Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/24/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
Petitioners,
S114171
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F040111
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
KINGS COUNTY,
Kings
County
Respondent;
Super.Ct.No. 00C2342
)
PATRICIA BODDE, Individually and
as Special Administrator, etc.,
Real Party in Interest.

As part of the California Tort Claims Act, Government Code section 900 et
seq.1 establishes certain conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a
public entity. As relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file a claim for money or
damages with the public entity. (§ 911.2.) The failure to do so bars the plaintiff
from bringing suit against that entity. (§ 945.4.) In this case, we consider whether
failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with this claim
presentation requirement subjects a complaint to a general demurrer. We conclude
it does.

1
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise indicated.
1

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I.
Plaintiff Bernard Bodde2 was an inmate in the California state prison
system. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants the State of California and various
state agencies and employees3 alleging that they misdiagnosed his lung cancer as
tuberculosis and failed to provide him with adequate medical care.
In their first three demurrers, defendants4 contended, among other things,
that plaintiff failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement contained in
Government Code section 900 et seq. The trial court sustained each of these
demurrers with leave to amend. Following the last order granting leave to amend,
plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. The complaint alleged five causes of
action: (1) violation of 42 United States Code section 1983, (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (3) violation of Government Code section 845.6,
(4) negligence, and (5) negligence per se.
With respect to the state law claims (counts two through five), the
complaint alleged that plaintiff had submitted a claim to the Office of the Attorney
General, which “represented that [it was] authorized to accept service for the State

2
During the pendency of the action, plaintiff died. The trial court
subsequently issued an order converting the action into a survivor action,
appointing Patricia Bodde, plaintiff’s successor in interest and beneficiary, as
special administrator of his estate and substituting Patricia Bodde as a party to the
action. For convenience, in this opinion we refer to Bernard Bodde as plaintiff.
3
Defendants are: (1) the State of California, (2) California Department of
Corrections, (3) California State Prison—Wasco, (4) Centinela State Prison, (5)
California Correctional Institution, (6) Corcoran State Prison, (7) Michael Songer,
M.D., (8) Charles Pickett, M.D., (9) Rajindra S. Sethi, M.D., (10) Brian Yee,
M.D., (11) Neil E. Fond, M.D., (12) Sarv Mittar Grover, M.D., (13) John Moor,
M.D., and (14) David J. Evans, M.D.
4
According to the record, all defendants, except for Dr. Moor and Dr. Evans,
apparently demurred. For convenience, we refer to the demurring parties as
defendants.
2

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Board of Control for the State of California” and “led [plaintiff] to believe that [he
was] serving the State Board of Control.” The complaint further alleged that
plaintiff “received telephonic notice that there were small errors contained in the
original claim and was requested to file an Amended Claim.” According to the
complaint, “an Agent of the Attorney General represented to [plaintiff] that she
would accept service of said amended claim, and that the requested changes would
correct any errors concerning said claim.” As requested, plaintiff filed an
amended claim. The complaint then alleged that plaintiff only learned that the
Office of the Attorney General—rather than the State Board of Control—had been
mistakenly served over one year after he discovered he had lung cancer.
Defendants demurred, alleging once again that plaintiff failed “to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action” and that his state law claims were
“barred by [his] failure to comply with Government Code section 900 et seq.”
This time, the trial court overruled the demurrer, holding that the complaint pled
“facts which if true could support a claim of estoppel so as to avoid the failure to
comply with sections 911.2 and 911.4 of the Government Code.”
Defendants then filed a petition for writ of mandate, asking the Court of
Appeal to issue an order sustaining their demurrer to the third amended complaint
as to all state law claims. After issuing an order to show cause, the court denied
the petition. In doing so, the court did not reach the estoppel issue. Instead, the
court held that compliance with the claim presentation requirement contained in
section 900 et seq. is not an element of a cause of action against a public entity and
need not be alleged. Thus, noncompliance is not a ground for sustaining a general
demurrer. According to the court, the state may only “raise its defense of
noncompliance with the Tort Claims [Act] requirement on a motion for summary
judgment and/or at trial.”
3

