Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/3/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S136345
v.
Ct.App.
1/5
A107999
VINCENT REED,
San
Francisco
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 192303

On January 24, 2004, two San Francisco police officers found defendant,
Vincent Reed, a convicted felon, in possession of a loaded and concealed .25-
caliber automatic pistol. In addition to other crimes not relevant here, he was
charged with and convicted of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.
Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),1 (2) carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd.
(a)(2)), and (3) carrying a loaded firearm while in a public place (§ 12031, subd.
(a)(2)(A)). The court sentenced him to prison for three years on the first count,
including a prior prison term enhancement, and stayed the sentences on the
remaining weapons counts. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.
Defendant contends he was improperly convicted of being a felon in possession of
a firearm in addition to the other weapons crimes.
In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more
than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. “In California, a

1
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
1

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single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any
number of the offenses charged.’ (§ 954, italics added; People v. Ortega (1998)
19 Cal.4th 686, 692.)” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.)
Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction. Section 654 is its counterpart
concerning punishment. It prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or
omission.” When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654
prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on
the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. (People v. Ortega,
supra, at p. 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 359-360.) Here, the
trial court stayed execution of sentence on two of the weapons convictions, so
multiple punishment is not at issue. This case concerns only multiple conviction.
A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple
conviction “prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included
offenses.” (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034.) “[I]f a crime cannot
be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a
lesser included offense within the former.” (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th
282, 288.) Defendant argues that, as charged, being a felon in possession of a
firearm is a lesser included offense of the other two weapons crimes, thus
prohibiting conviction of the former crime.
The question whether one offense is necessarily included in another arises
in various contexts. A common one is deciding whether a defendant charged with
one crime may be convicted of a lesser uncharged crime. A defendant may be
convicted of an uncharged crime if, but only if, the uncharged crime is necessarily
included in the charged crime. (§ 1159; People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364,
368-369.) The reason for this rule is settled. “ ‘This reasoning rests upon a
constitutional basis: “Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of
the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to
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prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at
his trial.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Lohbauer, supra, at p. 368.) The required
notice is provided as to any charged offense and any lesser offense that is
necessarily committed when the charged offense is committed. (Id. at pp. 368-
369.)
We have applied two tests in determining whether an uncharged offense is
necessarily included within a charged offense: the “elements” test and the
“accusatory pleading” test. Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of
the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the
latter is necessarily included in the former. Under the accusatory pleading test, if
the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of
the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former. (People v.
Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 288-289.) Defendant does not claim that being a
felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily included within the other weapons
offenses under the elements test. He does, however, argue that it is necessarily
included under the accusatory pleading test.
In this case, the amended information alleged as to all three weapons
offenses that defendant was a convicted felon. Accordingly, as charged, defendant
could not commit the crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded
firearm while in a public place without also being a felon in possession of a
firearm. The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that the accusatory pleading
test does not apply to determine whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple
charged offenses. We granted defendant’s petition for review to decide whether
the Court of Appeal was correct.
Several opinions, including some from this court, have assumed, without
discussion, that both the elements and the accusatory pleading tests apply in
deciding whether multiple conviction of charged offenses is proper. But in each
3

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case, the assumption was unnecessary to the holding because each opinion either
found the offenses not necessarily included or actually applied only the elements
test. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.3d 983, 988; People v. Ortega, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 698; People v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1507-1508;
People v. Belmares (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 23; People v. Strohman (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; People v. Thomas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 299, 305;
People v. Nicholson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 623; see also People v. Ausbie
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 862-863 [recognizing the question and applying the
accusatory pleading test out of caution, then holding that the offenses are not
necessarily included].)
We have found no opinion invalidating multiple convictions due to the
accusatory pleading test.2 In People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at page 356,
footnote 2, we noted that, “while an expanded definition of necessarily included
offenses [i.e., employing both the elements test and the accusatory pleading test]
may be appropriate in the context of [conviction of an uncharged offense], there
appears little reason to enlarge the meaning of the same phrase as it is used in
other situations.” We did not, however, decide the question because the offenses

