IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, )
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S112386
v.
Ct.App. 4/1 D039656
SYRIAH DEGRATE,
San Diego County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. CA775163
The federal government, through the “Section 8” program, provides
financial assistance to low-income tenants. (42 U.S.C. § 1437f.) We granted
review to determine whether a landlord who terminates a tenancy agreement with
a tenant receiving federal financial assistance through the Section 8 program
(Section 8 tenant) is required by Civil Code section 1954.535 to give the tenant 90
days’ notice if the property is not subject to a local rent control ordinance. We
conclude that Civil Code section 1954.535 applies whether or not the property is
subject to a local rent control ordinance, and that landlords must comply with the
90-day notice provision of section 1954.535 in order to terminate a tenancy
agreement with a Section 8 tenant.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Syriah Degrate, a Section 8 tenant, entered into a six-month
tenancy agreement for an apartment in San Diego. The agreement began on May
1, 2000 and was to terminate on October 31, 2000, but would thereafter be
renewed on a month-to-month basis. Degrate previously had entered into a one-
year lease for this apartment.
1
On June 1, 2000, the owner of the apartment entered into a housing
assistance payment contract (HAP contract) with the San Diego Housing
Commission to receive funds provided to the local authority by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development. (24 CFR §§ 982.451(a)(2),
(b)(1).) The HAP contract provided that it “only appli[ed] to the household and
unit” occupied by Degrate, and that the “contract terminates automatically if the
lease is terminated by the owner or the tenant.” An owner who receives such
funds also enters into a rental agreement with the Section 8 tenant (tenancy
agreement), under which the tenant agrees to pay the balance of the rent due. (24
CFR § 982.515.)
On January 31, 2001, plaintiff Wasatch Property Management served
Degrate with a “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” that stated, in pertinent part,
that “[t]he owner is electing not to renew your lease and you are being served with
this NOTICE pursuant to Title 42 United States Code Section 1437f(d)(1)(B)ii.”
The notice directed Degrate to vacate the unit on March 2, 2001.
Degrate did not vacate the premises on March 2, 2001 as ordered by the
notice of termination. On March 5, 2001, Wasatch filed an unlawful detainer
complaint in San Diego County Superior Court. The superior court entered
judgment in favor of Wasatch, and denied a motion by Degrate to vacate the
judgment, holding that Civil Code section 1954.5351 applies only in jurisdictions
that have enacted rent control ordinances.2
1
All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise
specified.
2
We use the term “rent control ordinance” to refer to an ordinance or charter
provision that controls the rental rate for a dwelling or apartment unit. (See, e.g., §
1954.53.) Neither Degrate nor Wasatch contend that the rental unit at issue here,
located in the city of San Diego, is governed by such a rent control ordinance.
2
The parties appealed the judgment to the appellate division of the superior
court, which held that section 1954.535 applies only in rent-controlled
jurisdictions, but reversed the trial court’s judgment because Wasatch had not
provided Degrate with notice of good cause to terminate the lease, as required by
the lease and the HAP contract.
The appellate division of the superior court certified the case to the Court of
Appeal, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 63. The Court of Appeal
accepted certification and, in a published decision, held that: 1) the 90-day notice
provision in section 1954.535 applies in all jurisdictions, including those without
rent control ordinances; and 2) when a landlord terminates a tenancy agreement,
thereby causing the termination of the HAP contract with the government agency,
the 90-day notice provision of section 1954.535 applies. The Court of Appeal also
held that the notice Degrate received was inadequate because the lessor failed to
provide Degrate with notice of good cause to terminate her lease.
We granted review to clarify the proper interpretation of section 1954.535,
and declined to review the Court of Appeal’s alternate holding that the notice was
inadequate for failure to show good cause to terminate the lease.
II. DISCUSSION
A tenant may defend against an unlawful detainer action by asserting that
the lessor has not provided proper notice of termination, as required by statute.
