Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/4/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ATWATER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, )

Plaintiff and Respondent,
S124188
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F043009
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
GENERAL SERVICES
)

Defendant and Respondent,
ALBERT G. TRUITT, JR.,
Merced
County
Real Party in Interest
Super. Ct. No. 146534
and
Appellant.

Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a)1 prohibits the introduction
of evidence relating to matters occurring more than four years before a school
district files a notice of intention to dismiss a teacher. It also bars the dismissal of
a teacher for events occurring more than four years before the notice was filed.
We conclude, however, that the four-year period in section 44944, subdivision (a)
(section 44944(a)) is not absolute. Its bar may be evaluated in the context of
equitable estoppel when the basis of equitable relief is established.

1
All further statutory references are to the Education Code.
1

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I. FACTS
Albert Truitt was a credentialed teacher employed by the Atwater Elementary
School District (the district). On July 17, 2002, the district filed and served an
“Accusation and Notice of Dismissal and Charges” (notice of intent or notice)
pursuant to sections 44939 and 44944 and Government Code section 11503,
alleging that Truitt had engaged in sexual misconduct with five students between
1992 and 1998. The district claimed that Truitt, who was also a track coach,
befriended young boys, encouraged their participation in track and field, and used
his position of trust to sexually abuse them. It alleged that on numerous occasions,
Truitt improperly massaged and touched the buttocks and genitals of several male
track participants. The conduct occurred in Truitt’s home as well as on overnight
trips when Truitt shared accommodations with students. All of the incidents set
out in the district’s notice of intent involved boys who were students or former
students of the district.
Truitt denied the allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. The district
then filed an amended notice alleging he was dishonest and unfit for service.
Truitt again denied all charges raising the same defenses.
During subsequent administrative proceedings, Truitt moved to dismiss all
allegations based on incidents occurring more than four years before the district
served its notice of intent and to exclude any evidence relating to such incidents.
He relied on section 44944(a), which states in pertinent part: “No testimony shall
be given or evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred more than four
years prior to the date of the filing of the notice. Evidence of records regularly
kept by the governing board concerning the employee may be introduced, but no
decision relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be made
based on charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more than
four years prior to the filing of the notice.”
2

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After the administrative law judge granted Truitt’s motions, the district
sought a writ of mandate to vacate the rulings. The trial court granted the petition
and directed the administrative law judge to enter new orders denying the motions.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the section 44944(a) time limit is
“absolute and cannot be extended by the application of equitable doctrines such as
delayed discovery, fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel, and continuing
course of conduct.”
II. DISCUSSION
Since we granted review the case has become moot. Truitt resigned his
teaching position, relinquished his teaching credential pursuant to a criminal plea
bargain, and subsequently died. However, it is undisputed that this case involves a
matter of statewide importance, so we have retained it for decision. (State of
California ex rel State Lands Com. v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 61.)
Under the Education Code, credentialed teachers may be disciplined by a
local school district or by the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CTC).
Regarding grounds for termination by a school district, section 44932, subdivision
(a) provides, as applicable here: “No permanent employee shall be dismissed
except for one or more of the following causes: [¶] (1) Immoral or unprofessional
conduct. [¶] . . . [¶] (3) Dishonesty. [¶] . . . [¶] (5) Evident unfitness for
service. . . .” Procedures for a dismissal of a credentialed teacher are detailed in
section 44944.2
The question here is whether section 44944(a)’s four-year limitation is
absolute or may be subject to equitable principles. The district argues that the

2
Alternatively, the CTC may discipline a teacher by private admonition,
public reproval, suspension or revocation of a teaching credential under section
44421. This alternative is not at issue here.
3

