IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SHAOPING CORDER,
S138666
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Ct.App.
4/3
G033608
v.
) Orange
County
LISA R. CORDER,
Super. Ct. No.
01CC10590
Defendant and Respondent.
LISA R. CORDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
) Orange
County
v.
Super. Ct. No.
01CC00182
SHAOPING CORDER,
Defendant and Appellant,
In a consolidated wrongful death action, one defendant settled with the
decedent’s wife and his adult daughter for an unapportioned lump sum of $1.1
million, and the two nonsettling defendants ultimately prevailed at trial. At a
subsequent court proceeding, the wife and the daughter offered evidence
pertaining to the allocation of the settlement proceeds. Based on testimony from
third party witnesses claiming the decedent was unhappy in his marriage and
1
intended to get a divorce, the trial court found the marriage was “on the verge of
ending,” even though there was no evidence the decedent had actually separated
from his wife or filed for a legal separation or a marital dissolution. The court
then allocated 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to the decedent’s daughter and
10 percent to the wife. We granted the wife’s petition for review, which
challenged the trial court’s judgment and the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of that
judgment.
We conclude, contrary to the wife’s assertions, that the trial court did not
violate statutory law or act in excess of jurisdiction in undertaking to apportion the
settlement proceeds. We also find the court was not required to allocate the
proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the nonsettling
defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir’s damages claim
supposedly made to the settlement amount. However, we further conclude the
record fails to support the court’s finding that the marriage between the decedent
and his wife was about to end. Because that finding cannot be sustained, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court
for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Raymond Corder (Corder) married Shaoping (Sherry) Corder (Wife) in
September 2000. Lisa R. Corder (Daughter) is Corder’s adult daughter from a
previous marriage. In May 2001, eight months after the marriage to Wife, Corder
was killed in a construction accident.
Wife and Daughter separately filed wrongful death actions in Orange
County against defendant Morrow Equipment Company (Morrow) and others.
After the two actions were consolidated, Morrow settled with both plaintiffs for an
unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 million. Wife and Daughter then entered into the
following stipulation: “Following the verdict or settlement of the [wrongful death]
2
case, should the Plaintiffs fail to agree on an allocation or apportionment of
damages between the heirs, that either Plaintiff shall have the right to a further
trial regarding the allocation or apportionment of damages among or between the
Plaintiffs. Furthermore, either party may supplement their witness list by
identifying witnesses not previously disclosed and that those witnesses may be
called as witnesses at the further trial proceeding.”
Wife and Daughter went to trial against the two remaining defendants. The
jury found neither defendant was negligent, and judgment was entered in their
favor. Shortly thereafter, Wife and Daughter began preparing for a further trial on
apportionment of the $1.1 million settlement proceeds from Morrow. Meanwhile,
Wife filed a separate action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking to
quiet title to the proceeds. Daughter responded by moving to set a trial date in the
Orange County case.
Over Wife’s objection, the Orange County court ruled it had jurisdiction to
apportion the settlement proceeds and set a hearing for that purpose. The court
then indicated that, as part of the apportionment proceeding, it would consider not
only the evidence it had heard in the wrongful death trial, but also, as the parties
stipulated, new evidence that had not been previously presented. At the
apportionment proceeding, much of the new evidence concerned Daughter’s
contention that Corder, at the time of his death, was contemplating dissolving his
marriage to Wife because he suspected she was engaging in prostitution.
Specifically, Daughter and Wife presented various witnesses who gave conflicting
testimony regarding statements Corder allegedly made about his marriage and
Wife prior to his death. There was no evidence, however, that Corder actually
separated from Wife or acted to initiate a legal separation or a marital dissolution.
Daughter also presented evidence of her relationship with Corder.
3
After hearing the evidence, the trial court filed a “judgment” containing the
following findings and conclusions. “Evidence at the allocation Trial
demonstrated two conflicting views of the Decedent’s relationship to his wife,
Shaoping Corder. Lisa Corder, Decedent’s daughter, presented witnesses who
testified that the Decedent intended to divorce his wife. According to them the
Decedent felt that his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to
work as a prostitute despite her promises to stop.[1] Witnesses also testified that
Lisa Corder and her father had a very close relationship. Lisa Corder’s argument
was that since Decedent was on the verge of divorcing his wife, the wife’s share of
the proceeds should be reduced drastically from what it would otherwise have
been.
“On the other hand, Shaoping Corder’s witnesses indicated that the
marriage was a good one and there was no intent manifested by the [Decedent] to
divorce his wife. Shaoping Corder argued that because she would have been
legally entitled to support from the Decedent during the marriage, the lion’s share
of the proceeds should go to her.
“Having considered the conflicting evidence presented and the arguments
of counsel, the Court finds most persuasive and credible the evidence that the
marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the verge of ending.
While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or contacted an
attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage would have
lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent’s belief, expressed to
several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his wishes.
Decedent may not have expressed his state of mind to all of those close to him, but
1
Daughter’s witnesses claimed Corder knew Wife engaged in prostitution
before he married her.
4
such is life. For reasons that are usually unknown, people often keep secrets from
some close friends or relatives and not from others. The Court finds unpersuasive
the contention that Lisa Corder’s witnesses came into Court to commit perjury
regarding the prostitution allegations.
“Given the above findings, the Court makes the following allocation as to
the 1.1 million dollar settlement proceeds: Lisa Corder 90%. Shaoping Corder
10%. [¶] In making these findings the Court has considered the total loss that each
Plaintiff suffered from the Decedent’s death . . . .” (Capitalization of names
omitted.) The trial court denied Wife’s motions to vacate the judgment and to
enter a different judgment or for a new trial. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Wife appealed the apportionment judgment and the denial of her posttrial
motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed in a split decision. While all three justices
agreed the trial court had jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds, there
was vigorous disagreement over the propriety of the apportionment. The majority
concluded that: (1) Daughter had standing to challenge the amount of Wife’s
share and was not estopped from doing so; (2) the evidence was sufficient to
support the finding that Raymond Corder intended to divorce Wife; (3) the award
was not excessive as to Daughter and inadequate as to Wife, given the decedent’s
intention to divorce, his close relationship with Daughter, and the fact that Wife’s
award was significantly more than she was likely to have received as spousal
support following an eight-month marriage, had Corder not died; and (4) evidence
of the settling defendant’s motives was properly excluded. These conclusions
prompted the dissenting justice to declare: “There is something profoundly wrong
in allocating 90 percent of a wrongful death award to an adult child and only 10
percent to the widow or widower.” Claiming the majority ignored California case
law dealing with wrongful death damages, the dissenting justice contended that
5
evidence of the decedent’s mere intention to divorce Wife was irrelevant because
the decedent had taken no concrete steps to effectuate or even initiate such action.
