IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Estate of ARTHUR PATRICK FORD,
Deceased. )
TERROLD BEAN,
S105508
Petitioner
and
Appellant,
Ct.App.
1/2
A094755
v.
City and County of
JOHN J. FORD III et al.,
San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. PES00280420
Objectors
and
Respondents.
Terrold Bean claims the right to inherit the intestate estate of Arthur Patrick Ford
as Ford’s equitably adopted son. The superior court denied the claim, and the
Court of Appeal affirmed the denial, for lack of clear and convincing evidence that
Ford intended to adopt Bean. After reviewing California case law on equitable
adoption, we conclude that no equitable adoption is shown unless the parties’
conduct and statements clearly and convincingly demonstrate an intent to adopt.
We will therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Born in 1953, Bean was declared a ward of the court and placed in the home of
Ford and his wife, Kathleen Ford, as a foster child in 1955. Bean never knew his
natural father, whose identity is uncertain, and he was declared free of his
mother’s control in 1958, at the age of four. Bean lived continuously with Mr. and
1
Mrs. Ford and their natural daughter, Mary Catherine, for about 18 years, until
Mrs. Ford’s death in 1973, then with Ford and Mary Catherine for another two
years, until 1975.
During part of the time Bean lived with the Fords, they cared for other foster
children and received a county stipend for doing so. Although the Fords stopped
taking in foster children after Mrs. Ford became ill with cancer, they retained
custody of Bean. The last two other foster children left the home around the time
of Mrs. Ford’s death, but Bean, who at 18 years of age could have left, stayed with
Ford and Mary Catherine.
Bean knew the Fords were not his natural parents, but as a child he called them
“Mommy” and “Daddy,” and later “Mom” and “Dad.” Joan Malpassi, Mary
Catherine’s friend since childhood and later administrator of Ford’s estate,
testified that Bean’s relationship with Mary Catherine was “as two siblings” and
that the Fords treated Bean “more like Mary rather than a foster son, like a real son
was my observation.” Mary Catherine later listed Bean as her brother on a life
insurance application.
Bean remained involved with Ford and Mary Catherine even after leaving the Ford
home and marrying. Ford loaned Bean money to help furnish his new household
and later forgave the unpaid part of the debt when Bean’s marriage was dissolved.
Bean visited Ford and Mary Catherine several times per year both during his
marriage and after his divorce. When Ford suffered a disabling stroke in 1989,
Mary Catherine conferred with Bean and Malpassi over Ford’s care; Ford was
placed in a board and care facility where Bean continued to visit him regularly
until his death in 2000.
Mary Catherine died in 1999. Bean and Malpassi arranged her funeral. Bean
petitioned for Malpassi to be appointed Ford’s conservator, and with Malpassi’s
agreement Bean obtained a power of attorney to take care of Ford’s affairs
2
pending establishment of the conservatorship. Bean also administered Mary
Catherine’s estate, which was distributed to the Ford conservatorship. When a
decision was needed as to whether Ford should receive medical life support,
Malpassi consulted with Bean in deciding he should. When Ford died, Bean and
Malpassi arranged the funeral.
The Fords never petitioned to adopt Bean. Mrs. Ford told Barbara Carter, a family
friend, that “they wanted to adopt Terry,” but she was “under the impression that
she could not put in for adoption while he was in the home.” She worried that if
Bean was removed during the adoption process he might be put in “a foster home
that wasn’t safe.”
Ford’s nearest relatives at the time of his death were the two children of his
predeceased brother, nephew John J. Ford III and niece Veronica Newbeck.
Neither had had any contact with Ford for about 15 years before his death, and
neither attended his funeral. John J. Ford III filed a petition to determine
entitlement to distribution (Prob. Code, § 11700), listing both himself and
Newbeck as heirs. Bean filed a statement of interest claiming entitlement to
Ford’s entire estate under Probate Code sections 6454 (foster child heirship) and
6455 (equitable adoption).
