IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
In re N.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
O.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
S274943
Second Appellate District, Division Five
B312001
Los Angeles County Superior Court
20CCJP06523A
December 14, 2023
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and
Evans concurred.
In re N.R.
S274943
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
We granted review in this matter to decide two related
issues associated with the exercise of dependency jurisdiction by
the juvenile court.
The first issue concerns the meaning of “substance abuse”
as used within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(D) (hereinafter section 300(b)(1)(D)).1 The
statutory scheme for dependency proceedings provides that
jurisdiction over a child exists in various scenarios in which the
“child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will suffer, serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1).) These circumstances include situations in which serious
physical harm or illness, or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness, results from an “inability of the parent or
guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s
or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.” (§ 300(b)(1)(D).) We must decide here
whether substance abuse, in this context, requires either a
diagnosis by a medical professional or satisfaction of the
prevailing criteria for a substance use disorder as specified
within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
1
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Disorders (DSM), a text developed by the American Psychiatric
Association.
As to this issue, we hold that neither of these showings is
essential under section 300(b)(1)(D). We interpret section
300(b)(1)(D) as assigning the term “substance abuse” its
ordinary meaning — essentially, the excessive use of drugs or
alcohol. Although a professional diagnosis or satisfaction of the
DSM criteria for the pertinent substance use disorder can be
relevant to ascertaining the existence of substance abuse under
this standard, we do not read the statute as requiring such
proof.
We caution, however, that for dependency jurisdiction to
exist due to substance abuse pursuant to section 300(b)(1)(D),
this abuse must render a parent or guardian unable to provide
regular care for a child and either cause the child to suffer
serious physical harm or illness or place the child at substantial
risk of suffering such harm or illness. These additional
requirements function to limit the circumstances in which a
parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse will support the exercise
of dependency jurisdiction under this provision.
The second issue before us relates to how these additional
requirements may be established. Some courts have held that
the existence of substance abuse by a parent or guardian, by
itself, amounts to prima facie evidence of both an inability to
provide regular care for a child and a substantial risk of serious
physical harm when the child is of “tender years,” a term that is
sometimes used by courts to describe young children with
limited ability to care for themselves. We reject this tender
years presumption as inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent,
as manifested in the statutory text. The age of a child may bear
2
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
upon whether substance abuse renders a parent or guardian
unable to provide that child with regular care, and whether the
child is thereby placed at substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness. But the statutory scheme does not allow courts
to treat a showing of substance abuse as always being sufficient
on its own to establish these other requirements for dependency
jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D), even when a young child
is involved.
Consistent with these conclusions, we reverse the
judgment below and remand this matter to the Court of Appeal
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 19, 2020, police officers executed a search
warrant at the residence of N.R.’s mother, S.H. (Mother).2 N.R.
was 12 months old at the time. Mother lived separately from
N.R.’s father, appellant O.R. (Father), with the two parents
sharing custody of N.R.
During the execution of the search warrant, a social
worker employed by the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) spoke with
Mother and inspected the premises. The social worker had
safety concerns regarding N.R.’s living arrangements and asked
Mother if N.R. could stay with Father while the investigation
continued. Mother agreed to contact Father, who soon arrived
to pick up N.R.
The social worker accompanied Father to his apartment
and toured it with him. The social worker’s assessment of
2
The search was directed toward weapons and drugs
believed to be in the possession of Mother’s brother and her
mother’s boyfriend.
3
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Father’s residence was generally positive. N.R. was observed to
be “clean, neat and on target with all developmental
milestones.” In speaking with the social worker, Father denied
that he abused substances, and he agreed to take a drug test.
Father’s drug test, conducted that same day, came back
positive for cocaine metabolite at a measured level of 1441
nanograms per milliliter. The social worker went to Father’s
apartment to discuss the results with him. Father said he had
been scared to reveal his cocaine use in their earlier
conversation. He admitted he had used cocaine the weekend
before the positive test. He said he did not know how much of
the substance he had used. Father denied that he was an active
user of cocaine. He explained that he used the cocaine to
celebrate his birthday and had not expected he would be asked
to take care of N.R. soon thereafter, and that he had not used
drugs since then.
N.R. remained in Father’s care, with no concerns beyond
those described above being noted by social workers, from
November 19, 2020, until the execution of a removal order on
December 8, 2020. Pursuant to this order, N.R. was placed in
the care of a maternal uncle.
Shortly thereafter, a petition was filed in Los Angeles
County Superior Court alleging that N.R. came within the
dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Tracking
language appearing within section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the
petition alleged that N.R. had suffered, or there was a
substantial risk he would suffer, serious physical harm or illness
“as a result of the failure or inability of his . . . parent or legal
guardian to supervise or protect [him] adequately,” “as a result
of the willful or negligent failure of [his] parent or legal guardian
to supervise or protect [him] adequately from the conduct of the
4
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
custodian with whom [he] has been left,” and “by the inability of
the parent or legal guardian to provide regular care for [him]
due to the parent’s or legal guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.”
The factual allegations in the petition alleged, first, that
Mother had created a dangerous home environment by allowing
her mother (N.R.’s maternal grandmother), who allegedly
abused drugs, to reside with Mother and N.R. According to the
petition, Father failed to protect N.R. from this danger even
though he knew or should have known of the grandmother’s
substance abuse. As a separate factual basis for the assertion
of dependency jurisdiction, the petition alleged that Father “has
a history of substance abuse and is a current abuser of cocaine,”
noting Father’s positive toxicology result. According to the
petition, N.R. was “of such a young age as to require constant
care and supervision and father’s substance abuse interferes
with providing regular care” for him. The petition further
alleged that Mother had failed to protect N.R. from what it
characterized as Father’s substance abuse.
Both parents subsequently spoke to Department staff
regarding Father’s drug use. Mother initially said that although
she had not known that Father used drugs, looking back, she
realized that Father had been using cocaine from before N.R.
was born until recently. In a later interview, however, she said
that Father used cocaine only before N.R. was born. As for
Father, he explained that he had celebrated his birthday by
using cocaine from Thursday, November 12, through Sunday,
November 15. He stated, “All 4 days I used [cocaine]. Maybe it
was a big amount throughout the 4 days, that’s why it came out
positive.” Asked how much cocaine he used, he said he and his
“friends would pitch in 10 dollars each to get something small
5
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
and that’s it. I don’t know how much we got. I had alcohol too
all 4 days, maybe just 2 tall cans a day.” Father, who was
26 years old at the time of the interview, said he was 21 or 22
when he first tried cocaine. He elaborated, “I never had a
problem with it, I never bought it myself, all these friends did it
together. I used to rave a lot, and when there were big parties,
I’d do it with my friends.” Father said that he used cocaine “once
or twice every two weeks,” adding, “I don’t have an addiction,
otherwise I’d be broke.”
According to Father, N.R. had overnight visits with him
on weekends, and both parents were working well on co-
parenting. Father said that he did not take care of N.R. when
high, and he would not “party” when N.R. was at his residence.
As for the positive test result, Father said, “I’m so upset that
they caught me! My mom was upset too. She was crying when
I told her I tested positive. This cocaine thing is not me! I’m so
upset!” Father said that he formerly smoked marijuana, but no
longer did so. He also reported that he began to drink alcohol at
age 16, but said, “It was never serious, never out of control. I
still go to work and school.”3
A social worker explained to Father what a Child and
Family Team was, as well as its potential benefits.4 Father said
3
Father had a barber’s license. He had been working at a
barber shop for approximately 20 hours per week until the
COVID-19 pandemic struck, at which time he began working
part-time at a warehouse. He lived with his mother and older
brother, and had no criminal record.
4
A Child and Family Team is “a group of individuals who
are convened by the placing agency and who are engaged
through a variety of team-based processes to identify the
strengths and needs of the child or youth and their family, and
6
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
that he did not want to participate in the program, explaining,
“I just want the drug testing. It’s too much. It’s already a big
deal I have two kids. I just want it over with.”5 Regarding this
testing, between January and March 2021 Father had three
negative drug tests, two missed tests, and one leaked test. After
the first missed test, Father contacted a social worker to explain
that he had missed the test due to his work schedule. He asked
that the drug tests occur on Mondays and Fridays, a request
that was denied. The other missed test, on February 23, 2021,
was on a Tuesday.
