IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
S102729
In re VINCENT MARQUEZ )
Ct.App.
6
H022214
on Habeas Corpus.
Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. CR 16624
In this case, petitioner Vincent Marquez was convicted in Monterey County
of first degree burglary and several prior serious felony conviction enhancements.
The court sentenced him to a term of 30 years in prison (later reduced to 25 years),
with credit for certain pretrial custody. Thereafter, petitioner’s conviction on an
earlier unrelated Santa Cruz County case was reversed and the charges dismissed.
On petitioner’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Monterey
County Superior Court declined to credit him with time spent in custody after he
was sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case and before he was sentenced in this
case. The question presented is whether the time petitioner spent in local jails
awaiting trial and sentencing in this case, after his sentencing in the Santa Cruz
County case, can be applied to reduce his sentence. We conclude the answer is
yes.
FACTS
Police arrested petitioner in Monterey County on July 8, 1991, on suspicion
of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459; all further statutory references are to
the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) He posted bail and was released from
1
custody on July 11, 1991. Following a preliminary examination, a magistrate held
him to answer on the burglary charge. He remained out of custody.
A few days later, on July 23, 1991, police arrested petitioner (then
apparently using the name Vincent Ernest Soto) in neighboring Santa Cruz
County, again on suspicion of burglary. He has remained in continuous custody
from that day. A criminal complaint in Santa Cruz County was filed the next day.
Monterey County placed a hold on him on August 21, 1991.1
Petitioner was thereafter convicted in Santa Cruz County of burglary
(§ 459) and assorted enhancement allegations. He was sentenced on
December 11, 1991, to 10 years in prison and given credit for 142 days in local
custody, representing the time he had spent in Santa Cruz County jail from his
July 23 arrest until and including his December 11 sentencing. For reasons that
are irrelevant for purposes of the present proceeding, he was subsequently
resentenced in Santa Cruz County to 11 years in prison, with two years stayed
pending imposition of sentence in Monterey County. The court again granted him
142 days of custody credit.
1
Petitioner alleges the hold was placed on him on August 8, 1991; his only
evidence for that fact is his own representation to the sentencing court. Although
the People allege that Monterey County placed a hold on petitioner on August 21,
1991, no document appears in the record verifying that fact. The People’s return
filed in Monterey County Superior Court on November 16, 1999, states Monterey
County placed a hold on petitioner on August 21, 1991. The People’s January 9,
2001, letter brief filed in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, which the appellate
court treated as a return, also alleges Monterey County placed a hold on August
21, 1991. Petitioner does not expressly dispute that date in his traverse in the
appellate court, but seems to assume the hold was placed on August 8. Finally, the
Court of Appeal’s opinion in this case uses August 21 as the date of the hold, and
petitioner did not petition for rehearing. (See rule 29(b)(2), Cal. Rules of Court.)
Accordingly, we will use August 21, 1991, as the true date Monterey County
officials placed a hold on petitioner.
2
Petitioner was then rebooked into the Monterey County jail and, in due
time, convicted in that county of burglary (§ 459) with multiple prior serious
felony allegations (§ 667, subd. (a)). The Monterey County Superior Court
sentenced him on April 2, 1992, to 30 years in prison with 229 days of credit,
representing 153 days of credit for “actual local time” (that is, time spent in
custody in county jail) and 76 days of “local conduct credit” (that is, credit for
work and good behavior for that same period of custody, pursuant to section
4019).
Petitioner appealed both convictions. His Monterey County case—the case
at hand—was decided first. The Court of Appeal directed the Monterey County
Superior Court to modify petitioner’s sentence from 30 to 25 years, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Marquez (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 115
[H009663], disapproved on another ground in People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th
252, 275, fn. 5.) The Monterey County Superior Court did as directed. About two
months later, the same appellate court filed an unpublished opinion reversing his
Santa Cruz County conviction. (People v. Soto (July 21, 1993, H009326).)2
Following receipt of the remittitur, the Santa Cruz County Superior Court vacated
petitioner’s sentence and dismissed the charges in the interests of justice. Since
that time, petitioner has sought unsuccessfully to be awarded credit against his
Monterey County sentence for time he spent in custody between the day he was
sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case and the day he was sentenced in the
Monterey County case.
