Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/10/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDDIE FLETCHER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S114715
v.
Ct.App. 2/7 B151534
CARLYLE DAVIS et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. BC242260

When an attorney wishes to secure payment of hourly legal fees and costs
of litigation by obtaining a charging lien against a client’s future recovery, must
the attorney obtain the client’s consent in writing? We conclude that rule 3-300 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California (rule 3-300),
which requires the client’s informed written consent to the attorney’s acquisition
of an interest adverse to the client, applies to such a transaction and therefore
reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
BACKGROUND
Because this case reaches us after the trial court sustained defendants’
demurrer, we assume the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint are true.
In November 1995, Master Washer & Stamping Co., Inc. (Master Washer),
was evicted for nonpayment of rent. Subsequently, David Gernsbacher, the
attorney for landlord Arthur Gilbert, filed a lawsuit against Master Washer for
breach of the lease. He also refused to allow Master Washer to retrieve its
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equipment, which was Master Washer’s only asset. Without it, Master Washer
could not conduct its business. Master Washer retained plaintiff, attorney Freddie
Fletcher, to defend the breach-of-lease action and to institute a conversion action
for damages. Master Washer orally agreed to pay all costs plus Fletcher’s fee of
$200 per hour. In lieu of a cash retainer, Master Washer agreed to grant Fletcher a
lien on any judgment or settlement in its litigation with Gilbert. If the judgment or
settlement was insufficient, Master Washer agreed to pay the difference from the
income it earned once it resumed operations. Master Washer also promised
Fletcher a “bonus” of an unspecified percentage of any judgment obtained against
Gilbert if extensive litigation or trial was required and if the recovery in the case
was “large.”
Fletcher prepared and filed a complaint for conversion against Gilbert and
Gernsbacher. Prior to filing the complaint, Fletcher sent Master Washer a
memorandum setting forth his understanding of the terms of their oral retainer
agreement. Master Washer’s president, William Scallon, represented to Fletcher
that he would sign a written retainer agreement, but never did so. The suits
between Gilbert and Master Washer were consolidated.
While the Gilbert/Master Washer litigation was pending, Fletcher agreed to
do additional, personal legal work on behalf of Scallon and Scallon’s mother. In
each matter, Scallon, on behalf of Master Washer, orally granted Fletcher a lien on
Master Washer’s prospective recovery against Gilbert in the conversion action.
In Master Washer’s conversion action against Gilbert and Gernsbacher,
Gernsbacher obtained a summary judgment. In Gilbert’s action against Master
Washer for breach of lease, Gilbert and Master Washer entered into an agreement
under which Master Washer admitted liability to Gilbert for breach of the lease
and stipulated a judgment be entered against it and in favor of Gilbert for $85,000
in damages. (Gilbert v. Master Washer & Stamping Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
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212, 214-215.) Master Washer’s conversion action against Gilbert was tried to a
jury and resulted in a mistrial. As Fletcher prepared for a second trial, Master
Washer discharged him and replaced him with defendant Joseph Fischbach.
Scallon also discharged Fletcher from the other legal matters Fletcher was
handling on behalf of Scallon and his mother.
The second trial of Master Washer’s conversion action against Gilbert
resulted in a judgment in favor of Master Washer in the sum of $504,000 plus
interest.
Eleven days after entry of judgment in favor of Master Washer in its
conversion action against Gilbert, defendant Carlyle Davis filed a collection suit
against Gilbert, Master Washer, and Scallon, seeking to stay disbursement of the
judgment proceeds and to satisfy, from that recovery, criminal restitution and civil
judgments he held against Scallon. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting Scallon’s diversion of the proceeds from the Master Washer
judgment against Gilbert. The following day, Gilbert deposited in the Davis
collection action the sum of $618,194.10, representing the amount of the Master
Washer judgment plus accrued interest. A few weeks later, the parties to the
Davis action and others claiming an interest in the Master Washer judgment
stipulated to a disbursement of the judgment in specified amounts to Davis,
Gilbert, Master Washer, and Fischbach. The trial court approved the stipulation
and ordered the Master Washer judgment disbursed accordingly. Under the
stipulation, nearly all the judgment proceeds were disbursed to Davis, Gilbert,
Master Washer, and Fischbach.
Fletcher alleges that he did not learn about the Davis action or the
stipulated disbursement of the Master Washer judgment until the day after the
funds had been disbursed. Fletcher then filed this action against Master Washer,
Davis, Fischbach, Gilbert, and Gernsbacher, alleging that defendants were on
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notice of his lien at the time they stipulated to the disbursement of the proceeds
from the Master Washer judgment.
The trial court sustained the demurrers of Davis, Fischbach, Gilbert, and
Gernsbacher and dismissed the action as to them on the grounds Fletcher did not
and could not plead facts showing the perfection of a lien on the Master Washer
judgment or that the defendants had knowledge of such a lien.1 The Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that Fletcher’s lien did not have to be in writing to be
valid and that Fletcher did not have to obtain a judgment as to the existence and
amount of the lien before asserting a lien on the Master Washer recovery. We
granted review.
DISCUSSION
“A lien is a charge imposed in some mode other than by a transfer in trust
upon specific property by which it is made security for the performance of an act.”
(Civ. Code, § 2872.) An attorney’s lien “upon the fund or judgment which he has
recovered for his compensation as attorney in recovering the fund or judgment . . .
is denominated a ‘charging lien.’ ” (Goodrich v. M’Donald (N.Y. 1889) 19 N.E.
649, 651.) A charging lien may be used to secure either an hourly fee or a
contingency fee. (Cetenko v. United California Bank (1982) 30 Cal.3d 528, 531-
532.)
In most jurisdictions, a charging lien is established by operation of law in
favor of an attorney to satisfy attorney fees and expenses out of the proceeds of a