After trial, the superior court ruled against Bean’s claim on both grounds. Probate
Code section 6454’s requirement of a legal barrier to adoption was unmet, since
the Fords could have adopted Bean after his mother’s parental rights were
terminated in 1958. The doctrine of equitable adoption, the trial court found, was
inapplicable because “there is no evidence that [Ford] ever told [Bean] or anyone
else that he wanted to adopt him nor publicly told anyone that [Bean] was his
adopted son.” There was thus no clear and convincing evidence of “an intent to
adopt.”
3
Bean appealed only on the equitable adoption issue. The Court of Appeal
affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that equitable adoption must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, the reviewing court held, any error by
the trial court in this respect would be harmless because the evidence did not
support equitable adoption on any standard of proof “for the same reasons
articulated by the trial court.”
We granted Bean’s petition for review.
DISCUSSION
Chapter 2 of part 2 of division 6 of the Probate Code,1 sections 6450 to 6455,
defines the parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. Section
6450, subdivision (b) provides that such a relationship exists between adopting
parents and the adopted child. Section 6453, subdivision (a) provides that the
relationship exists between a child and a presumptive parent under the Uniform
Parentage Act. Section 6454 delineates the circumstances in which a foster parent
or stepparent is deemed a parent for the purpose of succession, requiring both a
personal relationship beginning during the child’s minority and enduring for the
child’s and parent’s joint lifetimes, and a legal barrier but for which the foster
parent or stepparent would have adopted the child. (See generally Estate of
Joseph (1998) 17 Cal.4th 203, 208-212.) Finally, section 6455 provides in full:
“Nothing in this chapter affects or limits application of the judicial doctrine of
equitable adoption for the benefit of the child or the child’s issue.” We therefore
look to decisional law, rather than statute, for guidance on the equitable adoption
doctrine’s proper scope and application.
1
All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise
specified.
4
I. Criteria for Equitable Adoption
In its essence, the doctrine of equitable adoption allows a person who was
accepted and treated as a natural or adopted child, and as to whom adoption
typically was promised or contemplated but never performed, to share in
inheritance of the foster parents’ property. “The parents of a child turn him over
to foster parents who agree to care for him as if he were their own child. Perhaps
they also agree to adopt him. They do care for him, support him, educate him, and
treat him in all respects as if he were their child, but they never adopt him. Upon
their death he seeks to inherit their property on the theory that he should be treated
as if he had been adopted. Many courts would honor his claim, at least under
some circumstances, characterizing the case as one of equitable adoption, or
adoption by estoppel, or virtual adoption, or specific enforcement of a contract to
adopt.” (Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States (2d ed. 1988)
§ 20.9, p. 925.) The doctrine is widely applied to allow inheritance from the
adoptive parent: at least 27 jurisdictions have so applied the doctrine, while only
10 have declined to recognize it in that context. (Annot., Modern Status of Law as
to Equitable Adoption or Adoption by Estoppel (1980) 97 A.L.R.3d 347, § 3.)2
A California court first recognized the doctrine, albeit in the atypical context of
inheritance through the adoptive parent, in Estate of Grace (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d
956. A California couple had taken custody of and raised a Texas girl, Edna
Grace, having recorded in Texas a statement that they “ ‘hereby adopt’ ” the child,
who was to be their heir and “ ‘a member of our family, with all the rights and
2
In California, at least, adoption itself is “purely statutory in origin and
nature.” (Estate of Radovich (1957) 48 Cal.2d 116, 128 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).)
The effect of an equitable adoption finding, therefore, is limited to the child’s
inheritance rights and does not in other respects equate the child’s rights with
those of a statutorily adopted child.
5
privileges as if born to us.’ ” (Id. at p. 957.) Although Texas adoption law at that
time did not recognize inheritance from an adoptive grandparent through an
adoptive parent (id. at pp. 959-960), the California court upheld Grace’s
daughter’s entitlement to inherit from her adoptive grandparents as a matter of
contract.3 The parents had offered to adopt Grace and make her a full member of
their family, and “[t]he child, by living with them as a member of the family,
accepted the offer,” creating a contract concluded and performed in California.