2
Petitioner separately requests that we take judicial notice of the court
records in both appeals. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) permits this
court to notice the “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state.” Accordingly, we grant
the request for judicial notice of the court records in People v. Marquez, H009663,
and People v. Soto, supra, H009326.
3
DISCUSSION
I. Section 2900.5 Authorizes Credit
Petitioner claims that once his Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed
and the case dismissed, the time he spent in custody from the date of the Santa
Cruz County sentence to the date he was sentenced in Monterey County became
attributable to his Monterey County case. Such credit previously was unavailable
because his custody during that period followed his sentencing in the Santa Cruz
County case and was thus deemed attributable solely to that case. (In re Rojas
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 152 (Rojas).) But once the Court of Appeal reversed his Santa
Cruz County conviction and the trial court dismissed the case, petitioner argues,
the legal barrier to awarding him credit for such custody to reduce the length of his
Monterey County sentence disappeared.
Section 2900.5 is the applicable law. In general, credit is authorized in
subdivision (a), which provides in pertinent part: “In all felony and misdemeanor
convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody,
including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail . . . , all days of custody of the
defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a
court order, and including days credited to the period of confinement pursuant to
Section 4019, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment . . . .”
The outcome of the instant case depends on our interpretation of section
2900.5, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 2900.5(b)). It provides in full: “For the
purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited
is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant
has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody
attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.”
(Ibid., italics added.)
4
As with many determinations of credit, a seemingly simple question can
reveal hidden complexities. Although the statutory language in section 2900.5
“may appear to have meaning which is self-evident, the appellate courts have had
considerable difficulty in applying the words to novel facts.” (People v. Adrian
(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 868, 874.) “Probably the only sure consensus among the
appellate courts is a recognition that section 2900.5, subdivision (b), is ‘difficult to
interpret and apply.’ [Citation.] As we have noted, in what is surely an
understatement, ‘[c]redit determination is not a simple matter.’ ” (Id. at pp. 874-
875.)
We reach the proper resolution of this case by way of familiar principles:
We assign the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning, attempting
to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd.
of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632-633.) If the statutory
language is not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and we
apply the plain meaning of the statute without resort to extrinsic sources. (People
v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 192.) “In construing a statute,
we must also consider ‘ “the object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented by
the legislation.” ’ [Citation.] And, wherever possible, ‘we will interpret a statute
as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize
Constitution and statute.’ ” (Id. at p. 193.)
We turn, then, to whether the “custody to be credited” (§ 2900.5(b)) in this
case—the period between the day petitioner was sentenced in Santa Cruz County
(December 11, 1991) and the day he was sentenced in Monterey County (April 2,
1992)—can be deemed “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct
for which [petitioner] has been convicted” (ibid.), i.e., to the Monterey County
proceedings.
5
Although petitioner had been in custody since July 23, 1991, when he was
arrested for his Santa Cruz County crimes, as of August 21, 1991, when Monterey
County placed a hold on him, his custody became attributable to the pending
criminal charges in two counties: Monterey and Santa Cruz. Had Santa Cruz
County dropped its charges at that time, petitioner’s subsequent custody would
have been attributable solely to the Monterey County hold. But Santa Cruz
County dropped its charges only later, after petitioner’s conviction was reversed.
Nevertheless, after Monterey County placed a hold on petitioner, his custody was
attributable to the charges in both counties. Thus, once Santa Cruz County
dismissed its charges, all custody following Monterey County’s hold, including
the period between petitioner’s sentencing in Santa Cruz County and his Monterey
County sentencing, is properly characterized as “attributable to [the Monterey
County] proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been
convicted.” (§ 2900.5(b).) The plain meaning of section 2900.5(b) thus supports
petitioner’s claim.