DISCUSSION
We granted Wife’s petition for review to address essentially three issues.
First, does the trial court in a wrongful death action have jurisdiction to apportion
among the plaintiffs the proceeds of a settlement obtained in the action, or is the
court’s authority otherwise limited to apportioning an award of damages in such
an action? Second, in a proceeding to apportion a settlement, is the trial court
limited to consideration of the evidence introduced in the wrongful death action
itself or the evidence that the defendant considered in arriving at the amount of the
settlement? Third, did the evidence at the apportionment proceeding here,
including the testimony of the witnesses who claimed the decedent intended to
divorce Wife, support the trial court’s allocation of 90 percent of the settlement
proceeds to Daughter and only 10 percent to Wife?
A. “Jurisdiction” to Apportion Settlement Proceeds
Wrongful death actions are statutory in nature and governed by the Code of
Civil Procedure.2 Section 377.60 establishes a cause of action in favor of
specified heirs of a person whose death is “caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another.” The damages that may be awarded in a wrongful death action are
those that, “under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.” (§ 377.61.)
While each heir designated in section 377.60 has a personal and separate
wrongful death cause of action, the actions are deemed joint, single and indivisible
and must be joined together in one suit.3 (Cross, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 692-693.)
2
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
3
An heir who files a wrongful death action is required to properly join all
known heirs in that action. (Cross v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1964) 60 Cal.2d
(footnote continued on next page)
6
Accordingly, “the court or jury must compute the damages, if any, by considering
the pecuniary damage suffered by all the heirs and return a verdict for one sum.”
(Watkins v. Nutting (1941) 17 Cal.2d 490, 498, italics added; see Rickards v.
Noonan (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 266, 271.) In view of the lump-sum nature of
wrongful death awards, section 377.61 provides: “The court shall determine the
respective rights in an award of the persons entitled to assert the cause of action.”
Wife first contends that a settlement is not an award, and that section
377.61’s failure to employ the phrase “an award or settlement” in the above
quoted sentence indicates the Legislature did not intend to confer jurisdiction upon
a trial court in a wrongful death action to apportion settlement proceeds. Because
section 377.61 does not confer such jurisdiction, she argues, the only way a trial
court is authorized to apportion a wrongful death settlement is in an action that is
independent of the wrongful death action, such as an heir’s separately filed
interpleader or quiet title action. Wife also suggests that construing section 377.61
as allowing judicial apportionment of settlement proceeds in a wrongful death
action would defeat an heir’s right to a jury determination of disputed issues of
fact relevant to the competing claims to a settlement fund where such issues were
not presented to or considered by the jury in the wrongful death action. Thus,
Wife evidently contends that section 377.61, by implication, either reserves or
confers a right to a jury apportionment of any wrongful death recovery other than
“an award.”
(footnote continued from previous page)
690, 692-693 (Cross) [addressing former § 377]; Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) Any heir who fails in this burden may be liable to the
heirs who were intentionally omitted from the suit. (Ruttenberg, supra, 53
Cal.App.4th at pp. 809-811.)
7
As a preliminary matter, we address Wife’s characterization of this issue as
one of jurisdiction. Generally, when the state Constitution or a statute provides a
right to a jury trial, a trial court’s invalid denial or curtailment of that right is
considered an act in excess of jurisdiction and reversible error. (See generally 7
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Trial, § 85, p. 86.) Section 377.61, however,
represents “a ‘procedural’ and ‘not jurisdictional’ statute whose procedural
provisions can be waived.” (Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1983) 148
Cal.App.3d 512, 536 (Canavin), quoting Cross, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 692-694
[addressing former § 3774].) In light of Wife’s various assertions, we must decide
whether the trial court acted either in excess of jurisdiction or in contravention of
section 377.61 when it resolved the competing claims between Wife and Daughter
and apportioned the $1.1 million in settlement proceeds.
In determining what the Legislature intended with section 377.61, we look
first to the words of the statute. (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77,
83.) Section 377.61 provides in full: “In an action under this article, damages
may be awarded that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but may
not include damages recoverable under Section 377.34 [pertaining to a decedent’s
cause of action]. The court shall determine the respective rights in an award of
the persons entitled to assert the cause of action.” (Italics added.) True, section
377.61 omits express reference to settlements. But given that its first sentence
undertakes to describe the damages that “may be awarded” in a wrongful death
4
The Legislature first provided for judicial apportionment of awards in
wrongful death actions as part of a 1949 amendment to former section 377. The
original provision stated in relevant part: “The respective rights of the heirs in any
award shall be determined by the court.” (Stats. 1949, ch. 1380, § 4, p. 2402; see
Kim v. Yi (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 543, 546-547, fn. 3 (Kim).)
8
action, the circumstance that its second sentence employs the related term “an
award” provides no compelling basis for distinguishing between awards and
settlements as far as judicial apportionment is concerned. Indeed, the statutory
language does not purport to prohibit judicial apportionment in a wrongful death
action that is resolved through settlement. Nor does it suggest that jury
apportionment is either authorized or required when a settlement occurs.
In this particular context, moreover, there appears no meaningful
distinction between a lump-sum award and a lump-sum settlement. After a jury
trial, the trial court must apportion an award among the heirs based on the
pecuniary damages suffered by each heir. Similarly, after a settlement, the trial
court must apportion the settlement proceeds based on the identical criteria—the
pecuniary damages suffered by each heir. (See, e.g., Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th
543.) Additionally, where, as here, a trial court has heard evidence of damages at
the wrongful death trial against nonsettling defendants, having the same court
apportion the heirs’ recovery of an award and/or a settlement promotes judicial
economy and efficiency, even if the court takes further evidence regarding the
heirs’ competing interests therein.