A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred
in April 2021. After hearing argument from counsel, the court
dismissed the factual allegations involving conditions at
Mother’s former residence6 but concluded that Father’s
“substantial drug abuse history” warranted findings that N.R.
came within the court’s dependency jurisdiction and should be
removed from Father’s care and custody. The court
interlineated the dependency petition’s factual allegations to
describe Father as a “recent abuser of cocaine,” rather than a
“current” one. N.R. was ordered home with Mother on the
condition that she continue to comply with conditions specified
by the court. Father was given monitored visitation and ordered
to participate in drug- and alcohol-related services, including
random drug testing.
to help achieve positive outcomes for safety, permanency, and
well-being.” (§ 16501, subd. (a)(4).
5
Father had another child from a different relationship.
6
Mother had moved into her own apartment by the time of
the hearing.
7
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Father appealed. In his briefing before the Court of
Appeal, Father admitted that he had used cocaine, but he
argued that this use did not amount to substance abuse that
supported a jurisdictional finding. Identifying a split of
authority across the Courts of Appeal regarding the meaning of
“substance abuse” as it appears in section 300, subdivision (b),
Father urged the court to adopt the interpretation first
articulated by In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 (Drake
M.), disapproved on another ground in In re D.P. (2023
14 Cal.5th 266, 283. Drake M., after observing that
“[d]ependency cases have varied widely in the kinds of parental
actions labeled ‘substance abuse,’ ” concluded that “a workable
definition is necessary to avoid any resulting inconsistencies.”
(Drake M., at p. 765.) The court then opined “that a finding of
substance abuse for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b),
must be based on evidence sufficient to (1) show that the parent
or guardian at issue had been diagnosed as having a current
substance abuse problem by a medical professional or
(2) establish that the parent or guardian at issue has a current
substance abuse problem as defined in the” current version of
the DSM at the time of that decision. (Id. at p. 766.)7
Drake M. also concluded that a finding of substance abuse
under this standard constituted “prima facie evidence of the
inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care
resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm” to a child of
“ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.
7
At the time the Drake M. decision was rendered in 2012,
section 300, subdivision (b) had not yet been parsed into its
current subdivisions. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1; Stats. 2014,
ch. 29, § 64.
8
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Father’s briefing before the Court of Appeal criticized this aspect
of Drake M., observing that the statutory scheme nowhere on its
face treats sufficient proof of substance abuse as prima facie
evidence of an inability to provide regular care or a substantial
risk of physical harm. In any event, Father argued, the evidence
before the juvenile court rebutted any prima facie case that
might have arisen.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court determined, first,
that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over very young N.R. because of Father’s
abuse of cocaine.” In so holding, the Court of Appeal did not
discuss the split of authority regarding the meaning of the term
“substance abuse.” In upholding the juvenile court’s assertion
of jurisdiction, the court noted Father’s initial denial of drug use,
the high level of cocaine metabolites recorded in his positive test
result, and his admission to using cocaine once or twice every
two weeks over a four- or five-year period, concluding therefrom
that the record contained substantial evidence of substance
abuse.
The Court of Appeal recognized that a “section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) finding ‘cannot be based on substance abuse
alone; jurisdiction [also] requires a substantial risk of harm to
the child arising from the substance abuse.’ ” But the court then
invoked the tender years presumption, observing that “[w]here
very young children like N.R. are concerned . . . ‘ “the finding of
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a
substantial risk of physical harm.” ’ ” The Court of Appeal
determined that Father had not rebutted the prima facie
showing of a substantial risk of serious physical harm
established by his substance abuse, perceiving Father’s reaction
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
to the positive drug test and his refusal to participate in services
beyond random drug testing as further evidence of such risk.
Turning to the juvenile court’s disposition order, the Court
of Appeal determined that this order was supported by
substantial evidence establishing “both that N.R. would be at
substantial danger if returned to Father’s unsupervised care
and there were no reasonable means short of removal to
mitigate the danger to N.R.” The court found that Father’s
“behavior — especially his initial effort to conceal his drug use
and his steadfast denial that his drug use was a problem —
demonstrate he was unable or unwilling to substantively engage
with any efforts that might have prevented the need to remove
N.R. from his custody so as to mitigate the substantial danger
to the very young child from Father’s cocaine abuse.”
We granted review to resolve the split of authority
regarding the meaning of “substance abuse” as used in section
300(b)(1)(D). Some Courts of Appeal have adopted the definition
crafted in Drake M. (see, e.g., In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
646, 652; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 447,
disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7), whereas others (see, e.g., In re
K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601) have followed In re
Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Christopher R.), in
which the court “recognize[d] the Drake M. formulation as a
generally useful and workable definition of substance abuse for
purposes of section 300, subdivision (b),” but refused to accept
the argument that substance abuse can be found only when
someone “has been diagnosed by a medical professional or . . .
falls within one of the specific [DSM] categories.” (Christopher
R., at p. 1218.) In ordering review, we also agreed to decide
whether substance abuse by a parent or guardian, when found
10
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
to exist, should be treated as prima facie evidence of an inability
to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical
harm to a young child. This aspect of the Drake M. decision has
found acceptance even among courts that have rejected its view
that substance abuse requires a professional diagnosis or
satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria. (See, e.g., Christopher
R., at p. 1219.
II. DISCUSSION
Both issues before us present questions of statutory
interpretation. After reviewing the juvenile dependency
scheme, we consider whether the Legislature intended for
substance abuse to be recognized only upon evidence
establishing either that the pertinent DSM criteria have been
satisfied or that a parent or guardian has been diagnosed with
a substance use disorder by a qualified professional. We then
address whether a finding of substance abuse is properly
regarded as prima facie evidence of an inability to provide
regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to that child.
A. The Statutory Scheme for Dependency
Proceedings
“The purpose of California’s dependency law is ‘to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children
who are at risk of that harm.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2,
subd. (a).) In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law
balances a number of vital interests: children’s interests in safe
and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children;
11
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and
the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable
members.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,
623–624 (Michael G.).
“Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.
[Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court
determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court
because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant
harm.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 624.) “ ‘A
dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the
juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over
the endangered child’s care.’ [Citation.] After the juvenile court
takes that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations
on parental authority as necessary to protect the child.
[Citations.] It may also order that the child be removed from a
parent’s physical custody if there is clear and convincing
evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child from a
substantial risk of harm. [Citations.] In some cases, a
dependency adjudication may lead to termination of parental
rights.” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 876 (I.C.).
Section 300 enumerates the various ways in which a child
may come within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. Our focus here is upon section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
which provides that a juvenile may be adjudged a dependent of
the court when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness,
as a result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately
supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent
failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom
the child has been left. [¶] (C) The willful or negligent failure
of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate
food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. [¶] (D) The
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for
the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (Italics added.
Although we have previously considered other aspects of
section 300 (see, e.g., I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th 869; In re R.T. (2017
3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766 (I.J.)), we
have not previously interpreted the statute’s reference to
substance abuse.
B. Neither Satisfaction of the Relevant DSM
Criteria nor a Professional Medical Diagnosis Is
Required To Show Substance Abuse Under
Section 300
The first issue we address is whether a juvenile court may
recognize substance abuse by a parent or guardian under section
300(b)(1)(D) only in circumstances in which the evidence before
it either (1) establishes that the relevant diagnostic criteria in
the current edition of the DSM have been satisfied, as Father
has argued before us, or (2) includes a professional diagnosis of
a current substance use disorder, which the Drake M. court also
contemplated as an alternative method of proving the existence
of substance abuse. We conclude that the Legislature did not
impose either requirement when it added the substance abuse
language to section 300 in 1987 as part of a broader overhaul of
the dependency scheme.
1. Statutory Language
“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the
statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’
[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative
purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019
6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857 (Meza).
a. Applying standard principles of statutory
interpretation, “substance abuse” bears its
ordinary meaning here
Beginning with the statutory text, we observe that neither
section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme
relating to dependency proceedings defines “substance abuse,”
although definitions are provided for other terms relevant to the
exercise of dependency jurisdiction. (E.g., § 300, subds. (b)(4
[defining “sexually trafficked” by reference to the definition
provided in Pen. Code, § 236.1 and “sexual acts” by reference to
Pen. Code, §§ 236.1 and 11165.1], (d) [explaining that the
statute borrows the definition of “sexual abuse” found in Pen.
