Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/24/06 (This opn. should precede companion case, S132433, also filed 7/24/06)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIANS FOR DISABILITY
RIGHTS,
S131798
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Ct.App. 1/4 A106199
v.
Alameda County
MERVYN’S, LLC,
Super. Ct. No. 2002-051738
)

Defendant and Respondent.

California law previously authorized any person acting for the general public
to sue for relief from unfair competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 1 former § 17204, as
amended by Stats. 1993, ch. 926, § 2, p. 5198 (former section 17204); see also
Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 561; cf.
Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35
Cal.3d 197, 211.) After Proposition 64, which the voters approved at the
November 2, 2004, General Election, a private person has standing to sue only if
he or she “has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of
such unfair competition.” (§ 17204, as amended by Prop. 64, § 3; see also
§ 17203, as amended by Prop. 64, § 2.) This case requires us to decide whether

1
All further statutory citations are to the Business and Professions Code,
except as noted.

---

the amended standing provisions apply to cases already pending when Proposition
64 took effect. We hold the new provisions do apply to pending cases.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), a nonprofit corporation,
sued defendant Mervyn’s, LLC (Mervyn’s), a corporation that owns and operates
department stores, for alleged violations of the unfair competition law. (§ 17200
et seq.) CDR alleged that pathways between fixtures and shelves in Mervyn’s
stores were too close to permit access by persons who use mobility aids such as
wheelchairs, scooters, crutches and walkers. CDR did not claim to have suffered
any harm as a result of Mervyn’s conduct. Instead, CDR purported to sue on
behalf of the general public under former section 17204. As relief, CDR sought an
order declaring Mervyn’s practices to be unlawful, an injunction barring those
practices and requiring remedial action, CDR’s costs and expenses of suit, and
attorneys’ fees. Following a bench trial, the superior court entered judgment for
Mervyn’s. CDR appealed.
On November 3, 2004, while the appeal was pending, Proposition 64 took
effect, having been approved by the voters the preceding day. (See Cal. Const.,
art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) Mervyn’s moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the
measure eliminated CDR’s standing to prosecute the action. The Court of Appeal
denied the motion, holding that Proposition 64’s standing provisions did not apply
to cases pending when the measure took effect. We granted Mervyn’s petition for
review.
II. DISCUSSION
As mentioned, California’s statutory unfair competition law (§ 17200 et seq.)
(hereafter the UCL) previously authorized “any person acting for the interests of
itself, its members or the general public” (former § 17204) to file a civil action for
relief. Standing to bring such an action did not depend on a showing of injury or
2

---

damage. (See Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,
supra, 35 Cal.3d 197, 211; cf. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
supra, 17 Cal.4th 553, 561.)
In Proposition 64, as stated in the measure’s preamble, the voters found and
declared that the UCL’s broad grant of standing had encouraged “[f]rivolous
unfair competition lawsuits [that] clog our courts[,] cost taxpayers” and “threaten[]
the survival of small businesses . . . .” (Prop. 64, § 1, subd. (c) [“Findings and
Declarations of Purpose”].) The former law, the voters determined, had been
“misused by some private attorneys who” “[f]ile frivolous lawsuits as a means of
generating attorneys’ fees without creating a corresponding public benefit,” “[f]ile
lawsuits where no client has been injured in fact,” “[f]ile lawsuits for clients who
have not used the defendant’s product or service, viewed the defendant’s
advertising, or had any other business dealing with the defendant,” and “[f]ile
lawsuits on behalf of the general public without any accountability to the public
and without adequate court supervision.” (Prop. 64, § 1, subd. (b)(1)-(4).) “[T]he
intent of California voters in enacting” Proposition 64 was to limit such abuses by
“prohibit[ing] private attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where
they have no client who has been injured in fact” (id., § 1, subd. (e)) and by
providing “that only the California Attorney General and local public officials be
authorized to file and prosecute actions on behalf of the general public” (id., § 1,
subd. (f)).
Proposition 64 accomplishes its goals in relatively few words. The measure
amends section 17204, which prescribes who may sue to enforce the UCL, by
deleting the language that had formerly authorized suits by any person “acting for
the interests of itself, its members or the general public,” and by replacing it with
the phrase, “who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a
result of unfair competition.” The measure also amends section 17203, which
3

