Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/21/05

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

S112505
In re ORLANDO ROBERTS,
Ct.App. 2/4 B161777
on Habeas Corpus
Los Angeles County
____________________________________) Super.
Ct. No. No. A330146

In Los Angeles County, nearly 30 years ago, petitioner Orlando Roberts was
convicted of first degree murder and other offenses and was sentenced, under the
sentencing scheme then in effect, to an indeterminate term of life in prison. As is
typical of the majority of persons convicted in that county and other counties
containing major metropolitan areas, since his commitment to state prison
petitioner has been incarcerated at several locations in less populous counties
within the state.
Petitioner has been the subject of periodic evaluations by the Board of Prison
Terms (Board) to determine his suitability to be placed on parole, and repeatedly
has been found unsuitable for parole. As a consequence, petitioner has filed
numerous petitions seeking a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the Board’s
findings of parole unsuitability and to obtain a parole date. Generally, petitioner
has filed his habeas corpus petitions in a court within the county in which he then
was incarcerated. Recently, the courts that have received his petitions have
directed that petitioner file them in a court within another county.
We granted review to resolve an issue involving the procedural framework
within which the courts consider habeas corpus petitions that challenge the Board’s
finding of parole unsuitability or denial of a parole date. Under the procedure
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generally applicable to habeas corpus petitions, the court in which such a petition
initially is filed — within certain guidelines and with respect to various types of
claims — has discretion to adjudicate the case or, in the event the court determines
that resolution is more appropriate in another venue, to transfer the case for
resolution to a court in another county. Of course, the court in the second county
has similar discretion to transfer the petition.
As might be anticipated, when a habeas corpus petition raises a claim, such as
a challenge to the denial of parole, that has not been addressed in our prior
decisions directing resolution of particular types of claims by a court in a county
having a particular connection with the petitioner, the courts of the various counties
and appellate districts have not always agreed which is the most appropriate court
to adjudicate the claim. In that situation, the court that initially receives the
petition frequently has ordered that it be refiled by the petitioner or directly
transferred for resolution in another court. In some instances, repeated transfers
have been made, with consequential delay in the adjudication of petitions and
discordant relations between the courts in the affected counties.
Therefore, we decide in the present case whether a habeas corpus petition
challenging the Board’s finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole should be
filed in and adjudicated by a court within the county where petitioner was
convicted and sentenced or instead in a court within the county where he currently
is incarcerated. As we shall explain, we conclude that such a petition for writ of
habeas corpus must be filed in, and addressed by, the superior court in the county
where petitioner was convicted and sentenced. Although the conclusion we reach
on this procedural point is contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeal, it is
unnecessary to reverse the judgment of that court, because we do not disturb that
court’s determination that the petition should properly be denied on the merits.
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I
In 1976, petitioner Orlando Roberts and an accomplice committed a home
invasion robbery in which they shot two elderly victims, one fatally. In Los
Angeles County Superior Court, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187), attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187), and robbery (Pen.
Code, § 211), finding true the enhancement allegations that during the commission
of the offenses a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd.
(a)(1)), that petitioner personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5), and that
he committed great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7).1
In February 1977, petitioner was sentenced in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court under the indeterminate sentencing law then in effect to life in
prison with the possibility of parole, with a minimum period of seven years’
incarceration. (Former §§ 190, 1168, 3046, repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1139,
§ 273, p. 5140; see fn. 6, post.) In 1978, the Second Appellate District of the Court
of Appeal in Los Angeles affirmed the judgment against petitioner, and this court
denied his petition for review.
Since that time, on at least eight occasions at regularly scheduled parole
consideration hearings, petitioner has sought a parole date from the Board. On
each occasion the Board has denied his application, finding petitioner unsuitable
for parole primarily because of the nature of the offenses, petitioner’s refusal to
accept responsibility and insistence that he falsely was implicated in the crimes by
his accomplice, and his prior conviction of manslaughter while a juvenile.2

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
2
In October 1998, while incarcerated in San Diego County, petitioner again
requested a parole date. Following the denial of his request, petitioner filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court alleging that the Board had a duty to
(footnote continued on next page)
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In May 1999, petitioner filed in San Diego County Superior Court a petition
for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the constitutional proscriptions against ex
post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment entitled him to have his prison
term fixed as provided in the indeterminate sentencing scheme in effect at the time
of his offenses. The superior court stayed proceedings on the petition while similar
litigation was pending before that court in other cases. In April 2002, the court
lifted the stay and, in a lengthy order, denied on the merits petitioner’s request for
relief on habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a “motion for rehearing.” The court
deemed the motion to be a motion for reconsideration, denied it, and in reliance
upon In re Sena (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 836 (Sena) also directed petitioner to file
any additional habeas corpus petitions challenging a determination of his
unsuitability for parole in the county in which he had been convicted and
sentenced —that is, either in the Los Angeles County Superior Court or the Second
Appellate District of the Court of Appeal.
Meanwhile, petitioner had been transferred to Chuckwalla Valley State Prison
in Riverside County. In March 2002, the Board conducted a hearing and again
found petitioner unsuitable for parole.
In October 2002, petitioner, as directed by the San Diego County Superior
Court, filed in Los Angeles — this time in the Second Appellate District of the
Court of Appeal — an original habeas corpus petition alleging that he was entitled
to have a primary term fixed under the indeterminate sentencing law. The
appellate court decided the petition on the merits “to spare petitioner from being
bounced back and forth” between the two appellate districts and denied relief on
the ground that a primary term could not be fixed prior to a determination that

