Filed 11/15/07
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
In re RONALD LEE BELL,
S105569
on
Habeas
Corpus.
Petitioner Ronald Lee Bell is under sentence of death for the 1978 murder
of Raymond Murphy during a robbery of Wolff’s Jewelry Store in Richmond.
This court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and death sentence on automatic
appeal (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502) and denied previous petitions for
writs of habeas corpus in 1990 and 1995.
The present petition was filed on April 2, 2002. On February 19, 2003, we
issued an order to show cause on claim B of the petition, which asserted that
petitioner is actually innocent of the robbery murder and that petitioner’s brother,
Larry Bell, was the actual perpetrator, and on claim C, which asserted that the
prosecution introduced at trial false identification testimony from eyewitnesses
Ernestine Jackson, Ruby Judge, and Dorothy Dorton. After we directed the
Presiding Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court to select a judge to
serve as a referee at an evidentiary hearing, we appointed the Honorable
Thomas M. Maddock as our referee to take evidence and make findings of fact on
specified allegations.
On December 11, 2006, the referee’s report was filed in this court. The
referee detailed his answers to the reference questions and concluded that
1
petitioner had failed to prove (1) that any prosecution witness had testified falsely
at his trial, (2) that any prosecution witness had recanted her trial testimony
identifying petitioner as the perpetrator, or (3) that petitioner was actually innocent
of the murder or the related crimes. Having reviewed the record and the briefing
in this court, we agree with the referee that petitioner has failed to prove the
allegations in the petition. The order to show cause is discharged.
BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Judgment
On February 2, 1978, petitioner entered Wolff’s Jewelry Store in
Richmond, shot Raymond Murphy (the store manager) and John Benjamin (an
employee), and fled with more than $30,000 worth of jewelry. Murphy, who was
shot in the right side of the neck, suffered fatal injuries.
Petitioner was identified as the killer by Dorothy Dorton, age 13, and by
Dorton’s 14-year-old aunt, Ruby Judge, who had both been in the store at the time
of the robbery murder. Petitioner was also identified by Judge’s adult sister and
Dorton’s aunt, Ernestine Jackson, who was waiting in her car outside the jewelry
store. Petitioner’s defense at trial, and in these proceedings, was that these three
eyewitnesses had erred in their identifications and that his brother, Larry Bell, who
was some inches taller and had a substantially bigger build and a lighter skin tone,
was the real culprit.
Jackson testified at trial that she had driven to Wolff’s Jewelry Store around
4:00 p.m. to pick up a watch that had been repaired. She waited with Dorton and a
younger niece in the car while Judge went inside to pick up the watch. As they
waited, petitioner walked by and Jackson called out, “How’re you doing, Ronnie
Bell?” Petitioner greeted her and continued walking toward the jewelry store.
Jackson told Dorton that petitioner was the man who had killed her father, Alcus
Dorton, almost 10 years earlier and had been convicted of manslaughter. Dorton,
2
who had no recollection of her father, said she wanted to get a good look at
petitioner and left the car.
Dorton entered the store and found petitioner waiting while Judge was
being helped. Dorton walked over to Judge and told her to ask petitioner if his
name was “Larry.” Judge did so; petitioner said “no.” After Judge and Dorton
went to the rear of the store to pay for the repair, petitioner drew a gun from his
waist and shot Benjamin and Murphy. Petitioner then scooped up some jewelry,
placed it in a bag, and walked out of the store. Dorton was instructed by an
employee to push an alarm button.
Judge testified that she saw petitioner enter the store, followed by Dorton.
She asked petitioner if his name was “Ronnie Bell”; petitioner said “no.”
Petitioner subsequently shot the two men at the store, scooped up some jewelry in
a bag, and fled.
Jackson, who remained in the car, saw petitioner walk away about 15
minutes after their first encounter, carrying a plastic bag she had not seen earlier.
He turned a corner and ran out of sight. After Dorton informed her that two men
had been shot inside the jewelry store, Jackson called the police. Jackson
identified petitioner in a photo lineup and at trial. Jackson had attended school
with both Bell brothers and had known each for at least 10 years. She testified
that she could tell the brothers apart: Larry was taller than petitioner and had a
lighter complexion.
Dorton identified petitioner in a photo lineup and at trial without hesitation
or difficulty and testified that she was positive the person she had seen in the
jewelry store was petitioner and not his brother Larry, since she had seen Larry in
the past and could distinguish between them. She identified two photos of Larry
at trial and also testified that Larry was taller and had a lighter complexion.
3
Judge likewise was familiar with both Bell brothers and noted their
differing heights and skin tone. She too identified petitioner in a photo lineup and
at trial. She was positive that petitioner had been in the jewelry store.
