Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S134545
Catholic Mutual Relief v. Super. Ct.

Filed 8/27/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHOLIC MUTUAL RELIEF
SOCIETY et al.,
Petitioners,
S134545
v.
Ct.App. 2/8 B178101
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY,
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. JCCP No. 4297
Respondent.
)
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE
OF SAN DIEGO et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

INTRODUCTION
In this case we must determine whether Code of Civil Procedure section
2017.210,1 the statutory provision authorizing limited discovery of a defendant’s
insurance coverage information, authorizes pretrial discovery of a nonparty

1
All further undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. Former section 2017, subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be referred to as
former sections 2017(a) and 2017(b), respectively. Shortly after the Court of
Appeal filed its opinion in this case, former sections 2017(a) and 2017(b) were
repealed and reenacted without substantive change as sections 2017.010 (former
§ 2017(a)) and 2017.210 (former § 2017(b)). (Stats. 2004, c. 182, §§ 22, 23.) We
shall hereafter refer to the new code sections.
1


liability insurer’s reinsurance agreements for purposes of facilitating settlement of
an underlying tort action. We conclude that it does not.
As will further be explained, there may be unusual circumstances in which
a reinsurance agreement is functioning in the same way as a liability policy
(“fronting” arrangement), or where the reinsurance agreement is itself the subject
matter of the litigation at hand (e.g., coverage action between liability insurer and
its reinsurer). In such instances, discovery of such agreements would be
appropriate. In this matter, however, there is no evidence that any reinsurance
agreements for which pretrial discovery was being sought fall within those narrow
exceptions.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal, which interpreted section 2017.210
consistently with the views expressed herein, shall accordingly be affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego is the principal defendant
in an action brought by approximately 140 persons (plaintiffs) for alleged
childhood abuse by certain priests. Those cases, along with others involving the
San Bernardino Archdiocese, are known collectively as Clergy Cases II, and were
coordinated within the Los Angeles County Superior Court with claims against
dioceses from other parts of California.
In September 2003, pursuant to a stipulated order regarding settlement and
mediation proceedings, the trial court issued an initial case management order
which, among other things, directed the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San
Diego (Church) to turn over copies of all insurance policies that might provide
coverage for plaintiffs’ claims. Petitioner Catholic Mutual Relief Society is a
nonprofit corporation that administers a self-insurance fund for more than three
hundred archdioceses and other Catholic Church entities in the United States and
Canada, including the San Diego Archdiocese. The Catholic Mutual Relief
2
Society is not an insurance company, but its wholly owned subsidiary, petitioner
Catholic Relief Insurance Company of America, is the Church’s liability insurer.2
In compliance with the case management order, the Church produced
copies of its liability insurance policies issued by petitioners. Plaintiffs contended
this information was insufficient. According to plaintiffs, they also need to know
whether petitioners were financially sound enough to cover their policy
obligations. In April 2004, in an attempt to resolve the matter informally, the trial
court allowed plaintiffs to serve on petitioners a series of “interrogatories” aimed
at obtaining the desired information.3 Petitioners objected to those questions on
grounds that (1) the questions sought information concerning their financial
condition, reserves, and reinsurance agreements, none of which was relevant for
discovery purposes or was otherwise nondiscoverable; (2) that much of the
material sought was privileged; (3) that the requests were overbroad and
ambiguous; and (4) that the trial court lacked authority to require interrogatory
responses from nonparty insurers.
On May 6, 2004, the settlement judge issued an order permitting plaintiffs
to serve deposition subpoenas on petitioners in an attempt to secure the
information requested by plaintiffs’ “interrogatories.” The subpoenas sought
broad categories of financial documents, including a request for all writings

2
The Court of Appeal referred to the Catholic Mutual Relief Society and
Catholic Relief Insurance Company of America collectively as petitioners. We
shall do the same.
3
The questions, which the parties have denominated as “interrogatories,”
formed the basis for the deposition subpoenas here in issue. Since the questions
were directed to nonparties, they were technically not interrogatories. In any
event, the deposition subpoenas and the questions on which they were based were
nearly identical.
3


reflecting the total amount of funds available from reinsurance “to satisfy any
defense expenses or indemnify losses in connection with sexual abuse claims
against the [Church].”4
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that to the extent the
document requests sought information about the overall strength of petitioners’
financial condition, they were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence and were therefore beyond the permissible scope of
discovery. The settlement judge denied the motions to quash, finding that the
subpoena requests—aimed at determining whether petitioners were financially