(footnote continued from previous page)
set a parole date. In March 1999, we denied that petition. (In re Roberts [Mar. 31,
1999, S073745].)
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petitioner was suitable for parole. Expressly disagreeing with Sena, supra, 94
Cal.App.4th 836, the Court of Appeal also advised that the proper venue for a
habeas corpus petition challenging a determination of unsuitability for parole lies
in the county and corresponding appellate district in which an inmate was
incarcerated at the time of the denial of parole.
Petitioner subsequently filed in this court a petition denominated a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, challenging the determinations of the Court of Appeal that
he was ineligible to have a primary term fixed prior to a finding of suitability for
parole and that he was required to file any petition based upon the denial of parole
suitability in the venue in which he was incarcerated. We ordered that petitioner’s
petition be refiled nunc pro tunc as a petition for review, and thus deemed it timely.
We granted review and limited the issue to be briefed and argued to the
determination as to which court is the proper venue to adjudicate a petition for writ
of habeas corpus challenging the denial of parole.
II
A
To provide context for our discussion, we briefly trace the history of the
procedural rules governing the choice of an appropriate venue to entertain a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Prior to its revision in 1966, the California
Constitution conferred original habeas corpus jurisdiction upon the superior court
of the county in which a criminal defendant was incarcerated. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
former § 5; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 344 (Griggs).)
Following that revision, the California Constitution extended jurisdiction over
original habeas corpus matters to all superior courts in this state. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 10.) As a result, “there is now no territorial limitation on the power of a
superior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus relief.” (Griggs, supra, 16
Cal.3d at p. 346, fn. omitted.) Moreover, because article VI, section 10 “grants
identical original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to both the Court of
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Appeal and the superior court, it follows that the 1966 constitutional revision also
grants such statewide jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.” (In re Van Heflin
(1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 131, 135, fn. omitted; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal
Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Writs, § 12, p. 531.)
In the wake of the constitutional amendment, this court issued several
decisions providing “rules of judicial procedure to be followed by [the] superior
courts in the exercise of [their] unlimited jurisdiction.” (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d
at p. 347.) The applicable procedure generally has depended upon the nature of
the relief sought in the petition. (See, e.g., In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613, 624 [a
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of a prior conviction
must be filed initially in a court within the county of confinement and, if alleged
facts establish a prima facie case, “the superior court in the county of confinement
should then transfer the case to the court which imposed the sentence.”]; In re
Haro (1971) 71 Cal.2d 1021, 1024-1026, & fn. 1 [following determination of a
prima facie case, a petition challenging the validity of a prior conviction should be
transferred to the sentencing court]; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 765, fn. 3
[same]; cf. In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89, fn. 9 [a petition filed in the
county of confinement challenging the constitutional validity of a statute requiring
prosecution approval for dismissal of a prior conviction should be transferred to the
sentencing court prior to determination whether there is a prima facie case]; In re
Montgomery (1970) 2 Cal.3d 863, 868-869, fn. 4 [a petition challenging the
validity of a conviction based upon a retroactive decision of the United States
Supreme Court should be transferred to a court in the county of conviction, if that
county is not the one in which the petition was filed].)
In Griggs, we provided additional guidance for courts in making the
determination of which court should exercise its jurisdiction to hear and decide a
habeas corpus petition. We also confirmed the continuing validity of the
procedural rules developed in the preceding cases, while at the same time
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disavowing as dicta any language in those decisions implying “a continuing
territorial limitation on habeas corpus jurisdiction.” (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at
pp. 345-347.)
Cautioning that the constitutional expansion of jurisdiction to consider the
issuance of writs of habeas corpus did not signify that a superior court should give
such consideration in every instance, we directed in Griggs that, in general, when a
petitioner has complied with pertinent rules, the superior court in which the petition
is presented should file and review the allegations of the petition in order to
determine whether it states a prima facie case for relief. (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d
at p. 347.) We explained that if the petition states a prima facie case, the superior
court must determine whether to hear the matter on the merits. (Ibid.) “If the
challenge is to a particular judgment or sentence, the petition should be transferred
to the court which rendered judgment if that court is a different court from the
court wherein the petition was filed . . . .” (Ibid., italics added; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.552 (b)(2)(A).) “If the challenge is to conditions of the inmate’s
confinement, then the petition should be transferred to the superior court of the
county wherein the inmate is confined if that court is a different court from the
court wherein the petition was filed.” (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347, italics
added; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.552 (b)(2)(B).)3