---

authorizes courts to enjoin unfair competition, by adding the following words:
“Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if
the claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with
Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but these limitations do not apply to
claims brought under this chapter by the Attorney General, or any district attorney,
county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this state.” (§ 17203.)2
Proposition 64 does not expressly declare whether the new standing
provisions it adds to the UCL apply to pending cases. Mervyn’s argument that the
measure does so declare is unconvincing. According to Mervyn’s, the electorate
expressed its understanding that the new standing provisions apply to pending
cases by stating in section 17204 that suits under the unfair competition laws
“shall be prosecuted exclusively” (italics added) by the persons therein given
standing. Mervyn’s argues the word “prosecuted” is broad enough to describe the
continued prosecution of actions filed before the measure took effect. (Cf.
Melancon v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 698, 707-708 [describing the term
“prosecution” in a different context as “ ‘sufficiently comprehensive to include
every step in an action from its commencement to its final determination’ ”].)
Mervyn’s would find similar indications of the voters’ intent in the measure’s
preamble, which declares that “the intent of California voters” was “to eliminate

2
Proposition 64 also makes changes that do not affect this case.
Specifically, the measure provides that any civil penalties imposed under the UCL,
which now as before are recoverable only in actions brought by public officials
(§ 17206, subd. (a)), are “for the excusive use by the Attorney General, the district
attorney, the county counsel, and the city attorney for the enforcement of
consumer protection laws” (§ 17206, subd. (c), as amended by Prop. 64, § 4; see
also § 17206, subd. (e)). Proposition 64 also makes identical changes to the false
advertising law (§ 17500 et seq.) concerning standing to sue and the use of
penalties. (See §§ 17535, 17536, subd. (c), as amended by Prop. 64, §§ 5, 6.)

4

---

frivolous unfair competition lawsuits” (Prop. 64, § 1, subd. (d), italics added) and
to ensure “that only the California Attorney General and local public officials be
authorized to file and prosecute actions on behalf of the general public” (id., § 1,
subd. (f), italics added). Mervyn’s also relies on the ballot argument favoring the
measure, which urged the voters to “[c]lose the frivolous shakedown lawsuit
loophole.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004), argument in favor of Prop.
64, p. 40.)
Certainly the foregoing statements would be consistent with an assumed
intention to apply Proposition 64’s standing provisions to pending cases. The
language is not, however, sufficiently clear to compel the inference that the voters
did intend the provisions so to apply. The UCL’s reference to the “prosecution” of
actions appears in a part of section 17204 that Proposition 64 did not change.
Moreover, at least in modern times, we have been cautious not to infer the voters’
or the Legislature’s intent on the subject of prospective versus retrospective
operation from “vague phrases” (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 828, 843 (Myers)) and “broad, general language” (Evangelatos v.
Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209, fn. 13 (Evangelatos)) in statutes,
initiative measures and ballot pamphlets. We have also disapproved statements to
the contrary in certain older cases. (See Evangelatos, at pp. 1208-1209,
disapproving language In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587,
Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686-687, and In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746.) Accordingly, we will not attempt to infer from the
ambiguous general language of Proposition 64 whether the voters intended the
measure to apply to pending cases. Instead, we will employ the ordinary
presumptions and rules of statutory construction commonly used to decide such
matters when a statute is silent.
5

