Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S119897
Coalition etc. v. City of L.A.


Filed 12/9/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COALITION OF CONCERNED )
COMMUNITIES, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S119897
v.
Ct.App. 2/3 B149092
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Respondent; )
) Super. Ct. No. BC207782
CATELLUS RESIDENTIAL GROUP, )

Real Party in Interest and )
Respondent.

Government Code section 65590, subdivision (d) (section 65590(d)), part
of the Mello Act, provides that “[n]ew housing developments constructed within
the coastal zone” shall provide housing for those with low or moderate income
where feasible. We must decide whether this provision applies to a proposed
project that is partly within the coastal zone but has no housing impacts within that
zone. Because the purpose of the Mello Act is to provide for affordable housing
based on housing impacts within the coastal zone, we conclude that section
65590(d) does not govern this project.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Real party in interest Catellus Residential Group (Catellus) proposes to
develop approximately 45 acres of land near the Pacific Ocean in the Westchester-
1



Playa del Rey area of Los Angeles. About 12 acres of the property is located
within the California coastal zone. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30103.)
Defendant City of Los Angeles (city) originally approved an earlier version
of the proposed project. It concluded that the Mello Act’s affordable housing
requirement did not apply because none of the proposed houses would be
constructed within the coastal zone. Plaintiffs Coalition of Concerned Citizens,
Inc. and Spirit of the Sage Council (collectively, Coalition) commenced the instant
action in March 1999 by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court
challenging the city’s approval of the project. As relevant here, the petition
alleged that the project violated the Mello Act. (Gov. Code, §§ 65590, 65590.1.)
After this action commenced, the Coastal Commission denied Catellus a coastal
development permit. The trial court then stayed the instant action pending
revision of the project.
Catellus revised the project. As currently proposed, the project includes
114 homes, all to be constructed outside the coastal zone, and about 19 acres of
open space. The dissent in the Court of Appeal described the proposed
construction within the coastal zone: “Proposed construction within the coastal
zone includes the construction of part of an access road, widening of Lincoln
Boulevard, construction of a public view park, and erosion control measures, all of
which will involve the grading of a total of 2.31 acres of land within the coastal
zone. A storm drain and water, sewer, and other utility lines also are to be
constructed in or under the access road and partly within the coastal zone.”
The city approved the new proposal. In August 2000, the Coastal
Commission issued a coastal development permit. (The commission’s issuance of
the permit is being challenged in a separate action that is also before this court.
(Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com., review granted July 23, 2003,
S116081.)) Coalition amended the petition for writ of mandate in October 2000 to
2

challenge the city’s approval of the revised project. It alleges that the project is
located within the coastal zone and therefore must comply with Mello Act
affordable housing requirements. After a hearing, the trial court rejected
Coalition’s contentions and entered a judgment denying the petition in February
2001. Coalition appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The majority, in an opinion
by Justice Aldrich, held that “the Mello Act affordable housing requirement
applies to a new housing development only if the development includes housing
constructed within the coastal zone.” Justice Croskey dissented on this point. He
argued that “if a substantial part of the development is constructed within the
coastal zone, as here, the affordable housing requirement will apply.” We granted
Coalition’s petition for review limited to whether the Mello Act applies to this
development.
II. DISCUSSION
The Legislature enacted Government Code section 65590, part of the Mello
Act, in 1981. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 1547, 1552.) At issue in this case is section 65590(d), which states in
part: “New housing developments constructed within the coastal zone shall,
where feasible, provide housing units for persons and families of low or moderate
income, as defined in Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code.”1

1
In its entirety, section 65590(d) provides: “New housing developments
constructed within the coastal zone shall, where feasible, provide housing units for
persons and families of low or moderate income, as defined in Section 50093 of
the Health and Safety Code. Where it is not feasible to provide these housing
units in a proposed new housing development, the local government shall require
the developer to provide such housing, if feasible to do so, at another location
within the same city or county, either within the coastal zone or within three miles
thereof. In order to assist in providing new housing units, each local government
shall offer density bonuses or other incentives, including, but not limited to,
3



