Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S117816
City of Marina v. Cal. State Trustees

Filed 7/31/06



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA



CITY OF MARINA et al.,

S117816

Plaintiffs

and

Respondents,

Ct.App. 6 H023158

v.

Monterey

County

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

Super. Ct. Nos.

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,

M41795 & M41781

)


Defendant and Appellant.



The Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) challenges an environmental impact

report (EIR) prepared by the Board of Trustees of the California State University

(Trustees). The EIR concerns the Trustees’ plan to expand a small campus into a

major institution that will enroll 25,000 students. The planned expansion will

have significant effects on the physical environment throughout Fort Ord, the

former Army base on which the campus is located. While the Trustees have

agreed to mitigate effects occurring on the campus itself, they have disclaimed

responsibility for mitigating some effects occurring off campus. In particular, the

Trustees have refused to share the cost of certain infrastructure improvements

proposed by FORA, the base’s new civilian governing authority. FORA

challenges the Trustees’ decision to certify the EIR despite the remaining,

unmitigated effects as an abuse of discretion under the California Environmental

Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) (CEQA). Like the superior

1


court, we conclude the Trustees have abused their discretion and thus reverse the

Court of Appeal’s contrary decision.

I. FACTUAL, LEGAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Fort Ord is a former United States Army base on the Pacific Coast, about five

miles north of Monterey and 125 miles south of San Francisco. The base lies on

the northern end of Monterey Bay, an important tourist destination known for its

scenic beauty and historic sites. In 1994, the Department of Defense formally

closed the base and transferred 27,000 acres (over 42 square miles) to a variety of

governmental entities and local organizations. The closure created both problems

and opportunities for the region. On one hand, the loss of one of the nation’s

largest military installations threatened to disrupt the local economy. On the other

hand, valuable land that for over 75 years had been exclusively controlled by the

Army became available for civilian economic development.

To provide a government for the former base and to manage its transition to

civilian use, the Legislature enacted the Fort Ord Reuse Authority Act (Gov.

Code, § 67650 et seq.) (hereafter the FORA Act or the act). Effective May 9,

1994, the act authorized FORA’s creation and conferred upon it governmental

powers and duties within the former base that prevail over those of any other local

governmental entity. (Id., § 67657, subd. (c).) FORA’s general statutory purpose

is “to plan for, finance, and carry out the transfer and reuse of the base in a

cooperative, coordinated, balanced, and decisive manner.” (Gov. Code, § 67652,

subd. (a).) The act also charges FORA with the more specific policy goals of

“facilitat[ing] the transfer and reuse of the real and other property [of the base] . . .

with all practical speed,” “minimiz[ing] the disruption caused by the base’s

closure on the civilian economy and the people of the Monterey Bay area,”

“maintain[ing] and protect[ing] the unique environmental resources of the area,”

and accomplishing these tasks “in ways that enhance the economy and quality of

2

life of the Monterey Bay community.” (Id., § 67651, subds. (a)-(d).) The 13

members of FORA’s governing board are appointed by local governments

neighboring the base—Monterey County and the Cities of Carmel, Del Rey Oaks,

Marina, Monterey, Pacific Grove, Salinas, Sand City and Seaside. (Id., § 67660.)

Also on the board are 10 ex officio, nonvoting members, including one appointed

by the Chancellor of the California State University. (Id., § 67661.)

The charter for Fort Ord’s future use and development is the statutorily

mandated Base Reuse Plan (hereafter Reuse Plan), which FORA adopted on June

13, 1997. (See Gov. Code, § 67675 et seq.) The plan addresses land use,

transportation, conservation, recreation and capital improvement in Fort Ord until

the year 2015. (See id., § 67675, subd. (c).) Pursuant to the plan, FORA will

make land available over time for a wide range of civilian uses, including

residential housing, business, light industry, research and development, visitor

services, recreation and education. All such development will require

improvements to the infrastructure the Army left behind. Recognizing this, the

Legislature gave FORA the power and duty to prepare the base’s infrastructure for

civilian development. In the words of the act, FORA “shall identify those

basewide public capital facilities . . . that serve residents or will serve future

residents of the base territory” (Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1)) and “shall

undertake to plan for and arrange the provision of those facilities, including

arranging for their financing and construction or repair, remodeling, or

replacement” (ibid.; see also id., § 67675, subd. (c)(5) [Reuse Plan must include

capital improvement plan]).

FORA has, as the Legislature directed, prepared a capital improvement plan

identifying public facilities that need construction or improvement and projecting

future expenditures for that purpose through the year 2015. (See Gov. Code,

§ 67675, subd. (c)(5).) The facilities FORA has identified include elements of

3

Fort Ord’s infrastructure for transportation (mainly roadways), water supply and

distribution, wastewater management, drainage, and fire protection, among other

things. FORA plans to improve these facilities over the life of the Reuse Plan, as

increasing land use necessitates the improvements and as funding becomes

available. Funding is not expected to come through legislative appropriations.

Instead, the Legislature has directed FORA to arrange its own financing as it sees

fit (Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1)), employing any of several funding methods

authorized in the FORA Act. FORA may, for example, “levy assessments,

reassessments, or special taxes and issue bonds” under existing laws governing

public finance (id., § 67679, subd. (d)),1 “levy development fees on development

projects within the area of the base” (id., § 67679, subd. (e)) pursuant to the

Mitigation Fee Act (id., § 66000 et seq.), sell or lease land (id., § 67678, subd.

(a)), and “seek state and federal grants and loans or other assistance” (id., § 67679,

subd. (c)). FORA and its local-government member agencies (id., § 67660) may

also provide by contract for the transfer of tax revenues (id., § 67691) and/or adopt

programs of local revenue sharing (id., § 67692).

In order to determine the long-term financial viability of the Reuse Plan,

FORA has prepared a Comprehensive Business Plan setting out assumptions about


1

Specifically the Improvement Act of 1911 (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5000 et

seq.), the Improvement Bond Act of 1915 (id., § 8500 et seq.), the Municipal
Improvement Act of 1913 (id., § 10000 et seq.), the Benefit Assessment Act of
1982 (Gov. Code, § 54703 et seq.), the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972
(Sts. & Hy. Code, § 22500 et seq.), the Integrated Financing District Act (Gov.
Code, § 53175 et seq.), the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (id.,
§ 53311 et seq.), the Infrastructure Financing District Act (id., § 53395 et seq.), the
Marks-Roos Local Bond Pooling Act of 1985 (id., § 6584 et seq.), the Revenue
Bond Law of 1941 (id., § 54300 et seq.), a law permitting fire suppression
assessments (id., § 50078 et seq.), and the Habitat Maintenance Funding Act (Fish
& G. Code, § 2900 et seq.). (See Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d).)

4

projected revenue and expenditures. As part of this exercise—one obviously

subject to numerous contingencies given the long planning horizon—FORA has

projected that it will spend $249.2 million to improve Fort Ord’s infrastructure

over the 20-year life of the Reuse Plan, i.e., from 1996 to 2015. FORA projects

that the largest part of its operational revenue over the same period will derive

from the sale of land and from a one-time special tax under the Mello-Roos

Community Facilities Act of 1982 (Gov. Code, § 53311 et seq.). Other revenue is

expected to come through local development fees, water and sewer fees, a grant

from the federal Economic Development Administration, and the annual dues of

FORA’s members.

The California State University (CSU) is the largest university system in the

United States. Governed by the Trustees, CSU’s 23 campuses across the state

collectively enroll 405,000 students and employ 44,000 faculty and staff. CSU

Monterey Bay (CSUMB), which occupies 1,370 acres transferred by the Army to

CSU in 1994, is presently the main user of the base. CSUMB opened in 1995 with

633 students, using existing military buildings, and now enrolls approximately

3,800 students, 2,600 of whom live on campus. From this modest beginning the

Trustees plan to expand enrollment at CSUMB greatly over the next few decades,

eventually reaching the target enrollment of 25,000 full-time equivalent (FTE2)

students in the year 2030. On May 13, 1998, the Trustees approved a Campus

Master Plan (hereafter Master Plan) to guide CSUMB toward this target. Under

the Master Plan, CSUMB’s resident population of students, faculty, staff and

household members would gradually increase to 10,350. The campus’s average


2

One FTE student, a term used in the Trustees’ planning documents, means

any number of students collectively enrolled in 15 units, e.g., one student taking a
full course load of 15 units, or three students taking five units each.

5

daily population, which also includes students who commute, would grow to

19,000.

Together with the Master Plan for CSUMB, the Trustees also prepared and

certified an EIR. The EIR is the focus of the environmental review process and, as

we have explained, “the primary means” of achieving the state’s declared policy

of taking “ ‘all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the

environmental quality of the state.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v.

Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392, quoting Pub.

Resources Code, § 21000, subd. (a); see also CEQA Guidelines,3 § 15003, subd.

(a).) The EIR’s more specific purposes are “to identify the significant effects on

the environment of a project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate

the manner in which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.” (Pub.

Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a).) CEQA expressly requires that an EIR

accompany the Master Plan for CSUMB. “The selection of a location for a

particular campus and the approval of a long range development plan are subject

to [CEQA] and require the preparation of an [EIR].” (Id., § 21080.09, subd. (b).)

The Trustees necessarily serve as the “lead agency” (id., § 21067) responsible for

preparing and certifying the EIR (id., § 21100, subd. (a)) because they possess

“full power and responsibility in the construction and development of any state

university campus” (Ed. Code, § 66606) and thus final authority to approve or

disapprove the Master Plan.