---

CDR, arguing the new standing provisions do not apply to pending cases,
relies on the “well-established presumption that statutes apply prospectively in the
absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent . . . .” (Evangelatos, supra, 44
Cal.3d 1188, 1218; see also Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30
Cal.2d 388, 393 (Aetna Casualty).) In response, and assuming for the sake of
argument the cited presumption governs this case, Mervyn’s contends the
application of Proposition 64’s standing provisions to pending cases is not
“retroactive,” as we have defined the term, because such application does not
change the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different
liabilities based upon such conduct. (See Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915,
937 (Elsner); Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 291 (Tapia); cf.
Aetna Casualty, supra, at pp. 394-395.)
When a statute’s application to a given case is challenged as impermissibly
retroactive, we typically begin our analysis by reiterating the presumption that
statutes operate prospectively absent a clear indication the voters or the
Legislature intended otherwise. (E.g., Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 915, 936; Myers,
supra, 28 Cal.4th 828, 840; Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 287; Evangelatos, supra,
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207; Aetna Casualty, supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 393.) The
presumption embodies “ ‘ “[t]he first rule of construction[, namely,] that
legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past.” ’ ”
(Evangelatos, at p. 1207, italics omitted, quoting United States v. Security
Industrial Bank (1982) 459 U.S. 70, 79; see also Myers, at p. 840.)
Having articulated the presumption, “[t]here remains the question of what the
terms ‘prospective’ and ‘retroactive’ mean.” (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 288.)
We recently reviewed this subject in Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 951: “In deciding
whether the application of a law is prospective or retroactive, we look to function,
not form. (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 289; Aetna Casualty, supra, 30 Cal.2d at
6

---

p. 394.) We consider the effect of a law on a party’s rights and liabilities, not
whether a procedural or substantive label best applies. Does the law ‘change[] the
legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different liabilities based
upon such conduct[?]’ (Tapia, at p. 291.) Does it ‘substantially affect[] existing
rights and obligations[?]’ (Aetna Casualty, at p. 395.) If so, then application to a
trial of preenactment conduct is forbidden, absent an express legislative intent to
permit such retroactive application. If not, then application to a trial of preenact-
ment conduct is permitted, because the application is prospective.” (Elsner, at
pp. 936-937.) Viewed functionally, a statute that establishes rules for the conduct
of pending litigation without changing the legal consequences of past conduct
“ ‘ “is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its
enactment . . . . [Instead,] [t]he effect of such statutes is actually prospective in
nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future.” [Citations.]
For this reason, we have said that “it is a misnomer to designate [such statutes] as
having retrospective effect.” ’ ” (Elsner, at p. 936, quoting Tapia, at pp. 288.)
Applying these rules in illustrative cases, we have found to be retroactive,
and thus impermissible, the application of new statutes to pending cases in ways
that would have: (a) expanded contractors’ tort liability for past conduct by
imposing broader duties than existed under the common law (Elsner, supra, 34
Cal.4th 915, 937-938); (b) subjected tobacco sellers to tort liability for acts
performed at a time when they enjoyed the protection of an immunity statute
(Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th 828, 840); and (c) subjected persons to increased
punishment for past criminal conduct, or to punishment for past conduct not
formerly defined as criminal (Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 297-299). In each of
these cases, application of the new law to pending cases would improperly have
changed the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or different
liabilities based upon such conduct. (See Elsner, at p. 937.)
7

---

In contrast, courts have found to be prospective, and thus permissible, the
application to pending cases of new statutes: (a) requiring plaintiffs suing under
an environmental law to provide a certificate of merit (In re Vaccine Cases (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 438, 454-456); (b) eliminating the right under the Anti-SLAPP
law (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16, 425.17) to dismiss certain public-interest
lawsuits (Brenton v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 688-
691); and (c) eliminating the right to appeal (as distinguished from the right to file
a petition for writ of mandate) from a superior court’s decision upholding the
Medical Board of California’s decision to revoke a physician’s license (Landau v.
Superior Court (1998) 81 Cal.App.4th 191, 213-216). In each of these cases,
application of the new law to pending cases properly governed the conduct of
proceedings following the law’s enactment without changing the legal conse-
quences of past conduct. (See Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 915, 937.)
To apply Proposition 64’s standing provisions to the case before us is not to
apply them “retroactively,” as we have defined that term, because the measure
does not change the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing new or
different liabilities based on such conduct.3 (See Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 915,
937.) The measure left entirely unchanged the substantive rules governing
business and competitive conduct. Nothing a business might lawfully do before
Proposition 64 is unlawful now, and nothing earlier forbidden is now permitted.
Nor does the measure eliminate any right to recover. Now, as before, no one may
recover damages under the UCL (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2

3
Given this conclusion, we need not reach Mervyn’s additional argument
that Proposition 64 applies to pending cases under the statutory repeal rule, i.e.,
the rule “that an action wholly dependent on statute abates if the statute is repealed
without a saving clause before the judgment is final.” (Younger v. Superior Court
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 109.)
8