(Kwok v. Bergren (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600.) Generally, when a
month-to-month tenancy is terminated without good cause, a lessor must provide
the affected tenant with 30 days’ notice. (§ 1946; see, e.g., People ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation v. Lucero (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 166, 173.) However, in certain
instances, section 1954.535 alters the notice requirement by requiring a lessor to
provide 90 days’ notice of a lease termination.
Section 1954.535 requires that: “Where an owner terminates or fails to
renew a contract or recorded agreement with a governmental agency that provides
3
for rent limitations to a qualified tenant, the tenant or tenants who were the
beneficiaries of the contract or recorded agreement shall be given at least 90 days’
written notice of the effective date of the termination and shall not be obligated to
pay more than the tenant’s portion of the rent, as calculated under the contract or
recorded agreement to be terminated, for 90 days following receipt of the notice of
termination of nonrenewal of the contract.”
A.
Applicability of Section 1954.535 in Jurisdictions Without Rent
Control
Ordinances
Wasatch contends that it was required to give Degrate only 30 days’ notice
of the termination of her tenancy, as prescribed by section 1946, rather than the
90-day notice required by section 1954.535, because the latter statute applies only
in jurisdictions in which a public entity has enacted a residential rent control
ordinance. However, nothing in the language of section 1954.535 suggests that it
applies only in jurisdictions that have enacted rent control ordinances.
In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we look to the intent of the
Legislature as expressed by the actual words of the statute. (People v. Snook
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) We examine the language first, as it is the
language of the statute itself that has “successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.”
(Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238.)
“It is that [statutory] language which has been lobbied for, lobbied against,
studied, proposed, drafted, restudied, redrafted, voted on in committee, amended,
reamended, analyzed, reanalyzed, voted on by two houses of the Legislature, sent
to a conference committee, and, after perhaps more lobbying, debate and analysis,
finally signed ‘into law’ by the Governor. The same care and scrutiny does not
befall the committee reports, caucus analyses, authors’ statements, legislative
counsel digests and other documents which make up a statute’s ‘legislative
history.’ ” (Ibid.)
Examining the language of section 1954.535, it is apparent that the statute
does not apply only in jurisdictions with rent control ordinances, but rather applies
4
anywhere in the state “[w]here an owner terminates or fails to renew a contract or
recorded agreement with a governmental agency that provides” financial
assistance, such as through the Section 8 program. (§ 1954.535.)
It appears that the Legislature deliberately decided not to limit the reach of
section 1954.535 to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Not only is there no language
within section 1954.535 that explicitly limits the reach of the statute to rent-
controlled jurisdictions, but the same bill that added section 1954.535 to the Civil
Code also amended section 1954.53 to include such an express restriction.
Section 1954.53, subdivision (a)(1)(A), as amended, plainly limits its scope to a
“jurisdiction that controls by ordinance or charter provision the rental rate for a
dwelling or unit.” Had the Legislature intended to also limit the scope of section
1954.535 in the same manner, it would have included similar language doing so.
“ ‘[W]hen the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Brown v.
Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 725, quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
County of Tulare (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 688; 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutes and
Statutory Construction (6th ed. 2000) § 46:5.) Accordingly, we decline to
interpret section 1954.535 to include a term limiting its application to rent-
controlled jurisdictions.
Indeed, the legislative history of section 1954.535 suggests that the 90-day
notice provision was meant to address issues of statewide concern. The Senate
Judiciary Committee’s comment on the proposed 90-day notice provision
explained the purpose of the increased notice period as follows: “Proponents assert
that the current requirement of 30 days notice is insufficient time for a Section 8
tenant to find replacement income and housing when the property [owner] decides
to no longer accept Section 8 housing vouchers, thereby forcing the tenant to
move. They assert that this proposal, requiring 90 days notice of the effective date
of the landlord’s termination or nonrenewal of a Section 8 agreement and freezing
5
the tenant’s rent for that period, does not impose an undue burden on the property
owner. The only burden is to advise the affected tenants of the owner’s decision
60 days earlier, thereby giving the affected tenants more time to prepare. This is
fair, assert the proponents, given the tight market for low income housing and the
unique relationship between the Section 8 tenant and his or her landlord.” (Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 5.)
