IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT A. BORISSOFF,
as Executor, etc.,
S105600
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Ct.App. 1/2 A093450, A094395
v.
San Francisco County
TAYLOR & FAUST et al.,
Super. Ct. No. 995058
)
Defendants and Respondents. )
This case raises the question whether the successor fiduciary of an estate in
probate may assert a professional negligence claim against attorneys retained by a
predecessor fiduciary to provide tax assistance for the benefit of the estate. We
hold the successor fiduciary may do so.
I. BACKGROUND
Testator Veronica M. Smith died on June 16, 1989, leaving two wills, one
executed in 1983 and the other in 1987.1 The 1987 will named plaintiff Robert A.
Borissoff as executor. Decedent’s grandniece filed an action in probate court to
contest the 1987 will. Pending resolution of the contest, the court appointed Paul
Springer, an attorney and former probate commissioner, as special administrator.
Springer retained defendants, the law firm of Taylor & Faust (hereafter Faust, or
the Faust defendants), to provide assistance on tax matters. In their retention letter
1
The issue before us was submitted to the superior court for decision on
stipulated facts. Our statement of the facts is drawn from that stipulation and the
supporting documents to which the stipulation refers.
to Springer, the Faust defendants recited that they had “agreed to prepare the
Federal and California estate tax returns and the fiduciary income tax returns for
the estate, to provide [Springer] with tax planning advice concerning the estate and
to perform any other legal services which [Springer] request[s].” Springer
accepted “on behalf of the Estate of Veronica M. Smith . . . .” Faust subsequently
filed federal and state tax returns for the estate, and the court approved payment
from the estate of their fees.
At some point, Springer borrowed approximately $115,000 from the estate
for personal reasons, without authorization. On November 3, 1992, Springer
wrote an emotional letter to the Faust defendants, confessing the misappropriation
and asking for their help in keeping him “out of trouble.” Faust attempted to help
Springer borrow money to repay the estate, but without success. On February 2,
1993, Faust informed Springer that the firm had “decided not to represent
[Springer] any longer in [his] capacity as administrator of the [Smith] estate.”
Springer died on May 28, 1993. In July 1993, Faust turned over the estate’s file to
defendant Burton McGovern, an attorney. McGovern wrote to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), noting that he had received the estate’s file and, after
reviewing it, would “attempt to resolve any problems that might exist.”
McGovern asked the IRS to “address all communications” concerning the estate to
him.
September 14, 1993, was the last day for the estate to file IRS form 843,
which would have extended for three years the estate’s right to claim a tax refund.
The form was not filed. As a result, the estate lost the ability to claim a refund for
substantial administrative expenses related to the will contest.
On September 26, 1995, the court decided the will contest in favor of the
1987 will and thereafter appointed plaintiff Borissoff as executor. On November
21, 1995, Borissoff’s attorney wrote McGovern, expressing “concern[] that the
2
requisite annual filing [of IRS form 843] may not have taken place” and asking
McGovern to address the question. As mentioned, the form had not been filed.
Based on that omission, plaintiff filed the instant suit for malpractice against Faust
and McGovern on May 14, 1998. Defendants cross-complained against one
another. All defendants asserted against plaintiff, as affirmative defenses, that
defendants owed no duty as attorneys to plaintiff, with whom they did not stand in
privity of contract, and that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff’s claims. To
simplify the issues for trial, the parties agreed to submit those two defenses to an
assigned judge for resolution based on stipulated facts. The judge decided both
defenses against plaintiff and granted judgment for defendants. The Court of
Appeal agreed that plaintiff lacked standing to sue defendants and affirmed the
superior court’s judgment on that basis, without reaching the statute of limitations
issue. We granted plaintiff’s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
In granting review, we limited briefing and argument to the issue raised in
the petition for review: “May a successor fiduciary [2] of an estate in probate
assert a professional negligence claim against tax counsel whom a predecessor
fiduciary engaged exclusively to perform tax work for the estate?” The question is
one of first impression in California. We answer it in the affirmative. 3
Defendant attorneys contend they owed a duty, and are answerable in
malpractice, only to the person who retained them and with whom they stand in
privity of contract. The person who retained the Faust defendants was Springer,
[2] We use the generic term “fiduciary” rather than the more specific terms
“trustee,” “executor” and “personal representative,” unless the context requires the
distinction.
