Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/21/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

WAGNER CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, )

Plaintiff and Appellant,
S136255
v.
Ct.App. 2/5 B178996
PACIFIC MECHANICAL
CORPORATION,
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SC081031
Defendant and Respondent.

We granted review to consider whether the lower courts properly denied a
petition to compel arbitration (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.21) on the ground the
statute of limitations has run on the claims the parties agreed to arbitrate. We hold
the lower courts erred. Where, as here, the parties have agreed to arbitrate any
dispute arising out of their contract, the affirmative defense that the statute of
limitations has run is for the arbitrator rather than the court to decide.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 21, 1997, defendant Pacific Mechanical Corporation (Pacific)
hired plaintiff Wagner Construction Company (Wagner) as a subcontractor to
install a temporary shoring system for concrete work on the Moss Avenue Pump

1
All further citations to statutes are to the Code of Civil Procedure, except as
otherwise noted.

---

Station in Santa Monica. The parties’ written agreement provided that, “[s]hould
any dispute arise out of this Subcontract, or its performance, either party may
demand arbitration.” The arbitration clause prescribed a method for selecting
arbitrators and declared that their decision “shall be binding and conclusive . . . .”
The clause did not, however, set a time limit for demanding arbitration.
On January 11, 1999, Wagner filed a complaint alleging Pacific had failed to
pay all amounts due under the subcontract. The complaint included claims against
Pacific for breach of contract and the value of services rendered (a common
count). In the same action, Wagner also sued Pacific and its surety, American
Home Insurance Company, to enforce a contractor’s payment bond. Finally,
because the construction project had been a public work of improvement, Wagner
asserted statutory claims based on a stop notice (Civ. Code, §§ 3103, 3179 et seq.)
against Pacific, the City of Santa Monica and Montgomery Watson Americas,
Inc., the city’s general contractor.
Sometime thereafter, Wagner and Pacific were sued for personal injuries
related to the construction project. Pacific tendered its defense to Wagner, who
agreed to defend. Wagner then dismissed its complaint against Pacific without
prejudice. Wagner alleges the dismissal was pursuant to an agreement with
Pacific under which the statute of limitations on Wagner’s claims would be tolled
until the personal injury suit was resolved. Pacific denies this, and Wagner does
not allege the agreement was in writing. In any event, on July 22, 2004, after the
personal injury action was resolved, Wagner filed a new complaint against Pacific
alleging breach of contract, a common count, and new claims for statutory
penalties based on Pacific’s alleged failure to pay Wagner its share of funds
received from the general contractor (Pub. Contract Code, § 7107; Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 7108.5).
2

---

On August 18, 2004, Wagner demanded arbitration. Two days later,
anticipating Pacific’s refusal, Wagner filed the instant petition to compel. Pacific
opposed the petition, arguing that Wagner had waived its right to compel by
failing to demand arbitration within a reasonable time. Pacific thus invoked
section 1281.2, subdivision (a), which permits a court to deny a petition to compel
if it determines that “[t]he right to compel arbitration has been waived by the
petitioner . . . .” Pacific also argued that the four-year statute of limitations for
actions based on written contracts (§ 337) barred Wagner’s claim and that the
alleged tolling agreement was ineffective because it was not in writing (§§ 360,
360.5).
The superior court denied Wagner’s petition. In a tentative ruling, which the
court subsequently adopted as its decision, the court determined that all of
Wagner’s claims were barred, either by section 337 or by section 338, subdivision
(a) (the three-year statute of limitations on statutory claims). “From these
statutes,” the court concluded, “it is clear that the claims in this case are barred by
the statute of limitations, unless Wagner has a written tolling agreement. The
Court does not need to reach the argument that this Petition was not brought
within a reasonable time.”
On appeal, Wagner argued that the arbitrator, rather than the court, should
decide whether the statute of limitations bars claims the parties have agreed to
arbitrate; Pacific, in opposition, argued the superior court had properly decided the
issue. While the parties thus did not argue the waiver issue (§ 1281.2, subd. (a))
and the superior court had expressly declined to decide it, the Court of Appeal
nevertheless cast its decision in those terms, apparently concluding that Wagner’s
failure to demand arbitration before the statute of limitations had run on the
underlying claims in itself justified a finding of waiver. Mistakenly attributing
similar reasoning to the superior court, a divided Court of Appeal concluded that
3