2
The concurring and dissenting opinion claims that People v. Richardson
(1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 70 and People v. Johnson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 844, and
perhaps even People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, somehow support its position.
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2-3.) The continuing validity of the rule stated in
these old cases is dubious in light of more recent events. (See People v. Watterson
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944-947; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 304-306.) We need not decide this question, because those cases, even if still
valid, are irrelevant to the issue here. They do not say that “the accusatory
pleading alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant’s
transportation of the drugs necessarily included possessing those drugs . . . .”
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 3.) Indeed, none of those decisions even mentions
the accusatory pleading test or the actual accusatory pleading, and none of them
suggests that the accusatory pleading contained anything other than the statutory
elements. Whatever the basis might be for the rule stated in those cases, it is not
the accusatory pleading test.
4

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were not included in each other even under the accusatory pleading test. (Ibid.)
More recently, we again recognized this question but did not decide it. (People v.
Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.)
As we noted in People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1035, the
Court of Appeal decisions that specifically consider this question have concluded
that the accusatory pleading test does not apply in deciding whether multiple
conviction of charged offenses is proper. (People v. Miranda (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467; People v. Watterson, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 947, fn.
15; People v. Scheidt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 162, 165-171.) Now that the
question is squarely presented, we agree. In deciding whether multiple conviction
is proper, a court should consider only the statutory elements. Or, as formulated in
Scheidt, “only a statutorily lesser included offense is subject to the bar against
multiple convictions in the same proceeding. An offense that may be a lesser
included offense because of the specific nature of the accusatory pleading is not
subject to the same bar.” (People v. Scheidt, supra, at pp. 165-166.)
The accusatory pleading test arose to ensure that defendants receive notice
before they can be convicted of an uncharged crime. “As to a lesser included
offense, the required notice is given when the specific language of the accusatory
pleading adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the
elements of the lesser offense.” (People v. Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368-
369.) “Because a defendant is entitled to notice of the charges, it makes sense to
look to the accusatory pleading (as well as the elements of the crimes) in deciding
whether a defendant had adequate notice of an uncharged lesser offense so as to
permit conviction of that uncharged offense.” (People v. Montoya, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1039 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).) But this purpose has no relevance to
deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged offenses.
“[I]t makes no sense to look to the pleading, rather than just the legal elements, in
5

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deciding whether conviction of two charged offenses is proper. Concerns about
notice are irrelevant when both offenses are separately charged . . . .” (Ibid.)
The Legislature has defined three separate weapons offenses: possessing a
firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in a
public place. Defendant committed each of these crimes, albeit during the same
course of conduct. The Legislature has made clear that a defendant may be
convicted of more than one offense even if they arise out of the same act or course
of conduct. (§ 954.) We see no reason to prohibit multiple convictions that
section 954 permits simply because of the way the offenses are charged. “To
immunize” defendant from conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm
simply because the felony conviction was alleged as to each of the weapons
offenses “would be irrational and would frustrate the strong legislative purpose
behind [all three] statutes.” (People v. Scheidt, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 171.)
Applying the accusatory pleading test to charged crimes could also lead to
absurd results. Assume, for example, that the defendant robbed and killed
someone and was charged with robbery and murder for those actions. Under the
elements test, neither robbery nor murder is necessarily included in the other. One
can easily rob without murdering and murder without robbing. Conviction of both
crimes would be fully warranted. But if the prosecutor had alleged as to the
robbery that the force used in the crime consisted of killing the victim with malice,
then, as alleged, the defendant could not have committed the robbery without also
committing murder. If the accusatory pleading test applied, conviction of both
crimes would be impermissible. Moreover, the murder would be necessarily
included in the robbery, not the other way around, which presumably would
require vacating the murder conviction. This outcome would be absurd, would
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violate the legislative mandate permitting multiple conviction (§ 954), and would
serve no apparent purpose.3
Defendant argues that “[j]ust as a ‘rose is a rose is a rose is a rose’
(Gertrude Stein, ‘Sacred Emily’ (1913)), a lesser included offense is a lesser
included offense is a lesser included offense.” He contends we must maintain a
“logical consistency” in the definition of a necessarily included offense “to make
the scheme workable and logical.” However, we believe it is logically consistent
to apply the accusatory pleading test when it is logical to do so (to ensure adequate
notice) but not when it is illogical to do so (when doing so merely defeats the
legislative policy permitting multiple conviction). Our conclusion results in a
straightforward overall rule: Courts should consider the statutory elements and
accusatory pleading in deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore
may be convicted, of an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in
deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes. This
rule is not overly complex and, we believe, is quite workable.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

