Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 47 Cal. 4th 487, 213 P.3d 125, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790

In re Julian R.

Filed 8/17/09

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re Julian R., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________ )
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S159282
v.
Ct.App. 6 H031292
JULIAN R.,
Monterey County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. J38483
____________________________________)

When a minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is committed to
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice, the juvenile court is required to indicate the maximum period of physical
confinement. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c).)1 In setting that confinement
period, which may be less than, but not more than, the prison sentence that could
be imposed on an adult convicted of the same crime, the court must consider the
“facts and circumstances” of the crime. (§ 731, subd. (c).)
This case presents two issues: First, must the juvenile court orally
pronounce the juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement, or will a written
statement of that period suffice? Our answer: The latter is sufficient. Second,

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1


must the record show that the court complied with section 731, subdivision (c), by
considering imposition of a confinement period — shorter than the adult
maximum — that might be justified by the “facts and circumstances” of the crime
or crimes committed by the juvenile? Our answer: On a silent record, as is the
case here, we will presume that the juvenile court performed its statutory duty.
I
The probation report describes the incident leading to Julian R.‟s wardship
as follows: On June 11, 2006, police officers, responding to a reported carjacking
in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant in the City of Salinas, in Monterey
County, found two male victims who said they had been assaulted by the
occupants of another car. The victims‟ car had been taken, and was later found
abandoned nearby.
An hour later, during a routine traffic stop, police officers detained a car
near the fast food restaurant. In the car were 17-year-old Julian and five other
persons, some of whom fit the description of the carjackers. Radio speakers from,
and keys to, the victims‟ stolen car were found inside the detained car. The
officers brought the six suspects to the restaurant‟s parking lot. There, the
suspects were shown to witnesses of the carjacking. Julian was identified as the
one who had kicked and punched both victims.
On July 20, 2006, in return for dismissal of the carjacking count, Julian
admitted committing two counts of assault against separate victims by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); each
count was subject to a criminal street gang sentence enhancement (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
By a dispositional order of August 7, 2006, the juvenile court declared
Julian to be a ward of the court under section 602 and, rejecting the probation
officer‟s recommendation for a commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice
2
(formerly the California Youth Authority), the court ordered Julian committed to
the Monterey Youth Center. On February 5, 2007, after Julian tested positive for
cocaine use in violation of his probation, he was expelled from the Monterey
Youth Center. This led to the filing of a supplemental petition on February 7,
2007, alleging two probation violations — cocaine use and failure to satisfactorily
complete the youth center program. The next day, at a detention hearing on that
supplemental petition, Julian admitted the probation violations.
On February 26, 2007, at a dispositional hearing on the supplemental
petition, the juvenile court concluded that Julian was “too far entrenched in gangs
and the criminal lifestyle to be rehabilitated” through locally available services. It
then committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice. The court did not state the
maximum confinement that Julian would face, did not mention the maximum term
that an adult would face for the same offenses, and did not indicate its
consideration of the crimes‟ facts and circumstances that might justify a shorter
confinement. But on a preprinted form (Judicial Council Forms, form JV-665, as
rev. Jan. 1, 2007) the court checked a box beside this printed text: “The child is
committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of
Juvenile Justice, and form JV-732, Commitment to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, will be completed
and transmitted.”
Two days later, on February 28, 2007, the juvenile court signed the
required (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.805) preprinted commitment form (Judicial
Council Forms, form JV-732, as rev. Jan. 1, 2006). As “sustained petitions” the
form listed the two felony assault offenses (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) plus
applicable gang enhancements, resulting in a maximum confinement period of ten
years. To that were added two months for a prior offense of fighting in a public
place (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1)), a misdemeanor. Following the form‟s printed
3
text “maximum period of confinement,” the court inserted “10 years 2 months,
