IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
CLUB MEMBERS FOR AN HONEST
ELECTION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S143087
v.
Ct.App.
1/1
A110069
SIERRA CLUB, et al.,
San
Francisco
County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. 04-429277
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 commonly referred to as the anti-
SLAPP statute,2 provides that a civil cause of action may be dismissed as a
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). Section 425.17,
subdivision (b) (section 425.17(b)) provides an exception to the anti-SLAPP
statute by exempting some actions from dismissal. Here, we hold the exception
applies only when the entire action is brought in the public interest. If any part of
the complaint seeks relief to directly benefit the plaintiff, by securing relief greater
1
Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
1
than or different from that sought on behalf of the general public, the section
425.17(b) exception does not apply.
Accordingly, we reverse a contrary judgment by the Court of Appeal.
However, we affirm that part of the judgment holding that the trial court properly
struck parts of the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute because its order
established that plaintiffs did not show a probability of prevailing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
The Sierra Club (Club), the nation’s largest environmental organization, is
governed by a 15-member board of directors (Board), who are elected for three-
year staggered terms. The Club holds elections for five directors each year. A
nominating committee chooses a slate of candidates, but other candidates may be
nominated by member petition.
While total Club membership exceeds 700,000, member participation in
annual elections is generally low.4 As a result, the vote of a small number of
members may disproportionately influence the outcome. In 2003, there was a rift
among the Board members. A majority favored current policies, while a minority
sought to take the Club in a different direction. Ballots for the 2004 election were
to be mailed in February. On January 30, 2004, in response to a perceived threat
posed by candidates favoring the minority view, the Board held a meeting and
took the actions that led to this litigation.
First, the Board voted to disseminate an article to all chapter newsletters.
Written by Drusha Mayhue, it cautioned that low member participation in
3
These background facts have been taken largely from the Court of Appeal
opinion.
4
Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of members participating in the
vote ranged from 8.7 percent to 10.1 percent.
2
elections made the Club vulnerable to takeover efforts by those whose agenda
differed from that of the majority.
Second, the Board also directed that an “urgent election notice” be attached
to the front of voting materials. The notice warned of “an unprecedented level of
outside involvement and attention” to the Club’s election and named a number of
outside groups that “may be attempting to intervene” in the election. Though the
notice itself did not refer to specific candidates, ballot materials included
statements of three candidates who disclaimed any personal interest in being
elected. Instead, those three candidates’ statements urged members to vote for the
Club’s nominating committee slate or against candidates supported by outside
groups.5
Plaintiff and candidate Robert van de Hoek, and a group supporting him,
Club Members for an Honest Election (CMHE), objected to the Club’s distribution
of this material and sought injunctive relief. As amended, the complaint alleged
that the Club had distributed information supporting some candidates and
opposing others. It also alleged that candidates opposed by the Club were not
given an opportunity to present contrasting views and challenged the inclusion of
statements by “three fake Board candidates.” The Club defeated plaintiffs’
requests for temporary and preliminary restraining orders. Using the anti-SLAPP
statute, it successfully urged the court to strike a portion of the complaint seeking
to enjoin or censor future speech. Plaintiffs did not appeal the order to strike. The
election went forward; van de Hoek was not among those elected to the Board.
Several months after the election, van de Hoek and CMHE filed a second
amended complaint against the Club and added six individual directors as
5
The ballot materials also included a one-page general discussion on the
election, a list of candidates, and 10 pages of candidates’ statements about the
election.
3
defendants. The complaint alleged four causes of action: (1) a challenge to the
validity of the election under Corporations Code section 5617; (2) a petition for
declaratory relief; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200. The third cause of action was aimed, in part, at
directors Nick Aumen and Jan O’Connell, who ran successfully on the nominating
committee slate. It alleged that they breached their fiduciary duty by voting for
the Board actions taken at the January 30, 2004 meeting. The complaint sought
extensive injunctive relief, including the removal of five elected or appointed
Board members and the installation of van de Hoek and four other unsuccessful
candidates. It sought both to bar those removed directors from running for the
Board in the 2005 election and to bar Aumen and O’Connell from ever running for
the Board again.