---

“the trial court properly ruled plaintiff’s right to arbitrate was waived by the
failure to seek arbitration in a timely manner. (§ 1281.2, subd. (a) . . . .)” We
granted Wagner’s petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
The question before us is whether a court may deny a petition to compel
arbitration on the ground the statute of limitations has run on the claims the parties
agreed to arbitrate. We conclude the answer is no.
Sections 12812 and 1281.2,3 which govern petitions to compel arbitration,
reflect a “ ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively
inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ ” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1, 9, quoting Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v.
100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 322 (Ericksen).) When the parties to an

2
Section 1281 provides: “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”
3
Section 1281.2, as relevant here, provides:
“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of
a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to
arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent
to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists, unless it determines that:

“(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the
petitioner; or

“(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.
“(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court
action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction
or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact. . . .

“If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy
exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that
the petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit. . . . ”
4

---

arbitrable controversy 4 have agreed in writing to arbitrate it and one has refused,
the court, under section 1281.2, must ordinarily grant a petition to compel
arbitration. Exceptions to this rule are recognized by statute5 and judicial
decision.6 That the statute of limitations has run on the underlying claims,
however, is not among the legislatively or judicially recognized justifications for
denying a petition to compel. Instead, the assertion that the statute of limitations
has run is an affirmative defense that falls naturally within the plain language of
the parties’ broad agreement to submit to arbitration “any dispute aris[ing] out of”
their contract. Even were the language less clear, “doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues” would still have to be “resolved in favor of arbitration.”
(Ericksen, supra, 35 Cal.3d 312, 323; see also Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury
Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24-25.) For a court to deny a petition to compel
arbitration based on its adjudication of an affirmative defense would, moreover,
violate section 1281.2, subdivision (c), which declares that, “[i]f the court
determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, an order to
arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that the petitioner’s
contentions lack substantive merit.”
The only California decision squarely addressing the question holds that a
court may not deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground that the statute

4
We have held that certain claims for public injunctive relief are not
arbitrable. (See Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303,
316; Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066, 1079-1080.)
5
E.g., sections 1281, 1281.2, subdivisions (a)-(c).
6
E.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 83 (court may deny petition to compel arbitration on grounds the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable or cannot adequately vindicate
unwaivable rights).
5

---

of limitations has run on the claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate.7 In Meyer
v. Carnow (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 169, the Court of Appeal reversed a superior
court’s order denying a patient’s petition to compel a physician to arbitrate
malpractice claims under the terms of an agreement for medical treatment.
Rejecting the physician’s argument the petition had to be denied because the
statute of limitations on the malpractice claims had expired, the court explained
that “reliance upon the statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice
lawsuits is misplaced. [The patient] is not seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a
judicial forum to litigate the merits of a malpractice claim but rather seeks from
the superior court an order that [the physician] abide by a contract he signed.”
(Id., at p. 174.)
Pacific would read Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14
Cal.3d 473 (Freeman),8 as stating a different rule. It does not. Freeman held that
a court properly denied a petition to compel arbitration under section 1281.2,
subdivision (a), because the plaintiff had waived the right to arbitrate by failing to
demand arbitration within the time period specifically allowed therefore by statute.
(Freeman, supra, at pp. 482-487.) The applicable statute was former section
11580.2 of the Insurance Code, which regulated the terms and enforcement of
insurance policies covering damages caused by uninsured motorists. The former

