Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S137238
Alan v. American Honda Motor

Filed 3/15/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH ALAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S137238
v.
Ct.App. 2/3 B165756
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., )

Los Angeles County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. BC195461

We granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeal properly dismissed
as untimely an appeal from an order denying class certification. In dismissing, the
Court of Appeal concluded the notice of appeal was untimely because certain
documents the superior court had mailed to the parties to inform them of its order
satisfied rule 8.104(a)(1)1 of the California Rules of Court2 and, thus, commenced
the 60-day period specified in the rule for filing a notice of appeal. We hold, to
the contrary, that the documents in question did not satisfy the rule and that the
notice was timely filed.

1
Former rule 2 of the California Rules of Court was renumbered rule 8.104
and amended, effective January 1, 2007. The operative language of former rule 2
was not changed. For clarity’s sake, we refer throughout this opinion to the
current version of the rule.
2
All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
1


I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and appellant Keith Alan filed this action against defendant and
respondent American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda). Alan alleged that Honda,
beginning in the mid-1980’s, sold vehicles with timing belts that required costly,
periodic replacement to prevent catastrophic engine, power steering and power
brake failure, but prevented buyers from learning about the required maintenance
through various misrepresentations and omissions. Alan purported to sue on
behalf of all past and present owners of vehicles manufactured by Honda with
timing belts, including certain Acura vehicles. He attempted to state claims under
the unfair competition and false advertising laws (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 et
seq., 17500 et seq.) as well as the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code,
§ 1750 et seq.).
During pretrial discovery, the superior court concluded the proposed class
was unmanageably large and invited the parties to limit the case to specific vehicle
models and model years. The court’s invitation led to a stipulated order that,
while the case was pending, the statute of limitations would be tolled for all claims
concerning vehicles other than Acura Integras manufactured from 1986 to 1993.
Alan subsequently moved to certify a nationwide class consisting of “all
individuals who now own, or have ever owned, any one or more of the Subject
Vehicles”—a term defined in the operative complaint as all vehicles made by
Honda with timing belts. The superior court denied the motion, reasoning that
common issues did not predominate because each purported class member would
need to offer individual proof of detrimental reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in order to obtain damages.
The ultimate question before us is whether Alan timely filed his notice of
appeal from the superior court’s order denying class certification. The matter is
governed by rule 8.104(a), which provides as follows: “Unless a statute or rule
2
8.108[3] provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the
earliest of: [¶] (1) 60 days after the superior court clerk mails the party filing the
notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-
stamped copy of the judgment, showing the date either was mailed; [¶] (2) 60 days
after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the
judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or [¶] (3) 180 days after entry of
judgment.” The term “judgment,” for purposes of rule 8.104(a), includes an
appealable order. (Rule 8.104(f).)
Timeliness is at issue in this case because of the idiosyncratic manner in
which the superior court informed the parties of its order denying class
certification. On January 2, 2003, the superior court clerk mailed to the parties in
a single envelope two documents, neither of which unambiguously satisfied rule
8.104(a)(1). The first document mailed by the clerk is entitled “STATEMENT OF
DECISION RE: ALAN’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION,” and sets
out the court’s reasons for denying the motion. The statement of decision bears
the superior court’s file stamp and concludes with the sentence, “Alan’s motion
for Class Certification is Denied.” The second document mailed by the clerk, a
minute order, is entitled “RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER/MOTION FOR
CLASS CERTIFICATION.” The order states, “The Court, having heard
argument in this Motion, and read and considered the papers, now issues its . . .
‘Statement of Decision Re: Alan’s Motion for Class Certification’ this date. [¶]
Copies of this minute order and the Statement of Decision are sent via U.S. Mail
on January 2, 2003 to counsel of record in envelopes addressed as follows.” The