Notably, the relevant legislative history contains no suggestion the judicial
apportionment provision was adopted to limit or otherwise alter existing decisional
law that recognized the general equitable nature of apportionment proceedings and
the specific propriety of judicial apportionment in wrongful death actions.5 “The
5
While it is settled that the parties to a wrongful death action have a right to
trial by jury (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 531; § 592), it appears equally
settled that a proceeding to apportion the recovery in such an action “is equitable
in character as well as akin to a special proceeding.” (Canavin, supra, 148
Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10; see also Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)
Indeed, long before section 377.61 and its 1949 predecessor provided statutory
authorization for judicial apportionment in wrongful death actions, “the
(footnote continued on next page)
9
1949 statutory amendment to provide for judicial apportionment appears based
upon legislative acknowledgement of the respective heirs’ competing interests in
the lump-sum award. The amendment reflects a belief it was more desirable not to
add to the jury’s burden the task of apportioning the damages [citation], and the
practical consideration the trial judge had already heard the evidence of the
pecuniary loss as to each heir and thus was the most desirable party to apportion
the damages. [Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . [The] legislative delegation of
apportionment to the court is constitutional, promoting the nature of the remedy as
envisioned by its creators without substantively depriving any heir of the right to a
jury trial.” (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 533.) Thus, while the statutory
provision is fairly viewed as codifying early case law establishing the propriety of
judicial apportionment of wrongful death awards (see ante, fn. 5), neither its text
nor its history suggests a purpose to limit the type of recovery appropriate for
judicial apportionment, or an aim to expand the right to a jury trial to situations
where none previously existed.
In view of the foregoing, we find no interpretive or other reasoned basis for
construing section 377.61 as precluding a trial court in a wrongful death action
from apportioning a recovery obtained through settlement. (Cf. Estate of Rogers
(footnote continued from previous page)
established procedure in this state where plaintiffs recovered judgment was for the
court, in a separate proceeding, to apportion the amount to be awarded each heir.”
(Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 530, relying on Watkins v. Nutting, supra,
17 Cal.2d at p. 498.) Thus, judicial apportionment in a wrongful death action “is
consistent with historical precedent which has relied upon the equity powers of the
court in dividing such funds, regardless whether the recovery was the result of
compromise, settlement, litigation instituted by a personal representative of the
decedent as a statutory trustee for the heirs, or trial litigation pursued by any of the
heirs.” (Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10.)
10
(1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 69, 77 [similarly concluding that compromise settlements
fell within purview of a statute providing only that “damages . . . awarded” were
separate property].) In any case, even apart from section 377.61, judicial
apportionment of a wrongful death settlement falls squarely within the
contemplation of section 578, providing that “when the justice of the case requires
it, [the judgment may] determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side, as
between themselves.”
Case law is consistent with the conclusion that trial courts may complete
the adjudication of all contested issues in a wrongful death by determining the
appropriate allocation of settlement proceeds between competing heirs. (E.g.,
Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 547-548 [determining that, in light of the
statutory language and history, section 377.61 provides for judicial apportionment
of settlement proceeds, whether the competing claims are between the heirs of a
single or multiple decedents]; Smith v. Premier Alliance Ins. Co. (1995) 41
Cal.App.4th 691, 698 [“[w]hen the claims of all heirs are encompassed in a lump-
sum settlement, the court has authority to apportion the settlement”]; Estate of
Kuebler v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 500, 504 [“the court has
jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds”]; see also Canavin, supra, 148
Cal.App.3d at p. 534, fn. 10].)
Although the foregoing decisions did not specifically address the issues
raised here, Wife offers no authority contradicting their conclusions and
statements. Instead, she relies on Changaris v. Marvel (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 308
(Changaris) to argue the competing claims of heirs to a settlement fund “can only
be resolved by a court that has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute—
subject matter jurisdiction conveyed by bringing a separate interpleader or quiet
title action.” Changaris involved a situation where one attorney had represented
five different heirs in a wrongful death action. The heirs settled with the
11
defendant tortfeasor for a lump-sum amount, but subsequently could not agree on
its allocation. Facing a clear conflict of interest, the attorney filed an interpleader
action and was discharged from further responsibility. (Changaris, supra, 231
Cal.App.2d at p. 310.) Changaris held, in the context of the interpleader action,
that “the trial court properly received evidence of the damage suffered by each of
the parties whose rights had been compromised, and the evidence so taken
supports the apportionment made.” (Id. at p. 313.)
Like the Court of Appeal below, we find Changaris unhelpful to Wife’s
position. Even assuming a separate interpleader action was appropriate for the
type of situation presented in Changaris, that decision does not suggest that, where
recovery in the wrongful death action is obtained by settlement and not by an
award, the filing of an independent interpleader or other action is required to
confer jurisdiction on a trial court to apportion the recovery.6
Although Wife does not appear to assert a constitutional right to a jury trial
on the issue of apportionment,7 she does contend that judicial apportionment of a
6
Wife further argues that a separate action should be required so that
competing heirs can be given fair notice of the nature of the competing claims, full
discovery, and an opportunity at summary adjudication. But she fails to establish
that fair notice, a reasonable opportunity for discovery, and trial court rulings akin
to summary adjudication are unavailable or unobtainable in a wrongful death
action. The proceeding below, we observe, did not appear to suffer from these
perceived deficiencies.
7
Our state Constitution expressly guarantees the right to a jury trial. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 16.) But the right guaranteed is that of a jury trial as it existed at
common law, when the state Constitution was first adopted. (Cornette v.
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 75-76.) Consequently, the
constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to actions in equity (Matter of
Coburn (1913) 165 Cal. 202, 219) or to special proceedings (Cornette, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 76), although the Legislature may provide for a jury trial in these
situations by statute (ibid.; Estate of Dolbeer (1908) 153 Cal. 652, 657.)
12
settlement threatens to deprive litigants of an asserted right under section 592 “to
have a jury determine issues of fact . . . , if the judge is permitted to make a
determination of the value of each heirs’ [sic] claims independent of the factors
used to reach the settlement.” For the reasons below, we conclude section 592
does not provide an alternative statutory basis for jury apportionment of a
settlement or for requiring a jury determination of all facts relevant to such an
apportionment.
