affidavit subject to a protective order.
(Davenport, at pp. 258-259.) The trial court denied the request, and after in
camera review, ordered disclosure of the personnel records.
The city attorney filed a writ petition. (Davenport, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at
p. 259.) Citing Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at page 1130, the Court of
Appeal observed that “ ‘effective participation in an important pretrial matter’ ”
should not be precluded “ ‘merely because the defendant asserts that the factual or
legal showing made in support of a particular motion should remain
confidential.’ ” (Davenport, at p. 263.) It placed great reliance on the fact that the
city attorney’s office was not the agency prosecuting Davenport. (Id. at pp. 263-
264.) “We have reviewed the affidavit and conclude that to allow the city attorney
to review it, under a protective order, will in no way compromise Davenport’s
defense or right to a fair trial.” (Id. at p. 264.)
Contrary to the conclusion in Davenport and the City’s claim here, the city
attorney is not an entirely neutral third party. The parties vigorously debate the
extent of the interaction between the city attorney and the officer whose records
are sought, and whether the city attorney consults with the officer when
responding to a Pitchess motion. While the City may be correct that it is an entity
distinct from the prosecution, it nevertheless acknowledges that such an officer is
its client. He is a holder of the privilege, and the city attorney speaks in defense of
his privacy interest. (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
1411, 1430.) The officer is often “a prosecution witness or affiliated with the
prosecution team.” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1046, fn. 7.)
The Court of Appeal here declined to adopt the Davenport reasoning, and
concluded instead that redaction was required. We agree and disapprove City of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 255 (Davenport), to the
extent it holds that a supporting Pitchess affidavit filed under seal may be released
to the city attorney under a protective order.
This outcome is appropriate in light of the procedure set out here. A trial
court will have determined that disclosure of identified portions of an affidavit
would impinge upon privileged information, that those portions are necessary to
support the Pitchess motion, and that filing under seal is the only feasible way to
honor the privilege. This determination will not have been made merely on the
defendant’s assertion, but after a particularized showing scrutinized during an in
camera hearing. As we have observed in other contexts, “mere disclosure of client
confidences and attorney work product to third parties, in itself, would violate
these privileges.” (People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 719
[seized documents]; see § 915.)10 A criminal defendant should not be forced to

10 Indeed, under the reciprocal discovery scheme, “[n]either the defendant
nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials or information
which are work product as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 2018.030 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, or which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory
provision, or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.”
(Pen. Code, § 1054.6.)

choose between pursuing discovery efforts by revealing privileged information or
forgoing discovery to maintain a privilege.
We appreciate that when the affidavit is redacted, the resulting Pitchess
procedure will be less informed by adversarial debate. We have recognized other
procedures, however, in which limitations on the adversarial process are
necessary. Neither defense nor prosecution counsel are present, for example,
during in camera review of Pitchess records themselves. Thus, they cannot argue
the discoverability of particular documents in the file. Similarly, when the defense
moves to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and the court holds an
in camera hearing on the question, defense counsel is not entitled to attend the
hearing and argue, subject to a protective order. In these analogous situations, we
reasonably rely on trial courts to make the necessary factual findings, and for
appellate courts to objectively review the record. We repose that same reliance

11 The trial court may, of course, consider the entire affidavit in
determining whether a defendant has demonstrated good cause to discover
Pitchess material. The unredacted affidavit, along with the transcript of the in
camera privilege hearing, should be maintained under seal in the record. This
process will strike a balance between the defendant’s need for confidentiality and
the opponent’s right to meaningfully argue against the motion.

The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.


See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Garcia v. Superior Court

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 120 Cal.App.4th 1252
Rehearing Granted


Opinion No.

Date Filed: August 9, 2007


County: Orange
Judge: Carla Singer


Attorneys for Appellant:

Deborah A. Kwast, Public Defender, Thomas Havlena, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Kevin Phillips,
Assistant Public Defender, and Donald E. Landis, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.


Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.

Joseph W. Fletcher, City Attorney, and Paula J. Coleman, Assistant City Attorney, for Real Party in

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Claudia McGee Henry, Assistant City Attorney, and
Kim Rodgers Westhoff, Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities and California State
Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Donald E. Landis, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
14 Civic Center Plaza
Santa Ana, CA 92701
(714) 834-2144

Paula J. Coleman
Assistant City Attorney
20 Civic Center Plaza, M29
Santa Ana, CA 92702
(714) 647-5201

Kim Rodgers Westhoff
Deputy City Attorney
500 City Hall East
200 North Main Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 978-8104

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 08/09/2007S127432

1City Of Santa Ana (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Paula Jane Coleman
Office of the City Attorney
20 Civic Center Plaza, M-29
Santa Ana, CA

2Superior Court Of Orange County (Respondent)
700 Civic Center Dr. West Dept. C43
Santa Ana, CA 92702