3
California Rules of Court, rule 4.552, which became effective January 2,
2002, provides for the transfer of habeas corpus petitions to the proper superior
court to hear the petition. The rule provides in relevant part: “(a) Except as set
forth in subdivision (b)(2), the petition should be heard and resolved in the court in
which it is filed. [¶] (b)(1) The superior court in which the petition is filed must
determine, based on the allegations of the petition, whether the matter should be
heard by it or in the superior court of another county. [¶] (2) If the superior court
in which the petition is filed determines that the matter may be more properly heard
by the superior court of another county, it may nonetheless retain jurisdiction in the
matter or, without first determining whether a prima facie case for relief exists,
order the matter transferred to the other county. Transfer may be ordered in the
(footnote continued on next page)
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In Griggs, we did not have occasion to define either of the above italicized
phrases. We did not “attempt . . . to state a general rule or all-inclusive specific
rules which direct the proper procedural disposition in each instance,” and
acknowledged that certain types of petitions do not fall within either of the
described categories. (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347.) We advised that
“unless there is substantial reason for transferring a petition it should be entertained
and resolved in the court where filed.” (Ibid.) In applying those standards, we
held that a habeas corpus petition — claiming that the Department of Corrections’
error in noting a prior conviction in its records prevented the petitioner’s
assignment to work camp — could be resolved as efficiently by the court in the
county where the petitioner was incarcerated as by any other court. (Ibid.)
B
Among other functions, petitions for writ of habeas corpus traditionally have
afforded the means to challenge determinations of unsuitability for parole or
denials of parole. (In re Streeter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 47, 49; see In re Rosenkrantz
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 658 (Rosenkrantz); 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law,
supra, Criminal Writs, § 54, p. 585.) In applying the rules enunciated in Griggs for
habeas corpus petitions generally to petitions that challenge parole-related

(footnote continued from previous page)
following circumstances: [¶] (A) If the petition challenges the terms of a
judgment, the matter should be transferred to the county in which judgment was
rendered. [¶] (B) If the petition challenges the conditions of an inmate’s
confinement, it may be transferred to the county in which the petitioner is confined.
A change in the institution of confinement that effects a change in the conditions of
confinement may constitute good cause to deny the petition. [¶] (3) The
transferring court must specify in the order of transfer the reason for the transfer.
[¶] (4) If the receiving court determines that the reason for transfer is inapplicable,
the receiving court must, within 30 days of receipt of the case, order the case
returned to the transferring court. The transferring court must retain and resolve
the matter as provided by these rules.”
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determinations, the parties in the present case place very different emphasis upon
particular aspects of our opinion. Therefore, as an initial matter, we consider
which aspect of the guidance we provided in Griggs is most relevant in deciding
which is the proper court to resolve a habeas corpus petition challenging an adverse
determination regarding parole.
For his part, petitioner emphasizes our admonition in Griggs that a substantial
reason should exist for the court in which a habeas corpus petition initially is filed
to transfer the petition to another court for hearing and disposition. Petitioner
asserts that the court in which the petition is filed should determine, based upon the
facts of the specific case, whether to transfer the petition to another court. For
example, a petition that presents a “major issue” related to an offense committed in
a county other than the county in which the petition is filed properly would be
transferred to a court in the former county.
The Attorney General, on the other hand, emphasizes that in Griggs we
discussed two types of challenges made in habeas corpus petitions — challenges to
the judgment or sentence, and challenges to the conditions of confinement. Citing
considerations of judicial economy and efficiency, the Attorney General requests
that we determine whether petitioner’s challenge to the Board’s finding that he is
unsuitable for parole is analogous to a challenge to the judgment or sentence, or
instead to a challenge to the conditions of confinement; thus we are asked to decide
which court —the tribunal located in the county of sentencing or the one located in
the county of incarceration — properly should decide such a petition. The
Attorney General agrees with the Court of Appeal that petitioner’s challenge to the
finding of parole unsuitability more nearly corresponds to a challenge to the
conditions of confinement, and that the court in the county of confinement
therefore should have resolved the petition.
As we stated in Griggs, generally speaking a petition for writ of habeas
corpus should not be transferred to another court unless a substantial reason exists
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for such transfer. In general, a habeas corpus petition should be heard and resolved
by the court in which the petition is filed.
Nonetheless, we observe, as the Attorney General has pointed out, that the
volume of parole hearings and consequently the volume of habeas corpus petitions
seeking relief from unfavorable determinations related to parole, has expanded
greatly in recent years and undoubtedly will continue to increase in view of
enactments such as the Three Strikes Law.4 Moreover, as discussed below, it
appears that recently the courts have engaged in, as one court termed it, a “tennis
match” with respect to the decision to transfer parole-related habeas corpus
petitions ― a circumstance suggesting that application of a case-by-case standard
to this endeavor would perpetuate existing procedural impediments to the timely
resolution of these petitions. We therefore believe that considerations of judicial
economy and efficiency weigh against a case-by-case approach and in favor of our
making the determination which venue is proper in all such cases.
Accordingly, we begin by examining which of two categories identified in
Griggs — a challenge to a petitioner’s judgment or sentence, or a challenge to the
conditions of his or her confinement — more nearly comprises or corresponds to a
habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of a parole date, and thus which
court — that located in the county of sentencing or that in the county of
incarceration — properly should hear and decide such a petition.
The Courts of Appeal whose divergence of opinion attracted our review have
discussed the two categories identified in Griggs. In Sena, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th
836, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life