The concern addressed by the Senate Judiciary Committee—that the typical
30-day notice provision would not afford Section 8 tenants enough time to find
replacement income and housing, especially given a tight market for low-income
rental housing—was not limited to rent-controlled jurisdictions. Likewise, the
Assembly Committee on Appropriations understood Senate Bill No. 1098 to be a
bill that sought “to address some of the issues affecting low-income renters . . . at
a time when the healthy economy is pushing rent levels to new highs . . . .”
(Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg.
Sess.) as amended July 8, 1999, p. 2.) This concern for low-income renters
presumably extends not only to those renters in rent-controlled jurisdictions, but
statewide, to all those affected by the tight housing market.
Wasatch also supports its contention that section 1954.535 applies only in
jurisdictions with rent control ordinances by noting the placement of the statute
within a chapter of the Civil Code under the heading “Residential Rent Control.”
This court, however, has noted that “[t]itle or chapter headings are unofficial and
do not alter the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute.” (DaFonte v. Up-
Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 602.) Although section 1954.535 was added to
the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (§§ 1954.50-1954.535 (hereinafter, Costa-
Hawkins Act or Act)), the short title of the chapter does not indicate that its
contents are limited to rental housing within rent-controlled jurisdictions; to the
contrary, the official short title of the chapter is the “Costa-Hawkins Rental
6
Housing Act.” (§ 1954.50, italics added.) Thus, the short title of the Civil Code
chapter containing section 1954.535 indicates that the chapter’s contents address
rental housing in general, rather than simply residential rent control. The
inclusion of the words “rent control” in the unofficial heading, which by its nature
does not alter the scope, meaning, or intent of the statute, does not persuade us that
the Legislature intended to limit the application of section 1954.535 solely to rent-
controlled jurisdictions.
Wasatch argues, in essence, that because “ ‘[t]he words of the statute must
be construed in context’ ” (Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing
Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 268), if the Legislature had intended that the
provisions of section 1954.535 apply in non-rent-controlled jurisdictions, the
statute would have been placed, as other sections of Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-
2000 Reg. Sess.) were, within the appropriate non-rent-control code section.
Although the Costa-Hawkins Act was initially enacted to address issues arising in
rent-controlled jurisdictions (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1164 (1995-
1996 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats. 1995, Summary Dig., p. 114), its terms apply to all
property in California. (See, e.g., § 1954.52, subd. (a) [“Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, an owner of residential real property may establish the
initial and all subsequent rental rates for a dwelling or a unit . . . .”].) Moreover,
the placement of section 1954.535 within the Costa-Hawkins Act occurred several
years after the initial passage of the Act. Section 1954.535 was passed as part of
Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), which contained six parts
addressing a hodgepodge of unrelated issues in landlord-tenant law.3 Absent
3
Senate Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) section 1 allows tenants to
invite others into their homes to participate in a tenant association or to discuss
tenant rights. (§ 1942.6.) Senate Bill No. 1098, section 2 amended section
1954.53, a portion of the Costa-Hawkins Act, to reduce the ability of a property
owner in a rent-controlled jurisdiction to increase rents by opting out of the
(Footnote continued on next page.)
7
explicit language limiting section 1954.535 to rent-controlled jurisdictions, its
placement within the Costa-Hawkins Act does not persuade us that its application
is so limited.