3
We direct the Court of Appeal, on remand, to address plaintiff’s additional
claim that the superior court erred in holding that the statute of limitations (Code
Civ. Proc., § 340.6, subd. (a)) bars this action. On this issue we intimate no view.
3
the predecessor fiduciary.4 To be sure, an attorney will normally be held liable for
malpractice only to the client with whom the attorney stands in privity of contract,
and not to third parties. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 342-344.)
Furthermore, when a fiduciary hires an attorney for guidance in administering a
trust, the fiduciary alone, in his or her capacity as fiduciary, is the attorney’s client.
(Moeller v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1130 (Moeller); Fletcher v.
Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 773, 777.) The trust is not the client,
because “a trust is not a person but rather ‘a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property.’ ” (Moeller, at p. 1132, fn. 3, quoting Rest.2d Trusts, § 2, italics in
Moeller.) Neither is the beneficiary the client, because fiduciaries and
beneficiaries are separate persons with distinct legal interests. (Wells Fargo Bank
v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 201, 212; Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter v.
Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 264, 282-286.)
While Borissoff does not stand in privity of contract with defendants, he
nevertheless argues that three sources of law support his claim to standing. The
first is the Probate Code, which defines the powers of fiduciaries and successor
fiduciaries. (See id., §§ 8524, 9820, 10801.) 5 The second is our decision in
Moeller, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1129-1135), in which we held that a successor
fiduciary, upon taking office, becomes the holder of the attorney-client privilege
for certain confidential communications between the predecessor fiduciary and an
attorney on the subject of trust administration. The third is the set of judicial
decisions articulating the circumstances under which someone not a party to a
contract may sue to enforce it as a third party beneficiary. (E.g., Lucas v. Hamm
4
Defendant McGovern denies that he ever represented any predecessor
fiduciary. We leave this undecided factual question to the lower courts on
remand.
5
All citations to statutes are to the Probate Code.
4
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 583 [under specific facts of case, intended recipients of
testamentary gifts were third party beneficiaries of contract between testator and
attorney who wrote will]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 [unlicensed
person acting as attorney, but similar result].)
To determine the question of standing presented here, we need not look
beyond the Probate Code. The code’s relevant provisions strongly support the
inference that a successor fiduciary does have standing to sue an attorney retained
by a predecessor fiduciary to give tax advice for the benefit of the estate. The
code expressly authorizes a personal representative to “employ or retain tax
counsel” (§ 10801, subd. (b)) and to “pay from the funds of the estate for such
services” (ibid.). The code also provides that a “successor personal representative
has the powers and duties in respect to the continued administration that the
former personal representative would have had” (§ 8524, subd. (c)), including the
power to “[c]ommence and maintain actions and proceedings for the benefit of the
estate” (§ 9820, subd. (a)). Reading these provisions together, the following two
conclusions seem inescapable: First, a fiduciary who hires an attorney with estate
funds to provide tax assistance to the estate (§ 10801, subd. (b)), may, if the
attorney commits malpractice harming the estate, commence an action for the
benefit of the estate to recover the loss (§ 9820, subd. (a)). Second, if the fiduciary
who hired the attorney is replaced, the successor acquires the same powers the
predecessor had in respect to trust administration (§ 8524, subd. (c)), including the
power to sue for malpractice. In short, the absence of privity, viewed as an
impediment to standing, is a gap the Legislature has filled.
In this respect, the successor fiduciary’s power to sue for malpractice is no
different than the successor’s power to sue for nonperformance a person hired by
the predecessor to fix the roof of a house belonging to the estate. While privity of
5
contract may not exist, the successor has the same powers and duties as the
predecessor (§ 8524, subd. (c)), including the power to sue.