3
Former rule 3 was renumbered rule 8.108 and amended, effective January
1, 2007.
3


names and addresses of counsel of record follow. In the margin at the bottom of
the page is the notation, “Page 1 of 1 DEPT. 323.” The minute order bears the
typed or printed notation, “MINUTES ENTERED 01/02/03 COUNTY CLERK,”
but is not file-stamped. The parties disagree on whether these documents satisfied
rule 8.104(a)(1). Honda contends they did. Alan maintains they did not.
On January 21, 2003, nineteen days after the superior court clerk mailed the
documents just described, Honda filed and served on Alan a document entitled
“NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AND STATEMENT OF DECISION
DENYING CLASS CERTIFICATION,” attaching copies of the January 2 minute
order and statement of decision. The parties agree that Honda’s “Notice of Entry”
satisfied rule 8.104(a)(2).
Alan filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2003—63 days after the superior
court mailed to the parties copies of its statement of decision and minute order,
and 44 days after Honda mailed its own “Notice of Entry” of the court’s ruling.
Accordingly, if the documents mailed by the superior court clerk satisfied rule
8.104(a)(1), then Alan’s notice of appeal was late. Alternatively, if those
documents did not satisfy that rule, then rule 8.104(a)(2) governs and Alan’s
notice was timely.
Honda moved to dismiss Alan’s appeal on the ground that rule 8.104(a)(1)
governed and that his notice of appeal was therefore untimely. The Court of
Appeal granted the motion and thus did not reach the merits of the appeal. In its
opinion explaining the dismissal, the court addressed two issues. First, the court
held the superior court’s order denying the motion for class certification was
immediately appealable under the so-called death knell doctrine because it had the
effect of dismissing the action as to all members of the purported class other than
the plaintiff. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470; Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 699; Stephen v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car
4
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 806, 811.) The court rejected Alan’s arguments to the
contrary. Second, the court concluded Alan’s notice of appeal was indeed
untimely. On this point, Alan argued that neither of the alternative documents
required by rule 8.104(a)(1)—neither “a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ ”
(ibid.) nor “a file-stamped copy of the judgment”—existed. Rejecting Alan’s
argument, the court reasoned that the minute order could be read together with the
statement of decision to satisfy the rule. In the court’s words, “[t]he January 2,
2003, order showed the date it was mailed, and included a file-stamped copy of a
five-page statement of decision signed by the trial court.” The court also rejected
Alan’s further argument that rule 8.104(a)(1), both in its plain language and as
explained by the Advisory Committee, requires a single document that satisfies all
of the rule’s conditions without reference to other documents.
In his petition for review, Alan raised both of the points the Court of Appeal
addressed in its opinion. In granting review, however, we limited “[t]he issue to
be briefed and argued . . . to whether the Statement of Decision and Minute Order
dated January 2, 2003 trigger the 60-day period within which to notice an appeal
under California Rules of Court, rule [8.104](a)(1).” We thus do not review the
Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the order denying class certification was
immediately appealable.
II. DISCUSSION
Rule 8.104(a)(1), which prescribes how a superior court clerk properly
gives notice of a judgment or appealable order, has a limited function in California
appellate procedure. In most cases, the rule does not apply because the Code of
Civil Procedure requires not the clerk but “the party submitting an order or
judgment for entry” to mail notice of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (a),
italics added.) Parties give notice not under rule 8.104(a)(1), but under rule
8.104(a)(2), as did Honda in the case before us. The clerk is required to give
5
notice only in designated family law matters (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (a);
rule 5.134), in cases in which a prevailing party is not represented by counsel
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5, subd. (b)), and upon specific order of the court (id.,
§ 664.5, subd. (d)). The clerk was required to give notice in this case only because
the court had so ordered in taking the motion for class certification under
submission. In those family law proceedings in which the clerk must always give
notice, rule 5.134 requires the clerk to use a Judicial Council form (FL-190)
specifically drafted to ensure compliance with rule 8.104(a)(1). Obviously,
problems are more likely to occur when no approved form of notice is available.
This case, in which no approved form of notice was available, reveals an
ambiguity in rule 8.104(a)(1). The rule refers to “a document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment,[4] showing the date
either was mailed.” (Rule 8.104(a)(1), italics added.) The reference to “a
document . . . or a file-stamped copy of the judgment” appears to contemplate a
single document that itself shows the date on which it was mailed and, thus,
satisfies all of the rule’s requirements without reference to other documents. This
initial clarity is obscured, however, by subdivision (a)(1)’s final participial
phrase—“showing the date either was mailed . . . .” (Ibid.) If that phrase modifies
the immediately preceding, alternative nominal phrases—“a document entitled
‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment” and “a file-stamped copy of the judgment”—the
interpretation suggested above is correct: rule 8.104(a)(1) requires a single
document, sufficient in itself to satisfy the rule’s conditions. Alternatively, if the
final participial phrase modifies the noun “clerk” that appears earlier in the
sentence, then the rule demands only that the clerk show in some manner—and not