4
The deposition subpoena requests sought: “1. All writings pertaining to
the financial relationship between [the Relief Society and Relief Insurer] with
respect to financial responsibility for sexual abuse claims brought against the
[Church]; [¶] 2. All writings pertaining to the total amount of funds available to
satisfy any defense expenses or indemnify losses in connection with sexual abuse
claims against the [Church], whether from reserves, policyholder surplus,
reinsurance, or other available sources of funding; [¶] 3. All writings evidencing
the number of sexual abuse claims that have been filed against policyholders
affiliated with the Catholic church and the total amount of damages sought by
these claims; [¶] 4. All writings evidencing the annual amount over the past five
years of defense costs and indemnity payments incurred in connection with sexual
abuse claims against policyholders affiliated with the Catholic church; [¶] 5. All
writings evidencing the amount in reserves that have been set for sexual abuse
claims against the [Church] by [petitioners]; [¶] 6. All writings evidencing the
total indemnity reserves, total defense and expense reserves, and total incurred but
not reported reserves for sexual abuse claims against the [Church] by [petitioners];
[¶] 7. All writings evidencing the amount in reserves that has been set for sexual
abuse claims against all policyholders affiliated with the Catholic church; [¶] 8.
All writings evidencing the totals for indemnity reserves, defense and expense
reserves, and incurred but not reported reserves for sexual abuse claims against all
policyholders affiliated with the Catholic church; [¶] 9. All writings pertaining to
reinsurance available to [petitioners] to satisfy defense or indemnify costs arising
from the sexual abuse claims brought against the [Church]; [¶] 10. All writings
pertaining to the most recent balance sheets, financial statements, or other
financial filings with insurance regulators.” (Italics added.)
4


able to pay any judgment that might be entered against their insured—were
“clearly relevant and discoverable” to inform and facilitate settlement.
Petitioners sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal to vacate the
settlement judge’s order. The Court of Appeal granted relief, concluding the
documents and information sought were not discoverable under either the general
statutory discovery provision (§ 2017.010) or the specific provision authorizing
limited discovery of insurance information as a matter of right (§ 2017.210). The
court found that “section [2017.210] was intended to reach only a defendant’s
[direct] insurer, not that insurer’s reinsurance agreements.”5
We granted review of the issue framed by plaintiffs as follows: “Whether
the long-standing California rule that ‘has permitted discovery of the existence and
extent of liability insurance’ (Laddon v. Superior Court (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d
391, 394-395) allows discovery of reinsurance information that is critical to
determine the ‘nature and limits’ of coverage that may be available to satisfy a
judgment as set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure section [2017.210].”
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs sought broad pretrial discovery of financial information regarding
the assets and overall financial health of petitioners’ insurance operations.

5
The matter became moot with respect to these parties after the cause was
submitted in the Court of Appeal and plaintiffs thereafter informed that court that
the settlement judge had issued an ex parte order allowing plaintiffs to withdraw
the disputed discovery requests and vacating his earlier order denying petitioners’
motions to quash the deposition subpoenas. Plaintiffs sought to dismiss the
appeal, petitioners opposed the request. The Court of Appeal found the appeal
was not moot because the issues are likely to recur, either among these parties or
the many others involved in these consolidated proceedings; and because the
issues are of broad public interest. (See Environmental Charter High School v.
Centinela Valley Union High School Dist.
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) We
agreed and granted review.
5


Petitioners are not parties to the consolidated actions below. The information
requested included total funds and reserves available to settle claims, satisfy
judgments, and indemnify defense expenses in connection with sexual abuse
claims brought against the Catholic Church and its numerous dioceses nationwide.
The information was sought for the exclusive purpose of informing and facilitating
pretrial settlement of the 140 such claims brought against the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of San Diego in the consolidated litigation.
In this state pretrial discovery in a civil action is governed by the Civil
Discovery Act. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2016.010 et seq. (former § 2016 et seq.).)
As a general matter, information is discoverable if it is relevant to the subject
matter of an action and, additionally, is either admissible in evidence or reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (§ 2017.010.) The
Court of Appeal concluded none of the broad financial information sought from
these nonparty insurers6 in connection with potential settlement of the underlying
sexual abuse claims was relevant or discoverable on a showing of good cause
under section 2017.010. Plaintiffs have not challenged that aspect of the Court of
Appeal’s holding on review. Instead, plaintiffs sought review only of the specific
question whether section 2017.210, which authorizes limited discovery of a
defendant’s liability insurance coverage as a matter of right, likewise authorizes
discovery of the nonparty liability insurer’s reinsurance agreements, assertedly for
purposes of facilitating pretrial settlement of underlying tort claims.
Evidence of a tort defendant’s liability insurance is generally unrelated to a
party’s claims or defenses at trial; hence the common law rule has long been that

6
The permissible scope of discovery in general is not as broad with respect
to nonparties as it is with respect to parties. (See Monarch Healthcare v. Superior
Court
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289.)
6