Section 592 provides in full: “In actions for the recovery of specific, real,
or personal property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract, or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact must
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is ordered, as
provided in this Code. Where in these cases there are issues both of law and fact,
the issue of law must be first disposed of. In other cases, issues of fact must be
tried by the Court, subject to its power to order any such issue to be tried by a jury,
or to be referred to a referee, as provided in this Code.”
Like the constitutional provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16), section 592 is
historically based and does not expand the jury trial right beyond its common law
scope. (Crouchman v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1167, 1174; see generally
ante, fn. 7.) Accordingly, section 592 provides no independent basis for a right to
a jury in the apportionment of wrongful death settlement proceeds. Furthermore,
to the extent Wife assumes a separate interpleader action or a separate quiet title
action would afford the right to a jury, she is wrong. (Union Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Broderick (1925) 196 Cal. 497, 502 [interpleader]; Thomson v. Thomson (1936)
7 Cal.2d 671, 681 [quiet title action when possession of the property not
involved]; see Estate of Phelps (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 332, 340 [quiet title].)
Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 543, offers additional reasons for rejecting
section 592 as a basis for jury involvement in the apportionment context. As Kim
13
recognizes, proceedings to apportion a settlement fund among heirs are not actions
“for injuries” within section 592’s contemplation, because they typically involve
no allegation of injury infliction or wrongdoing by one heir against other heirs.
(Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 549.) Such proceedings simply concern two or
more heirs who, as wrongful death plaintiffs, may or may not agree on the
distribution of the recovery obtained and seek a determination as to the proper
apportionment. (See ibid.)
Also relevant here is Kim’s rejection of the contention that heirs are entitled
to a jury “to decide the amount of damages each . . . suffered, according to the
rules applicable to wrongful death damages.” (Kim, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p.
549.) As Kim explains, “[t]his is an action for apportionment. The amount of
damages was determined by the settlement, and no jury can now decide, as if in
the first instance, the amount each plaintiff might have been entitled to recover
from the alleged [settling] tortfeasors. Appellants argue that ‘the fact that the
monies are available for disbursement does not negate [their] right to have a jury
decide their damages.’ They are wrong. They gave up their right to have a jury
decide their damages when they settled the wrongful death case. The only issue
remaining is, indeed, apportionment. The fact that the apportionment will be
made according to the law on wrongful death damages does not change that.”
(Ibid.)
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not act in contravention of section
377.61 or in excess of jurisdiction when it apportioned the settlement proceeds
between Wife and Daughter.
B. Allocation Based on Contribution of Each Heir’s Claim to the
Settlement Fund
Wife contends the trial court erred in apportioning the settlement fund
based on evidence of the decedent’s alleged intent to divorce her, because that
14
evidence was not introduced in the wrongful death action itself or considered in
arriving at the amount of the settlement. To support this contention, she relies on
the following passage from Changaris, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at page 313:
“[W]hether the lump sum be ascertained by trial or by compromise, no plaintiff
can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff. If a
party be defeated in his right to share, that does not increase the right of any other
to a larger award. The right of each party plaintiff to recover, as well as the
amount rightfully to be recovered, is separate and apart from the like rights of all
the others and is neither added to nor lessened by the success or failure of any
other party in establishing a right to recover or in proving the amount to be
awarded under such right.” (Italics added.) This passage, Wife argues,
establishes a rule that prohibits heirs from attempting to increase their damages by
attacking the claims of other heirs and precludes the trial court from allocating a
settlement based on evidence the alleged tortfeasor did not consider in calculating
the settlement amount. In other words, she explains, a trial court must allocate a
settlement by considering the relative contribution that each heir’s claim made to
the settlement fund, just as the trial court’s role after a wrongful death jury award
is to make an allocation that reflects the extent to which each heir’s claim for
damages contributed to the total award.8 We find multiple reasons for rejecting
these contentions.
8
In this regard, Wife contends that, to the extent the trial court had the
jurisdiction and authority to allocate the settlement proceeds, it should have based
its decision on the evidence that: (1) at the wrongful death trial, Wife was the only
one with a claim for Corder’s loss of earnings; and (2) according to defendant
Morrow’s attorney, Morrow made its settlement on the strength of Wife’s claim,
not Daughter’s claim, and if Wife’s loss of earnings claim had not been
established, the settlement sum, if any, would have been one-tenth as much. Wife
further contends the trial court should not have considered the disputed evidence
(footnote continued on next page)
15
First, Wife overlooks a significant fact in this case. Wife and Daughter,
while represented by separate counsel, entered into a stipulation providing, in the
event they could not agree on an allocation of damages following the verdict or
settlement of the wrongful death action, that either party would have the right to a
further trial regarding apportionment, and that either party could call additional
witnesses not previously disclosed. Reasonably viewed, their stipulation reflected
an agreement that resolution of the competing interests of Wife and Daughter in
the $1.1 million settlement could be based on consideration of otherwise
admissible testimony from witnesses who did not testify at the trial against the
nonsettling defendants. We see no reason why this stipulation should not be
honored. (See Cohn v. Bugas (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 381, 392; Bemer v. Bemer
(1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 766, 771 [a stipulation may lawfully include or limit the
issues to be tried, whether or not such issues are pleaded].)
Second, we find the reasoning of Changaris flawed because it fails to
recognize that heirs may have competing interests in a settlement fund, which will
often be less than the sum of the separate claims. As the Court of Appeal reasoned
below, “In the face of this reality, the Changaris court inexplicably denied the
existence of any adversity between the wrongful death plaintiffs, saying ‘no
plaintiff can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff.’
(Changaris, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 313.) If that proposition were true, a
statutory provision for judicial apportionment would be [largely] unnecessary.
(footnote continued from previous page)
of Corder’s intent to divorce because it was not a factor disclosed at the wrongful
death trial against the two nonsettling defendants and was not known or
considered by Morrow when arriving at its settlement amount.