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We granted review and limited the issue to whether failure to plead facts
demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement of
section 900 et seq. may be raised on a general demurrer to the complaint. We
conclude it may.
II.
Under section 911.2, “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for
injury to person or to personal property . . . shall be presented as provided in
Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) of this chapter not later than six months
after the accrual of the cause of action.” Section 945.4 then provides that “no suit
for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action
for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of
Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the
public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have
been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this
division.”5 (Italics added.) Thus, under these statutes, failure to timely present a
claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit
against that entity.6
Plaintiff concedes that his state law claims are subject to this claim
presentation requirement. He, however, contends his complaint need not allege
facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement because
compliance is not an element of a cause of action against a public entity. As such,

5
Section 910 describes the mandatory contents of such a claim, and section
915 describes the manner by which the claim should be presented to the public
entity.
6
Section 905 lists the claims that are exempt from the claim presentation
requirement. None of these exceptions apply here.
4

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his state law claims are not subject to demurrer for failure to so allege. Defendants
counter that failure to allege compliance subjects a claim for money or damages
against a public entity to demurrer for either lack of subject matter jurisdiction
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a)) or for failure to “state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)). We conclude
that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim
presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for
failure to state a cause of action.7
Our analysis begins with our decision in Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16
Cal.3d 834. In Williams, we held that the claim presentation requirement “is
inoperative in an action brought under” 42 United States Code section 1983. To
reach this holding, we found that “the filing of a claim for damages ‘is more than a
procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an
action against defendant, in short, an integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action.’ ”
(Williams, at p. 842, quoting Illerbrun v. Conrad (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 521,
524.) We further observed that “[o]ur own view of the claims requirement
comports with that of ” Willis v. Reddin (9th Cir. 1969) 418 F.2d 702 (Williams, at

7
Although a Court of Appeal has suggested that failure to comply with the
claim presentation requirement divests the court of jurisdiction over a cause of
action against a public entity (see Kim v. Walker (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 375, 384),
we have long held to the contrary. As we noted in County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 550, “as of 1963, court decisions had clearly
settled that a court which erroneously entertained an action against a governmental
entity, despite noncompliance with claims requirements, committed only an error
of law; it did not act in excess of jurisdiction.” Thus, we concluded that
noncompliance does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over
causes of action against public entities. (Id. at p. 551.) We therefore reject
defendants’ contention that failure to allege compliance establishes a jurisdictional
defect.
5

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p. 841)—which held that “ ‘California statutes or ordinances which condition the
right to sue the sovereign upon timely filing of claims and actions are . . . elements
of the plaintiff’s cause of action and conditions precedent to the maintenance of
the action’ ” (Williams, at p. 840, italics added, quoting Willis, at p. 704). Because
the claim presentation requirement is a “state substantive limitation[] couched in
procedural language” (Williams, at p. 841), we concluded that the supremacy
clause precluded us from applying the requirement to the federal cause of action
(id. at p. 842). (See also Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d
876, 881 [“in holding the 100-day claims requirement of the Tort Claims Act
inapplicable, the [California] Supreme Court distinguished the substantive nature
of the claims requirements from the procedural nature of statutes of limitations
which remain applicable to federal actions”].)
Consistent with Williams, we have observed that “submission of a claim to
a public entity pursuant to section 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort
action and the failure to present the claim bars the action.’ ” (Phillips v. Desert
Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699, 708, quoting Lutz v. Tri-City Hospital (1986)
179 Cal.App.3d 807, 812.) Similarly, some Courts of Appeal have expressly
stated that compliance with the claim presentation requirement is an element of a
cause of action against a public entity. (See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767; Wood v. Riverside General Hospital (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119.) Thus, our Courts of Appeal have repeatedly held that
failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement
subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.8

8
(See, e.g., Hart v. County of Alameda (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 781
[affirming demurrer because the plaintiff could not allege compliance with the
claim presentation requirement]; Tapia v. County of San Bernardino (1994) 29

(footnote continued on next page)
6

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(footnote continued from previous page)