Arguing for the opposite result, defendants rely on Goldberg v. Frye (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 1258. That decision, however, is not on point. The court in
Goldberg held that the beneficiaries of a trust do not have standing to assert
malpractice claims against an attorney hired by the fiduciary. This conclusion, as
the Goldberg court explained, follows from the general rule that an attorney owes
a duty of care, and is thus answerable in malpractice, only to the client with whom
the attorney stands in privity of contract. (Goldberg v. Frye, supra, at pp. 1267-
1269.) Exceptions have been recognized only rarely, and then only when the
specific facts of the case showed that the beneficiaries who sought standing to sue
the fiduciary’s attorney were intended, third party beneficiaries of the contract to
provide legal services. (E.g., Lucas v. Hamm, supra, 56 Cal.2d 583, 588-590;
Biakanja v. Irving, supra, 49 Cal.2d 647, 648-651; cf. Goldberg v. Frye, supra, at
p. 1268.) The decision in Goldberg, while entirely correct, does not dispose of the
case before us because California law does not equate the successor fiduciary’s
rights with those of the beneficiaries. Instead, as we have explained, the Probate
Code gives successor fiduciaries, but not beneficiaries, the same rights as
predecessor fiduciaries, including the power to sue for malpractice causing loss to
the estate. (See §§ 8524, subd. (c), 9820, subd. (a); see also ante, at p. 5.)
Indeed, the successor fiduciary must have standing to sue the predecessor’s
attorney if there is to be an effective remedy for legal malpractice that harms
estates and trusts administered by successor fiduciaries. Defendants suggest the
probate court may reduce the compensation payable to attorneys found to have
rendered deficient performance on behalf of the estate. (Estate of Kruger (1900)
130 Cal. 621, 626; cf. Estate of Lagios (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 459, 464, fn. 4.)
But such a remedy protects the estate only to the extent of fees yet unpaid, rather
6
than to the extent of any loss caused by malpractice. Defendants also argue the
successor fiduciary may ask the probate court to surcharge the predecessor
fiduciary, who in turn may assert a claim for malpractice against defendants. But
this argument incorrectly assumes that the predecessor fiduciary is strictly liable,
without fault, for losses caused by defendants’ malpractice. To the contrary, a
faultless fiduciary is not liable to surcharge. The Probate Code provides that, “[i]f
the personal representative has acted reasonably and in good faith under the
circumstances as known to the personal representative, the court, in its discretion,
may excuse the personal representative in whole or in part from liability . . . if it
would be equitable to do so.” (§ 9601, subd. (b).) While this provision gives the
court discretion, case law establishes that a court may not surcharge a fiduciary
without substantial evidence that the particular loss was caused by the fiduciary’s
fault. (Estate of Bonaccorsi (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 462, 472.) “Liability [to
surcharge] is predicated upon a finding that the [fiduciary] failed to faithfully
perform the duties of managing the business affairs of the estate ‘with that degree
of prudence and diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected
to bestow upon his own affairs of a like nature.’ ” (Estate of Lagios, supra, 118
Cal.App.3d at p. 464, quoting In re Moore (1892) 96 Cal. 522, 525, italics in
Lagios.) That being so, a court would abuse its discretion by surcharging a
faultless predecessor fiduciary, at the request of a successor, simply to force the
predecessor to sue an allegedly negligent attorney. A discretionary ruling
predicated on a required finding of fact is necessarily an abuse of discretion if no
substantial evidence supports the fact’s existence. (E.g., People v. Superior Court
(Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681-682; People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580,
594-595.)
7
Defendants offer several additional arguments against permitting the
successor fiduciary to sue them for alleged malpractice harming the estate. We
address each in turn.
First, defendants argue that the Probate Code empowers a fiduciary to bring
only “actions and proceedings for the benefit of the estate” (§ 9820, subd. (a),
italics added) and that a fiduciary’s suit against tax counsel for malpractice is an
action for the fiduciary’s personal benefit and not for the benefit of the estate.
With this argument, defendants misread Estate of Lagios, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d
459 (Lagios). The Lagios court did not hold that a civil action by a fiduciary to
recover money owed the trust is for the administrator’s personal benefit rather than
for the benefit of the estate. Instead, the court held only that the probate court has
no power to surcharge a negligent attorney retained by a fiduciary. (Id., at
pp. 462-464) Lagios is correct; the statutory remedy of surcharge (see § 9601) lies
only against fiduciaries. But this does not mean, and Lagios did not hold, that a
fiduciary’s civil action against an attorney for malpractice harming the estate
would not be “for the benefit of the estate” under section 9820, subdivision (a).
To the contrary, the Lagios court noted that “the power to resolve disputes
between the estate and a stranger rests solely within the province of the superior
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.” (Estate of Lagios, supra, 118
Cal.3d at p. 462; see Schlyen v. Schlyen (1954) 43 Cal.2d 361, 372-373.) Thus, to
bring a suit for the benefit of an estate, a fiduciary ordinarily must invoke the
superior court’s general jurisdiction, as the Probate Code contemplates. (§ 9820,
subd. (a).)