To deny petitioner credit for his time spent in custody between
December 11, 1991, and April 2, 1992, would render this period “dead time,” that
is, time spent in custody for which he receives no benefit. Sometimes this result is
unavoidable. For example, had petitioner’s Santa Cruz County presentence
custody been attributable solely to the Santa Cruz County charges (that is, had
Monterey County never placed a hold), dismissal of the Santa Cruz County
charges would have left petitioner with no sentence against which credit for that
period could be applied. But because his custody after placement of the Monterey
County hold was attributable to both his Santa Cruz and Monterey County cases,
dismissal of the Santa Cruz County charges still left him with the Monterey
County sentence against which credit for all of his custody from placement of the
Monterey County hold until imposition of sentence could be applied.
6
Our conclusion is consistent with Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152. In Rojas, a
defendant who was already serving a term for manslaughter was charged with an
unrelated murder. He was removed from state prison and placed in local custody
to await trial. After his conviction for the murder, he claimed he was entitled to
credit against his murder sentence for the time he had spent in county jail awaiting
trial. We disagreed, explaining: “There is no reason in law or logic to extend the
protection intended to be afforded one merely charged with a crime to one already
incarcerated and serving his sentence for a first offense who is then charged with a
second crime. As to the latter individual the deprivation of liberty for which he
seeks credit cannot be attributed to the second offense. Section 2900.5 does not
authorize credit where the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a
defendant’s liberty.” (Id. at p. 156.) We further held that, although section 2900.5
does not expressly limit credit to situations where the custody is “exclusively”
attributable to a charge of which a defendant is later convicted, “it is clearly
provided that credit is to be given ‘only where’ custody is related to the ‘same
conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.’ The sensible inference is
that a defendant is not to be given credit for time spent in custody if during the
same period he is already serving a term of incarceration.” (Rojas, supra, at pp.
155-156.)
If an offender is in pretrial detention awaiting trial for two unrelated crimes,
he ordinarily may receive credit for such custody against only one eventual
sentence. Once the pretrial custody is credited against the sentence for one of the
crimes, it, in effect, becomes part of the sentence, bringing the case within the
embrace of the rule in Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152. In such circumstances, the
pretrial custody ceases to be “attributable” to the second crime, thus prohibiting its
being credited against the sentence for that crime. (People v. Bruner (1995) 9
Cal.4th 1178, 1189 (Bruner).)
7
In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 (Joyner) is illustrative. In that case, the
defendant was sought in connection with felonies committed in California. He
was thereafter arrested in Florida and charged with unrelated felonies there.
California authorities then placed a hold on him. Joyner was eventually convicted
and sentenced in Florida, which credited him for time spent in pretrial custody.
Following his extradition to California, Joyner pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to prison. The trial court denied his request for credit against his California
sentence for the time spent in pretrial detention in Florida. We affirmed: “In
determining the proceedings to which [his pretrial custody in Florida] may
properly be attributed, it is significant that the period has been credited against
petitioner’s Florida sentences, making it also a period during which petitioner in
effect was serving a sentence on another conviction.” (Id. at p. 492.) Hence,
Joyner’s pretrial custody came within the rule of Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152,
which prohibited its application to his California sentence.