which the probation officer had indicated was the maximum period of
confinement for an adult convicted of the same offenses.
Julian appealed, asserting that the juvenile court erred in its disposition. He
contended: (1) The court should have orally pronounced the maximum period of
confinement he would face, and (2) the court should have determined whether the
facts and circumstances of his crimes warranted a maximum confinement period
shorter than the adult maximum prison term for the same offenses. The Court of
Appeal rejected these claims. It held that the juvenile court was not required to
orally pronounce the maximum period of confinement that Julian would face. It
also held that, although the record did not expressly indicate the juvenile court was
aware of its discretionary power to impose a maximum confinement period shorter
than the adult maximum, its awareness of that power must be presumed, thus
compelling the conclusion that the juvenile court had considered a lesser
confinement period. This conclusion was contrary to the one reached by the Court
of Appeal in In re Jacob J. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 429, which had held that if the
record was silent as to a juvenile court‟s consideration of a facts and
circumstances confinement period, the reviewing court would presume that the
juvenile court had failed to consider such a period.
In this case, the Attorney General advised the Court of Appeal that Julian‟s
prior misdemeanor charge of fighting in a public place had been dismissed,
reducing the maximum adult term for his offenses to 10 years, and that the
principal and subordinate terms for the current two assault offenses had been
incorrectly stated on the commitment form. Although a maximum adult term of
10 years for the two assaults was correct, the Attorney General noted that Julian‟s
10-year confinement period had been incorrectly apportioned between the
principal and the subordinate terms for those assaults, each carrying a gang
4
enhancement; correctly calculated, the adult maximum term of imprisonment for
the first assault and gang enhancement was eight years, and the maximum term of
imprisonment for the second assault and gang enhancement was two years. Given
those errors, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it
could complete an amended commitment form.
Recognizing the conflict between this case and In re Jacob. J., supra, 130
Cal.App.4th 429 concerning the sufficiency of a juvenile court record that is silent
as to the appropriate confinement period based on the facts and circumstances of
the crime, we granted review to resolve that conflict.
II
We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the statutory scheme
governing commitments to the Division of Juvenile Justice.
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court extends to persons who are under 18
years of age when they violate any law defining a crime. (§ 602, subd. (a).) After
conducting an investigation, a probation officer may refer a juvenile matter to the
prosecuting attorney (§§ 650, 653.5), but no wardship action can commence until
the prosecutor has filed a petition on the People‟s behalf (§§ 650, subd. (c), 681,
subd. (a)). The petition states what penal laws were violated and describes the
offenses as either felonies or misdemeanors. (§§ 656, subd. (f), 656.1.)
A bifurcated hearing is then held. At the first phase — the jurisdictional
hearing — “the juvenile court decides whether the petition concerns a person
described in section 602.” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487.) The
alleged offense or offenses must be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt supported
by evidence[] legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases . . . .” (§ 701.)
At the second phase — the dispositional hearing — the juvenile court hears
“evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor.”
(§ 706.) A wardship determination must be made before the minor can be
5
removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian. (In re Eddie M.,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 488.)
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court must consider the social
study submitted by the probation officer. (§ 706.) Wards may be committed to a
county home, to a ranch or camp, or to a county juvenile hall. (§ 730, subd. (a).)
Wards requiring more secure facilities may be committed to the Division of
Juvenile Facilities. (§§ 731, subd. (a)(4), 734.) In the latter instance, the ward
“may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the
maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and
circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may not exceed the maximum period
of adult confinement as determined pursuant to this section.” (§ 731, subd. (c),
italics added.)2 Succinctly put, the juvenile court must consider the crime‟s
relevant “facts and circumstances” in determining whether the minor‟s maximum
commitment period should be equal to or less than the maximum confinement
term for an adult. At issue here is whether such a consideration did occur.
III

A. Oral Pronouncement of Maximum Confinement
Section 731 does not direct the juvenile court to orally pronounce the
juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement. Julian acknowledges this. He
contends, however, that because the juvenile offender scheme now favors