Next, defendants contend the predecessor fiduciary’s duties were not
delegable, so the successor fiduciary could not have acquired any right to sue
defendants. The doctrine that a fiduciary’s duties are not delegable, and that the
fiduciary is strictly liable regardless of fault for all losses suffered by the trust, has
8
never been fully embraced by California law. (See, e.g., Estate of Taylor (1877)
52 Cal. 477, 479 [holding that an executor was not justly chargeable with losses
caused by an agent].) Indeed, the code permits a fiduciary to delegate acts the
fiduciary cannot “reasonably be required personally to perform” (§ 16012, subd.
(a)) and permits courts to excuse from liability fiduciaries who have acted
reasonably and in good faith under the circumstances as known to the fiduciary
(§§ 9601, subd. (b) [personal representatives], 16440, subd. (b) [trustees]). As an
example of permissible delegation, the code expressly permits fiduciaries to
“employ or retain tax counsel, tax auditors, accountants, or other tax experts for
the performance of any action which such persons, respectively, may lawfully
perform in the computation, reporting, or making of tax returns, or in negotiations
or litigation which may be necessary for the final determination and payment of
taxes, and pay from the funds of the estate for such services.” (§ 10801, subd. (b),
italics added.) Because a fiduciary must exercise “ ‘that degree of prudence and
diligence which a man of ordinary judgment would be expected to bestow upon
his own affairs of a like nature’ ” (Estate of Beach (1976) 15 Cal.3d 623, 631,
quoting Estate of Moore, supra, 96 Cal. 522, 525), a fiduciary not expert in tax
law would arguably have a duty to retain competent tax counsel, and a
corresponding right to exemption from liability for losses caused solely by
counsel’s negligence.
Arguing for a broad rule of nondelegability, defendants cite Estate of
Spiritos (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 479, and Estate of Guilol (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d
818. But those decisions could not take precedence over the Probate Code, even if
they did support a broad rule of nondelegability. They do not support such a rule,
in any event. In those decisions, fiduciaries were held liable for estate losses
caused by their attorneys because the fiduciaries had completely abdicated their
duties by surrendering to the attorneys the entire administration of the estates.
9
(Estate of Spiritos, at pp. 488-489; Estate of Guilol, at pp. 825-826.) This
limitation on permissive delegation is, itself, found in the Probate Code, alongside
the provisions permitting delegation. (§ 16012, subd. (a) [“The trustee has a duty
not to . . . delegate the entire administration of the trust to a cotrustee or other
person.”].) No one contends that Springer surrendered all of his fiduciary duties to
defendants.
Next, defendants argue that to permit a successor fiduciary to sue an
attorney hired by a predecessor fiduciary would have a “drastic and undesirable
impact . . . on attorneys’ duties of confidentiality and loyalty.” We address the
two duties separately.
Concerning the duty of loyalty, defendants argue that, if they as attorneys
owe a duty not just to the person who retained their services but also to the current
occupant of the office of fiduciary, then certain conflicts of interest may arise.
Here, for example, Springer, the predecessor fiduciary, confessed to the Faust
defendants that he had improperly borrowed money from the estate and sought
their advice on how to avoid the negative personal consequences of that
indiscretion.6 Using these facts as an illustration, defendants argue that a rule
permitting a successor fiduciary to sue the predecessor’s attorney for malpractice
creates a potential conflict of interest if the attorney has advised the predecessor in
both fiduciary and personal capacities.
The problem defendants identify is not the result of the proposed rule,
which would only permit a successor fiduciary to sue an attorney whose
malpractice has harmed the estate. Instead, the problem arises when, and because,
6
Springer’s unauthorized use of estate funds has no apparent connection
with defendants’ alleged malpractice in failing to file IRS form 843. In a separate
cause of action, plaintiff has sued the Faust defendants for failing to take steps to
protect the estate from the consequences of Springer’s misappropriation. The
lower courts have not addressed this claim, and we intimate no view on its merits.