16
Courts adjudicate disputes, and disputes do not arise unless the litigants’
respective interests are adverse. [¶] The Canavin court identified the potential
tension between coplaintiffs in a wrongful death case as the raison d’etre for
judicial apportionment. ‘The 1949 statutory amendment to provide for judicial
apportionment appears based upon legislative acknowledgment of the respective
heirs’ competing interests in the lump-sum award.’ (Canavin, supra, 148
Cal.App.3d at p. 533, italics added.) And quite obviously, competing interests
cannot be adjudicated unless litigants are entitled to challenge their adversary’s
position.”9
Third, the assessments and intentions of a settling defendant are irrelevant
to the merits of the heirs’ competing claims; therefore, they deserve no
consideration in a judicial apportionment proceeding. Just as a defendant “has no
interest in the division which the plaintiffs may make among themselves, or which
may be made for them, of the damages recovered” in a wrongful death trial
(Robinson v. Western States Gas etc. Co. (1920) 184 Cal. 401, 410; see Canavin,
supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 537), so, too, the division of a lump-sum wrongful
death settlement is of no concern to the settling defendant (Smith v. Premier
Alliance Ins. Co., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 698; Spearman v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1113, fn. 3). Indeed, a defendant’s
offer to settle may be based on inadequate information due to incomplete
discovery, or a failure to reasonably investigate the claims, or some other
9
Strictly speaking, the relationship between heirs in wrongful death actions
is not wholly adverse given the mandatory joinder burden. (See ante, fn. 3.)
However, once the joinder burden is satisfied, heirs ordinarily have no duty to
each other with respect to advancing their respective claims for damages. (See
Watkins v. Nutting, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 499.)
17
consideration having little to do with the merits of the heirs’ competing claims.
Thus, whether or not the heirs have stipulated to the introduction of additional
witness testimony on the issue of apportionment, the trial court’s decision should
not be dependent upon what a settling defendant considered relevant in calculating
a compromise sum.
Wife also relies on Collins v. Hemet Valley Hospital Dist. (1986) 186
Cal.App.3d 922 (Collins) to support her position. In that case, the trial court
granted a petition filed on behalf of a decedent’s minor child for approval of a
$100,000 settlement with a defendant in a wrongful death action; it then issued a
second order determining that the parents of the decedent, who filed the action
along with the minor, were not heirs or “dependent parents” of the decedent and
therefore were not entitled to share in the settlement. (Id. at pp. 925-926.) Collins
reversed, finding: “The trial court was not called upon to determine whether Mr.
and Mrs. Collins were actually ‘dependent’ parents of the decedent. That would
have been a proper question to be determined in a trial of the wrongful death
action, but there was no trial; there was a settlement based not on actual facts but
claimed facts, and the fairness of the proposed settlement and division of the
proceeds should have been determined on the basis of the claimed facts and the
circumstances that produced the settlement offer.” (Id. at p. 928.)
Collins is not on point. Unlike the case before us, Collins concerned a
guardian ad litem’s petition for court approval of a settlement of a minor’s claim,
and, presumably, the showing required for such approval. (§ 372 [guardian ad
litem may compromise a minor’s claim with court approval]; see Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 7.950 [requirements for petitions for approval of a compromise of a
minor’s claim].) Moreover, while Collins purported to speak to the issue of
apportionment, it did not involve any stipulation between the decedent’s parents
and the minor’s guardian ad litem for a further trial on apportionment, so it is
18
unclear how Collins might have ruled had “[t]he trial court [been] called upon to
determine whether Mr. and Mrs. Collins were actually ‘dependent’ parents of the
decedent.” (Collins, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 928.) Finally, Collins did not
identify any case law or other authority in reaching the conclusions quoted above.
Accordingly, Collins fails to provide meaningful support for Wife’s contrary
views.
We conclude the trial court was not required to allocate the $1.1 million in
settlement proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the
nonsettling defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir’s damages
claim supposedly made to the settlement amount.
C. Testimony Regarding Decedent’s Intent to Divorce and Sufficiency
of the Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Allocation
As relevant here, the trial court explained its allocation decision as follows:
“Lisa Corder, Decedent’s daughter, presented witnesses who testified that the
Decedent intended to divorce his wife. According to them the Decedent felt that
his marriage was a mistake because his wife had continued to work as a prostitute
despite her promises to stop. . . . [¶] On the other hand, Shaoping Corder’s
witnesses indicated that the marriage was a good one and there was no intent
manifested by the [Decedent] to divorce his wife. . . . [¶] Having considered the
conflicting evidence presented . . . , the Court finds most persuasive and credible
the evidence that the marriage between Shaoping Corder and Decedent was on the
verge of ending. While it is true that Decedent had not yet filed for divorce or
contacted an attorney, the Court finds that had the Decedent lived the marriage
would have lasted a relatively short period of time given Decedent’s belief,
expressed to several persons, that his wife was working as a prostitute against his
wishes.” (Capitalization of names omitted.) As these findings indicate, the trial
court focused on the disputed evidence regarding Corder’s state of mind and his
19
intentions shortly before his death. The court did not consider any evidence
purporting to show that Wife actually engaged in prostitution.
In this court, Wife asserts the evidence at the apportionment proceeding,
especially the testimony regarding Corder’s alleged intent to divorce her, did not
substantially support the trial court’s allocation of only 10 percent of the
settlement fund to her and the remaining 90 percent to Daughter. In this regard,
Wife argues a surviving spouse’s claim for future financial support cannot be
reduced based on a decedent spouse’s unacted-upon expressions of an intent to
obtain a dissolution of the marriage at some point in the future.
Before elaborating on Wife’s contentions, we find it useful to review the
rules governing the recovery available in wrongful death actions. As a general
matter, damages for wrongful death “ ‘are measured by the financial benefits the
heirs were receiving at the time of death, those reasonably to be expected in the
future, and the monetary equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection.’ ”
(Benwell v. Dean (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 345, 349 (Benwell).) Specifically, this
means that “[n]o damages can be given for the pain or anguish suffered by the
person who is killed, the damages . . . being limited to the pecuniary loss suffered
by the person or persons for whose benefit the right of action is given by reason of
the death of the victim. [Citation.] This pecuniary loss may be a loss arising from
a deprivation of something to which the statutory beneficiary would have been
legally entitled if the person had lived, or it may be a pecuniary loss arising from
the deprivation of something which, from all the circumstances of the particular
case, it could reasonably be expected such beneficiary would have received from
the deceased had his life not been taken—even though the obligation resting on
the deceased to bestow such benefit may have been but a moral obligation.