4
Again, for present purposes, the term “ ‘judgment’ includes an appealable
order if the appeal is from an appealable order.” (Rule 8.104(f).)
6


necessarily on the face of the “Notice of Entry” or appealable order—the date on
which he or she mailed that document. The Judicial Council form (FL-190) that
clerks must use in family law proceedings (rule 5.134, subd. (a)) avoids the
ambiguity in rule 8.104(a)(1) by bearing the title, “Notice of Entry of Judgment,”
and by including at the bottom of its single page a form for the clerk’s certificate
of mailing.
Alan, who takes the position that rule 8.104(a)(1) requires a single, self-
sufficient document, contends that no such document exists in this case. First, as
he correctly observes, there exists in this case no “document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ . . .” (ibid.). Furthermore, the minute order, while arguably “showing the
date [it] was mailed” (rule 8.104(a)(1)), was not “file-stamped” (ibid.). Honda, in
opposition, argues that rule 8.104(a)(1) does not require a single, self-sufficient
document, and may also be satisfied by combining various documents. To apply
that proposition to this case, Honda would have us treat the file-stamped statement
of decision, rather than the minute order, as the appealable order, and would have
us treat the subsequent minute order as showing the date on which the statement of
decision was mailed.
We consider first the question of which document—the statement of
decision or the minute order—is the appealable order in this case. The general
rule is that a statement or memorandum of decision is not appealable. (Kinney v.
Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 357; In re Marriage of Biddle (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 396, 398, fn. 1; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San
Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003, fn. 3.) The rule’s practical
justification is that courts typically embody their final rulings not in statements of
decision but in orders or judgments. Reviewing courts have discretion to treat
statements of decision as appealable when they must, as when a statement of
decision is signed and filed and does, in fact, constitute the court’s final decision
7
on the merits. (Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, 896; cf. Native
Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 892, 896,
fn.1.) But a statement of decision is not treated as appealable when a formal order
or judgment does follow, as in this case. (Grossman v. Davis (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 1833, 1836, fn. 1; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, at p. 1003, fn. 3.) Certainly the desire to cut off a litigant’s right
to appeal cannot justify creating an exception to the general rule. Such an
exception would directly contravene “the well-established policy, based on the
remedial character of the right of appeal, of according that right in doubtful cases
‘when such can be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules.’ ”
(Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 674, quoting
Slawinski v. Mocettini (1965) 63 Cal.2d 70, 72.)
This conclusion would dispose of the present case. Because no “document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ ” (rule 8.104(a)(1)) exists, the clerk’s mailing cannot
have triggered the 60-day period for noticing an appeal unless it contained “a file-
stamped copy of the judgment” (ibid.) or appealable order (rule 8.104(f)). But the
clerk’s mailing contained no such document. While it did contain a copy of the
appealable minute order, that order is not file stamped. The typed or printed
notation that appears at the bottom of that order—“MINUTES ENTERED
01/02/03 COUNTY CLERK”—is not a file stamp. (In re Marriage of Taschen
(2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 681, 686.) Accordingly, the clerk’s mailing did not
satisfy rule 8.104(a)(1), and Alan’s notice of appeal was timely filed under rule
8.104(a)(2).
Nevertheless, our order specifying the issue in this case also fairly includes
the question whether rule 8.104(a)(1) requires a single, self-sufficient document
that satisfies all the rule’s conditions. The parties have briefed this issue, its
8
resolution offers an alternative basis for our decision in this case, and it has
importance for future cases. We therefore address it.
The ordinary principles of statutory construction govern our interpretation
of the Rules of Court. (Crespin v. Shewry (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 259, 265; Life
v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1296.) Our objective is to
determine the drafter’s intent. If the rule’s language is clear and unambiguous, it
governs. (Crespin v. Shewry, supra, at p. 265.) Experience teaches, however, that
unforeseen ambiguities can and do come to light despite the drafters’ considered
efforts to avoid them. In such cases, courts may consult appropriate extrinsic
sources to clarify the drafters’ intent. (Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 695, 703.) Certainly the Advisory Committee’s
