Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 12/18/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

FELICIA KAY EASTBURN, a Minor, etc., )
et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S107792
v.
Ct. App. 4/2 E029463
REGIONAL FIRE PROTECTION
AUTHORITY et al.,
San Bernardino County
Super. Ct. No. BCV05011
Defendants and Respondents, )

In California, public agencies each year receive millions of 911 dispatch
calls seeking emergency, medical, and fire services. (E.g., Sen. Com. on Energy
and Public Utilities and Joint Com. on Fire, Police, Emergency and Disaster
Services (Nov. 21, 1990) Joint Interim Hearing on the 911 Emergency Response
SystemAn Overview of its Effectiveness, pp. 11 [Cal. Highway Patrol], 18 [Los
Angeles Police Dept.], 23 [Los Angeles County], 25 [Los Angeles Fire Dept.].) In
this case, we must decide whether public entities employing emergency
dispatchers are subject to direct or vicarious tort liability for injury attributable in
part to a dispatcher’s failure or delay in responding to a 911 call. We conclude
that, based on applicable statutory provisions and the legislative policies
underlying them, no statute imposes direct liability on public entities in such
situations (see Gov. Code, §§ 815, 815.6 [direct liability for breach of statutory
mandatory duty]), and vicarious liability (see Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, subd. (a), 820)
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is limited to cases involving gross negligence or bad faith (Health & Saf. Code, §
1799.107 (hereafter section 1799.107)). Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts
disclosing any acts of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of defendants or
their employees, and they presently assert no additional facts that might justify an
amended complaint. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, which had affirmed a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants.
Because this case reaches us after the trial court sustained defendants’
demurrers, we assume the facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are true.
Defendants named in the complaint included the Regional Fire Protection
Authority, the Barstow Fire Protection District, and (following amendment to the
complaint) the City of Victorville. The complaint alleged defendants are public
entities providing “emergency dispatch services for 911 callers.” Defendants
allegedly had a duty to exercise reasonable care in staffing and training emergency
dispatch personnel, in promulgating reasonable guidelines for handing 9l1 calls,
and in responding to such calls. The complaint also alleged that plaintiff Felicia
Kay Eastburn, then three years old, suffered an electric shock while bathing, and
that although her parents informed defendants’ 911 emergency dispatcher of the
injury, defendants “failed to dispatch emergency personnel with emergency
equipment, so that Plaintiff [the minor] was denied early and prompt medical
attention.”
As a result of being deprived of prompt medical care, Felicia allegedly
suffered permanent, debilitating injuries for which she sought general, special, and
punitive damages from defendants. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants acted
“negligent[ly] and careless[ly]” and in “willful, wanton and . . . conscious
disregard of the rights of the safety of the general public, including Plaintiff,” thus
demonstrating malice and justifying a punitive damages award. Felicia’s parents,
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plaintiffs Herbert and Lori Eastburn, alleged they suffered related damages and
incurred expenses.
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend,
and plaintiffs appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal. The Court of
Appeal affirmed the judgment on the ground that, “under Government Code
section 815 and Health and Safety Code section 1799.107, defendants are immune
from liability except for bad faith or grossly negligent conduct, which plaintiffs
admittedly cannot allege.” (Fn. omitted.) We agree and will affirm.
1. Applicable Statutes
The California Tort Claims Act provides that “[a] public entity is not liable
for an injury,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” (Gov. Code, § 815,
subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to
confine potential governmental liability, not expand it. (Zelig v. County of Los
Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127 (Zelig).) We first must determine whether
any statute imposes direct liability on defendant agencies here. At oral argument,
plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that Government Code section 820, subdivision (a),
applied. But that section provides only that public employees are liable for injuries
from their acts or omissions in the scope of their employment to the same extent as
private persons, unless otherwise provided by statute. As we recently observed,
no similar provision makes public agencies liable for their own negligent conduct
or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. (Zelig, supra, 27
Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128.)