[Citations.] Thus, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a
deceased had continued he might have accumulated a greater estate, and that the
20
increased estate would have been inherited by the statutory beneficiaries as his
heirs. Or, there might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased had
not been taken the statutory beneficiaries, or some of them, would have continued
to receive from the one who was killed financial assistance, or services having a
financial value. These are illustrations of direct financial benefits for the loss of
which damages may be awarded.” (Griffey v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. (1922)
58 Cal.App. 509, 516-517 (Griffey).)
In addition to these types of direct financial benefits, “there is that less
tangible and not so immediate, but nevertheless real, pecuniary benefit which
often may reasonably be expected from a continuance of the ‘society, comfort and
protection’ of the deceased.” (Griffey, supra, 58 Cal.App. at p. 517.) The
pecuniary value of the society, comfort, and protection that is lost through the
wrongful death of a spouse, parent, or child may be considerable in cases where,
for instance, the decedent had demonstrated a “kindly demeanor” toward the
statutory beneficiary and rendered assistance or “kindly offices” to that person.
(Beeson v. Green Mountain G.M. Co. (1880) 57 Cal. 20, 38 [opn. on rehg.].) In
this regard, however, recovery is not available in wrongful death actions for the
grief or sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one. (See Krouse v. Graham
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 69.)
Powers v. Sutherland Auto Stage Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 487 (Powers)
illustrates the distinction between the tangible and intangible benefits of a
marriage relationship, and the circumstances that are relevant in assessing the
pecuniary value of their loss. In Powers, a husband and wife had been living
separate and apart for over 13 years, although they had not legally separated or
divorced. The wife had not received any significant or consistent support from the
husband during that time, and did not know his whereabouts in the years before he
died. In addition, the husband had been living in “illicit relations” with and
21
supporting another woman for three or four years prior to his death. (Id. at p.
489.)
Despite these circumstances, Powers concluded the husband’s death had
caused the wife to suffer pecuniary loss of her legally enforceable right of support.
As Powers explained, even though the husband had deserted the wife and for a
long time contributed nothing to her support, and even though he may have
intended never to return, “yet so long as the marriage relation existed she was
entitled to support from him in the absence of any evidence that she had forfeited
the right by her own wrong. This was a right which she could at any time during
his life have legally enforced. It was a right created by the marriage relation and
would exist so long as the marriage relation itself existed.” (Powers, supra, 190
Cal. at pp. 489-490; but see Carr v. Pacific Tel. Co. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 537,
544-545 [indicating in dictum, and without reference to Powers, that evidence of
husband’s abandonment and nonsupport of family was relevant to issue of
damages for loss of earnings].)
While finding that an award of approximately $15 per month over the
husband’s estimated life expectancy was reasonable as compensation for the
wife’s loss of her right of support, Powers determined that a different conclusion
was warranted regarding any claimed loss of the intangible benefits of the
marriage: “In view of the fact that the [wife] and deceased had been living apart,
nothing could have been awarded to [her] for the loss of the society, comfort, and
protection of the deceased.” (Powers, supra, 190 Cal. at p. 491.) This conclusion
is consistent with other decisions recognizing that factors relevant in assessing a
claimed loss of society, comfort, and protection may include the closeness of the
family unit at issue, the warmth of feeling between the family members, and the
character of the deceased as “ ‘kind and attentive’ ” or “ ‘kind and loving.’ ”
(Krouse v. Graham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 68, and cases cited therein.)
22
Here, Wife concedes the quality of her marriage and Corder’s state of mind
toward her may have some bearing on a claim for loss of society, comfort, and
protection. Based on Powers and the case law above, we agree. (See also
Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 349 [“evidence of the nature of the personal
relationship that existed between the decedent and the beneficiaries of a wrongful
death action has a bearing on the compensation for loss of society, comfort and
protection, and is therefore ordinarily admissible in such an action”]; id. at p. 350
[“if it is proper for the beneficiary to produce evidence of the attitude and affection
on the part of the decedent for the beneficiaries . . . then defendant should properly
be able to rebut or negate such evidence”].) Accordingly, evidence of a
decedent’s intent to seek a divorce, as well as other evidence reflecting a strained
relationship, may not be categorically excluded from the determination of a
surviving spouse’s wrongful death damages.
Nonetheless, Wife contends the evidence concerning Corder’s intent to
seek a divorce should not have been considered with respect to her claim for loss
of the right of support. As in Powers, she argues, such support was a direct
financial benefit to which she was legally entitled by virtue of her marital status at
the time of Corder’s death. Alternatively, she asserts, a decedent’s expression of
an intent to divorce a spouse deserves consideration only where there is evidence
the decedent engaged in affirmative action that manifested such intent. In this
case, she emphasizes, there was no evidence that Corder had initiated a marital
dissolution or separation.
We do not view Powers, supra, 190 Cal. 487, as compelling the conclusion
that, so long as a marriage relationship remains legally intact at the time of the
decedent’s death, evidence of the decedent’s declared intent to end the marriage
deserves no consideration in evaluating the surviving spouse’s claim for loss of
future financial support. Nor do we adopt such a conclusion here. As the
23
wrongful death statute expressly contemplates, damages must be assessed based
on the totality of the circumstances in each case. (§ 377.61 [recoverable damages
in a wrongful death action are those that, “under all the circumstances of the case,
may be just” (italics added)].) Evidence that tends to show that a marriage is on
the brink of being legally terminated appears to be material and to bear directly on
the issue whether financial support is properly found a benefit “ ‘reasonably to be
expected in the future’ ” had the decedent lived. (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d
at p. 349.)
At the same time, there is merit to the concern that evidence of a decedent’s
mere expression of a desire to divorce a spouse, when the decedent had taken no
steps to effectuate a marital dissolution or legal separation, seems a speculative
basis for finding that a marriage would have been short-lived had the decedent not
died. As Wife points out, the reasons why couples stay married are complicated
and personal, just as are the reasons why and when they get divorced. And as the
dissenting justice below commented: “No doubt there are some relationships
where the spouses form an intention to divorce on a daily basis, and the intention
evaporates just as quickly. Mere intentions can be wonderfully evanescent.”