In examining the broader context of hiring rental property as addressed by
title 5 of the Civil Code, it does not appear that the Legislature intended to divide
the Civil Code neatly into rent-control and non-rent-control sections. The Civil
Code chapter preceding the Costa-Hawkins Act contains several sections that
apply to local jurisdictions that have enacted rent control ordinances. (See
§§ 1947.7, 1947.8, & 1947.15.) It therefore appears that the Legislature did not
intend that the Costa-Hawkins Act would contain all statutory provisions related to
residential rent control. Likewise, it is not immediately apparent that we should
infer the converse—especially absent persuasive evidence of legislative intent to
the contrary—that all sections within the Costa-Hawkins Act are necessarily
limited to residential rent control issues.
Further, it is unclear that there exists within the Civil Code a more
appropriate placement for section 1954.535, whether or not it deals with rent
control issues, given that it deals with a federal entitlement program. We certainly
do not impose a requirement upon the Legislature that it create a new chapter in
order to distinguish a statutory provision from its neighbors. In placing section
1954.535 within the Costa-Hawkins Act, the Legislature ensured its proximity to
section 1954.53, certain subsections of which also address government-subsidized
tenancies, albeit only those tenancies within a rent-controlled jurisdiction.
(Footnote continued from previous page.)
Section 8 program. Senate Bill No. 1098, section 3 added section 1954.535.
Senate Bill No. 1098, sections 4, 5, and 6 amended the Fair Housing and
Employment Act (§ 12900 et seq.) to prevent discrimination on the basis of
income. (Stats. 1999, ch. 590, § 2.)
8
(§ 1954.53, subd. (a)(1)(A), (B).) It thus was logical to place both statutes
addressing such government-subsidized tenancies in the same chapter. The
placement of section 1954.535 alongside provisions applying exclusively and
expressly in rent-controlled jurisdictions is therefore consistent with the
proposition that the 90-day notice provision also applies in non-rent-controlled
jurisdictions.
Finally, we reject Wasatch’s argument that we should conclude that section
1954.535 only applies in rent-controlled jurisdictions because of the consequences
that would flow from the opposite interpretation. Specifically, Wasatch fears that
the 90-day notice provision, if applied statewide, would discourage landlords from
participating in the Section 8 program. Presumably, though, this concern applies
equally in jurisdictions with and without rent control ordinances and therefore
does not bear upon the issue of whether section 1954.535 applies outside of rent-
controlled jurisdictions.
For the abovementioned reasons, we conclude that the 90-day notice
provision of section 1954.535 applies both in jurisdictions with and without rent
control ordinances.
B.
Applicability to Owner Termination of Tenancy Agreement
Having concluded that section 1954.535 applies within jurisdictions that
have not enacted rent control ordinances, we now turn to the question whether
terminating a Section 8 tenancy agreement triggers the 90-day notice requirement
of section 1954.535 when the terminated tenancy agreement is the subject of a
related Section 8 HAP contract.
Section 1954.535 states that the 90-day notice provision is applicable
“[w]here an owner terminates or fails to renew a contract or recorded agreement
with a governmental agency. . . .” The statute clearly applies if the owner directly
terminates the HAP contract with the government. However, the statute also
9
applies where the owner knowingly causes the termination of the agreement with
a government agency, here the HAP contract.
Federal regulations provide that the HAP contract terminates if “the lease is
terminated by the owner or the tenant.” (24 C.F.R. § 982.309(b)(2)(i).) The terms
of the HAP contract here reflect this: “[t]he HAP contract terminates
automatically if the lease is terminated by the owner or the tenant.” The converse
is also true; “[i]f the HAP contract terminates for any reason, the lease terminates
automatically.” Ultimately, under both federal regulation and the language of the
specific HAP contract at issue, terminating one contract necessarily terminates the
other.
The principal question, then, is whether the word “terminate,” as used in
section 1954.535, encompasses situations in which the owner indirectly terminates
the HAP contract by terminating the tenancy agreement. When attempting to
ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the
dictionary definition of that word. (People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1009;
see, e.g., Hammond v. Agran (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189; Scott v.