Cal.App.4th 375, 387 [“ ‘Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required,
the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the
complaint is subject to general demurrer’ ”]; Wood v. Riverside General Hosp.,
supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1119 [“failure to allege compliance with the claims
statute renders the complaint subject to a general demurrer”]; Watson v. State of
California (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 845 [affirming demurrer because the
plaintiff could not allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement];
Briggs v. Lawrence (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 605, 613 [“Failure to allege
compliance renders the complaint . . . subject to general demurrer”]; Fall River
Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 437
[issuing writ of mandate entering an order granting the petitioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings because the real party in interest could not allege
compliance with the claim presentation requirement]; State of California ex rel.
Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 331, 338-339
[issuing writ of mandate entering order sustaining the petitioner’s demurrer
because the real party in interest could not allege compliance with the claim
presentation requirement]; Gurrola v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 145, 153 [“ ‘timely compliance with the claim filing requirements . . .
must be pleaded in a complaint in order to state a cause of action’ ”]; State of
California v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 754, 757 [“Where the claim
filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act are applicable, ‘[t]imely compliance . . .
must be pleaded in order to state a cause of action”]; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
County of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 188 [affirming demurrer because
the plaintiff could not allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement];
Bohrer v. County of San Diego (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 155, 160 [“The plaintiffs
have the burden of pleading and proving compliance with the claim presentation
requirement”]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [“compliance with
the 100-day requirement must be alleged”]; Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen.
Hosp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 350, 355 [“Timely compliance with the claim filing
requirements . . . must be pleaded in a complaint in order to state a cause of
action”]; San Leandro Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Leandro (1976) 55
Cal.App.3d 553, 559 [affirming judgment on the pleadings because the plaintiff
could not allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement]; Miner v.
Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 597, 602 [issuing a writ of mandate
commanding the trial court to sustain the petitioner’s demurrer because the real
party in interest could not allege compliance with the claim presentation
requirement].)
7

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Indeed, the Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged that it had consistently held
the same prior to its ruling in this case.9
This consistency in the holdings of our courts follows logically from the
history of claim presentation statutes in California. Prior to 1959, California law
contained a variety of “statutes and county and city charters and ordinances which
bar[red] suit against a governmental entity for money or damages unless a written
statement or ‘claim’ setting forth the nature of the right asserted against the entity,
the circumstances giving rise thereto and the amount involved [were]
communicated to the entity within a relatively short time after the claimant’s cause
of action [had] accrued.” (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-7.) And
from 1857 to 1959, California courts consistently held that failure to allege
compliance with these claim presentation requirements subjected a complaint to a
general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.10

9
(See, e.g., Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d
27, 31 [“In those circumstances in which a claim must be presented, the plaintiff
must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is
subject to general demurrer”]; Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d
861, 865 [“Where compliance with the Tort Claims Act is required, the plaintiff
must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is
subject to general demurrer”]; Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 871, 878 [“We
conclude that failure to allege the filing of a claim is fatal to appellant’s
complaint”]; Meester v. Davies (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 342, 348 [affirming
demurrers because the plaintiff could not allege compliance with the claim
presentation requirement]; Miller v. Hoagland (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 57, 61
[same].)
10
(See, e.g., Ward v. Jones (1952) 39 Cal.2d 756, 761 [holding that failure to
allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement found in Government
Code former section 1981 was “fatal”]; Veriddo v. Renaud (1950) 35 Cal.2d 263,
266-267 [affirming demurrer because the plaintiff could not allege compliance
with the claim presentation requirement found in Government Code former section
1981]; Artukovich v. Astendorf (1942) 21 Cal.2d 329, 336 [affirming demurrer

(footnote continued on next page)
8

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In 1959, after studying this patchwork of claim presentation requirements,
the California Law Revision Commission “recommended adoption of uniform
procedures for claims against local governmental entities. [Citation.] The
Legislature accepted the commission’s recommendation and enacted the present
scheme for presentation of claims.” (Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974)
11 Cal.3d 113, 120.) In construing this new statutory scheme, we continued to
hold that failure to allege compliance constituted a failure to state a cause of action
and subjected a complaint to demurrer. (See Dias v. Eden Township Hospital
Dist. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 502, 503-504.)