3
The concurring and dissenting opinion would avoid this problem by
adopting a modified version of the accusatory pleading rule. It would disregard
“allegations in the accusatory pleading that do not allege elements of the offense”
(conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 4) and, presumably, consider only allegations that do
allege elements of the offense. We see no support for this version of the
accusatory pleading test either in the cases or in logic; it merely adds complexity
for no apparent purpose.
7

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
I disagree with the majority’s view that a court never should consider the
language of the accusatory pleading in deciding whether multiple convictions are
proper. But I reach the same result as the majority in the present case, because the
parties agree that defendant’s status as a convicted felon is not an element of the
crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and possessing a loaded firearm in public
and, thus, the allegations in those counts that defendant was a felon should not be
considered in determining whether multiple convictions are proper.
“[T]his court has long held that multiple convictions may not be based on
necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355.)
In determining whether a defendant properly may be convicted of two crimes
based upon a single act or course of conduct, we examine both “the elements of
the offenses and the language of the accusatory pleading.” (People v. Ortega
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 698.) We emphasized this point: “The determination of
whether an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the
included offense must be based . . . upon the statutory definitions of both offenses
and the language of the accusatory pleading. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Similar
language appears in our decision in People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988:
“For purposes of the rule proscribing multiple conviction, ‘ “[u]nder California
law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the
statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the
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accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the
greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.” ’ [Citation.]”
The importance of the distinction between the elements test and the
accusatory pleading test is demonstrated by our decision in People v. Rogers
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, which held that the defendant properly could be convicted of
transporting marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11531) even though he had been
acquitted of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530) because
“possession of marijuana is not a necessary element of the offense of
transportation of marijuana.” (People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 131.) We
explained that although usually a person must possess marijuana in order to
transport it, this is not invariably so: “one may ‘transport’ marijuana or other drugs
even though they are in the exclusive possession of another. . . . For example, were
defendant shown to have aided and abetted his passengers in carrying, conveying
or concealing drugs in their possession, his conduct would have sustained a
conviction of transportation.” (Id. at p. 134.) We were quick to point out in a
footnote, however: “In cases where defendant’s possession is incidental to, and a
necessary part of, the transportation charged, and no prior, different or subsequent
possession is shown, the offense of possession is deemed to be necessarily
included in the offense of transportation, and defendant may not be convicted of
both charges. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 134, fn. 3.)
Our decision in Rogers cited two decisions of the Court of Appeal that had
held that a defendant could not be convicted of both possessing and transporting
drugs where the act of transporting the drugs included possessing them. People v.
Richardson (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 70, 78, held that the defendant could not be
convicted of both possessing heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500) and
transporting a narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11501): “The possession and
transportation in the instant case clearly were the same act. Under the
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circumstances, the possession of the heroin was a lesser, but necessarily included,
offense of the transportation of a narcotic.” People v. Johnson (1970) 5
Cal.App.3d 844, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rubacalba (1993) 6
Cal.4th 62, 66, held that the defendant could not be convicted of both possessing
restricted dangerous drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11910) and transporting them
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11912): “[T]he possession proved in the instant case was
incidental to, and a necessary part of, the transportation charged. No prior,
different or subsequent possession of the pill was shown. Under that circumstance
the offense of possession was necessarily included in the offense of transporting
the pill and appellant may not be convicted of both charges. [Citations.]”
(Johnson, supra, at p. 847.)1
Under the elements test, therefore, a defendant may be convicted of both
possessing and transporting the same drugs, because it is possible to transport
drugs without possessing them. But under the accusatory pleading test, if the
accusatory pleading alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the
defendant’s transportation of the drugs necessarily included possessing those
drugs, the defendant could not be convicted of both offenses.
The majority unnecessarily departs from our past decisions based upon
scanty reasoning that I do not find convincing. The majority correctly observes
that a defendant may be convicted of an uncharged offense that is necessarily
included within a charged offense if the language of the accusatory pleading
“adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the elements of
the lesser offense.” (People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 369.) From this,
the majority leaps to the conclusion that the language of the accusatory pleading