1
The trial court sustained the demurrer of Master Washer with leave to
amend on the ground Fletcher had not pleaded a timely written notice to Master
Washer of the right to arbitrate an attorney-client fee dispute, as required by
Business and Professions Code section 6201. When Fletcher failed to amend his
complaint within the allotted time, the trial court dismissed his action against
Master Washer. That ruling, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, has not
been challenged here.
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prospective judgment. (City of Los Angeles v. Knapp (1936) 7 Cal.2d 168, 173;
Wagner v. Sariotti (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 693, 697.) But in California, with a few
exceptions not pertinent here (see 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996)
Attorneys, § 194, pp. 249-250), “an attorney’s lien is created only by contract. . . .
Unlike a service lien or a mechanic’s lien, for example (Civ. Code, §§ 3051,
3110), an attorney’s lien is not created by the mere fact that an attorney has
performed services in a case.” (Carroll v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1168, 1172; see also Haupt v. Charlie’s Kosher Market (1941) 17
Cal.2d 843, 845.)
Fletcher’s complaint alleges that Master Washer orally granted him a
charging lien for hourly attorney fees on any recovery Master Washer
subsequently obtained from Gilbert in the conversion action. The trial court ruled
that no valid lien existed because, under rule 3-300, a client must consent in
writing to an attorney’s charging lien against the client’s future recovery. The
Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that rule 3-300 was inapplicable in that an
attorney’s charging lien is not “adverse” within the meaning of Hawk v. State Bar
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 589 (Hawk).
Rule 3-300, which is entitled “Avoiding Interests Adverse to a Client,”
provides: “A member shall not . . . knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory,
security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client, unless each of the
following requirements has been satisfied: [¶] (A) The transaction or acquisition
and its terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been
understood by the client; and [¶] (B) The client is advised in writing that the client
may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client’s choice and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and [¶] (C) The client thereafter
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consents in writing to the terms of the transaction or the terms of the acquisition.”
(Italics added.)
An attorney’s charging lien is a “security interest” in the proceeds of the
litigation. (Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153, 158; see also Wagner v.
Sariotti, supra, 56 Cal.App.2d at pp. 697-698.) Accordingly, the question here
becomes whether Fletcher’s charging lien was “adverse” to Master Washer. In
making that determination, we must be mindful that “ ‘[i]n civil cases, “there are
no transactions respecting which courts . . . are more jealous and particular, than
dealings between attorneys and their clients.” ’ ” (Eschwig v. State Bar (1969) 1
Cal.3d 8, 16.)
Although it is difficult to anticipate with precision the myriad of
transactions that may arise between an attorney and a client, an attorney generally
“must avoid circumstances where it is reasonably foreseeable that his acquisition
may be detrimental, i.e., adverse, to the interests of his client.” (Ames v. State Bar
(1973) 8 Cal.3d 910, 920 (Ames).) Under this standard, we have characterized as
adverse an attorney’s purchase of a note secured by a first deed of trust on
property that was the subject of the litigation the attorney was engaged to pursue
and on which the clients had a note secured by the second deed of trust (Ames,
supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 918-920); an attorney’s acquisition of a writ of execution
against the husband’s property to secure payment of fees in a domestic dispute and
the attorney’s subsequent decision to levy on his own writ instead of the writ of
his client, the wife (Silver v. State Bar (1974) 13 Cal.3d 134, 139-140); and an
attorney’s acquisition from the client of a note secured by a deed of trust in real