Government Code section 815.6, makes a public entity directly liable for its
breach of a statutory “mandatory duty,” but with the exception of Health and
Safety Code section 1799.107, discussed below, plaintiffs cite, and we have found,
no statutory provision declaring or defining a public agency’s duty of care with
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respect to handling 911 emergency calls. Civil Code section 1714 imposes a
general duty of care on all persons but, as we explain below in connection with our
discussion of Ma v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 488
(Ma), section 1714 is an insufficient statutory basis for imposing direct liability on
public agencies.
Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), makes a public entity
vicariously liable for its employee’s negligent acts or omissions within the scope
of employment (see Gov. Code, § 820), but section 815.2, subdivision (b), adds
the important qualification that a public entity is not liable for injuries committed
by an employee who is immune from liability for such injuries. Once again,
Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 is the only statute we have found
pertaining to the subject of the liability and immunity of public employees
performing emergency rescue services such as 911 dispatching.
In our view, therefore, the critical statute at issue here is section 1799.107.
This statute provides in pertinent part: “(a) [A] qualified immunity from liability
shall be provided for public entities and emergency rescue personnel providing
emergency services. [¶] (b) [N]either a public entity nor emergency rescue
personnel shall be liable for any injury caused by an action taken by the
emergency rescue personnel acting within the scope of their employment to
provide emergency services, unless the action taken was performed in bad faith or
in a grossly negligent manner.” (Italics added.)
Section 1799.107, subdivision (d), defines “emergency rescue personnel” to
mean “any person who is an officer, employee, or member of a fire department or
fire protection or firefighting agency of the federal government, the State of
California, a city, county, city and county, district, or other public or municipal
corporation or political subdivision of this state, or of a private fire department,
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whether that person is a volunteer or partly paid or fully paid, while he or she is
actually engaged in providing emergency services as defined by subdivision (e).”
Finally, subdivision (e) of section 1799.107 provides that “emergency
services” includes “first aid and medical services, rescue procedures and
transportation, or other related activities necessary to insure the health or safety of
a person in imminent peril.” (Italics added.)
2. The Zepuda and Ma Decisions
Two appellate cases have expressed somewhat conflicting views regarding
the reach of section 1799.107, and the liability of public agencies providing
emergency rescue services. (See Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 488; Zepeda v. City
of Los Angeles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 232 (Zepeda).) We believe the following
review of these cases demonstrates that Zepeda more correctly interprets section
1799.107.
In Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 232, the plaintiffs’ decedent had been
shot in the neck, but city paramedics who were summoned to the scene allegedly
refused to render medical aid until the police arrived. After the decedent died of
his wounds, the plaintiffs sued the city for wrongful death damages but the trial
court sustained its demurrer and dismissed the plaintiffs’ action. The appellate
court affirmed, observing that “[a]s a general rule, one has no duty to come to the
aid of another,” absent some special relationship between the parties. (Id. at p.
235, citing, e.g., Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23; Rest.2d
Torts, § 323; see also Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129.)
According to Zepeda, these principles likewise apply to law enforcement
and emergency rescue personnel employed by public entities: “Therefore,
recovery has been denied for injuries caused by the failure to investigate or
respond to requests for assistance where the police had not induced reliance on a
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promise, express or implied, that they would provide protection. [Citations.]”
(Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 235.) Zepeda rejected the argument that
Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 establishes a mandatory duty (see Gov.
Code, § 815.6) on the part of public agencies to provide emergency services to the
public. Instead, in Zepeda’s view, this section provides a qualified immunity for
public agencies and their emergency rescue personnel by limiting their liability to
acts of gross negligence or bad faith.
As Zepeda states, “the statute does not impose a general duty upon
emergency personnel to provide assistance whenever and wherever summoned.
Subdivision (b) [of section 1799.107] merely defines the level of negligence that
will result in the imposition of liability once assistance is rendered. . . . Had the
Legislature desired to impose upon emergency personnel the mandatory duty to
render aid, it could easily have said so.” (Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p.