Moreover, we are mindful that California has a public policy in favor of promoting
marriage. Thus, even when spouses have formally commenced the process of
legal separation or marriage dissolution, the governing law contemplates the
possibility of reconciliation as “ ‘the important issue.’ ” (In re Marriage of
McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 679; see 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 36, 38 (1978)
[California eliminated the concept of fault in marriage dissolutions “in order to
reduce the emotionally charged atmosphere and perhaps effect a reconciliation”].)
Emphasizing that one is legally entitled to support from one’s spouse (see
e.g. Fam. Code §§ 4300, 4301), the dissenting justice found that, at the time of a
spouse’s death, the surviving spouse would have “every expectation of the
24
pecuniarily measurable support embodied in the wrongful death award predicated
on [the late spouse’s] earnings.” In concluding that evidence of a decedent’s mere
intent to divorce is too speculative to affect a surviving spouse’s wrongful death
recovery for the loss of such earnings, he urged adoption of the following
restriction regarding such evidence: “[U]nless legally cognizable, concrete steps
are taken—either actual separation or filing for separation or dissolution—the
existing legal rights and expectations between spouses remain intact, including
expectations of continued support. California’s family law takes no account of a
mere unacted-upon intention to separate or divorce. Even taking the step of seeing
a lawyer does nothing to alter legal rights already in place.”
For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether evidence of these
identified “legally cognizable, concrete steps” is either necessary or sufficient to
establish that a marriage would not have lasted had the decedent lived.10 Here, the
trial court found that Corder’s marriage was “on the verge of ending” and “would
have lasted a relatively short period of time” had Corder lived, based solely on
testimony from Daughter’s witnesses claiming that Corder said he felt his
marriage was a mistake and he intended to divorce Wife. As we shall explain, that
testimony was insufficient to sustain these findings.
Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, is instructive on this point. Similar to
the situation here, Benwell involved a wrongful death action in which a husband,
shortly before his death, allegedly told a witness that he was getting ready to leave
his wife (the plaintiff) and that he could not stand her behavior. (Id. at p. 348.)
Yet the record disclosed that the husband “did not leave plaintiff and that at the
time of his death they were living together.” (Id. at p. 354.) As pertinent here,
10
As indicated, it is undisputed that Corder had not taken any of these
specific steps before his death.
25
Benwell concluded the decedent’s statements to the witness regarding his attitude
and feelings toward the plaintiff were relevant to and admissible on the issue of
the plaintiff’s loss of comfort and society, “since such conversations were
indicative of [the] deceased’s feelings and attitude at the time they were uttered.”
(Id. at p. 353.) Nonetheless, Benwell noted such evidence could not be used “to
prove that [the] deceased was going to leave plaintiff as a matter of fact or to
prove any acts of misconduct on the part of plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 350 [relying in
part on Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (b)].)
Ultimately, Benwell determined the trial court did not err in excluding the
evidence of the decedent’s alleged statements, because their “true evidentiary
bearing” was “at best slight and remote, yet of a nature as to make them very
prejudicial against plaintiff.” (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 354.) That is,
given the absence of any other evidence in the record showing the decedent
contemplated leaving plaintiff, “[t]he jury could draw inferences, which would be
no more than conjecture or speculation, that decedent, had he lived, would have
left plaintiff and that her behavior was less than exemplary.” (Ibid.)11
Daughter does not address Benwell’s conclusions on these points. Instead,
she relies on Foss v. Anthony Industries (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 794 (Foss), which
held a trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of a decedent’s
oral expression of intent on the issue of financial support damages in a wrongful
death action. (Id. at pp. 800-801.) In Foss, the plaintiff sought to introduce
testimony of a witness who said the decedent told him he intended to take a job
11
Benwell also held that evidence of the remarriage of the surviving spouse
does not affect the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action. (Benwell,
supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at pp. 355-356.) We agree with Daughter that this aspect
of the Benwell opinion is not implicated here.
26
after retiring from the Navy. Foss found this evidence relevant because it might
have supported a significantly higher amount of financial support damages for the
decedent’s children than what the jury had awarded. (Id. at p. 801.) Although the
proffered witness testimony was hearsay, Foss held the decedent’s statement of his
intent to continue working should have been admitted under Evidence Code
section 1250, which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements of
intent. (Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800-801.)
We do not read Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, and Foss, supra, 139
Cal.App.3d 794, as presenting a conflict of authority. In Benwell, the court was
unimpressed by the evidentiary bearing of the decedent’s alleged statement
because the record disclosed the decedent was living with his wife and had not left
her at the time of his death; nor was there any other evidence that he contemplated
leaving her. (Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d at p. 354.) Meanwhile, the court in
Foss determined the evidence of the decedent’s intent was relevant on the question
of damages in light of “testimony of an expert witness who said the deceased’s
children would have received over $100,000 more support from the deceased if he
had taken the new job rather than completely retiring at the end of his naval
career.” (Foss, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 800, italics added; see also ibid. [“the
witness would have testified the deceased told him he intended to take the job
following his retirement from the Navy” (italics added)].) This quoted passage
indicates there was other evidence in the record of an identified job prospect that
the decedent had been offered, but had not yet accepted, before his untimely death.
Consistent with both Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.2d 345, and Foss, supra,
139 Cal.App.3d 794, we conclude that the statements of Daughter’s witnesses, by
themselves, do not support the trial court’s factual finding that Corder’s marriage
would not have lasted for more than a short period of time had he lived. Although
declarations of marital unhappiness and a desire to dissolve a marriage may be
27
considered in corroboration of other evidence offered to prove a marriage is on the
verge of ending, such declarations, standing alone, are insufficient to support a
finding to that effect.12 In this regard, we are mindful that Powers, supra, 190
Cal. 487, stands as a compelling illustration of the principle that, in assessing
wrongful death damages, a surviving spouse has a legally enforceable right of
support that is not easily defeated or diminished by evidence that the marital
relationship was strained or disaffected. (See id. at pp. 489-490.)
In the proceeding below, the Court of Appeal emphasized that the trial
court “found as a factual matter that the marriage was on the verge of ending.”
