Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 6/29/09 (this opinion should follow the companion case, S155965, also filed 6/29/09)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION,
LOCAL 1756, AFL-CIO et al.,
Petitioners,
S151615
v.
Ct.App. 2/8 B191879
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Los Angeles County
Respondent;
FIRST TRANSIT, INC., et al.,
Super. Ct. No. KC043962
Real Parties in Interest.

At issue here are two state laws. One is the unfair competition law, which
allows a private party to bring an unfair competition action on behalf of others
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203), but only if the person ―has suffered injury in fact
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖ (Id.
§ 17204.) The other law is the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of
2004, which provides that an ―aggrieved employee‖ may bring an action to
recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code ―on behalf of himself or
herself and other current or former employees . . . .‖ (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd.
(a).)

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This case presents two issues. First, may a plaintiff labor union that has not
suffered actual injury under the unfair competition law, and that is not an
―aggrieved employee‖ under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of
2004, nevertheless bring a representative action under those laws (1) as the
assignee of employees who have suffered an actual injury and who are aggrieved
employees, or (2) as an association whose members have suffered actual injury
and are aggrieved employees? The answer is ―no.‖ Second, must a representative
action under the unfair competition law be brought as a class action? The answer
is ―yes,‖ for the reasons stated in the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court
(June 29, 2009, S155965) ___ Cal.4th ___.
I

Seventeen individual plaintiffs and two labor unions — Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO and Teamsters Joint Council 42, AFL-CIO
(plaintiff unions) — brought this action against defendants First Transit, Inc.,
Progressive Transportation Services, Inc., and Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.
In the fourth amended complaint plaintiff unions alleged: (1) they are the
representatives of defendants‘ employees; (2) this action is brought on behalf of
themselves and ―all aggrieved transportation industry employees and former
employees employed by‖ defendants; and (3) over 150 employees and former
employees of defendants have assigned to plaintiff unions their rights under the
unfair competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004,
―including the right to sue in a representative capacity.‖ With respect to the
individual plaintiffs, they allege they are bringing this action on behalf of
themselves as well as on behalf of current and former employees of defendants.
The fourth amended complaint further alleged that defendants have violated
the unfair competition law, and that defendants are subject to civil penalties under
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 for failing to provide meal
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or rest periods as required by the Labor Code and by an Industrial Welfare
Commission wage order. The complaint sought injunctive relief; restitution of
$10,608,000 in unpaid wages; in lieu of unprovided meal and rest periods, 30
days‘ wages for each employee who was terminated without being paid;
$2,626,500 in civil penalties; prejudgment interest; and attorney fees.
The case was assigned to a judge in the complex litigation program of the
Los Angeles County Superior Court. The judge held an initial status conference,
determined that this case was one of five related actions, and designated this action
as the lead case. The parties stipulated to a briefing schedule and to a hearing date
on which the trial judge would decide threshold legal issues, such as whether
plaintiff unions had standing to sue and whether this representative action must be
brought as a class action.
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled: (1) plaintiff unions
lack standing under the unfair competition law because they have not suffered
actual injury, and they lack standing under the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 because they are not ―aggrieved employees‖; (2) employee
assignments of rights to plaintiff unions did not confer standing on the unions to
prosecute the claims in question, as doing so would circumvent the requirements
of both the unfair competition law and the act and would render meaningless
recent voter-enacted amendments to the unfair competition law; and (3) the unfair
competition law claims brought on behalf of others must be brought as a class
action.
Plaintiff unions petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and a
stay of the trial court‘s ruling. After issuing a stay and an order to show cause, a
divided Court of Appeal panel denied the petition. We granted plaintiff unions‘
petition for review.
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II
We begin with a summary of the relevant aspects of both the unfair
competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004, the
two state laws at issue here.
A. Unfair Competition Law
The unfair competition law prohibits ―any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice . . . .‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Before 2004, the
unfair competition law allowed ―any person acting for the interests of itself, its
members or the general public‖ to seek restitution or injunctive relief against
unfair acts or practices. (Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 17204, added by Stats.
1977, ch. 299, § 1, p. 1202.) Thus, under the former law a plaintiff did not have to
show any actual injury, and a representative action brought under the unfair
competition law did not have to be brought as a class action. (Former §§ 17203,
17204; Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 126, fn.
10; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 561;
see Corbett v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 649, 680-681.)
But that changed in 2004, when voters, exercising their constitutionally
granted power of initiative, enacted Proposition 64. In the preamble to that
measure the voters declared that the broad standing permitted by the unfair
competition law had been abused. (See Californians for Disability Rights v.
Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 228.) Proposition 64 amended the unfair
competition law to allow private representative claims for relief to be brought only
by those persons who satisfied the law‘s new standing requirements and who
complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 382.1 (Bus. & Prof. Code,