such insurance coverage evidence is inadmissible at trial. (Laddon v. Superior
Court (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 391, 396 (Laddon); Pettie v. Superior Court (1960)
178 Cal.App2d 680, 690 (Pettie).) The rule is codified in Evidence Code section
1155, which provides that “[e]vidence that a person was, at the time a harm was
suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability
for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.”
Section 2017.210 nonetheless creates a statutory exception that allows
limited discovery of a defendant’s liability insurance coverage as a matter of right;
that is to say, without the need for a threshold showing of relevancy and
admissibility as is required under the general discovery statute, section 2017.010.
Under section 2017.210, a party is entitled to discover the “existence and contents
of any agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to satisfy in
whole or in part a judgment that may be entered in the action or to indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. This discovery may include
the identity of the carrier and the nature and limits of the coverage. A party may
also obtain discovery as to whether that insurance carrier is disputing the
agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action, but not as to the nature
and substance of that dispute.”
Plaintiffs argue that the plain language of section 2017.210 authorizes
discovery of reinsurance agreements. They point out that the section specifically
permits discovery of “any agreement under which any insurance carrier” may be
liable to satisfy a judgment “or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.” (§ 2017.210.)
Before examining the controlling language of section 2017.210, it will be
helpful to briefly consider some fundamental differences between liability
insurance and reinsurance.
7
As defined by statute, “Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or
unknown event.” (Ins. Code, § 22.) The purpose of liability insurance is to
protect the insured against losses from “contingent or unknown risks of harm.”
(Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 17.)
One distinguishing characteristic of liability insurance derives from
Insurance Code section 11580, which requires every policy of liability insurance
to expressly state that a plaintiff who obtains a judgment against a defendant
insured under such a policy is then entitled to bring an action directly against the
liability insurer to recover the policy benefits. Section 11580 effectively makes an
injured plaintiff who obtains a final judgment against a tort defendant a third party
beneficiary of the defendant’s liability insurance policy. (Shafer v. Berger, Kahn,
Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54, 68.) As a
result of the statute, a potential contractual relationship arises between the liability
insurer and any third party who might be injured by its insured under the terms of
coverage of the liability policy, which the common law in turn has long
recognized gives the injured party a “discoverable interest” in the existence and
terms of the defendant’s liability insurance coverage. (Superior Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1951) 37 Cal.2d 749, 754; Pettie, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at
pp. 684-688; Laddon, supra, 167 Cal.App.2d at p. 395.) Section 11580 does not
list reinsurance, or any other form of insurance other than liability insurance, as
coming within its purview. (§ 11580, subd. (a).) Nor is there any corresponding
California common law rule extending this limited right of discovery to
reinsurance agreements.7

7
There are reported cases in which reinsurance agreements themselves were
in dispute or were otherwise directly at issue or relevant to the litigation at hand.

(footnote continued on next page)
8


In contrast to liability insurance, “[a] contract of reinsurance is one by
which an insurer procures a third person to insure him against loss or liability by
reason of such original insurance.” (Ins. Code, § 620 added.) “A reinsurance is
presumed to be a contract of indemnity against liability, and not merely against
damage.” (Ins. Code, § 621.) Because a contract of reinsurance is defined by
statute as a contract of indemnity made for the benefit of the liability insurer, as a
general matter it has no relevance in an underlying tort action brought against an
insured under the policy of liability insurance. Indeed, the insurance code
expressly provides that “[t]he original insured has no interest in a contract of
reinsurance.” (Ins. Code, § 623, italics added.)
Reinsurance is “ ‘a special form of insurance obtained by insurance
companies to help spread the burden of indemnification. A reinsurance company
typically contracts with an insurance company to cover a specified portion of the
insurance company’s obligation to indemnify a policyholder . . . . This excess

(footnote continued from previous page)

In such instances, the reinsurance agreements may be discoverable under the
general discovery statute within the sound discretion of the trial court. For
example, in Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599 (Lipton), this
court approved of the discovery of an insurer’s reinsurance information. In that
case, however, the discovery was allowed because the insurer was the defendant in
a bad faith action, and the reinsurance information was directly relevant to the
issues in that proceeding. Discovery was limited to unprivileged communications
between the insurer and reinsurer concerning coverage issues and potential
liability, and it was deemed authorized under the general relevancy test of former
section 2017(a) (now § 2017.010), without reference to former section 2017(b)
(now § 2107.210). (Lipton, at pp. 1617-1618; cf. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.
v. Superior Court
(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1141 [refusing to approve
discovery of reinsurance information even though reinsurer was direct party to bad
faith action].)
9


insurance . . . enables the insurance companies to write more policies than their
reserves would otherwise sustain since [it] guarantees the ability to pay a part of
all claims. The reinsurance contract is not with the insured/policyholder. When a
valid claim is made, the insurance company pays the first level insured, and the
reinsurance company pays the insurance company. The reinsurance company’s
obligation is to the insurance company, and the insurance company vis-a-vis the
reinsurer is thus the insured, or more appropriately, the “reinsured.” ’ ”
(Ascherman v. General Reinsurance Corp. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 307, 311, fn. 5,
quoting Excess & Cas. Reinsurance Ass’n v. Insurance Com’r, Etc. (9th Cir. 1981)
656 F.2d 491, 492.)
An essential feature of reinsurance is that it does not alter the terms,
conditions or provisions of the contract of liability insurance between the direct
liability insurer and its insured (the tort defendant). (Lipton, supra, 48
Cal.App.4th at p. 1617.) The amounts of policy limits directly available to
respond to the underlying judgment are not increased by the existence of
reinsurance agreements. In other words, a reinsurance agreement does not answer
to liability for the underlying third party tort claim. There is no privity of contract
between a reinsurer and the insured under the liability policy or the plaintiff who
obtains a final judgment and becomes a judgment creditor under the policy—
unless the reinsurer becomes a direct party to a bad faith or similar action.
Whereas primary liability insurers have a duty to investigate claims and defend
lawsuits tendered to them by their insureds (see Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Transport Indem. Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 57-58), reinsurers have no comparable
duties to investigate or defend claims between third parties and the underlying
liability insurers or their insureds, nor do they owe any duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the original insureds, unless the reinsurance agreement somehow
10
specifically so provides. (See Ins. Code, §§ 623, 922.2; American Re-Insurance
Co. v. Ins. Comm’t of the State of Calif. (C.D. Cal. 1981) 527 F.Supp. 444, 453.)
With these distinctions between liability insurance and reinsurance in mind,
we turn to plaintiffs’ argument that the plain language of section 2017.210 is broad
enough to encompass discovery of reinsurance agreements. In seeking to
“ ‘ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law’ ” (In
re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209), we start with the statutory language. (Wilcox
v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.) “ ‘If the language [of a statute] is clear
and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to
indicia of the intent of the Legislature. . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
As noted, section 2017.210 provides, in pertinent part, “A party may obtain
discovery of the existence and contents of any agreement under which any
insurance carrier may be liable to satisfy in whole or in part a judgment that may
be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy
the judgment. This discovery may include the identity of the carrier and the nature
and limits of the coverage. A party may also obtain discovery as to whether that
insurance carrier is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in
the action, but not as to the nature and substance of that dispute. . . .”8