official comments on the rules, which are intended for this purpose, may properly
be consulted.
An additional principle of construction applies when courts are called upon
to resolve ambiguities in rules that limit the right to appeal, such as rule
8.104(a)(1). In such cases we follow the well-established policy already
mentioned, namely, that of “according [the] right [to appeal] in doubtful cases
‘when such can be accomplished without doing violence to applicable rules.’ ”
(Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico, supra, 15 Cal.3d 660, 674, quoting
Slawinski v. Mocettini, supra, 63 Cal.2d 70, 72.) This principle has led courts
interpreting rule 8.104(a)(1) and its predecessors to hold that documents mailed by
the clerk do not trigger the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal unless the
documents strictly comply with the rule. “Because the time limits for filing a
notice of appeal are jurisdictional, we must apply [former] rule 2(a)(1) . . . strictly
and literally according to its terms; the rules ‘must stand by themselves without
embroidery.’ ” (In re Marriage of Taschen, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 681, 686,
quoting 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 666, 672;
9
see also Sunset Millennium Associates, LLC v. Le Songe, LLC (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 256, 260 [“Within reason, [former] rule 2 is read literally”].) Thus,
courts have consistently held that the required “ document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ ” (rule 8.104(a)(1)) must bear precisely that title, and that the “file-stamped
copy of the judgment” (ibid.) must truly be file stamped. (E.g., Sunset Millennium
Associates, LLC v. Le Songe, LLC, supra, at p. 260; In re Marriage of Taschen,
supra, p. 686; Cuenllas v. VRL International, Ltd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1050,
1051, 1054; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 671-672;
Hughey v. City of Hayward (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 206, 210.) For the same
reason, the older rule that technical defects in a notice of entry of judgment are
excusable unless they are so egregious as to preclude actual notice of entry (In re
Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 114) has not been
applied to the rule 8.104(a)(1) or its identically worded, immediate predecessor,
former rule 2(a)(1) (as adopted, eff. Jan. 1, 2002). (See Sunset Millennium
Associates, LLC v. Le Songe, LLC, supra, at p. 260, distinguishing In re Marriage
of Eben-King & King, supra, at p. 114; cf. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra, at p. 672 [“It might seem that the difference between a ‘notice of
ruling’ and a ‘notice of entry’ is hypertechnical. In another context it might be.”].)
To interpret rule 8.104(a)(1) as commencing the 60-day period for filing a
notice of appeal only when the clerk has sent a single, self-sufficient document
satisfying all of the rule’s conditions does not do violence to the rule’s language.
(Cf. Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico, supra, 15 Cal.3d 660, 674;
Slawinski v. Mocettini, supra, 63 Cal.2d 70, 72.) Indeed, this interpretation is the
more literally correct. The plain language of the rule refers to “a document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment,
showing the date either was mailed . . . .” (Rule 8.104(a)(1), italics added.) The
Advisory Committee’s original official comment on the rule’s identically worded
10
predecessor appears to confirm that a single, self-sufficient document is required:
“Under revised subdivision (a)(1), a notice of entry of judgment (or a copy of the
judgment) must show the date on which the clerk mailed the document,
analogously to the clerk’s ‘certificate of mailing’ currently in use in many superior
courts and required by certain Judicial Council forms (see, e.g., Form 1290
[Notice of Entry of Judgment in family law cases]).” (Advisory Com. com. (2002)
foll. rule 2, as adopted eff. Jan. 1, 2002, italics added.) The form to which the
committee referred, form 1290, is now designated FL-190 and, as noted above,
satisfies rule 8.104(a)(1) by displaying the clerk’s certificate of mailing at the
bottom of the page.5
The only evident ambiguity in rule 8.104(a)(1), as noted above, arises from
the possibility that the subdivision’s final participial phrase, “showing the date
either was mailed,” might modify not the immediately preceding, alternative
nominal phrases—“a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ ” and “a file-stamped
copy of the judgment”—but the more remote noun, “clerk,” that appears earlier in
the sentence. One would thus read the rule as if it provided as follows: “the
superior court clerk[, showing the date either document was mailed,] mails the
party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ . . . .” In
general, however, participial phrases closely follow the nouns or nominal phrases
they modify, precisely in order to avoid misplaced or dangling participles that