Continental Ins. Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 24, 28-30.) The Oxford English
Dictionary defines “terminate” as meaning, among other things, “[t]o bring to an
end, put an end to, cause to cease; to end.” (17 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989)
p. 804.) This definition encompasses both directly ending something and
indirectly causing it to end.
Nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to limit the application
of section 1954.535 to situations in which the owner directly terminates a HAP
contract. The Senate Judiciary Committee Analysis repeatedly refers to the
“owner’s termination or nonrenewal of a ‘Section 8’ housing agreement.” (Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1098 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Apr. 7, 1999, p. 3.) This language does not specify whether indirect
termination of the housing agreement triggers the 90-day notice requirement, or
10
whether only direct termination is within the scope of section 1954.535.
Similarly, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest, which refers to “termination of a
specified rent limitation contract with a governmental agency,” does not specify
whether indirect, or only direct, termination of a single HAP contract would
trigger the 90-day notice provision. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1098
(1999-2000 Reg. Sess.).)
The court will apply common sense to the language at hand and interpret
the statute to make it workable and reasonable. (See, e.g., Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 536-537.) Accordingly, the
statute should be interpreted to avoid an absurd result. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25
Cal.3d 522, 537; Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra, 6
Cal.App.4th at p. 1238.)
Under Wasatch’s proposed application of the statute, the owner of a
Section 8 housing unit would be allowed, in effect, to choose between giving a 90-
day or 30-day notice to a Section 8 tenant whose tenancy agreement was being
terminated without cause, 4 merely based upon which contract was terminated
first. As noted earlier, when an owner terminates a tenancy agreement, the HAP
contract is terminated as effectively as if the owner had directly terminated it. Not
only is this true under the terms of the HAP contract at issue in this case, it also is
4
Wasatch and supporting amici curiae argue that section 1954.535 should
not apply if the landlord has good cause to terminate the tenancy because the
tenant had breached the terms of the rental agreement. In such circumstances,
they contend, the tenant is entitled to only 3 days’ notice of the termination of the
tenancy agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivisions 2
and 3. This issue is not raised by the circumstances of the present case, because
the parties agree that Wasatch terminated Degrate’s tenancy without cause.
Accordingly, despite the fact that Degrate conceded that section 1954.535 does not
apply to terminations of rental agreements for good cause, we need not—and do
not—address whether the 90-day notice provision applies where the tenancy is
terminated for good cause.
11
clearly required by the federal regulations governing Section 8 housing, under
which the termination of the tenancy agreement automatically terminates the HAP
contract. (24 C.F.R. § 982.309(b)(2)(i); see also Friedman, et al., Cal. Practice
Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2004) ¶ 12:50 [“The HAP contract
term is the same as the lease term. Both the HAP contract and housing assistance
payments terminate when . . . the lease is terminated by the landlord or
tenant. . . .”].)
Federal regulations create further interrelation and entanglement between
the HAP contract and the tenancy agreement by dictating that many of the crucial
terms of the tenancy agreement be included verbatim in the HAP contract. For
example, federal regulations require that the HAP contract include a tenancy
addendum containing certain lease provisions, including provisions that address
such important topics as the minimum initial lease term. (24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f),
982.309(a).) Moreover, the addendum must then be added “word-for-word” to the
tenancy agreement signed by the Section 8 tenant. (24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f)(2)
[“All provisions in the HUD-required tenancy addendum must be added word-for-
word to the owner’s standard form lease that is used by the owner for unassisted
tenants.”].) Federal regulations also provide that the “tenant shall have the right to
enforce the tenancy addendum against the owner, and the terms of the tenancy
addendum shall prevail over any other provisions of the lease.” (Ibid.) Given the
extensive interrelation of the two contracts, it would make little sense to allow the
owner of a Section 8 unit to attach a different notice requirement to the
termination of each contract, and thereby choose which notice period applies. Nor
would it be reasonable for two different notice periods to apply depending upon
whether an owner happened to deliver the tenancy termination notice or the HAP
termination notice first.