2
At the request of the Attorney General, we have judicially noticed official
documents of the legislative and the executive branches that comprise the
legislative history of Senate Bill No. 459, which in 2003 amended section 731 by
adding a “facts and circumstances” confinement period that is now codified in
subdivision (c). (Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 1.)
6


punishment over rehabilitation, it is now more like the adult criminal justice
system. Therefore, Julian argues, the commitment procedure for a juvenile ward
should parallel the statutory formalities required at an adult felony sentencing
hearing by, as relevant here, providing for an oral pronouncement of the period of
confinement, accompanied by a statement of reasons. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd.
(b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(a), (b)(2), (b)(4).) We disagree.
We begin with an examination of section 202. In that statute, enacted in
1984, the Legislature has expressed its concern for “the protection and safety of
the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 202,
subd. (a), added by Stats. 1984, ch. 756, § 2, p. 2726.) The statute requires, as it
has since 1984, that juvenile offenders “receive care, treatment and guidance
consistent with their best interest,” and it states that such “guidance may include
punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.”
(§ 202, subd. (b).) In 1999, although the Legislature deleted from the statute a list
of punitive sanctions available to the juvenile court (Stats. 1999, ch. 997, § 1.1) it
retained language, which still appears, that “ „punishment‟ means the imposition
of sanctions,” and that punishment “does not include retribution” (§ 202, subd.
(e)). Contrary to Julian‟s contention, the Legislature has not abandoned the
traditional purpose of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders and replaced it with
punishment as a form of retribution. Juvenile proceedings continue to be
primarily rehabilitative, disallowing punishment in the form of retribution. (In re
Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507.)
Significant differences between the juvenile and adult offender laws
underscore their different goals: The former seeks to rehabilitate, while the latter
seeks to punish. The determinate sentencing law, which governs sentencing of
adult offenders who have committed a crime for which a “statute specifies three
possible terms,” requires the trial court to choose a set term (Pen. Code, § 1170,
7
subd. (b)) — a lower, middle, or upper term — from the adult triad sentencing
scheme. The determinate sentencing law “provides for fixed terms designed to
punish.” (In re Christian G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 708, 715, italics added.) In
contrast, juveniles are committed “for indeterminate terms designed to
rehabilitate.” (Ibid., italics added.) And unlike an adult offender who commits a
felony and serves a set term, a juvenile offender who commits a felony and is
committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice is ordinarily not held beyond the age
of 25. (§ 1771.)
In light of these significant differences between juvenile offender laws and
adult offender laws, we reject Julian‟s contention that, as in adult criminal
sentencing proceedings, in juvenile offender proceedings there needs to be an oral
pronouncement of the juvenile‟s maximum period of confinement, accompanied
by a statement of reasons.3
Insisting that the juvenile court must at the dispositional hearing make an
oral pronouncement of the confinement period, Julian points to certain language in
section 726‟s subdivision (c) and in rule 5.795(b) of the California Rules of Court
as indicative of an intent to require such an oral pronouncement. The statute
provides that the court‟s “order shall specify” the maximum length of physical

3
Julian contends that due process requires a statement of reasons. He notes
that the determinate sentencing law, which governs adult offenders, requires a trial
court to “state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1170, subd. (c).) According to Julian, requiring such a statement of reasons at a
juvenile court‟s dispositional hearing would ensure that the court used reliable
sentencing information in exercising its discretion to impose either a physical
confinement period not exceeding the maximum adult term or a shorter period of
confinement based on the “facts and circumstances” of the crime. Because Julian
did not argue this claim in the Court of Appeal or in his petition for review he is
precluded from now raising it. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.500(c)(1),
8.504(b)(1).)
8


confinement (§726, subd. (c)); the rule directs the juvenile court to “specify and
note in the minutes the maximum period of confinement under section 726” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.795(b)). In Julian‟s view, “specify” means to orally
pronounce. That is only one of the word‟s meanings, however. The dictionary
defines “specify” as “name or state explicitly or in detail.” (Webster‟s 7th New
Collegiate Dict. (1970) p. 839.) That definition would encompass an oral
pronouncement. But it is not the only definition. According to the same
dictionary, “specify” also means “to include as an item in a specification.” (Ibid.)
A “specification,” which is “a plan or proposal for something” (ibid.), is
frequently a written document. Under that definition, a juvenile court‟s written
commitment order would comply with the court‟s statutory duty to “specify”
(§ 726, subd. (c)) the minor‟s maximum confinement period.