(Estate of Grace, supra, at p. 962.) Quoting from a treatise, the appellate court
noted that “ ‘the courts, in their effort to protect and promote the welfare of the
child, have given effect to a contract to adopt, where it has been fully performed
on the part of the child, although it was invalid under the laws where it was
made.’ ” (Id. at p. 963.)
This court decided its only case relating to equitable adoption nine years later.
(Estate of Radovich, supra, 48 Cal.2d 116.) The question before us was not
whether the child could inherit as an equitable adoptee—a final superior court
decree established that he could—but the child’s status, for purposes of inheritance
taxation, as either the decedent’s adopted child or a stranger in blood to the
decedent. (Id. at pp. 118-119.) The majority took the former view, but its opinion
rested on the in rem character of the superior court’s probate decree and did not
address the contours of the equitable adoption doctrine. (Id. at pp. 119-124.)
3
Much more recently, the Court of Appeal held an equitably adopted child
was not “issue” of the adoptive parent as that term was used in a grandparent’s
will. (Estate of Furia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1.) We have no occasion here to
decide whether that decision and Estate of Grace conflict or which is correct if
they do.
6
Justice Schauer’s dissenting opinion, however, addressed the equitable adoption
doctrine at some length, concluding the child took solely by virtue of an
unperformed contract of adoption and thus as a stranger in blood. (Estate of
Radovich, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 129-135 (dis. opn. of Schauer, J.).) Citing
sister-state authority, Justice Schauer explained: “When the child takes property
in such a case it is as a purchaser by virtue of the contract [citation] and by way of
damages or specific performance [citations]. . . . The child shares in the estate of
the deceased foster parent as though his own child but not as such. In order to do
justice and equity, as far as possible, to one who, though having filled the place of
a natural born child, through inadvertence or fault has not been legally adopted,
the court enforces a contract under which the child is entitled to property,
declaring that as a consideration on the part of the foster parents a portion of their
property will pass on their death to the child.” (Id. at p. 130.)
Although expressed in a dissenting opinion, Justice Schauer’s explanation of the
doctrine has been widely cited and relied upon by the Courts of Appeal. Estate of
Rivolo (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 773 presented the issue in the straightforward
context of intestate succession from the adoptive parent. The child was an eight-
year-old orphan when the foster parents took her in and “told [her] that she would
live with them and be their little girl,” an arrangement she said pleased her. (Id. at
p. 775.) The foster parents took the child to the courthouse, where they took out
letters of guardianship but told the child she was being adopted. Thereafter they
referred to her as their adopted daughter. As a child, the daughter helped them in
their business, and even after her marriage they remained “exceedingly close.”
(Id. at p. 776.)
Citing Estate of Radovich, supra, 48 Cal.2d 116, the Rivolo court held it “well
established that equity will specifically enforce an oral contract to adopt” and
found that the record “establishes the existence of a contract of adoption and
7
respondent’s part performance thereof by clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence. It is uncontroverted that the respondent was at all times regarded and
treated as the adopted daughter of the Rivolos; that they told her and others on
numerous occasions that she was legally adopted and would be their sole heir.”
(Estate of Rivolo, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at p. 777.) “[U]nder the circumstances,
equity demands recognition of her lifelong status as an adopted child of Frank
Rivolo and her inheritance rights [citations].” (Id. at p. 778.)
Estate of Wilson (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 242 also presented the question of
intestate succession from the adoptive parent. The child, born in a home for
unwed mothers, was placed with foster parents who petitioned to adopt him. The
adoption petition was dismissed, however, because the natural mother’s consent
could not be obtained; although the court record refers to an “abandonment
petition . . . to be filed,” the foster parents did not pursue that remedy and
apparently made no further efforts to adopt. They nonetheless told the child he
was adopted and treated him in all respects as their son; their relationship
remained warm and familial until the deaths of both parents. (Id. at pp. 248-249.)
Following both Estate of Rivolo and Estate of Radovich, the appellate court
regarded the issue as one of “the right of an equitably adopted child to inherit by
virtue of contract” (Estate of Wilson, supra, at p. 247) and found substantial
evidence “that, according to the above-noted authority, the Wilsons and Keith had
entered into a contract of adoption which was faithfully adhered to by them” (id. at
p. 249).