---

Cal.4th 1254, 1266), and now, as before, a private person may recover restitution
only of those profits that the defendant has unfairly obtained from such person or
in which such person has an ownership interest (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144-1150).
Proposition 64 does prevent uninjured private persons from suing for
restitution on behalf of others. This is a consequence of section 17203 (as
amended by Prop. 64, § 2), which provides that “[a]ny person may pursue
representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the
standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the
Code of Civil Procedure . . . .” 4 In effect, section 17203, as amended, withdraws
the standing of persons who have not been harmed to represent those who have.
But the section need not for that reason be described as operating retroactively.
For a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist at all times
until judgment is entered and not just on the date the complaint is filed.
“[C]ontentions based on a lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges and
may be raised at any time in the proceeding.” (Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438; see also Associated Builders &

4
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 provides: “If the consent of any one
who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a
defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question
is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all.” We have held that “[s]ection 382
. . . authorizes class suits in California . . . . The burden is on the party seeking
certification to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-
defined community of interest among the class members.” (Washington Mutual
Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913.) Section 382 has also been
interpreted as permitting associations to sue on behalf of their members. (Raven’s
Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Development Co. (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 783,
793.)
9

---

Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361;
McKinny v. Board of Trustees (1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 90.)
CDR argues that to apply Proposition 64’s standing rules to pending cases
“would significantly impair the settled rights and expectations of the parties to
continue prosecution of their actions.” But the only rights and expectations
Proposition 64 impairs hardly bear comparison with the important right the
presumption of prospective operation is classically intended to protect, namely, the
right to have liability-creating conduct evaluated under the liability rules in effect
at the time the conduct occurred. (See Elsner, supra, 34 Cal.4th 915, 936-937;
Myers, supra, 28 Cal.4th 828, 839; Aetna Casualty, supra, 30 Cal.2d 388, 393-
395.) Proposition 64 may, as applied to cases in which uninjured persons have
volunteered to act as private attorneys general, defeat such persons’ hope of
recovering attorneys’ fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. But
CDR does not argue that their hope of recovering fees has any relevance to the
issue before us. In any event, section 1021.5 confers no right to fees until a
plaintiff has, among other things, been “successful . . . in [an] action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,”
conferred “a significant benefit . . . on the general public or a large class of
persons,” and persuaded a court to exercise its discretion to award fees.
Proposition 64 might also be viewed as defeating CDR’s civic or philosophical
interest in enforcing the UCL as an uninjured, volunteer plaintiff. But CDR has
cited no case applying the presumption of prospective operation to protect an
interest so abstract. Given that the interest in suing on another’s behalf is not a
property right beyond statutory control (see Hogan v. Ingold (1952) 38 Cal.2d
802, 809 [shareholder’s derivative action]), to deny full effect to an initiative
measure in which the voters have chosen their own legal representatives for cases
10

---

brought ostensibly on their behalf cannot be defended as a plausible interpretation
of the measure.5
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.

5
Proposition 64’s standing provisions also apply to this case for the
additional reason that CRD seeks only injunctive relief. As we recently explained,
“it is clear under a long and uniform line of California precedents that the validity
of [a] judgment [concerning injunctive relief] must be determined on the basis of
the current statutory provisions, rather than on the basis of the statutory provisions
that were in effect at the time the injunctive order was entered. . . . ‘Because relief
by injunction operates in the future, appeals of injunctions are governed by the law
in effect at the time the appellate court gives its decision.’ [Citations.]” (Marine
Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 23; see also
Koebke v. Bernardo Heights County Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 837; Tulare Dist.
v. Lindsay-Strathmore Dist. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 489, 527-528.)
11

---

MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

12

---

See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 126 Cal.App.4th 386
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S131798
Date Filed: July 24, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Henry Needham, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Rosen, Bien & Asaro, Andrea G. Asaro, Holly M. Baldwin; Zelle, Hofmann, Voelbel, Mason & Gette,
Daniel S. Mason; Disability Rights Advocates, Sidney Wolinsky, Monica Goracke, Laurence W. Paradis;
The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant and Monique Olivier for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Robinson, Calcagnie & Robinson, Sharon J. Arkin; Arias, Ozzello & Gignac and H. Scott Leviant for
Consumer Attorneys of California, Janice Duran and Julia Ramos as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Appellant.