Applying Rojas to this case, we find that, as an initial matter, the Santa
Cruz County Superior Court correctly awarded petitioner credit against his Santa
Cruz County sentence for his time spent in pretrial custody up until December 11,
1991, the date he was sentenced on the Santa Cruz County charges. Because
petitioner’s Santa Cruz conviction occurred first, that was the sentence against
which the credit should have been applied. And once the credit was awarded, it in
effect became part of the sentence for those crimes. In other words, at that point,
before the Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed, Rojas would apply to
prohibit credit for any of petitioner’s custody (both before his trial for the Santa
Cruz County charges as well as after he was sentenced for those crimes) to reduce
8
his Monterey County sentence (with the exception of the four days he spent in
Monterey County jail before his Santa Cruz County arrest).3
But once the appellate court reversed petitioner’s Santa Cruz County
conviction, he was returned to a situation indistinguishable from that of a
defendant who had been charged in that county, but never tried. When Santa Cruz
County dismissed its charges, the “custody to be credited” (i.e., the time petitioner
had spent in local custody pursuant to the Monterey County hold, both before and
after the date of the Santa Cruz County sentencing) became “attributable [solely]
to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been
convicted” (§ 2900.5(b)), i.e., the proceedings in this case. The Monterey County
Superior Court thus properly awarded petitioner credit for his custody from the
time of the hold until the date of his sentencing in Santa Cruz County. It erred,
however, in failing to award him credit for his custody following his sentencing in
Santa Cruz County, up to and including the date of his sentencing in Monterey
County.
Although the plain language of section 2900.5 supports a decision to grant
petitioner credit for the latter period and nothing in Rojas, supra, 23 Cal.3d 152,
precludes it, respondent argues we should nonetheless deny petitioner additional
credit because we have, in the past, applied a rule of “strict causation” to credit
3
The record shows that the Monterey County Superior Court awarded
petitioner credit from the time of the hold until he was sentenced in Santa Cruz
County. This was error under Rojas, as that time in custody had already been
credited to his sentence in Santa Cruz County and was thus solely attributable to
his conviction in that county. The issue is moot, however, because after
petitioner’s Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed on appeal and the charges
dismissed, the time in custody from the hold until his Santa Cruz County
conviction became attributable to the Monterey County charges, and the time is
now properly credited against his sentence in Monterey County.
9
cases involving multiple restraints. Thus, for example, we held in Bruner, supra,
9 Cal.4th 1178, that “where a period of presentence custody stems from multiple,
unrelated incidents of misconduct, such custody may not be credited against a
subsequent formal term of incarceration if the prisoner has not shown that the
conduct which underlies the term to be credited was also a ‘but for’ cause of the
earlier restraint.” (Id. at pp. 1193-1194.) Relying on this holding, respondent
contends that “it is apparent that petitioner’s Monterey County case had absolutely
nothing to do with his confinement in Santa Cruz County” and that “[p]etitioner
has failed to show any evidence that he posted bail in the Santa Cruz case or that
he could have obtained release but for the Monterey County hold.”
This argument is misplaced. The requirement of “strict causation,” on
which this court relied in Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th 1178, and Joyner, supra, 48
Cal.3d 487, is applicable in cases involving the possibility of duplicate credit that
might create a windfall for the defendant. Here, because the Santa Cruz County
charges have been dismissed, no possibility of a windfall (in the form of double
credit) to petitioner exists. Unlike in Bruner and Joyner, the choice is not between
awarding credit once or awarding it twice. The choice is instead between granting
petitioner credit once for his time in custody between December 11, 1991, and
April 2, 1992, or granting him no credit at all for this period of local custody.
Respondent also argues that giving petitioner credit in this situation
requires that we “transmute” his Santa Cruz County postsentence custody time
into presentence custody time attributable to his Monterey County charges. We
disagree. As we explained, ante, petitioner’s custody after Monterey County’s
August 21st hold originally was attributable to charges in both counties. Once the
Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed and the charges dismissed,
petitioner’s situation was no different than if the Santa Cruz County charges had
10
been dismissed before trial. His custody—attributable originally to both sets of
charges—would still be attributable to the remaining charges in Monterey County.
Finally, respondent, like the Court of Appeal, relies on People v. Huff
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100. In Huff, the defendant was on probation for
possession of PCP when he was arrested on a new and unrelated charge of auto
theft. After spending more than two months in pretrial custody for the auto theft
charge, the defendant’s probation for possession of PCP was summarily revoked
due to the pending theft charge, and he was remanded into custody for the
revocation pending sentencing. The auto theft case was then dismissed for failure
to prosecute and, about one month later, the defendant was sentenced to prison for
his possession of PCP. The defendant sought custody credits against his drug
offense sentence for the period commencing with his arrest on the auto theft. The
Huff court found he was not entitled to such credits because he had not been in
custody on the probation violation for the entire period that commenced with his
arrest, i.e., his incarceration was not solely attributable to the probation revocation.