No physical evidence or fingerprints at the scene linked petitioner to the
crimes, but groove marks on a slug obtained from Murphy’s body were consistent
with a slug discharged from a .38-caliber Colt “Detective Special” with a two-inch
barrel. Petitioner had obtained such a gun in exchange for $50 from his father,
reportedly on his brother Larry’s behalf, in December 1977.
The People presented evidence that, on the day of the murder, Larry Bell
had been with a woman in a motel located more than a mile from Wolff’s Jewelry
Store. The couple injected cocaine intravenously from early afternoon until 10:30
or 11:00 p.m., and Larry was at the motel the entire time, except for a 30- to 45-
minute period when it was dark or near dark. Larry did not have a gun with him in
the motel room.
The principal defense witness, Psychologist Robert Shomer, questioned the
identifications by all three witnesses, opined that the child witnesses may have
been confused and allowed their identifications to be influenced by others, and
criticized the manner in which the police interviewed the witnesses. Dr. Shomer
also found unrealistic the witnesses’ claim that they bore petitioner no ill feeling
over his having killed Alcus Dorton and warned that their claim might indicate
strong, unconscious hostility towards petitioner.
The defense also presented evidence that Larry had used a gun similar to a
.38-caliber Colt “Detective Special” in an assault a few days after this robbery
murder and that a ring taken from the robbery was found in Larry’s possession
when he was arrested on unrelated charges on February 9, 1978. Larry was not
called to testify or for the purpose of allowing the jury to view him, but
petitioner’s wife testified that Larry was only an inch and a half taller than
4
petitioner. She admitted, however, that Larry had lighter skin and was more
muscular than her husband. A defense investigator testified that it would have
been possible to walk from Larry’s motel to Wolff’s Jewelry Store in about 15
minutes.
Petitioner was convicted of murder with personal use of a firearm; robbery
and attempted murder causing great bodily injury, also with personal use of a
firearm; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury found true the
special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the course of a
robbery. The penalty was fixed at death. (People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp.
513-519.)
B. The Habeas Corpus Proceeding
The third petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged, among other things,
that Ernestine Jackson saw Larry (not petitioner) outside the jewelry store but
instead told the police that she saw petitioner as retaliation for petitioner having
killed Alcus Dorton in 1968, that Jackson convinced her sister and her niece to
corroborate her false account, and that Dorothy Dorton had since recanted her
identification of petitioner. These allegations were supported by a declaration
from Wanda Diane Moore, a longtime acquaintance of Jackson’s, who claimed to
have heard Jackson admit this misconduct during a conversation in May 1991; a
declaration signed “Tanya Moore,” purportedly from another longtime
acquaintance of Jackson’s, who claimed to have heard Jackson express her
animosity toward petitioner for killing Alcus during a conversation at work
sometime between 1984 and 1986; a declaration from Leroy Kelly, who knew
both the Jackson family and the Bell family and who claimed to have heard
Jackson, in 1993, admit to falsely accusing petitioner in order to punish him for
having killed Alcus; and a declaration from Dorothy Dorton, in which she
recanted her identification of petitioner and claimed Jackson had told her to lie.
5
On February 19, 2003, we issued an order to show cause why relief should
not be granted on the grounds “that petitioner is actually innocent and that the
prosecution introduced false testimony at the trial.” In the return, the People, who
were represented by the Attorney General and who had requested the issuance of
an order to show cause, denied the relevant allegations and asked that a referee be
appointed to resolve the factual conflict. We thereafter appointed a referee to hear
evidence and make findings of fact on these questions:
1. In conversations with Wanda Diane Moore, Tanya Moore, Leroy Kelly,
or any other person, did eyewitness Ernestine Jackson recant her trial testimony
identifying petitioner as the perpetrator of the crimes at Wolff’s Jewelry Store? If
so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful?
2. Did Ernestine Jackson instruct eyewitnesses Dorothy Dorton or Ruby
Judge to lie to the police or at trial about the identity of the perpetrator? Did
Jackson instruct Dorton or Judge to identify petitioner, contrary to their actual
perceptions or observations? Did Jackson tell any person that, to Jackson’s
knowledge, the true perpetrator was petitioner’s brother Larry Bell?
3. Has Dorothy Dorton ever recanted her trial testimony identifying
petitioner as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner
nonetheless truthful?
4. Has Ruby Judge ever recanted her trial testimony identifying petitioner
as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless
truthful?
5. What, if any, newly discovered evidence exists that, if credited, casts
fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the eyewitness testimony
identifying petitioner as the perpetrator?
6
6. If the trial testimony of Jackson, Dorton, or Judge identifying petitioner
as the perpetrator was false, was the false testimony substantially material or
probative in light of all the evidence produced at the trial?