Lexington Law Group, Mark N. Todzo, Eric S. Somers and Lynne R. Saxton for California League for
Environmental Enforcement Now as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bramson, Plutzik, Mahler & Birkhaeuser, Robert M. Bramson; and Leslie A. Brueckner for National
Association of Consumer Advocates and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of Richard R. Wiebe and Richard R. Wiebe for Center for Biological Diversity, Inc.,
Environmental Protection Information Center and Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Thomas Osborne, Michael Schuster and Barbara Jones for AARP as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Morrison & Foerster, David F. McDowell, John Sobieski, Linda E. Shostak and Gloria Y. Lee for
Defendant and Respondent.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Roy G. Weatherup, David N. Makous, Eric J. Erickson and Leo Bautista
for ReadyLink HealthCare, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

---

Page 2 - S131798 – counsel continued

Attorneys for Respondent:

Fred J. Hiestand for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant
and Respondent.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Ronald L. Olson, Steven B. Weisburd and Dean N. Kawamoto for the California
Chamber of Commerce, the California Bankers Association, the California Financial Services Association,
the California Manufacturers & Technology Association and the California Motor Car Dealers Association
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Paul E. B. Glad, Thomas E. McDonald and Jennifer A. Bushoft for
Association of California Insurance Companies and American Insurance Association as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Paul J. Beard III for Pacific Legal Foundation and Central California Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Heller Ehrman, Vanessa Wells, Warrington S. Parker III and Daniel K. Slaughter for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, The Hertz Corporation and Visa U.S.A. Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Defendant and Respondent.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Gail E. Lees, Kirk A. Patrick, G. Charles Nierlich and Christopher Chorba for
Express Scripts, Inc., National Prescription Administrators, Inc., Aetna Health of California Inc., and Aetna
Life Insurance Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Neal T. Wiener and Neal T. Wiener for Jarrow Formulas, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf
of Defendant and Respondent.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

James C. Sturdevant
The Sturdevant Law Firm
475 Sansome Street, Suite 1750
San Francisco, CA 94111-3141
(415) 477-2410

David F. McDowell
Morrison & Foerster
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1024
(213) 892-5200

