Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/19/05

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

SIERRA CLUB et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S116081
v.
Ct.App.
1/5
A100194
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, )
)
San
Francisco
County
Defendant and Respondent;
Super. Ct. No. 315686
)
CATELLUS RESIDENTIAL GROUP, )
Real Party in Interest and )
Respondent. )
)
_______________________________ )

This case requires us to consider the California Coastal Commission’s
(Commission) exercise of permit authority under the California Coastal Act of
1976 (Coastal Act) (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.)1 in connection with a
proposed development project that straddles the coastal zone boundary. In issuing
a permit in this case, the Commission found that as conditioned, the part of the
proposed project within the coastal zone is in conformity with the Coastal Act’s
policies and requirements. The opponents of the permit request contend that the
Commission, based on an incorrect construction of the Coastal Act, improperly

1
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Public
Resources Code.

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refused to consider impacts within the coastal zone of the part of the proposed
project outside the coastal zone. The Court of Appeal upheld the Commission’s
reading of the Coastal Act and its decision. We affirm the Court of Appeal’s
judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Respondent Catellus Residential Group (Catellus) proposed to build a
development with 114 houses on a 44-acre parcel of property in the City of Los
Angeles (City) approximately one mile from the ocean and near the Ballona
Wetlands. All of the new houses would be built on top of a bluff that is outside
the “coastal zone” as defined by section 30103. To access 85 of the houses,
Catellus proposed to build a road—Street A—that would descend from the top of
the bluff, down its face, to State Highway 1. The bluff face is within the coastal
zone, as would be approximately one-half of Street A. Construction of Street A
would require substantial grading across the last remaining bluff in the area.
Catellus also proposed to locate related infrastructure under Street A, including a
storm water pipe to convey runoff from the bluff top to a detention basin below.
In carrying out the proposed project, Catellus also proposed to construct a public
access view park along the bluff rim, to revegetate over 10 acres of bluff face
within the coastal zone, and to purchase and dedicate to open space 15 off-site lots
along the bluff face inside the coastal zone.
Because part of the proposed project, including part of Street A, involves
“development in the coastal zone,” Catellus must “obtain a coastal development
permit.” (§ 30600, subd. (a).) In fact, because the City does not have a certified
local coastal program but has adopted procedures for issuing coastal development

2
The facts regarding the proposed development are taken from the Court of
Appeal’s opinion and are not disputed.

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permits, Catellus must get two such permits: one from the City and one from the
Commission. (See §§ 30519, subd. (a), 30600, subd. (b), 30601.) Catellus thus
applied to the City for a coastal development permit, as well as other approvals
and permits required under provisions other than the Coastal Act. After preparing
an environmental impact report (EIR) for purposes of complying with the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.), the City granted
Catellus’s coastal development permit request and approved the project.
Catellus then applied to the Commission for a separate coastal development
permit. At the same time, petitioners Sierra Club, Spirit of the Sage Council, and
Ballona Ecosystem Education Project (collectively, Sierra Club) appealed the
City’s coastal permit approval to the Commission pursuant to section 30625.3 In a
combined report addressing both the permit request and the appeal, the
Commission’s staff recommended permit approval conditioned on elimination of
Street A. However, a majority of the Commission voted to delete staff’s “no
Street A” recommendation, to grant Catellus’s permit request for construction of
Street A, and to deny Sierra Club’s appeal. The Commission made extensive
findings in support of its decision, including the following: “The bluff top . . . is
not in the Commission’s jurisdiction” and “it is not in the Commission’s power to
regulate development on the bluff top.”
Sierra Club challenged the Commission’s actions through several petitions
for writ of mandate filed in the superior court. As here relevant, Sierra Club
alleged that the Commission should have denied the permit request because the
project as a whole—including activities both inside and outside the coastal zone—
is not in conformity with the Costal Act’s “management policies and development
standards” for protecting “scenic views” and environmentally sensitive habitat

3
Other aspects of the City’s project approval were challenged, and ultimately
upheld, in a separate action. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733.)

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areas (ESHA’s). Regarding scenic views, Sierra Club alleged in relevant part that
the proposed location of the houses near the coastal zone boundary would “result
in significant impacts to scenic resources” inside the coastal zone, and that under
section 30251, the Commission should not have issued a permit until Catellus “set
back” the houses on the bluff top—which is outside the coastal zone—“far enough
from the bluff edge to avoid or eliminate” those impacts. Regarding ESHA’s,
Sierra Club alleged in relevant part that proposed activities on the bluff top,
“outside of the coastal zone,” would produce “adverse . . . impacts” to “the
Ballona Wetlands, an ESHA located directly adjacent to the site’s northerly
boundary,” and that under section 30204, subdivision (b), the Commission should
not have issued a permit until Catellus “sited and designed” the bluff top part of
the project so as “to prevent” these impacts. In support of its position, Sierra Club
argued that the Coastal Act authorizes the Commission to deny a permit request
“based on the effects inside the coastal zone of development outside” the coastal
zone, especially where the proposed activities inside and outside the coastal zone
are “part of one and the same project.”
In responding to these claims, the Commission relied principally on section
30604, subdivision (d) (section 30604(d)), which states: “No development or any
portion thereof that is outside the coastal zone shall be subject to the coastal
development permit requirements of [the Coastal Act], nor shall anything in [the
Coastal Act] authorize the denial of a coastal development permit by the
commission on the grounds the proposed development within the coastal zone will
have an adverse environmental effect outside the coastal zone.” This provision,
the Commission argued, “prohibits [it] from exercising its powers on development
outside the coastal zone” and, contrary to Sierra Club’s assertion, precludes it from
denying “a coastal permit based on the effects inside the coastal zone of
development outside” the coastal zone. Sierra Club’s contrary view, the
Commission explained, “ask[s] [the Commission] to do indirectly what the
Legislature has explicitly stated [it] can’t do directly,” i.e., “subject” portions of

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the proposed development “outside the coastal zone . . . to the coastal development
permit requirements of [the Coastal Act].”4 (§ 30604(d).)
Sierra Club disagreed with the Commission’s view of section 30604(d),
arguing that this provision “specifically does not preclude denial of a coastal
permit based on the effects inside the coastal zone of development outside.” On
the contrary, Sierra Club asserted, under the Coastal Act, the Commission “must
consider all Project impacts (within and outside the coastal zone) affecting the
coastal zone.” According to Sierra Club, “jurisdiction” and the duty to
“minimiz[e]. . . impacts” under the Coastal Act “extends [the Commission’s]
authority to control the generation point(s) of adverse effects originating outside
the coastal zone (causing impacts to resources within the coastal zone).” Thus,
Sierra Club maintained, the Commission had erred in “fail[ing] to assess the
impacts” of proposed activities outside the coastal zone “on the Ballona Wetlands
ESHA” and in issuing a permit without requiring Catellus to mitigate the “adverse
coastal impacts” inside the coastal zone “arising from houses being built along the
bluff edge.”
The superior court denied relief. As relevant here, it found “substantial
evidence” in the record to support the Commission’s conclusion that, consistent
with the Coastal Act, the proposed activities “in the coastal zone and subject to the
coastal development permit” are “sited and designed to . . . protect views” and will
“not significantly degrade the Ballona Wetlands . . . ESHA.” It also found that,
contrary to Sierra Club’s assertion, “the Commission was not required to consider

4
The Commission’s argument in the superior court closely mirrored the
argument Catellus had previously made to the Commission during its permit
proceedings. Relying on section 30604(d), Catellus argued during those
proceedings that “the Commission cannot lawfully do indirectly, by denying a
permit for development within the Coastal Zone based on the impacts of the
portion of that development which is outside the coastal zone, what it could not do
directly.”