Code, § 11165.1], (e) [defining “severe physical abuse”].
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
The Legislature’s failure to define substance abuse
suggests that legislators intended for this term to bear its
ordinary meaning in this context. (See Valley Circle Estates v.
VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 608–609
[“ ‘Excepting when clearly otherwise intended or indicated,
words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and
receive a sensible construction in accord with the commonly
understood meaning thereof’ ”]; County of Orange v. Santa
Margarita Water Dist. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 189, 192 [“When a
statute does not define its operative words, ‘courts should give
to the words . . . their ordinary, everyday meaning’ ”]; cf. People
ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 302
(Lungren) [noting of text in an initiative statute that “because
the term is not further defined, it can be assumed to refer not to
any special term of art, but rather to a meaning that would be
commonly understood by the electorate”].)8
In this respect, dictionaries can provide a helpful resource
for ascertaining the common meanings attached to a word or
phrase. (See People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1009.) The
definitions of “substance abuse” appearing within dictionaries
vary to some degree in their specificity and particulars. (See,
e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2000) p. 1170,
col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as “excessive use of a drug (as
8
The Legislature has defined “substance abuse” as it
appears in a different provision of the Welfare and Institutions
Code. Section 746, subdivision (b) identifies “substance abuse”
as among the factors that place a “minor at a significantly
greater risk of becoming a chronic juvenile or adult offender,”
and defines “substance abuse” in that context as including “any
regular use of alcohol or drugs by the minor, other than
experimentation.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
alcohol, narcotics, or cocaine): use of a drug without medical
justification”]; American Heritage Dict. of the English Language
(3d ed. 1996) p. 1791, col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as
“Excessive use of addictive substances, especially alcohol and
narcotic drugs”]; The Random House Dict. of the English
Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 1897, col. 1 [defining “substance
abuse” as “long-term, pathological use of alcohol or drugs,
characterized by daily intoxication, inability to reduce
consumption, and impairment in social or occupational
functioning; broadly, alcohol or drug addiction”].) These
definitions are alike, however, in that they all associate
substance abuse with the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. We
conclude that “substance abuse,” as it appears in section
300(b)(1)(D), is most plausibly understood as bearing this
ordinary meaning. (See Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794,
808 [perceiving no indication within a statute “that would justify
our presuming the Legislature intended a specialized or narrow
usage rather than a general one”].
While this commonplace understanding of substance
abuse may seem broad and potentially capable of inconsistent
application if read in isolation, nearby language within the
statute clarifies the kind of excessive drug or alcohol use that
section 300(b)(1)(D) is concerned with and limits the
circumstances in which substance abuse will allow for a
jurisdictional finding under this provision. Section 300(b)(1)(D
allows for dependency jurisdiction based on substance abuse
only when this abuse leads to an “inability” on the part of a
parent or guardian “to provide regular care for [a] child”
(§ 300(b)(1)(D)) that causes the child to suffer, or creates “a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness” (id., subd. (b)(1)). Even if a parent’s or guardian’s
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
excessive use of drugs or alcohol has other negative
manifestations, it does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under
section 300(b)(1)(D) unless it also has these effects. (Ibid.)9
b. The statutory scheme does not support defendant’s
argument that the Legislature assigned substance
abuse a technical meaning linked to the DSM
Father reads the statutory text differently, but his
interpretation is unpersuasive.
Father asserts that “substance abuse,” as used in section
300(b)(1)(D), “is best understood by consulting the dictionary of
brain disorders: the DSM.” In essence, he contends that section
300(b)(1)(D) uses “substance abuse” in a technical sense that
makes it appropriate to consult the DSM as an authoritative
text in its field. (See In re Smith (1928) 88 Cal.App. 464, 467–
468 [“Technical words when relating to a trade, when used in a
statute or ordinance, dealing with the subject matter of such
trade, are to be taken in their technical sense and will be so
construed unless the context or other considerations show a
contrary intent”]; Mueller v. Psychiatric Security Review Bd.
(Or. 1997) 937 P.2d 1028, 1032 [“Because the phrase
9
In certain circumstances a parent’s or guardian’s
substance-related issues may contribute to a finding that
dependency jurisdiction exists for another reason, such as a
“failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1)(A).) Although this case does not require that we construe
section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), this provision serves to show
that an exercise of dependency jurisdiction that is in some
measure premised on a parent’s or guardian’s involvement with
drugs or alcohol does not necessarily require a judicial finding
of substance abuse under some defined standard.
17
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
‘personality disorder’ [under Oregon statutory law] is a term of
art as to which the DSM-III was the definitive source, this court
has referred to the DSM for guidance in cases involving
individuals with mental diseases or defects”].
Some background information regarding the DSM is
helpful in evaluating Father’s argument. The DSM, now in its
fifth revised edition (DSM-5-TR),10 “is a classification of mental
disorders that was developed for use in clinical, educational, and
research settings” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 23). The “primary
purpose” of the DSM “is to assist trained clinicians in the
diagnosis of mental disorders as part of a case formulation
assessment that leads to an informed treatment plan for each
individual.” (Id. at p. 21.
The DSM-5-TR and prior editions of the DSM (including
the DSM-III and the DSM-III-R, which were the most recent
versions of the manual when the substance abuse language was
10
This version of the DSM was published in 2022. (Am.
Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022).) The DSM was first published
in 1952. (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (1952).) A second edition was
published in 1968 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2d ed. 1968)); a third
edition in 1980 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980) (DSM-III));
a third revised edition in 1987 (Am. Psychiatric Assn.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d rev.
ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R)); a fourth edition in 1994 (Am. Psychiatric
Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV)); a fourth revised edition in 2000 (Am.
Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR)); and a fifth
edition in 2013 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5)).
18
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
added to § 300) have identified an array of disorders involving
substance use and, beginning with the DSM-III, have included
criteria for diagnosing these disorders. The categorization and
specific descriptions of these disorders have evolved over time.
The DSM-III-R distinguished between “Psychoactive Substance
Dependence” (involving the satisfaction of at least three of nine
specified criteria) (DSM-III-R, supra, at p. 166) and a “residual”
disorder, “Psychoactive Substance Abuse,” which would be
diagnosed only if the criteria for substance dependence were not
satisfied (id. at p. 169). (See id. at pp. 165–169; see also DSM-
III, supra, at pp. 164–165 [distinguishing between “substance
abuse” and “substance dependence,” with the latter being
“generally . . . a more severe form of Substance Use Disorder”].
Within the DSM-5-TR, the previously recognized categories of
substance abuse and substance dependence have been replaced
“with an overarching new category of substance use disorders —
with the specific substance used defining the specific disorders.”
(DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. xxiv.)11
According to the DSM-5-TR, which Father identifies as
supplying the operative criteria at this time for ascertaining
substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D), “The essential
feature of a substance use disorder is a cluster of cognitive,
behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the
individual continues using the substance despite significant
substance-related problems.” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 544.
Within the array of substance use disorders described by the
11
Notwithstanding the DSM’s revision of its terminology for
substance use disorders, we primarily use the term “substance
abuse” within this opinion to remain consistent with the
language used in section 300(b)(1)(D).
19
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
DSM-5-TR, stimulant use disorders are characterized as “[a]
pattern of amphetamine-type substance, cocaine, or other
stimulant use leading to clinically significant impairment or
distress, as manifested by at least two” of 11 identified criteria
over a 12-month period. (Id. at p. 632.)12
Upon review of both the statutory text and the DSM, it
does not appear that the Legislature intended for the term
“substance abuse,” as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), to bear the
technical meaning that Father ascribes to it. Neither
section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme
12
The DSM-5-TR criteria for a stimulant use disorder
consist of the following: “The stimulant is often taken in larger
amounts or over a longer period than was intended”; “There is a
persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control
stimulant use”; “A great deal of time is spent in activities
necessary to obtain the stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover
from its effects”; “Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use the
stimulant”; “Recurring stimulant use resulting in a failure to
fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home”;
“Continued stimulant use despite having persistent or recurrent
social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the
effects of the stimulant”; “Important social, occupational, or
recreational activities are given up or reduced because of
stimulant use”; “Recurrent stimulant use in situations in which
it is physically hazardous”; “Stimulant use is continued despite
knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or
psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or
exacerbated by the stimulant”; “Tolerance, as defined by
either . . . : [¶] a. A need for markedly increased amounts of
the stimulant to achieve intoxication or desired effect. [¶] b. A
markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same
amount of the stimulant”; and “Withdrawal, as manifested by
either . . . : [¶] a. The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for
the stimulant . . . . [¶] b. The stimulant (or a closely related
substance) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.”