property in order to secure payment of legal fees (Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp.
593-594).
We have contrasted the above transactions with an unsecured promissory
note, which “gives an attorney only a right to proceed against the client’s assets in
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a contested judicial proceeding at which the client may dispute the indebtedness.
The note allows the attorney to obtain a judgment, and to seek to enforce the
judgment against the client’s assets, if any. It does not give the attorney a present
interest in the client’s property which the attorney can summarily realize.” (Hawk,
supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 600-601.)
An attorney’s charging lien on the proceeds of the litigation falls
somewhere between these extremes. Defendants Davis and Fischbach argue that
Fletcher’s charging lien was adverse to Master Washer because, under Ames,
supra, 8 Cal.3d at page 920, it was “reasonably foreseeable” that its acquisition by
Fletcher could become detrimental to the client. However, Fletcher and the Court
of Appeal use a different test. They contend that Hawk modified the “reasonably
foreseeable” test such that only those transactions that permit the attorney to
summarily extinguish the client’s interest in the property are deemed adverse,
relying in particular on this sentence from Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 600:
“Again, acquiring the ability to summarily extinguish the client’s interest in
property is what makes the acquisition ‘adverse.’ ”
Fletcher and the Court of Appeal have misread Hawk, which nowhere
criticized Ames and instead acknowledged explicitly that “[w]e have also said that
an attorney who has obtained an interest in the property of a client where it is
reasonably foreseeable that his acquisition may become detrimental to the client,
even though his intention is to aid the client, has acquired an interest adverse to a
client.” (Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 599; see also Connor v. State Bar (1990) 50
Cal.3d 1047, 1057.) That standard was triggered, we explained, when an
attorney’s “ ‘personal financial interest was in conflict with [his client’s] interest
in obtaining full repayment of its loan’ ” (Hawk, supra, at p. 599), when counsel
had “acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation for which they had
been retained” (id. at p. 600), and when a secured note “can be used to summarily
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extinguish the client’s interest in the property.” (Ibid.) Fletcher’s proposed test
would define only the last of these transactions as adverse. Plainly, the single
sentence seized on by Fletcher merely described the adverse interest presented in
that case. It did not purport to define what makes an interest adverse in all
circumstances.
Applying the correct test, we agree with Davis and Fischbach that it was
reasonably foreseeable the charging lien could become detrimental to the client.
Although a charging lien does not grant an attorney the power to summarily
extinguish the client’s interest in any recovery, a charging lien could significantly
impair the client’s interest by delaying payment of the recovery or settlement
proceeds until any disputes over the lien can be resolved. For example, when
there is a dispute over the existence or amount of an attorney’s charging lien, the
attorney can prevent the judgment debtor or the settling party from remitting the
recovery to the client until the dispute is resolved. (Ex parte Kyle (1851) 1 Cal.
331, 332 [an attorney with a charging lien “may stop the money in transitu, by
giving notice to the opposite party not to pay it, until his claim for costs be
satisfied, and then moving the court to have the amount of his costs paid to him in
the first instance”]; see generally 7 Am.Jur.2d (1997) Attorneys at Law, § 342, p.
335 [charging lien grants attorney “the right to have the court interfere to prevent
payment by the judgment debtor to the creditor in fraud of the attorney’s right to
it”].) Alternatively, when the settlement draft is made jointly payable to the client
and the attorney, the attorney may refuse to endorse the check until the dispute is
resolved.2 (Vapnek et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The
Rutter Group 2003) ¶ 5:830.) Even when the proceeds have been deposited in the