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alternatives to the entire project but rather properly limited its review to
alternatives to . . . those portions of the project within the coastal zone and the
Commission’s jurisdiction.”
Sierra Club appealed, arguing in relevant part that the Commission had
erred in issuing the permit without “consider[ing] the adverse impacts in the
coastal zone of project activities originating in the portion of the project site
located outside of the coastal zone.” As in the superior court, in the Court of
Appeal, Sierra Club specifically focused on the adverse scenic impacts within the
coastal zone of the houses to be built on the bluff top, and the adverse
environmental impacts to the Ballona Wetlands ESHA of project activities and
land uses on the bluff top. In response, the Commission maintained that section
30604(d) “expressly prohibit[s]” the Commission from denying Catellus’s permit
request based on a “find[ing] that the houses [to be built outside the coastal zone]
will adversely impact the coastal zone.” The Commission also maintained that it
“has no authority to require greater setbacks for the homes or to require less
density.” Likewise, citing section 30604(d), Catellus argued that the Commission
lacked “authority to deny or condition a project on the basis of changes to the
Larger Project outside the Coastal Zone.”
The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s decision. Agreeing with
the Commission and Catellus and relying on section 30604(d), the court rejected
Sierra Club’s argument that the Commission was “statutorily obligated” to “reject
the development inside the coastal zone” based on adverse impacts within the
coastal zone of “that portion of the project outside the coastal zone.” The court
found that in refusing to deny the permit request on this basis, the Commission
had “respected the boundaries on its power set out for it by the Legislature.”
Finally, finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s
conclusion “that the portions of the Project inside the coastal zone are consistent
with the environmental policies of the Coastal Act,” the court affirmed the
superior court’s denial of relief.

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We then granted Sierra Club’s petition for review.
DISCUSSION

As in the Court of Appeal, Sierra Club argues here that the Commission
erred in declining to base its decision regarding a permit for proposed activities
within the coastal zone on “the cumulative environmental impacts in the coastal
zone of project activities located outside” the coastal zone. More specifically,
Sierra Club asserts that the Commission should have denied the permit request
based on “the visual and scenic impacts in the coastal zone” of the proposed
“blufftop modifications” and the “adverse impacts” of those proposed
modifications “on the Ballona Wetlands’ ecosystem.” According to Sierra Club,
issuance of the permit despite these impacts within the coastal zone violates
sections 30251 and 30240, subdivision (b). The former provision states in relevant
part: “Permitted development shall be sited and designed to protect views to and
along the ocean and scenic coastal areas . . . [and] to be visually compatible with
the character of surrounding areas . . . . New development in highly scenic areas
. . . shall be subordinate to the character of its setting.” (§ 30251.) The latter
provision specifies that “[d]evelopment in areas adjacent to [ESHA’s] . . . shall be
sited and designed to prevent impacts which would significantly degrade those
areas, and shall be compatible with the continuance of those habitat and recreation
areas.” (§ 30240, subd. (b).) Sierra Club argues that its position is consistent with
“the plain meaning” and “legislative history” of section 30604(d) and with “the
purposes of the Coastal Act.”
In response, the Commission agrees that in making a permit decision
regarding “development inside the coastal zone,” it “may consider impacts in the
coastal zone of the portions of the project outside the coastal zone” and “may
properly . . . act to prevent” those impacts “to the extent [they] are related to the
development inside the coastal zone.” In fact, the Commission maintains, it
actually “did consider such impacts when it made its decision” here.

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However, the Commission argues, what it refused to do, and what it may
not do under the “plain” and “unambiguous” language of section 30604(d), is
“deny a permit for development inside the coastal zone where the impacts of that
development have been fully mitigated and the only purpose for denying the
permit would be to indirectly regulate development outside the coastal zone.” The
Commission first explains that under the “plain meaning” of section 30604(d), it
“has no permit jurisdiction over the residential subdivision which will be located
outside of the coastal zone.” Thus, “the Commission cannot impose a condition
directly reducing the number of homes outside the coastal zone or increasing the
setback of the homes from the bluff edge.” The Commission then argues that
adopting Sierra Club’s position—that the Commission, although finding Street A
to be “consistent with the Coastal Act” and to have no unmitigated “adverse
impacts,” must nevertheless deny the permit request “based solely on th[e]
impacts” within the coastal zone of activities outside the coastal zone—would
provide “an indirect route to achieve these same results.” This, the Commission
contends, “would violate” section 30604(d) by requiring “the Commission to do
indirectly what the Legislature has told it it may not do directly,” i.e., “subject[]
development outside of the coastal zone to the [Coastal] Act’s permit
requirements.” In other words, the Commission asserts, Sierra Club is improperly
trying to “leverage” the Commission’s “approval over Street A, which the
Commission found will have no unmitigated impacts, to force changes in portions
of the [project] over which the Commission has no permit jurisdiction.” In short,
the Commission argues, it “properly considered impacts from outside the coastal
zone as they related to the development inside the coastal zone and as necessary to
find the coastal zone development consistent with the Coastal Act,” and properly
declined to “abuse the limitations on its authority imposed by the Legislature by
leveraging its permit jurisdiction to regulate the project outside the coastal zone.”
Catellus agrees with the Commission’s position.

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We conclude that the Commission’s construction of the Coastal Act is
correct under the governing statutory framework. The Coastal Act, section 30600,
subdivision (a), provides in relevant part that “any person . . . wishing to perform
or undertake any development in the coastal zone, other than a facility subject to
Section 25500, shall obtain a coastal development permit.” On its face, this
section does not specify how its permit requirement applies to projects that
straddle the coastal zone boundary. That subject is addressed in section 30604(d),
which, as noted above, provides: “No development or any portion thereof that is
outside the coastal zone shall be subject to the coastal development permit
requirements of [the Coastal Act], nor shall anything in [the Coastal Act] authorize
the denial of a coastal development permit by the commission on the grounds the
proposed development within the coastal zone will have an adverse environmental
effect outside the coastal zone.” As to that part of a proposed project “subject to
the provisions of” the Coastal Act, “the standards” for determining “the
permissibility of [the] proposed development[]” are set forth in chapter 3 of the
Coastal Act (§ 30200 et seq.). (§30200, subd. (a).) Where, as here, no certified
“local coastal program” governs, a coastal development permit “shall be issued”
upon a “find[ing] that the proposed development is in conformity with Chapter 3.”
(§ 30604, subd. (a).)
This statutory framework authorizes the Commission, in determining
whether proposed development within the coastal zone is in conformity with the
Coastal Act’s standards, to consider whether that proposed development takes into
account or addresses impacts within the coastal zone of proposed development
outside the coastal zone, at least, as the Commission states, “to the extent these
impacts are related to the development inside the coastal zone.” This conclusion is
fully consistent with the Legislature’s express command that the Coastal Act “be
liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.” (§ 30009.) It is
also fully consistent with section 30604(d), through which the Legislature has
specifically addressed the scope of the Commission’s authority over projects that