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four-year time frame should be characterized as a statute of limitations, subject to
equitable principles. It urges that the Court of Appeal incorrectly characterized
subdivision (a) as an evidentiary bar or condition on a substantive right. We
conclude that the distinction is immaterial. The courts have applied equitable
principles to conditions on substantive rights as well as to statutes of limitation
(see, e.g., Estate of Caravas (1952) 40 Cal.2d 33, 42), and “where actual or
practical access to the courts is prevented the distinction between so-called
substantive and procedural statutes of limitations may be disregarded.” (Myers v.
Stevenson (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 405.) As one commentator has explained:
“In some jurisdictions, circumstances or events that suspend the running of a
statute of limitations . . . do not delay the expiration of a right except as provided
in the statute creating the right. [Citations.] Other jurisdictions reject this
distinction as legalistic and unreasonable. [Citations.] [¶] California is definitely
committed to the second position.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 4th (1997 supp.)
Actions, § 417, p. 525.) Thus, the characterization of section 44944(a)’s rule does
not resolve whether equitable principles apply. (3 Witkin, supra, § 417 at p. 526;
People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 709, 724.)
The district invites us to individually address several equitable doctrines.3
We decline to do so because consideration of individual doctrines is unnecessary.
A conclusion that any one applies resolves whether the four-year time limitation is
absolute. In addition, the record does not facilitate consideration of individual
doctrines. Because of the procedural posture of this case, the parties have not
adequately set forth the factual basis on which various equitable principles would

3
The district raises the doctrines of equitable tolling, equitable estoppel,
fraudulent concealment, and delayed discovery.
4

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rest. Accordingly, for the purposes of this case, we narrow our focus to the one
equitable doctrine that comes readily to mind in a section 44944(a) context:
equitable estoppel.
Our decision in Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 (Lantzy)
provides guidance. There, we explained, “ ‘ “Equitable estoppel . . . comes into
play only after the limitations period has run and addresses . . . the circumstances
in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another
into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period. [Equitable estoppel]
is wholly independent of the limitations period itself and takes its life . . . from the
equitable principle that no man [may] profit from his own wrongdoing in a court
of justice.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lantzy, supra, at p. 383.) Because equitable estoppel
is “wholly independent” of section 44944(a)’s time limitation, it could be relied
upon in some circumstances to prevent a defendant from asserting the statutory
bar. “To create an equitable estoppel, ‘it is enough if the party has been induced to
refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which
he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.’ ‘. . . Where the
delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot
be availed of by him as a defense.’ ” (Benner v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 26
Cal.2d 346, 349-350, italics and citation omitted.) Under this analysis, if the
district were able to meet the requirements of equitable estoppel, it could have
been allowed to introduce evidence of, and base its dismissal proceedings on,
incidents falling outside the four-year window.
We hold that equitable estoppel may apply to section 44944(a)’s four-year
time limitation. We express no opinion on whether the district could have
satisfied the doctrine’s requirements here. Nor need we decide whether other
equitable principles might apply. We simply conclude that the four-year time
5

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limitation is not absolute.4 Our decision is also supported by the view that “courts
should not presume the Legislature intended ‘to overthrow long-established
principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express
declaration or by necessary implication.’ [Citations.] The Legislature could have
easily stated it intended to abrogate long-established equitable principles [such as
equitable estoppel]. It did not do so.” (Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th
882, 896.)
In reaching a contrary result, the Court of Appeal referred to section 44242.7
which applies to disciplinary actions brought by the CTC against a credentialed
teacher. Section 44242.7 expressly exempts allegations of sexual misconduct
from the requirement that allegations of wrongful acts be presented to the CTC
within four years from the date of the alleged act. It states, “Any allegation of an
act or omission by the holder of a credential, except for an allegation that involves
sexual misconduct with a minor or recurring conduct resulting in a pattern of
misconduct, shall be presented to the Committee of Credentials for initial review
within four years from the date of the alleged act or omission, or within one year
from the date the act or omission should reasonably have been discovered.”
(§ 44242.7, italics added.) Because the Legislature did not incorporate this
exemption into local district proceedings brought under section 44944, the Court
of Appeal concluded that its time limits were absolute.
The Court of Appeal also relied on the fact that, in 1993, the Legislature had
an opportunity to amend section 44944(a) and include language similar to the

4
Because our decision is limited to the possible application of equitable
estoppel to section 44944(a)’s time limitation, we need not address the district’s
argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling may apply to the time limits set
forth in section 44944(a) based on our dicta in Fontana Unified School Dist. v.
Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 222, footnote 15.
6