In Estate of Bauer (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 554, an inheritance tax case, the court
found insufficient evidence of equitable adoption—the child did not live with the
asserted parents either as a minor or for any extended time as an adult, and did not
assume “any duties normally associated with a parent-child relationship” (id. at
p. 559)—but aptly summarized the doctrine as it had developed in California:
8
“[E]quitable adoption requires some form of agreement to adopt, coupled with
subsequent objective conduct indicating mutual recognition of an adoptive parent
and child relationship to such an extent that in equity and good conscience an
adoption should be deemed to have taken place.” (Id. at p. 560.)
In Mingo v. Heckler (9th Cir. 1984) 745 F.2d 537, the federal court expanded on
Bauer’s agreement-plus-conduct analysis, distilling from the California decisions
factors tending to show mutual recognition of a parent and child relationship:
“[T]he adoptee lived with the adoptive parent for a number of years; the adoptee
assumed the adoptive parent’s surname; the adoptive parent told the adoptee that
he or she was adopted; the adoptive parent publicly acknowledged the adoptee as
his or her child; the adoptee considered and conducted himself or herself as a
natural child; the adoptee worked or performed services for the adoptive parent;
and the adoptive parent attempted legally to adopt or obtained guardianship papers
for the child. Because the factors are merely examples of the type of conduct
demonstrating an adoptive parent and child relationship, the claimant need not
demonstrate that she satisfies every factor.” (Id. at p. 539.) The court held that the
child, who had lived with her grandmother and the grandmother’s cohabitant from
infancy, was entitled to Social Security benefits as the cohabitant’s equitably
adopted child. (Id. at pp. 538-540.)
As reflected in this summary, California decisions have explained equitable
adoption as the specific enforcement of a contract to adopt. Yet it has long been
clear that the doctrine, even in California, rested less on ordinary rules of contract
law than on considerations of fairness and intent for, as Justice Schauer put it, the
child “should have been” adopted and would have been but for the decedent’s
“inadvertence or fault.” (Estate of Radovich, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 134, 130 (dis.
opn. of Schauer, J.), italics omitted.) In the earliest case, Estate of Grace, the
court quoted a New Mexico case explaining why specific performance was an
9
unrealistic description of equitable adoption: “ ‘A specific performance of a
contract to adopt is impossible after the death of the parties who gave the promise.
Equity was driven to the fiction that there had been an adoption. That fiction
being indulged, the case was not one of specific performance.’ ” (Estate of Grace,
supra, 88 Cal.App.2d at pp. 964-965, quoting Wooley v. Shell Petroleum
Corporation (N.M. 1935) 45 P.2d 927, 931-932.) In both Estate of Rivolo, supra,
194 Cal.App.2d 773, and Estate of Wilson, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 242, moreover,
the contracts purportedly being enforced were made between foster parents and
their minor charges, yet neither court addressed the children’s capacity to contract,
suggesting, again, that the contract served mainly as evidence of the parties’
intent, rather than as an enforceable legal basis for transmission of property.4
Bean urges that equitable adoption be viewed not as specific enforcement of a
contract to adopt, but as application of an equitable, restitutionary remedy he has
identified as quasi-contract or, as his counsel emphasized at oral argument, as an
application of equitable estoppel principles. While we have found no decisions
articulating a quasi-contract theory, courts in several states have, instead of or in
4
The difficulty of applying ordinary contract law to equitable adoption has
also been recognized by commentators and by courts in other states. (See, e.g.,
Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra, 45 P.2d at p. 932 [“The weakness
of this class of cases, considered as resting upon a valid enforceable contract, is
readily apparent. . . . Its strength lies in inherent justice”]; Clark, The Law of
Domestic Relations in the United States, supra, at p. 926 [specific performance
rationale “does some violence to concepts of contract”]; Rein, Relatives by Blood,
Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (1984) 37 Vand.
L.Rev. 711, 772-775 (hereafter Rein) [noting that adoption contract would
ordinarily not be binding without approval of state agency or court, that contract
cannot be literally enforced after decedent’s death because “[a] corpse cannot
adopt anyone,” and that the idea of contract between adoptive parents and child is
suspect because “the child is usually too young when he enters the foster home to
know of any contract or to understand its import if he did know of it”].)