Again relying on the anti-SLAPP statute, the Club moved to strike the
second amended complaint. The parties also filed competing motions for
summary judgment. With regard to the anti-SLAPP motion, the court held that
voting as a director is protected under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution (First Amendment.) Thus, it struck the third cause of action alleging
that the votes of Aumen and O’Connell breached a fiduciary duty. It also struck a
paragraph of the first cause of action that referred to the votes of the directors.
The balance of the motion to strike was denied. The court went on to deny
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and to grant that of the defendants. The
complaint was then dismissed in its entirety. In connection with the Club’s
partially successful anti-SLAPP motions, the court awarded fees and costs in the
amount of $37,010.76.
Plaintiff van de Hoek did not appeal. CMHE did not challenge the
summary judgment rulings, but did appeal the anti-SLAPP rulings and related fee
and cost awards. The Club cross-appealed from the partial denial of the motion to
4
strike, arguing that the entire complaint arose from defendants’ protected
activities.
The Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action arose from protected First Amendment activity, and was thus subject to the
Club’s motion to strike.
The Court of Appeal also held that certain causes of action fell under
section 425.17(b), the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute, and that
those particular causes of action should not have been struck. The Court of
Appeal concluded that the first, second and fourth causes of action were exempt
from the anti-SLAPP statute under the public interest exception. Because CMHE
challenged the Club’s election procedures on the ground that they constituted an
unfair manipulation of an election to defeat candidates advancing views at odds
with those of the existing board of directors, the Court of Appeal held that the
“principal thrust or gravamen” of these causes of action were consistent with a
public interest action. The Court of Appeal relied in large measure on case law
interpreting section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute, which awards
attorney fees to a party whose action has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest. By analogy, the Court of Appeal
concluded that, even when a plaintiff has a personal stake in a case, the litigation
could still involve an important legal issue of public interest, the resolution of
which could benefit the public as a whole and transcend the plaintiff’s personal
interest. In applying the “principal thrust or gravamen” test, the Court of Appeal
erred.
DISCUSSION
The statutory scheme
In 1992, the Legislature enacted section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, to
provide for the early dismissal of unmeritorious claims filed to interfere with the
5
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances. (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 181, 186.) The Legislature authorized the filing of a special motion
to strike such claims, (§ 425.16, subds. (b)(1), (f)), and expressly provided that
section 425.16 should “be construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a); see Briggs v.
Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119.) Such a
motion requires a two-step process. First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the “cause[s] of action . . . aris[e] from” the defendant’s actions “in
furtherance of that [defendant’s] right of . . . free speech . . . in connection with a
public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If a defendant meets this threshold
showing, the plaintiff must establish “a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim[s].” (Ibid.)
In 2003, the Legislature enacted section 425.17 to curb the “disturbing
abuse” of the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.17, subd. (a).) This exception statute
covers both public interest lawsuits, under subdivision (b), and “commercial
speech,” under subdivision (c). This case involves only the application of
subdivision (b), which provides: “Section 425.16 does not apply to any action
brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public if all of the
following conditions exist: [¶] (1) The plaintiff does not seek any relief greater
than or different from the relief sought for the general public or a class of which
the plaintiff is a member. . . . [¶] (2) The action, if successful, would enforce an
important right affecting the public interest, and would confer a significant benefit,
whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general public or a large class of
persons. [¶] (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a disproportionate
financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the matter.”
(Italics added.) If a complaint satisfies the provisions of the applicable exception,
it may not be attacked under the anti-SLAPP statute.