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straddle the coastal zone boundary. Regarding such a project, that section places
two limits on the Commission: (1) it may not “subject” the “portion” of the
project “that is outside the coastal zone” to the Coastal Act’s “permit
requirements”; and (2) it may not deny a permit request “on the grounds the
proposed development within the coastal zone will have an adverse environmental
effect outside the coastal zone.” (§ 30604(d).) The Commission clearly does not
violate the second limitation merely by considering the impacts within the coastal
zone of the part of the proposed project that is outside the coastal zone. Nor does
it violate the first limitation, unless it considers the impacts originating outside the
coastal zone in such a way as to “subject” the “portion” of the project “that is
outside the coastal zone” to the Coastal Act’s “permit requirements.” (§30604(d).)
In short, as Sierra Club asserts, nothing in section 30604(d) or any other relevant
provision requires the Commission, in applying the Coastal Act’s standards to
proposed development within the coastal zone, to “turn a blind eye to the impacts
of project activities originating outside the coastal zone.”
Here, for example, the record reflects several ways in which the
Commission, in evaluating and approving Catellus’s permit request for the
proposed development inside the coastal zone, considered impacts within the
coastal zone of the proposed development outside the coastal zone. In its findings,
the Commission stressed that the distance the proposed “residential development”
on the bluff top will be “set back . . . from the bluff face” furthers the Coastal
Act’s policies in several ways; consistent with section 30253, “this design
solution” will “stabilize the bluff face” in the coastal zone, leave “the majority” of
that bluff face “in an ungraded condition,” and allow “the creation of a drainage
setback area at the top of the bluff face” that will facilitate “diversion of drainage
away from the bluff face.” The Commission also noted that “[t]o further reduce
erosion along the bluff face,” Catellus will construct “four soldier pile/retaining
walls . . . partially within the Coastal Zone.” These “drainage improvements,” the
Commission explained, “will help to reduce siltation and pollution in . . . [the]

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Ballona Wetlands caused by uncontrolled storm water runoff down the bluff.”
The Commission also stressed Catellus’s proposal to restore the already degraded
bluff face through “implementation of a comprehensive bluff face revegetation
plan.” In several respects, that plan takes into account the fact that as part of the
overall project, houses will be built nearby on the bluff top outside the coastal
zone. It divides the part of the project within the coastal zone into several “sub-
zone[s]” and specifies a different revegetation strategy for each sub-zone “based
on [its] distance . . . from the residential units.” It specifies that Catellus will use
“native species . . . that will not have to be extensively cleared to protect the
homes from fire.” It also specifies that the restoration “will be considered
successful” only when, among other things, the revegetated bluff face “resists
invasion by exotic plant species.” The Commission next stressed that the
dedication to open space of 15 off-site lots inside the coastal zone will further the
scenic preservation policies stated in section 30251 by “provid[ing] a visual buffer
between the [Ballona] [W]etlands and the upland development.” Moreover, these
lots, given Catellus’s promise “to keep [them] undeveloped and landscaped with
native vegetation,” will “provid[e] a landscape buffer between the wetland and
upland areas that are landscaped with non-native plants,” thus “prevent[ing] native
invasive type plants from encroaching closer to the wetlands.” More broadly, the
Commission explained that under Catellus’s proposal, “81[percent] of the bluff
face, within the Coastal Zone will be left ungraded” and will “serve as a buffer
between the Ballona Wetlands and the residential areas to the south.”
Consistent with these findings, the Commission imposed several “special
conditions” on its issuance of a permit. It required Catellus to implement a water
quality management program “to mitigate the potential development impact” by
“collecting and directing runoff from all streets and residential lots through a
system of filter devices . . . designed to trap sediment, particulates and other solids
and remove or mitigate contaminants.” It required Catellus to “carr[y] out and
complete[]” bluff face “restoration . . . consistent with” its proposed revegetation

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plan and to submit a report addressing the bluff face’s resistance to invasion by
exotic plant species “[f]ive years from the date of the receipt of the Certificate of
Occupancy for the residences” to be built on the bluff top. Finally, it required
Catellus to execute and record deed restrictions dedicating to open space the 15
specified off-site lots inside the coastal zone and to include those lots in its “bluff
face revegetation plan.” Thus, the record makes clear that the Commission did in
fact consider the ways in which the proposed development outside the coastal zone
would produce impacts within the coastal zone, and the ways in which the
proposed development inside the coastal zone, as further conditioned by the
Commission to implement the Coastal Act’s standards, would address those
impacts. The Commission’s actions in this regard were proper under the Coastal
Act and the parties do not suggest otherwise.
However, having found the proposed development within the coastal zone,
as conditioned, to be “in conformity with” the Coastal Act’s standards (§ 30604,
subd. (a)), the Commission correctly declined to deny the permit request solely on
the basis of the impacts within the coastal zone that Sierra Club alleges will result
from the proposed development outside the coastal zone.5 In its brief, Sierra Club
concedes that the language of section 30604(d) prohibits the Commission from
either “requir[ing] a coastal permit for the project elements outside the zone” or
“condition[ing] . . . coastal permits” for project activities within the coastal zone
“on changes to project elements sited outside the coastal zone.” As the
Commission asserts, for all practical purposes, that is precisely what Sierra Club
asked the Commission to do. Given the Commission’s finding that the proposed
development within the coastal zone, as conditioned, is in conformity with the

5
The Commission’s finding that the proposed development inside the coastal
zone, as conditioned, is itself in conformity with the Coastal Act was affirmed by
the Court of Appeal and is not within the scope of the issues on which we granted
review. Thus, our analysis assumes that finding to be correct.

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Coastal Act, a denial of the permit request for that development would simply be a
means of effectuating change in the portion of the project outside the coastal
zone.6 Indeed, the record makes clear that one of Sierra Club’s primary goals in
opposing the permit request is to force changes to the project outside the coastal
zone, specifically, the number and location of the proposed houses.7 Under these
circumstances, the Commission correctly found that Sierra Club was asking it “to
do indirectly” what Sierra Club concedes the plain language of section 30604(d)
prohibits: “condition[ing] . . .coastal permits” for project activities within the
coastal zone “on changes to project elements sited outside the coastal zone.”
Moreover, given the language of section 30604(d), the Commission correctly
rejected Sierra Club’s request as an improper attempt to “leverage” the
Commission’s permit authority regarding proposed activities within the coastal
zone “to force changes in portions of the [project] over which the Commission has
no permit jurisdiction.”
The evolution of section 30604(d) and its legislative history support this
conclusion. The Coastal Act was first enacted in 1976 through passage of Senate
Bill No. 1277 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.). As initially proposed in Senate Bill No.
1277, the Coastal Act provided that “[i]f any portion of a parcel of land on which

6
The same could not be said of a denial based on the impacts inside the
coastal zone of proposed development inside the coastal zone, even if that denial
has incidental effects on portions of a project outside the coastal zone. Thus, if
substantial evidence supports its decision, the Commission may properly deny a
permit request based on impacts within the coastal zone of proposed development
inside the coastal zone, even if those impacts can be sufficiently mitigated only by
changing the portion of a proposed project outside the coastal zone.
7
At a hearing before the Commission, Sierra Club argued: “What this
project comes down to is density. This project is too dense, and as a result
contains almost no open space, requires destruction of the bluff face . . . and will
result in unsightly visual impacts along the bluff edge. [¶] You can solve or
mitigate all of these problems simply by reducing the greed factor in the number
of homes, increasing the setbacks . . . and open space.”