(DSM-5-TR, supra, at pp. 632–633.
20
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
mentions the DSM. The absence of any such references counsels
against Father’s position. It would be unusual for the
Legislature to have delegated to a specific body such as the
American Psychiatric Association the authority to define such a
consequential term appearing in a statute. Had the Legislature
placed such reliance upon a text developed and maintained by a
nongovernmental entity, which could change its terminology or
redefine the relevant criteria in a manner wholly outside of the
Legislature’s control (see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979
23 Cal.3d 219, 234, fn. 14 [observing that “the American
Psychiatric Association frequently alters its definitions of what
constitutes a mental disorder”]), one would expect to see some
acknowledgement of that delegation on the face of the statute.
(See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, former § 813 [specifying that
the term “mental disorder,” as formerly used within the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.), was “limited to
those disorders listed by the American Psychiatric Association
in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”];
cf. Pub. Resources Code, § 48620.2, subd. (a)(2) [referencing an
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard
within a definition].) Yet no such explanation appears here,
suggesting that the Legislature did not intend for the meaning
of “substance abuse” to hinge entirely upon the criteria
articulated in the DSM.
Nor can we infer, based on usage at the time of section
300(b)(1)(D)’s enactment, that the Legislature regarded the
term “substance abuse” as so obviously referring to the pertinent
DSM criteria as to make any explanation unnecessary. To the
contrary, contemporaneously enacted statutes commonly
assigned the term “substance abuse” a more conventional,
nontechnical meaning. (See, e.g., Stats. 1987, ch. 1291, § 1,
21
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
p. 4618, adding Ed. Code, § 44049, subd. (b) [conferring limited
immunity upon school principals and their designees who
inform parents of instances in which a pupil engaged in “alcohol
or controlled substance abuse”]; Stats. 1987, ch. 879, § 1,
p. 2778, adding Pen. Code, § 1203.1ab [providing for “drug and
substance abuse testing” of certain probationers]; Stats. 1986,
ch. 1441, § 1, p. 5146, adding Welf. & Inst. Code, § 502, subd.
(a)(4) [referencing “crimes of . . . substance abuse”].
It is notable too that the Legislature departed from the
classification scheme and terminology that the DSM-III and the
DSM-III-R applied to substance use disorders. These
departures also suggest that legislators did not intend to limit
findings of substance abuse to situations in which the pertinent
DSM criteria had been satisfied. Section 300(b)(1)(D) avoids the
distinction that the DSM-III and DSM-III-R drew between
“Substance Dependence” and “Substance Abuse.” (DSM-III-R,
supra, at pp. 166, 169; DSM-III, supra, at pp. 164–165.) In doing
so, the statute does not explain whether the condition described
as substance dependence in those editions of the DSM should be
regarded as substance abuse for purposes of applying the
statute. Section 300(b)(1)(D) also departs from the DSM’s
approach insofar as the statute distinguishes between
“substance abuse” and “mental illness” (itself a term the DSM
has long rejected, in favor of “mental disorder”), rather than
treating the former as a subset of the latter. Had the
Legislature intended for the prevailing DSM criteria to provide
the sole reference point for recognizing substance abuse by a
parent or guardian, section 300 presumably would have
reconciled or at least acknowledged these differences in
terminology and categorization.
22
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
We therefore do not perceive in the language of section 300
any persuasive indication that the Legislature intended for the
relevant DSM criteria to supply the exclusive definition of
substance abuse. This conclusion is not altered by section
300(b)(1)(D)’s grouping of substance abuse together with
“mental illness” and “developmental disability.” Father asserts
that the Legislature would have perceived all three of these
circumstances as capable of being shown only through the
satisfaction of professionally developed criteria. His position
relies upon the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction,
whereby “ ‘ “[a] word of uncertain meaning may be known from
its associates and its meaning ‘enlarged or restrained by
reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is
used.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 200
(Hernandez).
When applicable, the noscitur a sociis canon favors “ ‘ “ ‘a
restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more
expansive meaning would make other items in the list
unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item
markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.’ ” ’ ”
(Hernandez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200, italics added.
There are some threshold hurdles to the application of this
principle here. It is not clear that section 300(b)(1)(D)’s
recitation of “mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse” implicates this canon at all. (See American
Bankers v. National Credit Union Admin. (D.C. Cir. 2019
934 F.3d 649, 665 [terms in a list found within a statute may be
treated differently when their “ ‘fit’ ” is neither tight nor self-
evident].) Moreover, the case law casts doubt on the premise,
essential to Father’s argument, that satisfaction of a specific
professionally developed standard analogous to the DSM
23
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
criteria for substance use disorders is required to show a mental
illness or developmental disability in the dependency context.
(See Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202
(Laurie S.) [finding expert testimony unnecessary to assess, at
the jurisdictional stage of dependency proceedings, whether a
parent’s mental health issues placed her child at substantial
risk of serious physical harm]; In re Khalid H. (1992
6 Cal.App.4th 733, 736 (Khalid H.) [noting that section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) “does not contain a described formal procedure
to determine if a parent suffers from a mental illness,” and
declining to read such a procedure into the statute].
But Father’s argument would fail even if we were to
regard the noscitur a sociis canon as relevant and further
assume for sake of argument that the Legislature intended for
findings of mental illness and developmental disability under
section 300(b)(1)(D) to require the satisfaction of objective
criteria commonly relied upon by professionals in the relevant
fields. It would not make mental illness and developmental
disability on the one hand, and substance abuse on the other,
“ ‘ “ ‘markedly
dissimilar’ ” ’ ”
(Hernandez,
supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200) if the same kind of showing were not
strictly necessary to establish substance abuse. The Legislature
could well have grouped mental illness, developmental
disability, and substance abuse together as circumstances that
all may lead to an inability to provide a child with regular care,
while at the same time appreciating that each could involve
somewhat different kinds of proof. (See Lungren, supra,
14 Cal.4th at p. 308 [rejecting an invocation of the noscitur a
sociis principle because when viewed in light of the relevant
statute’s broader purpose, “the seeming dissimilarities between”
24
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
two subjects of legislation “become less significant than their
similarities”].
In short, the mere fact that the terms “mental illness,”
“developmental disability,” and “substance abuse” are in close
proximity to one another within section 300(b)(1)(D) does not
establish that the Legislature intended that similar showings
would be required to prove them.
Father also argues that references to substance abuse
treatment programs (§§ 300.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A)
and substance abuse treatment facilities (e.g., §§ 366.21, subd.
(e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) appearing elsewhere within the
statutory scheme connote a focus upon substance use severe
enough to require treatment, and that the DSM criteria provide
the appropriate framework for determining whether substance
abuse exists under this standard.
This argument reads too much into these provisions,
which concern the significance to be accorded at different stages
of the dependency process to a parent’s or guardian’s enrollment
in a substance abuse treatment or facility (e.g., §§ 361.5, subd.
(a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) or to the
successful completion of, or failure to complete, a substance
abuse treatment program (e.g., § 300.2, subd. (a); § 364, subd.
(c) [referring to a “court ordered treatment program”]). These
scattered references to treatment in varied contexts do not
establish that the Legislature regarded substance abuse as
present under section 300(b)(1)(D) only when the relevant DSM
criteria for a substance use disorder have been satisfied. The
Legislature could have recognized the existence of substance
abuse treatment programs and facilities, and further sought to
explain the relationship between enrollment in a program or
25
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
facility and decisions that must be made at different stages of
the dependency process, without also perceiving the close
connections among substance abuse, treatment, and the DSM
that Father advances in his interpretation of section
300(b)(1)(D). Indeed, as we have explained, the weight of
evidence of legislative intent that can be gleaned from the
statutory text indicates that these connections were not
intended. Instead, the term “substance abuse” carries its
ordinary meaning as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), with other
language within the statute harmonizing this definition with
the overarching goals of the dependency scheme by clarifying
that, to supply grounds for dependency jurisdiction, substance
abuse must make the parent or guardian unable to provide
regular care for a child and lead to serious physical harm to the
child, or a substantial risk of such harm.