3

The term “CEQA Guidelines” refers to the regulations codified in title 14,

section 15000 et seq. of the California Code of Regulations, which have been
“prescribed by the Secretary of Resources to be followed by all state and local
agencies in California in the implementation of [CEQA].” (CEQA Guidelines,
§ 15000.)

6

In their EIR for CSUMB, the Trustees have determined that expanding

CSUMB to accommodate 25,000 students will have many significant effects on

the physical environment of Fort Ord. CEQA requires “[e]ach public agency [to]

mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects that it

carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so” (Pub. Resources Code,

§ 21002.1, subd. (b)) and to discuss feasible methods of mitigation in the EIR (id.,

§ 21100, subd. (b)(3); CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1); see also Pub.

Res. Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a) [one purpose of the EIR is “to indicate the manner

in which . . . significant effects can be mitigated or avoided”].) In fact, the

Trustees’ EIR does identify and adopt specific measures that the Trustees have

found will mitigate most of the environmental effects of campus expansion to a

level that is less than significant. Full mitigation of five remaining effects,

however, will require action not just by the Trustees on the CSUMB campus but

also by FORA on a basewide or regional basis. These remaining effects have

become the subject of this litigation.

The Trustees’ EIR describes the five remaining environmental effects, for

which the Trustees have not provided full mitigation, as follows: (1) Drainage:

“Construction of new buildings and facilities will increase impervious surfaces

and runoff, and could result in localized drainage problems and/or flows exceeding

storm drain capacities, if storm drainage facilities are not adequately sized and

maintained.” (2) Water supply: “CSUMB water demand will contribute

incremental demands on existing deficient facilities and/or non-existent facilities.”

(3) Traffic: “Campus-related traffic will result in a decrease in level of service

7

from D to E[4] at the [Light Fighter] Drive/North-South Road intersection[5]

during the PM peak period in the year 2005, from D to E along Del Monte Blvd.

between Reindollar [Avenue] and Reservation Road[6] in the years 2005 and

2015, and will contribute to Highway 1 impacts in the years 2015 and 2030.”

(4) Wastewater management: “Campus growth will result in increased wastewater

generation that can be accommodated by the existing wastewater treatment

system, but will contribute flows to currently deficient sewer lines.” (5) Fire

protection: “Campus population and facility growth will result in increased

demand for fire protection services.”

Before a public agency, such as the Trustees, may approve a project for

which the EIR has identified significant effects on the environment, such as the

Master Plan for CSUMB, the agency must make one or more of the findings

required by section 21081 of the Public Resources Code. The required findings

constitute the principal means chosen by the Legislature to enforce the state’s

declared policy “that public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if

there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which

would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects


4

A decrease in the level of service from D to E means, in the context of the

EIR, that a road’s capacity to handle the existing traffic is no longer minimally
acceptable for an urban road.
5

The Light Fighter Drive/North-South Road intersection is located, as the

EIR explains, near [t]he main regional entrance” to the CSUMB campus. This
entrance has “the most convenient freeway access from State Highway 1 via Light
Fighter Drive interchange and is signed as the campus main entrance. Most trips
from the Monterey Peninsula, Santa Cruz County, and the San Francisco Bay Area
use this entrance. North-South Road is also an important local link to Seaside.”
6

This half-mile stretch of Del Monte Boulevard lies within the City of

Marina and connects State Highway 1 with Reservation Road, which leads to the
CSUMB campus.

8

. . . .” (Id., § 21002; see also id., § 21002.1, subd. (a).) More specifically, the

agency must find that the project’s significant environmental effects have been

mitigated or avoided (id., § 21081, subd. (a)(1)), that the measures necessary for

mitigation “are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency

and have been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency” (id., subd.

(a)(2)), and/or that “specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other

considerations” render mitigation “infeasible” (id., subd. (a)(3)). When the agency

finds that mitigation is infeasible, the agency must also find “that specific

overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project

outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” (Id., subd. (b).)7


7

This important section of CEQA (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081) provides

in full:


“Pursuant to the policy stated in Sections 21002 and 21002.1, no public

agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an environmental impact
report has been certified which identifies one or more significant effects on the
environment that would occur if the project is approved or carried out unless both
of the following occur:


“(a) The public agency makes one or more of the following findings with

respect to each significant effect:


“(1) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated into, the

project which mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment.


“(2) Those changes or alterations are within the responsibility and

jurisdiction of another public agency and have been, or can and should be, adopted
by that other agency.


“(3) Specific economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations,

including considerations for the provision of employment opportunities for highly
trained workers, make infeasible the mitigation measures or alternatives identified
in the environmental impact report.


“(b) With respect to significant effects which were subject to a finding

under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the public agency finds that specific
overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the project
outweigh the significant effects on the environment.”

9

In their EIR, the Trustees have identified and adopted a variety of measures

they have found will partially mitigate the five remaining environmental effects

noted above. Full mitigation of these effects to the level of insignificance will,

however, as the EIR specifically notes, require FORA to improve Fort Ord’s

infrastructure. In fact, FORA’s own planning documents take the Trustees’ plans

for CSUMB into account and propose specific infrastructure improvements that

will fully mitigate the expanding campus’s remaining effects on water supply,

drainage, wastewater management, traffic, and fire protection. Concerning each of

these effects, the Trustees have declared in their formal findings certifying the EIR

and approving the Master Plan (see Pub. Resources Code, § 21081) that the

implementation of FORA’s proposed improvements constitutes the “specific

measure to mitigate [each of CSUMB’s corresponding environmental impacts] to

the level of insignificance . . . .”

As part of its long-term planning process, FORA adopted the assumption that

that CSUMB would pay, as its share of the cost of infrastructure improvements, 18

annual installments of $1.139 million each, beginning in fiscal year 1997/1998 and

ending in fiscal year 2015/2016, for a total contribution over time of approxi-

mately $20.5 million. At the present time, however, FORA has not imposed any

tax, fee or charge on CSUMB or proposed to do so. Instead, FORA hopes to reach

agreement with the Trustees on their fair share of the cost of infrastructure

improvements. The Trustees, however, have refused to contribute any amount to

FORA for improvements in roads and fire protection, even while finding that

FORA’s proposed improvements constitute the specific measures necessary to

mitigate CSUMB’s effects in these areas. Accordingly, the Trustees cannot

logically find and, indeed, have not found that CSUMB’s effects have been fully

mitigated. Instead, to justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan

despite the remaining, unmitigated effects, the Trustees rely on the following three

10

alternative findings: (1) improvements to roads and fire protection are the

responsibility of FORA rather than of the Trustees; (2) mitigation is infeasible

because the Trustees may not legally contribute funds toward these improvements;

and (3) the planned expansion of CSUMB offers overriding benefits that outweigh

any remaining unmitigated effects on the environment.8 (See Pub. Resources

Code, § 21081, subds. (a)(2), (3) & (b).)

While the Trustees have refused to contribute any amount for improvements

in roads and fire protection, they are willing to contribute for improvements in

water supply, drainage and wastewater management, albeit not in the amount

FORA has proposed. Instead, the Trustees propose to contribute through the

procedure set out in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (section 54999 et seq.).

Chapter 13.7 authorizes a public utility that is providing a public utility service to

a public educational agency to impose a capital facilities fee on the latter “after

agreement has been reached between the two agencies through negotiations

entered into by both parties.” (Gov. Code, § 54999.3, subd. (b).) The resulting

dispute over the amount of the Trustees’ contribution creates uncertainty about the

extent to which CSUMB’s off-campus environmental effects will be mitigated.


8

Here, in their own words, is the Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects

on traffic: “The Board of Trustees finds that the specific measure to mitigate this
impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA
transportation improvements, as identified in the FORA Reuse Plan and
accompanying documents. Implementation of the planned regional improvements
are [sic] within the responsibility of FORA (not the university). FORA can and
should implement these measures. Because implementation of the regional
mitigation is currently disputed among the responsible agencies, mitigation of the
impact to a less than significant level cannot be assured by CSU. It is hereby
determined that any remaining unavoidable impacts are acceptable for the reasons
specified in the Statement of Overriding Considerations . . . .”


The Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects on fire protection is similar.

11

Accordingly, to justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan for

CSUMB, the Trustees have made alternative findings of the same type used to

address CSUMB’s effects on roads and fire protection. Specifically, the Trustees

have found that (1) the basewide infrastructure improvements proposed by FORA

constitute the specific measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s effects to the

level of insignificance, (2) the mitigation of CSUMB’s effects on drainage, water

supply, and wastewater management are FORA’s responsibility, and

(3) overriding circumstances justify certifying the EIR and approving the Master

Plan despite any remaining unmitigated effects.9

In an appendix to the EIR addressing public comments, the Trustees explain

why they have refused to contribute toward improvements in roads and fire

protection, and why they have agreed to contribute toward improvements in

drainage, water supply and wastewater management only through the procedure

established in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.), even though

these decisions will leave some environmental effects unmitigated. Whether the

Trustees, in view of the unmitigated effects, properly exercised their discretion to

9

Here, in their own words, is the Trustees’ finding about CSUMB’s effects

on drainage: “The Board of Trustees finds that the specific measure to mitigate
this impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA
drainage improvements, including ocean discharge improvements, and potential
offsite percolation areas as identified in the FORA Reuse Plan and accompanying
documents. CSUMB will contribute fees as mandated by applicable provisions of
Government Code Section 54999 to mitigate its share of the impact. Implementa-
tion of the planned regional improvements is FORA’s responsibility. It can and
should implement these measures. They are, in fact, included in FORA’s Reuse
Plan. Drainage is presently adequate for university operations. As noted, there are
current disputes regarding implementation of these measures; any remaining
unavoidable impacts are acceptable as a worst case because of the reasons
specified in the Statement of Overriding Considerations.”