8
The language of former section 2017(b) (now § 2017.210) was originally
derived from Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, former rule 26(b)(2) (28 U.S.C.),
now rule 26(a)(1)(D). (See Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 733, 737.) A number of federal cases have interpreted former rule
26(b)(2) as permitting discovery of reinsurance information, but most of the
discovery orders appear to have been made in cases involving bad faith claims or
declaratory relief actions, where the reinsurer was itself a party, or the reinsurance
agreement was directly relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses in the litigation.
(See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County (D. Me. 2004) 224 F.R.D. 522, 523-524
[defendant county in self-funded risk management pool that obtained reinsurance];
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. (N.D. Ill. 1995)

(footnote continued on next page)
11


Reinsurance arguably falls within this language because it is an agreement
whereby the reinsurer agrees to “indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.” (§ 2017.210.) Nonetheless, considering the language of
section 2017.210 as a whole, we find the statute ambiguous on the point.
The term “any insurance carrier” in section 2017.210 is qualified by the
circumstance that the carrier “may be liable to satisfy in whole or in part a
judgment that may be entered in the action.” (§ 2017.210.) A liability carrier, as
explained, may become contractually liable—both to its insured defendant and to
the injured plaintiff who obtains a final judgment against the defendant and
thereby becomes a third party beneficiary under the defendant’s liability insurance

(footnote continued from previous page)

159 F.R.D. 502, 503 [existence of reinsurance agreements relevant to bad faith
claim]; Potomac Electric Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co. (D.D.C. 1990)
136 F.R.D. 1, 2 [coverage action by insured against insurers for cleanup and
defense costs]; Nat. Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Illinois Corp. (N.D. Ill. 1987)
116 F.R.D. 78, 83-84 [communications between insurer and reinsurer, and
reinsurance agreements, relevant in suit by insurer to rescind policies based on
claims of misrepresentations by its insured].)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, former rule 26(b)(2) has itself been
characterized by one leading authority as a rule intended to provide “explicit
recognition of the discoverability of liability insurance information.” (See 3
Hogan, Modern Cal. Discovery (4th ed. 1988) Proposed Civil Discovery Act of
1986, appen. D, p. 182, italics added.) The annotated advisory committee notes on
the amendment of former rule 26(b)(2) likewise reflect that the rule was enacted to
address the discoverability of “defendant’s liability insurance coverage.”
(Advisory com. note, 28 U.S.C.A. (19__) foll. rule 26(b)(2), at p. 24, italics
added.) In any case, for purposes of construing California discovery law, we note
the common law rule leading to codification of the California discovery statute
predated codification of former rule 26(b)(2). Federal discovery law neither
controls the matter before us nor undermines our analysis of the history and
legislative intent behind former section 2017(b) (now § 2017.210).