2. Legislative History
Although the lack of textual support for Father’s position
is compelling, we also consider Father’s argument that his
interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) is grounded in the
legislative history of, and purposes behind, the dependency
scheme. We conclude this contention is no more persuasive than
Father’s textual arguments.
The legislative history materials surrounding the 1987
amendments to the dependency scheme do not mention the DSM
at all. The absence of any such discussion provides a persuasive
indication that the Legislature did not intend to restrict judicial
findings of substance abuse to circumstances in which the DSM
criteria have been satisfied. (See, e.g., Larkin v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 166 [assigning significance
to the absence of discussion of an issue within legislative history
26
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
materials]; Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008
42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169 [same].
Father nonetheless argues that linking findings of
substance abuse to the prevailing DSM criteria for substance
use disorders would advance the enacting Legislature’s goals of
clarifying the grounds for dependency jurisdiction (see R.T.,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 631) and distinguishing between
substance use and substance abuse. Our review of the pertinent
legislative history materials, set out below, corroborates
Father’s understanding that the Legislature had these general
aims in mind when it added the substance abuse language to
section 300 in 1987. But we do not believe the Legislature
implemented these goals by defining substance abuse in the
manner Father proposes.
As background, the legislation that added the substance
abuse language to section 300 (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 243)) was developed by a task force
that had been charged by statute with reviewing the laws
relating to child abuse reporting, dependent children, and child
welfare services, and had been directed to “identify problem
areas in the law” and recommend “statutory revisions to
strengthen and compliment the child welfare system in
California.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 1122, § 24, p. 3995.) Among its
findings, the task force determined that section 300, as it existed
prior to 1987, provided “very little guidance to investigating and
petitioning agencies, to judges, attorneys or to parents as to
what actions or harms justify state intervention. Existing law
states that a child that comes within any of the following
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court: is in
need of proper and effective parental care and control; is
destitute; is dangerous to the public; [or] lives in a home which
27
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
is an unfit place for him or her. Because there is little legislative
guidance, different agencies and individuals employ different
standards, and cases are inappropriately brought into the
system.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243
(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 27, 1987, p. 3.) The
Legislature hoped that legislation developed by the task force
would “more clearly define the conditions under which a child
could be removed from the family home.” (Ibid.; see also Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10,
1987, p. 1 [describing the proposed legislation as “[c]learly
defin[ing] the conditions under which a child can be removed
from the family and/or the court can exercise jurisdiction”];
Legis. Analyst, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg.
Sess.) as amended May 26, 1987, p. 1 [observing that the
measure “[n]arrows the definition of abuse for purposes of
dependency proceedings”]; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 17,
1987, pp. 1, 3.
As originally introduced in the Legislature, Senate Bill
No. 243 provided for dependency jurisdiction in circumstances
such as where “[t]he minor has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that he or she will imminently suffer, physical harm
causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning,
protracted impairment of physical health, or other serious
physical injury, as a result of . . . the inability of the parent or
guardian to provide regular care for the minor due to the parent
or guardian’s use of drugs or alcohol or mental illness or
deficiency.” (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as
introduced Jan. 26, 1987, § 6, italics added.) This language was
amended soon after the bill’s introduction so that its last clause
28
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
described an “inability of the parent, guardian, or primary
caretaker to provide regular care for the minor due to the
parent’s, guardian’s, or primary caretaker’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (Sen. Bill No. 243
(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 30, 1987, § 6, italics
added; see also Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Minutes (Feb. 19–
20, 1987), p. 1 [recording the task force’s approval of this
change].) This “substance abuse” terminology was eventually
codified. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5606.) Nothing within
the legislative history materials before us specifically explains
why the original “use of drugs or alcohol” language within the
proposed legislation was replaced by the term “substance
abuse,” or otherwise communicates a prevailing view regarding
what the term “substance abuse” meant.
It is apparent from these and other legislative history
materials that the Legislature sought to clarify the grounds for
assertion of dependency jurisdiction through the revisions to the
dependency scheme that were enacted in 1987. But it is also
evident that the Legislature implemented its intent in a manner
that would “provide maximum protection for children who are
currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused,
being neglected, or being exploited, and to protect children who
are at risk of that harm,” albeit also being mindful not to
“disrupt the family unnecessarily or . . . intrude inappropriately
into family life.” (Former § 300; Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5,
p. 5608.) Insofar as some bases for dependency jurisdiction
could be precisely specified without depriving children of this
protection, they were. But as a matter of necessity, some
grounds for jurisdiction had to be phrased in more general
terms. (See Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and
29
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988) pp. 4–5 [“The task force spent
a great deal of time on the wording of each section and several
legislative committees reviewed the specific language in lengthy
hearings,” and “it is not possible to give a highly specific
definition of the phrase ‘serious’ [as used in § 300] without being
too restrictive”].
For instance, section 300 has since 1987 provided for the
exercise of dependency jurisdiction when a child “has been
subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian
or a member of the child’s household.” (§ 300, subd. (i); see
Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5608.) The Legislature did not
further define “act or acts of cruelty” (§ 300, subd. (i)) due to the
myriad forms such conduct may take. Instead, what constitutes
an “act or acts of cruelty” is a “factual determination that the
juvenile court makes based upon the common meaning of the
phrase and the totality of the child’s circumstances.” (In re D.C.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.
On balance, the available evidence of legislative intent
indicates the Legislature took a similar approach insofar as
substance abuse was concerned, and declined to recognize
substance abuse only in situations involving the satisfaction of
DSM criteria. Nor did it otherwise limit the ordinary meaning
of substance abuse when these constraints might fail to capture
the various ways in which substance abuse can render a parent
or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and place
a child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.
Meanwhile, the substitution of “substance abuse” for “use of
drugs or alcohol” during the legislative process may have simply
reflected an appreciation that, as a practical matter, only the
excessive use of drugs or alcohol would lead to an “inability of
the parent or guardian to provide regular care for [a] child.”
30
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
(§ 300(b)(1)(D).) The legislative history therefore does not
provide significant support for Father’s interpretation of the
statute.
3. Statutory Purpose and Public Policy
Father, supported by several amici curiae, also argues
that his interpretation of the statute is necessary to vindicate
important policy interests that motivated the above-discussed
changes to section 300. Echoing the reasoning in Drake M.,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at page 765, he asserts that the
definition of substance abuse that he proposes is necessary to
ensure consistency across dependency findings and guarantee
they are premised on sufficient showings of substance abuse, as
opposed to mere substance use. Father describes the alternative
approach, in which substance abuse is defined by reference to
conventional understandings of the term, as “nothing more than
‘you’ll know it when you see it.’ ” These policy arguments do not
persuade us to adopt Father’s interpretation of the statute.
At the outset, it is unclear whether Father’s proposed
definition of substance abuse would avoid the problems he
perceives with assigning this term its usual meaning. Recall
again that Father regards the DSM-5-TR as the touchstone for
the necessary analysis today, under the theory that the enacting
Legislature intended for the meaning of substance abuse to
evolve in step with developments in professional expertise. The
DSM-5-TR regards a diagnosis of a stimulant use disorder as
appropriate upon satisfaction of two or more out of 11 identified
criteria. (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632.) Some of these criteria
are susceptible to expansive and potentially inconsistent
application, particularly in the hands of untrained laypeople,
e.g., “[t]he stimulant is often taken in larger amounts or over a
31
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
longer period than was intended”; “[t]here is a persistent desire
or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control stimulant use”; “[a]
great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the
stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover from its effects”; and
“[c]raving, or a strong desire or urge to use the stimulant.”
(Ibid.) Connecting substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D
to the relevant DSM criteria is therefore not the obvious
panacea that Father makes it out to be.13
Nor are the findings required for dependency jurisdiction
under section 300(b)(1)(D) as elastic as Father asserts.