The Trustees’ findings about water supply and wastewater management are

similar.

12

certify the EIR and to approve the Master Plan for CSUMB depends in large part

on whether they have correctly understood the nature and scope of their obligation

to contribute to FORA. We thus briefly summarize the relevant portion of the

appendix, which effectively defined the issues in the lower courts and anticipated

the Trustees’ arguments in the present proceeding.

CSUMB’s land, the Trustees observe in the appendix to the EIR, is exempt

from taxation as “[p]roperty owned by the State” under article XIII, section 3,

subdivision (a) of the California Constitution. This constitutional provision has

been interpreted as implicitly immunizing state-owned property from special

assessments imposed by local governments, except as authorized by the

Legislature. (San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified School Dist. (1986)

42 Cal.3d 154, 160-161 (San Marcos).) In reaction to San Marcos, the Legislature

passed a law (chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, beginning with section

54999) authorizing any public agency that provides public utility services to a

public educational agency to impose a “[c]apital facilities fee” on the latter “after

agreement has been reached between the two agencies through negotiations

entered into by both parties.” (Gov. Code, § 54999.3, subd. (b).) This law, which

addresses only fees intended to “pay the capital cost of a public utility facility”

(id., § 54999.1, subd. (b)), defines “ ‘[p]ublic utility facility’ ” for these purposes

as “a facility for the provision of water, light, heat, communications, power, or

garbage service, for flood control, drainage or sanitary purposes, or for sewage

collection, treatment, or disposal” (id., subd. (d)). The FORA Act, in turn,

provides that “[t]he applicability of any capital facilities fees imposed under this

title [i.e., the FORA Act] to public educational agencies shall be subject to the

provisions of Chapter 13.7 [of the Government Code] (commencing with section

54999) . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 67685.)

13

Based on these authorities, the Trustees conclude in the appendix that the

Legislature has in effect authorized FORA to impose fees on CSUMB for the

purposes mentioned in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (e.g., water, drainage

and sewage; see id., § 54999.1, subd. (d)) but not for any other purposes not

mentioned (e.g., roads and fire protection). Any payment to FORA for a purpose

not mentioned in the section, the Trustees conclude, even a voluntary payment

made in order to mitigate CSUMB’s environmental effects, would amount to an

assessment prohibited by the state Constitution, as interpreted in San Marcos,

supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, and constitute a gift of public funds. Having thus concluded

that any contribution by CSUMB to mitigate the campus’s effects on roads and

fire protection would be unlawful, the Trustees further conclude that to mitigate

these effects is “infeasible,” presumably for “legal” reasons (see Pub. Resources

Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(3)), and thus not required by CEQA because, in the

Trustees’ view, overriding considerations justify proceeding with the project

despite the unmitigated effects (see id., § 21081, subd. (b)).

A lengthy statement of overriding considerations accompanies the Trustees’

findings certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan for CSUMB. In the

statement, the Trustees reiterate the requirements of CEQA, the content of the

EIR, the principal features of the Master Plan for CSUMB, and favorable public

comments on the EIR. The following excerpts summarize some of the

considerations underlying the Trustees’ conclusion that campus expansion will

offer benefits that outweigh any remaining unmitigated effects on the

environment: “The CSU has identified the need for a university in the Monterey

Bay area that addresses the projected demand for postsecondary education in the

state of California by accommodating 25,000 [FTE students] at buildout. CSU

recognizes official projections of future increases in the number of students to be

served . . . which cannot be accommodated within [the] existing system capacity

14

of the CSU. The reuse of Fort Ord for this purpose is particularly advantageous to

the CSU because of the difficulty in acquiring campus-size parcels, the value of

existing development on the site, and the attractive location of the site in the

Monterey area. The master plan has been designed to provide an institution that

will effectively serve the mission of the CSU system.” In addition, development

of the campus will offer higher education to “historically underrepresented

populations and cultures of the state of California,” “foster economic revitalization

of a region impacted by closure of the largest residential military training facility

in the nation” and “create job opportunities for approximately 2,760 faculty and

staff as well as significant additional employment in university support activities.”

On May 13, 1998, the Trustees adopted resolutions approving the statement

of overriding considerations, certifying the EIR, and approving the Master Plan for

CSUMB. Thereafter, FORA and the City of Marina filed separate petitions for

writ of mandate challenging the Trustees’ actions. The petitions alleged, among

other things, that the Trustees had (1) failed to identify and adopt existing, feasible

measures to mitigate significant effects on the environment described in the EIR,

(2) improperly certified the EIR and approved the Master Plan despite the

availability of feasible mitigation measures, (3) improperly disclaimed

responsibility for mitigating CSUMB’s environmental effects, and (4) improperly

relied on a statement of overriding considerations to justify certifying the EIR and

approving the Master Plan.

The superior court granted the petitions, issued its writ of mandate directing

the Trustees to vacate their actions certifying the EIR and approving the Master

15

Plan, and to set aside the EIR’s statement of overriding considerations. A divided

Court of Appeal reversed. We granted FORA’s petition for review.10

II. DISCUSSION

The question before us is whether the Trustees have properly certified the

EIR for CSUMB and, on that basis, approved the Master Plan. FORA contends

the Trustees’ decision must be vacated because three findings critical to their

decision depend on an erroneous legal assumption, namely, that the California

Constitution precludes them from contributing to FORA, even for the purpose of

mitigating the environmental effects identified in the EIR, except as expressly

permitted by chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.). The first

two challenged findings are (1) that the Trustees cannot feasibly mitigate

CSUMB’s significant environmental effects and (2) that to mitigate CSUMB’s

effects is not the Trustees’ responsibility. These two findings have, in turn,

necessitated the third, which is (3) that overriding considerations justify certifying

the EIR and approving the Master Plan despite the remaining unmitigated effects.

(See generally Pub. Resources Code, § 21081.) We conclude FORA is correct and

that the Trustees have abused their discretion.

We review the Trustees’ decision, as CEQA directs, under the abuse of

discretion standard. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5.) For these purposes,


10

The Court of Appeal left undisturbed the superior court’s additional

conclusion that the Trustees had improperly failed to determine whether certain
commercial developments contemplated in the Master Plan for CSUMB, including
a retail mall, were consistent with FORA’s Reuse Plan. CSUMB is exempt from
land use regulation by FORA (including regulation under the Reuse Plan) only
with respect to property “that is used for educational or research purposes.” (Gov.
Code, § 67678, subd. (f).) Profits from the developments in question are expected
to generate as much as 30 percent of CSUMB’s budget.


16

“[a]buse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner

required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial

evidence.” (Ibid.) Although this standard would command much deference to

factual and environmental conclusions in the EIR based on conflicting evidence

(e.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California,

supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 393, 409), no such conclusions are here at issue. At issue,

rather, are the Trustees’ findings that mitigation is infeasible and that mitigation is

not their responsibility. These findings depend on a disputed question of law—a

type of question we review de novo. De novo review of legal questions is

consistent with the abuse of discretion standard. In the context of review for abuse

of discretion, an agency’s “use of an erroneous legal standard constitutes a failure

to proceed in a manner required by law.” (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles

(1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 88; see also Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey

County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 [“questions of

interpretation or application of the requirements of CEQA are matters of law”].)

De novo review of legal questions is also consistent with the principle that, in

CEQA cases, “ ‘[t]he court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s

environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an `informative

document.’ ” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of

California, supra, at p. 392, quoting County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977)

71 Cal.App.3d 185, 189.) An EIR that incorrectly disclaims the power and duty to

mitigate identified environmental effects based on erroneous legal assumptions is

not sufficient as an informative document.

17

A. Is Mitigation Infeasible?

1. Is mitigation infeasible because the Trustees may not lawfully

contribute to FORA?

We consider first the Trustees’ finding that they cannot feasibly mitigate the

environmental effects of their plan to expand the CSUMB campus. CEQA defines

“ ‘[f]easible’ ” for these purposes as “capable of being accomplished in a

successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account

economic, environmental, social, and technological factors.” (Pub. Resources

Code, § 21061.1.) To this list, the CEQA Guidelines add “legal” factors. (CEQA

Guidelines, § 15364; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (a)(3).) The

Trustees, by arguing the state Constitution prohibits them from voluntarily

contributing funds to FORA as a form of mitigation, in effect take the position that

such contributions are legally infeasible. We discuss here only the permissibility

of voluntary payments by the Trustees. Some of the public financing laws that

FORA has the power to invoke (see Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d)) would, as the

Trustees acknowledge, permit FORA to assess state-owned property such as the

CSUMB campus. FORA has not, however, attempted to impose an assessment.

The plain language of the California Constitution does not support the

Trustees’ position that voluntary mitigation payments are impermissible. The

provision on which the Trustees rely, article XIII, section 3, subdivision (a),

provides simply that “[p]roperty owned by the State” is “exempt from property

taxation . . . .” FORA has not imposed a tax on the Trustees. We have, however,

interpreted the same constitutional provision as implicitly exempting publicly

owned property from special assessments made without legislative authority.

(Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles (1929) 207 Cal. 697, 703-704; see also

Regents of University of California v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d

547, 549; County of Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist. (1978) 84

18

Cal.App.3d 655, 659-660; cf. Regents of University of California v. City of Los

Angeles (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 451, 454, fn. 2 [questioning whether the

exemption is grounded in policy considerations rather than the Constitution].)11

We reaffirmed this conclusion in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, 160-161, the

case on which the Trustees principally rely. The Trustees, as noted, argue based

on San Marcos that any payment by themselves to FORA for the purpose of

improving Fort Ord’s infrastructure would constitute a special assessment

prohibited in the absence of legislative authority. The Trustees find in chapter

13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) legislative authority for payments

related to subjects mentioned therein, such as water, drainage and sewage

collection (id., § 54999.1, subd. (d)), but not for any purpose not mentioned, such

as roads and fire protection.

The Trustees have misinterpreted San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154. The

decision addresses only compulsory charges imposed by one public entity on

another. The case has nothing to say about a discretionary payment made by a

public agency that voluntarily chooses that method of discharging its duty under

CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of its project. Because the Trustees’

interpretation of San Marcos critically underlies their position in this case, we

examine the decision and its consequences in detail.

At issue in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, was the validity of a

“capacity fee” (id., at p. 157) imposed by a public water district on a public school


11

But see California Constitution, article XIII D, section 4: “Parcels within a

district that are owned or used by any agency, the State of California or the United
States shall not be exempt from assessment unless the agency can demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that those publicly owned parcels in fact receive no
special benefit.” (Added by initiative measure Prop. 218, § 4, approved by the
electorate Nov. 5, 1996.)

19

district. The specific question was whether the capacity fee was a user fee, which

the school district conceded it would have to pay, or a special assessment, from

which the school district was exempt under the cases cited above. The court held

the school district was exempt. The purpose of the fee was not to pay for water

service but to provide a source of funds for capital improvements to the water

system. (Id., at p. 159.) The capacity fee thus fit the definition of a special

assessment as “ ‘a compulsory charge placed by [the government] upon real

property within a pre-determined district, made under express legislative authority

for defraying in whole or in part the expense of a permanent public improvement

therein . . . .’ ” (San Marcos, at p. 161, quoting Spring Street Co. v. City of Los

Angeles (1915) 170 Cal. 24, 29.) In applying this definition, the court “look[ed] to

the purpose of the fee being charged, and not simply to the form of the fee, a

matter which can be easily manipulated.” (San Marcos, at p. 163.) Accordingly,

the court attributed no significance to the fact the water district had calculated the

charge by reference to the volume of water the school district anticipated using—a

characteristic typical of user fees. While the assessment’s form thus caused it to

resemble a user fee in some respects, the water district was not permitted “ ‘to do

indirectly that which it could not do directly.’ ” (Ibid., quoting County of

Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist., supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 655, 659-660.)

In summary, the court in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, announced two

holdings: the court reiterated the existing rule that publicly owned property was

exempt from special assessment absent “ ‘positive legislative authority therefor’ ”

(id., at p. 161, quoting Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 207 Cal. 697,

704), and the court determined that the particular charge at issue was an

assessment rather than a user fee (San Marcos, at pp. 163-165). The court found

analogous support for its conclusions in prior decisions identifying “[t]he rationale

behind a public entity’s exemption from property taxes and special assessments

20

[as being] to prevent one tax-supported entity from siphoning tax money from

another such entity; the end result of such a process [possibly being] unnecessary

administrative costs and no actual gain in tax revenues.” (San Marcos, at p. 161,

citing Eisley v. Mohan (1948) 31 Cal.2d 637, 642.) The court also acknowledged,

perhaps bluntly, one of the more significant consequences of its holding: “Our

conclusion does not mean,” the court wrote, “that the water district cannot collect

money for capital improvements from its customers; it simply means that the

private customers will pay the entire cost of capital improvements. Public entities,

such as the school district, will not be required to allocate their limited tax

revenues to pay for capital improvements built by the sewer district.” (San

Marcos, at p. 158.)

The Legislature promptly reacted to the decision in San Marcos, supra, 42

Cal.3d 154, by authorizing public utilities to charge public-entity customers their

fair share of the utilities’ capital costs and by ratifying fees previously imposed for

that purpose. Under chapter 13.7 of the Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.),

enacted in response to San Marcos, “[a]ny public agency providing public utility

service” may impose on any public agency a “capital facilities fee” (id.,

§ 54999.2), meaning “any nondiscriminatory charge to pay the capital cost of a

public utility facility” (id., § 54999.1, subd. (b)). A “ ‘[p]ublic utility facility’ ”

for these purposes is “a facility for the provision of water, light, heat, communica-

tions, power, or garbage service, for flood control, drainage or sanitary purposes,

or for sewage collection, treatment, or disposal.” (Id., § 54999.1, subd. (d).)

Motivating these changes to the law was the Legislature’s perception that public

utilities and their public-entity customers, on the whole, had not shared the court’s

understanding of the law. “[M]any public entities that provide public utility

service,” the Legislature explained, “have imposed capital facilities fees applicable

to users of public utility facilities in order to equitably apportion the cost of capital

21

facilities construction or expansion required by all public and private users of the

facilities.” As a result of San Marcos, however, “the fiscal stability and service

capabilities of the affected public utility service agencies which have in good faith

collected and spent these fees for capital improvements are seriously impaired as

is the ability to finance essential future facilities.” (Gov. Code, § 54999,

subd. (a).)

Against this background, we may easily reject the Trustees’ argument that

they may not lawfully contribute to FORA as a way of discharging their obligation

under CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of their project to expand

CSUMB. The Trustees’ three-part argument may be summarized as follows:

(1) Any payment by the Trustees to FORA for the purpose of capital improvement

in Fort Ord is an assessment, regardless of form; (2) public agencies are exempt

from assessment except as permitted by the Legislature; and (3) the Legislature

has permitted assessments only for the purposes set out in chapter 13.7 of the

Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.).

The Trustees err crucially at the outset. An assessment connotes, at the

very least, a compulsory charge imposed by the government on real property.

(Knox v. City of Orland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 132, 141; see also Southern Cal. Rapid

Transit Dist. v. Bolen (1992) 1 Cal.4th 654, 660; San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d

154, 161; Spring Street Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 170 Cal. 24, 29.) FORA

has imposed no charge on the Trustees, let alone a compulsory one. As part of its

planning process, FORA has made a provisional effort to estimate the Trustees’

fair share of the cost of infrastructure improvements, but FORA has taken no steps

to create an enforceable legal obligation to pay. Indeed, FORA disclaims any

intention to impose a charge on the Trustees and looks instead exclusively to a

negotiated payment. This case is not a collection action or an action to validate an

assessment. Instead, FORA claims the Trustees have abused their discretion under

22

CEQA by certifying an EIR that improperly fails to identify voluntary

contributions to FORA as a feasible method of mitigating the environmental

effects of their project to expand CSUMB.

In other words, the question of payment arises not because FORA has

imposed a charge (it has not), but because CEQA requires the Trustees to avoid or

mitigate, if feasible, the significant environmental effects of their project (Pub.

Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b)) and because payments to FORA may

represent a feasible form of mitigation. To illustrate the point, if campus

expansion requires that roads or sewers be improved, the Trustees may do the

work themselves on campus, but they have no authority to build roads or sewers

off campus on land that belongs to others. Yet the Trustees are not thereby

excused from the duty to mitigate or avoid CSUMB’s off-campus effects on traffic

or wastewater management, because CEQA requires a public agency to mitigate or

avoid its projects’ significant effects not just on the agency’s own property but “on

the environment” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b), italics added), with

“environment” defined for these purposes as “the physical conditions which exist

within the area which will be affected by a proposed project” (id., § 21060.5,

italics added). Thus, if the Trustees cannot adequately mitigate or avoid

CSUMB’s off-campus environmental effects by performing acts on campus (as by

reducing sufficiently the use of automobiles or the volume of sewage), then to pay

a third party such as FORA to perform the necessary acts off campus may well

represent a feasible alternative. A payment made under these circumstances can

properly be described neither as compulsory nor, for that reason, as an assessment.

Arguing to the contrary, the Trustees emphasize the court’s statement in

San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, 163, that courts will identify an assessment by

“look[ing] to the purpose of the fee being charged, and not simply to the form of

the fee, a matter which can be easily manipulated.” Based on this statement, the

23

Trustees argue that a voluntary payment made to fund projects that might also be

funded by an assessment, such as infrastructure projects, must be considered an

assessment for all purposes. The San Marcos court announced no such

conclusion. Instead, the court made the quoted statement in the context of

determining whether an admittedly compulsory charge was a user fee or an

assessment. Nothing in San Marcos speaks to voluntary payments or purports to

address or narrow any public agency’s duties under CEQA.

The Trustees also seek to draw support from the court’s statement in San

Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, of the reason traditionally thought to underlie the

rule exempting public property from taxation, i.e., that the exemption “prevent[s]

one tax-supported entity from siphoning tax money from another such entity; the

end result of such a process [possibly being] unnecessary administrative costs and

no actual gain in tax revenues.” (Id., at p. 161.) Inviting an analogy, the Trustees

point out that any payment by CSU to FORA for infrastructure improvements will

reduce the amount of money available to CSU for its core educational functions.

The Trustees read too much into San Marcos. While there does exist a general

rule to the effect that “[p]roperty owned by the State” is exempt from taxation

(Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 3, subd. (a)), no rule precludes a public entity from

sharing with another the cost of improvements benefiting both. Furthermore,

while education may be CSU’s core function, to avoid or mitigate the

environmental effects of its projects is also one of CSU’s functions. This is the

plain import of CEQA, in which the Legislature has commanded that “[e]ach

public agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of

projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so.” (Pub.

Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (b), italics added; see also id., § 21002

[declaring the same obligation to be “the policy of the state”].) Nothing in San

24

Marcos can fairly be read as addressing, much less narrowing, a public agency’s

obligations under CEQA.

The Trustees, as noted, are willing to contribute to FORA for the limited

purpose of mitigating CSUMB’s effects on drainage, water supply, and

wastewater management under the terms of chapter 13.7 of the Government Code

(§ 54999 et seq.). Chapter 13.7, as already explained, contains the law the

Legislature passed in the wake of San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, authorizing

public utilities to charge public-entity customers their fair share of the utilities’

capital costs. Under the law, “any public agency proposing to initially impose a

capital facilities fee . . . may do so after agreement has been reached between the

two agencies through negotiations entered into by both parties.” (Gov. Code,

§ 54999.3, subd. (b).) In such a case, “[t]he public agency imposing . . . the

capital facilities fee has the burden of producing evidence to establish that the

capital facilities fee is nondiscriminatory and that the amount of the capital

facilities fee does not exceed the amount necessary to provide capital facilities for

which the fee is charged.” (Id., subd. (c).) The FORA Act expressly invokes this

negotiative process by specifying that “[t]he applicability of any capital facilities

fees imposed under this title [i.e., the FORA Act] to public educational agencies

shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13.7 . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 67685.)

Because FORA has not imposed or sought to impose a capital facilities fee

on the Trustees, chapter 13.7 does not literally apply. That having been said, we

see no reason why an agreement between the Trustees and FORA regarding a

voluntary payment negotiated according to the procedure set out in chapter 13.7

for the purpose of mitigating specified environmental effects (i.e., water supply,

drainage and wastewater management) would not satisfy the Trustees’ CEQA

obligations as to those effects. While the amount determined by negotiation may

not equal the amount FORA originally projected, for its own planning purposes,

25

that the Trustees would pay, nothing in chapter 13.7 of the Government Code,

CEQA or the FORA Act permits FORA unilaterally to determine the amount of

any voluntary contribution the Trustees may choose to make as a way of satisfying

their obligation under CEQA to mitigate the environmental effects of their project.

To the contrary, the Trustees as the lead agency under CEQA have the power and

duty to assess the adequacy of mitigation measures, subject only to judicial review

for abuse of discretion. (See Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of

University of California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 393.) Furthermore, nothing in

chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, CEQA or the FORA Act obliges the

Trustees to pay more than is necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s effects. Certainly

the Trustees need not pay to mitigate effects caused by other users of the base. To

the contrary, CEQA requires that mitigation measures “be ‘roughly proportional’

to the impacts of the project.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(4)(B),

citing Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374; cf. id., at p. 391.)12

Finally on this point, the Trustees argue that chapter 13.7 of the

Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) and the FORA Act (id., § 67650 et seq.),

which specifically authorize FORA to impose on the Trustees a negotiated fee for

certain purposes (e.g., water supply, drainage and wastewater management),

suggest the Legislature must have contemplated the Trustees would have no

obligation to contribute to FORA for other purposes (e.g., the cost of improving

roads and fire protection). We discern in the cited provisions, however, no

evidence of a legislative intent to bar the Trustees from voluntarily contributing, as


12

Similarly, chapter 13.7 of the Government Code, although not here literally

applicable, requires that payments by a public agency to a public utility for capital
facilities be “nondiscriminatory” and that they “not exceed the amount necessary
to provide capital facilities for which the fee is charged.” (Gov. Code, § 54999.3,
subd. (c).)

26

a way of meeting their CEQA obligations, their fair share of the cost of

improvements to roads and fire protection necessitated by CSUMB’s expansion.

On this point the FORA Act, as noted, provides simply that “[t]he applicability of

any capital facilities fee imposed under this title to public educational agencies

shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 13.7 [of the same code].” (Gov.

Code, § 67685, italics added.) Chapter 13.7, in turn, speaks only of fees

impose[d]” (id., § 54999.3, subd. (b), italics added) by public utilities. Because

FORA has imposed no fee on the Trustees, neither Government Code section

67685 nor chapter 13.7 has any literal application to the present case. Moreover,

neither law purports to limit the Trustees’ independent obligation under CEQA to

protect the physical environment from the effects of their project to expand the

CSUMB campus.

2. Is mitigation infeasible because a contribution by the Trustees to

FORA would amount to a prohibited gift of public funds?

The Trustees next argue that any payment to FORA made otherwise than

under Government Code chapter 13.7 (§ 54999 et seq.) would constitute an illegal

gift of public funds. (See Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.) 13 The argument invokes the

court’s statement in San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, that the ability of the

school district in that case to “agree to pay [the disputed capacity] charge

depend[ed] upon whether the [water] district ha[d] the power to impose it,” and

that payment of an invalid charge “would amount to a ‘gift of public funds’ in


13

“[N]or shall [the Legislature] have power to make any gift or authorize the

making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual,
municipal or other corporation whatever . . . .” (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6.) We
have long assumed that this constitutional prohibition, applicable by its terms only
to the Legislature, also applies to public agencies. (E.g., Santa Barbara etc.
Agency v. All Persons
(1957) 47 Cal.2d 699, 707.)

27

contravention of article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.” (San

Marcos, at p. 167, quoting County of Riverside v. Idyllwild County Water Dist.,

supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 655, 660.) We have, however, already rejected the central

premise of this argument, which is that a voluntary payment by the Trustees would

constitute an assessment.

In any event, the relevant law makes clear that a payment by the Trustees for

the purpose of mitigating CSUMB’s environmental effects would not constitute an

unlawful gift of public funds. “It is well settled that, in determining whether an

appropriation of public funds or property is to be considered a gift, the primary

question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ purpose.

If they are for a ‘public purpose’, they are not a gift within the meaning of [the

Constitution].” (County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281.) Such

a payment by the Trustees would have the public purpose of discharging their duty

as a public agency, under the express terms of CEQA, to “mitigate or avoid the

significant effects on the environment of projects that [they] carr[y] out or

approve[] whenever it is feasible to do so.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1,

subd. (b).)

3. Is mitigation infeasible because the Trustees cannot guarantee that

FORA will actually implement the proposed infrastructure
improvements?


As a final reason why they cannot feasibly mitigate CSUMB’s environmental

effects by voluntarily contributing to FORA, the Trustees argue they cannot

guarantee that FORA will actually implement the infrastructure improvements

proposed in the Reuse Plan. The argument is not persuasive.

In certifying the EIR and approving CSUMB’s Master Plan, the Trustees

specifically found that the infrastructure improvements proposed by FORA

constitute the “specific measure[s]” necessary to mitigate each of CSUMB’s

28

corresponding environmental impacts to the level of insignificance. The Trustees

did not find that mitigation of these impacts was feasible, however, in part because

of asserted doubts about FORA’s ability to fund and implement the proposed

improvements. CEQA, as noted, defines a “ ‘[f]easible’ ” mitigation measure as

one that is “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a

reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social,

and technological factors.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.1; see also CEQA

Guidelines, § 15364.) Invoking this definition, the Trustees found in the EIR as to

each remaining environmental impact that “implementation of the regional

mitigation . . . is currently disputed, [and that] mitigation of the impact to a less

than significant level cannot be assured by CSU.”

The Trustees explained their position in more detail in response to public

comments on their EIR: “Although all parties to the MOA[14] will agree that the

determined contributions by CSUMB are intended to mitigate the offsite impacts

contributed by development of the Master Plan, it is acknowledged that CSUMB’s

contribution represents only a portion of the funding needed to implement the

regional improvements. Similar payments will need to be made by other

jurisdictions contributing to regional impacts in order for the improvements to be

implemented. In addition, ultimate implementation of the improvement program

is under the responsibility of FORA, and cannot be controlled or assured by the

University. For these reasons, . . . the [EIR] determine[s] that the significant

impacts on drainage, water supply, traffic, wastewater generation, and fire


14

That is, a Memorandum of Agreement proposed by the Trustees to

implement their proposal to contribute funds pursuant to chapter 13.7 of the
Government Code (§ 54999 et seq.) for improvements in water supply, drainage
and wastewater management.

29

protection, identified as caused by the Master Plan, will remain significant and

unavoidable. These impacts will therefore require the adoption of a Statement of

Overriding Conditions by the [Trustees] in compliance with CEQA.”

The presently identified, unavoidable uncertainties affecting the funding and

implementation of the infrastructure improvements FORA has proposed in its

Reuse Plan do not render voluntary contributions to FORA by the Trustees

infeasible as a method of mitigating CSUMB’s effects. Both the CEQA

Guidelines and judicial decisions recognize that a project proponent may satisfy its

duty to mitigate its own portion of a cumulative environmental impact by

contributing to a regional mitigation fund. Under the Guidelines, “a project’s

contribution to a significant cumulative impact” may properly be considered “less

than cumulatively considerable and thus . . . not significant” “if the project is

required to implement or fund its fair share of a mitigation measure or measures

designed to alleviate the cumulative impact.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15130, subd.