During the course of the hearing, petitioner withdrew several declarations
originally offered in support of the claims for relief in his habeas corpus petition—
namely, the declarations of Dorothy Dorton, “Tanya Moore,” and Wanda Dean
Moore—pursuant to the California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-200 (rule
5-200).1 As a result, Leroy Kelly was petitioner’s sole witness at the hearing. The
People called Wanda Diane Moore, Tonia Moore, Ernestine Jackson, Ruby Judge,
Dorothy Dorton, and Michael Tye to testify. Following the reference hearing, and
after reviewing the exhibits and other documentary materials submitted by the
parties, the referee found that Jackson had not recanted her testimony identifying
petitioner as the perpetrator of the murder, that Kelly’s contrary testimony was not
credible, that Jackson had not instructed Dorton or Judge to falsely identify
petitioner as the perpetrator, and that Dorton and Judge had not recanted their trial
testimony identifying petitioner.
The parties have filed postreference briefs on the merits. Petitioner has also
filed exceptions to the referee’s report. We address the referee’s individual
findings and petitioner’s specific exceptions to them only insofar as they are
relevant to our analysis of petitioner’s claims that he is actually innocent of the
robbery murder at Wolff’s Jewelry Store and that his conviction was unlawfully
tainted by false testimony.
1
Rule 5-200 provides in pertinent part that “[i]n presenting a matter to a
tribunal, a member: [¶] (A) Shall employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to the member such means only as are consistent with truth; [¶]
(B) Shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law; . . .”
7
DISCUSSION
The petition’s claim of false testimony requires proof that false evidence
was introduced against petitioner at his trial and that such evidence was material
or probative on the issue of his guilt. (In re Roberts (2003) 29 Cal.4th 726, 741-
742.) The petition’s claim of actual innocence depends on an evidentiary showing
that “would ‘undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to
innocence or reduced culpability.’ ” (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 798, fn.
33.)2 Both claims depend on petitioner’s assertion that the three eyewitnesses—
Ernestine Jackson, Ruby Judge, and Dorothy Dorton—falsely identified him as the
perpetrator instead of identifying his brother, Larry Bell.
The central allegation of false identification was originally supported in the
petition by a declaration from Wanda Diane Moore, a longtime acquaintance of
Ernestine Jackson’s, who said she heard Jackson admit having falsely accused
petitioner because of his responsibility for Alcus Dorton’s death and admit having
convinced the other eyewitnesses to change their story to conform to her nefarious
plot; a declaration from “Tanya Moore,” purportedly another longtime
acquaintance of Jackson’s, who said she heard Jackson justify her trial testimony
against petitioner because of petitioner’s responsibility for Alcus’s death; a
declaration from Dorothy Dorton, in which she recanted her identification of
petitioner and claimed Jackson had told her to lie to avenge Alcus’s death; and a
declaration from Leroy Kelly, who claimed to have heard Jackson admit falsely
accusing petitioner in order to punish him for Alcus’s death. By the end of the
2
Although we have not yet recognized on habeas corpus a claim of actual
innocence untethered to any newly discovered evidence, we need not decide here
whether such a claim would lie, inasmuch as petitioner’s claim does rely on newly
discovered evidence, the Attorney General did not challenge petitioner’s ability to
assert the claim of actual innocence, and the claim is meritless in any event.
8
hearing, however, the record supporting petitioner’s claims was much diminished.
Citing the California Rules of Professional Conduct, petitioner declined to call
Wanda Diane Moore to testify and declined as well to offer her declaration into
evidence.3 After Tonia Moore (who was called by the People) denied signing the
declaration attached to the petition and denied further that she had ever discussed
the murder with Jackson, petitioner declined to offer into evidence the declaration
of “Tanya Moore,” relying again on rule 5-200. Likewise, after Dorothy Dorton
(who was called by the People) denied signing the declaration attached to the
petition and denied further that Jackson had ever pressured her to identify
petitioner as the perpetrator or that her trial testimony had been untruthful,
petitioner withdrew Dorton’s declaration for the same reason.
In other words, by the end of the hearing, petitioner’s claims for relief
rested almost entirely on the testimony of Leroy Kelly, who claimed that Ernestine
Jackson had admitted falsely inculpating petitioner.4 We therefore examine his
testimony in some detail.
Kelly, who described himself as homeless by choice, testified that he had
known petitioner, Alcus Dorton, and Ernestine Jackson for many years. He had
grown up with petitioner and had gone to school with him, and their families had
been close and had lived on the same block. Kelly said that, in the early 1960’s,
3
The People did call Wanda Diane Moore to testify, but she invoked her
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
4
Petitioner obtained the Kelly declaration in November 1999, but did not
attach it or otherwise identify Kelly and describe this conversation with Jackson
when he amended his federal petition in March 2000 or in June 2000 or when he
asked for an evidentiary hearing in federal court in September 2001. It was only
after the federal district court ruled that the claim of actual innocence had not been
exhausted that petitioner presented, for the first time to any court, the Kelly
declaration (along with the other declarations, since withdrawn) as an attachment
to the instant petition.