4
For example, according to the Board’s Web site, in 1998 a total of 2,191
parole hearings were held for persons who received sentences of life in prison.
(Bd., Caseload Statistics, Lifer Hearing <http:///www.bpt.ca.gov/caseload ___
Stats. asp> [as of July 21, 2005].) In 2003, a total of 4,498 parole hearings were
held for life-term prisoners. (Ibid.)
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in Los Angeles County and thereafter was incarcerated in San Luis Obispo County.
After the Board denied his request for a parole date, the petitioner challenged the
denial by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. That court transferred the matter to the Superior Court of San
Luis Obispo County. After another round of transfers between the courts in San
Luis Obispo County and Los Angeles County, the Court of Appeal issued an order
to show cause “to stop this tennis match.” (Id. at p. 838.)
In Sena, the Court of Appeal held that the Board’s decision denying parole
involved the underlying sentence rather than the conditions of confinement, and
that consequently the sentencing court in Los Angeles County should hear and
determine the habeas corpus petition. (Sena, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838-
840.) The appellate court held, in the alternative, that the petition did not disclose
any “ ‘substantial’ reason” for transfer from the court in which it initially was
received, because the petitioner merely alleged that the prison term he already had
served was sufficiently lengthy for a second degree murder conviction and that he
was rehabilitated. (Id. at p. 840.)
The court in Sena reasoned that a parole decision is related to the sentence
imposed, because “ ‘parole eligibility is considered an integral part of any sentence
[citation]. [Citations].’ A petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking parole
denial is a challenge to the length of sentence, i.e., the sentence itself. It should be
heard in the court which ‘rendered judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Sena, supra, 94
Cal.App.4th at p. 839.) The court also observed that petitions raising similar
claims had been held to challenge the underlying sentences and to be subject to
adjudication in the sentencing court. (Id. at p. 839, citing In re Oluwa (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 439, 443-444 [entitlement to custody credits]; In re Van Heflin, supra,
58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 133-136 [erroneous inclusion of a prior felony conviction in
the abstract of judgment].)
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The Court of Appeal in the present case viewed the matter very differently. It
found that the Board’s determination of unsuitability for parole was unrelated to
the validity of the underlying sentence, but rather was “prison based” because it
concerned the prisoner’s continued incarceration, was made by a panel of the
Board at the site of the prisoner’s confinement, and was based upon the prisoner’s
“offenses, criminal record, prison conduct and readiness for parole, and potential
danger to the community if released.”
The present Court of Appeal concluded that therefore, the Board’s denial of
parole suitability falls within a broad category — distinct from either of the two
categories described in Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d 341 and instead identified in
California Standards of Judicial Administration, former section 6.5, which
provided that an appellate court ordinarily should deny, without prejudice, a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus based primarily upon facts occurring outside
that appellate district, including petitions that question “the conditions of
confinement or the conduct of correctional officials.” (Italics added.)5 The
appellate court concluded that because the Board’s conduct in denying parole
constituted conduct of correctional officials identified with petitioner’s
incarceration, a habeas corpus petition challenging the denial of parole suitability
should be filed and adjudicated in a court in the county or corresponding appellate
district where that official conduct primarily occurred — in petitioner’s case, the
Fourth Appellate District, where he then was incarcerated.

5
California Standards of Judicial Administration, former section 6.5, adopted
in 1985 and repealed effective January 1, 2005, stated: “A Court of Appeal should
ordinarily deny, without prejudice, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is
based primarily on facts occurring outside the appellate district. These include
petitions that question (1) the validity of judgments or orders of trial courts located
outside the appellate district, and (2) conditions of confinement or the conduct of
correctional officials outside the appellate district.” (See now, Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 60(e).)
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Having considered the opposing views of these Courts of Appeal, we agree
with the court in Sena that a challenge to the Board’s denial of suitability for parole
should be adjudicated by a court in the county in which the petitioner was
convicted and sentenced. As we shall explain, in making a parole-related
determination the conduct of the Board is not the equivalent of conduct of
individual correctional officials. In procedural and substantive terms, this type of
determination is more analogous to the sentencing determination made by the court
in the county where the judgment was rendered than it is to a decision affecting
confinement. As a practical matter, the Board’s parole determination is as readily
reviewable by a court located in the county where the prisoner was sentenced as it
is by a court located in the county where the prisoner is incarcerated, and
significantly the Board’s determination is more appropriately reviewed by a court
located in the county where he or she was sentenced. Finally, important
considerations of public policy support this conclusion.
In order to understand the nature of the Board’s determination with respect to
the matter of parole, we first consider the character of that agency. The executive
branch has “inherent and primary authority” over parole matters. (Rosenkrantz,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 667.) Within that branch, the Board is an “executive parole
agency” that is an “arm of the Department of Corrections.” (In re Dannenberg
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078 (Dannenberg); Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.
665.)6 The Board has limited authority over the duration of a prisoner’s