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section 44242.7 exemption. Senate Bill No. 941 would have “create[d] an
exception to the 4-year limitation in which evidence may be admitted against a
certificated employee, in a hearing to suspend or dismiss the employee, in the case
of allegations of childhood sexual abuse or molestation as long as the time limits
applicable in a civil action for recovery of damages in a childhood sexual abuse
case would otherwise be met.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 941 (1993-
1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 5, 1993.)5
The Legislature did not adopt Senate Bill No. 941. Although numerous
reasons might explain the Legislature’s inaction, the Court of Appeal relied on the
bill’s introduction as further support for its view that the Legislature could have,
but did not, include an exemption in section 44944(a) similar to the exemption for
sexual misconduct found in section 44242.7.
We disagree with the Court of Appeal’s analysis. By amending section
44242.7, the Legislature created an express legal exception in the case of sexual
misconduct charges made in proceedings before the CTC. By refusing to include a
similar express exception in section 44944(a), the Legislature did not foreclose the
application of equitable principles to the time limits set out in that statute. Indeed,

5
Thus, in pertinent part, section 44944(a) would have been amended to state:
“No testimony shall be given or evidence introduced relating to matters that
occurred more than four years prior to the date of the filing of the notice; however,
if allegations of childhood sexual abuse or molestation are made against the
employee, testimony and other evidence shall be admitted if the time requirements
specified in subdivision (a) of Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would
otherwise be met. Evidence of records regularly kept by the governing board
concerning the employee may be introduced, but, except for matters relating to
childhood sexual abuse or molestation, as provided for in this subdivision, no
decision relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be made
based on charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more than
four years prior to the filing of the notice.” (Sen. Bill No. 941 (1993-1994 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Mar. 5, 1993.)
7

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the application of equity does not create an exception to the four-year time limit.
Generally, as a matter of law, the limit still applies. Equitable estoppel may apply
in a given case for particular reasons “wholly independent” of the general rule of
section 44944(a). Thus, the Legislature’s decision to include or omit such an
express legal exception does not signal an intent to bar the application of equitable
estoppel. It simply reflects a legislative disinclination to write a sweeping
exception into the statutory scheme as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeal’s analysis also creates an unacceptable anomaly. A
teacher could be prosecuted criminally, the CTC could institute credential
revocation proceedings, and a school district could be sued for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision all based on the same set of facts that exist here. Yet,
the Court of Appeal’s literal interpretation of section 44944(a) would deprive a
school district of the ability to dismiss an employee on the same set of facts. The
district has no control over a prosecutor’s decision to pursue criminal charges or
over actions taken by the CTC. We decline to embrace the Court of Appeal’s
holding that a school district may be powerless to act against a teacher accused of
sexual misconduct, no matter how compelling the evidence, unless and until the
CTC acts or the teacher is criminally charged and prosecuted. Such a result could
not have been intended by the Legislature in light of the different burdens of proof
and procedures involved in those separate proceedings.6

6
For example, the prosecution must prove criminal charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. Credential revocation proceedings before the CTC involve
additional procedural requirements that the district does not incur in its dismissal
proceedings. (See § 44242.5 et seq.)
8

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We conclude the Legislature did not intend section 44944(a)’s time limitation
to be absolute. If the requirements of equitable estoppel had been established,
they could have applied in this case.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed.

CORRIGAN, J.

WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

9

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DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.

I dissent.
This case does not present an issue of whether disciplinary action may be
taken against a teacher for sexual misconduct that occurred more than four years
before an accusation of such misconduct was made. Rather, the question
presented here is whether the action may be taken by a school district or only by
the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (hereafter Commission). I would
respect the Legislature’s clear and unambiguously stated policy decision that such
actions are to be taken only by the Commission.
The Legislature has established two separate but interrelated systems for
addressing misconduct by a credentialed teacher. The first grants school boards
the authority to suspend or dismiss a teacher. (Ed. Code, § 44932 et seq.) The
second authorizes the Commission to admonish a teacher, to publicly reprove a
teacher, or to suspend or revoke a teacher’s credential. (Id., § 44242.5 et seq.)
The Legislature’s grant of authority to school boards to suspend or dismiss
a teacher is limited to matters occurring within four years of the filing of a notice
of charges. Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a)(5) so provides: “No
testimony shall be given or evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred
more than four years prior to the date of filing of the notice. . . . [N]o decision
relating to the dismissal or suspension of any employee shall be made based on
1