6
By incorporating the “principal thrust or gravamen” test, the Court of
Appeal’s analysis failed to adhere to the plain meaning of section 425.17(b). “In
construing any statute, we first look to its language. [Citation.] ‘Words used in a
statute . . . should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If
the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it
necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘If
the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court
looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy,
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which
the statute is a part.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 374, 379.) In addition, because section 425.17(b) is a statutory
exception to section 425.16, it should be narrowly construed. (City and County of
San Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 381, 400 (Ballard).)
Section 425.17(b)’s exception applies only to actions brought “solely in the
public interest or on behalf of the general public.” Use of the term “solely”
expressly conveys the Legislative intent that section 425.17(b) not apply to an
action that seeks a more narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff. Such an
action would not be brought “solely” in the public’s interest. The statutory
language of 425.17(b) is unambiguous and bars a litigant seeking “any” personal
relief from relying on the section 425.17(b) exception.6
6
Accordingly, we reject CMHE’s argument that insertion of the word “or” in
section 425.17(b) (“[Anti-SLAPP statute is not applicable to] any action brought
solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public” (italics added))
means that section 425.17 protects suits brought on behalf of the general public
even if the suit is not exclusively in the public interest. It makes little sense for the
Legislature to provide that an action brought “in the public interest” must be
brought solely for that purpose, while an action brought “on behalf of the general
public” would allow a plaintiff to seek personal relief. Such an interpretation
Footnote Continued on Next Page
7
Section 425.17(b) is not applicable because plaintiffs’ suit did not seek
relief solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public
The Court of Appeal correctly observed that there was “no doubt” that
portions of the prayer for relief sought a personal advantage7 by advancing
plaintiffs’ own interests. Under the Court of Appeal’s own analysis, CMHE
sought “relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general
public.” (§ 425.17(b)(1).) For example, it asked the court to order the Club to
install van de Hoek and four other unsuccessful candidates on the Board; publish,
at its own expense, “an article by Plaintiffs of equal length to that of the Mayhue
editorial;” and disseminate an “Urgent Election Notice” written by plaintiffs along
with ballots for the 2005 election. CMHE asked the court to order the Club to
“place an introduction written by Plaintiffs in the ballot for the 2005 Board
election that is equal in length to the introduction in the 2004 ballot that extolled
the virtues of the [Club’s] Nominating Committee Candidates.” It also sought to
bar directors Aumen, Karpf, O’Connell, Ranchod, and Restrom from running in
the Club’s 2005 election. The Court of Appeal concluded that such orders would
have assisted the candidacy of van de Hock and other CMHE-sponsored
candidates. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that “portions of the prayer. . .
were calculated to give plaintiffs and their allies an advantage in intra-club
politics” and there was “no doubt” that plaintiffs sought a “personal advantage” in
the Club’s elections.
Footnote Continued From Previous Page
would render the first phrase useless because a plaintiff would simply invoke the
second phrase, as CMHE attempts to do so in this case.
7
The use of the term “personal advantage” includes an individual or
particular advantage sought by a group, such as CMHE.
8
The Court of Appeal unduly relied on sections 425.16 and 1021.5
Notwithstanding its observations, the Court of Appeal gave the phrase
“public interest” in section 425.17(b) the same expansive meaning as it has in
section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Under section 425.16, a defendant may
move for dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute if the defendant’s underlying
speech activities are “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see id., subd. (e)(3).) The Legislature has also
directed that section 425.16 “shall be construed broadly” given that the anti-
SLAPP statute protects speech about important public issues. (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).)
The “public interest” referred to in section 425.17(b), does not simply
describe topics that members of the public might find interesting. Instead the term
“public interest” is used to define suits brought for the public’s good or on behalf
of the public. To qualify under section 425.17(b)’s exception, suits must be
brought solely to secure this public benefit.
In reaching its contrary conclusion the Court of Appeal relied on case law
involving section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute. Section 1021.5
awards attorney fees to a party whose action has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest.8 The Court of Appeal referred to
section 1021.5 because the Legislature, when drafting section 425.17(b), stated
8
Section 1021.5 provides, in part: “Upon motion, a court may award
attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the
recovery, if any.”