12


policy—to “satisfy . . . a judgment . . . entered in the action.” (Ibid.). A
reinsurance carrier, on the other hand, is not directly liable to satisfy a judgment
entered in the action, and makes no payments to either the insured defendant or the
successful plaintiff, although the reinsurer may ultimately make payments to the
liability insurer “to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the
judgment.” (Ibid.) Put differently, the liability insurer is directly liable to satisfy
the judgment in the underlying action with respect to the parties, whereas a
reinsurer is only derivatively liable to “indemnify or reimburse” (ibid.) the liability
insurer for payments made in satisfaction of the underlying judgment. We find the
statute’s use of the terminology “satisfy the judgment” (ibid.) ambiguous in this
regard.
There is further ambiguity created by the statutory language of section
2017.210 to the extent it provides, “A party may also obtain discovery as to
whether that insurance carrier is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim
involved in the action, but not as to the nature and substance of that dispute.”
(Italics added.) The only insurance carrier in a position to dispute its “[insurance]
agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action” (ibid.) is the liability
insurance carrier that issued a policy or policies of liability insurance intended to
provide third party liability coverage to the insured defendant. (Ins. Code, § 22;
Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 17.) Reinsurance contracts
and agreements, in contrast, do not serve that function—they are defined by statute
as contracts of indemnity made for the benefit of the direct insurer (Ins. Code,
§ 621), and in which “[t]he original insured [i.e., the tort plaintiff] has no interest.”
(Ins. Code, § 623.) Hence, to the extent the term “that insurance carrier” in the
quoted passage refers to the same “insurance carrier” referenced elsewhere in the
language of section 2017.210, all such references must be to liability insurance
carriers. “ ‘ “When used in a statute [words] must be construed in context,
13
keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they
appear.” ’ [Citations.]” (DuBois v. Workers’’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5
Cal.4th 382, 388.)
In sum, section 2017.210 neither expressly includes nor expressly excludes
reinsurance agreements. Moreover, the statutory language is ambiguous because it
leaves unclear whether the section is intended to authorize only discovery of
liability insurance coverage. “To the extent a statutory text is susceptible of more
than one reasonable interpretation, we will consider ‘ “a variety of extrinsic aids,
including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction,
and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” ’ (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977, quoting People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002,
1008.)” (Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 929, fn. omitted.) Accordingly,
we turn to the legislative history of section 2017.210 to assist us in ascertaining
the Legislature’s intent.
The text of section 2017.210 was originally enacted as part of the Civil
Discovery Act of 1986. (Former § 2016 et seq.) The committee analyses of the
1986 Civil Discovery Act uniformly reflect an intent to authorize limited
discovery of liability insurance coverage, but evince no similar intent with respect
to a nonparty insurer’s reinsurance agreements. (See Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses,
3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 169 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Aug. 25, 1986, p. 1 [The bill “would generally permit discovery of any
unprivileged matter relevant to the subject matter of the action. It would
specifically permit discovery of liability insurance without expressly precluding
discovery of the application for insurance,” italics added]; Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 169 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 1986,
p. 2 [same]; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 169 (1985-1986 Reg.
14
Sess.) as amended Jan. 8, 1986, p. 1 [same]; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Assem. Bill No. 169 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 8, 1986, p. 1
[same].)
“Where more than one statutory construction is arguably possible, our
‘policy has long been to favor the construction that leads to the more reasonable
result. [Citation.]’ (Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 343.) This
policy derives largely from the presumption that the Legislature intends reasonable
results consistent with its apparent purpose. (Harris [v. Capital Growth Investors
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142,] 1165-1166.) Thus, our task is to select the construction
that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the statutes’ general purpose, and to avoid a
construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.
(People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246; People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th
493, 517; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328.)” (Copley Press , Inc. v.
Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1291-1292.)
The legislative history, context, and purpose of section 2017.210 all suggest
the section was specifically intended to authorize limited discovery of a
defendant’s liability insurance coverage. Such was the rule at the time section
2017.210’s predecessor, former section 2017(b), was adopted. Under the common
law, plaintiffs were afforded limited discovery of a defendant’s liability insurance
coverage as a result of a plaintiff’s right, under Insurance Code section 11580, to
proceed directly against the liability insurer as a judgment creditor to satisfy his or
her judgment. (Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 754;
see also Pettie, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at pp. 684-688; Laddon, supra, 167
Cal.App.2d at p. 395.)
“As a general rule, ‘[u]nless expressly provided, statutes should not be
interpreted to alter the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict
15
with common law rules. [Citation.] “A statute will be construed in light of
common law decisions, unless its language ‘ “clearly and unequivocally discloses
an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the
particular subject matter . . . .” ’ (California Assn. of Health Facilities v.
Department of Health Services (1997) 16 Cal.4th 284, 297.) Nothing in the
language or legislative history of former section 2017(b) (now § 2017.210)
discloses an intention to extend the scope of the limited discovery right beyond
primary liability insurance policies to reinsurance agreements.
The availability and extent of a defendant’s liability insurance coverage is
important information that plaintiffs are clearly entitled to discover under section
2017.210. “The presence or absence of liability insurance is frequently the
controlling factor in determining the manner in which a case is prepared for trial.”
(Pettie, supra, 178 Cal.App.2d at p. 689.) A nonparty insurer’s reinsurance
information, in contrast, would not be of any relevance to plaintiffs in the vast
majority of cases. As we have explained, an essential feature of the reinsurance
contract is that it does not alter the terms, conditions or provisions of the contract
of liability insurance between the direct liability insurer and its insured. (Lipton,
supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617.) The amounts of liability insurance policy limits
directly available to respond to the underlying judgment are not increased by the
existence of a liability insurer’s reinsurance agreements.
Permitting discovery of nonparty insurers’ reinsurance agreements as a
matter of course under section 2017.210 could also lead to burdensome discovery
requests directed at entities that are not even parties to the litigation. Amici curiae
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, and Certain London Market Insurance
and Reinsurance Companies, explain that they have a direct interest in the
outcome of this litigation insofar as certain of their members are reinsurers of
petitioner Catholic Relief Insurance Company. They urge that, “If [section
16
2017.210] allows any plaintiff in a tort action to obtain not only insurance policies
but also any and all reinsurance and retrocessional reinsurance [i.e., second level
reinsurance contracts], the burden on nonparty insurers would be enormous. . . .
With respect to risks subscribed to by London Market Insurers . . . , locating and
producing every reinsurance and retrocessional reinsurance agreement for
hundreds of syndicates in any tort action would be an incredible burden to place
even on a party, much less a nonparty. [¶] . . . Each syndicate may have a number
of reinsurances and each reinsurance may have multiple subscribers.” It seems
highly unlikely the Legislature intended such a result. As this court has observed,
“ ‘ “It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute
should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd
consequences which the Legislature did not intend.” ’ ” (Younger v. Superior
Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113.)
The language of section 2017.210 allows for discovery of the “existence
and contents” of liability insurance policies that may be available to satisfy a
judgment, not the assets of the insurance companies providing the insurance.
Reinsurance is an asset of a liability insurer, just as capital reserves are, and
nothing in prior case law, legislative history, or the statutory language suggests
that either the common law right to discover insurance information or section
2017.210 authorize broad discovery of the financial health of the liability insurer
or its ability to meet its contractual obligations under its policies.
We acknowledge there may be limited circumstances under which a
liability insurer’s reinsurance agreements will be directly on the risk to satisfy a
judgment in an underlying tort action in the same way as the defendant’s liability
insurance coverage itself. One example is when a liability insurer is “fronting” for
17
a reinsurer who is the defacto primary insurer. (See Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher
& Zucker (N.J. Super. 1994) 638 A.2d 1333.)9 Here, however, plaintiffs have not
made a credible claim that a fronting arrangement exists. Although insurance
industry data that is public information reflects that petitioner Catholic Relief
Insurance Company utilizes reinsurance agreements to manage its risks, there is no
indication in the record that it has ceded control to its reinsurers of its functions as
a primary liability insurer, including the investigation and settlement of claims
under policies it has issued, and plaintiffs do not appear to contend otherwise. In
those unusual circumstances in which a reinsurance agreement is functioning in
the same way as a liability policy (fronting arrangement), or where the reinsurance
agreement is itself the subject matter of the litigation at hand (e.g., coverage action
between the liability insurer and its reinsurer), discovery of such agreements
would be appropriate. In this matter, however, there is no evidence that any
reinsurance agreements for which pretrial discovery was being sought fall within
those narrow exceptions.
In compliance with the case management order, defendant Church
furnished plaintiffs with copies of its liability insurance policies issued by
petitioners, as required by section 2017.210. The statute did not further require
petitioners, as the Church’s nonparty liability insurer and its corporate parent, to