3Garcia, Jose Antonio (Petitioner)
Represented by Donald E. Landis
Orange County Public Defender
14 Civic Center Plaza
Santa Ana, CA

4League Of California Cities (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Kim Rodgers Westhoff
Office of the City Attorney
900 City Hall West, 200 N. Main Street
Los Angeles, CA

Aug 9 2007Opinion: Affirmed

Aug 27 2004Petition for review with request for stay filed (criminal)
  counsel for real party (CITY OF SANTA ANA)
Aug 27 2004Record requested
Aug 31 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  one manila jacket.
Sep 22 2004Petition for review granted (criminal case)
  Petition for review granted. Pending final disposition, the superior court's order disclosing the public defender's declaration filed under seal in Orange County Superior Court, case number 02CF1970, entitled People v. Jose Antonio Garcia, is hereby stayed. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: Brown, ACJ, Kennard, Baxter, Weredgar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Oct 20 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  rpi, City of Santa Ana
Nov 18 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  petitioner Jose Antonio Garcia
Nov 23 2004Request for extension of time filed
  reply brief/merits to 12-15-04>>real party City of Santa Ana
Dec 1 2004Extension of time granted
  to Dec. 15, 2004 for rpi to filed the reply brief on the merits.
Dec 14 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  real party City of Santa Ana
Dec 16 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  The League of California Cities and The California State Association of Counties
Jan 3 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, et al., in support of RPI. Answer due within 20 days.
Jan 3 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, et al., in support of RPI.
Jan 21 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to ac brief of League of Calif Cities, etal>>petitioner Jose Antonio Garcia
Mar 21 2006Received:
  Letter from Donald E. Landis, Jr., Senior Deputy Public Defender, re case cite (attached)
Jan 16 20072nd record request
May 2 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Tuesday, May 29, at 1:00 p.m., in San Francisco
May 9 2007Application filed to:
  to divide oral argument time Paula J. Coleman, counsel for real party City of Santa Ana, asking to share 10 minutes of time with counsel for amici curiae League of California Cities & California State Association of Counties
May 11 2007Received:
  Respondent's additional citations for oral argument
May 16 2007Order filed
  The request of counsel for the real party in interest in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of the real party in interest to allocate to amici curiae League of California Cities et al. 10 minutes of real party's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 17 2007Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  by James Gualtieri of the California Channel.
May 17 2007Request for extended media coverage denied
  The request for extended media coverage, filed by The California Channel, on May 17, 2007, is hereby denied.
May 24 2007Received:
  Letter dated 5-23-2007 from Paula Coleman, Assistant City Attorney, counsel for real party in interest re case cite
May 29 2007Cause argued and submitted
Jun 14 2007Received:
  Letter dated 6-11-2007 from Donald E. Landis, Jr. Senior Deputy Public Defender, Orange County, informing this Court that on 6-7-2007, he withdrew his Pitchess motion and pled guilty to a negotiated plea for credit time served. This plea renders Mr. Garcia's habeas petition moot, since he is no longer in custody.
Jun 22 2007Received:
  Letter dated June 19, 2007, from Donald E. Landis, Jr., Senior Deputy Public Defender - Orange County enclosing copies of: 1) the retrieval order of the file, 2) copy of the plea agreement, and 3) the court's computerized minutes orders in the matter.
Jun 28 2007Received:
  Letter dated 6-27-2007 from Donald E. Landis, Jr., Sr, Deputy Public Defender - Orange County, counsel for petitioner, enclosing a copy of the Abstract of Judgment. (faxed copy)
Jul 9 2007Received:
  Letter from Paula J. Coleman, Assistant City Attorney of Santa Ana dated July 2, 2007, enclosing a certified copy of the "Abstract of Judgment - Prison Commitment Determinate" regarding Jose Antonio Garcia, filed on June 11, 2007.
Aug 8 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Aug 9 2007Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Court of Appeal's judgment. Opinion by Corrigan, J. -- joined by George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 22 2007Received:
  letter from L.A. Public Defender Mark Harvis re: error in the footnote of the opinion.
Aug 23 2007Request for modification of opinion filed
  Letter from Kim Rodgers Westhoff, Deputy City Attorney for the City of Los Angeles on behalf of the League of California Cities (amicus) requesting modification of the opinion.
Aug 29 2007Request for modification denied
Sep 12 2007Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Sep 24 2007Received:
  Acknowledgment of receipt for remittitur signed for by Lee Kegley, Deputy Clerk, 4th District/Div.3.
Sep 26 2007Received:
  Telephone call from Denise Massey, Fourth District, Division 3, requesting for the record.
Sep 26 2007Returned record
  to Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Attn: Denise Massey, Office of the Clerk. (one doghouse)

Oct 20 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 18 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
Dec 14 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Jan 3 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
Jan 21 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
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