Significantly, as previously alluded to, the recognition of
substance abuse by a parent or guardian does not by itself
establish that the other requirements for the exercise of
dependency jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) have been
satisfied. Even with sufficient proof of substance abuse, the
government also bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence (see § 355, subd. (a)) that this
abuse makes the parent or guardian unable to provide regular
care for a child, and that this inability has caused a child to
suffer serious physical harm or illness or places the child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. (See, e.g.,
13
Father asserts that premising findings of substance abuse
on satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria would comport with
prevailing best practices among social workers. Whatever
relevance these practices may have to the central question of
legislative intent, we do not perceive a significant tension
between standards calling for social workers to stay abreast of
current knowledge regarding substance use disorders and how
we conclude “substance abuse” should be interpreted as it
appears in section 300(b)(1)(D). Such knowledge may be
pertinent to an assessment of what amounts to excessive use of
drugs or alcohol.
32
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003 (Destiny S.
[jurisdiction under § 300 cannot be premised on drug use alone,
without evidence of serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of such harm or illness].
On this subject, although we reject the Drake M. court’s
interpretation of the term “substance abuse,” we agree with its
conclusion that the facts before the juvenile court in that case
did not support the exercise of dependency jurisdiction due to
parental substance abuse. The father in Drake M. used
marijuana pursuant to a medical recommendation four or five
times a week, mostly early in the day, to ease pain in his hands
and knees. (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 760–761.
He smoked the substance in a detached garage, away from his
young child, and otherwise kept it in a locked box that the child
could not access. (Ibid.) When the father smoked marijuana
with his wife, another adult watched over their child. (Id. at
pp. 758, 759.) The father stated that at least four hours would
pass between when he smoked marijuana and when he saw his
child after day care, and that by that time he no longer felt any
problematic effects of the drug. (Id. at p. 761.) No evidence was
offered before the juvenile court, in the form of expert testimony
or otherwise, to establish that the father would still be feeling
such effects upon resuming supervision of the child (id. at
pp. 761, 767–768), and no other substantial issues were reported
in connection with the child’s care (id. at p. 758). Viewing the
record as a whole, even though Drake M.’s reasoning was flawed
with respect to how it defined substance abuse, we believe that
its ultimate conclusion rejecting the exercise of dependency
jurisdiction under what is today section 300(b)(1)(D) was
nonetheless correct. (Drake M., at p. 768.) The record before
that court did not contain substantial evidence of substance
33
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
abuse that made the father unable to provide regular care for
his child and placed the child at substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness.
Meanwhile, there are substantial countervailing policy
considerations that counsel against regarding the DSM criteria
for substance use disorders as providing the exclusive yardsticks
for assessments of substance abuse for purposes of section
300(b)(1)(D). These include the fact that DSM criteria are
designed for clinical application and assume the availability of
information relevant to a diagnosis. Several of the DSM-5-TR
criteria for substance use disorders, such as the presence of
cravings, tolerance, and withdrawal symptoms (e.g., DSM-5-TR,
supra, at pp. 632–633), rely on information that might
commonly be divulged by a patient interested in obtaining an
accurate diagnosis, but may not be as readily forthcoming from
a parent or guardian during the dependency process. Courts
therefore may lack the information necessary to apply the DSM
criteria in their intended manner.
Also, Father’s approach gives short shrift to the DSM’s
warnings that its criteria should not be mechanically applied by
laypeople and may not capture all of the considerations relevant
to a legal question that may come before a court. Cautionary
statements regarding the DSM’s use have appeared in versions
of the manual dating back to the DSM-III.14 The statement
14 DSM-5-TR, supra, at page 29; DSM-5, supra, at page 25;
DSM-IV-TR, supra, at page xxxvii; DSM-IV, supra, at
page xxvii; DSM-III-R, supra, at page xxix. The statement in
the DSM-III, which bore the title, “CAUTIONS,” provided in
full: “The purpose of DSM-III is to provide clear descriptions of
diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
within the DSM-III-R, for example, advised that the proper use
of the manual’s “criteria requires specialized clinical training
that provides both a body of knowledge and clinical skills” and
warned that the DSM-III-R’s inclusion, “for clinical and
research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Pathological
Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the condition meets
legal or other nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental
disease, mental disorder, or mental disability.” (DSM-III-R,
supra, at p. xxix.) The statement within the DSM-5-TR
acknowledges that, “Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and
text are primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting
clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning,
DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and attorneys
in assessing the legal consequences of mental disorders. As a
result, it is important to note that the definition of mental
disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of
clinicians, public health professionals, and research
investigators rather than the technical needs of the courts and
legal professionals.” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 29.) Following
additional warnings, the statement continues, “Use of DSM-5 to
assess the presence of a mental disorder by nonclinical,
nonmedical, or otherwise insufficiently trained individuals is
not advised.” (Ibid.) Elsewhere, the DSM-5-TR warns that it
should “not be applied mechanically by individuals without
clinical training” and that the text’s diagnostic criteria “are not
investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat
various mental disorders. The use of this manual for non-
clinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility,
competency or insanity, or justification for third-party payment,
must be critically examined in each instance within the
appropriate institutional context.” (DSM-III, supra, at p. 12.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
meant to be used in a rigid cookbook fashion.” (Id. at p. 23.) Yet
Father’s approach runs a high risk of exactly that type of
application, even assuming the best efforts of judges and others
involved in the juvenile dependency process to faithfully apply
the manual.
Rote application of the DSM criteria would be particularly
inappropriate within a statutory scheme for dependency
proceedings that is intended “to provide maximum safety and
protection for children who are currently being physically,
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.”
(§ 300.2, subd. (a).) As the Department observes in its answer
brief, as a diagnostic resource the DSM is not designed to “assess
risk to a third party, much less a child.” To identify one example
of the disconnects that exist between the DSM criteria and the
statutory scheme for juvenile dependency proceedings, if a
parent or guardian engages in frequent stimulant use “resulting
in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or
home” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632) that relate to the care of a
child, it is unclear why another of the remaining 10 criteria for
a stimulant use disorder enumerated within the DSM-5-TR —
with any of these criteria sufficing — would also have to be
satisfied to recognize substance abuse under section
300(b)(1)(D). And although the DSM-5-TR recognizes that a
positive diagnosis may be rendered in some situations in which
fewer than the normal number of required criteria are satisfied
(DSM-5-TR, at p. 23), that allowance merely serves to
underscore that the standard criteria-based requirements for
diagnosis under the DSM do not and should not supply the
definition of substance abuse in this setting.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
4. Our Interpretation Harmonizes with Prior Case
Law Construing Section 300
Our interpretation of the substance abuse language
within section 300(b)(1)(D) as concerned with the excessive use
of drugs or alcohol aligns with the analysis in our previous
decisions that have declined to read implicit limitations into
other grounds for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction. In In
re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610 (Ethan C.), we concluded that
the Legislature intended for the word “ ‘neglect,’ ” as used in
section 300, subdivision (f) to carry its “commonly understood
meaning” (Ethan C., at p. 627), rather than describing only
situations in which a parent or guardian acted with criminal
negligence. (Id. at pp. 627–631.) Likewise, in I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th 766, we rejected the position that “scientific
authority or empirical evidence” were required to establish a
substantial risk of harm to a father’s sons based on sustained
allegations that the father had sexually abused one of his
daughters. (Id. at p. 778; see id. at pp. 778–779.) We held
instead that “the juvenile court is supposed to use its best
judgment to determine whether or not the particular
substantial risk exists.” (Id. at p. 779.) Finally, in determining
that the invocation of dependency jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) due to the failure or inability of a parent or
guardian to adequately supervise a child did not require a
finding of parental culpability, our decision in R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th 622 noted, “Because the Legislature has made
parental culpability (based on either willful or negligent
conduct) a requirement in some, but not all, grounds for
asserting dependency jurisdiction under section 300, we may
conclude that the omission of a culpability requirement in the
first clause of section 300(b)(1) ‘was purposeful.’ ” (R.T., at
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
p. 630.) Similarly here, in contrast with the definitions that
have been provided for other terms within the statute, there is
no persuasive indication on the face of section 300 or otherwise
that the Legislature intended to deviate from the ordinary
understanding of the term “substance abuse.”