5
Alan’s request for judicial notice of Judicial Council Forms, forms 1290,
FL-190 and Adopt-215 is granted. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c) [permitting
notice to be taken of the “[o]fficial acts of the . . . judicial departments . . . of any
state of the United States”]; Lewis v. Clarke (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 563, 570,
fn. 3.) The last form mentioned is an adoption order that includes, like forms 1290
and FL-190, a clerk’s certificate of mailing.

11


generate confusion about what they might be intended to modify.6 For this reason,
the rule is most naturally read as requiring the clerk to mail a document that itself
shows the date on which it was mailed.
The Court of Appeal, as mentioned, held to the contrary that rule
8.104(a)(1) permitted the clerk to use a separate document to show the date on
which the “file-stamped copy of the judgment” (ibid.) was mailed. Applying this
reasoning, the court concluded the minute order showed the date on which the
clerk had mailed the statement of decision, which the court in turn erroneously
treated as the appealable order. To permit a separate document to show the date of
mailing, the court reasoned, was supported by rule 8.104(a)(2), which requires a
party giving notice of entry of judgment to serve “a document entitled ‘Notice of
Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof
of service . . . .” (Rule 8.104(a)(2), italics added.) The Court of Appeal thus read
rule 8.104(a)(2) as if it constituted an interpretative gloss on rule 8.104(a)(1). This
was erroneous. Rule 8.104(a)(2) shows only that the drafters knew how to require
a separate document (“proof of service”) when that was their intention. Nothing in
rule 8.104(a)(2) affects our conclusion that the different language of rule
8.104(a)(1) requires a single, self-sufficient document satisfying all the rule’s
conditions.
For these reasons, we conclude that rule 8.104(a)(1) does indeed require a
single document—either a “Notice of Entry” so entitled or a file-stamped copy of
the judgment or appealable order—that is sufficient in itself to satisfy all of the

6
E.g., American Heritage Book of English Usage (Houghton Mifflin 1996)
page 24 (“It is important to remember that readers will ordinarily associate a
participle with the noun or noun phrase that is adjacent to it”); Garner, Modern
American Usage (Oxford 2003) page 217 (“when the antecedent of a participle
doesn’t appear where it logically should, the participle is said to ‘dangle’ ”).
12