10
addition to the contract rationale, analyzed equitable adoption as arising from “a
broader and vaguer equitable principle of estoppel.” (Clark, The Law of Domestic
Relations in the United States, supra, at p. 926.)5 Bean argues Mr. Ford’s conduct
toward him during their long and close relationship estops Ford’s estate or heirs at
law from denying his status as an equitably adopted child.
For several reasons, we conclude the California law of equitable adoption, which
has rested on contract principles, does not recognize an estoppel arising merely
from the existence of a familial relationship between the decedent and the
claimant. The law of intestate succession is intended to carry out “ ‘the intent a
decedent without a will is most likely to have had.’ ” (Estate of Griswold (2001)
25 Cal.4th 904, 912.) The existence of a mutually affectionate relationship,
without any direct expression by the decedent of an intent to adopt the child or to
have him or her treated as a legally adopted child, sheds little light on the
decedent’s likely intent regarding distribution of property. While a person with
whom the decedent had a close, caring and enduring relationship may often be
seen as more deserving of inheritance than the heir or heirs at law, whose personal
relationships with the decedent may have been, as they were here, attenuated,
equitable adoption in California is neither a means of compensating the child for
services rendered to the parent nor a device to avoid the unjust enrichment of
5
See, e.g., Calista Corp. v. Mann (Alaska 1977) 564 P.2d 53, 61; Holloway
v. Jones (Mo. 1922) 246 S.W. 587, 591; Mize v. Sims (Mo.Ct.App. 1974) 516
S.W.2d 561, 564, 566; Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra, 45 P.2d at
page 932 (New Mexico); Cubley v. Barbee (Tex. 1934) 73 S.W.2d 72, 78-79;
Jones v. Guy (Tex. 1940) 143 S.W.2d 906, 907-909. Recent Texas decisions have
relaxed or excused proof of the reliance element of equitable estoppel in this
context. (See Spiers v. Maples (Tex.Ct.App. 1998) 970 S.W.2d 166, 171; Luna v.
Estate of Rodriguez (Tex.Ct.App. 1995) 906 S.W.2d 576, 581; Ramsay v. Lane
(Tex.Ct.App. 1974) 507 S.W.2d 905, 907.)
11
other, more distant relatives who will succeed to the estate under the intestacy
statutes. Absent proof of an intent to adopt, we must follow the statutory law of
intestate succession.
In addition, a rule looking to the parties’ overall relationship in order to do equity
in a given case, rather than to particular expressions of intent to adopt, would
necessarily be a vague and subjective one, inconsistently applied, in an area of law
where “consistent, bright-line rules” (Estate of Furia, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at
p. 6) are greatly needed. Such a broad scope for equitable adoption would leave
open to competing claims the estate of any foster parent or stepparent who treats a
foster child or stepchild lovingly and on an equal basis with his or her natural or
legally adopted children. A broad doctrine of equitable adoption would also
render section 6454, in practice, a virtual nullity, since children meeting the
familial-relationship criteria of that statute would necessarily be equitable
adoptees as well.
While a California equitable adoption claimant need not prove all the elements of
an enforceable contract to adopt, therefore, we conclude the claimant must
demonstrate the existence of some direct expression, on the decedent’s part, of an
intent to adopt the claimant. This intent may be shown, of course, by proof of an
unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt. But it may also be
demonstrated by proof of other acts or statements directly showing that the
decedent intended the child to be, or to be treated as, a legally adopted child, such
as an invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt, the decedent’s statement of his
or her intent to adopt the child, or the decedent’s representation to the claimant or
to the community at large that the claimant was the decedent’s natural or legally
adopted child. (See, e.g., Estate of Rivolo, supra, 194 Cal.App.2d at p. 775
[parents who orally promised child she would “be their little girl” later told her
and others they had adopted her]; Estate of Wilson, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at
12
p. 248 [petition to adopt filed but dismissed for lack of natural mother’s consent];
Estate of Reid (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 185, 188 [written agreement with adult
child].)