2
Indeed, the attorney must do so in order to preserve the charging lien. (In
the Matter of Feldsott (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 754, 758.)
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client’s trust account, the attorney may withhold an amount equivalent to the
disputed portion. (Id., ¶ 5:829; Flahavan et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal
Injury (The Rutter Group 2003) ¶ 4:544.) In each of these instances when the
charging lien is disputed, the client’s recovery will be “ ‘tied up until everyone
involved can agree on how the money should be divided . . . or until one or the
other brings an independent action for declaratory relief.’ ” (Carroll v. Interstate
Brands Corp., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.)
In sum, a charging lien grants the attorney considerable authority to detain
all or part of the client’s recovery whenever a dispute arises over the lien’s
existence or its scope. That would unquestionably be detrimental to the client.
(Cf. Brockway v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 51, 64-65 [an adverse interest exists
where the fee arrangement “gives the attorney an ownership interest in client
property that has a value greater than the amount absolutely agreed upon in fees,”
italics added].) A charging lien is therefore an adverse interest within the meaning
of rule 3-300 and thus requires the client’s informed written consent. Requiring
the client’s informed written consent has the additional benefit of ensuring that the
client truly agrees to the creation of the lien and its scope, thus making it less
likely that a disagreement will arise that could lead to litigation or other action
adverse to the client, and also impressing upon the client the importance of his or
her consent and of the right to withhold it. (Cf. Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29
Cal.4th 142, 157 & fn. 9.)
Our construction of rule 3-300 finds additional support in the discussion
note following the rule, which states that “[r]ule 3-300 is intended to apply where
the member wishes to obtain an interest in client’s property in order to secure the
amount of the member’s past due or future fees.” (Discussion, 23 pt. 3 West’s
Ann. Codes, Court Rules (1996 ed.) Rules Prof. Conduct, foll. Rule 3-300, p. 366.)
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A charging lien on a future recovery qualifies as an interest in the client’s property
designed to secure the member’s fees.
Our construction is also supported by the State Bar of California’s Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, which concluded in a
formal opinion that “it is unethical to require a lien or security device unless the
member adheres to the provisions of rule 5-101 [now rule 3-300].” (1 Cal.
Compendium on Prof. Responsibility, State Bar, Formal Opn. No. 1981-62, at p.
IIA-174.) The Los Angeles County Bar Association came to the same conclusion:
“Whenever an attorney engages in a fee arrangement which involves the use of
subject matter as a source of payment, the attorney must be extremely careful to
protect his client’s rights and avoid adverse interest. At a minimum, the fee
arrangement must be governed by the standards set forth in Rule 5-101 [now rule
3-300].” (3 Cal. Compendium on Prof. Responsibility, L.A. County Bar Assn.
Formal Opn. No. 416 (Oct. 25, 1983), p. 122; contra, 2 Cal. Compendium on Prof.
Responsibility, Bar Assn. of S.F. Ethics Opn. No. 1997-1, p. IIB-139.)3
The Restatement Third of the Law Governing Lawyers is in accord. Under
the Restatement, a lawyer “may contract in writing with the client for a lien on the
proceeds of the representation to secure payment for the lawyer’s services and