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charges or evidence of any nature relating to matters occurring more than four
years prior to the filing of the notice.” (Italics added.)
The Legislature’s grant of authority to the Commission, however, is not so
limited. Education Code section 44242.7, subdivision (a) provides: “Any
allegation of an act or omission by the holder of a credential, except for an
allegation that involves sexual misconduct with a minor or recurring conduct
resulting in a pattern of misconduct, shall be presented to the [Commission’s]
Committee of Credentials for initial review within four years from the date of the
alleged act or omission, or within one year from the date the act or omission
should reasonably have been discovered.” (Italics added.) A school district, as the
credentialed teacher’s employer, is specifically authorized to present such
allegations to the Commission. (Ed. Code, § 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A), (4).)
The wording of these statutes is so clear and their meaning so plain that no
statutory construction is needed or warranted. As noted earlier, a school district’s
authority to impose professional discipline on a teacher based on evidence or
charges of any nature is limited to matters occurring more than four years before
the charges were initiated. The Commission may, however, take action as to any
allegation of sexual misconduct with a minor without any time limitation. (Ed.
Code, § 44242.7, subd. (a); In re R.G. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1417.) The
conclusion that the Legislature made the Commission the exclusive forum for
disciplinary actions involving allegations of teacher sexual misconduct more than
four years old is unavoidable.
Also unavoidable is the conclusion that the Legislature’s decision was an
intentional, considered one and not the result of inadvertence. Senate Bill No. 941
was introduced in 1993 to amend Education Code section 44944, subdivision (a),
the statute governing school district actions, to create an exception to the four-year
limitation for cases involving allegations of sexual abuse or molestation of a
2

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minor. (Stats. 1994, ch. 681, § 3, p. 3292.) But the Legislature never enacted
Senate Bill No. 941. Instead, it enacted Senate Bill No. 1843, a measure that
added to the Education Code section 44242.7, which exempts allegations of sexual
misconduct with a minor from the four-year limitation in Commission
proceedings. (Sen. Bill No. 1843 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) § 3.) Thus, as the Court
of Appeal correctly observed: “The legislative materials show, in fact, that the
lawmakers declined to exempt allegations of sexual misconduct from section
44944’s prohibitions and, instead, enacted provisions dealing with the topic in the
credential revocation scheme.”
The Legislature has made a decision and expressed that decision in clear
and unmistakable language. Whether the members of this court agree or disagree
with the Legislature’s decision is irrelevant. “The judiciary, in reviewing statutes
enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the
policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the
choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative
function.” (Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Whatever the applicability, scope, and efficacy of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be in cases not involving allegations of teacher sexual misconduct
more than four years old, in my view it may not be invoked to nullify a decision
by the Legislature to vest authority over such cases more than four years old in the
Commission and not in school districts.
The majority suggests that unless school districts are, contrary to the
Legislature’s decision, given authority to discipline a teacher for sexual
misconduct with a minor occurring more than four years before the notice of
charges is filed, a school district will be powerless, no matter how compelling the
evidence, to take any action against the teacher. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.) Not so.
A school district that learns of a teacher’s sexual misconduct with a minor more
3

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than four years earlier may immediately suspend the teacher while it presents
those charges to the Commission. (Ed. Code, §§ 44242.5, subd. (a)(3)(A), 44939.)
Moreover, the Legislature could reasonably decide that the Commission’s power
to suspend or revoke a teaching credential is the most effective means of ensuring
that the teacher will be denied access to students in districts statewide who might
otherwise become potential molest victims.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
KENNARD,
J.
4

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Atwater Elementary School District v. Department of General Services
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 116 Cal.App.4th 844
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S124188
Date Filed: June 4, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Merced
Judge: Betty L. Dawson

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Driscoll & Associates and Thomas J. Driscoll, Jr., for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

John F. Kohn, Beverly Tucker, Rosalind D. Wolf, Robert E. Lindquist, Brenda E. Sutton-Wills, Michael D.
Hersh and Joseph R. Colton for California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party
in Interest and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Lozano Smith, Michael E. Smith, Howard A. Friedman, Stephen A. Mendyk, Jesse J. Maddox and Martha
B. Scott for Plaintiff and Respondent.