9
“In a fronting arrangement—a well-established and perfectly legal
scheme—policies are issued by a state licensed insurance company and then
immediately reinsured 100% of their face value by the out-of-state unlicensed
insurer.” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver (7th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3d 641, 643, quoted
in Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes (13th ed.
2006) § 15.02[c], p. 1067.) Under such arrangements, the reinsurer is typically the
de facto insurer, investigating claims and making settlement decisions. (See, e.g.,
Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, supra, 638 A.2d at p. 1335.)
18


furnish plaintiffs additional discovery of all reinsurance agreements entered into
by petitioners with nonparty reinsurers.
19

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the matter remanded
to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

20


DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J.

I respectfully dissent. Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.210
unambiguously provides for discovery of reinsurance policies, by including “any
agreement under which any insurance carrier may be liable to . . . indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.” 1 The majority detects an
ambiguity in the “satisfy the judgment” term, because a reinsurer is “derivatively”
rather than “directly” liable. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) However, the Legislature
has chosen terminology that expressly includes derivative liability. The obligation
to “indemnify or reimburse” easily encompasses the duty assumed by reinsurers.
The majority finds further ambiguity in the third sentence of section
2017.210: “A party may also obtain discovery as to whether that insurance carrier
is disputing the agreement’s coverage of the claim involved in the action, but not
as to the nature and substance of that dispute.” According to the majority, only the
defendant’s liability insurer is in a position to dispute coverage. (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 13.) This is not the case; reinsurers can and do argue that their policies do not
cover the claim involved in the action. (See, e.g., Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool,
England, v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Edinburgh, Scotland (1920) 182 Cal. 219, 224-
226; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co. (1906) 2
Cal.App. 690, 694-695; Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gerling Global Reinsurance
Corp. of America (2nd Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 181, 193-194; National American Ins.
Co. of California v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (9th Cir. 1996) 93
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
1