Given this factual finding, the Court of Appeal explained, “substantial evidence
supports the allocation” of 90 percent of the settlement proceeds to Daughter and
10 percent to Wife. Along the same lines, the court concluded that “if, as found
by the trial court,” Corder’s eight-month marriage was “about the end,” that
finding supported the amount of Wife’s allocated share because it was
“significantly more than she was likely to receive” with respect to her legal right
of support had Corder not died. In light of our determination that substantial
evidence did not support the trial court’s findings, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeal with respect to the allocation issue.
12
These conclusions in no way alter the existing law that mere declarations of
a decedent regarding his or her unhappiness in a marriage may suffice to negate or
minimize the surviving spouse’s recovery for loss of the decedent’s society,
comfort, and protection. (See Benwell, supra, 249 Cal.App.3d at p. 353.)
28
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter remanded
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
29
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Corder v. Corder
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 132 Cal.App.4th 1261
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S138666Date Filed: July 5, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Orange
Judge: Randell L. Wilkinson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Davis & Heubeck, Law Offices of John C. Heubeck and John C. Heubeck for Plaintiff and Appellant andfor Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington, G. David Tenenbaum and Ronald E. Harrington for Plaintiff andRespondent and for Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
John C. HeubeckLaw Offices of John C. Heubeck
400 Continental Boulevard, 6th Floor
El Segundo, CA 90245
(310) 426-2478
G. David Tenenbaum
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington
202 Newport Center Drive, 2nd Floor
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 729-4440
Ronald E. Harrington
Law Offices of Ronald E. Harrington
202 Newport Center Drive, 2nd Floor
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 729-4440
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 07/05/2007 | S138666 |
Parties
| 1 | Corder, Shaoping (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by John Christopher Heubeck Law Offices of John C. Heubeck 400 Continental Boulevard, 6th Floor El Sugundo, CA |
| 2 | Corder, Lisa R. (Defendant and Respondent) Represented by G. David Tenenbaum Attorney at Law P.O. Box 1161 Evanston, IL |
| 3 | Corder, Lisa R. (Defendant and Respondent) Represented by Ronald Eli Harrington Attorney at Law 202 Newport Center Drive, 2nd Floor Newport Beach, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Jul 5 2007 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| Nov 7 2005 | Petition for review filed on behalf of appellant SHAOPING CORDER by counsel |
| Nov 7 2005 | Record requested |
| Nov 10 2005 | Received Court of Appeal record file jacket/briefs/appendix |
| Nov 28 2005 | Answer to petition for review filed respondent Lisa R. Corder |
| Dec 14 2005 | Petition for review granted (civil case) Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. |
| Jan 4 2006 | Request for extension of time filed opening brief/merits to 3-14-06>>Appellant Sherry Wu Corder |
| Jan 13 2006 | Extension of time granted on application of appellant Sherry Wu Corder, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the appellant's opening brief on the merits is extended to and including March 14, 2006. |
| Jan 25 2006 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Shaoping Corder, appellant John C. Heubeck, counsel |
| Jan 25 2006 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Lisa Corder, respondent Ronald E. Harrington, counsel |
| Mar 14 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed Appellant Shaoping Corder Attorney John C. Heubeck, Retained |
| Apr 3 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to file answer brief/merits to 5-15-06 Respondent Lisa R. Corder Attorney Ronald E. Harrington |
| Apr 6 2006 | Extension of time granted On application of respondent, Lisa R. Corder, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the respondent's answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 15, 2006. |
| May 10 2006 | Request for extension of time filed Answer Brief/Merits to 5-30-06 Respondent Lisa R. Corder Attorney Ronald E. Harrington, Retained |
| May 12 2006 | Extension of time granted On application of respondent Lisa R. Corder, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 30, 2006. |
| May 30 2006 | Received: oversize answer brief/merits Respodent Lisa R. Corder |
| May 30 2006 | Application to file over-length brief filed answer brief/merits Respondent Lisa R. Corder |
| May 30 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) Respondent Lisa R. Corder |
| May 30 2006 | Received: Out of State Authorities Respondent Lisa R. Corder |
| Jun 5 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed with permission: to file brief in excess of 14,000 words Lisa R. Corder, respondent Ron E. Harrington, counsel |
| Jun 5 2006 | Filed: Respondent's Out of State Authorities, Lisa R. Corder, respondent Ron E. Harrington, counsel |
| Jun 26 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Appellant Shaoping Corder Attorney John C. Heubeck, retained |
| Aug 3 2006 | Received: document entitled: Respondent's Letter Brief; letter regarding appellant's reply brief. Lisa R. Corder, respondent Ronald E. Harrington, counsel |
| Jan 25 2007 | Received: letter dated January 19, 2007: Notice of unavailability of respondent's counsel Ronald E. Harrington, counsel |
| Apr 3 2007 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Monday, April 30, 2007, at 1:00 p.m., in San Francisco |
| Apr 16 2007 | Application filed to: divide oral argument time, filed by counsel for respondent Lisa R. Corder requesting to divide time between G. David Tenenbaum (20 minutes) and Ronald E. Harrington (10 minutes). |
| Apr 17 2007 | Order filed The request of counsel for respondent in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondent at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of respondent to allocate to G. David Tenenbaum 20 minutes and Ronald E. Harrington 10 minutes of respondent's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted. |
| Apr 30 2007 | Cause argued and submitted |
| May 7 2007 | Received: "Letter brief" Lisa Corder, respondent Ronald Harrington, counsel |
| May 15 2007 | Received: document entitled: Application for supplemental oral argument on the issue of Bright-Line Rule Lisa R. Corder, respondent Ron E. Harrington, counsel |
| May 16 2007 | Letter sent to: Ronald E. Harrington, counsel for Respondent, regarding respondent's application for Supplemental Oral Argument. |
| Jul 3 2007 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
| Jul 5 2007 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings Majority Opinion by Baxter, J. joined by George C. J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno & Corrigan, JJ. |
| Jul 19 2007 | Rehearing petition filed Lisa R. Corder, respondent Ronald E. Harrington, counsel |
| Jul 23 2007 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing The time for granting or denying rehearing in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including October 3, 2007, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first. |
| Sep 19 2007 | Rehearing denied |
| Sep 19 2007 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Sep 26 2007 | Received: receipt for remittitur from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division 3 |
| Dec 21 2007 | Returned record to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three two doghouses |
| Briefs | |
| Mar 14 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Jun 5 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Jun 26 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