Thus, in California the doctrine of equitable adoption is a relatively narrow one,
applying only to those who “ ‘ “though having filled the place of a natural born
child, through inadvertence or fault [have] not been legally adopted,” ’ [where] the
evidence establishes an intent to adopt.” (Estate of Furia, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th
at p. 5, italics added.) In addition to a statement or act by the decedent
unequivocally evincing the decedent’s intent to adopt, the claimant must show the
decedent acted consistently with that intent by forming with the claimant a close
and enduring familial relationship.6 That is, in addition to a contract or other
direct evidence of the intent to adopt, the evidence must show “objective conduct
indicating mutual recognition of an adoptive parent and child relationship to such
an extent that in equity and good conscience an adoption should be deemed to
have taken place.” (Estate of Bauer, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 560.)
II. Standard of Proof of Equitable Adoption
Bean also contends the lower courts erred in applying a standard of clear and
convincing proof to the equitable adoption question. We disagree. Most courts
that have considered the question require at least clear and convincing evidence in
order to prove an equitable adoption. (See Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations
6
A close familial relationship sufficient to support the decedent’s intent to
adopt must persist up to, or at least not be repudiated by the decedent before, the
decedent’s death.
13
in the United States, supra, at p. 927; Rein, supra, 37 Vand. L.Rev. at p. 780.)7
Several good reasons support the rule.
First, the claimant in an equitable adoption case is seeking inheritance outside the
ordinary statutory course of intestate succession and without the formalities
required by the adoption statutes. As the claim’s “strength lies in inherent justice”
(Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra, 45 P.2d at p. 932), the need in
justice for this “extraordinary equitable intervention” (Rein, supra, 37 Vand.
L.Rev. at p. 785) should appear clearly and unequivocally from the facts.
Second, the claim involves a relationship with persons who have died and who
can, therefore, no longer testify to their intent. As with an alleged contract to
make a will (see Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750, fn. 3), the law, in order
to guard against fraudulent claims, should require more than a bare preponderance
of evidence. Where “the lips of the alleged adopter have been sealed by death . . .
proof of the facts essential to invoke the intervention of equity should be clear,
unequivocal and convincing.” (Cavanaugh v. Davis (Tex. 1951) 235 S.W.2d 972,
978.)
7
California appellate decisions are not to the contrary, though the issue has
not until now been squarely decided in the intestate succession context. Two
courts upholding findings of equitable adoption in that context assumed, without
needing to decide, that the standard is one of clear and convincing evidence.
(Estate of Wilson, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 248; Estate of Rivolo, supra, 194
Cal.App.2d at p. 777.) The court in Estate of Bauer, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at
page 561, an inheritance tax case, applied that same standard in reversing an
equitable adoption finding. The federal court in Mingo v. Heckler, supra, held the
clear and convincing standard inapplicable, for purposes of a Social Security
benefits decision, where the alleged adoptive parent was still alive and available to
testify. (745 F.2d at p. 538, fn. 3.) We consider the issue here only in the context
of intestate succession from the adoptive parent.
14
Finally, too relaxed a standard could create the danger that “a person could not
help out a needy child without having a de facto adoption foisted upon him after
death.” (Rein, supra, 37 Vand. L.Rev. at p. 782.) As pointed out in an early
Missouri decision, if the evidentiary burden is lowered too far, “then couples,
childless or not, will be reluctant to take into their homes orphan children, and for
the welfare of such children, as well as for other reasons, the rule should be kept
and observed. No one, after he or she has passed on, should be adjudged to have
adopted a child unless the evidence is clear, cogent, and convincing . . . .”
(Benjamin v. Cronan (Mo. 1936) 93 S.W.2d 975, 981.)
Evidence Code section 115 provides that the burden of proof in civil cases is a
preponderance of the evidence “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” The law
providing for a higher standard of proof may include decisional law. (Weiner v.
Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 483.) Persuaded by the reasoning of sister-state
decisions and commentary, we hold that in order to take as an equitably adopted
child from the alleged adoptive parent’s intestate estate, the claimant must prove
the decedent’s intent to adopt by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSION
Although the evidence showed the Fords and Bean enjoyed a close and enduring
familial relationship, evidence was totally lacking that the Fords ever made an
attempt to adopt Bean or promised or stated their intent to do so; they neither held
Bean out to the world as their natural or adopted child (Bean, for example, did not
take the Ford name) nor represented to Bean that he was their child. Mrs. Ford’s
single statement to Barbara Carter was not clear and convincing evidence that Mr.
Ford intended Bean to be, or be treated as, his adopted son. Substantial evidence
thus supported the trial court, which heard the testimony live and could best assess
its credibility and strength, in its finding that intent to adopt, and therefore Bean’s
claim of equitable adoption, was unproven.
15
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
16
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Estate of Ford
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S105508Date Filed: January 15, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: San Francisco
Judge: Alex Saldamando
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Patrick Sullivan for Petitioner and Appellant.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Thomas J. Williams for Objectors and Respondents.17
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Patrick Sullivan436 14th Street
Central Building, Suite 1112
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 836-1010
Thomas J. Williams
870 Market Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 362-7414
18
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 01/15/2004 | S105508 |
Parties
| 1 | Bean, Terrold (Claimant and Appellant) Represented by Patrick James Sullivan Attorney at Law 436 14th Street, Suite 1112 Oakland, CA |
| 2 | Ford, John J. (Objector and Respondent) Represented by Thomas Williams Attorney at Law 870 Market Street, Suite 900 San Francisco, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Jan 15 2004 | Opinion: Affirmed |
| Dockets | |
| Mar 29 2002 | Petition for review filed By counsel for appellant {Terrold Bean}. |
| Mar 29 2002 | Record requested |
| Mar 29 2002 | Received Court of Appeal record file jacket/briefs/accordian file |
| Apr 16 2002 | Answer to petition for review filed by resps |
| Apr 16 2002 | Received document entitled: correction to petition for review |
| May 21 2002 | Time extended to grant or deny review to 6-27-02 |
| Jun 7 2002 | Received letter from: aplt's counsel (re Nicholas H.) |
| Jun 12 2002 | Petition for Review Granted (civil case) Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin and Brown, JJ. |
| Jun 19 2002 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by resp |
| Jun 20 2002 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by aplts. |
| Jul 9 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed by counsel for aplt Bean |
| Jul 26 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed by resps |
| Aug 9 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by counsel for appellant (T. Bean) |
| Aug 9 2002 | Received: from counsel for appellant (T. Bean) Correction of typographical errors in Opening Brief on Merits. |
| Sep 29 2003 | Issues ordered limited The issues to be argued and decided are limited to those raised in the petition for review. |
| Oct 1 2003 | Case ordered on calendar Wednesday, November 5, 2003 @ 9AM (Sacramento) |
| Oct 23 2003 | Received: resps' list of additional authorities for oral argument |
| Oct 27 2003 | Supplemental brief filed by counsel for Appelllant Terrold Bean |
| Nov 5 2003 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jan 15 2004 | Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full OPINION BY: Werdegar, J. -- joined by: George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ. |
| Jan 20 2004 | Rehearing petition filed by counsel for aplt. (Terrold Bean) |
| Jan 22 2004 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing to and including April 14, 2004, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied. |
| Jan 23 2004 | Filed: resps' notice of non-opposition to rehg petn |
| Feb 4 2004 | Rehearing denied George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. |
| Feb 4 2004 | Opinion modified - no change in judgment The opinion herein, filed January 15, 2004, is modified as follows: On page 3 of the filed opinion, the last sentence of the second full paragraph and the first sentence of the following paragraph are deleted and in their place are inserted the following sentences: "Bean filed a statement of interest claiming entitlement to Ford's entire estate under Probate Code sections 6454 (foster child heirship) and 6455 (equitable adoption) as well as sections 6402, subdivision (a) and 6450. [] After trial, the superior court ruled against Bean." This modification does not affect the judgment. |
| Feb 18 2004 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Briefs | |
| Jul 9 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Jul 26 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Aug 9 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