1
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 states: ―If the consent of any one who
should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a

(footnote continued on next page)
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§ 17203.) The law now requires that a representative claim, that is, a claim
seeking relief on behalf of others (id., § 17203), may be brought only by a ―person
who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the
unfair competition‖ (id.,§ 17204).2 This replaced the former standing provision
which had allowed an unfair competition law action to be brought ―by any person
acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public.‖ (Bus. & Prof.
Code, former § 17204.)
B. Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
In September 2003, the Legislature enacted the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004. (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq., Stats. 2003, ch. 906,
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.) The act permits a civil action ―by an aggrieved employee
on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees‖ to recover
civil penalties for violations of other provisions of the Labor Code. (Id., § 2699,
subd. (a).) It defines an ― ‗aggrieved employee‘ ‖ as ―any person who was

(footnote continued from previous page)

defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint; and when the question
is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of all.‖
2
Business and Professions Code section 17203 states in relevant part: ―Any
person may pursue representative claims or relief on behalf of others only if the
claimant meets the standing requirements of Section 17204 and complies with
Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but these limitations do not apply to
claims brought under this chapter by [specified government attorneys].‖

Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides: ―Actions for relief
pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent
jurisdiction by [specified government attorneys] . . . or by a person who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.‖
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employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged
violations was [sic] committed.‖ (Id., § 2699, subd. (c).)
C. Summary
Both the unfair competition law and the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004 require a plaintiff to have suffered injury resulting from an
unlawful action: under the unfair competition law by unfair acts or practices;
under the act, by violations of the Labor Code. Here, plaintiff unions concede that
they do not satisfy these requirements. They insist, however, that under either law
they have standing to sue in a representative capacity as the assignees of
defendants‘ employees who did sustain injury. We explore the assignment issue
below.
III
The legal concept of assignment refers to the transferability of all types of
property, including a cause of action. (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc.
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1252, 1259.) A cause of action, sometimes called a ―thing in
action,‖ ―is a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial
proceeding.‖ (Civ. Code, § 953.) ―A thing in action, arising out of the violation
of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.‖
(Id., § 954.) ―An obligation is a legal duty, by which a person is bound to do or
not to do a certain thing.‖ (Id., § 1427.)
At issue here is whether under the unfair competition law an assignment of
a cause of action can confer standing on an uninjured assignee, and whether a
cause of action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is
assignable. In both instances, the answer is ―no,‖ as discussed below.
A
We noted earlier that through Proposition 64 the California electorate in
2004 amended the unfair competition law by requiring the plaintiff to be one ―who
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has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204; see ante at p. 5, fn. 2; Voter
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) official title and summary, p. 38.)
As the trial court and the Court of Appeal here pointed out, that requirement
would be nullified if a person claiming actual injury from some unfair business
practice were allowed to assign that claim to one who has suffered no injury. We
agree. Below, we explain why.
An assignment requires very little by way of formalities and is essentially
free from substantive restrictions. ―[I]n the absence of [a] statute or a contract
provision to the contrary, there are no prescribed formalities that must be observed
to make an effective assignment. It is sufficient if the assignor has, in some
fashion, manifested an intention to make a present transfer of his rights to the
assignee.‖ (9 Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed. 2007) § 47.7, pp. 147-148; see Rest.2d
Contracts, §§ 317, 324.) Generally, interests may be assigned orally (Civ. Code,
§ 1052; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 709, p. 795),
and assignments need not be supported by any consideration (Civ. Code, § 1040;
National R. Co. v. Metropolitan T. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 827, 831; 9 Corbin on
Contracts, supra, § 48.1, pp. 159-160; see Rest.2d Contracts, § 332).
To allow a noninjured assignee of an unfair competition claim to stand in
the shoes of the original, injured claimant would confer standing on the assignee
in direct violation of the express statutory requirement in the unfair competition
law, as amended by the voters‘ enactment of Proposition 64, that a private action
under that law be brought exclusively by a ―person who has suffered injury in fact
and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖ (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17204; see ante at p. 5, fn. 2; Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.
(Nov. 2, 2004) official title and summary, p. 38 [Proposition 64 permits one to
bring unfair competition law action ―only if that individual was actually injured by
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. . . an unfair business practice,‖ italics added].) Accordingly, we conclude that
under the unfair competition law an injured employee‘s assignment of rights
cannot confer standing on an uninjured assignee.
B
With respect to the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, an
action brought under it is also not assignable, as we explain below.
The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 permits an
― ‗aggrieved employee‘ ‖ — that is, an employee against whom a violation of a
provision of the Labor Code was committed (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c)) — to
bring an action ―on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former
employees‖ to recover civil penalties for violations of other provisions of the
Labor Code (id., § 2699, subds. (a), (g)). In bringing such an action, the aggrieved
employee acts as the proxy or agent of state labor law enforcement agencies,
representing the same legal right and interest as those agencies, in a proceeding
that is designed to protect the public, not to benefit private parties. (Arias v.
Superior Court, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, ___ [pp. 16-17]; see People v. Pacific
Land Research Co. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 10, 17.)
A cause of action is transferable, that is, assignable, by its owner if it arises
out of a legal obligation or a violation of a property right. (Civ. Code, § 954.) The
Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 does not create property rights
or any other substantive rights. Nor does it impose any legal obligations. It is
simply a procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover civil
penalties — for Labor Code violations — that otherwise would be sought by state
labor law enforcement agencies. As we have held in the past, the right to recover
a statutory penalty may not be assigned. (Esposti v. Rivers Brothers, Inc. (1929)
207 Cal. 570, 573; Peterson v. Ball (1931) 211 Cal. 461, 468-470; Western
Mortgage etc. Co. v. Gray (1932) 215 Cal. 191, 198; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