Specifically, we must decide what the Legislature meant by “[n]ew housing
developments.” If, as here, a proposed housing development includes open space
and infrastructure within the coastal zone, but every house will be outside the
coastal zone, is it a housing development “constructed within the coastal zone” for
purposes of this statute?
Catellus argues, and the Court of Appeal majority below found, that section
65590(d) applies only if some actual housing is constructed within the coastal
zone. Coalition argues that the section applies if any part of the development is
within the coastal zone. The dissent below argued that the section applies if a
“substantial part” of the development is within the coastal zone. We conclude that
section 65590(d) does not apply to a development like this which contains within
the coastal zone no housing or even private amenities reserved for the exclusive
use of the homeowners.2
Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the
statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not
examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as
a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various
parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its
plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one
reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s

modification of zoning and subdivision requirements, accelerated processing of
required applications, and the waiver of appropriate fees.”
2
Because the facts do not present the issue, we do not decide whether the
Mello Act would apply if the project included within the coastal zone amenities
that are an adjunct of a residential housing development and intended for the
exclusive enjoyment of the homeowners, such as a golf course or other sporting
facility.
4



purpose, legislative history, and public policy. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service,
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003; People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142;
People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95.)
We agree with the majority below that section 65590(d)’s words, “[n]ew
housing developments constructed within the coastal zone,” are ambiguous. (See
Citizens for Hatton Canyon v. Dept. of Transportation (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
838, 844 [phrase “in the coastal zone” is ambiguous; it could either mean at least
partially within the zone or entirely within the zone].) One could say that if any
part of a proposed development that includes houses is within the coastal zone, the
development is a housing development, and it is constructed within the coastal
zone. One could also say, as did the dissent below, that if a substantial part of a
proposed development that includes houses is within the coastal zone, the
development is a housing development, and it is constructed within the coastal
zone (although it is difficult to find the concept substantial part in the words of the
statute). But it is also reasonable to say that if no house is constructed within the
coastal zone, a development that includes houses constructed outside the coastal
zone is not a housing development constructed within the coastal zone.
We also agree with the majority below that a review of the legislative
history does not help to resolve the ambiguity. The parties discuss at some length
the nature and significance of the city’s position on this question as expressed in
this case, in certain guidelines and interim procedures the city has adopted, and in
an agreement to settle the litigation in Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1547. We conclude that the city’s actions do not
assist us in determining what the Legislature meant in enacting the Mello Act and,
accordingly, do not consider those actions. The parties also debate the history and
nature of the Coastal Commission’s role in furthering the goal of providing
affordable housing. This, too, we find unhelpful. Finally, noting that the Mello
5

Act does not define the term, “[n]ew housing developments,” the parties cite
definitions of somewhat similar terms in other, generally unrelated, statutes. We
also find these definitions do not assist in deciding what the Legislature meant in
this specific context. Instead, we find the answer to the question presented by
considering the statutory language in context and in light of the statute’s purpose.
One purpose of the Mello Act is “to preserve residential housing units
occupied by low- or moderate-income persons or families in the coastal zone.”
(Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1552-1553.) The act also seeks to create affordable housing in some
circumstances. It promotes these purposes by two means. First, when existing
affordable housing within the coastal zone is converted or demolished, it seeks to
provide replacement affordable housing nearby. (Gov. Code, § 65590, subd. (b).)
Second, when a new housing development is constructed within the coastal zone,
it seeks to provide commensurate affordable housing nearby. (§ 65590(d).) The
key circumstance triggering these goals is the existence of, or proposal to create, a
housing impact within the coastal zone. As the majority below stated, “the clear
purpose of [section 65590(d)] is to require the provision of affordable housing
based on activities conducted within the coastal zone.” The majority also noted
that Government Code section 65590, subdivision (a), provides that “[e]ach
respective local government shall comply with the requirements of this section in
that portion of its jurisdiction which is located within the coastal zone.” (Italics
added.) This language also suggests that housing impacts within the coastal zone
are what matter, not housing impacts elsewhere.
The project proposed here will neither affect existing affordable housing
nor have a new housing impact within the coastal zone. The project includes only
some infrastructure and construction of a public view park within the coastal zone.
No logical connection exists between the goal of encouraging the preservation or
6