Finally, Julian argues that even though the statutory scheme (§§ 726, subd.
(c), 731, subd. (c)) does not compel an oral pronouncement of the juvenile‟s
maximum period of confinement, nonetheless we should impose such a
requirement “pursuant to our supervisory authority over state [court] procedure.”
(In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 938; see People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th
354, 368.) He contends that unless the juvenile court is required to make such an
oral pronouncement, with a statement of reasons, it will be difficult for a
reviewing court to determine whether the juvenile court has indeed considered a
period of confinement based on the crime‟s facts and circumstances. That concern
is overstated, especially in light of the recent revision of the Judicial Council‟s
commitment form. As of January 1, 2009, that form requires the juvenile court
both to state the duration of the maximum period of confinement and to
acknowledge that it has “considered the individual facts and circumstances of the
case in determining the maximum period of confinement.” (Judicial Council
Forms, form JV-732, [as rev. Jan. 1, 2009,] Commitment to the California
9


Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, item 8,
p. 2.)

B. Juvenile Court’s Consideration of Crime’s “Facts and

Circumstances”
Section 731 sets two ceilings on the period of physical confinement to be
imposed. The statute permits the juvenile court in its discretion to impose either
the equivalent of the “maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed
upon an adult for the offense or offenses” committed by the juvenile (§ 731, subd.
(c)) or some lesser period based on the “facts and circumstances of the matter or
matters that brought or continued” the juvenile under the court‟s jurisdiction
(ibid.).
Here, the juvenile court determined that the maximum adult sentence for
Julian‟s offenses — two counts of assault — was imprisonment for 10 years. But
it did not state on the record that it had considered the crimes‟ “facts and
circumstances” that might justify a confinement period below the maximum adult
prison term for the same offenses. Julian interprets the record‟s silence on this
point as an indication that the juvenile court never considered imposing a
confinement period shorter than the maximum adult term. Therefore, according to
Julian, a reviewing court must presume from the record‟s silence that the juvenile
court was either unaware of, or failed to perform, its statutory duty to consider that
the “facts and circumstances” might warrant a confinement period shorter than the
adult maximum term.
But such a presumption would, as the Court of Appeal here concluded,
require the reviewing court “to ignore a cardinal principle of appellate review”: A
“ „ “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct[, and a]ll
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ‟ [Citation.]” As this
10


court has stated, “we apply the general rule „that a trial court is presumed to have
been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]‟ ” (People v. Stowell
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) “This rule derives in part from the presumption of
Evidence Code section 664 „that official duty has been regularly performed,‟ ” and
thus when “a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a
reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular
finding or order.” (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did set a maximum confinement period by
completing the appropriate Judicial Council commitment form. In the
circumstances of this case, we presume, as the Court of Appeal did, that: (1) the
court exercised its discretion in setting a maximum period of physical confinement
that was measured against both the ceiling set by the maximum adult prison term
and a possibly lower ceiling set by the relevant “facts and circumstances” (§ 731,
subd. (c)), and (2) the court determined that Julian‟s appropriate confinement
period was a period equal to the maximum adult term.4
As we noted at the outset, this case presents a conflict with the decision by
the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 429. There, as here,
the record did not indicate that the juvenile court had considered whether, based
on the facts and circumstances of the juvenile‟s offense, a confinement period
shorter than the maximum adult sentence imposed for the same crime was called