9
he and petitioner went regularly to Jackson’s house to dance, shoot dice, and hang
out. Alcus Dorton was there as well. They were all friends at that time, but Kelly
was closer to Alcus than to petitioner.
What broke up the “pack,” in Kelly’s view, was when petitioner killed
Alcus Dorton on October 15, 1968. Kelly believed that petitioner had been
defending himself when he shot Alcus and that petitioner “did what every one of
you all would did.” Alcus, who was a “really big” man, tried to take away
petitioner’s girlfriend in a way Kelly did not like. Alcus then beat up petitioner
and followed him home. Even when petitioner ran into his house, Alcus broke
open the door. The police did not show up, and petitioner shot Alcus, fatally.
Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, in Kelly’s opinion, because
he had a “lousy lawyer.”
Kelly said that the shooting split the community in two geographically, that
everyone took either petitioner’s side or Alcus’s side, and that people who
sympathized with one side got “jumped” if they were caught in a neighborhood
supporting the other side. Kelly moved from Richmond to Los Angeles in 1977
and was still there when he heard about petitioner being arrested for murder in
1978. Kelly said that everyone in the neighborhood and in “the whole black
community” knew that petitioner was not guilty of the murder at the jewelry store.
Kelly moved back to Richmond in June 1993. The next month, he saw
Ernestine Jackson outside a grocery store in El Cerrito and they exchanged
greetings. Kelly claimed that Jackson then brought up “the Ronnie Bell thing.”
Jackson told Kelly that she had lied when she testified that petitioner had been
outside the jewelry store, that in reality she had seen petitioner’s brother instead,
but that she decided to make sure petitioner “went down” for killing Alcus Dorton.
Kelly said he had trouble believing her, called her a “liar” and a “dyke,” and
walked away. He told petitioner’s wife about the conversation a month later and
10
also told three friends about it but never mentioned it to the police because
“[t]hat’s something black people don’t like to do.”
Jackson, by contrast, testified that she had encountered Kelly at a grocery
store in El Cerrito but had only exchanged greetings. She did not mention
anything to Kelly about petitioner or his brother. Jackson further testified that she
had seen petitioner, not Larry, outside the jewelry store; that she had never
claimed to anyone that she actually saw Larry instead; and that she never
instructed anyone to lie about the murderer’s true identity.
The referee, who observed both witnesses as they testified, concluded that
Jackson’s testimony was credible and that Kelly’s testimony was not credible.
The referee found in particular that Jackson had not recanted her trial testimony
during the conversation with Kelly or with any other person, that Jackson did not
instruct the other eyewitnesses to lie about the murderer’s true identity, and that
Jackson’s trial testimony identifying petitioner was truthful. We accept the
referee’s findings for several reasons.
First, “this court gives great weight to those of the referee’s findings that
are supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] ‘This is especially true for
findings involving credibility determinations. The central reason for referring a
habeas corpus claim for an evidentiary hearing is to obtain credibility
determinations (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 824); consequently, we give
special deference to the referee on factual questions “requiring resolution of
testimonial conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ credibility, because the referee
has the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying”
(In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 946).’ ” (In re Freeman (2006) 38 Cal.4th
630, 635.) In this instance, the referee made explicit, detailed findings concerning
the basis for his credibility determinations, pointing out “that Kelly’s demeanor
changed, he crossed his arms and he became nervous, and was observed to
11
actually begin sweating on his forehead” as he described his conversation with
Jackson. We are not persuaded by petitioner’s theory that Kelly was merely
offended by the allegedly belittling tone of the People’s cross-examination,
inasmuch as the referee’s observations of Kelly encompassed his demeanor during
direct examination by petitioner’s counsel. Nor do we find that the referee failed
to give appropriate weight to the hearsay letters attesting to Kelly’s character that
Kelly had procured on his own behalf and that were admitted into evidence
without objection.5 That Kelly “has helped out with small jobs,” is a “friendly”
and “pleasant” person, and “keeps a close look” on certain businesses after hours
hardly compels a finding that Kelly’s account of his conversation with Jackson
was credible, inasmuch as Kelly believed that petitioner had been unjustly
convicted and punished for killing Alcus Dorton and that petitioner was likewise
innocent of this robbery murder (and inasmuch as Kelly expressed hostility to
Jackson, as evidenced by his use of a slur concerning her sexual orientation).
Second, Kelly’s testimony suffered from various infirmities and was, at
bottom, rather implausible. Kelly claimed that Alcus Dorton’s death tore the
community apart and that “everybody” took a side on it. Yet Kelly denied
repeatedly that he ever did. It seems unlikely that Jackson, who allegedly took
Alcus’s side in this grudge that violently split the community, would suddenly
choose to confide in Kelly, who had stopped hanging out at Jackson’s house by
the time he was sent to the Contra Costa County Boys Ranch for vehicle theft in
1965 and who thereafter never talked to her, not even to say “hi,” for nearly three
decades. Had Jackson offered such a confession to Kelly, she would likely have
5
The People stated at oral argument that they had declined to object to these
letters in order to grant petitioner the widest possible latitude to prove his claim of
innocence.