6
The former indeterminate sentencing law (ISL) established “an
administrative framework for term-fixing and parole-granting” by creating the
Adult Authority, an administrative agency within the Department of Corrections.
(In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 644; People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d
169, 174; former §§ 5001, 5075-5082; see Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp.
1077-1078.) The Adult Authority made the determination of suitability for parole,
as well as (pursuant to statutory guidelines) the actual length of the term a
defendant was required to serve. (Former §§ 3020, 3040; Dannenberg, supra, 34
(footnote continued on next page)
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confinement, whereas authority over the conditions of confinement is reposed in
the Department of Corrections.7
The Board’s status as an arm of the state’s correctional entity does not convert
the parole decisions of the Board into the decisions of correctional officials. The
Board is a distinct entity, and the commissioners of the Board, who are authorized
to conduct hearings and perform other duties related to parole matters, are not
correctional officials. (See, e.g., §5075 [appointment and composition of the
Board], § 5076.1 [conduct of meetings and employment of deputies], § 5076.3
[authority of the Board Chairman as head of a department to issue subpoenas], and
§ 5080 [authority to request transfer of prisoners by the Department of
Corrections].)

(footnote continued from previous page)
Cal.4th at pp. 1077-1078; People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94; In re
Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 434-435.)

On July 1, 1977, the ISL was repealed and the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act of 1976 (DSL) became effective. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p.
5140; see generally Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1077-1078.) The Adult
Authority was abolished and replaced by the Board. (§ 5078.) In In re Stanworth
(1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, 181-188, we held that a life prisoner sentenced under the
ISL and determined to be suitable for parole following enactment of the DSL was
entitled to the benefit both of pre-DSL and post-DSL guidelines in the
determination of a parole date. Petitioner never has been determined to be suitable
for parole.
7
The Board’s discretion under the DSL has been narrowed from that of its
predecessor, but it remains broad. (See Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
pp. 1078-1080; In re Stanworth, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 182-185.) The Board
decides the actual confinement periods of life-term inmates within a statutory
range. (Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1078; see § 3040.) The Board may
not, by denying parole, retain a prisoner sentenced to a life-maximum term for a
period grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the state
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. (Dannenberg,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1096; see In re Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 651,
656.)
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It is the Attorney General’s view, shared by amicus curiae Los Angeles
County Superior Court, that because the Board is an executive agency rather than a
judicial entity, the Board’s function is not comparable to that of a sentencing court
and its parole determination is unrelated to a sentencing decision of the “court of
commitment.” In this view, a challenge to the Board’s parole determination,
therefore, is not a matter for review by that court.
As we noted at the outset, under the state Constitution the superior court of
any county, including the county of commitment, has jurisdiction to review a
habeas corpus petition challenging the Board’s parole determination. Because
there is no question that the court has jurisdiction to review the Board’s denial of
parole suitability, and we merely decide here the appropriate venue in which to
adjudicate a challenge to that denial, the Board’s status as an executive agency
rather than a judicial entity does not preclude our consideration of any features
shared in common by a parole determination and a sentencing decision that favor
review by the sentencing court.
Amicus curiae Los Angeles County Superior Court also asserts that
sentencing and parole are distinct and unrelated phases in the convicted person’s
affiliation with the correctional system, and that therefore a court in the county
where the petitioner is sentenced is in no better position than a court in the county
where the petitioner is incarcerated to decide claims related to parole.
It is apparent that a term of imprisonment and the onset of parole are distinct
phases under the legislative scheme. (§ 3000; Community Release Bd. v. Superior
Court (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 814, 817.) As amicus curiae observes, the general
objectives of sentencing include protecting society, punishing offenders, deterring
future crimes, and treating with uniformity those committing the same types of
offenses (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410; 3 Witkin & Epstein,
Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Punishment, § 251, p. 334), whereas the objective of
parole is, through the provision of supervision and counseling, to assist in the
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parolee’s transition from imprisonment to discharge and reintegration into society.
(§ 3000, subd. (a)(1).)
Generally speaking, however, a sentence contemplates a period of parole,
which in that respect is related to the sentence. (See § 1168, subd. (b) [the trial
court shall not fix the term or duration of the sentence of life imprisonment],
§ 3000, subd. (a)(1) [the sentence pursuant to § 1168 “shall include a period of
parole, unless waived”], § 3000.1, subd. (a) [an inmate sentenced pursuant to
§ 1168 to a maximum of life imprisonment shall remain on parole for life].) In
addition, the objectives of sentencing and parole are related; in essence,
sentencing ⎯ by punitive incarceration ⎯ achieves mandatory separation of the
offender from society. At the conclusion of that phase, parole assists in returning
the prisoner to society while simultaneously affording some measure of continuing
protection to society.
The Attorney General and amicus curiae Los Angeles County Superior Court
also suggest that other features of the Board’s parole determination, including its
timing and the factors it takes into account, establish that a prisoner’s challenge to
a parole determination is more analogous to his or her challenge to the conditions
of confinement. We recognize that a challenge to an adverse determination
regarding parole, in common with a challenge to the conditions of confinement,
seeks review of the conduct of officials that occurs during the petitioner’s
confinement. Unlike a challenge to the conditions of confinement, however, a
challenge to official conduct in denying parole suitability seeks review of a
determination based upon evidence that is not related solely to the period or
circumstances of confinement, but also to the petitioner’s behavior prior to
confinement as well as to his or her likely behavior following confinement.8