F.3d 529, 536-537.) And as a matter of logic, the additional statutory
authorization for discovery of coverage disputes does not make the broad terms of
the section 2017.210’s opening sentence ambiguous. “[A]ny agreement under
which any insurance carrier may be liable” includes reinsurance, whether or not
coverage is contested.
Given the clarity of the statutory language, there is no need to resort to
indications of legislative intent. (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973,
977.) We may not rewrite the statute to make it conform to an intent that is not
expressed in its terms. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto
Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633; Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v.
Shay (1931) 214 Cal. 361, 365-366.) In any event, the majority’s reliance on
committee analyses reflecting an intent to authorize discovery of liability
insurance is not persuasive. As the majority recognizes, reinsurance is
presumptively a form of liability insurance. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9; Ins. Code,
§ 621; Staring, The Law of Reinsurance Contracts in California in Relation to
Anglo-American Common Law (1988) 23 U.S.F. Law Rev. 1, 4-5.) What is clear
from the legislative history, and from the language of the statute, is that the terms
before us were framed on the example of rule 26 of the federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (28 U.S.C.).2 (See Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 733, 737.) The Legislature might have drawn instead on the rule
developed by California case law, based on the right of direct action conferred by
Insurance Code section 11580. However, it did not.
The federal rule has been interpreted to require disclosure of reinsurance
policies. Discovery has not been limited to cases “where the reinsurer was itself a
2 Further references to enumerated rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 26(a)(1)(d) mandates the disclosure of “any insurance agreement
under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy
part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.”
2
party, or the reinsurance agreement was directly relevant to the parties’ claims or
defenses in the litigation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11, fn. 8.) In Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. (N.D.Ill. 1995) 159 F.R.D.
502, the court determined that the reinsurance documents sought by the plaintiffs
were irrelevant, but nevertheless ordered the insurer to disclose its reinsurance
policies under rule 26. (Great Lakes, supra, 159 F.R.D at p. 504.)
In
Tardiff v. Knox County (D.Me. 2004) 224 F.R.D. 522, reinsurance was
not relevant to any issue in the underlying litigation; discovery was permitted
simply because “the reinsurers are exposed to potential liability for reimbursing
the [self-insurance] Pool when judgment is entered against the Pool’s member
[i.e., the defendant County].” (Id. at p. 524.) The Tardiff court adopted the
following language from Nat. Union Fire Ins. v. Continental Illinois Corp.
(N.D.Ill. 1987) 116 F.R.D. 78, which has been widely accepted by the federal
courts: “Reinsurers (‘person[s] carrying on an insurance business’) are insurers’
own insurers. If Insurers are held liable under the Policies, they will turn to their
reinsurers for partial indemnification, as provided in the reinsurance agreements,
for any ‘payments made to satisfy the judgment.’ [Fn. omitted.] Insurers contend
their reinsurance agreements are not ‘insurance agreements’ under [former] Rule
26(b)(2).3 True enough, reinsurance agreements are a special breed of insurance
policy. . . . But the English language remains the same: Reinsurers ‘carry[ ] on an
insurance business’ and ‘may be liable . . . to indemnify [Insurers] for payments
made to satisfy the judgment’ that Movants hope to obtain. [Former] Rule
26(b)(2) does not require that a party’s insurer be directly liable to the other party.
It is totally irrelevant that the reinsurers would pay Insurers and not the defendants
and that Movants cannot directly sue the reinsurers.” (National Union, supra, 116
F.R.D. at p. 84; Tardiff, supra, 224 F.R.D. at pp. 523-524.)
3 The terms quoted by the National Union court are now found in rule
26(a)(1)(d). (See fn. 2, ante.)
3

Discovery of reinsurance policies is a routine matter in federal court. (E.g.,
Ohio Management, LLC v. James River Ins. Co. (E.D.La.) 2006 WL 1985962, *2;
Bondex Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. (N.D. Ohio) 2006 WL
355289, *1-2; Country Life Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Lines Ins. Co. (C.D.Ill.) 2005 WL
3690565, *9-10; Medmarc Cas. Ins. Co. v. Arrow Internat’l Inc. (E.D.Pa.) 2002
WL 1870452, * 3; Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. (N.D.Tex)
1995 WL 861147, *2; FDIC v. Marsiglia (E.D.La.) 1992 WL 300830, *1; Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co. (E.D.Pa.) 1991 WL 237636, *2;
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co. (D.D.C. 1990) 136
F.R.D. 1, 2.) The cases reflect no judicial concern over any resulting burden on
nonparty reinsurers. Thus, the majority’s suggestion that allowing discovery of
reinsurance would lead to abuse and absurdity seems not to have been borne out
by experience. 4 (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16-17.) While any discovery process is
susceptible to abuse, a protective order is the answer provided by statute.
(§ 2017.020.)
I agree with the majority that section 2017.210 does not “authorize broad
discovery of the financial health of the liability insurer or its ability to meet its
contractual obligations under its policies.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) The statute
permits only limited discovery of “the existence and contents” of an insurance
policy, including “the nature and limits of the coverage.” (§ 2017.210.) No
general exposure of insurers’ assets is at issue. Reinsurance is a unique kind of
asset; it is not fungible, and is designed solely to respond to liability. (Cf. Pettie v.
4 Here, there can be little doubt that petitioners have, for their own
purposes, marshalled the reinsurance available to meet the Church’s potentially
massive liability in the molestation litigation. Moreover, Catholic Relief
Insurance Company, like any insurer, must make detailed disclosures of its
reinsurance policies to the Insurance Commissioner in order to claim those
policies as assets. (Ins. Code, § 922.1 et seq.) Complying with plaintiffs’ request
for discovery of the Church’s reinsurance policies would not appear to be unduly
burdensome.
4
Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 689-690.) Most importantly, it is
expressly included by the terms of section 2017.210. An insurer that chooses to
back up its policies with a discoverable asset is in no position to complain about
disclosure.
The majority creates an exception for discovery of reinsurance agreements
that are “directly on the risk to satisfy a judgment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.) In
such a case, the majority acknowledges that discovery of the policy “would be
appropriate.” (Id. at p. 18.)5 No statutory authority is offered for this exception.
Nor is there any need for it; the discovery statutes should simply be applied as
they are written. Reinsurance is plainly discoverable under section 2017.210. If
the insurer objects, it may seek a protective order under section 2017.020.

CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
5 The majority also recognizes a “narrow exception[]” permitting
discovery of a reinsurance policy that is the subject matter of the litigation, as in a
coverage dispute between a liability insurer and its reinsurer. (Maj. opn., ante, at
p. 18.) However, no exception is required in this circumstance; any policy that is
“relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” is discoverable as a
matter of right under section 2017.010, without resort to the provisions of section
2017.210.
5



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Catholic Mutual Relief Society v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 128 Cal.App.4th 879
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S134545
Date Filed: August 27, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Peter D. Lichtman

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Borton, Petrini & Conron, Rocky K. Copley, Jonathan P. Geen and Paul Kissel for Petitioners.