4
It would have been better practice if the juvenile court had stated on the
record that it had considered, based on the “facts and circumstances” of Julian‟s
offenses, a confinement period less than the prison term for an adult convicted of
the same offenses (§ 731, subd. (c)), and that in the exercise of its discretion it had
decided against such a shorter confinement. In light of newly revised Judicial
Council form JV-732 requiring the juvenile court to acknowledge its consideration
of the crime‟s facts and circumstances (p. 9, ante) in the future a court‟s exercise
of its discretion will be evident.
11


for. The court acknowledged that section 731 does not require the juvenile court
to recite “the facts and circumstances” on which it relies or to discuss “their
relative weight.” (In re Jacob J. at p. 438.) Because the record did not reflect the
juvenile court‟s consideration of the crimes‟ “facts and circumstances” that might
justify a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum term, the Court of
Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the juvenile court.
(Ibid.) Unlike the Court of Appeal in this case, the Court of Appeal in In re Jacob
J. failed to apply the general rule that “ „a trial court is presumed to have been
aware of and followed the applicable law [Citations.]‟ ” (People v. Stowell, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.) That was error. To the extent that In re Jacob J., supra,
130 Cal.App.4th 429, 438 is inconsistent with this opinion, we disapprove it.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal here remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it
could correct certain errors. (See pp. 4-5, ante.) We agree that a remand is
appropriate. On remand, the juvenile court is to complete Judicial Council form
JV-732, as revised January 1, 2009, acknowledging that the court has considered
the facts and circumstances of the offenses in determining the maximum period of
Julian‟s physical confinement.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
12



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Julian R.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 156 Cal.App.4th 1404
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S159282
Date Filed: August 17, 2009
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Monterey
Judge: Stephen A. Sillman

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Lori A. Quick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A.
Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye, Laurence K. Sullivan and Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Lori A. Quick
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310
Santa Clara, CA 95050
(408) 241-6171

Jeffrey M. Bryant
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5852


Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed an order in a wardship proceeding and remanded for redetermination of maximum commitment term. This case presents the following issues: (1) When a juvenile ward is committed to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice, must the juvenile court orally set the maximum period of physical confinement at the dispositional hearing or does a notation on the signed commitment form suffice? (2) Did the juvenile court fail to consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case in setting the maximum commitment term here?

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:
Mon, 08/17/200947 Cal. 4th 487, 213 P.3d 125, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790S159282Review - Criminal Appealopinion issued

Parties
1R., J. (Overview party)
Represented by Lori Quick
Sixth District Appellate Program
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310
Santa Clara, CA

2The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Jeffrey M. Bryant
Office of the Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA

3R., J. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Lori Quick
Sixth District Appellate Program
100 N. Winchester Boulevard, Suite 310
Santa Clara, CA


Opinion Authors
OpinionJustice Joyce L. Kennard

Disposition
Aug 17 2009Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Dec 21 2007Petition for review filed
Julian R., defendant and appellant by Lori A. Quick, CA-appointed counsel
Dec 21 2007Record requested
Dec 27 2007Received Court of Appeal record
one file folder/briefs/transcripts
Feb 13 2008Time extended to grant or deny review
The time for granting or denying review in the above-entitled matter is hereby extended to and including March 20, 2008, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Feb 27 2008Petition for review granted (criminal case)
George, C.J., and Corrigan, J., were absent and did not participate. Votes: Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Mar 6 2008Counsel appointment order filed
Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Lori A. Quick is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appelant's brief o the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Apr 3 2008Request for extension of time filed
to and including May 2, 2008 to file appellant's opening brief on the merits by Lori A. Quick, Supreme Court appointed counsel.
Apr 7 2008Extension of time granted
On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including May 2, 2008.
May 1 2008Request for extension of time filed
to and including May 30, 2008, to file appellant's opening brief on the merits by Lori A. Quick, Supreme Court appointed counsel
May 5 2008Extension of time granted
On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including May 30, 2008.
May 30 2008Request for extension of time filed
to June 13, 2008, to file appellant's opening brief on the merits by Lori A.Quick, Supreme Court appointed counsel
Jun 4 2008Extension of time granted
On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including June 13, 2008.
Jun 13 2008Opening brief on the merits filed
Appellant Julian R. by Lori A. Quick, Staff Attorney, Sixth District Appellate Program
Jul 10 2008Compensation awarded counsel
Atty Quick - Sixth District Appellate Program
Jul 11 2008Request for extension of time filed
to and including August 12, 2008, to file Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits by Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General
Jul 14 2008Extension of time granted
On application of Respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Answer Brief on the Merits is extended to and including August 12, 2008.
Aug 12 2008Request for extension of time filed
to and including 9-11-2008 to file the respondent's answer brief on the merits by Jeff Bryant, Deputy A.G. - SF
Aug 18 2008Extension of time granted
On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including September 11, 2008.
Sep 3 2008Answer brief on the merits filed
Respondent People of the State of California by Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General - San Francisco
Sep 3 2008Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
Respondent People of the State of California by Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General - San Francisco
Sep 24 2008Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Julian R., defendant and appellant by Lori A. Quick, Staff Attorney, Sixth District Appellate Program CRC8.25(b)
Apr 22 2009Case ordered on calendar
to be argued Thursday, May 28, 2009, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
May 28 2009Cause argued and submitted
Jun 9 2009Request for judicial notice granted
The request of the Attorney General for judicial notice, which was filed in this court on September 3, 2008, is granted, except as to a newspaper article as to which judicial notice is denied.
Aug 14 2009Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
To be filed Monday, August 17, 2009 at 10 a.m.
Aug 17 2009Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the juvenile court so it could correct certain errors. (See pp. 4-5, ante.) We agree that a remand is appropriate. On remand, the juvenile court is to complete Judicial Council form JV-732, as revised January 1, 2009, acknowledging that the court has considered the facts and circumstances of the offenses in determining the maximum period of Julian's physical confinement. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Majority Opinion by Kennard, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.