237.) Thus, Zepeda concluded that because the defendant city owed no mandatory
statutory duty to the plaintiffs, and its paramedics had no statutory or common law
duty to provide assistance, the trial court properly sustained the city’s demurrer.
Zepeda, if correct, strongly supports defendants’ argument here that they are
entitled to a qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ action.
The Ma decision, on the other hand, would support a theory of potential
liability to plaintiffs in this case. Finding Health and Safety Code section
1799.107 inapplicable to 911 dispatchers, the Ma court nonetheless held that a
public agency and its dispatchers owe the public a mandatory duty of care arising
from the common law duty to act with reasonable care that is embodied in Civil
Code section 1714. We disagree. As will appear, section 1714, standing alone,
fails to provide the requisite statutory basis for public entity liability required by
Government Code sections 815 and 815.6. We further conclude that Ma erred in
holding Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 inapplicable to 911 dispatchers
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and their public employers. In our view, Zepeda correctly held that the section
indeed applies, and provides a qualified or limited immunity to such persons.
In Ma, the plaintiffs’ decedent Chan experienced difficulty in breathing
from an asthma attack. Her family drove her to a nearby hospital, which
unfortunately could not provide emergency medical services. A hospital security
guard called defendant city’s 911 medical emergency number to report Chan’s
distress and breathing difficulty. Perhaps due to language differences or confusion
as to whether Chan was reacting to drug overdose, but in any event allegedly
violating the city’s dispatching protocols, the 911 dispatcher merely summoned
police officers to the scene, and they then called for paramedics. Although the
total elapsed time between the 911 call and the arrival of medical assistance was
only 20 minutes, Chan died before the paramedics could reach her. (See Ma,
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 495-501.)
The Ma plaintiffs sued the city for damages, but the trial court granted the
city summary judgment, concluding that it owed the plaintiffs no duty of care and,
in any event, it was entitled to the discretionary act immunity in Government Code
section 820.2. On appeal, the Ma court disagreed with both holdings. Without
acknowledging the provisions of Government Code section 815, requiring a
statutory basis for direct public entity liability, the Ma court, “employing a
traditional common law duty analysis,” held that the city owed its citizens the
general duty of ordinary care embodied in Civil Code section 1714. (Ma, supra,
95 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) Using traditional tort analysis (i.e., balancing the
factors enumerated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113,
including the foreseeability and certainty of harm, the close connection with and
moral blame of the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
etc.), the Ma court concluded that “all the individual Rowland factors favor duty
overwhelmingly.” (Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 511.)
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As for the city’s possible qualified immunity under section 1799.107, the
Ma court found the section inapplicable to 911 emergency dispatchers. Contrary
to the assumptions of both parties in Ma, the appellate court concluded that “the
legislative history of section 1799.107, including that relating to subsequent
attempts to amend the section, leads us to conclude that the limited immunity
codified in section 1799.107 does not extend to 911 dispatching.” (Ma, supra, 95
Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) The court focused on the statutory definition of
“emergency rescue personnel” in section 1799.107, subdivision (d), namely,
persons who are employed by a federal, state, or municipal fire department, fire
protection, or firefighting agency while “actually engaged in providing emergency
services as defined in subdivision (e).” In Ma’s view, 911 dispatchers are not
persons providing such emergency services. Instead, Ma found that the provision
was enacted “specifically to shield from potential liability firefighters engaged in
rescue operations not involving fire suppression activities . . . .” (Ma, supra, at p.
516, italics added; see Lewis v. Mendocino Fire Protection Dist. (1983) 142
Cal.App.3d 345, 346-347.)
Having found a mandatory duty to the plaintiffs arising from Civil Code
section 1714, and having concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1799.107
was inapplicable to 911 dispatching, Ma reversed a summary judgment in the
city’s favor and remanded the case for trial. (Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p.
520.) If Ma were correct, plaintiffs would be entitled to similar relief here.
3. Discussion
We think that Ma erred in concluding that Civil Code section 1714, and the
common law principles it codified, were alone sufficient bases for imposing direct
tort liability on a public entity. As previously noted, “[a] public entity is not liable
for an injury,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” (Gov. Code, § 815.)