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 07/24/2006	S131798

Disposition
Jul 24 2006	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Feb 28 2005	Opposition filed   by aplts
Feb 28 2005	Request for depublication filed (initial case event)   by Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Inc. on behalf of Non-Parties Covenant Care California, Inc., GranCare, LLC, and the additional parties represented
Mar 14 2005	Petition for review filed   by resp c/a rec req
Apr 1 2005	Answer to petition for review filed   by counsel for aplt. (Californians for Disability Rights)
Apr 6 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/briefs/appendices/one box
Apr 11 2005	Reply to answer to petition filed   by resp
Apr 27 2005	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
May 10 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for aplt. (Californians for Disability Rights)
May 17 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for Mervyns, LLC
May 31 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   by resp (40.1b)
Jun 9 2005	Request for extension of time filed   for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits, to 7-14-05.
Jun 13 2005	Extension of time granted   to 7-14-05 for aplt to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jul 14 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   by appellant
Jul 28 2005	Request for extension of time filed   by respondent to file the reply brief on the merits, to 8-17-05.
Aug 3 2005	Extension of time granted   to 8-17-05 for respondent to file the reply brief on the merits.
Aug 17 2005	Notice of substitution of counsel   Laurence W. Paradis in place of Sidney Wolinsky (appellant)
Aug 23 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by AARP in support of appellant, with brief.
Aug 23 2005	Received:   untimely Reply brief on the merits. (sent to justices for approval)
Aug 23 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by respondent Mervyns. (late filing permitted)
Aug 31 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by AARP in support of appellant. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Aug 31 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by AARP in support of appellant.
Sep 14 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by the National Association of Consumer Advocates and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in support of Appellant
Sep 15 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   from the Calif. Chamber of Commerce, Calif. Bankers Assn., Calif. Financial Services Assn., Calif. Manufacturers & Technology Assn., and Calif. Motor Car Dealers Assn. in support of Resp. with brief
Sep 15 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by Calif. League for Environmental Enforcement in support of Appellant. with brief
Sep 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   respondent [Mervyn's LLC] to AC/brief of AARP.
Sep 21 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by Center for Biological Diversity Inc., Environmental ProtectionInformation Center and Electronic Frontier Foundation in support of Appellant. with brief
Sep 22 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by Association of Calif. Insurance Companies and American Insurance Association in support of respondent. with brief
Sep 22 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., The Hertz Corp. and Visa U.S.A. Inc. in support of respondent. with brief.
Sep 22 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   on behalf of a/c EXPRESS SCRIPTS INC., NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION ADMINISTRATORS, AETNA HEALTH OF CALIFORNIA INC. & AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Sep 22 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by Pacific Legal Foundation and Central Calif. Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse in support of Respondent. with brief
Sep 22 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   on behalf of CONSUMER ATTORNEYS OF CALIFORNIA, JANICE DURAN & JULIA RAMOS
Sep 23 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by the Civil Justice Association of Calif. in support of respondent. with brief. (40.1b)
Sep 23 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by ReadyLink Healthcare Inc. in support of respondent. with brief (40.1b)
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Center for Biological Diversity, Inc., et al in support of appellant. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Center for Biological Diversity et al in support of appellant
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Consumer Attorneys of California et al in support of appellant. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by Consumer Attorneys of California et al in support of aplt.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al in support of appellant. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Nat. Assn. of Consumer Advocates in support of aplt.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Calif. League for Environmental Enforcement Now in support of aplt. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Calif. League for Environmental Enforcement Now in support of aplt.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Civil Justice Association of California in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Civil Justice Association of California in support of respondent.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by ExpressScripts Inc. et al. in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by ExpressScripts et al in support of respondent
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al. in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance et al in support of respondent.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Pacific Legal Foundation et al in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Pacific Legal Foundation et al in support of resp.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by ReadyLink Healthcare Inc. in support of resp. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by ReadyLink Healthcare Inc. in support of resp.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the California Chamber of Commerce et al. in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Calif. Chamber of Commerce et al. in support of resp.
Sep 29 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   by the Association of California Insurance Companies et al. in support of respondent. Answers may be filed w/in 20 days.
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Association of California Insurance Companies et al in support of respondent.
Oct 11 2005	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   by Jarrow Formula, Inc., in support of respondent Mervyns LLC app/brief under same cover.
Oct 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   on behalf of respondent MERVYN'S, LLC by counsel to a/c brief of CONSUMER ATTORNEYS OF CALIFORNIA, et al. (40.1)
Oct 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by counsel for appellant (Californians for Disability Rights) - filed with permission
Oct 20 2005	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Jarrow Formulas, Inc., in support of respondent.
Oct 20 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed   Jarrow Formulas, Inc., in support of respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Nov 9 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by aplt to the A/C brief of Jarrow Formulas
Nov 30 2005	Change of contact information filed for:   appellants. (counsel Disability Rights Advocates)
May 2 2006	Case ordered on calendar   May 31, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
May 22 2006	Change of contact information filed for:   for Sharon J. Arkin.
May 31 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 24 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Opinion filed: Werdegar,J. -----joined by George,C.J.,Kennard,Baxter,Chin, and Moreno, JJ. CA First Appellate District - Division Four
Aug 8 2006	Rehearing petition filed   Californians for Disability Rights, appellant by James C. Strdevant, counsel
Aug 10 2006	Time extended to consider modification or rehearing   to and including October 20, 2006, or the date upon which rehearing is either granted or denied, whichever occurs first.
Aug 16 2006	Answer to rehearing petition filed   Respondent Mervyn's LLC Attorneys David F. McDowell, etal
Aug 30 2006	Rehearing denied   Request for modification denied.
Aug 30 2006	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Mar 27 2007	Returned record   Court of Appeal - First District three (3) doghouses - volume 1 & 2 = clerk and reporters transcript/ volume 3 = appelants appendix

Briefs
May 31 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 14 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 23 2005	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Aug 31 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 29 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 20 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 20 2005	Amicus curiae brief filed
Nov 9 2005	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website