9
that it was borrowing from section 1021.5 and noted that the two statutes were
similar. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004
Reg. Sess.), pp. 11-12.) Analogizing to section 1021.5, the Court of Appeal
concluded that when a plaintiff has a personal stake in the litigation, such as
having his or her statement included in the voters’ pamphlet, the litigation could
still include an important legal issue of public interest that transcends the
plaintiff’s personal stake and would benefit the public interest as a whole.
While section 425.17 is similar to section 1021.5 in certain respects, the two
statutes are also different in significant ways. First, unlike the private attorney
general statute, the text of section 425.17(b) requires that an action be brought
“solely in the public interest,” and cannot seek “any” relief greater than or
different from the relief sought for the general public. (§ 425.17(b)(1).) Section
1021.5 does not contain these limitations.
The two statutes also involve different functions. Section 1021.5 is an
attorney fees statute. It authorizes a trial court at the end of litigation to determine
whether attorney fees should be awarded to a prevailing party. Section 425.17(b)
comes into play at the outset of litigation and pertains to a special motion to strike.
The viability of the underlying action itself is at issue in an anti-SLAPP motion
and in the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute. Attorney fees are
separately available to a prevailing party in such instances under the anti-SLAPP
statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) Because of these functional differences, section
425.17(b) cannot simply be intended to parallel the private attorney general
statute.
The plain language of section 425.17(b) is dispositive here. The Court of
Appeal erred in reaching beyond it to interpret the language in a contrary fashion.
Even if the statute’s language were ambiguous, reliance on the private attorney
general fee statute and cases is flawed because of the disparities noted above.
10
Application of the “principal thrust or gravamen” test was error
The Court of Appeal’s application of the “principal thrust or gravamen” test
also fails because it contravenes the statutes’ plain meaning and confuses the
broad interpretation called for under section 425.16 with the narrow reading
required for the section 425.17(b) exception. The “principal thrust or gravamen”
test has been used to determine whether an action fits within the scope of the anti-
SLAPP protection provided by section 425.16 when a pleading contains
allegations referring to both protected and unprotected activity. (See, e.g.,
Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.) The
Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded that the same approach should govern here.
The “principal thrust or gravamen” test serves the Legislative intent that
section 425.16 be broadly interpreted. Thus, a plaintiff could not deprive a
defendant of anti-SLAPP protection by bringing a complaint based upon both
protected and unprotected conduct. The anti-SLAPP statute specifically permits
the striking of a “cause of action.” The exception provided for in section 425.17
operates in the opposite manner. As an exception, it is to be narrowly interpreted
(Ballard, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 400), lest it swallow the rule found in the
anti-SLAPP statute. The Legislature also made this general rule of construction
explicit in the language it chose. It requires that, under section 425.17(b) an
action, as opposed to a cause of action, must be brought solely in the public
interest. The Court of Appeal’s analysis of section 425.17(b) renders the term
“solely” as surplusage, a result cautioned against by the rules of statutory
construction. (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 980-981.)
An examination of section 425.17, subdivision (c), dealing with commercial
speech, reveals that the choice of words was intentional. Subdivision (c) provides
for the exemption of a “cause of action,” rather than an “action” as a whole, as
required under subdivision (b). The Legislature clearly distinguished between an
11
“action” and a “cause of action” in drafting subdivisions (b) and (c) of section
425.17, and treated them differently. (See also § 425.17, subds. (d)(2) & (e).) It
expressly provided that the public interest exception only applies if the entire
action is brought solely in the public interest. If individualized relief is sought, a
plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute in order for the
action to proceed. (Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1067; cf. Northern Cal. Carpenters Regional Council v.
Warmington Hercules Associates, (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.)