8
The parties and amici curiae labor to characterize the Board’s parole
decision as relating primarily either to the circumstances of the prisoner’s offense
(footnote continued on next page)
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The particular factors employed in the Board’s evaluation of parole suitability
do not dictate or suggest the appropriate venue for judicial review of the Board’s
decision. That is because, as we recognized in Rosenkrantz, the court’s review of
the Board’s decision is circumscribed. The court is authorized to review the factual
basis of a decision by the Board denying parole “to ensure that the decision
comports with the requirements of due process of law, but . . . in conducting such a
review, the court may inquire only whether some evidence in the record before the
Board supports the decision to deny parole based upon the factors specified by
statute and regulation.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 658; In re Powell
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 894, 901-902.) Thus, a challenge to the Board’s determination
may be reviewed as readily by a court in the county of commitment as by a court in
the county of confinement.
Other practical considerations, however, indicate that the court in the county
of commitment is more suited to review the Board’s parole determination.
Assigning the task of adjudicating habeas corpus petitions that challenge adverse
parole determinations to the court in the county of commitment will have the
beneficial effect of producing consistent review of such claims by one court,
instead of review by a multitude of courts as the petitioner is relocated from one
prison to another within the state. In addition, it is likely that the prisoner under
consideration by the Board will return to and have ties to the county in which he or

(footnote continued from previous page)
or the circumstances of confinement. In fact, the Board reviews the offense
committed, the judgment or sentence, the prisoner’s prior history of offenses, the
prisoner’s conduct during the period of confinement, and his or her potential future
conduct. (§ 3041, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2281-2284, 2402, subds.
(c), (d); see Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079, 1093-1095;
Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 654, 679-683; cf., In re Van Heflin, supra, 58
Cal.App.3d at pp. 136-137 [evidence of conditions of confinement generally is not
germane at a parole hearing].)
17

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she formerly resided at the time of the offenses that resulted in the commitment.
We agree with amici curiae San Luis Obispo County Superior Court et alia that
assigning venue to the court of commitment serves the goal of locating the review
of parole decisions where the release of the prisoner is most likely to have an
impact upon the community. The local prosecutor and persons representing the
victims often are the sole witnesses at the Board hearing, and they, along with
persons interested in the prisoner’s welfare, may have the greatest interest in any
court proceeding that reviews the Board’s determinations, as well as the greatest
need to have that proceeding conducted in a venue that does not require extensive
travel.
Finally, important considerations of public policy support our conclusion.
Within this state, certain counties ⎯ small in population and contributing a minute
percentage of the felony convictions that occur statewide, but having large or
numerous facilities for the incarceration of criminal defendants ⎯ process a
disproportionate number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus relative to their
population and their number of felony commitments. In certain instances, the
number of petitions filed in a small county is so large that a substantial portion of
those petitions must be redirected for processing to neighboring sparsely populated
counties, with an attendant adverse impact upon the resources of the affected
counties.
By contrast, certain other counties ⎯ large in population and in their
number of felony convictions, but having comparatively few (or no) prison
facilities ⎯ resolve a fraction of the habeas corpus petitions filed statewide by
inmates in state custody that is small in relation to their share of the state’s
population and total felony convictions. Thus, such counties do not share
18

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proportionately in expending the court resources required to adjudicate these
petitions.9

9
For example, during the state fiscal year 2002-2003, Kings County’s share
(773) of felony convictions statewide (120,011) was substantially less than one
percent. Kings County is the site of three large prison facilities: California State
Prison, Corcoran; California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison,
Corcoran; and Avenal State Prison. During that fiscal year, 415 criminal petitions for
writ of habeas corpus were filed by inmates in state custody in Kings County.
(Judicial Council of Cal., 2004 Court Statistics Rep., State Caseload Trends, table 8b,
Felonies – Filings and Dispositions by Outcome and County, Fiscal Year 2002-2003,
p. 55.2; id., table 11f, Habeas Corpus — Criminal and “Other” Filings & Dispositions
by County, Fiscal Year 2002-2003, p. 58.6, on line at
<http://www.court.info.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2004.pdf [as of July 21, 2005].)
As of June 30, 2003, the end of fiscal year 2002-2003, there were 18,384 felony
prisoners in Kings County. (See Cal. Dept. Corrections, Monthly Rep. of Population
(July 3, 2003) p. 2, online at
<http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0
306.pdf [as of July 21, 2005].) The number of judicial positions authorized for Kings
County is seven (Gov. Code, § 69585.5.) As of June 30, 2003, the ratio of superior
court judges to felony prisoners in that county was one judge for every 2,626 inmates.