7
Other decisions that have been cited for the same proposition are not truly
on point. Kennedy, Cabot & Co. v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1167, concerned not a statute of limitations but a rule of the
National Association of Securities Dealers requiring claims to be submitted to
arbitration within six years. (Id., at p. 1171 & fn. 3.) Similarly, Boys Club of San
Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1266,
concerned not a statute of limitations but a contractual provision requiring any suit
on a performance bond to be instituted within three years. (Id., at p. 1276, fn. 4.)
8
In Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, this court adopted the decision of the
Court of Appeal. (See id., at p. 477.)
6

---

statute’s subdivision (i) provided: “No cause of action shall accrue to the insured
under any policy or endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless
within one year from the date of the accident: [¶] (1) Suit for bodily injury has
been filed against the uninsured motorist, in a court of competent jurisdiction, or
[¶] (2) Agreement as to the amount due under the policy has been concluded, or
[¶] (3) The insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings.” (Ins. Code,
former § 11580.2, subd. (i), as amended by Stats. 1974, ch. 1409, § 3, p. 3093,
italics added.) The authority on which Freeman relied explains the point more
clearly: “It appears to be the legislative intent that compliance with [Insurance
Code, former section 11580.2, subdivision (i)] is a condition precedent to
arbitration as well as to the enforcement of any other right under the policy.
Failure to act within this time limit constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate,
and such waiver may be determined by a court whose jurisdiction is invoked for
that purpose.” (Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d
333, 339, cited in Freeman, at p. 483.)
The court in Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, thus applied the statutory rule
(§ 1281.2, subd. (a)) that petitions to compel may be denied when the right to
arbitrate has been waived. No issue concerning a statute of limitations was before
the court. Nevertheless, Pacific, echoing the Court of Appeal below, reads
Freeman as holding that statutes of limitations present issues for courts rather than
arbitrators. Pacific points to the following language in the opinion: “ ‘It should
not be overlooked that a determination of this issue of waiver (or compliance with
conditions precedent, whichever it be called) may be very different if it is tried
before an arbitrator rather than a court. A court determines the facts upon the
weight of competent evidence, and applies the law as it is laid down by the
authorities. Arbitrators, on the other hand, “may base their decision upon broad
principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject
7

---

a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action.”
[Citation.] Thus, what an arbitrator would find to be compliance could be
something other than compliance as measured by the standards of the law. [¶]
‘[Former Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)] is, in effect, a statute of
limitations. Such statutes are intended to set controversies at rest by foreclosing
consideration thereafter as to the merits of the claim. To reject a strict application
of the law in favor of “broad principles of justice and equity” would make a statute
of limitation meaningless.’ [Citation.]” (Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, 483-
484.)
The Freeman court’s correct conclusion that questions of waiver are for the
court rather than the arbitrator required no further justification than the
Legislature’s explicit statement to that effect in section 1281.2, subdivision (a).
(See Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, 483.) Given this categorical legislative
determination, the hypothetical question whether arbitrators might decide waiver
issues differently than courts (see ibid.) is of no concern. On the other hand,
neither section 1281.2 nor any other statute permits a court to deny a petition to
compel arbitration based on a party’s assertion that the statute of limitations has
run on the claims the parties agreed to arbitrate. Nor does the chance that an
arbitrator might decide this affirmative defense differently than a court provide a
legitimate nonstatutory basis for denying a motion to compel. The possibility that
arbitrators “ ‘may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity,
and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might
successfully have asserted in a judicial action’ ” is simply a risk that the parties,
“by voluntarily submitting to arbitration, . . . have agreed to bear . . . in exchange
for a quick, inexpensive, and conclusive resolution to their dispute.” (Moncharsh
v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1, 10-12.) The parties may avoid this risk, if
they wish, by specifically agreeing that the arbitrators must act in conformity with
8