In sum, common sense weighs against interpreting section 1954.535 to
distinguish between terminating the HAP contract and terminating the tenancy
12
agreement. It would be absurd to apply differing notice requirements depending
upon which of these two inextricably intertwined contracts the owner chose to
terminate first.
III. DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
BROWN,
J.
13
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 103 Cal.App.4th 913
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S112386Date Filed: June 13, 2005
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: San Diego
Judge: Michael S. Goodman, Commissioner
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Legal Aid Society of San Diego and Bernadette E. Probus for Defendant and Appellant.National Housing Law Project, Catherine Bishop; Legal Services of Northern California, R. Mona
Tawatao, Erin Farley; Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, David Pallack; Legal Aid
Foundation of Los Angeles, Susanne Browne; California Rural Legal Assistance and Ilene J. Jacobs for
Southern California Association of Non-Profit Housing, California Coalition for Rural Housing, Housing
Rights, Inc., Fair Housing Foundation, Coalition for Economic Survival, Greater Long Beach Interfaith
Community Organization, Long Beach Community Action Network, Long Beach Area Coalition for the
Homeless, City of West Hollywood, Santa Monica Recant Control Board and Annette Osborne as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Brian Kelly and Donald A. Tine for City of Berkeley and City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Kimball, Tirey & St. John, Patricia Helen Tirey and Gary Douglas Urie for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Heidi P. Poppe for California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Houk & Hicks, Lloyd L. Hicks; Thomas E. Campagne & Associates and Sarah A. Wolfe for Norcal
Executive Directors Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Christensen Schwerdtfeger & Spath and Sean D. Schwerdtefeger for San Diego Housing Commission as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Peter Mezza for Housing Authority Executive Directors Association Southern California Chapter as
Amicus Curiae.
1
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Bernadette E. ProbusLegal Aid Society of San Diego
110 South Euclid Avenue
San Diego, CA 92114
(619) 262-5557, ext. 2615
Catherine Bishop
National Housing Law Project
614 Grand Avenue, Suite 320
Oakland, CA 94610
(510) 251-9400. ext. 105
Patricia Helen Tirey
Kimball, Tirey & St. John
1202 Kettner Boulevard, Fifth Floor
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 234-1690
Gary Douglas Urie
Kimball, Tirey & St. John
1202 Kettner Boulevard, Fifth Floor
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 234-1690
2
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: |
| Mon, 06/13/2005 | 35 Cal. 4th 1111, 112 P.3d 647, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 | S112386 |
| 1 | Wasatch Property Management (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Gary Douglas Urie Kimball, Tirey & St. John 1202 Kettner Blvd., 5th Floor San Diego, CA |
| 2 | Wasatch Property Management (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Patricia Helen Tirey Kimball, Tirey & St. John 1202 Kettner Blvd., 5th Floor San Diego, CA |
| 3 | Degrate, Syriah (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by Bernadette Elaine Probus Legal Aid Society of San Diego 110 South Euclid Avenue San Diego, CA |
| 4 | California Apartment Association (Pub/Depublication Requestor) Represented by Heidi Palutke Attorney at Law 980 9th St #2150 Sacramento, CA |
| 5 | Affordable Housing Management Association Of Pacific S.W. (Pub/Depublication Requestor) attn: Vikki Gherzi, Vice President 2900 Bristol Street, Suite G-105 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 |
| 6 | San Diego Housing Commission (Pub/Depublication Requestor) Represented by Sean Schwerdtfeger Christensen Schwerdtfeger & Spath LLP 444 W "C" St #200 San Diego, CA |
| 7 | National Housing Law Project (Objector) Represented by Catherine Morrison Bishop Attorney at Law 614 Grand Ave #320 Oakland, CA |
| 8 | City Of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board (Amicus curiae) Represented by Donald A. Tine Rent Stabilization Board 2125 Milvia St #200 Berkeley, CA |
| 9 | City Of Berkeley (Amicus curiae) Represented by Donald A. Tine Rent Stabilization Board 2125 Milvia St #200 Berkeley, CA |
| 10 | Norcal Executive Directors Association (Amicus curiae) Represented by Lloyd L. Hicks Houk & Hicks P.O. Box 350 Visalia, CA |
| 11 | Housing Authority Executive Directors Association (Amicus curiae) attn: Peter Mezza, President 2121 Cloverfield Blvd., Suite 131 Santa Monica, CA 90404 |