1
We also cited in Rogers the decision in People v. Solo (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d
201, 208, which recognized that a defendant could properly be convicted of both
possession of marijuana for sale and transportation of marijuana.
3

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should not be considered in the present case because “this purpose has no
relevance to deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged
offenses.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)
It is true that whether a defendant was given notice that the People would
seek to prove the elements of a lesser offense does not affect whether multiple
convictions are proper. But the majority fails to consider that the language of the
accusatory pleading not only gives the defendant notice of the charges, it also is
instructive in determining the nature of the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. In People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, for example, we held that
the trial court properly considered the language of the accusatory pleadings of two
prior convictions in determining that the defendant had been convicted of
residential burglary. The trial court based its determination of the nature of the
prior convictions on a review of “the record of each conviction, which included an
accusatory pleading charging a residential burglary and defendant’s plea of guilty
or nolo contendere.” (Id. at p. 345.)
In the same manner that the language of the accusatory pleading sheds light
on the nature of a prior conviction, so too it sheds light on the nature of the crime
of which a defendant was convicted for purposes of determining whether multiple
convictions are proper. But this does not mean that every allegation in an
accusatory pleading affects whether multiple convictions are proper. Consistent
with our application of the accusatory pleading test in other contexts, I believe that
allegations in the accusatory pleading that do not allege elements of the offense
should not be considered in determining whether multiple convictions are proper.
Accordingly, we need not, and should not, depart from our established, and
correct, statements in People v. Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th 983, 988 and People v.
Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th 686, 698.
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In the present case, defendant was convicted of three offenses, among
others: being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd.
(a)(1))2, carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. (a)(2)), and carrying a
loaded firearm in public (§ 12031, subd. (a)(1)). We must determine whether the
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily included within
the other two offenses. If we do not consider the language of the accusatory
pleading, the answer is no. A person who carries a concealed weapon does not
necessarily commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The
same is true of a person who carries a loaded firearm in public.
But the accusatory pleading in the present case alleged that defendant was a
felon in the counts charging him with carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a
loaded weapon in public. The apparent reason the prosecutor included those
allegations is that those offenses are wobblers that can be punished as either
felonies or misdemeanors depending upon several enumerated factors. As
relevant here, section 12025, subdivision (b)(1) provides that carrying a concealed
firearm is a felony if the defendant previously has been convicted of a felony.
Similarly, section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides that carrying a loaded
weapon in public is a felony if the defendant previously has been convicted of a
felony.
If we were to consider the allegations in the accusatory pleading in all three
of the counts under examination that defendant was a felon, the analysis of
whether the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily
included within the other two offenses changes; the answer would be yes. A felon
who carries a concealed weapon necessarily also is a felon in possession of a
firearm. The same is true of a felon who carries a loaded firearm in public.