Other issues
Because of our holding we need not address the Club’s contention that its
“urgent election notice” constituted a political work under section 425.17,
subdivision (d)(2).9 We note also that this argument was not advanced in the trial
court, nor was it addressed by the Court of Appeal. Because we hold that section
425.17(b) applies to actions as a whole, we also do not address the Club’s
contention that the fiduciary duty claim did not fall under the public interest
exception.
We also reject CMHE’s contention that it met its burden under the second
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute by showing a probability of success on its breach
of fiduciary duty claim. In separate orders, the trial court partially granted the
Club’s motion to strike. It also granted the Club’s motion for summary judgment
and dismissed CMHE’s complaint. CMHE did not appeal the order of dismissal.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s dismissal after the grant of
summary judgment “actually adjudicated this issue by ordering dismissal of the
9
Section 425.17, subdivision (d)(2) excepts from the “public interest”
exemption of section 425.17(b)(2), “[a]ny action against any person or entity
based upon the creation, dissemination . . . or other similar promotion of any . . .
political . . . work.”
12
second amended complaint.” Because CMHE failed to challenge the order of
dismissal, the Court of Appeal concluded that CMHE could not challenge the
propriety of this determination. We agree.
DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
Court of Appeal with directions to affirm the trial court's order insofar as it granted
the anti-SLAPP motion, to reverse the trial court's order insofar as it denied that
motion, and to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
13
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 137 Cal.App.4th 1166
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S143087Date Filed: December 15, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: San Francisco
Judge: James L. Warren
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Law Offices of Ian B. Kelley, Ian B. Kelley, Conrad Wu; Law Office of Jeff D. Hoffman and Jeff D.Hoffman for Plaintiff and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Davis Wright Tremaine, Thomas R. Burke, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Susan E. Seager for Defendants andAppellants.
Law Offices of James Wheaton and James R. Wheaton for Senator Sheila Kuehl as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Ian B. KelleyLaw Offices of Ian B. Kelley
885 Bryant Street, Suite 202
San Francisco, CA 94103
9415) 581-0885
Thomas R. Burke
Davis Wright Tremaine
505 Montgomery Street, 8th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 276-6500
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal l affirmed an order granting in part and denying in part a special motion to strike in a civil action. This case includes the following issue: Can the exception to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.16) for actions "brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public" (Code Civ. Proc., section 425.17, subd. (b)) apply to a complaint that includes any claim for personal relief?
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: |
| Mon, 12/15/2008 | 45 Cal. 4th 309, 196 P.3d 1094, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288 | S143087 | Review - Civil Appeal | closed; remittitur issued |
| 1 | Sierra Club (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 2 | Aumen, Nick (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 3 | Oconnell, Jan (Real Party in Interest) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 4 | Karpf, David (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 5 | Ranchod, Sanjay (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 6 | Renstrom, Lisa (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 7 | Casini, Greg (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 San Francisco, CA |
| 8 | Club Members For An Honest Election (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Ian Booth Kelley Law Office of Ian B. Kelley 885 Bryant Street, Suite 202 San Francisco, CA |
| 9 | Club Members For An Honest Election (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Jeff David Hoffman Attorney at Law 132-B Coleridge San Francisco, CA |
| 10 | Kuehl, Sheila (Amicus curiae) Represented by James R. Wheaton Attorney at Law 1736 Franklin Street, 9th Floor Oakland, CA |
| 11 | Wheaton, James (Amicus curiae) Represented by James R. Wheaton Attorney at Law 1736 Franklin Street, 9th Floor Oakland, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Carol A. Corrigan |
| Disposition | |
| Dec 15 2008 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| May 3 2006 | Petition for review filed Appellants, Sierra Club, et al. by counsel. Thomas R. Burke. |
| May 3 2006 | Request for judicial notice received (pre-grant) Appellants, Sierra Club, et al.. by counsel, Thomas R. Burke. |
| May 3 2006 | Record requested |
| May 15 2006 | 2nd record request |
| May 16 2006 | Received Court of Appeal record file jacket/briefs/two accordian files |
| May 22 2006 | Request for depublication (petition for review pending) Sierra Club, a California non-profit public benefit corporation, Defendants and Appellants. Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| May 22 2006 | Answer to petition for review filed Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellant. Jeff Hoffman, counsel |