(a)(3).) Similarly, courts have found fee-based mitigation programs for

cumulative impacts, based on fair-share infrastructure contributions by individual

projects, to constitute adequate mitigation measures under CEQA. (E.g.,

Anderson First Coalition v. City of Anderson (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1188;

Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87

Cal.App.4th 99, 140.) 15


15

The Trustees assert that courts have not permitted public entities, as

opposed to private entities, to mitigate their projects’ contributions to cumulative
impacts by paying into regional mitigation funds. The single decision on which
the Trustees rely, however, is not on point. The court in Goleta Union School
Dist. v. Regents of University of California
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1025, held that
the Regents of the University of California had no obligation to propose, in an EIR
addressing a project to expand the University of California at Santa Barbara,
methods for alleviating overcrowding in local public schools expected to result


(footnote continued on next page)

30

“Of course a commitment to pay fees without any evidence that mitigation

will actually occur is inadequate.” (Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey

County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 140; see also Kings County

Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal. App.3d 692, 727-728 [lacking

evidence water would be available for purchase, an agreement to purchase

replacement water did not adequately mitigate groundwater depletion].) There is,

however, no reason to doubt that FORA will meet its statutory obligation as the

government of Fort Ord to prepare the base for civilian development by

constructing whatever public capital facilities are necessary for that purpose. (See

Gov. Code, § 67679.) As noted, FORA plans to implement the improvements

over a period of several years, as increasing land use necessitates them and as

funding becomes available. To enable this task to be accomplished, the

Legislature has given FORA a broad array of fundraising powers, including the

power to levy assessments and development fees, to share tax revenue with its

local-government member agencies, and to sell and lease property. (See Gov.

Code, §§ 67678, subd. (a), 67679, subds. (c)-(e), 67691, 67692.) Furthermore, the

law specifically directs FORA to use its powers to ensure the success of its

statutory mission (e.g., Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (a)(1) [FORA must “undertake

to plan for and arrange the provision of [public capital] facilities, including



(footnote continued from previous page)

from the project. The basis for the court’s holding was that CEQA requires
consideration only of “physical change[s]” in the environment (Pub. Resources
Code, § 21065; cf. id., § 21060.5), and that the “[e]conomic or social effects of a
project shall not be treated as significant effects on the environment” (CEQA
Guidelines, § 15131, subd. (a)). (See Goleta Union School Dist. v. Regents of
University of California
, supra, at pp. 1030-1033.)


31

arranging for their financing and construction”]), and the courts ordinarily

presume that the government, in this instance FORA, will comply with the law

(e.g., City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 291, 297; Save

Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87

Cal.App.4th 99, 141).

By way of analogy, the court in Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey

Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, held that a county had adequately

ensured the mitigation of traffic congestion effects by “provid[ing] for

improvements to be constructed as the traffic triggering the need for the

improvements exceeded a projected threshold and the funds to pay for the

improvements were generated by the new development.” (Id., at p. 141.) CEQA,

the court explained, required not “a time-specific schedule for the County to

complete specified road improvements” (ibid.) but only “that there be a reasonable

plan for mitigation” (ibid.). FORA’s Reuse Plan satisfies that criterion. The

Trustees’ assumption that CEQA requires more is an error of law invalidating their

finding that voluntary mitigation payments to FORA do not represent a feasible

method of mitigating CSU’s off-campus environmental effects. (No Oil, Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d 68, 88 [an agency’s “use of an erroneous

legal standard constitutes a failure to proceed in a manner required by law”]; see

also Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors,

supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 118 [“questions of interpretation or application of the

requirements of CEQA are matters of law”].)

B. Is Mitigation Exclusively the Responsibility of FORA?

CEQA, as previously noted, does not require a public agency to undertake

identified mitigation measures, even if those measures are necessary to address the

project’s significant environmental effects, if the agency finds that the measures

32

“are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have

been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency.” (Pub. Resources Code,

§ 21081, subd. (a)(2).) The Trustees have made such a finding with respect to the

measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s projected effects on drainage, water

supply, wastewater management, traffic, and fire protection. As to each such

effect, the Trustees have found that “the specific measure to mitigate [each]

impact to a level of insignificance is to implement the planned regional FORA

. . . improvements,” and that “[i]mplementation of the planned regional

improvements is FORA’s responsibility.”

Certainly FORA has responsibility for implementing the infrastructure

improvements it has proposed. (See Gov. Code, § 67679.) Just as certainly,

however, the FORA Act contemplates that the costs of those improvements will be

borne by those who benefit from them. (See ibid.) A finding by a lead agency

under Public Resources Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), disclaiming the

responsibility to mitigate environmental effects is permissible only when the other

agency said to have responsibility has exclusive responsibility. As the CEQA

Guidelines explain, “[t]he finding in subsection (a)(2) shall not be made if the

agency making the finding has concurrent jurisdiction with another agency to deal

with identified feasible mitigation measures or alternatives.” (CEQA Guidelines,

§ 15091, subd. (c).) The Guidelines’ logical interpretation of CEQA on this point

“avoids the problem of agencies deferring to each other, with the result that no

agency deals with the problem. This result would be contrary to the strong policy

[requiring the mitigation or avoidance of significant environmental effects]

declared in Sections 21002 and 21002.1 of the statute.” (Discussion of Resources

Agency following CEQA Guidelines, § 15091; see also 1 Kostka, Practice Under

the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2005) § 17.19, pp. 821-823.)

33

The Trustees offer two arguments in support of their finding disclaiming

responsibility for the measures necessary to mitigate CSUMB’s off-campus

environmental effects. Neither withstands close scrutiny. The Trustees’ first

argument—that they may not lawfully contribute to FORA in view of San Marcos,

supra, 42 Cal.3d 154, and the constitutional exemption of state property from

taxation (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 3, subd. (a))—has already been considered and

rejected. The Trustees’ second argument—that they lack the power to construct

infrastructure improvements away from campus on land they do not own and

control—is beside the point. Certainly the Trustees may not enter the land of

others to widen roads and lay sewer pipe; CEQA gives the Trustees no such

power. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21004 [“[i]n mitigating or avoiding a

significant effect of a project on the environment, a public agency may exercise

only those express or implied powers provided by law other than this division.”].)

CEQA does not, however, as we have explained, limit a public agency’s

obligation to mitigate or avoid significant environmental effects to effects

occurring on the agency’s own property. (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21002.1,

subd. (b), 21060.5.) CEQA also provides that “[a]ll state agencies . . . shall

request in their budgets the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation

to problems caused by their activities.” (Id., § 21106.) Thus, as we have also

explained, if the Trustees cannot adequately mitigate or avoid CSUMB’s off-

campus environmental effects by performing acts on the campus, then to pay a

third party such as FORA to perform the necessary acts off campus may well

represent a feasible alternative.

To be clear, we do not hold that the duty of a public agency to mitigate or

avoid significant environmental effects (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd.

34

(b)), combined with the duty to ask the Legislature for money to do so (id.,

§ 21106),16 will always give a public agency that is undertaking a project with

environmental effects shared responsibility for mitigation measures another

agency must implement. Some mitigation measures cannot be purchased, such as

permits that another agency has the sole discretion to grant or refuse. Moreover, a

state agency’s power to mitigate its project’s effects through voluntary mitigation

payments is ultimately subject to legislative control; if the Legislature does not

appropriate the money, the power does not exist. For the same reason, however,

for the Trustees to disclaim responsibility for making such payments before they

have complied with their statutory obligation to ask the Legislature for the

necessary funds is premature, at the very least. The superior court found no

evidence the Trustees had asked the Legislature for the funds. In their brief to this

court, the Trustees acknowledge they did not budget for payments they assumed

would constitute invalid assessments under San Marcos, supra, 42 Cal.3d 154.

That assumption, as we have explained, is invalid.

C. Do Overriding Circumstances Justify Approving the Campus

Master Plan?

When a public agency has found that a project’s significant environmental

effects cannot feasibly be mitigated, the agency may nevertheless proceed with the

project if it also finds “that specific overriding economic, legal, social, technologi-

cal, or other benefits of the project outweigh the significant effects on the environ-

ment.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (b).) The Trustees, as noted, have

made such a finding with respect to each of the remaining, unmitigated environ-


16

“All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall request in their budgets

the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation to problems caused by
their activities.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21106.)

35

mental impacts on drainage, water supply, wastewater management, traffic and

fire protection.

If we agreed with the Trustees that mitigation were infeasible for the reasons

given in the findings, i.e., that the Trustees may not legally contribute to FORA

and that the Trustees cannot ensure that FORA will actually construct infrastruc-

ture improvements—we would give much deference to the Trustees’ weighing of

the project’s benefits against the remaining environmental effects. Generally

speaking, “a court’s proper role in reviewing a challenged EIR is not to determine

whether the EIR’s ultimate conclusions are correct but only whether they are

supported by substantial evidence and whether the EIR is sufficient as an

informational document.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of

University of California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 407.) Moreover, an agency’s

decision that the specific benefits a project offers outweigh any environmental

effects that cannot feasibly be mitigated, while subject to review for abuse of

discretion (Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5), lies at the core of the lead agency’s

discretionary responsibility under CEQA and is, for that reason, not lightly to be

overturned. (Cf. Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of

California, supra, 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 [court reviews the EIR’s sufficiency as an

informative document and not the correctness of its environmental conclusions].)

In this case, however, the Trustee’s statement of overriding considerations is

invalid for a reason that does not require us to reweigh benefits and detriments, or

to inquire into the statement’s factual basis. A statement of overriding considera-

tions is required, and offers a proper basis for approving a project despite the

existence of unmitigated environmental effects, only when the measures necessary

to mitigate or avoid those effects have properly been found to be infeasible. (Pub.