provision of affordable housing in the coastal zone and a development that
includes no homes of any price range or any other amenities for the exclusive use
of the homeowners, within that zone. A development that contains housing
impacts solely outside the coastal zone may be subject to requirements pertaining
to housing developments outside that zone, but no reason appears to believe the
Legislature wanted to subject the same development to the Mello Act’s additional
coastal zone affordable housing requirements.
The dissent below and Coalition note that Government Code section 65590
sometimes refers to “housing developments” and sometimes uses terms like
“dwelling units” and “residential structure.” They assert that the “Legislature’s
separate use of these terms necessarily suggests that each must have a different
meaning.” However, the Legislature used the broader term “housing
developments” when referring to the entire development, and the narrower terms
when referring to individual units or structures. This use of the differing terms
does not answer the question presented here—whether a development containing
no housing impact within the coastal zone is a housing development that is
constructed within the coastal zone.
We also see practical difficulties with Coalition’s interpretation. An
argument that the Mello Act applies whenever any part of a proposed housing
development is within the coastal zone would be too broad to make practical
sense. If, for example, a proposed development contains only a drainage pipe
within the coastal zone, it is hard to imagine any reason to require affordable
housing because of that drainage pipe. As another example, if a proposed
development contains only one acre within the coastal zone that is meant to
remain open space, and the only proposed construction within that acre is a public
right of way to the beach, the developer could presumably avoid Mello Act
affordable housing requirements by giving that acre to the local governmental
7

entity. But if the entity did not want the land or could not afford to build and
maintain the right of way, and the developer agreed instead to build and maintain
the right of way at its own expense, then, under Coalition’s interpretation, this
agreement would trigger the act’s affordable housing requirements. Such a result
would be counterproductive.
On the other hand, the dissent’s position that the Mello Act applies when a
substantial part of the development is within the coastal zone, while not so
extreme, injects uncertainty into the planning process. As the majority below
noted, the parties here and “future developers and municipalities [would be] left to
speculate on a case-by-case basis [citation] whether a particular housing
development is within the coastal zone or not. Such an ad hoc analysis lacks
clarity and in all probability [would] lead to needless future litigation. [¶] [S]uch
an amorphous standard provides no clear direction or predictability for future
developments as to when this substantiality test is met. Examples . . . might
include scenarios where only the main sewer line to a housing development
traverses but a few feet of the coastal zone property or, as here, part of one of the
main access roads traverses the same land. Or take the situation where there is to
be no construction or excavation of any kind within the coastal zone, but some of
the project acreage is to be left in its natural state as a habitat for rare species of
plant or wildlife. Under any of these scenarios, the parties would never be able to
predict whether they must consider the feasibility of affordable housing.”
The most precise and easily predictable test is also the most logical one
given the act’s purpose: A housing development is a “[n]ew housing
development[] constructed within the coastal zone” only if it will have a housing
impact within the coastal zone. Because this project does not have such an impact,
we agree with the majority below that it is not subject to the Mello Act.
8

III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.

9




CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.

I concur in the result. I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the
proper holding and rationale.
I agree with the majority that neither the language of the statute nor its
legislative history can resolve the question before us, although the use of the broad
term “housing development” at least permits the possibility the Legislature was
concerned with something beyond housing units in the strict sense. I also agree with
the majority that the key to this case is to divine the legislative purpose of
Government Code section 65590, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 65590(d)).
I believe the purpose of section 65590(d) was expressed in the Coastal
Commission’s Interpretive Guidelines to former Public Resources Code section
30213, which had mandated the Coastal Commission to protect and provide for
“housing opportunities for persons of low and moderate income.” (Stats. 1976,
ch. 1330, § 1, p. 5958.) The Interpretive Guidelines state that section 30213 “is a
recognition that meaningful access to the coast requires housing opportunities as well
as other forms of coastal access.” (Cal. Coastal Com., Interpretive Guidelines on
New Construction of Housing (1981) § II.A, p.13.) “The access, economic
development and environmental policies of the Coastal Act all provide that the coastal
zone will not be the domain of a single class of citizens but will instead remain
1