“While it is true that the new [auto theft] charges were eventually dismissed due to
a failure to prosecute, so that there was no resulting sentence against which to
credit appellant’s time in custody on those charges, that fact does not transmute
the custody to time attributable to the old [drug] charges.” (Id. at p. 1105.)
Because Huff is distinguishable on its facts, it is unhelpful here. Petitioner
here seeks credit only for the time he spent in custody from the day he was
sentenced in Santa Cruz County until the day he was sentenced in Monterey
County. As we explain, once the Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed on
appeal and the charges dismissed, the time in question became attributable to
petitioner’s Monterey County conviction. Huff would be relevant only if
petitioner had sought credit for the time spent in custody from the time he was
arrested in Santa Cruz County, before Monterey County placed a hold on him,
11
because that period would be analogous to the period in Huff commencing with
that defendant’s arrest for auto theft.
We thus conclude petitioner is entitled to additional credit. All that remains
is calculation of the correct amount.
II. Calculation of Credits
The Monterey County Superior Court awarded petitioner a total of 229
days of credit, comprised of 153 days of local time and 76 days of conduct credit.
Included in the amount of custody credit was credit for the four days he spent in
Monterey County jail from the time he was arrested on the Monterey County
charges (July 8, 1991) until he was released on bail (July 11, 1991). As
respondent acknowledges, the trial court properly awarded credit for these four
days.
The same court also properly awarded petitioner credit for the time between
the Monterey County hold and his sentencing in Santa Cruz County, a purported
total of 149 days of custody credit. Unfortunately, both dates the court used in its
calculations were wrong: the hold was placed on August 21, 1991 (not August 8,
1991), and defendant was first sentenced in Santa Cruz County on December 11,
1991 (not January 3, 1992).4 Petitioner should have received credit for 113 days
of custody.
Contrary to the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts in this case,
we find petitioner is entitled to credit for time spent in local custody between the
day he originally was sentenced in Santa Cruz County (December 11, 1991) and
the day he was sentenced in Monterey County (April 2, 1992). Having already
4
Petitioner perpetuates these errors in his briefing before this court, and this
error accounts for the discrepancy between the number of custody credits to which
we find he is entitled, and the number of credits he claims in his briefing.
12
counted December 11 in the previous calculation, we find petitioner is entitled to
an additional 113 days of credit (which includes the leap day of February 29,
1992). The total number of custody credit days to which petitioner is entitled is
thus 230 days (4 + 113 + 113).
There being nothing in the record suggesting petitioner is disallowed the
full amount of conduct credit pursuant to section 4019,5 we must also calculate his
conduct credit. People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 explained the
applicable method of calculation: “ ‘Penal Code section 4019, specifies how
prisoners may obtain certain credits. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of that section
provide: “for each six-day period in which a prisoner is confined in or committed
to a specified facility” one day shall be deducted from his period of confinement
for performing labors, and one day shall be deducted for compliance with the rules
and regulations of the facility. Subdivision (f) of that section provides “if all days
are earned under this section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been
served for every four days spent in actual custody.” (Italics added.)’ [Citation.]
5
Section 4019, subdivision (b) states: “[F]or each six-day period in which a
prisoner is confined in [county jail], one day shall be deducted from his or her
period of confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner has refused
to satisfactorily perform labor as assigned by the sheriff, chief of police, or
superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp.”
Subdivision (c) of the same section provides: “For each six-day period in
which a prisoner is confined in [county jail], one day shall be deducted from his or
her period of confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner has not
satisfactorily complied with the reasonable rules and regulations established by the
sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent of an industrial farm or road camp.”
Subdivision (e) provides: “No deduction may be made under this section
unless the person is committed for a period of six days or longer.”