John Bukey, Richard Hamilton and Judith Cias for The Education Legal Alliance of the California School
Boards Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Thomas J. Driscoll, Jr.
Driscoll & Associates
801 South Ham Lane, Suite H
Lodi, CA 95242
(209) 334-1935

Michael E. Smith
Lozano Smith
7404 N. Spalding Ave.
Fresno, CA 93720-3370
(559) 431-5600

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 06/04/2007	S124188

Disposition
Jun 4 2007	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Apr 16 2004	Petition for review filed   by counsel for pltf/resp Atwater
Apr 21 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   one volume
May 6 2004	Answer to petition for review filed   by RPI/Aplt Truitt
May 7 2004	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   by resp
May 10 2004	Filed:   letter from counsel for RPI, re c/a case record.
May 10 2004	Opposition filed   by RPI to the depub. request
May 14 2004	Reply to answer to petition filed   and oppos. to depub request by pltf/resp Atwater
May 19 2004	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, and Brown, JJ.
May 28 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by Pltf/resp
Jun 3 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for RPI-Aplt.
Jun 18 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed   by resp
Jul 12 2004	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by pltf/resp Atwater
Jul 19 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed   by RPI-aplt
Jul 27 2004	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by RPI-aplt
Aug 6 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by pltf-resp (filed in Fresno)
Aug 9 2004	Motion to dismiss filed (non-AA)   by counsel for RPI
Aug 16 2004	Opposition filed   by Pltf-resp to the motion to dismiss review and publication request.
Aug 16 2004	Received:   from Los Angeles Unified School District, a non-party document entitled "oppostion to rpi's motion for dismissal."
Aug 18 2004	Received:   Letter from the Education Legal Alliance of the Calif. School Board's Association (non-party)
Sep 3 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California Teachers Assn [in support of aplt Truitt]
Sep 8 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   The Education Legal Alliance of the Calif. School Boards Assoc.
Sep 9 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   on behalf of LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (2 days late) supporting respondent
Sep 10 2004	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   California Teachers Association (non-party)
Sep 10 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed   CaliforniaTeachers Association in support of Real Party in Interest. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 10 2004	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The Education Legal Alliance of the California School Boards Association (non-party)
Sep 10 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed   The Education Legal Alliance of the California School Boards Association in support of Real Party in Interest. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 15 2004	Motion to dismiss denied   Motion to dismiss review filed on August 9, 2004, is denied.
Sep 28 2004	Change of contact information filed for:   counsel for resp Atwater
Sep 30 2004	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   RPI's response to A/C brief of Education Legal Alliance
Sep 30 2004	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   Resp's response to A/C brief of Calif. Teachers' Association
Oct 13 2004	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   by pltf-resp Atwater
May 27 2005	Filed:   Counsel's notice of demise of RPI Truitt
Sep 27 2005	Received additional record   sealed envelope from court of appeal containing portions of file submitted in lieu of a clerk's transc.
Oct 3 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   two volumes for F042519 and two vol for F041705
Feb 8 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Wednesday, March 7, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Feb 27 2007	Request for judicial notice granted   The requests for judicial notice, filed on July 12 and 27, 2004 and October 13, 2004 are granted.
Feb 27 2007	Request for judicial notice granted   the requests for judicial notice, filed on July 12 and 27, 2004, and October 13, 2004 are granted.
Mar 7 2007	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 1 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jun 4 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   Opinion by Corrigan, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. dissenting opinion by Kennard,J.
Jul 9 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jul 16 2007	Received:   Receipt for Remittitur from Court of Appeal - Fifth Appellate Distriect
Jul 17 2007	Note:   Returned Superior Court record to Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District.

Briefs
Jun 18 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 19 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 6 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Sep 10 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 10 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 30 2004	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 30 2004	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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