Resources Code, § 21081, subd. (b).) Given our conclusion the Trustees have

abused their discretion in determining that CSUMB’s remaining effects cannot

36

feasibly be mitigated, that the Trustees’ statement of overriding circumstances is

invalid necessarily follows. CEQA does not authorize an agency to proceed with a

project that will have significant, unmitigated effects on the environment, based

simply on a weighing of those effects against the project’s benefits, unless the

measures necessary to mitigate those effects are truly infeasible. Such a rule, even

were it not wholly inconsistent with the relevant statute (id., § 21081, subd. (b)),

would tend to displace the fundamental obligation of “[e]ach public agency [to]

mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of projects that it

carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do so” (id., § 21002.1, subd. (b)).

This conclusion does not, however, preclude the Trustees from including in a

revised EIR a statement of overriding considerations regarding environmental

effects as to which they have properly found mitigation to be infeasible for reasons

other than those we have rejected.

III. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion it follows that the Trustees must be directed to

vacate their actions certifying the EIR and approving the Master Plan and set aside

the EIR’s statement of overriding circumstances. The superior court’s writ of

mandate does order such relief. The writ is, however, incorrect in one respect. In

describing the principles that would apply should the Trustees decide to make

voluntary mitigation payments to FORA, the court wrote that “CSUMB’s

proportional share of the cumulative impacts on public capital facilities in the

region necessary to mitigate the significant adverse environmental impacts of the

CMP shall be determined by [FORA] . . . .” (Italics added.) To the contrary,

having chosen not to assess the campus but instead to rely on the Trustees to

comply with their CEQA obligation to mitigate or avoid the environmental effects

of their project, FORA has no power to dictate the manner in which the Trustees

exercise their discretion. Neither do the remedial provisions of CEQA “authorize

37

a court to direct any public agency to exercise its discretion in any particular way.”

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.9, subd. (c).) CEQA requires only that any

mitigation measures the Trustees adopt be adequate. If FORA wishes to compel

the Trustees to contribute a specific amount to infrastructure improvement

projects, FORA is free to proceed by exercising the powers specifically granted in

the FORA Act (e.g., Gov. Code, § 67679, subd. (d)), and in the public financing

statutes to which the act refers (ibid.), to impose a formal assessment on the

CSUMB campus, complying of course with the procedural requirements set out in

those statutes and in the California Constitution (e.g., art. XIII D, § 1 et seq.).

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to

that court with directions to order the superior court to vacate its writ of mandate

and to issue a new writ consistent with the views set forth in this opinion.

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.


38










CONCURRING OPINION BY CHIN, J.




I concur in the judgment and in most of the majority opinion’s reasoning. I

write separately to explain my reasons for agreeing that the Board of Trustees of

the California State University (Trustees) may not rely on Public Resources Code

section 21081, subdivision (a)(2),1 and to express concern about the majority’s

discussion of this issue.

Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.),

when a certified environmental impact report identifies significant environmental

effects of a proposed project, section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), permits a public

agency to approve or carry out the project if it finds that “changes or alterations”

in the project that would mitigate or avoid the identified environmental effects

“are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of another public agency and have

been, or can and should be, adopted by that other agency.” The Trustees, who

made such a finding here, argue that this provision applies because, under the Fort

Ord Reuse Authority Act (Gov. Code, § 67650 et seq.) (FORA Act), the Fort Ord

Reuse Authority (FORA) has “exclusive authority to plan and construct off-

campus local infrastructure improvements” and “the University lacks

jurisdiction . . . to build off-site improvements.”


1

All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.

1

In my view, the Trustees err by focusing on the wrong question: Whether

the Trustees, acting for the California State University (CSU), have any

responsibility and jurisdiction regarding actual construction of the necessary off-

campus infrastructure improvements. The particular mitigation measure at issue

here—i.e., the proposed “change[] or alteration[]” in the project to mitigate or

avoid the identified environmental effects (§ 21081, subd. (a)(2))—is not actual

construction of the improvements, but is payment to FORA to help fund the

improvements FORA intends to construct. Thus, the relevant question here in

applying section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), is not, as the Trustees argue, whether

they have jurisdiction actually “to build off-site improvements,” but is whether

they have any responsibility and jurisdiction to help fund FORA’s construction of

those improvements.

Based on provisions of the FORA Act and the Education Code, I conclude

that the Trustees have such responsibility and jurisdiction. Regarding the former,

the FORA Act declares the “financing . . . of the reuse of Fort Ord” to be “a matter

of statewide importance.” (Gov. Code, § 67657, subd. (c).) It provides that

FORA’s Fort Ord reuse plan “shall be the official local plan for the reuse of the

base for all public purposes, including . . . funding by all state agencies.” (Gov.

Code, § 67675, subd. (a), italics added.) It directs FORA to “arrang[e] for the[]

financing” of—not to finance itself —“basewide public capital facilities” such as

“roads.” (Id., § 67679, subd. (a)(1).) It also authorizes FORA to “seek state and

federal grants and loans or other assistance to help fund public facilities” (id., §

67679, subd. (c)), and to “enter into contracts and agreements as necessary to

mitigate impacts of the reuse of Fort Ord.” (Id., §67680.5.) These provisions

demonstrate the Legislature’s intent that funding of the necessary infrastructure

improvements not be solely FORA’s responsibility, and that funding be provided,

at least in part, by other public agencies.

2

Several provisions of the Education Code also are relevant to the Trustees’

responsibility and jurisdiction. The Education Code declares generally that “[t]he

mission of the public segments of higher education . . . include[s] a broad

responsibility to the public interest.” (Ed. Code, § 66010.5.) Of course, payments

to FORA to help mitigate significant environmental impacts of the expansion

project here at issue would serve the public interest. The Education Code also

declares “the intent of the Governor and the Legislature, in cooperation with the

Trustees,” to “[p]lace a major priority on resolving the serious problem of

impacted and overcrowded classes, not only with respect to the [CSU], but

throughout public postsecondary education.” (Id., § 66015, subd. (a).) Consistent

with this declared priority, the Education Code imposes on the CSU a duty “to

plan that adequate spaces are available to accommodate all California resident

students who are eligible and likely to apply to attend an appropriate place within

the system.” (Id., § 66202.5.) It also grants the Trustees “full power and

responsibility in the construction and development of any state university campus,

and any buildings or other facilities or improvements connected with the [CSU].”

(Id., § 66606.) Finally, it directs the Trustees to “expend all money appropriated

for the support and maintenance of the [CSU]” (id., § 89750), and authorizes them

to “enter into agreements with any public or private agency, officer, person, or

institution, corporation, association, or foundation for the performance of acts or

for the furnishing of services, facilities, materials, goods, supplies, or equipment

by or for the trustees or for the joint performance of an act or function or the joint

furnishing of services and facilities by the trustees and the other party to the

agreement.” (Id., § 89036, subd. (a).) Based on these provisions, I have no

trouble concluding that the Trustees have both responsibility and jurisdiction

within the meaning of Public Resources Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to

contribute to the cost of off-site infrastructure improvements needed to mitigate

3

significant environmental impacts of an expansion project designed, in part, to

address the statutorily declared “priority on resolving the serious problem of

impacted and overcrowded classes, not only with respect to the [CSU], but

throughout public postsecondary education.”2 (Ed. Code, § 66015, subd. (a).)

I do not join the majority’s analysis of this issue insofar as it relies on

several CEQA provisions to find that the Trustees have jurisdiction and

responsibility within the meaning of section 21081, subdivision (a)(2). (Maj. opn.,

ante, at pp. 34-35.) The majority cites section 21002.1, subdivision (b), which

requires “[e]ach public agency [to] mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the

environment of projects that it carries out or approves whenever it is feasible to do

so,” and section 21106, which requires “[a]ll state agencies . . . [to] request in

their budgets the funds necessary to protect the environment in relation to

problems caused by their activities.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 34-35.) Because

these two CEQA statutes apply to every state agency, the majority’s analysis

substantially limits the circumstances under which a state agency may invoke

section 21081, subdivision (a)(2). It is unclear to me the Legislature intended

section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to be read so narrowly. Because my analysis

depends on non-CEQA provisions, I need not, and do not, address that question.

I also do not join the majority’s analysis insofar as it appears to suggest that

a public agency lacks jurisdiction and responsibility within the meaning of section

21081, subdivision (a)(2), when “the Legislature does not appropriate” money

requested to pay for mitigation measures. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 34-35.) To

begin with, the discussion is dictum. As the majority notes, there is no evidence


2

As the majority notes, the Trustees cited this problem in a statement of

overriding considerations to justify their approval of the project despite
unmitigated environmental effects. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)

4

here the Trustees have even asked the Legislature for the necessary funds. (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 35.) Thus, it is both unnecessary and premature to express an

opinion about whether the Legislature’s denial of a funding request would affect

the Trustees’ jurisdiction and responsibility for purposes of applying section

21081, subdivision (a)(2).

The other reason I do not join the majority’s dictum is that I question its

soundness. It is not clear to me that, for purposes of applying section 21081,

subdivision (a)(2), a public agency has no responsibility or jurisdiction for a

mitigation measure simply because the Legislature denies a specific request for

money to pay for that mitigation measure. Here, for example, even were the

Legislature to reject such a request, arguably, the Trustees would still have

responsibility and jurisdiction to contribute to FORA with money from the CSU’s

general operating fund. Moreover, the Legislature has expressly authorized the

Trustees, at their discretion and “without the prior approval of any other state

department or agency,” to “sell improvements located on the land at the . . .

Monterey Bay campus that was transferred” from the federal government (Ed.

Code, § 89010, subd. (a)) and to use proceeds from those sales “for the purposes

of building, maintaining, and funding a campus . . . at Monterey Bay through

expenditures for improvements to the campus . . . .” (Id., § 89010, subd. (b).)