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Law, supra, Contracts, § 728, p. 811.) Therefore, under the Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004 an aggrieved employee cannot assign a claim for
statutory penalties because the employee does not own an assignable interest.
We turn next to plaintiff unions‘ claim that they may nevertheless maintain
the actions as entities in their own right based on the legal concept of associational
standing.
IV
Under the doctrine of associational standing, an association that does not
have standing in its own right may nevertheless have standing to bring a lawsuit
on behalf of its members. The doctrine was developed in the federal courts under
the ―case or controversy‖ requirement of Article III of the United States
Constitution.
The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
―cases‖ or ―controversies.‖ (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; 1 Rotunda & Nowak,
Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure (4th ed. 2007) § 2.13,
p. 246.) In construing the scope of this constitutional provision, the United States
Supreme Court has held that an association, such as a labor union, may bring an
action on behalf of its members when the association itself would not otherwise
have standing. Associational standing exists when: ―(a) [the association‘s]
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests
[the association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization‘s purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.‖ (Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm’n (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 343 (Hunt).)
Here, plaintiff unions argue that the voters‘ enactment of Proposition 64
incorporated the federal doctrine of associational standing into California‘s unfair
competition law. We disagree. Such incorporation did not occur; indeed, the
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amendments that Proposition 64 made to the unfair competition law are
inconsistent with the doctrine of associational standing, as explained below.
In proposing the amendment to the unfair competition law, section 1 of
Proposition 64 sets forth its findings and declarations of purpose. Subdivision (e)
of section 1 states: ―It is the intent of California voters in enacting this act to
prohibit private attorneys from filing lawsuits for unfair competition where they
have no client who has been injured in fact under the standing requirements of the
United States Constitution.‖ (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)
text of proposed law, p. 109, italics added.) That intent is reflected in the amended
statutory language stating that an unfair competition law action can be brought
only by a person who has suffered ―injury in fact.‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204,
italics added.) This standing requirement is inconsistent with the federal doctrine
of associational standing. That doctrine applies only when the plaintiff association
has not itself suffered actual injury but is seeking to act on behalf of its members
who have sustained such injury. (See Automobile Workers v. Brock (1986) 477
U.S. 274, 281; Hunt, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 342; Tribe, American Constitutional
Law (3d ed. 2000) § 3-20, p. 451.)
Nor do plaintiff unions here have associational standing under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. The act permits an ―aggrieved
employee‖ to bring an action on behalf of himself or herself and other current or
former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. (Lab.
Code, § 2699, subd. (a).) An ― ‗aggrieved employee‘ means any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged
violations was committed.‖ (Id., § 2699, subd. (c).) Because plaintiff unions were
not employees of defendants, they cannot satisfy the express standing
requirements of the act.
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Insisting that they have standing as associations, plaintiff unions point to
Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a). That provision allows the ―aggrieved
employee or representative‖ (italics added) to give written notice of alleged labor
violations to both the employer and the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency, and it describes the range of decisions the agency can make. There is
nothing in that provision, however, that relates to standing to bring an action under
the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.
To summarize, a plaintiff has standing to bring an unfair competition law
action only if the plaintiff has suffered ―injury in fact‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17204), and a plaintiff has standing to bring an action under the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 only if the plaintiff is an ― ‗aggrieved
employee‘ ‖ (Lab. Code, § 2699, subds. (a), (c)). Associations suing under either
law are not exempt from these express statutory standing requirements.
V
Plaintiff unions challenge the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that all unfair
competition law actions seeking relief on behalf of others, including those brought
by representative or associational plaintiffs, must be brought as class actions. We
agree with the Court of Appeal. In the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court,
supra, ___ Cal.4th at pp. ___-___ [pp. 5-8], we rejected a similar challenge.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
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CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I concur in the judgment. However, as I explain in my concurring opinion in
the companion case of Arias v. Superior Court (June 29, 2009, S155965) __
Cal.4th __, __ (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.), I do not agree with the majority‘s
conclusion that the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.)
(UCL), as amended by Proposition 64 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004)), literally or
invariably requires that representative actions be brought as class actions.
I do agree with the majority that the plaintiff unions in this case may not
properly bring representative actions under the UCL. As the majority explains, the
UCL as amended by Proposition 64 clearly and expressly confers standing to bring
a representative action only on a ―person who has suffered injury in fact and has
lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.‖ (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17204; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8.) Plaintiffs‘ concession that they do not
satisfy these absolute statutory requirements necessarily disposes of any argument
they might make for standing.
Because the UCL and plaintiffs‘ concession negate standing in this case, the
majority‘s discussion of associational standing (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 9-11) is
unnecessary to the decision. I agree with the majority that Proposition 64 did not
incorporate wholesale the federal doctrine of associational standing, as set out in
such cases as Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n (1977) 432 U.S.
333, but California has its own distinct and well-established law of associational
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standing based not on federal law but rather on Code of Civil Procedure section
382. (E.g., Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60
Cal.2d 276, 283-285; Del Mar Beach Club Owners Assn. v. Imperial Contracting
Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 898, 907-908; Raven’s Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Development Co. (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 783, 793-796.) Because
plaintiffs do not rely on this body of law, the majority does not address it. I do not
understand the majority opinion to hold that an association that has suffered injury
in fact and lost money or property (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204) may not
represent its members as the plaintiff in a UCL action.
WERDEGAR, J
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See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 148 Cal.App.4th 39
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S151615
Date Filed: June 29, 2009
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Carl J. West