Briefs
Jun 13 2008Opening brief on the merits filed
Appellant Julian R.
Sep 3 2008Answer brief on the merits filed
Respondent People of the State of California
Sep 24 2008Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Julian R., defendant and appellant
Brief Downloads
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In re Julian R. Appellant's Opening Brief.pdf (2531459 bytes) - Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits
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In re Julian R.- Respondent's Answer Brief.pdf (2622041 bytes) - Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits
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In re Julian R. Appellant's Reply Brief.pdf (1652846 bytes) - Appellant's Reply Brief on the Merits
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website
May 22, 2011
Annotated by Ashley Bowman

Facts:

Two male victims were carjacked and assaulted by several men in a fast food parking lot in Salinas, California. When police detained 17-year-old appellant Julian R. and five other men during a routine traffic stop, they found that several of the men fit witnesses’ description of the carjackers, and that the men’s vehicle contained several items that were stolen from the victims during the carjacking. Witnesses later identified Julian R. as the person who the saw kick and punch both victims during the carjacking.

In return for dismissal of the carjacking charge, Julian admitted to two counts of assault against separate victims by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm, both of which counts were subject to a criminal street gang sentence enhancement. The juvenile court issued a dispositional order declaring Julian to be a ward of the court and committing him to a youth center; however, Julian was subsequently expelled from the youth center after he testing positive for cocaine use in violation of his probation

Procedural History:

Following Julian’s expulsion from the youth center, The People filed a supplemental petition alleging two probation violations: cocaine use and failure to complete the youth center program. Julian admitted to both violations, and the juvenile court committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice at the conclusion of a dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition. The court did not state the maximum confinement that Julian would face or the maximum term that an adult would face for the same offenses, and it did not indicate having considered the facts and circumstances of the offenses that might justify a shorter confinement period. The court did, however, list the offenses, applicable gang enhancements, and resulting maximum confinement period on a pre-printed form that it completed two days later. The court sentenced Julian to ten years and two months confinement, a period equivalent to the adult maximum.

Julian appealed the juvenile court’s decision on the basis that (1) the court should have orally pronounced the maximum period of confinement he would face, and (2) the court should have determined whether the facts and circumstances of his offenses warranted a maximum confinement period shorter than the adult maximum. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, holding that the juvenile court was not required to orally pronounce the maximum sentence, and that the Appeals Court must presume that the juvenile court considered a lesser confinement period before determining Julian’s sentence. Although the juvenile court correctly calculated the maximum adult sentence at ten years and two months, on Julian’s commitment form it incorrectly apportioned the sentence for both assaults and a gang enhancement; therefore the Appeals Court approved the juvenile court’s decision but remanded the case in order to amend the commitment form.