Arguably, by virtue of these provisions, even were the Trustees to make, and the

Legislature to reject, a specific appropriation request regarding the off-campus

improvements here at issue, the Trustees would have “the power” to make

contributions to FORA for those improvements (maj. opn., ante, at p. 35) and

would have jurisdiction and responsibility within the meaning of Public Resources

Code section 21081, subdivision (a)(2), to make such contributions. Because of

these substantive doubts, because we need not decide the question here, and

5

because we have no briefing on the question, I decline to join the majority’s

dictum.

CHIN, J.

6



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 1179
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.
S117816
Date Filed: July 31, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:
Superior
County: Monterey
Judge: Richard M. Silver

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Horvitz & Levy, John A. Taylor, Jr., Patricia Lofton; Miller, Starr & Regalia, Basil S. Shiber and Christian
M. Carrigan for Defendant and Appellant.

James E. Holst, Alan C. Waltner and Jeffrey A. Blair for The Regents of the University of California as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Miller Brown & Dannis, Marilyn J. Cleveland, Chad J. Graff and Kenneth S. Levy for Coalition for
Adequate School Housing as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Lombardo & Gilles, Sheri L. Damon; Law Offices of Robert Wellington, Kenneth D. Buchert; Law Offices
of Mary L. Hudson, and Mary L. Hudson for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Manuela Albuquerque, City Attorney (Berkeley) and Zach Cowan, Assistant City Attorney, for League of
California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Respondents.

McDonough Holland & Allen, Harriet A. Steiner and Kara K. Ueda for City of Davis as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Law Offices of Donald B. Mooney, Donald B Mooney; Law Offices of Marsha A. Burch and Marsha A.
Burch for San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, Protect Our Water and Central Valley Safe Environmental
Network as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Norma Turner, Mary-Alice Coleman and Jeffrey A. Diamond for West Davis Neighbors as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.








Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Patricia Lofton
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA 91436
(818) 995-0800

Mary L. Hudson
Law Offices of Mary L. Hudson
1505 Bridgeway, Suite 206
Sausalito, CA 94965
(415) 331-7712

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 07/31/2006S117816

Parties
1Fort Ord Reuse Authority (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Mary L. Hudson
Law Offices of Mary L. Hudson
1505 Bridgeway, Suite 206
Sausalito, CA

2Fort Ord Reuse Authority (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Sheri Lynn Damon
Lombardo & Gilles, PLC
318 Cayuga Street
Salinas, CA

3City Of Marina (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Kenneth Dale Buchert
Law Office of Robert R. Wellington
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, CA

4Board Of Trustees Of The California State University (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by John A. Taylor
Horvitz & Levy, LLP
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA

5Board Of Trustees Of The California State University (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Basil S. Shiber
Miller Starr & Regalia
P.O. Box 8177
Walnut Creek, CA

6Regents Of The University Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alan C. Waltner
Office of the General Counsel
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor
Oakland, CA

7City Of Davis (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Kara K. Ueda
McDonough Holland & Allan
555 Capitol Mall, 9th Floor
Sacramento, CA

8League Of California Cities (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Zachary D. Cowan
Office of the City Attorney
2180 Milvia Street, 4th Floor
Berkeley, CA

9Coalition For Adequate School Housing (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Marilyn J. Cleveland
Miller Brown & Dannis
71 Stevenson Street, 19th Floor
San Francisco, CA

10San Joaquin Raptor Rescue (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Donald B. Mooney
Attorney at Law
129 "C" Street, Suite 2
Davis, CA

11Protect Our Water (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Donald B. Mooney
Attorney at Law
129 "C" Street, Suite 2
Davis, CA

12Central Valley Safe Environmental Networks (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Marsha Ann Burch
Law Offices of Masha A. Burch
11300 Pleasant Valley Road, Suite 5
Penn Valley, CA

13West Davis Neighbors (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Mary-Alice Coleman
Attorney at Law
506 Fillmore Court
Davis, CA

14California State Association Of Counties (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Zachary D. Cowan
Office of the City Attorney
2180 Milvia Street, 4th Floor
Berkeley, CA


Disposition
Jul 31 2006Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jul 29 2003Received:
  petition for review from resp Fort Ord Reuse Authority. (did not contain proper cert. of word count, counsel is sending it)
Jul 29 2003Petition for review filed
  by counsel for resp Fort Ord Reuse Authority (word count cert rec'd)
Aug 4 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  1 envelope and briefs.
Aug 19 2003Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for appellant (Board of Trustees of the California State University). (timely per rule 40k)
Sep 18 2003Time extended to grant or deny review
  The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including October 27, 2003, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Oct 1 2003Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Oct 6 2003Record requested
  requested balance of record.
Oct 7 2003Received Court of Appeal record
  balance of record.
Oct 14 2003Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for Respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}.
Oct 15 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by respondent (Fort Ord Reuse Authority) requesting to Dec. 15, 2003 to file opening brief on the merits.
Oct 17 2003Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by counsel for appellant (Board of Trustees of the Calif. State University).
Oct 20 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent (Fort Ord Reuse Authority) and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Dec. 15, 2003. No further extensions are contemplated.
Dec 15 2003Request for extension of time filed
  respondent requesting to Dec. 29, 2003 to file opening brief on the merits. (Recv'd fax from attorney Susan M. Popik on behalf of attorney Mary L. Hudson, counsel for respondent.)
Dec 17 2003Extension of time granted
  On application submitted by Susan Popik on behalf of counsel for respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including December 29, 2003.
Dec 30 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for respondent (Fort Ord Reuse Authority). (40k)
Jan 5 2004Received:
  Errata notice from counsel for respondent regarding opening brief on the merits filed 12/30/03. Provided page 50 that was missing from brief.
Jan 22 2004Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellant requesting a 30 day extension to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 26 2004Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including March 1, 2004.
Jan 27 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  two boxes
Feb 17 2004Filed:
  application for leave to file answer brief on the merits in excess of 14000 words - from appellant.
Feb 17 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  with permission by counsel for appellant (Board of Trustees of the Calif. State University.
Mar 9 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  with permission by counsel for respondent. (tan covers - should be white) (40k)
Apr 6 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  from the Regents of the University of California in support of appellant
Apr 7 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  City of Davis in support of Respondents.
Apr 7 2004Request for extension of time to file amicus curiae brief
  by The Coalition for Adequate School Housing ("CASH") requesting a 20-day extension.
Apr 7 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by League of California Cities and the California State Association of Counties in support of respondent Fort Ord Reuse Authority.
Apr 8 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by West Davis Neighbors in support of respondents City of Marina and Fort Ord Reuse Authority.
Apr 8 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, Protect Our Water, and Central Valley Safe Environmental Network in support of respondent Fort Ord Reuse Authority.
Apr 12 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The Regents of the University of California in support of appellant.
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  The Regents of the University of California in support of appellant. Answer is due within twenty days.
Apr 12 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  City of Davis in support of Respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}.
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  City of Davis in support of respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}. Answer is due within twenty days.
Apr 12 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties in support of Respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}.
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties in support of Respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}. Answer is within twenty days.
Apr 12 2004Extension of time granted
  To April 28, 2004 to file application and amicus brief of Coalition for Adequate School Housing.
Apr 12 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, Protect Our Water and Central Valley Safe Environmental Network in support of respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}.
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  San Joaquin Raptor Rescue Center, Protect Our Water and Central Valley Safe Environmental Network in support of respondent {Fort Ord Reuse Authority}. Answer is due within twenty days.
Apr 13 2004Opposition filed
  By Respondent Fort Ord Reuse Authority to request for extension of time filed by Adequate School Housing.
Apr 13 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  West Davis Neighbors in support of Respondents.
Apr 13 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  West Davis Neighbors in support of Respondents. Answer is due within twenty days.
Apr 19 2004Filed:
  JOINT Application of ( Applt. Bd. of Trustees and Resp. Fort Ord.) for extension of time to May 18, 2004, to file one consolidated answer to amicus curiae briefs.
Apr 21 2004Request for extension of time filed
 
Apr 26 2004Extension of time granted
  for Appellant and Respondents to serve and file one consolidated Answer to Amicus Curiae briefs to May 18, 2004.
Apr 29 2004Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Coalition for Adequate School Housing.
May 3 2004Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The Coalition For Adequate School Housing. Answer due within 20 days.
May 3 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
  The Coalition for Adequate School Housing in support of Appellant. Answer due within in 20 days.
May 18 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  By appellant {Board of Trustees of the California State University} to AC Briefs.
May 19 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Respondent ( Fort Ord) one consolidated brief.
Apr 4 2006Case ordered on calendar
  Tuesday, May 2, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
Apr 21 2006Supplemental brief filed
  Fort Ord Reuse Authority, respondent Sheri L. Damon, counsel
May 2 2006Cause argued and submitted
 
Jul 27 2006Received:
  letter dated July 25, 2006, regarding recent decision of a Court of Appeal case, # D046728 Fort Ord Reuse Authority, respondent Mary L. Hudson, counsel
Jul 31 2006Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and the cause remanded to that court with directions to order the superior court to vacate its writ of mandate and to issue a new writ consistent with the views set forth in this opinion. Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. Concurring & Dissenting Opinion by Chin, J.
Aug 31 2006Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Sep 5 2006Received:
  Receipt for Remittitur from the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District No. H023158, Superior Court No. M41795, M41781
Sep 11 2006Note:
  record sent to Sixth Appellate District - six doghouses

Briefs
Dec 30 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Feb 17 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Mar 9 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 12 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 13 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 3 2004Amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 18 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 19 2004Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
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