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn & Grosboll, John L. Anderson, Scott M. De Nardo and Benjamin K. Lunch for
Petitioners.

Davis, Cowell & Bowe, John J. Davis, Jr., and Paul L. More for Heat and Frost Insulators Local 16,
Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 159, Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 393 and Plasterers Local 200 as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, David Pallack, José Tello, Linda Fang; National
Employment Law Center, Laura Moskowitz; Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Anel Flores; Asian
Pacific American Legal Center, Yungsuhn Park; Legal Aid Society–Employment Law Center, Matthew
Goldberg; The Worksafe Law Center, Danielle Lucido; The Watsonville Law Center and Dori Rose Inda
for Garment Worker Center, Inquilinos Unidos, Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, Yamin Yan and Yao
Zhang as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Cynthia L. Rice, Blanca Bañuelos, Michael L. Meuter and Julie
Montgomery for Jose Arias and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioners.

Altshuler Berzon, Scott A. Kronland and Barbara J. Chisholm for American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Laborers International
Union of North America, Service Employees International Union, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and Unite Here as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioners.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.
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Page 2 – S151616 - counsel continued:

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest:

McMahon Berger, James N. Foster, Jr., Michelle M. Cain; Kampe & Kampe and K. W. Kampe III for Real
Party in Interest First Transit, Inc.

Gleason & Favarote, Paul M. Gleason, Torey J. Favarote and Richard Y. Chen for Real Party in Interest
ATC/Vancom, Inc.

Fulbright & Jaworski, Marcus Torrano, Rachel Salvin; Jenkens & Gilchrist, Margaret Rosenthal and
Sabrina L. Shadi for Real Parties in Interest Progressive Transportation Services, Inc., and Coach USA
Transit Service.

Littler Mendelson, Theodore R. Scott and Tami Falkenstein-Hennick for Real Party in Interest Laidlaw
Transit Services, Inc.

O‘Melveny & Myers, Scott H. Dunham, Ryan W. Rutledge; Law Offices of Steven Drapkin, Steven
Drapkin, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., and Robin S. Conrad for Employers Group, California
Employment Law Council, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California
Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

Deborah J. La Fetra, Timothy Sandefur and Elizabeth A. Yi for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

John L. Anderson
Neyhart, Anderson, Flynn & Grosboll
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2080
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 677-9440

James N. Foster, Jr.
McMahon Berger
2370 N. Ballas Road, Suite 200
St. Louis, MO 63131
(314) 567-7350

Marcus Torrano
Fulbright & Jaworski
555 South Flower Street, Forty-First Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 892-9200

Scott H. Dunham
O‘Melveny & Myers
400 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899
(213) 430-6000

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal denied a petition for peremptory writ of mandate. This case presents the following issues: (1) Does a worker's assignment to the worker's union of a cause of action for meal and rest period violations carry with it the worker's right to sue in a representative capacity under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, sec. 2698 et seq.) or the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 17200 et seq.)? (2) Does Business and Professions Code section 17203, as amended by Proposition 64, which provides that representative claims may be brought only if the injured claimant "complies with Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure," require that private representative claims meet the procedural requirements applicable to class action lawsuits?

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:	Cross Referenced Cases:
Mon, 06/29/2009	46 Cal. 4th 993, 209 P.3d 937, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605	S151615	Review - Civil Original Proceeding	closed; remittitur issued	ARIAS v. S.C. (ANGELO DAIRY) (S155965)

Opinion Authors
Opinion	Justice Joyce L. Kennard
Concur	Justice Kathryn M. Werdegar