| Jun 1 2006 | Reply to answer to petition filed Sierra Club, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| Jun 21 2006 | Petition for review granted (civil case) Request for judicial notice denied. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Jun 21 2006 | Letter sent to: counsel re: Certification of Interested Entities or Persons. |
| Jun 29 2006 | Request for extension of time filed Attorney Burke counsel for defendants and appellants, Sierra Club et al. reqeusting to 9/15/06 to file the opening brief on the merits (to court for permission) |
| Jul 6 2006 | Extension of time granted To September 15, 2006 to file appellants', Sierra Club, opening brief on the merits. |
| Jul 6 2006 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Sierra Club, et al., Defendants and Appellants by Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| Jul 21 2006 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellant Jeff Hoffman, counsel |
| Aug 16 2006 | Filed: Notice of Substitution of Attorney of Record. Attorney Ian Kelley is substituted in place of Jeff Hoffman for Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellant |
| Sep 5 2006 | Change of contact information filed for: law firm of DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP effective immediately. |
| Sep 15 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed Sierra Club, a California Non-Profit Public Benefit Corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| Sep 15 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) By Club Members for Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellants. Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| Sep 28 2006 | Request for extension of time filed Atty Ian Kelley counsel for Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellant, requesting to December 14, 2006 (60-days) to file answer brief on the merits (to court for permission) |
| Sep 29 2006 | Received: amended POS |
| Oct 6 2006 | Extension of time granted On application of plaintiff and appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including December 14, 2006. |
| Dec 11 2006 | Request for extension of time filed Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Respondent requesting to January 13, 2007, to file its answer brief on the merits (to court for permission) |
| Dec 20 2006 | Extension of time granted On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 13, 2007. No further extensions will be contemplated. |
| Jan 16 2007 | Answer brief on the merits filed Club Members for an Honest Election, Plaintiff and Appellant Ian B. Kelley, counsel |
| Jan 30 2007 | Request for extension of time filed Atty Burke for appellants requesting to March 7, 2007 (30-days) to file reply brief on the merits (to court for permission) |
| Feb 9 2007 | Extension of time granted On application of appellants and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including March 7, 2007. |
| Mar 7 2007 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Sierra Club et al., Defendants and Appellants. Thomas R. Burke, counsel |
| Apr 16 2007 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief By James R. Wheaton counsel for Senator Sheila and James Wheaton, amicus in support Sierra Club (to court for permission) |
| Apr 16 2007 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Senator Sheila Kuehl and James Wheaton for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants and appellants is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief. |
| Apr 16 2007 | Amicus curiae brief filed Senator Sheila Kuehl and James Wheaton in support of defendants and respondents. James R. Wheaton, counsel |
| Jul 23 2008 | Filed: letter from Thomas Burke counsel for Sierra Club, Defendant and Appellant. Counsel requests the Court not to schedule oral argument from approximately October 10 - October 17, 2008. He is schedule to serve as the moderator for an Internet law session at the International Bar Association Conference being held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. |
| Aug 20 2008 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Wednesday, October 8, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in Riverside County |
| Sep 2 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Filed The California Channel by James Gualtieri |
| Sep 5 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Granted The request for media coverage, filed by the California Channel on September 2, 2008, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, of the California Rules of Court. |
| Oct 1 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Filed The Desert Sun Mike Snyder, photographer |
| Oct 1 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Filed Calif. State University. San Bernardino-Palm Desert Campus Mike Singer, photographer |
| Oct 3 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Granted The request for extended media coverage of the Supreme Court's Oral Argument Special Session on October 7 and 8, 2008, filed by the California State University, San Bernardino Campus photographer on September 26, 2008, is granted, subject to the conditions set for in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court. |