3
Without citing its Formal Opinion No. 416, a subsequent opinion of the Los
Angeles County Bar Association suggested that rule 3-300 did not apply to a
contingency fee coupled with a lien against the client’s prospective recovery “in
the same matter in which legal services are being provided.” (3 Cal. Compendium
on Prof. Responsibility, L.A. County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 496 (Nov. 16,
1998), p. 238.) However, the opinion did require a written agreement if the
attorney’s lien secured hourly fees “incurred in an unrelated case.” (Id. at p. 239.)
We are presented here only with a lien to secure hourly fees and thus do not decide
whether rule 3-300 applies to a contingency-fee arrangement coupled with a lien
on the client’s prospective recovery in the same proceeding. (Cf. Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 6147.)
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disbursements in that matter.” (Rest.3d Law Governing Lawyers (2000) § 43,
subd. (2)(a), p. 306, italics added.) The requirement of a writing “ensures that the
client has notice that the lawyer may detain part of any recovery and an
opportunity to bargain for a different result [citation]. The requirement of a
writing also permits third parties to verify the lien’s existence and provisions.”
(Id., com. e, p. 309.)
The Court of Appeal perceived that a conflict existed among other
jurisdictions as to whether a charging lien must be in writing—citing Wisconsin
and Florida as examples—but a closer examination reveals that no such conflict
exists. The Court of Appeal correctly identified Wisconsin as a jurisdiction that
requires an attorney’s charging lien to be in writing. (Weigel v. Grimmett
(Wis.Ct.App. 1992) 496 N.W.2d 206, 209-210.) Wisconsin thus supports our
holding. However, the court erred in classifying Florida as a jurisdiction with a
contrary position. In Florida, as in most other jurisdictions, a charging lien arises
by operation of law when an attorney is retained and a positive judgment or
settlement is obtained. Hence, there is no requirement in Florida that the client
agree—orally or in writing—to the lien. (Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, et
al. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1987) 517 So.2d 88, 91-92.) Fletcher thus has failed to
identify any jurisdiction that has embraced the rule he proposes.
Finally, our holding that an attorney’s charging lien to secure payment of
hourly fees is adverse within the meaning of rule 3-300 does not compromise the
public policy in favor of attorney liens. Rule 3-300 does not bar attorneys from
obtaining liens on future recoveries. The rule merely requires the attorney who
wishes to obtain such a lien to explain the transaction fully, to offer fair and
reasonable terms, to provide a copy of the agreement, to give the client an
opportunity to seek independent legal advice, and to secure the client’s written
consent. (Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 601.) This is not a great deal more than is
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now required for most fee agreements: attorneys are required, with limited
exceptions, to put most fee agreements in writing and explain fully the terms of
the agreement. (Ibid.; see Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6147, 6148.) As we stated in
Hawk in similar circumstances, “[w]e do not think that this interpretation of the
rule is unduly onerous.” (Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 601.)
We therefore conclude that an attorney who secures payment of hourly fees
by acquiring a charging lien against a client’s future judgment or recovery has
acquired an interest that is adverse to the client, and so must comply with the
requirements of rule 3-300.4 Fletcher failed to comply with the rule. Accordingly,
Fletcher’s lien may not be enforced in this proceeding. Were we to hold
otherwise, “we would, in effect, be both countenancing and contributing to a