Subdivision (f) provides: “It is the intent of the Legislature that if all days
are earned under this section, a term of six days will be deemed to have been
served for every four days spent in actual custody.”
13
[¶] Credits are given in increments of four days. No credit is awarded for anything
less. . . . Under the statutory scheme, ‘rounding up’ is not permitted.”
“Other courts have adopted the Smith approach to the calculation of
credits.” (People v. Fabela (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1664 [citing several
cases].) We do as well.
Employing this approach, we take the number of actual custody days (4 +
113 + 113 = 230) and divide by 4 (discarding any remainder), which leaves 57
(230 ÷ 4 = 57). We then multiply the result by two (57 x 2 = 114), resulting in a
total of 114 days of conduct credit. To arrive at the total amount of credit to which
petitioner is entitled (custody plus conduct), we add the custody credit (230 days)
to the conduct credit (114 days), giving us a total of 344 days (230 + 114).
Because the trial court had previously awarded petitioner a combined 229 days of
credit (custody and conduct), we conclude he is entitled to an additional 115 days
of credit (344 – 229 = 115).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The trial court is directed
to correct the judgment to reflect that petitioner is entitled to an additional 115
days of credit (custody and conduct).
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
14
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
I agree with the result and reasoning of the majority opinion. I write
separately to express my views regarding the majority’s discussion of People v.
Huff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1100 (Huff). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.) After
reciting the facts of Huff, the majority states that, “[b]ecause Huff is
distinguishable on its facts, it is unhelpful here.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)
While I agree that Huff is “distinguishable on its facts,” I am inclined to go further
in order to point out that, in People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178 (Bruner), we
endorsed a method of computing presentence custody credits contrary to that
utilized in Huff.
In 1988, the defendant in Huff was placed on three years’ probation for
possession of phencyclidine. On January 17, 1989, he was arrested for grand theft
automobile. He did not post the $15,000 bail and remained in custody. Yet his
probation was not revoked until March 27, 1989, more than two months after the
date of his arrest. Most importantly, the probation revocation was based solely on
the grand theft automobile charge. On April 24, 1989, the underlying grand theft
automobile charge was dismissed, but, after a probation violation hearing in which
the court heard evidence regarding the automobile theft, the defendant was found
in violation of probation and his probation remained revoked. (Huff, supra, 223
Cal.App.3d at p. 1103.) In sentencing the defendant, the Court of Appeal declined
to award him presentence custody credit for the period of January 17, 1989
1
through March 26, 1989, for the reason that he was not “in custody” on the
probation violation until March 27, 1989, and thus his custody was not attributable
to the probation violation until that date. (Id. at pp. 1105-1106.)
But
in
Bruner, we stated that “post-[People v. Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487,
489] decisions apply a general rule that a prisoner is not entitled to credit for
presentence confinement unless he shows that the conduct which led to his
conviction was the sole reason for his loss of liberty during the presentence period.
Thus, these cases reason, his criminal sentence may not be credited with jail or
prison time attributable to a parole or probation revocation that was based only in
part on the criminal episode. [Citations.] . . . [W]e conclude that these authorities
construe the statute correctly.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) We then
cited, with approval, People v. Williams (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 827, 832-834, a
case in which the Court of Appeal held that the defendant “was entitled to credit
against his sentence for the time spent in custody on the probation revocation
because this custody arose from the identical conduct that led to the criminal
sentence.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1194, fn. 10, italics added.)
In
Huff, the Court of Appeal failed to award presentence custody credit
where the probation revocation was based on the identical conduct that led to the
criminal offense. Therefore, the method used to calculate presentence custody
credits in Huff is contrary to the method we endorsed in Bruner.1
The majority also states that “Huff would be relevant only if petitioner had
sought credit for the time spent in custody from the time he was arrested in Santa
Cruz County, before Monterey County placed a hold on him, because that period
1
In the Huff-type of situation, moreover, whether the probation hold
precedes or is subsequent to the filing of criminal charges is of no moment
because custody credit accrues from the date of arrest.