---

rules of law. (Id., at pp. 10-11.) Having broadly agreed to arbitrate any dispute
arising out of a contract, however, a party may not attempt to avoid arbitration by
“ ‘assert[ing] all possible legal or procedural defenses in court proceedings before
the arbitration itself can go forward, [because] “the arbitral wheels would very
soon grind to a halt.” ’ ” (Ericksen, supra, 35 Cal.3d 312, 323.)
Delay in demanding or seeking to compel arbitration can, indeed, justify
denying a motion to compel. But the rules that enforce the requirements of timely
demands and petitions have nothing to do with the statutes of limitation that create
affirmative defenses to the claims the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Moreover,
none of the applicable rules permits us, or permitted the courts below, to decide on
the existing record that Wagner’s delay in seeking arbitration does justify denying
its motion to compel. To make the point clear, we briefly review the applicable
rules:
A petition to compel arbitration must be brought within four years after the
party to be compelled has refused to arbitrate. (Spear v. California State Auto.
Assn. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1035, 1040.) This rule has nothing to do with the statute of
limitations on the underlying claims. Instead, the rule reflects our understanding
that a petition to compel arbitration states a separate cause of action subject to its
own limitation period. As we have explained, “[a]n action to compel arbitration
‘is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract’ ” and
is, thus, subject to the four-year statute of limitations for actions founded upon
written contracts. (Ibid., citing Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, 479; see § 337.)
Under section 1281.2, “a party to an agreement to arbitrate may not bring an
action to compel specific performance of the arbitration provision until he or she
can allege not only the existence of the agreement, but also that the opposing party
refuses to arbitrate the controversy. Therefore, it appears that a cause of action to
compel arbitration does not accrue until one party has refused to arbitrate the
9

---

controversy.” (Spear v. California State Auto. Assn., supra, at pp. 1041-1042.)
Applying these rules, Wagner’s action to compel Pacific to arbitrate could not
have accrued until sometime after August 18, 2004, when Wagner first demanded
arbitration. Wagner’s petition to compel, filed on August 20, was thus timely
under the applicable statute of limitations.
This does not mean that a party may postpone arbitration indefinitely by
delaying the demand. As mentioned, the Code of Civil Procedure expressly
permits a court to deny a petition to compel arbitration on the ground that “[t]he
right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner . . . .” (§ 1281.2,
subd. (a).) As Freeman, supra, 14 Cal.3d 473, explains, a party may waive the
right to compel arbitration by failing to demand arbitration within a time limit
specified for that purpose in a statute. (Id., at p. 483; see also Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d 333, 339.) A party may also waive
the right to compel by failing to comply with a time limit for demanding
arbitration specified in the contract. (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6
Cal.4th 307, 321; Jordan v. Friedman (1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 726, 727-728.)
Compliance “is a condition precedent to the right to arbitration. In the absence of
a legal excuse or subsequent modification of the parties’ agreement, the failure to
submit the dispute to arbitration within the agreed time precludes judicial
enforcement of the right to arbitrate.” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, supra, at
p. 321.) In the case before us, however, no statute or contractual provision
specifies a time limit within which Wagner was required to demand arbitration.
When no time limit for demanding arbitration is specified, a party must still
demand arbitration within a reasonable time. (Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist.
(1966) 64 Cal.2d 833, 836.) This rule is an application of the general principle of
contract law articulated in Civil Code section 1657, to the effect that, “[i]f no time
is specified for the performance of an act required to be performed, a reasonable
10

---

time is allowed.” (See Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., supra, at p. 836.) “[W]hat
constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending upon the situation of
the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the facts of the particular case.”
(Ibid.)
Although Wagner may have delayed unreasonably in seeking to compel
arbitration,9 the superior court expressly declined to reach the issue because it
erroneously concluded the statutes of limitations on Wagner’s contractual and
statutory claims barred the petition to compel. The Court of Appeal, for its part,
concluded that Wagner’s failure to demand arbitration before the statutes of
limitations had run on the underlying claims in itself justified a finding of waiver.
This too was erroneous. “[N]o single test delineates the nature of the conduct that
will constitute a waiver of arbitration.” (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of
California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195.) A wide range of factors are relevant, as
we have explained: “ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider “(1) whether
the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the
litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well
into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an
intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement
close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay;
(4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for
a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking
advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken
place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, misled, or prejudiced’ the opposing
party.” ’ ” (Id., at p. 1196, quoting Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61