By contrast, during the fiscal year 2002-2003, Los Angeles County’s share
(29,881) of felony convictions statewide (120,011) was 25 percent. Los Angeles
County has one major state prison facility within its county limits: California State
Prison, Lancaster. During that fiscal year, 408 criminal petitions for writs of habeas
corpus were filed by inmates in state custody in Los Angeles County. (Judicial
Council of Cal., 2004 Court Statistics Rep., State Caseload Trends, table 8b,
Felonies — Filings and Dispositions by Outcome and County, Fiscal Year 2002-
2003, p. 55.2; id., table 11f, Habeas Corpus — Criminal and “Other” Filings &
Dispositions by County, Fiscal Year 2002-2003, p. 58.6, online at
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2004.pdf [as of July 21,
2005].) As of June 30, 2003, there were 4,281 felony prisoners in Los Angeles
County. (Cal. Dept. Corrections, Monthly Report of Population, supra, p. 2, online
at
http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad
0306.pdf.) The number of judicial positions authorized for Los Angeles County is
429 (Gov. Code, § 69586.) As of June 30, 2003, the ratio of superior court judges to
felony prisoners in that county was one judge for every 10 inmates.

Statistics available from the Department of Corrections reflect that as of June 30,
2003, there were 18,707 inmates with life sentences (and 2,974 inmates with life without
(footnote continued on next page)
19

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By tradition, the superior courts that are located in counties having significant
percentages of prisoners serving life sentences frequently have adjudicated habeas
corpus petitions challenging the denial of parole and, as a consequence, have developed
concomitant expertise in that area of the law. Nonetheless, the historical delegation of
that function has imposed an onerous workload upon the superior courts in sparsely
populated counties having far fewer judges and other personnel and resources than are
available in more populous counties — a circumstance that likely has motivated such
courts in the past to transfer such habeas corpus petitions elsewhere.
As a result, a petitioner may be subjected to significant delays in obtaining resolution
of his or her claims during the time the petition makes the rounds of several courts. In
addition, the process is likely to foster discord between the superior courts in sparsely
populated rural counties (where prisons predominantly are located) and the superior courts
in urban counties with large populations (where trials and sentencing proceedings are
largely conducted and from which the bulk of felony commitments ensue).
We properly consider all of these circumstances in establishing a procedural rule
intended to more equitably and efficiently deal with this situation. As we explained in
Griggs, this court has inherent authority to establish “rules of judicial procedure to be
followed by superior courts” in exercising their territorially unlimited jurisdiction over
habeas corpus petitions. (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 347; see also People v. Pena
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 389, 398-399, 403 [in the exercise of supervisory power over state
courts, directing the Court of Appeal to refrain from utilizing an oral argument waiver
notice]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 861 [in the exercise of supervisory
power over state criminal procedure, prohibiting trial courts from making race-

(footnote continued from previous page)
possibility of parole sentences) in California, but do not set forth the number of such
inmates by county. (Cal. Dept. Corrections, Prison Census Data, table 10, online at
<http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/Annual/Census/CENSUSd0306.
pdf.> [as of July 21, 2005].)
20

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conscious assignments of prospective jurors]; People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th
436, 449 [in the exercise of supervisory power over the courts, directing trial courts to
refrain from instructing juries pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.41.1 on the obligation of
jurors to advise the court of certain juror conduct].)
In light of the foregoing considerations, we direct that a petitioner who seeks
to challenge by means of habeas corpus the denial of parole (or his or her
suitability for parole) should file the petition in the superior court located in the
county in which the conviction and sentence arose, and that the petition should be
adjudicated in that venue. We also direct that when a habeas corpus petition
challenging the denial of parole or suitability for parole is filed in the superior
court in a county other than that in which the petitioner’s conviction and sentence
were imposed, the filing court should transfer the petition to the superior court in
the county of commitment in the first instance, prior to any determination being
made that the petitioner has made a prima facie case. This practice is equitable and
will serve to redress the disparity in the relative burdens imposed upon the
resources of the various courts by this category of habeas corpus petition.
Based upon similar considerations, and again in the exercise of our inherent
authority to establish rules of judicial procedure, we also direct that, among the three
levels of state courts, a habeas corpus petition challenging a decision of the parole
board should be filed in the superior court, which should entertain in the first instance
the petition. (Accord, In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 688, 692 [directing that in
general, a section 1054.9 discovery motion related to a petition for writ of habeas
corpus challenging a judgment of death or life without possibility of parole first
should be made in the trial court that rendered the judgment]; Roma Macaroni
Factory v. Giambastiani (1933) 219 Cal. 435, 436-438 [directing that applications for
writ of mandate ordinarily “should first be made to the superior court”].)
21