10
an attorney undertakes to represent a fiduciary in the latter’s personal and
fiduciary capacities simultaneously, when that entails a conflict of interest. The
situation is analogous to that presented when a corporation’s officer seeks personal
advice from corporate counsel. “The attorney for a corporation represents it, its
stockholders and its officers in their representative capacity. He in nowise
represents the officers personally.” (Meehan v. Hopps (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d
284, 290, italics added.) Thus, for example, corporate counsel may not advise an
embezzling officer how to avoid personal liability to the corporation without
thereby acquiring a conflict of interest with the corporation. Similarly, an attorney
retained to advise a fiduciary in his or her official capacity, who is asked by the
fiduciary for assistance in avoiding detection of and liability for misappropriation,
faces a potential conflict of interest and may have no choice but to withdraw, as
did defendants here. As we have previously explained, the law “require[s] a
trustee to distinguish, scrupulously and painstakingly, his or her own interests
from those of the beneficiaries . . . .” (Moeller, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1135.)
Obviously, an attorney representing a fiduciary must observe the same distinction.
This problem, however, has little or nothing to do with the proposed rule.
To permit a successor fiduciary to sue an attorney hired by a predecessor to
perform legal work for the benefit of the estate, when the attorney’s negligent
work has harmed the estate, creates no conflict of interest. With respect to matters
of estate administration, the predecessor and successor fiduciaries’ interests are
identical: Both have the power and duty to obtain competent legal representation
for the purpose of fairly reporting the estate’s tax liability.
Concerning the duty of confidentiality, defendant attorneys argue that to
recognize any duty on their part to successor fiduciaries creates the possibility that
confidential information disclosed by a predecessor fiduciary in his or her personal
capacity will later have to be disclosed to a successor. This is incorrect. A
11
successor fiduciary becomes the holder of the attorney-client privilege “only as to
those confidential communications that occurred when the predecessor, in [his or
her] fiduciary capacity, sought the attorney’s advice for guidance in administering
the trust.” (Moeller, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1124, 1134, first italics added.)
Conversely, a successor fiduciary does not become the holder of the privilege for
confidential communications that occurred when a predecessor fiduciary in his or
her personal capacity sought an attorney’s advice.
Finally, defendants note that courts in other states have denied successor
fiduciaries standing to sue their predecessors’ attorneys. The cited cases, however,
are not persuasive as a matter of California law. The courts in Trask v. Butler
(Wn. 1994) 872 P.2d 1080 and Roberts v. Fearey (Or.Ct.App. 1999) 986 P.2d 690,
did refuse to permit successor fiduciaries to sue their predecessors’ attorneys for
malpractice. Both courts, however, appear to have assumed that successor
fiduciaries have no different rights in this context than do beneficiaries. The
courts thus denied standing based on the general rule that a fiduciary’s attorney
owes a beneficiary no duty of care unless the particular facts of the case make the
beneficiary a third party beneficiary of the contract between the fiduciary and the
attorney. (Trask v. Butler, supra, 872 P.2d at pp. 1083-1086; Roberts v. Fearey,
supra, at pp. 692-696.) California law also recognizes that a fiduciary’s attorney
normally owes the beneficiaries no duty of care. (Goldberg v. Frye, supra, 217
Cal.App.3d 1258, 1267; cf. Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th
201, 208-209.) In contrast, however, California law does not equate the successor
fiduciary’s rights with those of the beneficiaries. Instead, as we have explained,
the Probate Code gives successor fiduciaries the same powers and duties their
predecessors possessed, including the power to sue for malpractice harming the
trust. (See §§ 8524, subd. (c), 9820, subd. (a); see also ante, at p. 5.)
12
III. DISPOSITION
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
13
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 96 Cal.App.4th 418
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S105600Date Filed: July 15, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: San Francisco
Judge: Paul H. Alvarado
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Law Offices of Mattaniah Eytan, Mattaniah Eytan, Howard Underwood and Andrea Widburg for Plaintiffand Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Krieg, Keller, Sloan, Reilley & Roman, James C. Krieg, Allison Lane Cooper; Law Offices of Anthony P.David and Anthony P. David for Defendants and Respondents Taylor & Faust and Leland H. Faust.
Law Offices of Joseph D. Joiner and Joseph D. Joiner for Defendant and Respondent Burton McGovern.