Disposition
Jun 29 2009	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Apr 9 2007	Petition for review filed Petitioners, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, et. al. by counsel, Scott M. DeNardo.
Apr 9 2007	Record requested
Apr 9 2007	Received Court of Appeal record
Apr 23 2007	Request for depublication (petition for review pending) Calif. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., non-party
Apr 30 2007	Request for depublication filed (another request pending) AFL-CIO Service Employees Union, non-party Scott Kronland, counsel
May 29 2007	Time extended to grant or deny review The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including July 6, 2007, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Jun 20 2007	Petition for review granted (civil case) Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jul 2 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed Amalgamated Transit Union, petitioner
Jul 5 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed Laidlaw Transit, RPI
Jul 9 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed ATC / Vancom, Real Party in Interest by Torey Favarote, counsel
Jul 9 2007	Received: Amended proof of service ATC/Vancom, Real Party in Interest by Torey Favarote, counsel
Jul 11 2007	Request for extension of time filed Petitioners requesting a 30-day extension to and including August 20, 2007, to file petitioner's opening brief on the merits.
Jul 12 2007	Certification of interested entities or persons filed First Transit, Inc., Real Party in Interest by Kurt W. Kampe, counsel
Jul 17 2007	Extension of time granted On application of petitioner and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file petitioner's opening brief on the merits is hereby extended to and including August 20, 2007.
Aug 20 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed Amalgamated Transit Union, et al, petitioners John Anderson, counsel
Sep 7 2007	Request for extension of time filed to file answer brief/merits to 10-19-07 Real Party Progressive Transportation Services, Inc. Attorney Rachel Salvin, etal
Sep 11 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Heat & Frost Insulators Local 16, Plumbers & Steamfitters Locals 159 & 393 and Plasterers Local 200 in support of petitioners John Davis, Paul More, counsel
Sep 11 2007	Extension of time granted On application of real party in interest Progressive Transportation Services and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 19, 2007.
Sep 12 2007	Request for extension of time filed for RPI Laidlaw Transit Services to file the answer brief on the merits, to 10/19/07.
Sep 13 2007	Request for extension of time filed for RPI ATC/Vancom. Inc. to file the answer brief on the merits, to 10/19/07.
Sep 13 2007	Request for extension of time filed answer brief/merits to 10-19-07 Real Party First Transit, Inc. Attorney K.W. Kampe, III
Sep 19 2007	Extension of time granted On application of real party in interest Laidlaw Transit Services and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 19, 2007.
Sep 19 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Heat and Frost Insulators Local 16, et al. for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Sep 24 2007	Extension of time granted On application of real party in interest First Transit, Inc. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 19, 2007.
Sep 24 2007	Extension of time granted On application of real party in interest ATC/Vancom, Inc. and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 19, 2007.
Oct 19 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed First Transit, RPI K.W. Kampe III, counsel
Oct 19 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed Real Party Progressive Transportation Services, Inc. Attorneys Marcus Torrano and Rachel Salvin
Oct 22 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., Real party in interest Theodore R. Scott, counsel CRC 8.25b
Oct 22 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed ATC/Vancom, Inc., Real party in interest Torey J. Favarote, counsel CRC 8.25b
Nov 6 2007	Request for extension of time filed for petitioner to file the reply brief on the merits, to 11-28-07
Nov 7 2007	Filed: Supplemental declaration of Scott De Nardo in support of request for extension of time.
Nov 9 2007	Extension of time granted On application of petitioners and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including November 28, 2007.
Nov 13 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Garment Worker Center, Inquilinos Unidos, Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, Yamin Yan and Yao Zhang Attorneys David Pallack, etal
Nov 27 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Garment Worker Center, Inquilinos Unidos, Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund, Yamin Yan, Yao Zhang for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Nov 27 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed Garment Worker Center, et al. David Pallack, Laura Moskowitz, Anel Flores, Yungsuhn Park, Matthew Goldberg, Danielle Lucido, Dori Rose Inda, counsel
Nov 28 2007	Received: Application to file oversize consolidated reply brief on the merits (with brief) Amalgamated Transit Union, et al, petitioners
Nov 28 2007	Motion filed (non-AA) to augment the record Amalgamated Transit Union, et al., petitioners
Dec 3 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Consolidated reply brief on the merits Amalgamated Transit Union, et al., petitioners John Anderson, counsel filed with permission
Dec 17 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed Pacific Legal Foundation, in support of RPIs Elizabeth Yi, counsel *(docket entry out of order due to computer error. Application and order listed above)
Dec 17 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Pacific Legal Foundation in support of real parties in interest. by counsel, Elizabeth A. Yi.
Dec 17 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of real parties in interest is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 24 2007	Received: Notice of Unavailability of Counsel from Scott M. De Nardo, counsel for Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1756 et al.,. Counsel will be unavailable from February 22, 2007- March 10, 2007.