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development is proposed lies within the permit area, the entire parcel is subject to
the requirements of this division, where the proposed development could have a
significant impact on any portion of the parcel within the permit area.” (Sen. Bill
No. 1277 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 18, 1976, §1 [proposed §
30111, subd. (e)].) This provision, had it been enacted, would have authorized the
Commission to do precisely what Sierra Club argues it must do: base its permit
decision on the adverse impacts within the coastal zone of proposed development
outside the coastal zone, even where proposed development inside the coastal zone
is otherwise in conformity with the Coastal Act. However, this provision was
deleted before the bill’s passage. (Sen. Bill No. 1277 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Aug. 2, 1976.) Instead, the Legislature added section 30604(d), which
provided, as first enacted: “Nothing in this division shall authorize the denial of a
coastal development permit on grounds that a portion of the proposed
development not within the coastal zone will have adverse environmental impacts
outside the coastal zone; provided, however, that the portion of the proposed
development within the coastal zone shall meet the requirements of this chapter.”
(Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, § 1, p. 5990.) On its face, this provision said nothing about
whether or how the Commission should consider impacts within the coastal zone
of proposed activities outside the coastal zone.
However, even before the Governor signed the Coastal Act into law, the
Legislature recognized this potential ambiguity and took steps to address it. On
August 31, 1976, the same day Senate Bill No. 1277 was enrolled and sent to the
Governor, the Senate published a letter from Senator Smith, the author of the
legislation, to the Secretary of the Senate. The letter stated: “During the debate
on [Senate Bill No.] 1277, questions were raised relative to the interpretation of
several provisions in the bill. . . . By including this letter in the Senate Journal, it
is my purpose to clarify my intent, as the author of [Senate Bill No.] 1277, with
respect to [some of those] provisions. I have made these same statements of intent
before both Senate and Assembly Committees. Speaker McCarthy made similar

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representations, with my full concurrence, during the debate on this bill before the
full Assembly. [¶] 1. The area within which the provisions of [Senate Bill No.]
1277 apply: [¶] The coastal commission’s jurisdiction and the area to which the
provisions of [Senate Bill No.] 1277 apply is the coastal zone and is limited
entirely to that area inside the specifically delineated boundaries described in
Section 17 of the bill and shown on the maps adopted by Committee . . . . The
planning and regulatory requirements of this bill do not apply inland of these
boundaries of the coastal zone . . . . [¶] The coastal commission has no direct
permit or planning controls, pursuant to [Senate Bill No.] 1277, over any area or
the activities of any other public agency outside the coastal zone (i.e., the
commission may only deal with those activities occurring within the coastal zone).
The area outside the specifically mapped coastal zone remains under the exclusive
jurisdiction of existing units of local and state government and the authority,
power, duties and responsibilities of the latter are not changed by this bill. The
only charge to such agencies is (see Section 30200) that where their activities
outside the coastal zone could have a direct impact on resources within the coastal
zone, they must consider the effect of such activities relative to the policies of this
bill. This provision can be fully met if such effects are considered by way of the
environmental impact review process. No additional requirements are required or
intended by this section.”8 (9 Sen. J. (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) pp. 16967-16968.)
Seeking further guidance, the Commission asked the Attorney General for a
legal opinion regarding its duties in considering permit requests for proposed

8
Although we generally do not consider the understanding of individual
legislators in construing statutes, the letter from Senator Smith is relevant because
it purports to reiterate statements made to the Legislature during consideration of
Senate Bill No. 1277 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) and because it was printed with the
Senate’s consent pursuant to Senator Smith’s motion. (See In re Marriage of
Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 590.) It also provides relevant background for
construing section 30604(d) in its current form.

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projects that straddle the coastal zone boundary. (Cal. Atty. Gen., Indexed Letter,
No. IL 77-20 (Aug. 26, 1977).)9 In August 1977, the Attorney General issued an
opinion in response to the request, which stated that “if the portions of a project
inside and outside the coastal zone are part of one development, then the
commission may go on to determine whether portions outside the zone have
significant environmental impacts inside the zone” (ibid.) and may “deny permits
on the basis that the portion of [the] development outside the coastal zone would
have adverse environmental impacts inside the coastal zone.”10 (Ibid.)
The Legislature quickly responded by amending section 30604(d) in 1978
to provide, as it does today, that “[n]o development or any portion thereof that is
outside the coastal zone shall be subject to the coastal development permit
requirements of” the Coastal Act. (Stats. 1978, ch. 1075, § 14, p. 3304.) An
analysis of the 1978 amendment by the Senate Committee on Natural Resources
and Wildlife explained the impetus and purpose of the amendment as follows: “In
some instances the coastal zone boundary bisects a developable parcel, leaving
part in and part out of the coastal zone. The Attorney General has issued an
opinion stating that if such a parcel is proposed for subdivision, the commission
may look at the entire parcel in making its decision. This [amendment] would
expressly provide that no portion of a development outside the coastal zone shall
be subject to coastal development permit requirements.” (Sen. Com. on Natural
Resources and Wildlife, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1873 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.)
Mar. 22, 1978, p. 3.) Other legislative analyses described the amendment’s
purpose as being to clarify that “only that portion of [a proposed] project within

9
At Sierra Club’s request, we have taken judicial notice of an opinion letter
from the Attorney General’s office dated August 26, 1977, and addressed to the
South Coast Regional Commission.
10
The analysis in the opinion made no mention of the statements of intent
published in the Senate Journal on motion of Senator Smith, the author of the
Coastal Act.

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the coastal zone is subject to commission jurisdiction” (Assem. Com. on
Resources, Land Use, and Energy, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1873 (1977-1978 Reg.
Sess.) as amended May 8, 1978, p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No.
1873 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 28, 1978), and to “make[] clear
that coastal permit controls do not apply to any project or portion of any project
that is outside the coastal zone.” (Comm., analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 1873 (1977-
1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1978, p. 1; Dept. of Fin., analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 1873
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) May 8, 1978, p. 1.)
This legislative history demonstrates that regarding developments
straddling the coastal zone boundary, the Legislature intended to divide permit
authority between the Commission and all other local public entities having
jurisdiction over portions of the development outside the coastal zone, with the
Commission passing on permit requests for proposed development inside the
coastal zone and the other entities passing on permit requests for proposed
development outside the coastal zone.11 Having concluded in this case that the
proposed development inside the coastal zone, as conditioned, is in conformity
with the Coastal Act, the Commission’s refusal to deny the permit request for that
development based on the impacts inside the coastal zone of the proposed
development outside the coastal zone—i.e., its refusal to leverage its permit
authority over the part of the project within the coastal zone to force changes in

11
Other sources confirm the Legislature’s intent to place significant
responsibility for implementing the Coastal Act on local authorities. (§ 30004,
subd. (a) [stating the Legislature’s finding that “[t]o achieve maximum
responsiveness to local conditions, accountability, and public accessibility, it is
necessary to rely heavily on local government and local land use planning
procedures and enforcement”]; Sen. Democratic Caucus, analysis of Senate Bill
No. 1277 (Aug. 19, 1976) pp. 2-3 [Coastal Act contains “[p]rovisions for . . . the
transfer of coastal management responsibilities back to local government [that
would] alleviate[] previous problems regarding local control in the planning
process”].)