rule’s conditions, including the requirement that the document itself show the date
on which it was mailed. That having been said, we see no reason why the clerk
could not satisfy the single-document requirement by attaching a certificate of
mailing to the file-stamped judgment or appealable order, or to a document
entitled “Notice of Entry.” Obviously a document can have multiple pages. But
the rule does not require litigants to glean the required information from multiple
documents or to guess, at their peril, whether such documents in combination
trigger the duty to file a notice of appeal. “Neither parties nor appellate courts
should be required to speculate about jurisdictional time limits.” (Van Beurden
Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 51, 64.)
Honda contends the documents mailed by the clerk in this case could be
viewed as a single document by treating the minute order as incorporating the
statement of decision. The Court of Appeal suggested the same. But the minute
order does not purport to incorporate the statement of decision. Instead,
describing itself as “Page 1 of 1,” the minute order declares only that the court
“now issues its . . . ‘STATEMENT OF DECISION RE: ALAN’S MOTION FOR
CLASS CERTIFICATION’ this date.” Nor, if it mattered, does the clerk appear
to have attached the two documents. Alan maintains he received two separate,
unattached documents from the clerk, and Honda does not now argue to the
contrary. In any event, none of the documents required by rule 8.104(a)(1) was
included in the clerk’s mailing; for the clerk to have attached the documents
actually mailed would change nothing.
In conclusion, the documents mailed by the clerk in this case did not
comply with rule 8.104(a)(1). No document entitled “Notice of Entry” exists. Nor
is the appealable minute order, which arguably shows the date on which it was
mailed, file stamped. Accordingly, the clerk’s mailing of these documents did not
13
commence the 60-day period for the filing of a notice of appeal. Instead, the
relevant 60-day period began when Honda filed its own, proper notice of entry on
January 17, 2003. Alan timely filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2003, 44
days later. Thus, the Court of Appeal erred in dismissing Alan’s appeal as
untimely.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed in part and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the views set forth herein.
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
14
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 131 Cal.App.4th 886
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S137238
Date Filed: March 15, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Charles W. McCoy, Jr.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

The Law Offices of John A. Schlaff and John A. Schlaff for Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Michelman & Robinson, Carol Boyd, Larry Nathenson; Neumeyer & Boyd, Katherine Tatikian; Sonnett &
Associates, Anthony E. Sonnett, Jocelyn A. Julian; Yukevich & Sonnett and Stephanie A. Hingle for
Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Amicus:

Jay-Allen Eisen; Dennis A. Fischer; Paul D. Fogel; Steven L. Mayer; Robert Olson; Douglas R. Young;
Lascher & Lascher and Wendy Cole Lascher for California Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae.


Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

John A. Schlaff
The Law Offices of John A. Schlaff
2265 Westwood Boulevard, No. 1013
Los Angeles, CA 90064
(310) 474-2627

Carol Boyd
Michelman & Robinson
15760 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 500
Encino, CA 91436
(818) 783-5530


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 03/15/2007S137238

Parties
1Alan, Keith (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by John A. Schlaff
Attorney at Law
2265 Westwood Boulevard, No. 1013
Los Angeles, CA

2American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Carol Boyd
Michelman & Robinson, LLP
15760 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 500
Encino, CA

3American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Anthony Sonnett
Sonnett & Associated
333 S. Grand Avenue, 35th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

4California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jay-Allen Eisen
Attorney at Law
980 Ninth Street, Suite 1400
Sacramento, CA

5California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Dennis A. Fischer
Attorney at Law
1448 Fifteenth Street, Suite 206
Santa Monica, CA

6California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Paul D. Fogel
Reed, Smith, LLP
2 Embarcadero Center, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA

7California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Wendy Cole Lascher
Lascher & Lascher
605 Poli Street
P. O. Box 25540
Ventura, CA

8California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Steven L. Mayer
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin
3 Embarcardo Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

9California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Robert A. Olson
Greines Martin et al., LLP
5700 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 375
Los Angeles, CA

10California Academy Of Appellate Lawyers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Douglas R. Young
Farella, Braun & Martel
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA


Disposition
Mar 15 2007Opinion: Affirmed in part/reversed in part

Dockets
Sep 13 2005Petition for review filed
  appellant Keith Alan [rule 40.1]
Sep 15 2005Received Court of Appeal record
 
Oct 3 2005Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  counsel for appellant ("ALAN"]
Oct 3 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  on behalf of resp. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC. by counsel
Oct 12 2005Reply to answer to petition filed
  appellant Keith Alan
Oct 13 2005Opposition filed
  to depub request>>respondent American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Oct 19 2005Letter sent to:
  Counsel re: Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
Oct 19 2005Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)
  Petition for review GRANTED. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to whether the Statement of Decisions and Minute Order dated January 2, 2003 trigger the 60-day period within which to notice an appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1). Kennard, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Oct 20 2005Received Court of Appeal record
 