12
made similar statements to others—yet petitioner did not produce any such
witnesses. It is also telling that petitioner did not offer corroborating testimony
from any of the people with whom Kelly claimed to have discussed Jackson’s
startling admissions. (See People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 539.)
Third, Jackson lacked a sufficient motive to falsely accuse petitioner of the
murder. Petitioner theorizes at length that Jackson had a “powerful” motive to
seek revenge against him because he was responsible for the death of Alcus
Dorton, who had fathered Dorothy Dorton with Jackson’s sister, but served only a
short period in custody for voluntary manslaughter. Yet the sole evidence that
Jackson harbored any grudge against petitioner at the time of the murder, or that
the wider community had been riven by Alcus’s death, consisted of Kelly’s
testimony. Jackson herself testified that Alcus, who never married her sister, was
merely an acquaintance; that his death, while unfortunate, did not prevent her from
going on with her life; that she did not have an opinion whether petitioner’s
sentence for Alcus’s death had been long enough; and that she was unaware of any
division in the community over Alcus’s death. Jackson also testified, without
contradiction, that she did not connect her sister’s death from alcoholism in March
1973 to Alcus’s death in 1968 and that her sister had in the meantime married
another man. Jackson’s lack of a vengeful motive was corroborated by Dorothy
Dorton, who testified at her deposition that she did not even remember Alcus or
whether her mother had taken his death “hard,” and by Ruby Judge, who testified
at her deposition that Alcus “was kind of like a bully” and “probably did
something to [petitioner]” and who testified at the preliminary hearing that her
mother had told her not to hold a grudge against petitioner for what happened to
Alcus. Indeed, Detective Michael Tye, who interviewed Jackson at the murder
scene, testified that Jackson had been reluctant to cooperate with police because of
13
fear for her own safety and that of her sister and niece. This would hardly seem to
be the behavior of a witness who was plotting to frame petitioner.
Fourth, Jackson’s identification of petitioner was corroborated by the other
eyewitnesses. Ruby Judge testified at trial, in a deposition, and at the reference
hearing that petitioner committed the murder. So did Dorothy Dorton. The
referee, who observed their testimony at the reference hearing, found that both
witnesses were credible. We accept that finding not merely because the referee
was able to observe their demeanor but also because Dorton was able confidently
to identify petitioner, whom she had otherwise never seen before, as the murderer
in a photo lineup at the police station a short time after the murder. We further
note that Judge never recanted her identification of petitioner, nor was any
evidence presented that she ever did.
Petitioner’s various challenges to the referee’s findings are unconvincing.
Petitioner complains first that Jackson was not credible because of her
hostility to the habeas corpus proceedings and because of inconsistencies and
hesitations in her testimony at the reference hearing. We disagree. As the district
attorney pointed out at the reference hearing, Jackson had been interviewed
multiple times by the police, had testified at a preliminary hearing, and had
testified again at two trials. It was unfortunate but unsurprising that, as the referee
found, she was irritated and did not want to testify again. Moreover, it is
understandable that Jackson’s recollection of conversations and events decades
earlier would be hazy or incomplete. (See In re Burton (2006) 40 Cal.4th 205,
217.)
Petitioner claims next that Dorton was not credible, based on his alleged
“showing” that Dorton lied when she denied meeting defense investigators at a
Carrows Restaurant in El Cerrito and denied signing the declaration in her name
recanting her trial testimony. The sole evidence that Dorton signed the
14
declaration, which petitioner withdrew under compulsion of the California Rules
of Professional Conduct, was the “impression” of a forensic document examiner
that Dorton had signed and initialed the declaration while trying to distort her
signature and initials. In the view of the document examiner, the initials on the
first page were “probably” written by Dorton, the initials on the second page were
too “scrawled and brief” to support an opinion, and the signature was too “poorly
written” to support a positive identification, either, but the probability that she
initialed the first page nonetheless “strongly indicated” that she had signed the
third page.
The remaining evidence, however, supported Dorton’s testimony that she
never met with defense investigators and, thus, never signed the declaration.
Neither defense investigator could identify Dorton in a photo lineup as the woman
they had interviewed and who had signed the declaration. The investigators also
claimed that the woman identifying herself as Dorton had attended the interview
with a man identified as her cousin, Marchon King—yet petitioner, even after
locating King, declined to have him testify. (See Evid. Code, § 412.) The
referee’s finding that Dorton did not recant is therefore supported by substantial
evidence, and we accept his finding.