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In other words, direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific
statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care,
and not on the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714. Otherwise, the
general rule of immunity for public entities would be largely eroded by the routine
application of general tort principles. (See, e.g., Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp.
1131-1132; Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932, and
cases cited.) As Zelig observed, quoting from an earlier case, “ ‘ “the intent of the
[Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against
governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly
delineated circumstances . . . .” ’ ” (Zelig, supra, at p. 1127.)
As for a public agency’s vicarious liability based on its own employee’s act
or omission (see Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a)), we believe the Ma court also
erred in concluding that, based on legislative history including failed proposed
amendments, the city and its 911 dispatchers lacked qualified immunity under
Health and Safety Code section 1799.107. In our view, Ma’s reliance on
legislative history was unnecessary, for despite the absence of any express
reference to 911 emergency dispatching, the language of Health and Safety Code
section 1799.107 is clearly broad enough to include that activity within its scope.
The city’s 911 dispatcher certainly was an employee working for the city’s “fire
protection” agency within the scope of subdivision (d), and this dispatcher was
employed by the city to provide, and was “actually engaged in providing
emergency services as defined in subdivision (e),” namely, “rescue procedures . . .
or other related activities necessary to insure the health or safety of a person in
imminent peril.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.107, subds. (d), (e), italics added.)
The 911 dispatching service, at the least, is an activity closely “related” to
emergency rescue operations.
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We conclude that section 1799.107 unambiguously applies to 911
emergency dispatching. But even were we to consider the subsequent legislative
history cited by Ma, the failure of the Legislature to adopt proposed amendments
expressly extending the section to 911 dispatchers could merely reflect a
determination that such amendments were unnecessary because the law already so
provided. (See, e.g., Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 28-29.) We
disapprove Ma v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 488,
to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of defendants’
liability in the present case. Does Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 afford
a basis for defendants’ direct or vicarious liability? In their appellate briefs before
the Court of Appeal, plaintiffs assumed that section 1799.107 did apply in this
case, and that vicarious liability could be based on the gross negligence of
defendants’ 911 emergency dispatcher. In light of the intervening Ma decision,
however, plaintiffs now state that they “abandon” reliance on section 1799.107,
agreeing that it has no application to 911 dispatchers. Instead, following Ma, they
posit defendants’ direct liability on Civil Code section 1714, a general tort statute
which, as we have seen, is insufficient by itself to serve as a basis for direct public
liability. Plaintiffs also suggest that, if permitted to amend, they would allege a
special relationship existing between 911 call dispatchers and anyone seeking their
aid. Plaintiffs fail to explain in what manner such a relationship with the general
public could be deemed a “special” one.
In Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pages 235-236, the court recognized
that paramedics and other emergency rescue personnel are entitled to the benefit of
the general rule that, absent a special relationship between them, a person owes no
duty to come to the aid of another, assuming the person by his conduct has neither
created nor increased the peril. (See also, Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-
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1129; Williams v. State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 25.) If, as Zepeda
holds, paramedics do not automatically stand in a special relationship with anyone
seeking their services, then logically neither do 911 call dispatchers.
But it is unnecessary to decide whether the dispatcher in the present case
may have owed and breached a common law duty of care to plaintiffs because
here, as previously discussed, the dispatcher’s activities clearly were shielded by
the qualified immunity of Health and Safety Code section 1799.107. (See Zepeda,
supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 237.) We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to
identify an independent statutory basis for imposing liability on defendants, as
required by Government Code section 815. Absent a showing of bad faith or
gross negligence, defendants are immune under Health and Safety Code section
1799.107 for the acts or omissions of the 911 emergency dispatchers in their
employ.
4. Proposed Amendment to Complaint
At the hearing on the demurrer of defendant Regional Fire Protection
Authority, plaintiffs’ counsel told the court he could not amend the complaint
except to add a general allegation of gross negligence or bad faith. The court ruled
that “plaintiff has not indicated anything that changes in the complaint or the
amendments that could take it beyond Zepeda or [sic] the Court will sustain the
demurrer without leave to amend. . . . I can’t see how it can be amended at this
point to get beyond—or work its way around Zepeda.”
On appeal, plaintiffs initially argued that they should have been allowed to
amend their complaint to allege either gross negligence or, in the alternative, a
special relationship giving rise to a special duty by defendants toward them.
Relying on Ma, however, plaintiffs now treat section 1799.107 as inapplicable.
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Having found Ma incorrect in this regard, we consider whether plaintiffs should be
permitted to amend their complaint as originally sought.
Plaintiffs’ pleadings and briefs fail to set forth any additional relevant facts
that might support a finding of gross negligence or bad faith. Plaintiffs’ briefs
before the Court of Appeal made the additional allegation that the 911 dispatcher
put them “on hold” during their telephone conversation, but such conduct would
hardly amount to gross negligence or bad faith. The case law has defined gross
negligence as “ ‘the want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the
ordinary standard of conduct.’ ” (Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 124, 138; see Decker v. City of Imperial Beach (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 349, 358.) Nothing in plaintiffs’ pleadings or appellate briefs points to
such extreme conduct. Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in defendants’ favor is affirmed.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 98 Cal.App.4th 426
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S107792
Date Filed: December 18, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Bernardino
Judge: John P. Vander Feer

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Offices of Charles D. Sneathern and Charles D. Sneathern for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Baughman & Wang and David E. Russo as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Graves & King, Patrick L. Graves, Harvey W. Wimer III and Dennis J. Mahoney for Defendants and
Respondents Regional Fire Protection Authority and City of Victorville.

Cuff, Robinson & Jones, W. O. Robinson and Brian C. Cuff for Defendant and Respondent Barstow Fire
Protection District.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Burk E. Delventhal and Ellen Forman, Deputy City
Attorneys; Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Girard Fisher and Daniel P. Barer for 76 California Cities, The California
Association of Joint Powers Authorities and The California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Charles D. Sneathern
Law Offices of Charles D. Sneathern
21307 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 350
Torrance, CA 90503
(310) 316-6663

Harvey W. Wimer III
Graves & King
3610 Fourteenth Street, Second Floor
Riverside, CA 92520-1548
(909) 680-0100

Brian C. Cuff
Cuff, Robinson & Jones
5 Peters Canyon, Suite 301
Irvine, CA 92606
(714) 368-6900

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 12/18/2003	S107792

Disposition
Dec 18 2003	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 19 2002	Petition for review filed   Felica Kay Eastburn, appellant
Jun 25 2002	Record requested
Jul 1 2002	Answer to petition for review filed   Respondents Regional Fire Protection Authority and City of Victorville
Jul 2 2002	Record requested
Jul 2 2002	Received:   Telephone call from Attorney Wimer that he has never been at the address appearing in the docket. Address corrected herein.
Jul 8 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   E029463 - one doghouse
Jul 31 2002	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   votes : George, C.J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., Werdegar, J. Brown, J., was absent and did not participate.
Jul 31 2002	Letter sent to:   all parties enclosing both the grant order and the Certification of Interested Entities and Persons form.
Aug 12 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by W. O.Robinson of Cuff Robinson & Jones, for Barstow Fire Protection District.
Aug 12 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by Dennis J. Mahoney of Graves & King LLP, for Respondents Regional Fire Protection Authority and the City of Victorville
Aug 21 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by Charles D. Sneathern, counsel for Eastburn (plaintiff and appellant)
Aug 22 2002	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for appellant Eastburn.
Sep 5 2002	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for appellants (Felicia Kay Eastburn request to October 5, 2002 to file opening brief on the merits. faxed to sf [ extension to 10/5/2002 granted -- order prepared. ]
Sep 10 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Opening Brief on the Merits is extended to and including October 5, 2002.
Oct 3 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed   by aplts
Oct 24 2002	Request for extension of time filed   to file respondent's Answer Brief/Merits.
Oct 25 2002	Received document entitled:   *notice of change of address and "handiling" atty.* for resp Barstow Fire etc.
Oct 30 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including December 13, 2002. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Nov 1 2002	Request for extension of time filed   Respondent Barstow Fire Protection District joins in the E.O.T. application of Respondent Regional Fire Protection Authority and City of Victorville, and requests that they be granted the same E.O.T.
Nov 7 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent Barstow Fire Protection District and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including December 13, 2002. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Dec 13 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   respondent BARSTOW FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT
Dec 17 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed   Respondents Regional Fire Protection Authority and City of Victorville (40k)
Jan 23 2003	Telephone conversation with:
Jan 31 2003	Received:
Jan 31 2003	Received letter from:   (faxed) Charles D. Sneathern dated today, that appellants will be filing an application for permission to file a tardy reply to Respondents' answer briefs by no later than Monday, February 3, 2003.
Feb 3 2003	Received:   applcation and declaration to file late Reply Brief submitted w/brief submitted by Atty. Charles D. Sneathern for applnt.,EASTBURN.
Feb 5 2003	Received application to file Amicus brief (extend time)   from 75 California Cities, the California State Association of Counties, and the Association of Joint Powers Authorities, that the deadline to apply for leave to file an amicus curiae brief be extended to 30 days after this court rules on appellants' application to file a late reply brief.
Feb 14 2003	Order filed   Appellants' application for permission to file a tardy Reply Brief on the Merits to two answer briefs on the merits is hereby GRANTED.
Feb 14 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by plaintiffs and appellants Eastburn et al. PERM
Feb 14 2003	Extension of time granted   Good cause appearing, the application of Amicus Curiae 75 California Cities, the California State of Association of Counties, and the California Association of Joint Powers Authorities for an extension of time to submit their request for permission to file and serve their amicus curiae brief is extended to and inculding March 17, 2003. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Feb 28 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   under same cover; The Law Firm of BAUGHMAN & WANG, in support of petitioners
Mar 6 2003	Note:
Mar 7 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Amici Curiae 76 California Cities, The California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and The California State Association of Counties in support of respondents.
Mar 7 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of David E. Russo, Baughman & Wang, for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Mar 7 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   David E. Russo, Baughman & Wang, in support of appellants.
Mar 10 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by defendants and respondents to Amici Curiae David E.Russo and Baughman & Wang
Mar 13 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   Amici Curiae 76 California Cities, The California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and The California State Association of Counties in support of respondents.
Mar 13 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Amici Curiae 76 Cailfornia Cities, The Caifornia Association of Joint Powers Authorities and The California State Association of Counties for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Mar 14 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by Respondents to Amici Curiae 76 California Cities et al.
Mar 26 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   (Joinder) by Respondents Regional Fire Protection Auhority and City of Victorville in Barstow Regional Fire Protection District's Answer to Amici Curiae David Russo and Bauman & Wang.
Mar 27 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   respondent Barstow Fire Protection District's Answer to Amici Brief of David Russo and Baughman & Wang.
Mar 27 2003	Filed:   respondent Barstow Fire Protection District's Joinder in Respondent Regiional Fire Protection Authoritie's Answer to Amici Brief of 76 California Cties.
Aug 28 2003	Case ordered on calendar   10-08-03, 2pm, L.A.
Sep 8 2003	Filed:   request of resps to divide oral argument time.
Sep 15 2003	Order filed   The request of counsel for respondents in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents at oral agument is hereby granted.
Oct 8 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Dec 18 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Court of Appeal Judgment in defendants' favor is affirmed. Opinion by Chin, J. -- Joined by George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jan 21 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jan 28 2004	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from Fourth District, Division Two, signed for by Yolanda A. Burns, Deputy Clerk

Briefs
Oct 3 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed
Dec 13 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Dec 17 2002	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 14 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Mar 7 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 10 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 13 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Mar 14 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 26 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 27 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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