4
Fletcher also contends that Business and Professions Code sections 6147
and 6148, which regulate contingency-fee and hourly-fee contracts between
attorneys and their clients, impliedly preempt the field of attorney-client
transactions, and that section 6148, subdivision (d)(4) in particular exempted his
fee agreement with Master Washer, a corporation, from any requirement of a
writing. As demonstrated above, however, an agreement to secure client payment
with an interest in client property imposes risks and consequences beyond those
inherent in a fee agreement. A finding that regulation of the former is preempted
by regulation targeted at the latter would render rule 3-300 meaningless, even
though the drafters of the rule expressly contemplated that these provisions would
have complementary effects. (Discussion, 23 pt. 3 West’s Ann. Codes, Court
Rules (1996 ed.) Rules Prof. Conduct, foll. Rule 3-300, p. 366 [“Rule 3-300 is not
intended to apply to the agreement by which the member is retained by the client,
unless the agreement confers on the member an . . . interest adverse to the
client”].) Indeed, as Fletcher concedes, “if the lien is adverse to the client, then
the requirements of Rule 3-300 are required to be satisfied.” Moreover, we
recognized the concurrent operation of the predecessor to rule 3-300 and Business
and Professions Code sections 6147 and 6148 in Hawk, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page
601. Finally, a finding of preemption would divest clients of any meaningful
protection even when an attorney secures an interest that allows the client’s
interest in the property to be summarily extinguished. Fletcher offers nothing to
suggest the Legislature intended this result.
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violation of a rule we formally approved in order ‘to protect the public and to
promote respect and confidence in the legal profession.’ ” (Chambers v. Kay,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 158.) Such a result would be untenable as well as
inconsistent with the policy considerations that animated the adoption of rule 3-
300.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed insofar as it reversed the
trial court’s order sustaining the general demurrers of defendants Joseph S.
Fischbach and Carlyle E. Davis et al., and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Fletcher v. Davis
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 106 Cal.App.4th 398
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S114715
Date Filed: June 10, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Richard L. Fruin, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Freddie Fletcher, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Latham & Watkins, Susan S. Azad and Kathryn M. Davis for Defendants and Respondents Carlyle E.
Davis, TransCoast Financial Inc. Defined Benefit Trust, Carlyle E. Davis and Barbara Davis as Trustees of
TransCoast Financial Inc. Defined Benefit Trust and TransCoast Financial Inc.