The Supreme Court granted review to resolve a conflict between the Appeals Court’s holding in this case and its holding in In re Jacob J., 130 Cal.App.4th 429 (2005), regarding the sufficiency of a juvenile court record that is silent on the question of whether it considered the facts and circumstances of a crime to determine the appropriate confinement period.

Issues:

(1) Whether a juvenile court must orally pronounce a juvenile’s maximum period of confinement, or whether a written statement of that period is sufficient.

(2) Whether a juvenile court record must show that the court complied with Cal. Welf & Inst. Code § 731, subd. (c), by considering whether the imposition of a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum might be justified by the facts and circumstances of the crime(s) committed by the juvenile.

Holdings:

(1) A juvenile court need not orally pronounce a juvenile’s maximum confinement period; a written statement is sufficient.

(2) In re Jacob J. is overruled. Where the record is silent, the higher court will presume that the juvenile court satisfied its statutory duty to consider facts and circumstances of the juvenile’s crime that might justify imposing a confinement period shorter than the adult maximum.

Reasoning:

(1) Cal. Welf & Inst. Code § 731, subd. (c) requires that a juvenile court’s detention “order shall specify the maximum length of physical confinement.” Although an adult criminal court must orally pronounce an adult’s maximum confinement period, the juvenile court differs in that it imposes confinement as a means of rehabilitation rather than retribution. Therefore, while adults are subject to fixed confinement terms intended to punish, juveniles are committed for indeterminate terms designed to rehabilitate. Given these differences, the court need not apply adult criminal court’s oral pronouncement requirement rules to juvenile proceedings. Additionally, because the plain definition of “specify” can mean to include as item in a (frequently written) plan or proposal, § 731, subd. (c) does not require an oral pronouncement. Therefore, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that the juvenile court’s written statement of Julian’s maximum sentence satisfies the requirement of § 731. .

(2) "[A] cardinal principle of appellate review” is that a “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct[, and a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” The California Supreme Court affirmed this principle in People v. Stowell when it held that “a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (2003). Presuming that the juvenile court did not consider the facts and circumstances of Julian R.’s crimes before sentencing him to the adult maximum confinement period would impermissibly violate this “cardinal principle.” The Court of Appeal correctly presumed that the juvenile court had considered the facts and circumstances of Julian R.’s crime before making a sentencing determination. Jacob J. was decided incorrectly because the court failed to presume that the juvenile court followed the applicable law.

Ruling: Affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Relevant Authorities and Cases:

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202: affirming juvenile court system’s rehabilitative purpose.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic&group=00001-01...

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 726, subd. (c): outlining requirement that a juvenile court wardship order specify that the juvenile will not be confined for longer than the maximum adult sentence for the same offense.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic&group=00001-01...

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 731, subd. (c): stating that a ward committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities may not be confined for a period in excess of the confinement term set by the court based on the facts and circumstances of the juvenile’s offense.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic&group=00001-01...

In re Eddie M., 31 Cal.4th 480 (2003): holding that juvenile proceedings are primarily rehabilitative, disallowing punishment in the form of retribution. Julian R. relies on the distinction between rehabilitative juvenile confinement and retributive adult confinement to determine that a juvenile court is not required to orally pronounce the maximum confinement period.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7670588646931502774&q=In+re+...

People v. Stowell, 31 Cal.4th 1107 (2003): California Supreme Court decision holding that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. The court in Julian R. relies in part on Stowell to overrule Jacob J.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7662350861634961854&q=People...

In re Jacob J., 130 Cal.App.4th 429 (2005): California Court of Appeal decision holding that if the record is silent as to a juvenile court’s consideration of the facts and circumstances of a juvenile’s offense in determining the juvenile’s confinement period, the reviewing court presumes that the court failed to make such a consideration. Because this decision conflicts with the Court of Appeals holding in Julian R., the California Supreme Court must decide which decision is correct.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17364267725706056255&q=in+Re...

TAGS: appellate review, California Welfare and Institutions Code, facts and circumstances confinement, juvenile court, oral pronouncement

Annotation by Ashley Bowman