Finally, petitioner relies on the discrepancy between Dorton’s testimony
that she told Judge, in the jewelry store, to ask the perpetrator whether he was
Larry Bell (and that Judge did so) and Judge’s testimony that Dorton told her to
ask the perpetrator whether he was Ronnie Bell (and that Judge did so). This
discrepancy, which was presented to the jury at petitioner’s trial, “does not
constitute ‘ “new evidence” that fundamentally undermines the judgment’ ” (In re
Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 798, fn. 33), nor does it establish that his conviction
was the product of false testimony (In re Roberts, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 744).
Both witnesses identified petitioner as the murderer at trial and continued to
15
identify him at the reference hearing. The referee found that both witnesses were
credible in their identification of petitioner as the murderer, and we accept that
finding as well.
In sum, the record falls far short of establishing either that petitioner is
actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted or that his criminal
convictions were tainted by false testimony.
DISPOSITION
Our order to show cause was limited to the claims that petitioner was
actually innocent of the crimes at Wolff’s Jewelry Store and that his convictions
were the unlawful product of false testimony. Bell’s other claims and his petition
for writ of habeas corpus will be resolved by a separate order, as is our practice.
(See In re Freeman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 652.) The order to show cause is
discharged.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
16
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion In re Bell on Habeas Corpus
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XXX
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S105569Date Filed: November 15, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Margaret Littlefield, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner Ronald Lee Bell.__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette,Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald A. Bass and Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorneys General, and
Ronald S. Matthias, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent State of California.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Margaret LittlefieldLaw Offices of Michael Satris
Post Office Box 337
Bolinas, CA 94924
(415) 868-9209
Ronald S. Matthias
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5858
In this case, which is related to the automatic appeal in People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, the Court issued an order to show cause limited to the following claims: Is petitioner entitled to relief on the grounds that he is actually innocent and that the prosecution introduced false testimony at the trial?
Opinion Information
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: | Cross Referenced Cases: |
| Thu, 11/15/2007 | 42 Cal.4th 630 original opinion | S105569 | Habeas (AA Post-Judgment) | complete | PEOPLE v. BELL (RONALD LEE) (S004260) |
Parties
| 1 | Bell, Ronald Lee (Petitioner) San Quentin State Prison Represented by Margaret J. Littlefield Law Offices of Michael Satris P.O. Box 337 Bolinas, CA |
| 2 | Department Of Corrections (Non-Title Respondent) Represented by Attorney General - San Francisco Office Ronald S. Matthias, Senior Asst. Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Nov 15 2007 | Opinion: OSC discharged |
| Dockets | |
| Apr 2 2002 | Petition for writ of (AA-related) Habeas Corpus filed by atty Margaret Littlefield. (68 pp. excluding exhibits) |
| Apr 4 2002 | Informal response requested due 5-6-2002. Any reply due within 30 days of service & filing of response. If counsel find it necessary to request additional time, the court will consider requests for extensions of time in 30-day increments only. |
| Apr 8 2002 | Received: copy of federal second amended habeas corpus petition (no. C-99-20615 RMW). |
| Apr 16 2002 | Filed: Notice and submission of original declarations, exhibits E,F,G and H to petn. for writ of habeas corpus. |
| Apr 19 2002 | Note: Confidential habeas funds request filed in automatic appeal no. S004260. |
| May 6 2002 | Informal Response filed (AA) by resp. (34 pp. - excluding exhibits) |
| Jun 7 2002 | Reply to Informal Response filed (AA) (17 pp.) |
| Feb 10 2003 | Note: Request for funds for habeas investigation filed in AA no. S004260 (confidential). |
| Feb 19 2003 | Order to show cause issued The Director of the Department of Corrections is ordered to show cause in this court, when the matter is placed on calendar, why the relief prayed for should not be granted on the grounds that petitioner is actually innocent and that the prosecution introduced false testimony at the trial, as alleged in claims B and C of the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed April 2, 2002. The return shall be filed on or before March 21, 2003. |
| Mar 14 2003 | Written return filed by Respondent. (9 pp. - excluding exhibits) |
| Apr 4 2003 | Note: Habeas funds request filed in AA no. S004260 (confidential). |
| Apr 4 2003 | Filed: "Application for Permission to file Denial and to do so 60 Days After Order on Accompanying Pleading." |
| Apr 15 2003 | Filed: Supplemental declaration in support of application for extension of time to file traverse. (1st request) |
| Apr 18 2003 | Extension of time granted to 5/14/2003 to file the traverse. Extension is granted based upon counsel Michael Satris's representation that he anticipates filing that pleading by 5/14/2003. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| May 14 2003 | Traverse to return filed by attorney Margaret Littlefield. (9 pp.) |