5. Substance Abuse Under Section 300 Does Not
Require a Medical Diagnosis in Lieu of a Showing
That the DSM Criteria Have Been Satisfied
Although Father’s briefing concentrates on the DSM
criteria, he also acknowledges Drake M.’s position that a
professional medical diagnosis of current substance abuse may
suffice in lieu of a showing that these criteria have been
satisfied. (See Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.
Considerations similar to those discussed above also foreclose
this interpretation of section 300’s substance abuse language.
Just as we assigned significance to the absence of any
reference to the DSM in the statutory scheme, we believe that
had the Legislature intended to require a medical diagnosis of
substance abuse, it would have said so. (See Khalid H., supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.) The Legislature certainly knew how to
draw such a connection. A different provision within the
statutory scheme for dependency proceedings assigns special
significance to testimony from professionals. Under section
355.1, subdivision (a), “Where the court finds, based upon
competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or
detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as
would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the
unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent,
the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the
minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor
38
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section
300.” (Italics added.
Other flaws with Father’s arguments regarding the DSM’s
applicability also carry over to the position that substance abuse
requires a medical diagnosis. Among these shortcomings, there
is no indication within the legislative history that legislators
contemplated such a close connection between a medical
diagnosis and judicial recognition of substance abuse. With
good reason; information that could be critical to a diagnosis by
a medical professional may not be available at the
prejurisdictional stage of a dependency proceeding, particularly
given the limited powers of the court at that early stage of the
dependency process. (See Laurie S., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at
p. 202 [“At the prejurisdictional stage, an allegation by the
Department that a parent is mentally ill or the fact of mental
illness alone does not justify a psychological examination of that
parent”].) Also, the considerations that may inform a medical
diagnosis of substance abuse may be misaligned with legislative
intent, in that these diagnostic criteria may not capture the
aspects of abuse most relevant to a determination of whether a
parent’s or guardian’s issues with drugs or alcohol render that
person unable to provide regular care for a child and place that
child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.
Consistent with the discussion above, we conclude that a
professional medical diagnosis is not required, whether on its
own or as an alternative to satisfaction of the relevant DSM
criteria, in order to establish the existence of substance abuse
under section 300(b)(1)(D).
39
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
6. Due Process Considerations Do Not Justify Father’s
Interpretation of Section 300
Finally, Father argues that unless his proposed definition
of substance abuse is adopted, the term is so indefinite that it
violates constitutional due process guarantees. (See U.S.
Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).
“The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ” (In re Sheena
K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Yet “ ‘ “a statute is not void
simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether
some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.” ’ ”
(People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606.) “ ‘[F]ew words
possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes
must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual
situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the
business of government inevitably limit the specificity with
which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.
Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the
risk that he may cross the line.’ ” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117, quoting Boyce Motor Lines v.
United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 340.
Due process considerations do not compel us to adopt
Father’s interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) or else find the
statute unconstitutional. Section 300(b)(1)(D) provides
adequate notice regarding the conduct that will support a
jurisdictional finding based on a parent’s or guardian’s
40
In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
substance abuse. As we have explained, the statute does not
premise dependency jurisdiction on substance abuse alone, but
requires that substance abuse, as commonly understood, makes
a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child
and results in either serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of such harm or illness to the child. (See, e.g.,
Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.) Even
acknowledging the existence of borderline cases, this standard
is sufficiently concrete and intelligible that it avoids due process
concerns. (See Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 570
[rejecting a due process vagueness challenge to Pen. Code, § 272
because Welf. & Inst. Code “[§] 300 provides guidelines
sufficiently specific to delineate the circumstances under which
a child will qualify for dependent status and thus to define the
parental duty of care and protection that would prevent the
occurrence of those circumstances”]; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 428, 435–438 [rejecting the argument that the
phrase “ ‘serious physical harm,’ ” as it appears in § 300, subd.
(a), is unconstitutionally vague]; accord, Johnson v. United
States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 603–604 [“As a general matter, we
do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the
application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to
real-world conduct”].
7. Conclusion
For the reasons provided above, we hold that under section
300(b)(1)(D), “substance abuse” bears its ordinary meaning of
excessive use of drugs or alcohol, and that substance abuse by a
parent or guardian may be established without a professional
medical diagnosis of current substance abuse or satisfaction of
the pertinent DSM criteria. In so holding, we recognize that a
professional diagnosis, or evidence bearing upon whether DSM
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
criteria have been met, may be helpful in evaluating the
existence of substance abuse at the jurisdictional stage of
dependency proceedings or at another step in this process. (See,
e.g., Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322,
1346 [concluding that the government failed to meet its burden
of showing that returning children to their mother would create
a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being (see § 366.22, subd. (a)) for
reasons including, but not limited to, the absence of a medical
diagnosis of substance abuse or proof that the mother satisfied
the DSM’s description of substance abuse].) Our decision today
is not intended to discourage the presentation or consideration
of such evidence in appropriate circumstances.15
Our holding also recognizes the significance of a
jurisdictional finding. Dependency adjudication “allows the
juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over
the endangered child’s care” (Ethan C., supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 617), and is therefore a weighty determination with
important consequences. Yet it is also true that a jurisdictional
finding is “a first step, and the system includes many
subsequent safeguards to ensure that parental rights and
authority will be restricted only to the extent necessary for the
child’s safety and welfare.” (Ibid.; see also R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th
15
As a matter of course, the Legislature remains free to
redefine the term “substance abuse” as it appears within section
300(b)(1)(D) if it finds Father’s arguments, or the arguments
raised by amici curiae who have filed briefs in support of Father,
to be compelling.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
at p. 637; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 410–411.)16 These
safeguards apply to cases involving substance abuse, just as
they extend to other dependency matters.
Furthermore, as we have emphasized, dependency
jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) requires more than just
the identification of substance abuse by a parent or guardian. A
court must also find that the parent or guardian is unable to
provide regular care for a child and that as a result, the child
has suffered serious physical harm or illness or is at significant
risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. The second
issue presented for review, which we turn to next, concerns the
relationship between a finding of substance abuse and these
additional requirements.
C. The Tender Years Presumption Conflicts with
Legislative Intent and Must Be Rejected
We reject the position that a “finding of substance abuse
is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian
to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical
harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)17 Section 300, subdivision (b)(1
16
These safeguards “include representation by counsel to
assist parents at every stage of the proceedings [citation], notice
of all hearings and rights [citations], clear and convincing
evidence for removal from custody [citation], reunification
services [citation], and review hearings at which services and
progress are reviewed.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
307–308.
17
The rule announced in Drake M. expanded upon a more
generic discussion appearing in In re Rocco M. (1991
1 Cal.App.4th 814, abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 629. That earlier decision had observed, “Cases
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
recognizes that substance abuse may make a parent unable to
provide regular care, which in turn may create a substantial risk
of serious physical harm or illness. But the rule articulated in
Drake M. improperly short-circuits this analysis insofar as it
regards substance abuse by a parent or guardian as always
amounting to sufficient, though not conclusive, evidence of an
inability to provide regular care to a young child and a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to that child.
As a threshold matter, the parties’ briefing reflects some
uncertainty regarding whether this judicially created principle
amounts to an inference or a presumption. To repeat, the
relevant language in Drake M. provides that a “finding of
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a
substantial risk of physical harm.” (Drake M., supra, 211
Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) “A statute providing that a fact or group
finding a substantial physical danger [under section 300,
subdivision (b)] tend to fall into two factual patterns. One group
involves an identified, specific hazard in the child’s
environment — typically an adult with a proven record of
abusiveness. [Citations.] The second group involves children of
such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and
care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety.”
(In re Rocco M., at p. 824, italics omitted.) The Drake M. court
explained that “in cases involving the second group [discussed
in In re Rocco M.], the finding of substance abuse is prima facie
evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide
regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.”
(Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) Although there is
no strict age cut-off after which a child is regarded as being
beyond “tender years,” this presumption has generally been
applied in cases involving children of ages six or younger at the
time of a jurisdiction hearing. (See, e.g., Christopher R., supra,
225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a
rebuttable presumption” (Evid. Code, § 602), which is a kind of
“assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action” (id., § 600, subd. (a)), subject to rebuttal. A
“judicially created nonstatutory ‘inference,’ if it meets the test of
a presumption, should be regarded as, and given the effect of, a
presumption.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (6th ed. 2023) Burden,
§ 107.) It follows from the above that, as articulated in Drake
M., the tender years rule amounts to a presumption.