available to the entire public; the provision of affordable housing benefits not only
those who live in it but all members of society.” (Id., § II.B, p. 14.)
The Mello Act transferred the responsibilities for providing affordable housing
within the coastal zone from the Coastal Commission to local governments. But I
believe it retained the original purpose expressed in the above Interpretive Guidelines.
The reason for the concern with the absence of affordable housing in the coastal zone
is obvious. The coastal zone offers some of the choicest, and most expensive, land.
The housing market, left to itself, might well make the coastal zone, or large portions
of it, “the domain of a single class of citizens,” i.e, the wealthy, contrary to the public
policy of access embodied in the Coastal Act and transplanted in slightly different
form into the Mello Act.1
If the goal of the Mello Act is not to have the coastal zone dominated by a
single class, the means chosen to achieve that goal are to require the building of
affordable housing in the coastal zone when affordable coastal housing is destroyed
and, “where feasible,” when any housing is constructed within the zone.
(§ 65590(d).) When no housing is constructed within the coastal zone then, generally
speaking, there is no issue of monopolization of coastal housing by the wealthiest
citizens. But such is not invariably the case. Consider, for example a development
that builds houses just outside the coastal zone boundary but constructs private
amenities, e.g., golf courses or other sporting facilities, within the coastal zone. Such
amenities would be occupying the coastal zone as an adjunct of residential
development and would thwart the purpose of the Mello Act by making a portion of

1
I note that the Mello Act includes moderate-income families with incomes
of up to “120 percent of the area median income, with some flexibility to adjust
that figure upward for certain geographic areas. (Health & Saf. Code, § 50093.)
The Mello Act was evidently concerned, therefore, with the exclusion from the
coastal zone of both low income and middle income families.
2



the coastal zone the exclusive domain, the backyard as it were, of wealthy
homeowners.
As the majority correctly points out, the present case does not involve such
private amenities. (Maj. opn, ante, at p. 4, fn. 2.) Rather, the portion of the coastal
zone to be used includes various public improvements such as an access road, sewers,
a storm drain, various utility lines, erosion control measures, and a public view park.
These public improvements do not raise the issue of monopolization of coastal land
by a single class that would be implicated by the construction of private facilities in
the coastal zone that are an adjunct of residential development. I therefore concur in
the majority’s result.
MORENO, J.
I CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
3

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Coalition of Concerned Communities v. City of Los Angeles
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 111 Cal.App.4th 1166
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S119897
Date Filed: December 9, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: David P. Yaffe

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Office of Craig A. Sherman and Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Susan D. Pfann, Jack L. Brown and Jeri L. Burge, Assistant City
Attorneys, and Kenneth T. Fong, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

Latham & Watkins, Robert D. Crockett, Kathryn M. Davis and James R. Repking for Real Party in Interest
and Respondent.


1

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Craig A. Sherman
Law Office of Craig A. Sherman
1901 First Avenue, Suite 335
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 702-7892

Robert D. Crockett
Latham & Watkins
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2007
(213) 485-1234

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 12/09/2004S119897

Parties
1Coalition Of Concerned Communities, Inc. (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Craig A. Sherman
Attorney at Law
1901 First Avenue, Suite 335
San Diego, CA

2Spirit Of The Sage Council (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Craig A. Sherman
Attorney at Law
1901 First Avenue, Suite 335
San Diego, CA

3City Of Los Angeles (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Kenneth T. Fong
Ofc City Attorney
200 N Main Street
Los Angeles, CA

4City Of Los Angeles (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Jack L. Brown
Ofc City Attorney
200 N Main Street
Los Angeles, CA

5Catellus Residential Group (Real Party in Interest and Respondent)
Represented by Robert D. Crockett
Latham & Watkins
633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Dec 9 2004Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Oct 20 2003Petition for review filed
  in San Diego by plaintiffs and appellants (Coalition of Concerned Comunities, Inc., and Spirit of the Sage Council
Oct 22 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse
Oct 22 2003Record requested
 