| Jun 11 2003 | Reference hearing ordered Based on the record in this matter and good cause appearing: The Honorable Laurel S. Brady, Presiding Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, shall select a Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court to sit as a referee in this proceeding and shall promptly notify this court of the referee selected. After appointment by this court, the referee shall take evidence and make findings of fact on the following questions regarding the case of People v. Ronald Lee Bell (Contra Costa County Superior Court No. 21631; Judge Richard E. Arnason): 1. In conversations with Wanda Diane Moore, Tanya Moore, Leroy Kelly, or any other person, did eyewitness Ernestine Jackson recant her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator of the crimes at Wolff's Jewelry Store? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 2. Did Ernestine Jackson instruct eyewitnesses Dorothy Dorton or Ruby Judge to lie to the police or at trial about the identity of the perpetrator? Did Jackson instruct Dorton or Judge to identify petitioner, contrary to their actual perceptions or observations? Did Jackson tell any person that, to Jackson's knowledge, the true perpetrator was petitioner's brother Larry Bell? 3. Has Dorothy Dorton ever recanted her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 4. Has Ruby Judge ever recanted her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 5. What, if any, newly discovered evidence exists that, if credited, casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the eyewitness testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? 6. If the trial testimony of Jackson, Dorton, or Judge identifying petitioner as the perpetrator was false, was the false testimony substantially material or probative in light of all the evidence produced at the trial? It is further ordered that the referee prepare and submit to this court a report of the proceedings conducted pursuant to this appointment, of the evidence adduced, and the findings of fact made. Any requests for discovery in this matter should be addressed to the referee. |
| Jul 9 2003 | Referee appointed THE COURT: Based on the record in this matter and good cause appearing: The Honorable Thomas Maddock, Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, is appointed to sit as a referee in this proceeding. He shall take evidence and make findings of fact on the following questions regarding the case of People v. Ronald Lee Bell (Contra Costa County Superior Court No. 21631; Judge Richard E. Arnason): 1. In conversations with Wanda Diane Moore, Tanya Moore, Leroy Kelly, or any other person, did eyewitness Ernestine Jackson recant her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator of the crimes at Wolff's Jewelry Store? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 2. Did Ernestine Jackson instruct eyewitnesses Dorothy Dorton or Ruby Judge to lie to the police or at trial about the identity of the perpetrator? Did Jackson instruct Dorton or Judge to identify petitioner, contrary to their actual perceptions or observations? Did Jackson tell any person that, to Jackson's knowledge, the true perpetrator was petitioner's brother Larry Bell? 3. Has Dorothy Dorton ever recanted her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 4. Has Ruby Judge ever recanted her trial testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? If so, was her trial identification of petitioner nonetheless truthful? 5. What, if any, newly discovered evidence exists that, if credited, casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the eyewitness testimony identifying petitioner as the perpetrator? 6. If the trial testimony of Jackson, Dorton, or Judge identifying petitioner as the perpetrator was false, was the false testimony substantially material or probative in light of all the evidence produced at the trial? It is further ordered that the referee prepare and submit to this court a report of the proceedings conducted pursuant to this appointment, of the evidence adduced, and the findings of fact made. Any requests for discovery in this matter should be addressed to the referee. George, C.J., and Brown, J., were absent and did not participate. |
| Sep 16 2003 | Received: status report from referee, dated 9-12-2003. |
| Dec 11 2003 | Letter sent to: referee requesting status report. |
| Dec 18 2003 | Received: status report from referee, dated 12-15-2003. |
| Mar 15 2004 | Received: status report from referee. |
| Apr 29 2004 | Note: Habeas funds request filed in AA no. S004260 (confidential). |
| Sep 28 2004 | Note: habeas funds request filed in AA no. S004260. (confidential) |
| Oct 13 2004 | Note: Order re habeas funds request filed in AA no. S004260 (confidential). |
| Nov 19 2004 | Letter sent to: Judge Maddock requesting status report. |
| Nov 30 2004 | Received: status report from referee. |
| Feb 7 2005 | Received: status report from referee. |
| May 9 2005 | Letter sent to: referee requesting status report. |
| May 24 2005 | Received: status report from referee. |
| Jun 3 2005 | Note: request for habeas corpus funds filed in related A.A., no. S004260 |
| Sep 1 2005 | Received: status report from referee, dated 8-31-2005. |
| Sep 1 2005 | Letter sent to: referee requesting status report. |
| Dec 15 2005 | Received: status report from referee. |
| Mar 30 2006 | Received: status report from referee, dated 3-28-2006. |
| Jun 22 2006 | Letter sent to: referee requesting status report. |
| Jul 3 2006 | Received: status report from referee, dated 6-30-2006. |
| Aug 2 2006 | Received: status report from referee, dated 8-2-2006. |
| Dec 5 2006 | Letter sent to: referee requesting status report. |
| Dec 6 2006 | Letter sent to: referee regarding transmission of evidentiary hearing record. |
| Dec 11 2006 | Referee's report filed |
| Dec 11 2006 | Letter sent to: counsel inviting parties to serve and file exceptions to the report of the referee and simultaneous briefs on the merits on or before January 10, 2007. Responses, if any, should be served and filed 30 days thereafter. |
| Dec 22 2006 | Request for extension of time filed by petitioner to file briefing on referee's report. (1st request) |