To assess this presumption, we apply the standard
approach to statutory interpretation and begin our review with
the text of the statute. (See Meza, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 856.
Nothing within the statutory scheme suggests that the
requirements for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under
section 300(b)(1)(D) can be collapsed through a tender years
presumption. The statute does not provide that a “finding of
substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a
parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a
substantial risk of physical harm” to a young child (Drake M.,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767), or anything similar. Rather,
the relevant statutory text makes it clear that the government
must establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse
(2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care
for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer
serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of
such harm or illness. Just as courts have routinely rejected the
equation of mental illness with a significant risk of serious harm
(see, e.g., In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 684; In re
Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318), we find the
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
tender years presumption adopted by Drake M. objectionable
because it oversimplifies the necessary analysis.
Significantly, at several other junctures within the
dependency scheme the Legislature has expressly identified
situations in which specific proof will constitute prima facie
evidence of a particular fact. For example, as previously
observed, section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides that certain
“competent professional evidence” shall be regarded as “prima
facie evidence that the minor is a person described by
subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.” Several other
examples of a particular fact being cast as prima facie evidence
of another fact appear elsewhere within the statutory scheme.
(§§ 355.1, subd. (d), 361, subd. (c)(1), 364, subd. (c), 366.21,
subds. (e)(1), (f)(1)(B), 366.22, subd. (a)(1), 366.25, subd. (a)(1).
The Legislature’s manifested ability to assign such significance
to certain facts or evidence in proving another fact suggests that
it did not intend for courts to presume a similar relationship
when not expressly provided for within the statutory text. (See
R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 630.
The Department asserts that the tender years
presumption is a commonsense rule based on the well-
understood needs of young children and still allows courts to
fully consider all evidence presented on the question of whether
a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse places a young child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.
This argument fails to fully grapple with the fact that the
fundamental problem with the tender years presumption is not
that it robs courts of discretion; it is that the presumption
threatens to oversimplify the analysis required under section
300(b)(1)(D). It is reasonable for courts to infer that very young
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
children require a substantial degree of close supervision. But
it is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s excessive
use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being sufficient, by
itself, to show that the parent or guardian is unable to provide
regular care for a young child and that the child is therefore at
substantial risk of serious physical harm. Even granting that
this presumption may be rebutted, it still distorts the necessary
inquiry under section 300(b)(1)(D) by treating one established
fact (a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse) as always
amounting to sufficient proof of other facts (an inability to
provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical
harm to a child of tender years) without any indication that the
Legislature approved of such conflation. We conclude that to
uphold the Legislature’s intent, an inability to provide regular
care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness
must be established on the facts of each case, without relying on
a categorical rule providing that a “finding of substance abuse is
prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to
provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical
harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.
In this respect, the basic task before the juvenile court is
similar regardless of the age of the child involved. Substance
abuse, when shown to exist, should not be regarded as
automatically amounting to prima facie evidence of the other
facts required for dependency jurisdiction. Courts must
undertake a further inquiry to ascertain whether the
government has met its burden as to each of the elements
involved, without shifting the burden to a parent or guardian to
rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.
(See, e.g., In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830,
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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at
pp. 628–629 [even accepting the existence of substance abuse by
a parent, the evidence before the juvenile court failed to show
that this abuse led to a significant risk of serious physical
harm].) Courts may in appropriate circumstances discern an
inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness from the evidence that has been
introduced in a particular case, including evidence relating to
substance abuse, and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from this evidence. (See, e.g., In re L.W. (2019
32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–850 [mother’s two arrests for driving
under the influence, one of which led to a reckless driving
conviction, adequately established a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to her 13-year-old daughter].) In this respect, a
child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the
child may require and whether a parent’s or guardian’s
substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious
physical harm. Courts can properly take these facts regarding
a child into account, together with all other relevant evidence,
in deciding whether the government has met its burden at the
jurisdictional stage. But courts may not shortcut the inquiry
envisioned by the Legislature by regarding substance abuse as
constituting prima facie evidence of an inability to provide
regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to that child, and then look to the parent or
guardian to rebut this presumption.
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the tender years
presumption and disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions that
have relied upon it, along with the Court of Appeal decisions
that have regarded a professional medical diagnosis or
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In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary for a
finding of substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D).18
D. Remand to the Court of Appeal
Father argues that the evidence before the juvenile court
did not support a jurisdictional finding based on his drug use.
The Department argues that substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding. Rather than decide this question
ourselves, the better course is to remand this case to allow the
Court of Appeal to revisit its analysis in light of our decision.
18
We disapprove the following decisions insofar as each
regarded a medical diagnosis of substance abuse or satisfaction
of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary to a finding of
substance abuse, recognized the tender years presumption, or
both: In re L.C., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 646; In re Alexzander C.,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438; In re Kadence P. (2015
241 Cal.App.4th 1376; In re Christopher R., supra,
225 Cal.App.4th 1210; and In re Drake M., supra,
211 Cal.App.4th 754. We also disapprove In re K.B., supra,
59 Cal.App.5th 593 insofar as its assertion that “[w]hen a child
is of tender age, a parent’s substance abuse can be prima facie
evidence of a risk of serious physical harm or illness” (id. at
p. 603, italics added) might be read as broadly relieving the
government of its full burden under section 300(b)(1)(D).
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In re N.R.
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
50
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion In re N.R.
Procedural Posture (see XX below
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 4/29/22 – 2d Dist.,
Div. 5
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S274943
Date Filed: December 14, 2023
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Martha A. Matthews
Counsel:
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Duke Law School, Allison E. Korn; UCLA School of Law and Alicia
Virani for W. David Ball, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, Paul
Bennett, Leo Beletsky, Taleed El-Sabawi, Matthew I. Fraidin,
Stephanie K. Glaberson, Cynthia Godsoe, Crystal Grant, Josh Gupta-
Kagan, Julia Hernandez, Alex Kriet, Sarah Lorr, Laura Matthews-
Jolly, Jennifer D. Oliva, Dorothy Roberts, Shanta Trivedi and Vivek
Sankaran as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Proskauer Rose, Jonathan M. Weiss, Justin B. Cohen, Michelle K.
Moriarty and Bradley M. Presant for Association for Multidisciplinary
Education and Research in Substance Use and Addiction and
California Society of Addiction Medicine as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Leslie A. Barry for Persons with Lived Experience in the Child Welfare
System as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Martin Schwarz, Public Defender (Orange), and Brian Okamoto,
Deputy Public Defender, for California Dependency Trial Counsel and
California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Minouche Kandel; Elizabeth Gill, Faride Perez-Aucar; Brenda Star
Adams and Jean Strout for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Northern California, the National Center for Youth Law and
Children’s Rights, Inc. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and
Appellant.
Kellen Russoniello for Drug Policy Alliance, Any Positive Change,
Beyond Do No Harm Network, California Coalition for Women
Prisoners, Children’s Defense Fund-California, CLARE Matrix,
Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto, Elephant Circle,
Immigrant Legal Resource Center, JMACforFamilies, Law For Black
Lives, Legal Action Center, Legal Momentum, Women’s Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children,
National Harm Reduction Coalition, National Health Law Program, A
New Path (Parent for Addiction Treatment & Healing), Pregnancy
Justice, San Francisco AIDS Foundation and Sidewalk Project as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
The Hill Law Firm and Tasha Alyssa Hill for Professor Alan J. Dettlaff
and Professors of Social Work and Social Workers as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva and Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky and David Michael
Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jennifer Hearing; David Chiu, City Attorney (San Francisco), Kimiko
Burton and Elizabeth McDonald Muniz, Deputy City Attorneys, for
California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Sean Angele Burleigh
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1976
Cortaro, AZ 85652
(415) 692-4784
David Michael Miller
Deputy County Counsel
500 West Temple Street, Suite 648
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 808-8777
Opinion Information
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 12/14/2023 | S274943 |