9
We intimate no view on the question.
11

---

Cal.App.4th 980, 992.)10 California law, “like [federal law], reflects a strong
policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of
waiver claims.” (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California, supra, at
p. 1195.) Moreover, “waivers are not lightly to be inferred and the party seeking
to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof.” (Ibid.)
In the case before us the superior court did not undertake the factual inquiry
necessary to determine whether Wagner has waived its right to compel arbitration.
Furthermore, the court expressly declined to “reach the argument that [the]
Petition was not brought within a reasonable time.” Pacific, as the prevailing
party below, invites us to infer whatever factual findings are necessary to support
the judgment. We may not infer a finding of waiver, however, because the
superior court expressly declined to make such a finding in its statement of
decision. “When a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue, . . .
it shall not be inferred on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the
prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.” (§ 634.)11 We will, therefore,
remand the case for further proceedings, during which the superior court may

10
Ignoring our decision in St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of
California, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1187, and the multi-factored test we adopted in that
case for determining whether a party has waived the right to arbitrate (id., at
p. 1196), Pacific argues that “a reasonable time to exercise a contract right cannot
exceed the statute of limitations for exercising that right.” The decision on which
Pacific relies, however, Thomas v. Pacific Beach Co. (1896) 115 Cal. 136, 142-
143, did not involve arbitration and did not purport to address the issue before us
in this case.
11
The superior court, as noted, adopted the tentative decision as its ruling and
expressly incorporated it by reference into the dispositive minute order. Pacific
seems to argue that section 634 does not apply because the court in effect issued
its statement of decision sua sponte rather than at Wagner’s request. Section 634
is not so limited.
12

---

conduct whatever additional factual and legal inquiries are necessary to decide the
issue of waiver.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to that
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

13

---

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Wagner Construction v. Pacific Mechanical Corp.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 6/29/05 – 2d Dist., Div. 5
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S136255
Date Filed: May 21, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Gerald Rosenberg

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Marks, Golia & Finch, P. Randolph Finch, Jr., and Jason R. Thornton for Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

McInerney & Dillon, Timothy F. Winchester, William A. Barrett and Alexander Bannon for Defendant and
Respondent.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Jason R. Thornton
Marks, Golia & Finch
3900 Harney Street, First Floor
San Diego, CA 92110-2825
(619) 293-7000

Alexander Bannon
McInerney & Dillon
Lake Merritt Plaza, Suite 1700
1999 Harrison Street
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 465-7100

2

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 05/21/2007	S136255

Disposition
May 21 2007	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Aug 8 2005	Petition for review filed   by counsel for appellant (Wagner Construction Company).
Aug 9 2005	Record requested
Aug 9 2005	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Sep 29 2005	Time extended to grant or deny review   to November 4 2005.
Oct 26 2005	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Nov 16 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   Attorney Phillip Finch of Marks & Golia for Appellant (Wagner).
Nov 23 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   In San Diego by counsel for appellant {Wagner Construction Company}.
Dec 22 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed   Pacific Mechanical Corp., defendant and respondent William Barrett, counsel
Dec 22 2005	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   respondent
Jan 6 2006	Received:   Faxed letter dated Jan. 6, 2006, from Timothy F. Winchester, counsel, of new address change, eff. 12/1/05. Hard copy will be mailed today.
Jan 11 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Wagner Construction, plaintiff and appellant P. Randolph Finch Jr., Jason Thornton, counsel
Feb 8 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Tuesday, March 6, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Mar 6 2007	Cause argued and submitted
May 18 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
May 21 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and case remanded to the court of appeal Majority opinion by Werdegar, J. ----------joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, JJ.
Jun 25 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jul 9 2007	Note:   case record transmitted to court of appeal
Jul 9 2007	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from 2 DCA Div. 5.

Briefs
Nov 23 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Dec 22 2005	Answer brief on the merits filed
Jan 11 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website