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portions of the project over which it has no permit authority—is consistent with
this intended division of authority. A contrary conclusion would be inconsistent
with this intended division of authority; it would, where proposed development
within the coastal zone is in conformity with the Coastal Act, effectively allow the
Commission to overrule the decisions of other public agencies regarding proposed
development outside the coastal zone and within their jurisdiction.
Despite the statutory language and the evidence of legislative intent, Sierra
Club argues that its construction of section 30604(d) is consistent with “the
manifest purposes of the Coastal Act,” as reflected in several of its other
provisions. Specifically, Sierra Club cites express legislative findings that the
coastal zone “is a distinct and valuable resource of vital and enduring interest to all
the people and exists as a delicately balanced ecosystem” (§ 30001, subd. (a)); that
“to promote the public safety, health, and welfare, and to protect public and
private property, wildlife, marine fisheries, and other ocean resources, and the
natural environment, it is necessary to protect the ecological balance of the coastal
zone and prevent its deterioration and destruction” (§30001, subd. (c)); and that
“developments that are carefully planned and developed consistent with the
policies of this division, are essential to the economic and social well-being of the
people of this state and especially to working persons employed within the coastal
zone.” (§30001, subd. (d).) Sierra Club also cites the “basic goals” expressly
stated in the Coastal Act, which are protecting, enhancing and restoring “the
overall quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and artificial
resources” (§ 30001.5, subd. (a)); “[a]ssur[ing] orderly, balanced utilization and
conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account the social and economic
needs of the people of the state” (§ 30001.5, subd. (b)); “[m]aximiz[ing] public
access to and along the coast and maximiz[ing] public recreational opportunities in
the coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation principles and
constitutionally protected rights of private property owners” (§ 30001.5, subd.
(c)); “[a]ssur[ing] priority for coastal-dependent and coastal-related development

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over other development on the coast” (§ 30001.5, subd. (d)); and “[e]ncourag[ing]
state and local initiatives and cooperation in preparing procedures to implement
coordinated planning and development for mutually beneficial uses, including
educational uses, in the coastal zone.” (§ 30001.5, subd. (e).) Finally, Sierra Club
relies on the Legislature’s express command that the Coastal Act “be liberally
construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.” (§ 30009.)
For several reasons, Sierra Club’s reliance on these provisions is
unavailing. First, these broad statements regarding the general goals of the
Coastal Act cannot overcome the express terms of section 30604(d), through
which the Legislature has specifically addressed the limits of both the Coastal
Act’s reach and the Commission’s power. Second, Sierra Club’s construction
would effectively transfer control over proposed development outside the coastal
zone from local authorities to the Commission, simply because part of a proposed
project happens to be inside the coastal zone, but the general statements Sierra
Club cites reflect no legislative intent to effect such a transfer of control. By
contrast, statements in the relevant legislative history discussed above indicate that
the Legislature had precisely the opposite intent and envisioned that under the
Coastal Act, “area[s] outside the . . . coastal zone . . . [would] remain[] under the
exclusive jurisdiction of existing units of local and state government.” (9 Sen. J.
(1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) p. 16968.) This conclusion is consistent with the fact, as
noted above, that in passing the Coastal Act, the Legislature considered, but
rejected, proposed language that would have effected the transfer of control that
would result under Sierra Club’s construction. (Sen. Bill No. 1277 (1975-1976
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 18, 1976, § 1 [all portions of a parcel of land are
“subject to the requirements of” the Coastal Act “[i]f any portion of [that] parcel
. . . lies within the permit area” and “the proposed development could have a
significant impact on any portion of the parcel within the permit area”].) We may
not judicially write the deleted provision back into the Coastal Act simply
because, as Sierra Club observes, “the coastal zone boundary does not immunize

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the zone against . . . impacts” from “project activities on the other side of the
boundary.”
Sierra Club next asserts that its construction “is in harmony with” the
second sentence of section 30200, subdivision (a), which provides: “All public
agencies carrying out or supporting activities outside the coastal zone that could
have a direct impact on resources within the coastal zone shall consider the effect
of such actions on coastal zone resources in order to assure that the[] policies [set
forth in Chapter 3 of the Coastal Act] are achieved.” Sierra Club argues that this
provision applies because in issuing a permit for Street A, which would provide
access to houses built outside the coastal zone, the Commission is “supporting
activities outside the coastal zone that could have a direct impact on resources
within the coastal zone.” (§ 30200, subd. (a).) The Commission responds that
because it has no “permitting or other discretionary authority outside of the coastal
zone and therefore by definition does not ‘carry out or support’ activities outside
the coastal zone,” the cited provision is simply inapplicable. In reply, Sierra Club
concedes that the provision in question “is primarily aimed at agencies other than
the Commission.” However, citing the statute’s reference to “[a]ll public
agencies” (§ 30200, subd. (a)), Sierra Club argues that the Commission’s view is
“not supported by section 30200’s all-inclusive language or the Coastal Act’s
mandate that its provisions be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and
objectives.” According to Sierra Club, the Commission “is a public agency and
whether through permitting of coastal development related to activities outside the
coastal zone, or through other means, . . . can be called upon to support activities
outside the zone.”
Sierra Club’s reliance on section 30200, subdivision (a), is unpersuasive.
Initially, the relevant legislative history supports the Commission’s view that the
Legislature did not intend the second sentence of section 30200, subdivision (a), to
apply to the Commission. As noted above, the letter of intent published in the
Senate Journal in connection with the Coastal Act’s passage explained that

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“existing units of local and state government” other than the Commission have
“exclusive jurisdiction” over land outside the coastal zone and that in dealing with
“activities outside the coastal zone [that] could have a direct impact on resources
within the coastal zone,” these other “agencies” are “charge[d]” under “Section
30200” with “consider[ing] the effect of such activities relative to the policies of”
the Coastal Act. (9 Sen. J. (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) p. 16968.) This discussion
suggests that the Legislature viewed the second sentence of section 30200,
subdivision (a), as being applicable only to agencies other than the Commission,
as part of carrying out the division of permit authority the Legislature established
in section 30604(d). Supporting this conclusion is the absence of anything in the
1978 amendment to section 30604(d) or its legislative history—which specifically
addressed the scope of the Commission’s authority over activities outside the
coastal zone—even suggesting that the second sentence of section 30200,
subdivision (a), has anything to say about this subject.12
Ultimately, however, we need not determine here whether the second
sentence of section 30200, subdivision (a), never applies to the Commission
because even if we assume it does in some cases, it cannot apply as Sierra Club
asserts. As explained above, the legislative history shows that as to proposed
developments straddling the coastal zone boundary, section 30604(d) implements
the Legislature’s intent to divide permit authority between the Commission and
other local public entities having jurisdiction over portions of a development
outside the coastal zone. Sierra Club’s construction of section 30200, subdivision
(a), would largely undo that legislatively established division of authority; as we
have already explained, where proposed development inside the coastal zone is in

12
Nor does anything in the Attorney General’s opinion letter, which
specifically addressed the same subject and which was the stated impetus for the
1978 amendment, suggest that the second sentence 30200, subdivision (a), speaks
to the Commission’s authority.

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conformity with the Coastal Act, such a construction would effectively authorize
the Commission to overrule the decisions of other public agencies regarding
proposed development outside the coastal zone and within their jurisdiction.
Thus, adopting Sierra Club’s view of section 30200, subdivision (a), would be
contrary to our duty to “harmonize” the “various elements” of the Coastal Act “in
order to carry out the overriding legislative purpose as gleaned from a reading of
the entire act. [Citation.]”13 (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29
Cal.3d 781, 788.)
Sierra Club next argues that the Commission’s construction of section
30604(d) is inconsistent with the Commission’s “information disclosure
requirements” under CEQA. According to Sierra Club, CEQA requires the
Commission to “disclose and publicly review in its staff reports the reasonably
foreseeable effects in the coastal zone of the whole project because, under CEQA,
environmental ‘effects’ or ‘impacts’ to be considered by agencies, and integrated
in their decisionmaking procedures (see § 21006), include not only direct or
primary effects caused by the project, but also indirect or secondary effects which
‘are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable.’ [Citations.] ” “[L]ikewise,” Sierra Club asserts, CEQA “requires
agencies to account for cumulative impacts in their decisionmaking.” Based on
these alleged requirements, Sierra Club “asks [us] to hold that the Commission has
a duty under CEQA to identify and evaluate all impacts on the coastal zone
environment of a project that straddles the coastal zone boundary” (italics added)
and “to refrain from approving an activity as proposed, if available feasible

13
By contrast, rejecting Sierra Club’s view of section 30200, subdivision (a),
does not affect that provision’s application to agencies other than the Commission.
As noted above, Sierra Club concedes that the second sentence of section 30200,
subdivision (a) “is primarily aimed at” those other agencies.

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alternatives or mitigation measures would substantially lessen any significant
adverse effect of the activity on the coastal zone environment.”
Contrary to Sierra Club’s assertion, nothing in CEQA authorizes or requires
the Commission, notwithstanding its finding that proposed development inside the
coastal zone is in conformity with the Coastal Act, to deny a permit request for
that development based on the impacts within the coastal zone of proposed
development outside the coastal zone. On the contrary, several provisions of
CEQA preclude us from using that act to expand the Commission’s authority
beyond the limits set forth in the Coastal Act. Section 21004 provides that “[i]n
mitigating or avoiding a significant effect of a project on the environment, a public
agency may exercise only those express or implied powers provided by law other
than” CEQA. (Italics added.) In an uncodified section of the legislation that
enacted this provision, the Legislature explained that “clarification” of CEQA’s
“scope and meaning” had become “necessary because of contentions that” its
provisions, “by themselves, confer on public agencies independent authority to . . .
take . . . actions in order to comply with [CEQA’s] general requirement . . . that
significant effects on the environment be mitigated or avoided whenever it is
feasible. . . .” (Stats. 1982, ch. 1438, §4, p. 5484.) The Legislature went on to
explain that section 21004 “clarif[ies]” that CEQA “confer[s] no such independent
authority. Rather, [its] provisions . . . are intended to be used in conjunction with
discretionary powers granted to a public agency by other law in order to achieve
the objective of mitigating or avoiding significant effects on the environment
when it is feasible to do so. . . . In order to fulfill [CEQA’s] requirement [that
feasible mitigating actions be taken], a public agency is required to select from the
various powers which have been conferred upon it by other law, those which it
determines may be appropriately and legally exercised . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.)
As these comments demonstrate, the Legislature passed section 21004 to preclude
us from doing precisely what Sierra Club’s now asks us to do: use CEQA as tool
to expand the Commission’s authority beyond the Coastal Act’s express limits.

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Sierra Club’s CEQA analysis is also inconsistent with section 21174, which
provides in part: “To the extent of any inconsistency or conflict between the
provisions of the . . . Coastal Act . . . and the provisions of [CEQA], the provisions
of [the Coastal Act] shall control.” Thus, to the extent, if any, the Commission’s
construction of section 30604(d)—which is consistent with the statutory language
and legislative history—creates a conflict with some aspect of CEQA, CEQA
itself resolves the conflict by requiring us to honor the limits of the Commission’s
authority under the Coastal Act and to reject Sierra Club’s request that we use
CEQA’s provisions to override or expand those limits. Although the Commission
relies on sections 21004 and 21174 in support of its position, Sierra Club simply
ignores these statutes; we are not free to do so.
Sierra Club’s CEQA analysis also ignores section 21002.1, subdivision (d),
which explains the respective “responsibilit[ies]” of a “lead agency” and a
“responsible agency” in reviewing an EIR and applying CEQA’s command to
mitigate or avoid a project’s significant environmental effects. Whereas the lead
agency is “responsible for considering the effects, both individual and collective,
of all activities involved in a project,” “[a] responsible agency [is] responsible for
considering only the effects of those activities involved in a project which it is
required by law to carry out or approve.” (§ 21002.1, subd. (d), italics added.) In
its CEQA discussion, Sierra Club maintains that as to Catellus’s entire proposed
project, the City is the lead agency and the Commission is “a responsible agency”
within the meaning of CEQA. Assuming Sierra Club is correct, under CEQA’s
express terms, the Commission is “responsible for considering only the effects of
those activities” within the coastal zone, which are the only project activities the
Commission “is required by law to . . . approve.” (§ 21002.1, subd. (d).) This
provision directly refutes Sierra Club’s argument that the Commission’s
construction of section 30604(d) conflicts with CEQA.
Finally, Sierra Club argues that the Commission’s construction conflicts
with its duties under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (16

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U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.). As relevant to Sierra Club’s argument, CZMA requires
“any applicant for a required Federal . . . permit to conduct an activity, in or
outside of the coastal zone, affecting any land . . . use or natural resource of the
coastal zone of that state” to “provide” the federal “permitting agency a
certification that the proposed activity complies with the enforceable policies of
the state’s [federally] approved [coastal zone management] program.” (16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(c)(3)(A).) CZMA also requires “the state or its designated agency” to
“notify” the federal permitting agency “that the state concurs with or objects to the
applicant’s certification.” (Ibid.) By statute, the Commission is the California
agency responsible for providing most of these CZMA notifications (§30330) and
the Coastal Act is part of California’s federally approved “coastal zone
management program . . . for purposes of” CZMA. (§ 30008; see also American
Petroleum Institute v. Knecht (C.D.Cal. 1978) 456 F.Supp. 889, 895.) In
requesting federal approval, the Commission described how it “intend[ed] to carry
out its responsibilities in connection with [CZMA’s] consistency provisions.”14
Regarding proposed activities “[w]ithin the coastal zone” requiring a federal
permit, the Commission explained that “a Coastal Commission permit will be
required” and that “issuance of a Coastal Commission permit . . . will be deemed
to be a determination by the State that the proposed Federal . . . permit activity is
consistent with [California’s coastal] management program, and no further
certification will be required.” According to Sierra Club, because the
Commission’s issuance of a permit also constitutes its CZMA concurrence that a
proposed activity is consistent with California’s coastal zone management
program, even where the Commission has determined that proposed activities
within the coastal zone are in conformity with the Coastal Act, the Commission’s

14
At Sierra Club’s request, we have taken judicial notice of part of the
document the Commission submitted in requesting federal approval of
California’s coastal management program.

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disposition of a permit request must be based on an assessment of, in the words of
CZMA, proposed “activit[ies] . . . outside of the coastal zone, affecting any land
. . . use or natural resource of the coastal zone.” (16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A).)
Sierra Club further asserts that because the project at issue here “straddl[es] the
coastal zone boundary,” the Commission’s refusal to base its permit decision
solely on the impacts within the coastal zone of the proposed activities outside the
coastal zone is inconsistent with CZMA and “create[s] an issue of conflict
preemption.”
Sierra Club’s argument fails because it rests on an incorrect understanding
of CZMA. Sierra Club is correct that the Commission’s issuance of a coastal
development permit constitutes its CZMA concurrence that a proposed activity is
consistent with California’s coastal management program. However, that fact
does not, as Sierra Club asserts, establish that the Commission must base its
permit decisions on whether proposed activities outside the coastal zone will have
impacts inside the coastal zone, or that a permit approval constitutes a
representation that it has considered such activities. One of the administrative
regulations implementing CZMA provides that “[i]f described in a State’s
management program, the issuance . . . of relevant State permits can constitute the
[designated] State agency’s consistency concurrence . . . if the [designated] State
agency ensures that the State permitting agencies or the [designated] State agency
review individual projects to ensure consistency with all applicable State
management program policies . . . .”15 (15 C.F.R. § 930.6(c) (2004).) Because
this regulation was promulgated by “the federal agency charged with
administering CZMA,” it is “entitled to deference by the courts.” (Secretary of

15
These regulations in title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which
were promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) of the Commerce Department, will hereafter be referred to as NOAA
regulations.

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Interior v. California (1983) 464 U.S. 312, 320, fn. 6.) Under it, the
Commission’s issuance of a permit for project activities inside the coastal zone
does not create a conflict with CZMA so long as the Commission ensures that
agencies issuing permits for proposed activities outside the coastal zone are
reviewing those activities for “consistency with all applicable State management
program policies.” (15 C.F.R. § 930.6(c) (2004).)16
This conclusion is consistent with other NOAA regulations that generally
describe CZMA’s structure and approach. According to those regulations,
CZMA’s requirement that a state designate a single responsible agency “should
not be viewed as confining or otherwise limiting the role and responsibilities
which may be assigned to this agency. It is up to the State to decide in what
manner and to what extent the designated State agency will be involved in actual
program implementation or enforcement.” (15 C.F.R. § 923.47(b)(2) (2004).) In
other words, the requirement “is designed [merely] to establish a single point of
accountability . . . for monitoring of management activities.” (15 C.F.R. §
923.47(b)(1) (2004).) Thus, “[d]esignation does not imply that this single agency
need be a ‘super agency’ or the principal implementation vehicle. It is, however,
the focal point for proper administration and evaluation of the State’s program and

16
Although section 930.6(c) of the NOAA regulations does not define the
term “State permitting agencies,” section 923.41(a)(2) of those regulations
provides that under CZMA, “[t]he state chosen agency or agencies (including
local governments, area-wide agencies, regional agencies, or interstate agencies)
must have the authority for the management of the coastal zone.” (15 C.F.R. §
923.41(a)(2) (2004), italics added.) This latter regulation mirrors the express
language of CZMA, which provides that a state’s coastal management plan may
not be federally approved unless “[t]he State, acting through its chosen agency or
agencies (including local governments, areawide agencies, regional agencies, or
interstate agencies) has authority for the management of the coastal zone in
accordance with the management program.” (16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(10), italics
added.) Thus, both CZMA itself and its implementing regulations contemplate
that local governments qualify as “State permitting agencies.” (15 C.F.R. §
930.6(c) (2004).)

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the entity to which [the federal government] will look when monitoring and
reevaluating a State’s program during program implementation.” (Ibid.) This
explanation of CZMA’s structure reinforces the conclusion that the Commission’s
construction does not create an impermissible conflict with CZMA.
For the reasons explained above, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the
Commission, having found the proposed development within the coastal zone, as
conditioned, to be “in conformity with” the Coastal Act’s standards (§ 30604,
subd. (a)), correctly declined to deny the permit request solely on the basis of the
impacts within the coastal zone that Sierra Club alleges will result from the
proposed development outside the coastal zone.
Sierra Club raises two additional challenges to the permit approval here,
both based on the assertion that although Commission staff reviewed the final EIR
certified by the City in connection with its consideration of Catellus’s proposed
project, the Commissioners did not. As support for its assertion, Sierra Club relies
on the declaration attached to its reply brief in the superior court, in which Sierra
Club’s counsel recounted his telephone conversation with “the coastal program
analyst in the Commission’s South Coast Area Office assigned to the [Catellus]
project.” According to the declaration, the program analyst told counsel that
“Commission staff had not provided the [C]ity’s EIR to the Commissioners.”
Sierra Club asserts that by failing to review the City’s EIR, the Commission
members violated the CEQA Guidelines,17 which provide that “[t]he
decisionmaking body of a public agency shall not delegate the following
functions: [¶] (1) Reviewing and considering a final EIR . . . prior to approving a
project.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15025, subd. (b)(1).) Sierra Club also asserts
that because the Commissioners did not themselves review the City’s EIR, the

17
We use the term “CEQA Guidelines” to refer to title 14 of the California
Code of Regulations, the administrative regulations for implementing CEQA
promulgated by the California Resources Agency pursuant to section 21083.

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Court of Appeal erred in partially relying on that EIR to find that substantial
evidence supports the Commission’s decision.
For several reasons, we reject Sierra Club’s arguments. First, they depend
on evidence that is not part of the administrative record. By statute, review of the
Commission’s decision to grant a permit is by way of a “writ of [administrative]
mandate in accordance with Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
(Pub. Resources Code, § 30801.) “ ‘The general rule’ ” in such actions is that
judicial review “ ‘is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the
administrative agency. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Pomona Valley Hospital
Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101.) A reviewing
court may receive additional evidence only if that evidence “in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or that was improperly
excluded at the hearing before” the administrative agency. (Code Civ. Proc., §
1094.5, subd. (e); see also No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68,
79, fn. 6.) Thus, in reviewing the Commission’s decision, courts are “confined to
the record before the Commission unless” the petitioner shows it “could not have
produced” the new evidence “in the exercise of reasonable diligence or unless
relevant evidence was improperly excluded at the administrative hearing.” (State
of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 257 (State of California).)
Here, because Sierra Club has made no attempt to establish either of these
prerequisites, consideration of the statement in counsel’s declaration would be
improper.18 (See City of Fairfield v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768, 775-

18
The record does not indicate whether either the superior court or the Court
of Appeal considered the statement. In the superior court, Catellus objected to the
proffered declaration, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision
(e). The record does not reflect a ruling on the objection. However, the superior
court rejected Sierra Club’s request that the court’s statement of decision expressly
admit the declaration into evidence. The Court of Appeal’s decision is silent
regarding the issue.

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776 (City of Fairfield); Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior
Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 101 [“absen[t] . . . a proper preliminary
foundation showing that one of the [statutory] exceptions . . . applies, it is error for
the court to permit the record to be augmented”].)
Second, Sierra Club’s arguments ask us to do something we may not do:
go behind the administrative record to “determine what material the Commission
read and relied upon in reaching its determination . . . .” (State of California,
supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 258.) “[I]n California,” where an “administrative board”
conducting “a quasi-judicial proceeding” states its findings, judicial “inquiry
outside the administrative record to determine what evidence was considered . . .
by the administrators” is “preclude[d].” (City of Fairfield, supra, 14 Cal.3d 768 at
p. 779.) In State of California, we applied this rule to judicial review of permit
decisions by the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission. (State of
California, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 257-258.) We discern no reason not to apply
the rule to the Commission, which, by statute, “succeed[ed] the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Commission.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California
Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 163.) Here, in granting Catellus’s permit
application, the Commission made extensive findings that specifically cited and
relied on the City’s EIR in numerous places.19 In accordance with California law,
we therefore reject Sierra Club’s invitation to determine, based on evidence
outside of the administrative record, whether the Commissioners, although citing

19
Notably, as a ground for writ relief, Sierra Club complained that “[t]he
Commission . . . improperly relied on a review of alternatives in the City of Los
Angeles EIR . . . .”

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the City’s EIR in their findings, did not actually review that EIR.20
Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision.
CHIN, J.
We concur:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

20
To the extent Sierra Club is arguing that the Commissioners’ alleged
violation of CEQA Guidelines section 15025 alone requires reversal, its argument
suffers from another deficiency: untimeliness. Sierra Club never objected during
Commission proceedings that the Commissioners failed to review the City’s EIR.
Although Sierra Club made this objection in its reply briefs in the superior court
and the Court of Appeal, it did not argue that reversal was required for this reason.
Rather, as Sierra Club explains in its opening brief here, in the trial court and the
Court of Appeal, it raised this factual issue only as a basis for precluding the
Commission from relying on the City’s EIR to support its decision. “We do not
ordinarily consider issues that were not raised below (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
29(b)(1); [citation]) and see no compelling reason to depart from the ordinary rule
in this case.” (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 828, fn.
3.) Thus, we express no opinion regarding Sierra Club’s view that CEQA
Guidelines section 15025, subdivision (b)(1), is violated if the Commissioners
personally review the report prepared by their own staff—which “serves as the
functional equivalent of an EIR” for purposes of complying with CEQA (see §
21080.5; Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105,
113)—but only review staff summaries of EIR’s prepared by other agencies. We
also express no opinion as to whether any such violation necessarily requires
reversal. (See Sierra Club v. State Bd. Of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1236
[reversal required “[o]nly if the manner in which an agency failed to follow the
law is shown to be prejudicial, or is presumptively prejudicial”]; Laurel Heights
Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112,
1123, fn. 4 [declining to decide whether CEQA guidelines “are regulatory
mandates or merely aids to interpretation”].)

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Sierra Club v. California Coastal Commission
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 107 Cal.App.4th 1030
Rehearing Granted

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Opinion No.

S116081
Date Filed: May 19, 2005
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Court:

Superior
County: San Francisco
Judge: A. James Robertson II

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Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Offices of Frank P. Angel, Frank P. Angel, Curtis M. Horton, Phyl van Ammers, Meredith Lobel-
Angel and Edward Grutzmacher for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

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Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, J. Matthew Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, Jamee Jordan Patterson
and Hayley Peterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

Latham & Watkins, Robert C. Crockett, Kathryn M. Davis and James R. Repking for Real Party in Interest
and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Frank P. Angel
Law Offices of Frank P. Angel
3250 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suite 300
Santa Monica, CA 90405-3219
(310) 314-6433

J. Matthew Rodriguez
Deputy Attorney General
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2540

Robert D. Crockett
Latham & Watkins
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2007
(213) 485-1234

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 05/19/2005	S116081

Disposition
May 19 2005	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 22 2003	Petition for review filed   By counsel for Appellants {Sierra Club et al.,} / 40(K).
May 22 2003	Record requested
May 23 2003	Received:   Filing fee.
May 27 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   1-file jacket & briefs
May 30 2003	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by counsel for appellants Sierra Club, et al.
Jun 6 2003	Answer to petition for review filed   real party Catellus Residential Group.
Jun 10 2003	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   counsel for appellant Sierra Club
Jun 10 2003	Answer to petition for review filed   by (AG) counsel for respondent (Calif.Coastal Commission)
Jun 11 2003	Received:   appellant Sierra Club's Depub/Supplement.
Jun 19 2003	Opposition filed   RPI, Catellos opposing depub of Sierr Club and Ballona Exosystem Education Project
Jul 14 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   Six boxes
Jul 18 2003	Time extended to grant or deny review   to 8-20-03
Jul 23 2003	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   The request for judicial notice granted. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Chin, Werdegar and Moreno, JJ. Brown, J., was absent and did not participate.
Aug 1 2003	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by Lathan & Watkins csl for Real Party In Interest (Catellus Residential Group)
Aug 11 2003	Stay application filed (separate petition pending - civil)   Motion by counsel for appellant (Sierra Club, et al.) for immediate stay order
Aug 11 2003	Opposition filed   to reqt for stay>>respondent Catellus Residential Group
Aug 12 2003	Filed:   by (AG) counsel for respondent (Calif. Coastal Comm.) Response to Petitioner's Motion for Stay.
Aug 14 2003	Filed:   by counsel for appellant (Sierra Club) Reply to Opposition
Aug 15 2003	2nd record request   Records case A093566
Aug 19 2003	Application for stay denied   The "Request for an Immediate Stay Order" filed on 8-12-03, is denied. Moreno, J. is of the opinion the stay should be granted.
Aug 22 2003	Request for extension of time filed   to file appellant, Sierra Club's opening brief/merits extension requested to 9-22-03 **** granted *** order being prepared.
Aug 27 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the brief on the merits is extended to and including September 22, 2003.
Sep 16 2003	Request for extension of time filed   opening brief/merits to 10-3-03>>appellants Sierra Club, etal
Sep 17 2003	Opposition filed   to application for extension to file opening brief/merits>> respondent Catellus Residential Group
Sep 19 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including October 3, 2003.
Oct 3 2003	Request for extension of time filed   by counsel for appellant (Sierra Club, et al.,) requesting an extension of time to Monday, October 6, 2003, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Oct 6 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including October 6, 2003.
Oct 7 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for appellants (Sierra Club, et al.) (40k)
Oct 9 2003	Filed:   by counsel for appellants (Sierra Club, et al.,) Errata to Opening Brief
Nov 5 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   respondent Catellus Residential Group
Nov 5 2003	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for resp. (Calif. Coastal Comm.) requests an extension of time to November 13, 2003 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Nov 10 2003	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief is extended to and including November 13, 2003.
Nov 12 2003	Received:   amended proof of service to answer brief>>respondent Catellus Residential Group
Nov 13 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   by resp. (Calif. Coastal Comm.)
Nov 24 2003	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for plfs. and aplts.(Sierra Club, et al.) requests an extension of time to December 22, 2003 to file the reply brief on the merits and for permission to file one combined 10,000 word reply in lieu of two separate reply briefs.
Nov 26 2003	Extension of time granted   appellant's time to serve and file the combined reply brief not to exceed 10,000 words is extended to and including December 22, 2003.
Dec 23 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for aplts. (Sierra Club, et al.,) (40k)
Dec 23 2003	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   Second Motion Requesting Judicial Notice by counsel for aplt. (Sierra Club, et al.,)
Jun 15 2004	Letter sent to:   Court requests from counsel a progress report re: project construction and development etc. Letter is to be served and filed in this court on or before 6-22-2004.
Jun 22 2004	Received:   letter from RPI (faxed)
Jun 23 2004	Filed:   by counsel for aplt. (Sierra Club) Progress Report (40k)
Jun 23 2004	Filed:   by counsel for (RPI) Catellus Res. Group (hard copy of progress report) (40k)
Jan 4 2005	Request for judicial notice granted   Appellant's second request for judicial notice filed December 23, 2003, is granted.
Feb 9 2005	Case ordered on calendar   3/8/05 @9am, S.F.
Feb 23 2005	Filed:   Request of respondent to divide oral argument time.
Mar 1 2005	Filed:   The request of counsel for respondent to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondent at oral argument is hereby granted.
Mar 1 2005	Filed:   The request of respondent to allocate to real party in interest 10 minutes of respondent's 30-minute alloted time for oral argument is granted.
Mar 8 2005	Cause argued and submitted
May 19 2005	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   OPINION BY: Chin, J. --- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Brown, Moreno, JJ.
Jun 21 2005	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Jun 23 2005	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA 1/5

Briefs
Oct 7 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 5 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Nov 13 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Dec 23 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

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