2
would be analogous to the period in Huff commencing with that defendant’s arrest
for auto theft.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 11-12.) While I agree that Huff might be
factually relevant, it should be noted that, even if petitioner had sought
presentence custody credit from the time spent in custody from the day he was
arrested in Santa Cruz County, Huff is not analogous to the present case because
the custody credit rules governing the interplay between an underlying crime and
probation violation (i.e., a Huff situation) are different from the custody credit
rules that govern a Marquez situation, i.e., where a defendant commits two distinct
crimes in two different counties. As noted, in a Huff situation, the defendant is
entitled to custody credit from the date of arrest. In a Marquez situation, a
defendant is not entitled to credit from the date of arrest by the first county in the
event that charge is dismissed. Instead, he receives credit only from the date the
hold was placed by the second county, which makes his custody attributable to
both distinct cases.
For the reasons stated above, I would go further than the majority and
recognize that the Huff situation is not analogous to the facts of the present case
and, where a probation revocation is based on the identical conduct that led to
criminal charges, the Huff court’s method of computing presentence custody
credits is contrary to the method we endorsed in Bruner.
MORENO, J.
I CONCUR:
BROWN, J.
3
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion In re Marquez
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S102729Date Filed: March 27, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Arthur Dudley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Vincent Marquez.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass,Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Christina V. Vom Saal and James Panetta, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Respondent State of California.
1
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Arthur DudleyPage, Salisbury & Dudley
605 Center Street
Santa Cruz, CA 95060-3804
(831) 429-9966
Christina V. Vom Saal
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-1360
2
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 03/27/2003 | S102729 |
| 1 | Marquez, Vincent (Petitioner) Represented by Arthur Guilford Dudley Page Salisbury & Dudley 605 Center Street Santa Cruz, CA |
| 2 | Marquez, Vincent (Petitioner) Represented by Sixth District Appellate Program 100 North Winchester Boulevard 100 North Winchester Boulevard Santa Clara, CA |
| 3 | The People (Non-Title Respondent) Represented by Attorney General - San Francisco Office Christina Vom Saal, DAG 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Mar 27 2003 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| Dec 7 2001 | Petition for review filed by counsel for petitioner Vincent Marquez. |
| Dec 7 2001 | Record requested |
| Dec 10 2001 | Received Court of Appeal record 1-file jacket and misc. petitions |
| Jan 16 2002 | Petition for Review Granted (criminal case) Votes: George, CJ, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar & Moreno, JJ. |
| Feb 11 2002 | Counsel appointment order filed Arthur G. Dudley to represent petnr. The brief on the merits is due by 3-13-02. |
| Mar 12 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed by counsel for petitioner |
| Mar 12 2002 | Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding) By petitioner |
| Apr 19 2002 | Request for extension of time filed Respondent's request for relief from default/extension of time to file answer brief on the merits. to May 13. |
| Apr 23 2002 | Extension of time granted time to file resp's answer brief on the merits is extended to 5-13-02. |
| May 9 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed by counsel for resp. |
| May 29 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) by counsel for petnr |
| Nov 27 2002 | Case ordered on calendar 1-7-03, 1:30pm, S.F. |
| Jan 7 2003 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Mar 27 2003 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed Majority opinion by Werdegar, J. ------joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin & Moreno, JJ. Concurring opinion by Moreno, J.----joined by Brown, J. |
| Apr 2 2003 | Request for modification of opinion filed Office of the Los Angeles Public Defender |
| Apr 25 2003 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing Finality of the opinion is hereby extended to and including 5-27-03. |
| May 5 2003 | Time extended to consider modification or rehearing "Finality of the opinion in the above-entitled case is further extended to and including June 25, 2003" |
| May 21 2003 | Opinion modified - no change in judgment |
| May 21 2003 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
| Dec 1 2004 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Dudley |
| Briefs | |
| Mar 12 2002 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| May 9 2002 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| May 29 2002 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