(footnote continued from previous page)

because the plaintiff could not allege compliance with the claim presentation
requirement found in Political Code former section 4075]; Farmers & Merchants’
Bank of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (1907) 151 Cal. 655, 657 [“a complaint
containing no . . . allegation [of presentation of a demand pursuant to various city
charter provisions] fails to state a cause of action”]; Rhoda v. Alameda County
(1877) 52 Cal. 350, 352 [affirming demurrer because the plaintiff failed to
specifically plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement found in
Political Code former section 4072]; McCann v. Sierra County (1857) 7 Cal. 121,
124 [affirming demurrer because the plaintiff could not allege compliance with the
claim presentation requirement found in a statute]; Fonseca v. County of Santa
Clara (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 257, 263 [affirming demurrer because the plaintiff
could not allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement found in
Government Code former sections 1981, 29702, 29704 and 29705]; Illerbrun v.
Conrad, supra, 216 Cal.App.2d at p. 524 [“The filing of a claim for damages, as
required by city charter and ordinance provisions . . . is a condition precedent to
plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendants”]; Chavez v. Sprague (1962)
209 Cal.App.2d 101, 106 [“Failure to comply with the claims procedure of
Government Code [former] section 1981, is fatal to the maintenance of an action
against an employee whenever Government Code [former] section 1981, is
applicable”]; Hafliger v. County of Sacramento (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 850, 854
[affirming judgment of nonsuit because the plaintiff could not allege compliance
with the claim presentation requirement found in Political Code former section
4075].)
9

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Following our decision in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55
Cal.2d 211—which abrogated common law immunity for public entities—in 1963
the Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act. As part of the act, the Legislature
amended the claim presentation statutes. (See Minsky v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 120, fn. 11; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 443,
446-447.) But these amendments did not alter the fundamental nature of the claim
presentation requirement—which still required plaintiffs to submit a timely claim
for money or damages to a public entity in order to maintain an action against that
entity. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 32 West’s Ann. Gov.
Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 911.2, p. 561 [“This section is substantially the same as the
first paragraph of Government Code [former] Section 715 . . . .”]; Cal. Law
Revision Com. com., reprinted at 32A pt. 1 West’s Ann. Gov. Code, supra, foll.
§ 945.4, p. 15 [noting that section 945.4 merely amended former sections 641 and
710 by preventing “a claimant from bringing an action against a public entity until
his claim has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected” and limiting the
time an entity has to consider the claim].) Indeed, the Legislature did not intend
“to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to
confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances:
immunity is waived only if the various requirements of the act are satisfied.”
(Williams v. Horvath, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 838.) As such, the language of the
amended claim presentation statutes “make[s] it clear that . . . a plaintiff must still
allege in his complaint that he has complied with the claim statute in order to state
a cause of action against a public employee.” (Burgdorf, at p. 447.)
In light of this overwhelming case law and history, we conclude that a
plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim
presentation requirement. Otherwise, his complaint is subject to a general
demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
10

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The cases cited by plaintiff and the Court of Appeal do not dictate a
contrary conclusion. Each of these cases involved the premature filing of a
complaint against a public entity even though the plaintiff had submitted a timely
claim to the entity (see Radar v. Rogers (1957) 49 Cal.2d 243, 246 (Radar);
Cory v. City of Huntington Beach (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 131, 133 (Cory); Petersen
v. City of Vallejo (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 768 (Petersen); Taylor v. City of
Los Angeles (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 255, 258 (Taylor)) or had successfully
petitioned for leave to present a late claim under sections 911.4 or 946.6 (see Bell
v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 438, 441-442 (Bell); Bahten v.
County of Merced (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 101, 103-104 (Bahten); Savage v. State of
California (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 793, 794-795 (Savage)). None of these cases
considered whether failure to allege compliance or circumstances excusing
compliance subjected a complaint to a general demurrer for failure to state a cause
of action, and they are not relevant here. (See Illerbrun v. Conrad, supra, 216
Cal.App.2d at p. 524 [holding that cases involving “prematurity of action brought”
do not apply where the plaintiff failed to file a claim for damages].)
Moreover, these cases are distinguishable on their facts. In those cases
where the plaintiffs submitted a timely claim but prematurely filed a complaint,
the courts refused to dismiss the action because the plaintiffs had substantially
complied with the claim presentation requirement. According to these courts, the
plaintiffs, by filing the claim and prematurely filing the complaint, had satisfied
the purpose behind the requirement—to give the entity the opportunity to
investigate and settle the claim before suit was brought. (See Radar, supra,
49 Cal.2d at p. 249; Cory, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at p. 136; Petersen, supra, 259
Cal.App.2d at pp. 770-771; Taylor, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d at pp. 262-263.)
Likewise, in those cases where the plaintiffs prematurely filed a complaint against
a public entity before obtaining leave to present a late claim but failed to timely
11