Hancock Rothert & Bunshoft, Paul J. Killion, Heidi H. Frenzel, Kathryn C. Ashton and Allegra A. Jones
for Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Certain London Market Insurance and Reinsurance
Companies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.

Kiesel Boucher & Larson, Raymond P. Boucher, Patrick DeBlase and Anthony M. DeMarco for Real
Parties in Interest.


1



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Jonathan P. Geen
Borton, Petrini & Conron
402 West Broadway, Suite 880
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 232-2424

Raymond P. Boucher
Kiesel Boucher & Larson
8648 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA 90211
(310) 854-4444

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 08/27/2007S134545

Parties
1Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Anthony Michael Demarco
Klesel Boucher & Larson, LLP
8648 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA

2Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Raymond Paul Boucher
Kiesel Boucher & Larson, LLP
8648 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA

3Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Respondent)
4Catholic Mutual Relief Society (Petitioner)
Represented by Rocky Copley
Borton Petrini, LLP
402 W. Broadway, Suite 880
San Diego, CA

5Catholic Mutual Relief Society (Petitioner)
Represented by Jonathan Paul Geen
Borton Petrini, LLP
402 W. Broadway, Suite 880
San Diego, CA

6Plaintiffs in the Clergy Cases II (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Anthony Michael Demarco
Klesel Boucher & Larson, LLP
8648 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA

7Certain Underwrites at Lloyd's, London (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Kathryn C. Ashton
Duane Morris, LLP
1 Market Plaza, Spear Street Tower #2000
San Francisco, CA

8Certain London Market Insurance & Reinsurance Companies (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Kathryn C. Ashton
Duane Morris, LLP
1 Market Plaza, Spear Street Tower #2000
San Francisco, CA

9Catholic Relief Insurance Company of America (Petitioner)
Represented by Rocky Copley
Borton Petrini & Conron, LLP
402 W. Broadway, Suite 880
San Diego, CA

10Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Susan Lynn Oliver
White & Oliver
550 W "C" St #950
San Diego, CA


Disposition
Aug 27 2007Opinion: Affirmed with directions

Dockets
Jun 7 2005Petition for review filed
  real parties Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego, etal [entitled"Plaintiffs in the Clergy Cases II" [rule 40.1]
Jun 7 2005Request for judicial notice received (pre-grant)
  real parties Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Diego, etal
Jun 8 2005Received Court of Appeal record
 
Jun 17 2005Received:
  amended p.o.s. from RpI for petition for review.
Jun 24 2005Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  RPI Roman Catholic Archdiocese
Jun 27 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  Petitioners ( Catholic Mutual Relief Society).
Jun 27 2005Received:
  Petitioner's ( Catholic Mutual Relief) opposition to request for judicial notice
Jul 1 2005Received:
  Petitioner's ( Catholic Mutual Relief) opposition to request for depublication request of RPI Roman Catholic Archdiocese
Jul 27 2005Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 11 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  RPI ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN DIEGO
Aug 26 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  RPI Roman Catholic Archdiocese
Sep 23 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  By counsel for Catholic Mutual Relief Society and Catholic Relief Insurance Company of America
Oct 13 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  by real party in interest Roman Catholic Archdiocese
Nov 14 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and Certain London Market Insurance and Reinsurance Companies in support of petitioner.
Nov 17 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Certain Underwriters at Lloys's London, Certain London Market Ins. and Reinsurance Companies in support of petitiioners. Answer due within 20 days.
Nov 17 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, Certain London Market Ins. and Reinsurance Companies in support of petitioners.
Jan 24 2006Change of contact information filed for:
  counsel for A/C Certain Underwriters at Lloyds et al. Firm name changed to Duane Morris LLP.
Mar 30 2006Change of contact information filed for:
  address for law firm of Duane Morris, counsel for A/C Certain Underwriters at Lloyds
May 2 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Wednesday, May 30, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
May 15 2007Notice of bankruptcy stay filed
  petitioners' faxed request
May 15 2007Letter sent to:
  (faxed) Raymond Boucher (for RPI Roman Catholic Diocese) and Susan Oliver (for RPI Roman Catholic Bishop) requesting responses to the stay request. They are due in the S.F. office by 1pm on 5/18.
May 17 2007Filed:
  response to bankruptcy/stay request Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego, RPI Susan Oliver, counsel (faxed)
May 17 2007Request for judicial notice granted
  Real Parties in Interest's request for judicial notice of the Best Insurance Report, filed on July 7, 2005, is granted.
May 18 2007Filed:
  response to bankruptcy/stay request Roman Catholic Archdiocese, RPI Raymond Boucher, counsel Included is a request to remove the case from the oral argument cal. (faxed)
May 23 2007Order filed
  The request of Catholic Mutual Relief Society and Catholic Relief Insurance Company of America to stay proceedings in the above-captioned matter pending further order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California, in bankruptcy case number 07-00939-11, is denied. Oral argument in this matter will proceed as scheduled on May 30, 2007.
May 30 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Aug 24 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Aug 27 2007Opinion filed: Affirmed in full with directions
  and remanded to C/A for further proceedings. Majority opinion by Baxter, J. ---------------joined by George, C.J., Chin, Moreno, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J.----joined by Kennard, J., Werdegar, J.
Sep 27 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Oct 11 2007Note:
  case record being sent back to C/A

Briefs
Aug 26 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Sep 23 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 13 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Nov 17 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
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