14
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Mattaniah EytanLaw Offices of Mattaniah Eytan
21 Tamal Vista Boulevard, Suite 219
Corte Madera, CA 94925
(415) 399-1000
James C. Krieg
Krieg, Keller, Sloan, Reilley & Roman
114 Sansome Street, Suite 700
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 249-8330
Joseph D. Joiner
Law Offices of Joseph D. Joiner
490 Second Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94107
(415) 806-4545
15
Date: | Docket Number: |
Thu, 07/15/2004 | S105600 |
1 | Borissoff, Robert A. (Petitioner) Represented by Mattaniah Eytan Law Offices of Mattaniah Eytan 21 Tamal Vista Blvd., Suite 219 Corte Madera, CA |
2 | Taylor & Faust (Respondent) Represented by James C. Krieg 114 Sansome St., 7th floor 114 Sansome St., 7th floor San Francisco, CA |
3 | Taylor & Faust (Respondent) Represented by Allison Lane Cooper 114 Sansome Street, Ste. 700 114 Sansome Street, Ste. 700 San Francisco, CA |
4 | Taylor & Faust (Respondent) Represented by Anthony P. David A Professional Corporation One Embarcadero Center, 8th Floor San Francisco, CA |
5 | Mcgovern, Burton (Respondent) |
Disposition | |
Jul 15 2004 | Opinion: Reversed |
Dockets | |
Apr 3 2002 | Petition for review filed by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) |
Apr 3 2002 | Record requested |
Apr 9 2002 | Received Court of Appeal record file jacket/briefs/two accordian files |
Apr 23 2002 | Answer to petition for review filed by counsel for respondent (Taylor & Faust, et al) |
May 1 2002 | Reply to answer to petition filed by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) |
May 15 2002 | Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case) Briefing and argument shall be limited to the issue raised in the petition for review. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Brown & Moreno, JJ. |
May 29 2002 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) |
Jun 3 2002 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by counsel for respondent (Taylor & Faust) |
Jun 4 2002 | Request for extension of time filed by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) requesting an extension of time to July 15, 2002 to file the Opening Brief. |
Jun 11 2002 | Extension of time granted petitioner's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including July 15, 2002. |
Jul 15 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed by counsel for petitioner (Robert Borissoff) |
Aug 1 2002 | Request for extension of time filed Respondent asking to Sept. 13, 2002 to file answer brief on the merits. |
Aug 2 2002 | Filed: by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) Errata Notice (Corrected Table of Contents to Opening Brief on the Merits). |
Aug 5 2002 | Extension of time granted Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including September 13, 2002. *** NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS ARE CONTEMPLATED *** |
Aug 7 2002 | Request for extension of time filed by counsel for respondent (B. McGovern) requesting extension of time to September 13, 2002 to file the answer brief on the merits. |
Aug 8 2002 | Extension of time granted Counsel for respondent (B McGovern) time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including September 13, 2002. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS ARE CONTEMPLATED. |
Aug 16 2002 | Association of attorneys filed for: respondent (Taylor & Faust, et al) |
Sep 13 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed by counsel for respondent (B. McGovern) |
Sep 13 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed counsel for respondents (Leland H. Faust and Taylor & Faust) |
Oct 3 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) to McGovern's Answer) |
Oct 3 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by counsel for petitioner (R. Borissoff) to Faust's Answer. |
Oct 17 2002 | Change of Address filed for: counsel for respondents (Taylor and Faust, et al.) |
Apr 6 2004 | Case ordered on calendar 5-5-04, 9am, S.F. |
Apr 19 2004 | Filed: resps' application to divide oral argument time. |
Apr 28 2004 | Order filed permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument for resps. |
Apr 28 2004 | Order filed permission granted for division of oral argument time: 10 min to atty Joseph Joiner for resp McGovern and 20 min to atty James Krieg for resp Taylor. |
May 5 2004 | Cause argued and submitted |
May 19 2004 | Change of contact information filed for: Anthony P. David assoc. counsel for respondent |
Jul 15 2004 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed and Remanded OPINION BY: Werdegar, J ---joined by: George, C. J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown, Moreno, JJ. |
Aug 17 2004 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
Aug 17 2004 | Note: records returned to CA 1/2 (3 doghouses) |
Aug 23 2004 | Received: receipt for remittitur from CA 1/2 |
Briefs | |
Jul 15 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
Sep 13 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
Sep 13 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
Oct 3 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
Oct 3 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |