IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
MARIO RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
S272129
Sixth Appellate District
H049016
Santa Clara County Superior Court
C1647395, C1650275
December 14, 2023
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and
Evans concurred.
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
S272129
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
A criminal defendant cannot be tried while mentally
incompetent. (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)1 Although such
defendants may be involuntarily committed for the purpose of
restoring their competency (see § 1370; Jackson v. Superior
Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–101), the commitment may not
last indefinitely (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); Jackson v. Indiana (1972
406 U.S. 715, 720; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis)).
The statutory scheme governing competency proceedings limits
the term of commitment. For individuals like defendant Mario
Rodriguez charged with offenses that carry a maximum
sentence exceeding two years, the period of commitment due to
incompetency is limited to two years. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(1).
In this case, Rodriguez was adjudged incompetent,
committed to a state hospital, and then returned to court when
a medical director of the hospital filed a certificate indicating he
was restored to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1).) The
certificate was filed within the two-year time limit specified by
section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) (section 1370(c)(1)). By statute,
the court was supposed to determine whether to approve the
certificate — that is, decide “whether or not” Rodriguez has
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
“recovered competence.” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).) However,
primarily because of restrictions on court operations due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez did not receive such a hearing
within the two-year period of section 1370(c)(1). Claiming the
time for commitment had run out, Rodriguez moved to dismiss
the charges against him. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim.
It held that time had not run out because a commitment ends
when a certificate of restoration is filed, not when the court
determines whether the defendant has been restored to
competence. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2021
70 Cal.App.5th 628, 652 (Rodriguez).
The parties ask us to resolve a question of statutory
interpretation: For purposes of calculating the maximum
commitment period under section 1370(c)(1), does an
incompetency commitment end when the medical treatment
provider informs the court that the defendant has regained
competency by filing a certificate of restoration, or does the
commitment end only when the court has determined whether
the defendant has been restored to competency? We resolve this
question by determining whether the period between the filing
of the certificate, and the court’s ruling on that certificate, is
covered by section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit. And we conclude
this period is not excluded from the two-year limit.
Because we reject the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that an
incompetency commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of
restoration, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. We
remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to consider
issues that remain outstanding, including whether Rodriguez’s
aggregate commitments have exceeded the limit set by section
1370(c)(1) and what remedy he may be entitled to if the limit
has been exceeded. (See, e.g., Camacho v. Superior Court (2023
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
15 Cal.5th 354, 382–390 & fn. 5 (Camacho); Jackson v. Superior
Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2016, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney charged Rodriguez with several felonies, each carrying
a maximum sentence in excess of two years imprisonment. The
charged offenses included assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1) [maximum punishment of four years in state
prison]); oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or
fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [maximum punishment of eight years
in state prison]); rape by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear
(§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a) [eight years]); and infliction
of corporal injury on a present or former spouse, or a present or
former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) [four years]). Rodriguez
was held to answer on all charges.
In late 2017, the court declared a doubt as to Rodriguez’s
competency, ordered a hearing regarding his competency, and
suspended all proceedings. In May 2018, the court found
Rodriguez not competent to stand trial. On May 24, the court
issued its commitment order, directing that Rodriguez “be
committed to the [State] Department of State Hospitals for
placement in a locked psychiatric facility.” The order specified
that “[t]he Sheriff shall redeliver the patient to the Court upon
receiving from the state hospital a copy of the certification of
mental competency.” (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372, subd.
(a)(2).) The court also ordered the State Department of State
Hospitals (Department) to “provide a placement for defendant
for treatment of his mental illness and restoration of
competency by 5:00 p.m., June 29, 2018” and that Rodriguez be
transported to his placement by that date. The record does not
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
indicate when Rodriguez was actually transported or admitted
to a state hospital.
On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero
State Hospital certified Rodriguez as restored to competency.
The parties stipulated that the certificate of restoration was
filed with the superior court the same date. On September 20,
the court found Rodriguez had been restored to competency and
reinstated criminal proceedings.
In early January 2019, the court declared a new doubt as
to Rodriguez’s competency to stand trial and again suspended
criminal proceedings. In April, the court found Rodriguez not
competent.
On May 16, 2019, the court issued a second commitment
order, once more directing that Rodriguez be committed to the
Department. As before, the court specified a date by which the
Department was to provide a placement for Rodriguez, setting
that date as June 14, 2019. The court further noted in its
commitment order that it found Rodriguez did “not have the
capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication,”
and it ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication.
On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero
State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was restored to
competency. The parties stipulated the certificate of restoration
was filed with the superior court the same date. Among the
documents transmitted to the court, the medical director
included a letter stating that Rodriguez was “being returned to
court on psychotropic medication.” “It is important,” continued
the director, “that [Rodriguez] remain on this medication for his
own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified [as
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
competent] under Section 1372 of the Penal Code.” The date
when Rodriguez was discharged from the state hospital does not
appear in the record. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 638.
On January 24, 2020, the court set May 21 as the date for
a contested hearing on Rodriguez’s competency. In March, the
court suspended almost all its operations due to the COVID-19
pandemic. As a result, the competency hearing set for May 21
did not take place.
On July 17, 2020, the parties returned to court following
the relaxation of certain COVID-19 restrictions. The court
rescheduled the competency hearing for August 24, a date later
reset to September 21 at the request of both parties. The
hearing did not occur on that date either. Instead, the court
continued the hearing to November 2 “due to the COVID-19
pandemic and the lack of courtrooms and court resources
available.” The court subsequently continued the competency
hearing several times due to the “pandemic and the [s]uperior
[c]ourt’s limited trial capacity.”
In March 2021, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss. Even
though the Department had timely determined that he was
competent to stand trial, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled
to a dismissal because his commitment had lasted more than
two years. Rodriguez contended a commitment must be
measured based on “dates from one judicial decision until a
second judicial decision” — in this case, from the date when the
court issued the commitment order to the date when it
eventually approved or rejected the certificate of restoration.
Rodriguez thus argued his total commitment period — counting
days from his first and second commitments — exceeded two
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
years and was ongoing. (See In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th
1230, 1232 (Polk) [holding that the limit on a commitment term
“applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same
charges”].
On March 16, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, reasoning that it had to first determine whether
Rodriguez had regained competency before it could ascertain
whether the statutory two-year limit had been reached. The
court explained, “the days between the restoration certificate
and the restoration hearing [would] only count towards the two-
year maximum commitment if, in fact, it is determined that the
defendant is not restored to competence.” If instead “the
defendant is [judicially determined to be] restored to
competence,” the court continued, “then the date on the
certificate of restoration will serve as the date of restoration for
purposes of counting the days towards the maximum
commitment.” After the court announced its decision,
Rodriguez’s counsel asked for a continuance, requesting that the
court sign an order so that counsel could receive Rodriguez’s
updated mental health records related to his recent placement
on “24-hour hold” and “suicide watch” while in county jail.
Between the date of the second commitment order and the
court’s decision on March 16, 2021, a total of 670 days had
elapsed. When combined with the period between the first
commitment order and the court’s decision on September 2,
2018, finding Rodriguez restored to competency, 789 days — or
more than two years — had passed. In contrast, if a
commitment were deemed to begin with a commitment order
and end upon the filing of a certificate of restoration, Rodriguez
had been committed for a total of 344 days — or less than one
year — during the two commitments.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Rodriguez challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the Court
of Appeal, raising the same argument he presented in the trial
court. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, agreeing with
the People that Rodriguez’s commitment ended when the
certificate of restoration was filed. (Rodriguez, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.) Unlike the trial court, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the filing of the certificate of restoration
terminates a commitment regardless of whether the court
subsequently approves or rejects the certificate. (See id. at
pp. 635–636.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal disagreed
with People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136 (Carr), which
held that a judicial determination of competency, “not a health
official’s certification of competency that initiates court
proceedings to consider whether the defendant has regained
competency, terminates the defendant’s commitment.” (Id. at
p. 1140; Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.
We granted review to resolve the split in authority. We
now reject the Court of Appeal’s holding that the two-year clock
set by section 1370(c)(1) stops with the filing of a certificate of
restoration.
II. DISCUSSION
To determine whether the running of the clock set by
section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of
restoration, we provide an overview of the relevant statutory
framework, and then analyze the text of the governing statute
and the context, history, and purpose of the competency scheme.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
A. The Competency Statutory Scheme
1. Pre-1974
A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if “as a
result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability,
the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a
rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Prior to 1974, “California
law provided that persons charged with criminal conduct but
found incompetent to stand trial were committed to state
hospitals until they became ‘sane’ (i.e., competent). Because
attainment of competence was the sole standard for release the
commitments were indefinite, even permanent, so long as
incompetence persisted.” (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980
28 Cal.3d 161, 167 (Hofferber).
In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held
that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on
account of his incompetency to stand trial” offends
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.
(Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 731.) The court
explained, “[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense
who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed
to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future.” (Id. at p. 738.) “If it is determined that this is not the
case” — that is, the defendant is not likely to soon regain
competency — “then the State must either institute the
customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required
to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the
defendant.” (Ibid.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
The following year, our court “adopt[ed] the rule of the
Jackson [v. Indiana] case.” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.
We further accepted that “the duration of commitments to state
hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
which originally justified the commitment” (id. at p. 805), which
is to “provide observation, care and treatment of [the committed
individuals’] mental condition, with a view toward restoring
their capacity to stand trial” (id. at pp. 805–806). Accordingly,
we instructed trial courts to direct hospital authorities to
examine the persons committed and periodically report to the
courts on their progress toward recovery of competency. We
delegated to trial courts the discretion to “decid[e] whether, in a
particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify
continued commitment pending trial” but imposed no specific
time limits on how long a person may be held in “continued
commitment.” (Id. at p. 807.) Consistent with Jackson v.
Indiana, however, we specified that if “there exists no
reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his
competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the
court should either order him released from confinement or
initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et
seq.),” California’s civil commitment scheme. (Ibid.
2. 1974 to the Present
In response to Davis, the Legislature enacted Assembly
Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) in 1974. (Stats. 1974,
ch. 1511.) Sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, the bill
was designed to “bring California’s statutory provisions into
accord” with the guidelines in Davis and Jackson v. Indiana.
(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324; see also Parker, California’s
New Scheme For The Commitment Of Individuals Found
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Incompetent To Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 489
(Parker).) The Legislature specified that a defendant found
incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed for more than
three years. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) The
Legislature also provided for the return of a defendant to court
if “ha[ving] been committed for 18 months” — half of a
maximum three-year commitment term — the defendant is still
hospitalized as incompetent. (Ibid.) Upon returning to court, a
hearing is held to determine the defendant’s competency. (Ibid.
As part of the same enactment, the Legislature created a
new type of conservatorship, referred to as a “Murphy”
conservatorship after the sponsor of Assembly Bill No. 1529
(1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) (see, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102). This allows for a one-year,
renewable commitment of qualifying mentally incompetent
defendants who have reached the maximum time for a
commitment under section 1370(c)(1). (See Stats. 1974,
ch. 1511, §§ 6, 12, pp. 3319, 3322; see also, e.g., Conservatorship
of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096–1097; Hofferber, supra,
28 Cal.3d at pp. 169–170.) This new civil commitment
procedure, together with the imposition of a maximum
commitment period and additional periodic reporting
requirements, sought to “integrate and resolve the conflicting
concerns of protecting society from dangerous individuals who
are not subject to criminal prosecution . . . and safeguarding the
freedom of incompetent criminal defendants who present no
threat to the public.” (Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at p. 485; see
also, e.g., People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568
(Waterman); Hofferber, at pp. 176–177.
The 1974 statutory scheme has been amended numerous
times. Particularly relevant for our purposes are amendments
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
enacted in 1980 and 2018. In 1980, the Legislature amended
section 1372 to add procedures following the filing of a certificate
of restoration of competency. As added, section 1372,
subdivision (a)(2) specified that “[u]pon the filing of a certificate
of restoration, the defendant shall be returned to the committing
court.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1516.) The Legislature also
added subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 1372 at that time.
Subdivision (c) requires the court to provide notice of “the date
of any hearing on the defendant’s competence and whether or
not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered
competence” when a defendant is returned to court. (Stats.
1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.) Subdivision (d) specifies the court’s
responsibilities regarding the defendant’s custodial status if it
approves the certificate of restoration. (Stats. 1980, ch. 547,
§ 14, p. 1517.
In 2018, the Legislature reduced the maximum term of
commitment from three years to two years. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1008, § 3.) The author of the bill explained that the
legislation was motivated by (1) the need to reduce “[w]ait lists
for placements in state-operated treatment facilities,” and (2) a
reassessment of the maximum period of time reasonably
necessary “for restoring a person to competency, or for
determining that he or she is not restorable” in response to
advancements in “modern medical science.” (Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) As part of the same
bill, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that a
defendant who remains committed for 18 months be returned to
court for a redetermination of competency. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1008, § 3.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
3. Current Law Governing Competency
As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing
competency works as follows: When a doubt arises in the trial
court judge’s mind regarding the mental competency of a
criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine
the defendant’s competency.2 (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) All
criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues. (Id.,
subd. (c).) At the competency hearing, the defendant is
presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also
Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.) If
a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings remain
“suspended until the person becomes mentally competent,” and
the court issues a commitment order. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).
Specifically, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally
incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State
Department of State Hospitals facility, as defined in Section
4100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as directed by the
State Department of State Hospitals, or to any other available
public or private treatment facility, including a community-
based residential treatment system approved by the community
program director, or their designee, that will promote the
2
The judge must order such a hearing if defense counsel
also declares a doubt regarding a defendant’s competency.
(§ 1368, subd. (b).) Even where counsel believes the defendant
is competent, however, the court “may nevertheless order a
hearing.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58,
82 [explaining that our court has construed section 1368 “ ‘in
conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law’ ”
to mean that “[i]f the court is presented with substantial
evidence of mental incompetence . . . the court must declare a
doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry”].
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence, or placed
on outpatient status as specified in Section 1600.” (§ 1370, subd.
(a)(1)(B)(i).) After the issuance of the commitment order, a
defendant who is ordered “delivered . . . to a . . . State Hospitals
facility” is to be admitted to a state hospital or a facility under
contract with the Department. (Ibid.
Whether admitted to a state hospital facility, delivered to
a community-based residential treatment program, or placed on
outpatient status, a defendant is returned to court when any of
the following occurs: (1) a medical director or comparable
personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been
restored to competency;3 (2) an appointed psychiatrist or
psychologist opines that the defendant has regained
competency;4 (3) the court determines that “treatment for the
defendant’s mental impairment is not being conducted” (§ 1370,
subd. (b)(4)); (4) a medical director or comparable personnel
reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the
3
Section 1372, subdivision (a).
4
Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) (“If, at any time after
the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial
pursuant to this section, counsel for the defendant or a jail
medical or mental health staff provider provides the court with
substantial evidence that the defendant’s psychiatric symptoms
have changed to such a degree as to create a doubt in the mind
of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental incompetence,
the court may appoint a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist
to opine as to whether the defendant has regained competence.
If, in the opinion of that expert, the defendant has regained
competence, the court shall proceed as if a certificate of
restoration of competence has been returned pursuant to
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1372”).
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;5 or
(5) the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1
has been reached.6 For ease of reference, we sometimes use the
term “designated medical professional” through the remainder
of this opinion to include the medical director of the Department
or any relevant designee under the competency statutes.
5
Section 1370, subdivision (b)(1)(A) (specifying the
reporting obligations of medical personnel and stating “[i]f the
report [filed by the medical director of the State Department of
State Hospitals, the person in charge of a treatment facility, or
outpatient treatment staff] indicates that there is no substantial
likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in
the foreseeable future, custody of the defendant shall be
transferred without delay to the committing county and shall
remain with the county until further order of the court. The
defendant shall be returned to the court for proceedings
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) no later than
10 days following receipt of the report. The court shall not order
the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department
of State Hospitals under the same commitment”).
6
Section 1370(c)(1) (“At the end of two years from the date
of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the
maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most
serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or
complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by
law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision,
whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the
expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a defendant
who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to
the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be
transferred without delay to the committing county and shall
remain with the county until further order of the court. The
court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of
the State Department of State Hospitals under the same
commitment. The court shall notify the community program
director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court
orders”).
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Regarding the first path back to court, under section 1372,
if the designated medical professional “determines that the
defendant has regained mental competence,” that person “shall
immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate
of restoration.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Within 10 days of the
filing of the certificate of restoration, the defendant “shall be
returned to the committing court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C).
“When a defendant is returned to court with a certification that
competence has been regained,” the court shall notify the
appropriate personnel “of the date of any hearing on the
defendant’s competence and whether or not the defendant was
found by the court to have recovered competence.” (§ 1372,
subd. (c)(1).
Although section 1372 refers to a “hearing on the
defendant’s competence” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1)), it does not “set
forth any . . . procedures” for such a hearing. (People v.
Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867 (Rells).) We have held,
however, that “section 1372 allows its gaps to be filled by Penal
Code section 1369,” which establishes the procedures for the
initial hearing on the issue of a defendant’s mental competence.
(Id. at p. 868.) Thus, when a defendant returns to court after a
certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is
presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise
at a hearing. (See id. at pp. 867–868.) “If the committing court
approves the certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (d)) — thus
finding the defendant has recovered competency — criminal
proceedings resume (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and the court “shall
hold a hearing to determine whether the person is entitled to be
admitted to bail or released on own recognizance status pending
conclusion of the proceedings” (§ 1372, subd. (d)). The court
may, however, “reject[] a certificate of restoration” based on a
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medical evaluation (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), at which point a
defendant may be returned to a treatment facility if the
maximum commitment period has not yet been reached. (See
§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 106.
Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment
term has been reached. As mentioned, section 1370(c)(1
prohibits commitments lasting more than two years. If the
defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not
provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant’s competency
at this point. (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233,
239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized
to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory
commitment period has expired where the court “had not
received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to
competence by certain mental health officials (including the
county medical health director) or the conservator”]; People v.
Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that
a trial judge has no power “to convene a competency hearing
after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been
involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to
stand trial, is not likely to regain competency”].) Instead,
section 1370 directs the committing court to “initiate
conservatorship proceedings for the defendant” if “it appears to
the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.” (§ 1370,
subd. (c)(3).
A defendant is gravely disabled if, “as a result of a mental
health disorder,” the defendant “is unable to provide for his or
her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Alternatively, a defendant
is gravely disabled — and subject to a Murphy
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conservatorship — if the defendant “has been found mentally
incompetent” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)) and certain facts obtain,
including that “[t]he person represents a substantial danger of
physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or
disorder” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)). If the defendant is deemed
gravely disabled under either definition, the defendant may be
confined as long as “conservatorship is still required.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b).) On the other hand, “If the
defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be
released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in
the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations]. Such
a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any
proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the [Lanterman-
Petris-Short] Act.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 102.
To summarize the steps in the commitment process most
relevant to the issue before us: A defendant found mentally
incompetent to stand trial shall be committed by court order.
(See § 1370.) If the designated medical professional finds that
the defendant’s competency has been restored, the person files
a certificate of restoration, triggering the defendant’s return to
court. (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.) Following the
defendant’s return, the court holds a hearing to determine
whether to approve or reject the certificate. (See § 1372.) If a
defendant has not regained competency within two years of the
date of commitment, the defendant is either released or subject
to civil conservatorship proceedings. (See § 1370, subd. (c);
Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues
Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration
Because it involves a pure question of law, we review de
novo the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the filing of a
certificate of restoration terminates an incompetency
commitment. (See, e.g., Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 870.) In
interpreting the competency statutory scheme, “ ‘[O]ur task is to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words
of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the
Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a
statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an
enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context
of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Kim v. Reins
International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).) If
“ ‘the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable
construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ”
(Ibid.
1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with
Rodriguez’s Position than the People’s
“The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at
which an incompetency commitment ends” when a certificate of
restoration has been timely filed. (Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1144.) That is, section 1370(c)(1) does not expressly specify
when a commitment ends for a defendant who has been certified
as restored to competence. Likewise, section 1372 — the
provision pertaining to certificates of restoration of
competence — is silent regarding how the issuance of the
certificate affects the running of the two-year maximum period
of commitment.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Nonetheless, as we explain below, the crucial competency
assessments before and after the filing of the certificate of
restoration require judicial action and approval. The “legal
force and effect” of the “filing of the certificate” is simply to
“cause[] the defendant to be returned to court for further
proceedings” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; see also § 1372,
subd. (a)), and even that return occurs pursuant to a court order.
(See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); § 1372, subd. (a)(2).) When the
court’s central role in competency proceedings is juxtaposed
against the limited significance of a certificate of restoration, we
conclude the Legislature did not intend for the filing of a
certificate to “fix[] . . . the end date for calculation of the
commitment treatment period under section 1370(c)(1),” as the
court below concluded. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 652.
a. The statutory text suggests that the two-year
clock of section 1370(c)(1) does not stop with the
filing of a certificate of restoration
We begin, “as always, with the text” of the relevant
statutes. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021
11 Cal.5th 104, 114.
Section 1370(c)(1) provides that “[a]t the end of two years
from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior
to the expiration of the defendant’s term of commitment, a
defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be
returned to the committing court.” Even when a certificate of
restoration of competency has been filed, it is the court’s decision
whether to accept a certificate that determines whether criminal
proceedings may resume, or whether — if the two-year
timeframe has not elapsed — further treatment is required
instead. A finding that a defendant has recovered mental
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
competency requires a court order, and the court must act to
approve the certificate of restoration even when not contested
by the parties. (See § 1372, subds. (c), (d).) Moreover, before the
court adjudicates a defendant competent, the defendant cannot
seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because
criminal proceedings remain suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d),
1370, subd. (a)(1).) This array of procedures suggests that until
the court decides whether to accept a certificate, the two-year
clock on an incompetency commitment (§ 1370(c)(1)) has not
stopped.
Section 1370(c)(1) also requires the defendant’s return to
court 90 days before the expiration of the maximum two-year
commitment period. The reservation of a 90-day period cannot
be wholly explained by the time it should take to transport the
defendant. Section 1370 makes clear that the defendant must
be transported “without delay” (§ 1370(c)(1)), “immediate[ly]”
(id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and most concretely, “within 10 calendar
days” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)). The statute thus allows time for
necessary subsequent judicial proceedings to be completed
before reaching the maximum period of commitment.
It is true the Legislature did not appear to have the issue
before us specifically in mind when it amended section
1370(c)(1) in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to include this
90-day period. (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 2625 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Apr. 24, 2014, p. 1 [indicating that the language was added with
the aim “to reduce the backlog of patients awaiting a state
hospital placement in county jails by ensuring defendants found
incompetent to stand trial (IST) who cannot be restored to trial
competency are returned to their original county of commitment
in a timely manner”].) Nonetheless, the 90-day window is
20
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
consistent with Rodriguez’s general position that some judicial
action is necessary to end a commitment period.
b. The People’s interpretation of the statutory text
is unpersuasive
The People’s arguments do not persuade us that “the plain
language of the statutory scheme” requires courts to exclude the
period following the filing of a certificate of restoration from the
two-year maximum commitment period.
i. Section 1372
First, the People rely heavily on section 1372’s provisions
regarding the certification of restoration to competence. Yet it
is not clear how this section supports the People’s
interpretation. As previously summarized, section 1372
specifies that “[i]f the medical director of a state hospital [or
other appropriate personnel] determines that the defendant has
regained mental competence, the director or designee shall
immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate
of restoration with the court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Because
the court’s initial commitment order must have directed the
sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court . . . upon receiving
from the state hospital or treatment facility a copy of the
certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(2)), “the patient shall be
returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following
the filing of a certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)).
Upon a defendant’s return to court, all further proceedings occur
at the court’s discretion. (See § 1372, subds. (c)–(e).) In short,
section 1372 specifies what the filing of a certificate of
restoration accomplishes: It causes the sheriff to “redeliver the
patient to the court” pursuant to the court order. (§ 1372,
subd. (a)(2).) Section 1372 contains no hint that the time
21
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a court’s
ruling on the certificate is excluded from the commitment
period.
The People maintain that “[n]othing in the plain language
of the statutory scheme suggests that the discretionary hearing
contemplated by section 1372 falls within the commitment time
enumerated in section 1370, subd. (c)(1).” The Court of Appeal
reached the same conclusion. (See Rodriguez, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 650 [“Section 1372 does not explicitly state
any timeframe within which the restoration hearing must be
held and does not reference section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year
maximum for an incompetency commitment”].
As we have recognized, however, section 1372 “does not set
forth any . . . procedures whatsoever” to govern the hearing on a
defendant’s recovery of mental competency. (Rells, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 867; see also People v. Murrell (1987
196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [observing that “section 1372 does not
directly provide for a hearing where the defendant may
challenge the medical director’s certification of competence” and
the legislative intent to provide for such a hearing must be
inferred].) Thus, the fact that section 1372 does not mention
section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit is neither surprising nor
illuminating.7
7
We also note that section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii
specifies that “[i]f a certificate of restoration of competency was
filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court
subsequently rejected the certification,” the court shall provide
“a new computation or statement setting forth the amount of
credit for time served, if any, to be deducted from the
defendant’s maximum term of commitment based on the court’s
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
ii. The statutory presumption of competence
Second, the People rely upon the presumption of
competence (see § 1369, subd. (f)), which applies at a section
1372 hearing at which a judge determines whether to approve
or reject a certificate of restoration. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th
at p. 862.) The court below likewise relied on this presumption,
reasoning that the absence of further treatment together with
the presumption of competence meant that a defendant could no
longer be regarded as subject to a commitment after the
certificate’s filing. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653,
655–656.) But there is reason to question this analysis.8
The presumption of competence applies at every trial and
retrial of a defendant’s competency, even where there is reason
to doubt a defendant is competent. As we have previously noted,
“[t]he presumption that the defendant is mentally competent . . .
rejection of the certification.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii), italics
added.) This language appears to contemplate that when “a
certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court
pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected
the certification,” the period in between the filing of the
certificate and the court’s rejection thereof is relevant for
purposes of computing the maximum period of commitment
allowed by section 1370(c)(1). (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).
8
The Court of Appeal relied on Rells in concluding that “the
filing of the certificate triggers a presumption of mental
competency under section 1372.” (Rodriguez, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.) But Rells merely stated that the
filing of the certificate of restoration “trigger[s] a hearing on a
defendant’s recovery of mental competence.” (Rells, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 868, italics added.) At this hearing, as
explained post, the presumption of competence operates as a
principle of law as in any competency proceeding. It is a
misreading of Rells to conclude that a restoration certificate
itself creates the presumption of competence.
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RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
is applicable at a trial of the defendant’s mental competence”
when a court first declares doubt as to the mental competence of
the defendant. (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867.) The
presumption therefore applies “in spite of the fact that it may
run counter to any doubt expressed by the court and supported
by the opinion of [the defendant’s] own counsel.” (Ibid.) When
the statute provided for a defendant’s return to court if the
defendant was still incompetent after an 18-month commitment
(see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; former § 1370, subd.
(b)(2)), the presumption of competence was likewise applicable
at the retrial of the defendant’s competence “in spite of the fact
that it is inconsistent with his apparent nonrecovery of mental
competence.” (Rells, at p. 867.
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature
simply intended for the presumption of competence to operate
as a principle of law that a court applies in making a competency
determination at any stage. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 862 [stating that the presumption of competence “operates to
impose the burden of proof on the party, if any, who claims that
the defendant is mentally incompetent, and fixes the weight
thereof at preponderance of the evidence”]; Medina v.
California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 449 [explaining that the
presumption of competence has limited legal effect, “affect[ing]
competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases
where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence
that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence
that he is incompetent”].) It goes too far to conclude that the
presumption reflects the Legislature’s understanding that a
commitment ends upon the filing of a certificate of restoration.
Furthermore, even when the presumption of competence
does not run counter to doubts regarding the defendant’s
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
competency — and instead “conforms in fact with the certificate
of restoration filed by the specified mental health official” (Rells,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867, italics omitted) — the court has the
statutory authority to reject the certification and find a
defendant incompetent (see § 1372, subd. (c)(2)).9 Yet, under the
People’s interpretation, even an erroneous certificate of
restoration terminates an incompetency commitment. The
People offer no persuasive explanation why the Legislature
would intend that an incompetent defendant — who like
Rodriguez may be moved between a state hospital and the
county jail, all the while remaining confined and involuntarily
medicated — should not have such time counted toward the
maximum term of commitment merely because his doctor
mistakenly concluded that he has regained competency.
iii. The asserted primacy of location
The People’s third textual argument is based on section
1370. The People assert that section 1370 uses the words
“delivered” and “committed” synonymously in arguing that a
commitment consists only of that period “wherein the defendant
is physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital
for restoration treatment.” (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i
[specifying that once a defendant is found incompetent, “[t]he
9
This contrasts with previous versions of the law, in which
a designated medical professional’s certification that a
defendant has recovered mental competency served to render a
person competent as a matter of law. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511,
§ 7, p. 3320; People v. Ashley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 339, 359 (Ashley
[after a superintendent of a state hospital certifies that a
defendant has regained competence, “[t]he defendant is then to
be tried”]; In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 843–844 (Phyle);
People v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County) (1935) 4 Cal.2d
136, 145 (Contra Costa County).
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RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be
delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals
facility . . . or to any other available public or private treatment
facility . . . or placed on outpatient status”]; id., subd. (a)(2
[referring to the order made under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) as
“the order directing that the defendant be committed to the
State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility
or placed on outpatient status”].) Because a defendant is
“committed” only upon being “delivered” to a treatment facility,
the People maintain, “the definition of the ‘commitment’ . . .
should not be conflated with the period of court-adjudged
incompetency.” Instead, according to the People, this language
signifies that it is a defendant’s presence at a treatment facility
that constitutes a commitment. And because a defendant is
transferred back to county custody after being certified as
having been restored to competency, the People contend, the
defendant is no longer committed for purposes of calculating the
two-year time limit.
There are significant problems with the People’s argument
that commitment only occurs when the defendant is physically
present at a treatment facility. First, if location is
determinative of whether a defendant is committed, then a
commitment should end with a defendant’s actual transport
from the treatment facility back to county custody — not with
the filing of a certificate of restoration, as the People claim.
Section 1372 makes clear that such transport may take as long
as 10 days from the filing of the certificate. (§ 1372,
subd. (a)(3)(C) [“In all cases, the patient shall be returned to the
committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a
certificate of restoration”].) The People’s position that a
commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration is
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
therefore inconsistent with their own assertion that a
commitment consists of the period when a defendant is
physically in a treatment facility.10
Second, the People’s position is inconsistent with various
statutory provisions relating to competency determinations and
proceedings that treat “commitment” as distinct from events
such as “admission,” “transfer,” or “confinement.” For example,
Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 “establish[es] a
program for the [D]epartment to perform reevaluations
primarily through telehealth evaluations for felony incompetent
to stand trial (IST) individuals in jail who have been waiting for
admission to the [D]epartment.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4335.2,
subd. (b).) Among the stated goals of allowing for such
telehealth evaluations is “[t]o permit the [D]epartment to
conduct reevaluations of IST defendants committed to the
[D]epartment and awaiting admission to [D]epartment
facilities.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also id., subd. (c
10
In this case, the dates of the trial court’s orders of
commitment are not the dates of Rodriguez’s transport to a state
hospital or the dates of his admission to such a facility — i.e.,
they are not when Rodriguez was “physically placed in the care
and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.” The
record does not reflect when Rodriguez was transported to or
from a state hospital for either of his two commitments (see
Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 636–638), making it
impossible to evaluate how long Rodriguez has been committed
under the People’s reading of the statutes. This gap in the
record may be explained by the fact that the parties below
agreed that the dates of the transports were not legally
significant. Before the Court of Appeal, the People “apparently
concede[d] that Rodriguez’s ‘commitment’ under section
1370(c)(1) began on the date of the trial court’s order of
commitment.” (Id. at p. 650, fn. 14.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
[“The [D]epartment, or its designee, have the authority and sole
discretion to consider and conduct reevaluations for IST
defendants committed to and awaiting admission to the
[D]epartment”], italics added.) This provision suggests that a
defendant is deemed committed upon having his or her place of
treatment judicially determined, not when the defendant
actually enters a treatment facility.
Along the same lines, section 1370 requires the
Department to “make a written report to the court . . .
concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of mental
competence” “[w]ithin 90 days after a commitment made
pursuant to subdivision (a).” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).
“Commitment,” as used in this provision — i.e., “a commitment
made pursuant to subdivision (a)” — refers to the court’s
commitment order, and not admission to or physical placement
in a state hospital. (Ibid.) Similarly, other subdivisions of
section 1370 refer to “commit[ment]” and “confine[ment]” or
“commit[ment]” and “transfer” to a facility as separate events.
(See, e.g., § 1370, subd. (a)(5) [“When directing that the
defendant be confined in a State Department of State Hospitals
facility pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall commit the
defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals”]; id.,
subd. (a)(6)(A) [specifying appropriate actions a court may take
in the event “the defendant is committed or transferred to the
State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to this section”].
A commitment thus does not necessarily coincide with actual
presence in a state treatment facility.11
11
We need not decide in this case whether defendants placed
on outpatient status (see § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(A)(ii)) are,
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
iv. Other textual arguments
The People also rely on section 1370(c)(1), which specifies
that “a defendant who has not recovered mental competence
shall be returned to the committing court” at the end of a two-
year commitment period. The People argue that the two-year
time limit in section 1370(c)(1) cannot “apply to court hearings
after the defendant has been returned to court pursuant to
section 1372, given that the remedy [under section 1370(c)(1)] is
to return the defendant to the committing court — an event that
has already occurred.”
The People’s interpretation fails to recognize section
1370(c)(1)’s multiple functions. This statute not only compels
the transport of a defendant from one place to another, but also
limits the amount of time that a defendant may be committed
due to incompetency. (See § 1370(c)(1) [specifying that “[t]he
court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of
the State Department of State Hospitals under the same
commitment” if a defendant has reached his maximum term of
commitment].) Rodriguez seeks the application of this limit and
a declaration that as a defendant whose commitment has
reached the statutorily allowed maximum, “the court should
either order him released from confinement or initiate
appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
in fact, committed for purposes of the two-year limit. Under the
People’s reading of the statutes, however, defendants who are
on outpatient status are never committed because they are never
physically in the custody of a treatment facility. It is unclear
what meaning, if any, section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year limit would
have under the People’s reading.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
p. 807) — neither of which is “an event that has already
occurred.”12
The People also contend that if we were to “conclud[e] that
a court’s competency finding is necessary to terminate [a]
commitment,” commitments would last “indefinitely” for certain
defendants. Specifically, the People point to defendants
returned to court when a designated medical professional
reports that “there is no substantial likelihood that the
defendant[s] will regain mental competence in the foreseeable
future” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and those returned to court after
12
The People’s argument also ignores the possibility that an
incompetent defendant may be treated at the county jail.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100 enumerates the
types of facilities over which the Department has jurisdiction.
Among these are “county jail treatment facilit[ies] under
contract with the State Department of State Hospitals to
provide competency restoration services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 4100, subd. (g).) A defendant committed to a Department
facility could be at the county jail treatment facility for the
entire commitment period.
Section 1370(c)(1) therefore requires that defendants
treated at the county jails “be returned to the committing court”
and their “custody . . . be transferred without delay to the
committing county” at the end of their maximum terms of
commitment and “shall remain with the county until further
order of the court.” (Ibid.) This means that section 1370(c)(1
requires defendants already in county custody be returned to
county custody until the court takes action regarding their
commitment status. (Ibid.) Yet, the People do not argue that
section 1370(c)(1) is inapplicable to defendants receiving
treatment at a county jail facility despite their county custody
constituting “an event that has already occurred.” For such
defendants,
like
those
in
Rodriguez’s
situation,
section 1370(c)(1) is applicable regardless of the defendant’s
physical location.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
their maximum commitment term has expired (§ 1370(c)(1)).
The People maintain that because the statutes do not provide
for a court hearing to redetermine defendants’ competency when
they are returned via these two paths, such hearings would
never occur and the defendants “would remain indefinitely
committed.” (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239;
Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) But we are
addressing only the limited issue of whether the interval
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and the court’s
ruling on it is excluded from the maximum commitment time set
by section 1370(c)(1). Our holding does not mean that
defendants returned without such certificates will be committed
“indefinitely.”
Finally, in their amicus curiae brief submitted in support
of the People, the State Department of State Hospitals and the
State Department of Developmental Services make an
argument that relies on the timing of when a commitment
begins. According to amici curiae, “[i]t is undisputed that the
maximum commitment period does not include the time before
a court conducts an initial competency hearing,” i.e., a hearing
under section 1370. According to amici curiae, “[t]he time
between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a
section 1372 hearing should be treated the same way” and
excluded from the maximum competency period.
But a defendant awaiting a competency hearing under
section 1370 differs in important ways from a defendant
awaiting a competency determination under section 1372.
Before a court conducts an initial competency hearing under
section 1370, the defendant has not been legally adjudicated as
incompetent. In contrast, a defendant who has been certified by
medical personnel as restored to competency necessarily has
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
been previously determined to be incompetent, and until a court
makes a competency finding pursuant to section 1372, the
defendant cannot be treated as legally competent. In addition,
a defendant who has not been adjudicated as incompetent may
still be released on bail. (See § 1371.) A defendant who has been
certified as competent, on the other hand, is ineligible for bail
consideration until the court determines the defendant has
regained competency. (See § 1372, subd. (d).
In short, the period prior to a competency hearing under
section 1370 occurs before the period of commitment and thus
tells us very little about the period of commitment itself. The
fact that “the time before a court conducts an initial competency
hearing” under section 1370 is not counted toward the term of
commitment does not persuade us to likewise exclude from a
maximum period of commitment the interval before a court
conducts a competency hearing under section 1372.
2. Rodriguez’s Interpretation Furthers the Purposes
of the Statute
The statutory text read in context is consistent with the
understanding that the filing of a certificate of restoration does
not stop the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1). But
because the language of these statutes “ ‘supports more than one
reasonable construction,’ ” we look for an interpretation of the
statute that will best “ ‘effectuate the purpose’ ” of the
competency statutory scheme. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.
We conclude Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation furthers the
purpose of the relevant competency statutes.
We have explained that “[t]he incompetence program . . .
is a special form of pretrial detention” whose “purpose is
restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal
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process cannot proceed.” (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569,
italics omitted.) In adopting the “incompetence program” in
1974, the Legislature clearly intended to limit a defendant’s
time in “pretrial detention” and to suspend “the criminal
process” so that the defendant can be restored to “a specific
mental state.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511,
§ 16, pp. 3323–3324.) The Legislature also intended to
“eliminate uncertainty among all persons concerned regarding
court procedures.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324.) This
latter goal of providing certainty is evident in the Legislature’s
decision to limit the maximum term of commitment to three
years (and later two), rather than the “reasonable period of
time” mandated under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. (Davis,
supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at
p. 738.) As we explained in Jackson v. Superior Court, “the
Legislature established the [then] three-year maximum in
section 1370(c) to protect defendants’ due process and equal
protection rights not to be committed solely because of
incompetence for longer than is reasonable.” (Jackson v.
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.
Rodriguez’s proposed interpretation — specifically, not
excluding the period between the filing of a certificate of
competence, and the court’s ruling on the certificate — is
consistent with the Legislature’s intent to limit the period of
detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding
the length of that detention period. Under this interpretation,
incompetent defendants are assured that they cannot be
confined simply on account of their inability to proceed to trial
for more than a specified two-year period.
By contrast, the People’s proposed interpretation runs
counter to the legislative goal of limiting a defendant’s
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
confinement “solely because of incompetence.” (Jackson v.
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) If we were to adopt
the People’s interpretation, a defendant could be held
indefinitely while awaiting a competency hearing, subject only
to the limits imposed by the due process clause. As explained
previously, after the filing of a certificate of restoration but
before the court adjudicates the defendant competent, the
defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the
underlying charges because the criminal proceedings remain
suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Allowing
defendants to remain in this state of limbo is contrary to the
entire statutory scheme.
The People’s construction would also eliminate any
urgency in reaching a determination of competency. This again
runs counter to the Legislature’s intent, in imposing the two-
year limit under section 1370(c)(1), to eliminate the uncertainty
inherent in the “reasonable period of time” standard under
Davis and Jackson v. Indiana and ensure that individuals who
may never regain competence are not indefinitely detained with
the criminal process suspended.
Furthermore, the fact that a defendant may continue to
receive treatment even post-certification means that some of the
period following the filing of the certificate is reasonably seen as
a part of the process of treatment to determine whether
competence can be, and ultimately is, regained — which is what
the statute generally aims to expedite. (See Stats. 1974,
ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323–3324; see also, e.g., Davis, supra,
8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at p. 105.) Including this period within the limit of section
1370(c)(1) furthers the legislative intent underlying the
competency statutes for this reason as well.
34
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3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the
People’s Position
Our interpretation of the relevant statutes is bolstered by
the evolution of the competency scheme, which since 1974 has
progressively moved control of incompetent defendants away
from designated medical professionals at facilities providing
competency restoration services, and toward supervision by the
courts.
a. The evolution of the competency statutory
scheme
In ending the indefinite commitment of mentally
incompetent defendants in 1974, the Legislature imposed on the
Department (and other facilities) the obligation to provide
periodic reports to the court. Specifically, the Legislature
mandated that “[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the
superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which the
defendant is committed shall make a written report to the court
concerning the defendant’s progress toward recovery of his
mental competence.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, pp. 3318–3319.
Only if “the report discloses a substantial likelihood the
defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable
future” will the defendant “remain in the state hospital or other
facility.” (Id. at p. 3319.) After the initial report, “at six-month
intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent,
the superintendent of the hospital or person in charge of the
facility shall report to the court regarding the defendant’s
progress.” (Ibid.) Should a report at any point indicate that
“there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain
35
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his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the committing
court shall order him to be returned to the court.”13 (Ibid.
In 1980, the Legislature extended the courts’ role in
overseeing competency procedures by making them responsible
for determining whether a defendant has regained competency
when the defendant is returned to court following the filing of a
certificate of restoration. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14,
p. 1517.) Before this amendment, once the designated medical
professional certified a defendant as restored to competency,
“[t]he defendant [was] then to be tried.” (Ashley, supra,
59 Cal.2d at p. 359; see also Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.
13
These
reporting
requirements
have
remained
substantially unchanged since 1974, although the statutory
language has been amended to take into account placement
options not previously available. (See § 1370, subd. (b).
Relying on passages from various Court of Appeal
decisions, the People argue that “[t]he evil remedied by In re
Davis and later addressed by the Legislature in enacting section
1370, subd. (c)(1) [in 1974], was the languishing of incompetent
defendants in treatment facilities, not delays in judicial
determinations of competency or other court business when
defendants are within the court’s direct control.” Davis makes
clear, however, that we were also concerned with the lack of
court supervision over defendants “confined in state hospitals.”
(Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 806.) It was with an eye toward
imposing more judicial oversight that we directed “the hospitals’
authorities [to] report [to the superior courts] . . . regarding
the . . . progress toward competence” of “all persons . . .
committed as incompetent to stand trial.” (Ibid.) These
reporting requirements, designed to help courts determine
whether progress was made in restoring competency, were then
enacted into law when the Legislature overhauled the
competency statutory scheme in 1974. In other words, our court
in Davis and the Legislature in 1974 both sought to put
incompetent defendants more “within the court’s direct control.”
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That is, “the final determination” of a defendant’s restoration of
competency rested with the designated medical professional.
(Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 849.) The Legislature took away
the power to make this “final determination” when it required a
court to approve or reject a certificate of restoration. (Ibid.
Now, a court may accept a certificate of restoration, finding the
defendant competent and allowing criminal proceedings to
resume. (See §§ 1372, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Or, a court
may reject a certificate of restoration, finding that the defendant
remains incompetent. (See § 1372, subd. (c)(2).) In other words,
the court may disagree with the designated medical
professional, and it is the court’s judgment that carries legal
significance.14
14
The courts in Carr and Rodriguez touched on this point as
it relates to the question before us. The Carr court reasoned
that “if the commitment terminates when a health official files
a certification of competence, [no] plausible purpose [would be]
served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as
expressly contemplated in section 1372, subdivision (d).” (Carr,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145.) The court below responded to
Carr by positing that “[t]he issuance of the restoration
certificate and the subsequent court hearing have distinct
statutory objectives.” (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 652.) According to Rodriguez, “[t]he certificate of restoration
to competence by the designated health official and prompt
return to the trial court vindicates the defendant’s right not to
remain longer than two years in the treatment facility,” whereas
“[t]he judicial determination of restoration of competency
ensures that the defendant is not tried if incompetent.” (Id. at
p. 655.) The fact remains, however, that the designated medical
professional and the court are making the same
determination — whether the defendant is competent — and
the court’s decision controls.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
In addition, courts are empowered to remove defendants
from their commitment placement without input from the
designated medical professional. In the 1974 enactment, the
Legislature declared that a defendant “shall be returned to the
committing court” if the court determines that “treatment for
the defendant’s mental impairment is [not] being conducted.”
(Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; see also § 1370, subd. (b)(4).
In 2018, the Legislature specified that “[i]f, at any time after the
court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the
court receives “substantial evidence . . . as to create a doubt in
the mind of the judge as to the defendant’s current mental
incompetence,” the court may appoint an expert to examine the
defendant. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(G), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 34,
§ 25.) If the expert opines that the defendant has regained
competency, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of
restoration of competence has been returned,” although no such
certificate has been filed by the designated medical professional.
(Ibid.)15 Neither of these procedures requires the state
hospital’s involvement.
15
Likewise, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of
restoration of competence has been returned” if the Department
elects to conduct a telehealth reevaluation of a defendant
adjudicated mentally incompetent when the defendant is still in
county custody and “in the opinion of the department’s expert,
the defendant has regained competence.” (§ 1370, subd.
(a)(1)(H)(ii).) If the filing of a certificate ends a commitment as
the People argue, it follows that an opinion of restored
competency rendered under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G
and (a)(1)(H) should also automatically end a commitment. It
seems unlikely the Legislature would have intended for multiple
events, potentially happening on different dates, to mark the
end of a commitment, as that would sow conflict and confusion.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
To summarize: Through a series of enactments
concerning competency proceedings, the Legislature has vested
courts with responsibility for overseeing the progress of
defendants committed for the purpose of restoring their
competency. Much of this responsibility previously rested with
the Department and related entities. The Legislature, however,
has shifted this authority to the courts to ensure that “a person
charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed
solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be
held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” (Jackson v.
Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) This sequence of
amendments cuts against the People’s argument and suggests
that the Legislature did not intend a certificate of restoration
filed by a designated medical professional to unilaterally stop
the two-year clock.
b. The People’s reliance on the 2018 amendment
As mentioned, in 2018, the Legislature shortened the
maximum commitment term from three years to two years.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.) The People point to a summary
provided by the Legislative Counsel, which stated that the 2018
bill “would reduce the term for commitment to a treatment
facility when a felony [is] committed to the shorter of 2 years or
the period of commitment equal to the maximum term of
imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense
charged.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.).) Relying on the phrase “to a treatment facility”
within this summary, the People argue that the Legislature did
not intend “the maximum commitment to include court hearings
that occur when the defendant is no longer receiving restoration
39
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
treatment and is no longer in the care and custody of the state
hospital.”
To the extent the People are focused on a defendant being
in a “treatment facility” or in the “custody of the state hospital,”
the People are again arguing that physical presence in a facility
is determinative of commitment. The legislative history of the
2018 amendment does not support this claim. For example, the
Senate Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of the measure
simply stated, “The bill changes the maximum commitment
term for a felony from three years to two years.” (Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as
introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 5.) The analysis thus repeated the
Legislative Counsel’s Digest statement regarding the reduction
in the maximum term, but omitted the phrase “to a treatment
facility.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra.
Similarly, another analysis explained that the bill “reduces the
maximum term of commitment to a treatment facility to restore
a defendant’s competency from three years to two years.” (Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 25,
2018, p. 1.) Yet the same analysis also stated that the bill
“[r]educes the maximum term of commitment for purposes of
restoring a defendant’s mental competency from three years to
two years,” again without mentioning treatment facilities. (Id.
at p. 3.) The varying language found in the legislative materials
does not establish that the legislators understood that only time
at treatment facilities would be impacted by the bill. The
Legislature instead could have referred to time spent in a
facility as a shorthand for the entire time of commitment,
without intending to exclude other time intervals from counting
toward the maximum commitment period.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
c. The People’s argument that treatment is
determinative
Based largely on their reading of the legislative history,
the People argue that the provision and termination of
treatment for incompetency marks the beginning and end of an
incompetency commitment.16
Underlying the People’s equation of treatment with
commitment are the assumptions that (1) incompetent
defendants always receive treatment while committed to
facilities like a state hospital, and (2) incompetent defendants
never receive treatment when they leave the facilities. Both
assumptions are unsupported.
First, the statutory scheme allows for the possibility that
even after a judge or jury finds a defendant incompetent to stand
trial and the court orders the defendant committed to the
Department, the Department can certify the defendant as
restored to competency — without providing any treatment.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2, the
Department has the “authority and sole discretion to consider
and conduct reevaluations for IST defendants committed to and
awaiting admission to the department.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 4335.2, subd. (c).) Such reevaluations are done “primarily
through telehealth evaluations.” (Id., subd. (b).) If “the
16
As various amicus curiae point out, the People’s position
would mean that commitment does not encompass “the period
of time while an individual is awaiting treatment even where
the current average wait time for placement in a state hospital
competency restoration program” is significant. As discussed
ante, such an interpretation runs counter to the legislative
intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and
provide certainty regarding the length of the detention period.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
department clinician or contracted clinician” (see id., subd. (d)
conducting the evaluation concludes that the defendant has
regained competency (id., subd. (d)(1)), the clinician’s opinion
obligates the court to “proceed as if a certificate of restoration of
competence has been returned” (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd.
(a)(1)(H)(ii)). In other words, defendants may be returned to
court as if they have been certified as restored to competency
without any restoration treatment being extended. (See also
Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1225
(Medina) [“it was not necessary for Medina to have first been
provided care and treatment for a certificate of restoration to be
filed”]; Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264, 272
[similar]; Contra Costa County, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 146 [“The
medical superintendent of the Stockton state hospital [informed
the court] that he believed from the first that the defendant was
simulating insanity” and so requested that the defendant be
returned to court].
Second, also contrary to the People’s assertion, treatment
may continue even after a defendant has been certified as
restored to competency. Section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(iii),
permits continued “involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication to the defendant . . . when the defendant returns to
county custody” after a certificate of restoration has been filed.
This is precisely what happened in this case. When Rodriguez
was certified as competent, the medical director of the state
hospital informed the court that Rodriguez was “being returned
to court on psychotropic medication.” The director stressed that
Rodriguez needed to “remain on this medication . . . to enable
him to be certified” as competent. The record therefore
demonstrates it was contemplated that Rodriguez’s treatment
would continue even after he left the state hospital.
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There are also practical problems with the People’s
approach. It would be difficult to calculate exactly how long a
defendant has been committed if the provision of treatment
determined the length of a commitment. The provision of
treatment does not necessarily coincide with where the
defendant is located (e.g., in or outside a treatment facility) or
what part of the competency proceedings the defendant is in
(e.g., after a commitment order issues but before transport, or
after a certificate is filed but before transport). Given these
circumstances, it is unlikely that the Legislature intended for
the provision or cessation of treatment to delineate whether the
two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1) is running.
4. The Decisions Cited by the People Do Not Support
Their Interpretation of the Statutory Text
We are unconvinced that the decisions cited by the People
support their position that only time spent at a treatment
facility counts as part of a commitment period.
The court in Medina stated in dicta that “[i]n the usual
case, only days actually spent in commitment at a mental
institution or treatment facility are applied to the maximum
commitment period.” (Medina, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1203.) The statement, however, was made without any
support or elaboration, and the court emphasized it found the
case before it “unusual.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the defendant in
Medina had not received required treatment due to what the
Court of Appeal characterized as a “standoff” between the trial
court that issued a commitment order and the authorities
responsible for providing treatment, who refused to accept him.
(Id. at p. 1201.) The Court of Appeal resolved this impasse, and
the defendant’s resulting claim of a due process violation, by
including “all days since the date of the commitment order in
43
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
which [the defendant] has been in jail, prison, or treatment” (id.
at p. 1203; see id. at p. 1230) as part of the commitment period.
The Medina court was not asked to decide whether a certificate
of restoration or a court’s subsequent order finding the
defendant restored to competency marks the end of a
commitment period, because no certificate of restoration was
ever filed in that case. (Id. at p. 1229.) Furthermore, that
court’s assessment of the “usual” calculations regarding the time
of commitment (id. at p. 1203) was inconsequential in light of
the remedy the court ultimately adopted.
Similarly distinguishable are People v. G.H. (2014
230 Cal.App.4th 1548 (G.H.) and People v. Reynolds (2011
196 Cal.App.4th 801 (Reynolds). Those courts held a
defendant’s precommitment custody credits did not apply when
calculating the then-applicable three-year maximum statutory
limit for a commitment. (See G.H., at p. 1553; Reynolds, at
pp. 803–804, 808–809.)17 The People and the Court of Appeal
17
In doing so, G.H. and Reynolds distinguished In re Banks
(1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 864. Banks held equal protection and due
process principles mandated application of precommitment
custody credits when the maximum commitment period is
measured by the maximum term of imprisonment for the most
serious offense charged because “the denial of credit[s]
necessarily results in longer confinement for indigents unable to
post bail bonds. This discriminatory treatment is
constitutionally forbidden.” (Id. at p. 869, fn. omitted.
However, when the maximum commitment period is set to the
statutory maximum limit, G.H. and Reynolds held that there are
no potential equal protection or due process violations and the
statute controls because similarly situated defendants are not
deprived of the benefit of the precommitment jail time if
convicted. (See G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1557–1558;
Reynolds, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808–809.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
relied on G.H. and Reynolds in support of the notion “that a
defendant’s days in custody in which he or she is not being
treated for restoration to competence do not count toward the
maximum
commitment
period.”
(Rodriguez,
supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) But here again, G.H. and Reynolds
were focused on an issue different from the one before us. The
analysis in G.H. and Reynolds centered on how to treat a
defendant’s time in custody prior to the issuance of a
commitment order when calculating the maximum commitment
period under section 1370(c)(1). By contrast, the court is here
asked to address the treatment of custodial time after a trial
court has ruled a defendant incompetent but before ruling on a
certificate of restoration. As we have explained, this distinction
is significant and counsels against relying on G.H.’s
characterization of the commitment period.18
5. We Are Not Persuaded by the People’s Remaining
Arguments
The People contend that “absurd and unintended
consequences” would result if we were to adopt Rodriguez’s
interpretation. (See, e.g., Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v.
18
In the course of its decision, G.H. stated that “[s]ection
1370, subdivision (c)(1)’s three-year statutory limit applies to
the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental
institution. ([Polk, supra,] 71 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1238 . . . .)”
(G.H., supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1558–1559, italics added.
As amicus curiae have observed, Polk in fact makes no mention
of any distinction between time spent postcommitment at a
treatment facility versus time spent postcommitment in county
custody awaiting judicial proceedings following submission of a
certificate of restoration. Polk held that the maximum statutory
period under section 1370(c)(1) applies to “the aggregate of all
commitments on the same charges.” (Polk, at p. 1238.) Nothing
in our decision contradicts this holding.
45
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 [“we may reject a literal
construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent
in the statute or that would lead to absurd results”].) We
address each of the People’s arguments in turn.
a. “Arbitrarily truncated” time for treatment
The People contend that if a commitment does not
terminate with a filing of a certificate of restoration, time “to
provide necessary restoration treatment would . . . be arbitrarily
truncated” because medical personnel would need to “predict[]
whether the defendant will contest the hospital’s certification in
the future” and “how much time the defense will require to
prepare for such a hearing.”
The People’s argument implies that medical personnel
would take into account the time available until the maximum
term of commitment is reached in deciding when and how to
provide treatment, instead of expeditiously restoring defendants
to competency. But the Department denies it considers such
factors when providing treatment, and the People offer no
evidence to the contrary.
According to the Department, “[t]he focus of [the
Department’s] treatment is on restoration of competence in the
most expeditious manner possible.” (See § 1370, subd.
(a)(1)(B)(i) [specifying that the defendant shall receive
treatment “that will promote the defendant’s speedy restoration
to mental competence”].) If the Department is providing
services to restore competency “in the most expeditious manner
possible,” then it should not matter for purposes of treatment if
a defendant may be committed for a maximum of two years or a
maximum of two years minus the time it takes to conduct the
competency hearing under section 1372. In either case, the
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Department is extending the treatment necessary to restore
competency as soon as possible; it is not basing its treatment on
“predict[ions]” of whether the defendant will contest the
certification of competency or how much preparation time will
be needed if the matter is contested.
b. “Delays predicated on defense counsel’s needs”
The People further contend that contested competency
hearings following the filing of a certificate of restoration are
often delayed by defense counsel’s need to prepare for the
hearings. According to the People, “[i]f this court adopted
[Rodriguez’s] position, the trial court would have no . . .
discretion or control in balancing the needs of defense attorneys
to adequately prepare on behalf of their clients with concerns of
delay.”
An important premise underlying the People’s argument
is that the time defense counsel need to “adequately prepare”
would often push the competency hearings past the time limit
set by section 1370(c)(1). The People, however, have not
provided any persuasive evidence that a two-year maximum
term is likely to be routinely exhausted even when
postcertification judicial proceedings are taken into account.
Indeed, the available evidence suggests the contrary is true.
When the Legislature reduced the maximum period of
commitment permitted under section 1370(c)(1) from three
years to two years, it noted that “the vast majority (80–90%) [of
persons committed as mentally incompetent] becomes trial-
competent within six months of starting treatment, and nearly
all who attain competency do so within a year.” (Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187, supra, as
introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) The Department likewise
47
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
acknowledges that average “treatment time in a state hospital
operated by [the Department is] 270 days before return to
court” — well below the two-year limit.19
The Department states that “[i]n [its] experience,
competency hearings under section 1372 following a certificate
of restoration are often delayed, sometimes for a significant
length of time.” The only examples of delays that the
Department offers are those occurring in this case and in Carr.
But the proceeding here and in Carr demonstrate how unusual
these delays were.
This case involved extraordinary circumstances relating
to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the People themselves
acknowledge, “the continuances in th[is] case [including] the
final continuance past the two-year mark from the date of
commitment, were not due to gamesmanship by either party, or
institutional negligence like in Carr . . . but rather because of an
unprecedented national emergency and the consequences on
court capacity that resulted therefrom.”
19
To the extent the Department is concerned about running
out of time to provide treatment, its concerns appear to be based
on defendants who have been certified as competent and yet are
“returned to the hospitals for additional competency services.”
Defendants “returned to the hospital for additional competency
services” are those defendants whose certifications of
competency have been rejected by a court, or who had again
become incompetent in short succession. Although we do not
lightly dismiss the Department’s concerns that for these
defendants the Department will not have a full two-year period
in which to provide treatment, ultimately, in setting a maximum
term of commitment, the Legislature has accepted that there
will be some individuals for whom the allotted time is not
enough to restore competency. It is not the role of the courts to
second-guess these legislative choices.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
As for Carr, the defendant there (Carr) spent almost a
year in jail waiting to be transported to a state hospital. (See
Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.) Then without
ever being transported or receiving any treatment, Carr was
certified as competent by a Department psychiatrist. (Id. at
p. 1141.) Carr petitioned for a writ of mandate, claiming that
“ ‘the certification of his competency was employed as a
subterfuge to circumvent the state’s obligation to place him in a
state hospital.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the claim.
(Ibid.) More than a year later, the trial court concluded that
Carr remained incompetent. (Ibid.) The court again committed
Carr to the Department, and he once more waited for transport
to a facility. (Ibid.) Three months later, while still waiting for
transport, “Carr moved for release on the ground he had
completed the maximum three-year commitment [then]
authorized by law.” (Ibid.) This procedural history makes it
difficult to infer that delays in holding competency hearings are
often so lengthy that the two-year limit is likely to be exceeded
in the normal course.
More generally, neither the facts of this case nor those in
Carr support the assertion that defendants have the incentive
to, and routinely, engage in dilatory tactics. As mentioned, the
People acknowledge that the delays that occurred in this case
were not attributable to “gamesmanship” by Rodriguez. The
court in Carr likewise noted that “there is no basis in this case
to infer Carr’s efforts to oppose the certification contributed to
his commitment exceeding the three-year maximum.” (Carr,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.) If a trial court is concerned
that a defendant is requesting continuances for the sole purpose
of exhausting the two-year period, the court may take that into
consideration when determining whether to grant a
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
continuance. (Cf. Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368
[“underscor[ing] the vital role of trial courts in safeguarding the
timely trial right of alleged [sexually violent predators]”].
Finally, the People’s argument assumes that litigation
delays attributable to the defense cannot be excluded when
determining whether the two-year period has run out. We do
not decide whether that assumption is correct. (See pt. II.C.,
post.
c. “Competent defendants evading prosecution”
The People contend that adopting Rodriguez’s
interpretation would “result in presumptively competent
defendants evading prosecution” because once section
1370(c)(1)’s limit has been reached, a defendant must be
conserved or released. In its amicus curiae brief, the San Diego
County District Attorney goes further, arguing that “dangerous
criminals” will be released “to the streets.” The statutory
scheme, however, provides safeguards against these results.
Individuals whose commitment terms have expired need
not be released to the community. Instead, they may be civilly
committed, including to long-term conservatorships. (See
§ 1370, subds. (c)(3), (e); Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 568
& fn. 1.) Specifically, a Murphy conservatorship is available to
keep in custody a criminal defendant who is incompetent to
stand trial and who may not be further committed under
section 1370. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(3).) An incompetent
defendant may be conserved under a Murphy conservatorship
if, among other criteria, the defendant “represents a substantial
danger of physical harm to others.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008,
subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) The conservatorship may last as long as the
conditions supporting conservatorship persist. (See Welf. &
50
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b); Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at
p. 170; Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at pp. 485, 497.
Accordingly, it is not the case that “dangerous persons” are
simply released “to the streets” if they are not committed under
section 1370. Even when an incompetent criminal defendant is
not conserved and felony charges are dismissed, the People may
refile charges if they believe the defendant has regained
competency. (See Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested, and a trial
court may order a new competency hearing, following the
prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges pursuant
to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously committed
for three years”].
Finally, the People’s argument assumes that when the
two-year period runs out, even a defendant who has been
certified as restored to competence must be released. We do not
decide whether that assumption is correct either. (See pt. II.C.,
post.
C. Issues to Address on Remand
As previously noted, Rodriguez was initially returned to
the trial court pursuant to a timely-filed certificate of
restoration to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1), (3).
We have decided the issue of statutory interpretation
presented, concluding that section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year
maximum commitment period continues past the filing of the
certificate, through the court’s decision whether to accept the
51
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
certificate.20 We are not deciding, however, whether the two-
year maximum commitment period was reached here as a result
of Rodriguez’s aggregate periods of commitment. We instead
leave that question for the Court of Appeal to address on
remand.
Because the Court of Appeal concluded that section
1370(c)(1)’s two-year period had not run out, it did not need to
reach whether Rodriguez was otherwise entitled to his
requested remedy. It did not need to decide whether Rodriguez
would have been entitled to dismissal if the period had run out.
It did not need to decide whether expiration of the maximum
commitment period under section 1370(c)(1) mandates release
where the defendant is competent to stand trial. The issue of
what remedy is available when section 1370(c)(1)’s two-year
period has run out — including whether release or
conservatorship are the only appropriate remedies — was not
briefed here.
We therefore conclude these issues merit consideration on
remand to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court may decide
in the first instance what remedy exists if the two-year time
limit has been reached — either as a matter of statutory
interpretation or as a constitutional matter. (Cf. Jackson v.
Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106; Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379, 382 & fn. 5 [noting that courts in
other contexts have suggested there may be other possible
20
Because we reach this conclusion based on a reading of the
statutes, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that a holding
for the People here would violate constitutional principles of
“due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel,
and proscriptions on cruel and unusual punishment.”
52
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
remedies for unconstitutional delay, such as an order that
proceedings commence forthwith].
Similarly, we remand to the Court of Appeal to address
whether section 1372 hearings may be continued upon good
cause such that the period between continuances is tolled for
purposes of calculating whether the maximum commitment
term under section 1370(c)(1) has been reached. Stated
differently, we do not address here whether the two-year clock
of section 1370(c)(1) can be paused by good cause continuances
that may arise during the period between a defendant’s return
to court and the trial court’s determination of competence.
Although the issue is mentioned in the parties’ briefing before
us, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal ruled on it.21
This issue is best addressed in the context of the other issues
that remain to be decided in the first instance by the Court of
Appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3).
We express no view on whether Rodriguez has reached the
maximum two-year commitment period; whether Rodriguez is
entitled to the remedy of dismissal he seeks; or whether and how
21
We briefly acknowledge the arguments the parties have
made for and against the availability of such tolling in this
context. Rodriguez argues that “[c]ontinuances and waivers are
not authorized by sections 1370 and 1372, so the courts cannot
read into the statutes what has ‘been omitted.’ ” The People, on
the other hand, counter that tolling, like many of the procedures
governing a section 1372 hearing, may be considered “implied”
by the statutes.
53
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
the issue of tolling may affect Rodriguez’s entitlement to any
relief.22
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that an incompetency commitment does not end
with the filing of a certificate of restoration. Instead, the two-
year maximum commitment period set by Penal Code
section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of the certificate and
includes the time between such filing and the court’s decision
whether to accept the certificate. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Upon remand, the court shall consider whether the two-
year limit of section 1370(c)(1) was exceeded in this case. To
answer that question, the court may consider whether good
cause continuances can toll the limit of section 1370(c)(1). (Cf.
Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 378–379.) If the court finds
that the two-year statutory period has indeed been exceeded, it
shall further consider the nature of the remedy Rodriguez is
entitled to at this point. In particular, the court should examine
whether Rodriguez is entitled to dismissal of the charges
pending against him or whether other relief is appropriate. (Cf.
Camacho, at p. 382, fn. 5; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 106 [holding that “a defendant may be rearrested,
and a trial court may order a new competency hearing, following
the prosecution’s dismissal and refiling of felony charges
pursuant to section 1387 even if the defendant was previously
22
This court’s decision to issue a stay in connection with
granting Rodriguez’s petition for review should not be
understood to resolve the question whether Rodriguez is entitled
to the relief he seeks.
54
RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
committed for [the statutory maximum period permitted by
section 1370(c)(1)]”].
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
55
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Rodriguez v. Superior Court
Procedural Posture (see XX below
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 70 Cal.App.5th 628
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S272129
Date Filed: December 14, 2023
Court: Superior
County: Santa Clara
Judge: Eric S. Geffon
Counsel:
Brian C. McComas, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Petitioner.
Ellen McDonnell, Public Defender (Contra Costa), and Diana Garrido,
Deputy Public Defender, for Contra Costa County Public Defender
Office and California Public Defenders Association as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Petitioner.
Emi MacLean and Kim Pederson for American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Northern California and Disability Rights California as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
DLA Piper and Justin R. Sarno for Silicon Valley De-Bug as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Alexandra W. Gadeberg, Crystal
Tindell Seiler and Barbara A. Cathcart, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Real Party in Interest.
Summer Stephan, District Attorney (San Diego), Linh Lam and
Jennifer Kaplan, Deputy District Attorneys, for the San Diego County
District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys
General, for State Department of State Hospitals and State
Department of Developmental Services as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Brian C. McComas
The Law Office of B.C. McComas, LLP
PMB 1605, 77 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 101
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 814-2465
Emilou MacLean
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-4805
(929) 375-1575
Alexandra W. Gadeberg
Deputy District Attorney
70 West Hedding, West Wing
San Jose, CA 95110
(408) 792-2757
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 12/14/2023 | S272129 |