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amend that complaint after obtaining leave, the courts refused to dismiss the action
because the plaintiffs had substantially complied with the claim presentation
requirement. (See Bell, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 449; Bahten, supra, 59
Cal.App.3d at p. 112; Savage, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at p. 797.) Thus, these cases
actually enforced the claim presentation requirement and did not excuse the
plaintiffs from alleging facts showing or excusing compliance.
Some of these cases did, however, state that compliance with the claim
presentation requirement is not an element of a cause of action against a public
entity. (See Bell, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 444; Bahten, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d
at p. 107.) As explained above, these statements are erroneous. (See ante, at pp.
5-11.) We therefore disapprove of Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 196
Cal.App.3d 438, and Bahten v. County of Merced, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 101, to
the extent they conflict with our decision here.
Plaintiff’s reliance on language in Government Code section 911.2 stating
that the claim must be filed within six months “after the accrual of the cause of
action” is also misplaced. Government Code section 901 defines the “date of the
accrual of a cause of action” for purposes of Government Code section 911.2 as
“the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within
the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there
were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public
entity before an action could be commenced thereon.” (Italics added.) Thus, the
reference in Government Code section 911.2 to “the accrual of the cause of
action” has no bearing on the elements that must be pled to “state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action” under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.010.
Finally, requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate or
excuse compliance does not deprive them of their due process rights or unfairly
bar just claims. As an initial matter, we note that the Legislature has provided
12

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numerous ways to obtain relief from the claim presentation requirement. For
example, sections 911.4 , 911.6, 911.8 and 946.6 contain a detailed scheme
permitting litigants to petition the public entity and the court for leave to present a
late claim. Sections 910.8 and 911 also require public entities to alert a claimant
to any deficiencies in his claim or waive any “defect or omission in the claim as
presented” (§ 911). Moreover, a plaintiff need not allege strict compliance with
the statutory claim presentation requirement. Courts have long recognized that
“[a] claim that fails to substantially comply with sections 910 and 910.2, may still
be considered a ‘claim as presented’ if it puts the public entity on notice both that
the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the
matter is not resolved.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th
at p. 769, fn. omitted.) Finally, a plaintiff may arguably be able to satisfy the
claim presentation requirement by alleging an appropriate excuse, such as
equitable estoppel. (See Ard v. County of Contra Costa (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
339, 346-347.) Accordingly, we see no reason to ignore the overwhelming
precedent establishing that failure to allege compliance or circumstances excusing
compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a complaint to a
general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Because the Court of Appeal never considered whether plaintiff had, in fact,
alleged facts sufficient to excuse compliance on the ground of estoppel, we
remand for consideration of this unresolved issue.
13

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III.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
KENNARD,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
MORENO,
J.
SIMONS,
J.*

*
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division
Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

14

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion State of California v. Superior Court of Kings County
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 105 Cal.App.4th 1008
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S114171
Date Filed: May 24, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Kings
Judge: Peter M. Schultz

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Allen R. Crown,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Paul D. Gifford and Frances T. Grunder, Assistant Attorneys General,
James E. Flynn and David A. Carrasco, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioners.

Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard and Jonathan P. Hobbs for League of California Cities and
California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Katherine J. Hamilton, Assistant City Attorney, and
Lisa S. Berger, Deputy City Attorney, for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.

Law Office of Kim D. Scovis, Kim D. Scovis and Jenny Scovis for Real Party in Interest.

15

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

David A. Carrasco
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94255
(916) 323-1938

Kim D. Scovis
Law Office of Kim D. Scovis
223 E. Thousand Oaks Blvd., Suite 412
Thousand Oaks, CA 91360
(805) 496-6413
16

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 05/24/2004	S114171

Disposition
May 24 2004	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Mar 10 2003	Petition for review filed   by petnrs
Mar 24 2003	Record requested
Mar 25 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Mar 26 2003	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   (AG) counsel for petitioners (State of Calif. et al.)
Mar 28 2003	Request for depublication filed (another request pending)   League of California Cities (non-party)
Mar 28 2003	Received:   Amended Proof of Service from League of Calif. Cities showing service on CA 5
Apr 24 2003	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including June 6, 2003, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
May 14 2003	Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)   The issue to be briefed and argued before this court is limited to: Can a Plaintiff's failure to comply with the claim-filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, Section 900 et seq.) or to be plead facts excusing compliance be raised on demurrer to the complaint. Baxter, J., was recused and did not participate. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
May 22 2003	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for petitioner (State of Calif.)
Jun 11 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   by (AG) counsel for petitioners (State of Calif.)
Jul 11 2003	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for RPI (Bernard Bodde) requests extension of time to July 25, 2003 to file the answer brief.
Jul 16 2003	Received:   from counsel for (RPI) Declaration to Extension Request.
Jul 18 2003	Filed:   Original declaration of Kim Scovis re ext of time.
Jul 24 2003	Extension of time granted   Real Party in Interest time to serve and file the answer brief is extended to and including July 25, 2003. No further extensions will be granted.
Jul 24 2003	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for RPI requests extension of time to August 11, 2003 to file the answer brief.
Jul 30 2003	Extension of time granted   Real Party in Interest time to serve and file the answer brief is extended to and including August 11, 2003. No further extensions will be granted.
Aug 11 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for Real Party in Interest (B.Bodde)
Sep 8 2003	Received:   from (AG) counsel for petitioner late reply brief
Sep 8 2003	Application for relief from default filed   by (AG) counsel for petitioner (State of CA.)
Sep 11 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Sep 23 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   League of Calif. Cities and Calif. State Assoc. of Counties.
Sep 26 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   City of Los Angeles [in support of petitioners]
Sep 26 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   League of Calif. Cities, et al.
Sep 26 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed   League of Calif. Cities, et al. in support of petitioners. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Oct 3 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   City of Los Angeles
Oct 3 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed   City of Los Angeles in support of petitioners. (non-party) An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief
Oct 10 2003	Request for extension of time filed   response to ac brief of League of Calif Cities & Calif State Assn of Counties to 11-12-03>>real party Bernard Bodde
Oct 10 2003	Request for extension of time filed   response to ac brief of City of Los Angeles to 11-15-03 >>real party Bernard Bodde
Oct 23 2003	Extension of time granted   Real Party in Interest time to serve and file the response to amicus curiae brief of City of Los Angeles is extended to and including November 15, 2003. No further extensions will be granted.
Oct 28 2003	Extension of time granted   Real Party in Interest time to serve and file the response to amicus curiae brief of League of Calif. Cities and Calif. State Assoc. of Counties is extended to and including November 15, 2003.
Jan 9 2004	Received letter from:   counsel for RPI (Bernard Bodde) re; Request for expedition of Petition for Review.
Feb 10 2004	Case ordered on calendar   3-11-04, 9am, S.F.
Mar 11 2004	Cause argued and submitted
May 24 2004	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   and Remanded OPINION BY: Brown, J --- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, Simons, JJ. (Assigned)
Jun 23 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jun 24 2004	Note:   Records returned to CA/5
Jul 1 2004	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA/5

Briefs
Jun 11 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Aug 11 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Sep 11 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Sep 26 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 3 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website