Nov 6 2003Telephone conversation with:
  attorney Craig Sherman advising the court that the CA ask him to pick up the administrative record after they denied case. Counsel advised to forward record to this court (3 boxes).
Nov 10 2003Exhibit(s) lodged
  administrative record (33 volumes in 3 boxes) from counsel for appellant (Coalition).
Nov 10 2003Received document entitled:
  Notice of Lodgment of Administrative Record - from counsel for appellant (Coalition).
Nov 12 2003Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for real party in interest (Catellus Residential Group). (40k)
Dec 17 2003Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)
  The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Does the term "housing development" -- for purposes of the Mello Act requirement that a developer provide affordable housing, where feasible, when a new housing development is constructed within the coastal zone subject to the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Commission (Gov. Code, ? 65590) -- refer only to the actual housing component of a project, or is the Mello Act applicable if some aspects of the project are in the coastal zone even if all actual housing is to be constructed outside the coastal zone? Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Jan 5 2004Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by counsel for appellants (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc., et al.).
Jan 6 2004Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  respondent Catellus Residential Group
Jan 8 2004Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellants requesting to April 16, 2004 to file opening brief on the merits.
Jan 9 2004Opposition filed
  by counsel for resp & real party Catellus Residential Group to ext. req. of applnts Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc., et al.
Jan 12 2004Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including February 15, 2004 without prejudice. Appellants may file a request for more time if needed.
Feb 6 2004Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for aplts. requests extension of time to February 27, 2004 to file the opening brief.
Feb 13 2004Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including February 27, 2004. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Feb 27 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  in San Diego by counsel for appellants (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc., and Spirit of the Sage Council). (note: corrected brief filed with permission on 3/3/04. Answer to opening brief on the merits due on or before 4/2/04.)
Mar 1 2004Request for judicial notice filed (in granted case)
  by counsel for appellants. (recv'd in San Diego)
Mar 1 2004Filed:
  Notice of Errata in appellants' opening brief on the merits; application and motion in support of order allowing the filing of a corrected appellants' opening brief on the merits. (recv'd in San Diego)
Mar 3 2004Filed:
  Corrected Opening Brief on the Merits by appellants. (filed with permission) ***Answer due April 2, 2004***
Apr 1 2004Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for resp (City Of Los Angeles) request to May 3, 2004 to file answer brief/merits
Apr 2 2004Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for real parties Catellus Residential Group, Inc.) request to May 3, 2004 to file answer brief on the merits.
Apr 8 2004Extension of time granted
  Real Parties in Interest time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 3, 2004.
Apr 8 2004Extension of time granted
  Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including May 3, 2004.
Apr 27 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  respondent City of Los Angeles
Apr 27 2004Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  respondent City of Los Angeles
Apr 27 2004Opposition filed
  opposition to appellant's request for judicial notice>> respondent City of Los Angeles
May 3 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  resps & real parties Catellus Residential Group, Inc.
May 3 2004Filed:
  resps & real parties Catellus Residential Group, Inc. Joinder in Resp City Of Los Angeles' Motion For Judicial Notice & Opposition To Appellants' Motion For Judicial Notice
May 3 2004Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  resps & real parties Catellus Residential Group
May 13 2004Request for extension of time filed
  Appellant (Coalition) to file a combined Reply Brief on the Merits not to exceed 6000 words. Asking to June 25, 2004.
May 19 2004Extension of time granted
  to June 25, 2004, for Appellant to serve and file a single combined reply brief on the merits not to exceed 6,000 words.
Jun 25 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  by counsel for (Coalition of Concerned Communities Inc. and Spirit of the Sage Council)
Jun 25 2004Filed:
  by counsel for aplts. Opposition to Respondent's Request for Judicial Notice.
Sep 1 2004Case ordered on calendar
  10/6/04 @ 9am - Los Angeles
Sep 23 2004Notice of substitution of counsel
  counsel for resp., City of Los Angeles , for Kenneth T. Fong, instead and in lieu of Jack L. Brown.
Sep 24 2004Received:
  letter from counsel for rpi/resp Catellus Res. Group re: status report about project -- letter dated September 24, 2004. faxed to sf.
Sep 29 2004Request for judicial notice granted
  The requests for judicial notice of plaintiffs and appellants Coalition of Concerned Communities, et al., filed March 1, 2004, of defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles, filed April 27, 2004, and of real party in interest Catellus Residential Group, filed May 3, 2004, are granted.
Oct 6 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
Dec 9 2004Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion by Chin, J. joined by George CJ, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Brown, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Moreno, J.
Jan 12 2005Remittitur issued (civil case)
  CA2/3
Jan 26 2005Received:
  Receipt for remittitur - from CA2/3.

Briefs
Feb 27 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Apr 27 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
May 3 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jun 25 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
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