Nov 3 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by counsel for respondent AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.
Nov 7 2005Request for extension of time filed
  on behalf of appellant KEITH ALAN by counsel
Nov 7 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  on behalf of appellant KEITH ALLAN by counsel
Nov 17 2005Extension of time granted
  to 12-19-05 for appellant to file the opening brief on the merits. The court will entertain a further application for extension of time only upon a showing of good cause.
Dec 13 2005Request for extension of time filed
  appellant, Keith Alan additional ten days to file the opening brief on the merits.
Dec 19 2005Extension of time granted
  to December 29, 2005 for appellant to file the opening brief on the merits.
Dec 27 2005Request for extension of time filed
  to file opening brief on the merits, asking to January 3, 2006 appellant, Keith Alan
Dec 30 2005Extension of time granted
  To January 3, 2006 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits.
Jan 3 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to file opening brief on the merits, asking to January 6, 2006. by appellant Keith Alan.
Jan 6 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including January 6, 2006.
Jan 9 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
  appellant, Keith Alan (40.K)
Feb 8 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
  Respondent American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Attorneys Carol Boyd and Anthony Sonnett, Retained
Feb 27 2006Request for extension of time filed
  reply brief on the merits, asking to 3-7-06 by appellant Keith Alan
Mar 2 2006Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Appellant Keith Alan Attorney John A. Schlaff, Retained
Mar 2 2006Extension of time granted
  to March 7, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief on the merits.
Mar 7 2006Request for extension of time filed
  reply brief/merits to 3-13-06 Appellant Keith Alan
Mar 9 2006Extension of time granted
  to March 13, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief on the merits.
Mar 14 2006Application filed to:
  to file oversize opening brief/merits Appellant Keith Alan
Mar 15 2006Received:
 
Mar 20 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Keith Alan, appellant John A. Schlaff, counsel oversize opening brief filed with permission
Apr 13 2006Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by California Academy of Appellate Lawyers.
Apr 14 2006Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Academy of Appellate Lawyers
Apr 14 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
  California Academy of Appellate Lawyers
May 2 2006Request for extension of time filed
  response to ac brief of Calf Academy of Appellate Lawyers Responsdent American Honda Motor Co., Inc. [to 5-24-06] Attorney Carol Boyd, Retained
May 3 2006Request for extension of time filed
  response to ac brief of Calif Academy of Appellate Lawyers Appellant Keith Alan [to 5-24-06] Attorney John A. Schlaff, Retained
May 4 2006Extension of time granted
  to May 24, 2006 to file respondent's (American Honda Motor Co.) Answer to Amicus Curiae Brief.
May 8 2006Extension of time granted
  to May 24, 206 to file appellant's response to the Amicus Brief of the California Academy of appellate lawyers.
May 19 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to June 23, 2006 to file respondent's (American Honda Motor Co., Inc.) answer to amicus curiae brief.
May 22 2006Extension of time granted
  to June 23, 2006 to file respondent's answer to amicus curiae brief.
May 23 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to file response to ac brief Calif Academy of Appellate Lawyers to 6-23-06>>Appellant Keith Allan
May 26 2006Extension of time granted
  to June 23, 2006 to file response to the amicus curiae brief of The California Accademy of Appellate Lawyers.
Jun 23 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to ac brief of Calif Academy of Appellate Lawyers Respondent American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Attorneys Carol Boyd, etal, retained
Jun 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to ac brief of Calif Academy of Appellate Lawyers Appellant Keith Alan [rule 40.1] Attorney John A. Schlaff, retained
Jan 3 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued Tuesday, January 30, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in Sacramento
Jan 23 2007Change of contact information filed for:
  counsel John A. Schlaff
Jan 23 2007Received:
  petitioner's supplemental brief
Jan 29 2007Received:
  Notice of Errata for appellant Keith Allan by John A. Schlaff, counsel
Jan 30 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Mar 14 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Mar 15 2007Opinion filed: Affirmed in part, reversed in part
  and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views set forth herein. Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ.
Apr 17 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Apr 26 2007Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from 2 DCA, Div. 3

Briefs
Jan 9 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Feb 8 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Mar 20 2006Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Apr 14 2006Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jun 23 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jun 27 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
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