2
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5

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The parties agree, however, that defendant’s status as a felon is not an
element of the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a loaded
weapon in public. Rather, defendant’s status as a felon is a factor that elevates the
sentence for the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. (People v. Padilla
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127, 138; People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 134
[“The prior conviction referred to in subdivision (b)(1) [of section 12025] is
simply a sentencing factor which serves to elevate the offense from misdemeanor
to felony; the prior conviction is not an element of the offense of carrying a
concealed firearm within a vehicle proscribed in section 12025. [Citations.]”]; see
also People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 473; People v. Robinson (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 275, 281.)
In People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 101, we held that allegations of
sentencing enhancements should not be considered in applying the accusatory
pleading test to determine a trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
regarding lesser included offenses. The defendant in Wolcott was charged with,
and convicted of, robbery. The defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court
had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that assault with a deadly weapon was a
lesser included offense of robbery because the information alleged in addition to
the robbery charge that the defendant used a firearm in committing the robbery
within the meaning of section 12022.5. Noting that “ ‘section 12022.5 does not
prescribe a new offense but merely additional punishment for an offense in which
a firearm is used,’ [citations]” we held “that an allegation of firearm use under
section 12022.5 should not be considered in determining lesser included offense.”
(People v. Wolcott, supra, at pp. 100-101.)
In my view, the accusatory pleading test should be applied in a similar way
to determine whether multiple convictions are proper. In the present case,
defendant’s status as a felon, although alleged in the information, is not an element
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of the crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded firearm in
public but was a sentencing factor and, thus, should not be considered in
determining whether defendant can be convicted of being a felon in possession of
a firearm in addition to those crimes.
Applying the accusatory pleading test in this manner to determine whether
multiple convictions are permitted alleviates the concern expressed by the majority
that using the accusatory pleading test could “lead to absurd results.” (Maj. opn.,
ante at p. 6.) The majority worries that if a hapless prosecutor were to allege in a
charge of robbery “that the force used in the crime consisted of killing the victim
with malice,” murder would become, under the accusatory pleading test, a
necessarily lesser included offense of the robbery as pleaded. That would not
happen if the accusatory pleading test were applied in the manner I propose.
Malice is not an element of the crime of robbery. Thus, an unnecessary allegation
in the accusatory pleading that a robbery was committed with malice should not be
considered in applying the accusatory pleading test to determine if multiple
convictions are permitted.
Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority, but not with
its reasoning.
MORENO, J.
7

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Reed
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 7/12/05 – 1st Dist., Div.5
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S136345
Date Filed: July 3, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Francisco
Judge: John Kennedy Stewart

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Melissa R. Krum
and Jeffery M. Laurence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

John F. Schuck
Law Offices of John F. Schuck
4083 Transport Street, Suite B
Palo Alto, CA 94303
(650) 856-7963

Jeffrey M. Laurence
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5897

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 07/03/2006	S136345

Disposition
Jul 3 2006	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Aug 12 2005	Petition for review filed   by counsel for appellant (Vincent Reed).
Aug 12 2005	Record requested
Aug 16 2005	2nd record request
Aug 16 2005	Received Court of Appeal record
Sep 21 2005	Petition for review granted; issues limited (criminal case)   Petition for review GRANTED. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: Does the accusatory pleading test for determining whether one offense is necessarily included in another apply in deciding whether conviction of two charged offenses is proper? George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: Werdegar, ACJ., Baxter, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Sep 23 2005	Filed letter from:   Jeffrey Laurence, Deputy Attorney General. He will be representing the People in this matter.
Oct 20 2005	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, John F. Schuck is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from that date of this order.
Nov 17 2005	Request for extension of time filed   to Dec. 21, 2005 for appellant to file the opening brief on the merits.
Nov 23 2005	Extension of time granted   to December 21, 2005 for appellant to file the opening brief on the merits.
Dec 2 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed   by appellant
Dec 28 2005	Request for extension of time filed   for respondent to file the answer brief on the merits, to 2-2-06.
Jan 6 2006	Extension of time granted   to 2-2-06 for respondent to file the answer brief on the merits. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Jan 25 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed   the People, plaintiff and respondent Jeffrey Laurence, Dep. A.G.
Feb 3 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Vincent Reed, defendant and appellant John Schuck, counsel
Apr 4 2006	Case ordered on calendar   Wednesday, May 3, 2006, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
May 3 2006	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 3 2006	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Opinion by Chin, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, & Corrigan, JJ. Concurring and Dissenting Opinoin by Moreno, J.
Aug 9 2006	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Aug 30 2006	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Schuck

Briefs
Dec 2 2005	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jan 25 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 3 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website