Dec 28 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Employers Group, Chamber of Commerce of the USA, et al., in support of RPI Scott Dunham, counsel
Dec 28 2007	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice filed Robin S. Conrad, to represent A/C applicant Chamber of Commerce of the USA
Dec 28 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief AFL-CIO, et al, in support of petitioners Scott Kronland, counsel
Jan 2 2008	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Jose Arias, Calif. Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, in support of petnr. Cynthia Rice, Julia Montgomery, counsel Received separate Request for Judicial Notice
Jan 7 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed Response to A/C of Pacific Legal Foundation Amalgamated Transit Union, et al., petitioners John Anderson, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Jose Arias and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed Jose Arias and Calif. Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, in support of petitioner Cynthia Rice, Julie Montgomery, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) Jose Arias and Calif. Rural Legal Assistance Found.
Jan 11 2008	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Employers Group, California Employment Law Council, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California Chamber of Commerce for permission to file an amicus brief in support of real parties in interest is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed Employers Group, et al., in support of RPIs Scott Dunham, Steven Drapkin, Robin Conrad, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice granted Robin S. Conrad for A/C Chamber of the United States of America
Jan 11 2008	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of AFL-CIO, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Laborers International Union of North America, Service Employees International Union, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and Unite Here for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed AFL-CIO, et al., in support of petitioner Scott Kronland, counsel
Jan 31 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed by plaintiffs, John Anderson counsel response to amicus brief of Employers Group, et al
Feb 4 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed Laidlaw Transit Services, RPI Theodore Scott, Counsel response to amicus brief of Arias and Calif. Rural Legal Assistance (timely per CRC 8.25b) supplemental proof of service received
Apr 29 2008	Motion filed (non-AA) "Application/Motion Requesting Court to Treat this and Another Pending Case as Campanion Cases for Argument and Decision" filed by Employers Group, non-party, by Steven Drapkin, Counsel ** Motion filed with permission.
May 1 2008	Filed: "Joint Application on Behalf of Real Parties in Interest Laidlaw Transit and First Transit Requesting Court to Treat this and another Pending Case as Companion Cases for Argument", by Theodor R. Scott, counsel
Mar 11 2009	Order filed The motion of real parties in interest Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc. and First Transit, Inc. to treat this case as a companion to Arias v. Superior Court (S155965) is granted. The motion of Amici Curiae Employers Group, California Employment Law Council, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, and California Chamber of Commerce to treat this case as a companion case to Arias v. Superior Court (S155965) is denied as moot.
Mar 11 2009	Case ordered on calendar to be argued on Wednesday, April 8, 2009, at 9:00 a.m., in Los Angeles
Mar 18 2009	Note: Mail returned and re-sent original address: Anel Malissa Flores, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 8601 Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90003-3319 new address, from State Bar website, now noted in case: 1102 Crenshaw Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90019
Mar 20 2009	Request for judicial notice granted Plaintiff-Petitioners Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756 et al.'s Motion to Augment the record filed in this court on November 28, 2007, is granted. The Request for Judicial Notice of Amici Curiae Jose Arias and California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation filed in this court on January 11, 2008, is granted.
Mar 23 2009	Application filed to Divide Oral Argument Time Real Parties First Transit, Inc., etal ~Attorneys K.W. Kampe, III, etal
Mar 25 2009	Order filed The request of counsel for real parties in interest in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of real parties at oral argument is hereby granted The request of real parties in interest to allocate to real party First Transit, Inc. 10 minutes, and real parties Progressive Transportation Services, Inc. 10 minutes, and to allocate to amicus curiae Employers Group et al. 10 minutes of real parties' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Mar 30 2009	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice (granted case) James N. Foster as counsel for Real Party in interest First Transit, Inc.
Mar 30 2009	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice (granted case) Michelle M. Cain as counsel for real Party in Interest First Transit, Inc.
Apr 2 2009	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice granted The application of James N. Foster, Jr., for admission pro hac vice to appear on behalf of First Transit, Inc., is hereby granted. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40.)
Apr 2 2009	Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice granted The application of Michelle M. Cain for admission pro hac vice to appear on behalf of First Transit, Inc. is hereby granted. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.40.)
Apr 6 2009	Received: Letter, dated 4-6-09, from counsel for RPIs First Transit and Progressive Transportation (faxed)
Apr 8 2009	Cause argued and submitted
Jun 26 2009	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jun 29 2009	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Werdegar, J.
Jul 31 2009	Remittitur issued