| Oct 3 2008 | Request for Extended Media coverage Granted The request for extended media coverager of the the Supreme Court's Oral Argument Special Session on October 7 and 8, 2008, filed on October 1, 2008, by The Desert Sun to serve as pool photographer is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court. |
| Oct 8 2008 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Dec 12 2008 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
| Dec 15 2008 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to affirm the trial court's order insofar as it granted the anti-SLAPP motion, to reverse the trial court's order insofar as it denied that motion, and to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Majority Opinion by Corrigan, J. ----- Joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ. |
| Jan 26 2009 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Jan 27 2009 | Received: Receipt for Remittitur |
| Briefs | |
| Sep 15 2006 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Jan 16 2007 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Mar 7 2007 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
| Apr 16 2007 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
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| May 22, 2011 Annotated by ari freilich | FACTS The Sierra Club is governed by a 15–member board of directors, who are elected for three-year staggered terms. In response to a perceived threat from candidates favoring contrary policies for the 2004 election, the Board voted to disseminate an article to all chapter newsletters cautioning that low member participation in elections made the Club vulnerable to takeover efforts by those whose agenda differed from that of the majority, and also directed that an “urgent election notice” be affixed to voting materials warning of “an unprecedented level of outside involvement and attention” to the Club’s election. The notice named a number of outside groups attempting to intervene in the election and included ballot materials with the statements of three candidates who, though disclaiming any personal interest in being elected, urged members to vote against candidates supported by outside groups. Lead plaintiff and candidate, Robert van de Hoek, and the CMHE sought injunctive relief to forestall distribution of these materials, alleging that the Club had unfairly disseminated information to support some candidates and not others, and objecting to the publication of statements from three “fake board candidates” in ballot materials. The Club defeated plaintiffs’ requests for preliminary restraining orders. After the election, plaintiffs’ amended complaint added six individual directors as defendants and alleged four causes of action: (1) a challenge to the validity of the election under Corporations Code section 5617; (2) a petition for declaratory relief; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; and (4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The complaint sought extensive injunctive relief, including the replacement of five elected or appointed Board members with van de Hoek and four other unsuccessful candidates. It sought to bar those removed directors from seeking election the Board in the 2005 election and to bar two particular directors from ever again seeking election to the Board. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Hearing these cross-appeals, the Appeals Court held that certain causes of action challenging the validity of the Club’s election procedures fell under the anti-SLAPP statute’s public interest exception, pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 425.17, subd. (b), and that those claims should not have been stricken. The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Appeals Court with orders to affirm the Superior Court’s grant of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike, and to reverse the Superior Court’s order to the extent that it denied that motion. ISSUE HOLDING ANALYSIS The Court discussed the legislative history of the anti-SLAPP statute, which provided for the early dismissal of unmeritorious claims filed to interfere with the valid exercise of constitutional speech rights. The legislature had expressly called for the statute to be construed broadly and the Court averred that the statutory exception for actions “brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public” should be narrowly construed; the word “solely” was not “surplusage” and was intended by the Legislature to apply to both clauses. The Court of Appeals’ “principal thrust or gravamen test” was in error because it contradicted the plain meaning of the statute and confused the broad interpretation intended for the anti-SLAPP statute with the narrow construction intended for the public interest exception. Where “individualized relief” is sought, a plaintiff cannot appeal to the public interest exception; to do so would allow the exception to swallow the rule and deprive defendants of anti-SLAPP protections. TAGS KEY RELATED AUTHORITY Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., 113 Cal.App.4th 181 (2003) Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (1999) People v. Cole, 38 Cal.4th 964, 980–981(2006) Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1067 (2005) Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.), pp. 11–12 |
| May 14, 2012 Annotated by diana teasland | Written by Mark Finucane Case Background Facts Procedural History Why this Case is Interesting and Important |