| 12 | Southern California Association Of Non-Profit Housing (Amicus curiae) Represented by David Pallack Neigborhood Legal Svcs of Los Angeles County 13327 Van Nuys Blvd Pacoima, CA |
| 13 | Southern California Association Of Non-Profit Housing (Amicus curiae) Represented by Susanne Michelle Browne Legal Aid Foundation Of LA 110 Pine Ave #420 Long Beach, CA |
| 14 | Southern California Association Of Non-Profit Housing (Amicus curiae) Represented by Ilene Jacobs California Rural Legal Assistance 818 "D" Street Marysville, CA |
| 15 | Southern California Association Of Non-Profit Housing (Amicus curiae) Represented by Rau Mona Tawatao Legal Svcs Of Northern CA 515 12th St Sacramento, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Carlos R. Moreno |
| Disposition | |
| Jun 13 2005 | Opinion: Affirmed |
| Dockets | |
| Dec 24 2002 | Petition for review filed In San Diego by counsel for Respondent {Wasatch Property Management}. |
| Dec 26 2002 | Received Court of Appeal record One doghouse. |
| Jan 10 2003 | Answer to petition for review filed by counsel for appellant Syriah Degrate. |
| Jan 17 2003 | Request for depublication (petition for review pending) filed by San Diego Housing Commission (non-party). (recv'd in San Diego) |
| Jan 21 2003 | Request for depublication filed (another request pending) by the California Apartment Association (non-party). |
| Jan 21 2003 | Request for depublication filed (another request pending) by respondent Wasatch Property Management. |
| Jan 21 2003 | Request for depublication filed (another request pending) by the (non-party) Affordable Housing Management Association Pacific Southwest in support of the California Apartment Association's request for depublication. |
| Jan 24 2003 | Received: Amended Proof of Service from the Law Offices of Kimball, Tirey & St. John regarding amicus letters & request for depubication. |
| Jan 27 2003 | Opposition filed by counsel for appellant Syriah Degrate opposing the request for depublication. |
| Jan 27 2003 | Opposition filed by (non-party) counsel for National Housing Law Project et al., opposing depub request filed by San Diego Housing Commission. |
| Jan 29 2003 | Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case) The issue to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether the Court of Appeal properly interpreted Civil Code Section 1954.535. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ. |
| Jan 29 2003 | Note: sent cert letter and form to lead counsel. |
| Feb 7 2003 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by counsel for appellant. Counsel also informs the court that appellant's name, Syriah Degrate, is misspelled. The error originated in CA. Letter to CA re error is attached. |
| Feb 10 2003 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed by respondent (Wasatch Property Management). |
| Mar 3 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed by counsel for respondent (Wasatch Property Management). (40k) |
| Mar 18 2003 | Filed: Letter from amicus Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles (dated 3/14/03) in support of appellant, requesting the Court republish a portion of the CA 4 opinion. |
| Apr 1 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed in San Diego by counsel for appellant (Syriah Degrate). |
| Apr 21 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by respondent Wasatch Property Management |
| May 16 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief by The City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board and The City of Berkeley in support of appellant (Syriah Degrate). |
| May 20 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief by Norcal Executive Directors Assoc. in support of respondent (Wasatch Property Management). |
| May 20 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board and The City of Berkeley |
| May 20 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of The City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board and The City of Berkeley for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| May 21 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief by San Diego Housing Commission in support of respondent. (received in San Diego) |
| May 21 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief Housing Authority Executive Directors Assn |
| May 21 2003 | Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief Southern California Assn of Non-Profit Housing, etal |
| May 21 2003 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief by California Apartment Association in support of respondent (Wasatch Property Management). |
| May 23 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Norcal Executive Directors Assoc. |
| May 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of Norcal Executive Directors Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| May 23 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted California Apartment Association |