Briefs
Aug 20 2007	Opening brief on the merits filed Amalgamated Transit Union, et al, petitioners John Anderson, counsel
Oct 19 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed First Transit, RPI K.W. Kampe III, counsel
Oct 19 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed Real Party Progressive Transportation Services, Inc. Attorneys Marcus Torrano and Rachel Salvin
Oct 22 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., Real party in interest Theodore R. Scott, counsel CRC 8.25b
Oct 22 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed ATC/Vancom, Inc., Real party in interest Torey J. Favarote, counsel CRC 8.25b
Nov 27 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed Garment Worker Center, et al. David Pallack, Laura Moskowitz, Anel Flores, Yungsuhn Park, Matthew Goldberg, Danielle Lucido, Dori Rose Inda, counsel
Dec 3 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Consolidated reply brief on the merits Amalgamated Transit Union, et al., petitioners John Anderson, counsel filed with permission
Dec 17 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed Pacific Legal Foundation, in support of RPIs Elizabeth Yi, counsel
Jan 7 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed Response to A/C of Pacific Legal Foundation Amalgamated Transit Union, et al., petitioners John Anderson, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed Jose Arias and Calif. Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, in support of petitioner Cynthia Rice, Julie Montgomery, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed Employers Group, et al., in support of RPIs Scott Dunham, Steven Drapkin, Robin Conrad, counsel
Jan 11 2008	Amicus curiae brief filed AFL-CIO, et al., in support of petitioner Scott Kronland, counsel
Jan 31 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed by plaintiffs, John Anderson counsel response to amicus brief of Employers Group, et al
Feb 4 2008	Response to amicus curiae brief filed Laidlaw Transit Services, RPI Theodore Scott, Counsel response to amicus brief of Arias and Calif. Rural Legal Assistance