Gernsbacher & Associates and David L. Gernsbacher for Defendants and Respondents Arthur Gilbert and
David L. Gernsbacher.

Stocker & Lancaster and Jay F. Stocker for Defendant and Respondent Master Washer & Stamping Co.,
Inc.

Fischbach & Fischbach and Joseph S. Fischbach for Defendant and Respondent Joseph S. Fischbach.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Freddie Fletcher
2901 W. Beverly Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90057
(310) 487-4706

Kathryn M. Davis
Latham & Watkins
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2007
(213) 485-1234

Joseph S. Fischbach
Fischbach & Fischbach
9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 410
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(310) 278-4015

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 06/10/2004	S114715

Disposition
Jun 10 2004	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Mar 28 2003	Petition for review filed   respondent, Joseph Fischbach.
Apr 2 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse.
Apr 2 2003	Record requested
Apr 2 2003	2nd petition for review filed   respondent, Carlyle Davis 40K
May 14 2003	Letter sent to:   Counsel regarding Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
May 14 2003	Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)   The issues to be briefed and argued before this court are limited to: (1) Must an attorney's agreement with a client authorizing a lien for payment of attorney fees to be imposed against any recovery in the litigation be in writing? (2) Must an attorney obtain a judgment against the client establishing the existence and amount of such a lien before suing non-client third parties to enforce the lien? Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
May 30 2003	Change of Address filed for:   counsel for respondents Arthur Gilbert & David L. Bernsbacher
Jun 2 2003	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   By counsel for Respondents.
Jun 3 2003	Note: Mail returned and re-sent   To Appellant Freddie Fletcher.
Jun 12 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   respondent Joseph S. Fischbach in pro per
Jun 12 2003	Request for extension of time filed   to file opening brief/merits to 8-12-03>>respondents Carlyle E. Davis, etal
Jun 12 2003	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   respondent Carlyle Davis
Jun 16 2003	Extension of time granted   To August 12, 2003 to file Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits.
Jun 18 2003	Received:   application for extension to time to file opening brief/merits--late respondents Arthur Gilbert and David L. Gernsbacher
Jun 27 2003	Extension of time granted   To July 11, 2003 to file Respondents' {Arthur Gilbert and David L. Gernsbacher} Opening Brief on the Merits.
Jul 11 2003	Request for extension of time filed   answer brief/merits>>appellant Freddie Fletcher in pro per
Jul 11 2003	Change of Address filed for:   appellant Freddie Fletcher
Jul 21 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's Brief shall be filed 7 days after the final Opening Brief is filed.
Aug 7 2003	Request for extension of time filed   respondents Carlyle E. Davis, etal
Aug 11 2003	Order filed   On application of respondents and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including August 21, 2003.
Aug 20 2003	Request for extension of time filed   to file opening/brief merits to 9-15-03>>respondents Carlyle Davis, etal
Aug 26 2003	Extension of time granted   To September 15, 2003 to file Respondents' Carlyle E. Davis et al., Opening Brief on the Merits. No further extensions are contemplated.
Sep 16 2003	Received:   resondents Carlyle E. Davis, et al late opening brief/merits submitted concurrent with application for permission to file.
Sep 18 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   By Respondents {Carlyle E. Davis et al.,}. Filed with permission.
Sep 25 2003	Received:   from atty for respondents -- > supplemental p.o.s. for opening brief/merits.
Sep 25 2003	Received:   supplemental p.o.s. to request to file opening brief; declaration of K. M. Davis.
Oct 8 2003	Request for extension of time filed   appellant Freddie Fletcher request to December 8, 2003 to file answer brief on the merits
Oct 16 2003	Extension of time granted   To November 7, 2003 to file Appellant's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Nov 6 2003	Request for extension of time filed   [30 day] to file answer brief/merits to -> December 8, 2003. [aplnt/pro per Freddie Fletcher.
Nov 13 2003	Extension of time granted   To December 8, 2003 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Dec 8 2003	Request for extension of time filed   to file answer/brief asking to Jan 8, 2004.
Dec 15 2003	Received:   Respondent's {Joseph Fischbach} notice of Non-opposition to Appellant's application for extension of time.
Dec 16 2003	Received document entitled:   resp. Joseph S. Fischbach's "Notice of non-oppo. to 3rd app. for extension of time."
Dec 16 2003	Extension of time granted   The application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file appellant's answer brief on the merits is hereby extended to and including January 8, 2004. No further extensions will be granted.
Jan 8 2004	Request for extension of time filed   to file answer brief/meritis asking to Jan 12, 2004
Jan 13 2004	Received:   appellant freddie Fletcher's Answer Brief on the Merits [late] submitted with request for relief from default.
Jan 14 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed   with permission.
Jan 29 2004	Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed)   by respondent Joseph S. Fishbach in pro per.
Feb 3 2004	Request for extension of time filed   to file respondent. Davis' Reply Brief - asking to March 4, 2004.
Feb 4 2004	Extension of time granted   To March 4, 2004 to file Respondents' {Carlyle E. Davis et al.,} reply brief on the merits. No further extensions are contemplated.
Mar 3 2004	Received:   notice of correciton of errors for appellant "Fletcher's" answer brief.
Mar 5 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   By counsel for Respondents {Carlyle E. Davis et al.,}
Mar 5 2004	Application to file over-length brief filed   with respondents' reply brief under separate cover.
Apr 6 2004	Case ordered on calendar   5-6-04, 9am, S.F.
Apr 20 2004	Filed:   request of resp Davis to divide oral argument time with resp Fischbach.
Apr 28 2004	Order filed   permission granted for two counsel to present oral agrument for resps.
Apr 28 2004	Order filed   permission granted for division of oral argument time: 20 min to Kathryn Davis for resp Carlyle Davis and 10 min to resp Joseph Fischbach (in pro per)
May 6 2004	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 10 2004	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   insofar as it reversed the trial court's order sustaining the general demurrers of defendants Joseph S. Fischbach and Carlyle E. Davis et al., and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Majority Opinion by Baxter, J., ----- Joined by George, CJ., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Jun 28 2004	Rehearing petition filed   pro per appellant Freddie Fletcher [40k]
Jul 2 2004	Time extended to consider modification or rehearing   To September 8, 2004.
Jul 6 2004	Answer to rehearing petition filed   By Respondents {Carlyle E. Davis et al.,}.
Aug 11 2004	Rehearing denied
Aug 11 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Aug 26 2004	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from Second District, Division Seven, signed for by Eva McClintock.
Aug 31 2004	Returned record   To 2 DCA Div. 7.

Briefs
Jun 12 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Sep 18 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jan 14 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 29 2004	Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed)
Mar 5 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

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