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III
Because we have disagreed with the Court of Appeal solely with respect to its
determination that the proper venue for the petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the determination that petitioner is unsuitable for parole lies in the
county and corresponding appellate district in which petitioner is incarcerated, and
we do not disturb the Court of Appeal’s decision that petitioner is ineligible to have
a primary term fixed prior to a finding of suitability for parole, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
GEORGE, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
22

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Roberts
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 104 Cal.App.4th 151
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S112505
Date Filed: July 21, 2005
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Melinda J. Lasater

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Donald Specter, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Orlando Roberts.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frances T.
Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, and Julie L. Garland, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent the
People.

Frederick R. Bennett and Christine Zarifian for Los Angeles Superior Court as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Respondent the People.

Rita Coyne Federman, Charles A. Piccuta; Dawn N. Pilimanu; Kathryn Houck; and William S. Bateman for
San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior Court
and Solano County Superior Court as Amici Curiae.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Donald Specter
Prison Law Office
General Delivery
San Quentin, CA 94964
(415) 457-9144

Julie L. Garland
Deputy Attorney General
110 Wes A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 645-2604

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/21/2005	S112505

Disposition
Jul 21 2005	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 30 2002	Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed   pro per petitioner Orlando Roberts
Dec 30 2002	Petition for review filed   By petitioner {Orlando Roberts} in pro per.
Jan 24 2003	Order filed   On the Court's own motion, the above-entitled petition for writ of habeas corpus is ordered refiled as a petition for review of the court of appeal decision filed December 6, 2002, in B16177, in re Orlando Roberts on Habeas Corpus. The petition for review is deemed to have been timely filed as of December 30, 2002.
Jan 24 2003	Record requested
Jan 24 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   1 doghouse [being sent o/n]
Feb 11 2003	Petition for Review Granted; issues limited (criminal case)   The issue to be briefed and argued shall be limited to the determination of the proper court to adjudicate habeas corpus petitions challenging the denial of a parole date by the Board of Prison Terms. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Mar 18 2003	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Donald Specter is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's Brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty days from the date of this order.
Apr 18 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   By petitioner {Orlando Roberts} / 40(K).
Apr 21 2003	Received:   Petitioner's Certificate of Word Count.
May 16 2003	Request for extension of time filed   By Respondent {The People} asking until June 18, 2003 to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
May 22 2003	Extension of time granted   To June 18, 2003 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits.
Jun 13 2003	Request for extension of time filed   (in San Diego) by the Attorney General for an extension to July 18, 2003, to file respondent's answer brief/merits.
Jun 20 2003	Extension of time granted   To July 18, 2003 to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Jul 17 2003	Request for extension of time filed   By the Attorney General asking until July 28, 2003 to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Jul 21 2003	Extension of time granted   To July 28, 2003 to filed Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits.
Jul 28 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   In San Diego by Respondent {The People}.
Aug 11 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Los Angeles County Superior Court [in support of respondent People]
Aug 19 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by petitioner Orlando Roberts / 40(K).
Aug 19 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Los Angeles Superior Court in support of the People.
Aug 19 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   The Los Angeles Superior Court in support of The People. Answer is due within twenty days.
Sep 9 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   By Petitioner{Orlando Roberts} / 40(K)
Sep 12 2003	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior Court and Solano County Superior Court.
Sep 17 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior and Solano County.
Sep 17 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed   The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior Court and Solano County Superior Court. Answer is due within twenty days.
Oct 7 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   In San Diego by The Attorney General to AC Brief filed by San Luis Obispo County Superior Court et al.,
Oct 8 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   By petitioner. / 40(K).
Nov 5 2004	Notice of substitution of counsel   Rita Coyne Federman withdrwas as lead counsel for AC San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. Charles A. Picccuta, is substituted as lead counsel.
May 3 2005	Case ordered on calendar   5/26/05, 9am, S.F.
May 26 2005	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 21 2005	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Opinion by George, CJ. ----joined by Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Moreno, JJ.
Aug 5 2005	Received:   letter from AG dated August 4, 2005.
Aug 17 2005	Order filed   Finality of the opinion in the above-entitled case is hereby extended to and including September 16, 2005.
Aug 24 2005	Opinion modified - no change in judgment
Aug 24 2005	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Specter
Sep 19 2005	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Sep 22 2005	Received:   Remittitur receipt

Briefs
Apr 18 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 28 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 19 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Aug 19 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Sep 9 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Sep 17 2003	Amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 7 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Oct 8 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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