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Nov 8, 2009 Annotated by Michelle Munoz	This labor law case addressed questions of standing under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §17203) and the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, §2699 subd. (a)). The court held that the plaintiff labor union that brought this case did not have standing under either of these laws, as it had not suffered actual injury and could not be assigned a cause of action by its members. The Unfair Competition Law (UCL) underwent a significant modification by Proposition #64 (Prop. #64) in 2004. This proposition changed the standing requirements for actions brought under the UCL. After Prop. #64, only those who had suffered “injury in fact” could bring suit under the UCL. According to the Court’s interpretation of the language of Prop. #64, the direct purpose of the change was to limit abuse of the law by restricting standing to only those who had actually suffered a loss of money or property due to unfair competition. Nor could the members of the plaintiff labor union assign their rights to a UCL cause of action to their labor union. To allow such an assignment would make Prop. #64 devoid of all meaning because it would allow non-injured assigned parties to bring suit. And assignment is not available under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (Private Attorney General Act) because it does not satisfy the requirements of Civ. Cod 954, which defines what causes of action are assignable. Under 954, only causes of action that violate a property right or arise out of a legal obligation are assignable. The Private Attorney General Act does neither of these. Finally, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that standing could be based upon the federal doctrine of associational standing. The court held that, again, such an interpretation of the UCL would eviscerate Prop. #64. The federal doctrine of associational standing was intended to grant standing to associations that have not actually suffered injury so they could bring a cause of action on behalf of their members. It was precisely this wide definition of standing that Prop. #64 intended to corral. Thus, Prop. #64 could not have meant to incorporate federal associational standing doctrine when the plain language of the amendment required “injury in fact.”
Nov 8, 2009 Annotated by Michelle Munoz	In her concurrence, Justice Werdegar disagreed with the Court's holding that UCL claims brought by representative action have to be brought as a class action. She also did not believe the Court needed to discuss associational standing because the UCL already denied standing to the plaintiff union. Moreover, she allowed for the possibility that California's associational doctrine, apart from the federal doctrine, might have been incorporated by Prop. #64.