| Jan 8 2007 | Extension of time granted to March 12, 2007 to file petitioner's exceptions to the report of the referee and brief on the merits. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. Extension is granted based upon counsel Margaret Littlefield's representation that she anticipates filing that document by March 11, 2007. |
| Jan 23 2007 | Order filed The order filed on January 8, 2007, is amended to read as follows: Good cause appearing, and based upon counsel Margaret Littlefield's representation that she anticipates filing petitioner's exceptions to the report of the referee and brief on the merits by March 11, 2007, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to March 12, 2007. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. On the court's own motion, the time for respondent to serve and file exceptions to the report of the referee and brief on the merits is extended to March 12, 2007. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| Mar 5 2007 | Request for extension of time filed to file exceptions to referee's report and brief on the merits. (2nd request) |
| Mar 13 2007 | Extension of time granted Good cause appearing, and based upon counsel Margaret Littlefield's representation that she anticipates filing the petitioner's exceptions to referee's report and brief on merits by April 11, 2007, counsel's request for an extension of time in which to file that brief is granted to April 11, 2007. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. On the court's own motion, time for respondent to serve and file exceptions to referee's report and brief on merits is extended to April 11, 2007. After that date, no further extension is contemplated. |
| Apr 2 2007 | Filed: record from evidentiary hearing. [7 vols. of C.T. (1,539 pp.) and 4 vols. of R.T. -- including one vol. under seal (585 pp.), and exhibits. |
| Apr 3 2007 | Letter sent to: superior court appeals clerk, returning dcouments for superior court's file. |
| Apr 11 2007 | Exceptions/briefing filed re referee's report "Respondent's Brief on the Merits Following Submission of the Report of the Referee." (27 pp.; 8,338 words) |
| Apr 12 2007 | Exceptions/briefing filed re referee's report "Petitioner's Brief of Exceptions to the Report of the Referee." (1 volume - 46 pp; perm) |
| May 14 2007 | Response brief re referee's report (fully briefed) petitioner's brief in reply to respondent's brief on the merits re: report of referee. (6 pp.) |
| May 17 2007 | Note: respondent will not be filing additional briefing. |
| Jun 14 2007 | Oral argument letter sent advising counsel that the court could schedule this case for argument as early as the September calendar, to be held the week of September 3, 2007, in San Francisco. |
| Sep 5 2007 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued on October 3, 2007, in Santa Rosa, at 9:00 a.m. special session at the Sonoma Country Day School, 4400 Day School Place, Santa Rosa |
| Sep 18 2007 | Request for Extended Media coverage Filed By The California Channel. |
| Sep 18 2007 | Received: appearance sheet from Margaret J. Littlefield, Attorney at Law, indicating 30 minutes for oral argument for appellant. |
| Sep 18 2007 | Received: appearance sheet from Ronald Matthias, Senior Assistant Attorney General, indicating 30 minutes for oral argument for respondent. |
| Sep 20 2007 | Request for Extended Media coverage Granted The request for extended media coverage, filed September 18, 2007, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court. |
| Sep 25 2007 | Request for Extended Media coverage Filed by The Santa Rosa Press Democrat |
| Sep 28 2007 | Request for Extended Media coverage Granted The request for extended media coverage, filed by The Santa Rosa Press Democrat on September 25, 2007, is granted, subject to the conditions set forth in rule 1.150, California Rules of Court. |
| Oct 3 2007 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Nov 14 2007 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
| Nov 15 2007 | Opinion filed: OSC discharged Our order to show cause was limited to the claims that petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of Wolff's Jewelry Store and that his convictions were the unlawful product of false testimony. Bell's other claims and his petition for writ of habeas corpus will be resolved by a separate order, as is our practice. (See In re Freeman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 652.) The order to show cause is discharged. Opinion by Baxter, J. --- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Jan 3 2008 | Order filed: remaining habeas corpus issues denied The petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on April 2, 2002, is denied. Each claim is denied on the merits. In addition, Claims D, E, G, and I are denied as untimely (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 780-781; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 782-787, 797-798) and successive (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 788, fn. 9; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768; In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 546-547). To the extent they repeat claims raised and rejected in a prior petition for writ of habeas corpus, Claim D (subpart 3) and Claim E (subpart 2) are procedurally barred. (In re Miller (1941) 17 Cal.2d 734, 735.) To the extent it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal, Claim I is procedurally barred. (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 825, fn. 3, 828-841; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759. Werdegar, J., was absent and did not participate. |
| Jan 3 2008 | Letter sent to: counsel advising that opinion is now final. No remittitur will issue. |
| Briefs | |
| Mar 14 2003 | Written return filed |
| May 14 2003 | Traverse to return filed |
| May 14 2007 | Response brief re referee's report (fully briefed) |