| May 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of California Apartment Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| May 30 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted San Diego Housing Commission |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of San Diego Housing Commission for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| May 30 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Housing Authority Executive Directors Association, Southern California Chapter |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of Housing Authority Executive Directors Association, Southern California Chapter for permission to file an amicus curiae brief is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| May 30 2003 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Southern California Association of Non-Profit Housing, et al |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: The application of Southern California Association of Non-Profit Housing, et al for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days. |
| Jun 12 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed in San Diego by counsel for appellant (Syriah Degrate). Response to amici curiae supporting respondent. |
| Apr 1 2005 | Case ordered on calendar 5/4/05 @1:30pm, S.F. |
| Apr 8 2005 | Filed: application of aplt Degrate to divide oral argument time (faxed) |
| Apr 8 2005 | Filed: Letter from counsel for aplt Degrate re status of case (faxed) |
| Apr 11 2005 | Filed: Resp's request to divide oral argument time |
| Apr 12 2005 | Order filed Permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument on behalf of respondent. |
| Apr 12 2005 | Order filed Permission granted for respondent to allocate to Patricia H. Tirey 15 min of resp's oral argument time. |
| Apr 12 2005 | Order filed Permission granted for two counsel to present oral argument on behalf of appellant. |
| Apr 12 2005 | Order filed Permission granted for appellant to allocate to amicus curiae National Housing Law Project 15 min. of aplt's oral argument time. |
| Apr 14 2005 | Received: letter from Legal Aid Society of San Diego re: proof of service |
| May 4 2005 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Jun 13 2005 | Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full Majority Opinion by Moreno, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Brown, JJ. |
| Jul 8 2005 | Filed: Letter from Apartment Association California Southern Cities, Inc. (non-party) dated 7/5/05 regarding opinion. (7/8/05 received fax copy of proof of service. 7/11/05 hard copy received.) |
| Jul 11 2005 | Filed: Letter from California Association of Realtors (non-party) dated 7/8/05 requesting modification of opinion. |
| Jul 11 2005 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing Finality of the opinion in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including August 12, 2005. |
| Jul 12 2005 | Filed: Letter from attorney Jon D. Smock (non-party) dated 7/10/05 regarding opinion. |
| Jul 27 2005 | Opinion modified - no change in judgment |
| Aug 15 2005 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Aug 24 2005 | Received: Receipt for remittitur from CA4/1. |
| Feb 22 2006 | Returned record to San Diego Couny Superior Court. Superior Court record (One manila folder). |
| Briefs | |
| Mar 3 2003 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Apr 1 2003 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Apr 21 2003 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
| May 20 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| May 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| May 23 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| May 30 2003 | Amicus Curiae Brief filed by: |
| Jun 12 2003 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
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| May 25, 2011 Annotated by megan worman | Facts Procedural History Issue Holding Analysis Applicability to Owner Termination of Agreement Subject to HAP contract— The court concluded that the word “terminate” in section 1954.535 applies to indirect termination of HAP contracts, such as when the related tenancy agreement is terminated, in the first instance, because nothing in the legislative history indicated an intent to limit it in such a manner. Absent such a manifested intent, statutory language should be interpreted in a manner that avoids absurd results: here, reading in a different notice period depending on which contract was terminated first would make little sense in light of the interrelatedness of the two contracts (the HAP contract language ties its duration to that of the tenancy agreement). Search Tags: Fair housing, Section 8, housing assistance payment contract, HAP contract, termination of tenancy, notice of termination of tenancy, unlawful detainer |
