Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/29/08 (This opn. should publish following S141282, also filed this date.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S140413
v.
Ct.App. 3 C045348
RICHARD ALEX MILES,
) San
Joaquin
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 87174

After a jury convicted defendant of multiple felony offenses, a court trial
was held on the allegation, for purposes of sentencing under the “Three Strikes”
law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c)), that he had
suffered two prior “ ‘serious felony’ ” convictions (id., § 1192.7, subd. (c)),
including a 1976 federal conviction under 18 United States Code section 2113(a).1
One of the two distinct offenses set forth in section 2113(a), as in effect in 1976,
was the taking, or attempted taking, of bank property from the person or presence
of another by force, violence, or intimidation. Such acts constitute the California
serious felony of bank robbery. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(19), (d).) The
other offense set forth in section 2113(a) — entering, or attempting to enter, a
bank with felonious or larcenous intent — includes many of the traditional

1
All further unlabeled statutory references are to title 18 of the United States
Code.
1

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elements of nonresidential burglary, and does not correspond to any California
serious felony.
To prove the 1976 federal conviction, and its nature as a serious felony, the
People presented certified documents from the record of that conviction, including
a “Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order” signed by a federal judge (federal
judgment form or 1976 federal judgment form). The federal judgment form
recites that defendant pled guilty to “armed bank robbery” and “kidnapping” in
violation of sections 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2113(e). On the basis of this evidence,
the instant trial court found that the 1976 federal conviction was for the California
serious felony of bank robbery. The court therefore used this prior conviction as a
strike to enhance defendant’s sentences for his current crimes. The Court of
Appeal affirmed.
As below, defendant urges that the “bank robbery” notation on the federal
judgment form, even as augmented by the references to “arm[ing]” and
“kidnapping,” was insufficient evidence his 1976 conviction occurred under the
prong of section 2113(a) that qualified as a California serious felony. To resolve
the issue, we apply principles discussed in People v. Delgado (May 29, 2008,
S141282) __ Cal. 4th ___ (Delgado) to the more complicated facts of this case.
The increased complexity here arises from the structure and language of
section 2113. This statute, in its entirety, includes a group of bank-related
offenses under the title “Bank robbery and incidental crimes.” However, nowhere
in the body of the statute are the terms “robbery” or “bank robbery” used to
describe any of the offenses set forth therein.
Thus, unlike in Delgado, there is no direct semantic link between the statute
under which defendant was convicted, the words used by the convicting court to
describe his crime, and one of the serious felony offenses enumerated in California
law. Nonetheless, as we will explain, the evidence strongly supports the inference
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that the “armed bank robbery” and “kidnapping” notations on the 1976 federal
judgment form were intended to describe a conviction for conduct which, under
California law, constitutes the serious felony of bank robbery.
Accordingly, here, as in Delgado, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis
for the trial court’s finding that the prior conviction at issue was for a serious
felony. The Court of Appeal so concluded. We will therefore affirm the judgment
of that court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On December 27, 2002, in the parking lot of a shopping mall, defendant
approached several drivers, brandishing a gun, and demanded their car keys and
personal belongings. Defendant ignored a responding police officer’s order to
drop the gun, instead raising his weapon in the officer’s direction. The officer
fired three times as defendant walked toward a store entrance, still holding the
weapon. The officer’s fourth bullet felled defendant, but he still refused to
relinquish the gun, and he appeared to be trying to rise. The officer’s fifth bullet
knocked defendant flat, and a bystander kicked his gun away.
A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm upon a police
officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (d)(1)) (count 1), possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (id., § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), four counts of attempted
carjacking (id., §§ 215, subds. (a), (b), 664) (counts 3, 5, 7, and 9), and five counts
of assault with a firearm (id., § 245, subd. (a)(2)) (counts 4, 6, 8, 12, and 13). As
to the count of firearm assault upon a police officer, and three of the attempted
carjacking counts (counts 3, 5, and 7), the jury found true that defendant
personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). (See also id., subd. (a)(5), (7), (18).) As to each count of assault
3

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with a firearm, the jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm within
the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a).2
The information also alleged, for purposes of sentence enhancement under
Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) (five-year enhancement of current
serious felony conviction for prior serious felony conviction) that defendant had
suffered a 1976 federal conviction for “armed bank robbery and kidnaping,” and,
for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c)-(e),
1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)), that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions
— the 1976 federal conviction and a 1972 California conviction for robbery.
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on these allegations, and they were tried
to the court.
As their sole evidence of the fact and nature of the 1976 federal conviction,
the People introduced a package of documents certified by a records custodian of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons. This package included a prison fingerprint card,
and also the 1976 federal judgment form (i.e., the “Judgment and
Probation/Commitment Order”) as signed by Judge Philip C. Wilkins of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The federal
judgment form recited that on November 30, 1976, defendant was convicted, on
his guilty plea, of “violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) (d) (e), armed bank robbery
and[ ]kidnapping, as charged in the First Count of the Indictment,” and that he
received a 40-year sentence. The federal judgment form further indicated that
“Count II of the Indictment,” an unspecified charge, would be dismissed. The
November 20, 1986, fingerprint card, from the Federal Correctional Institution at

2
The jury acquitted defendant of attempted robbery (count 10) and an
additional count of attempted carjacking (count 11).
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Lompoc, California, similarly described the offense as “ARMED BANK
ROBBERY & KIDNAP.”
The trial court found true that, as alleged, defendant had sustained two prior
serious felony convictions.3 Accordingly, it imposed, on the current convictions, a
third strike sentence of 219 years to life.4
Defendant appealed, urging only that the evidence was insufficient to prove
his 1976 federal conviction was for a California serious felony. The Court of
Appeal affirmed. Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that the
“armed bank robbery” notation on the 1976 federal judgment form was a clear
reference to the prong of section 2113(a) which, in its 1976 version, conformed to
the California serious felony of bank robbery. We granted review. We now
conclude that the Court of Appeal’s judgment must be affirmed.

3
In response to defense counsel’s argument that the notation on the 1976
federal judgment form did not reliably indicate a California serious felony, the
court commented, “I’m relying on the part [of the federal judgment form] that says
‘armed bank robbery,’ and that’s why I don’t think it’s a second-degree burglary
of a bank. I think it’s ‘armed bank robbery.’ ”
4
The sentence was computed as follows: Count 1, 25 years to life, plus 10
consecutive years for the personal firearm enhancement; count 2, stayed; count 3,
25 years to life, consecutive to count 1, plus 10 consecutive years for the personal
firearm enhancement; count 4, stayed; count 5, 25 years to life, consecutive to
counts 1 and 3, plus 10 consecutive years for the personal firearm enhancement;
count 6, stayed; count 7, 25 years to life, consecutive to counts 1, 3, and 5, plus 10
consecutive years for the personal firearm enhancement; count 8, stayed; count 9,
25 years to life, consecutive to counts 1, 3, 5, and 7; count 12, 25 years to life,
consecutive to counts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, plus four consecutive years for the personal
firearm enhancement; count 13, 25 years to life, consecutive to counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
and 12.
5

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DISCUSSION
Defendant urges, as he did below, that the federal judgment form’s
description of his 1976 conviction as for “armed bank robbery” and “kidnapping”
does not constitute sufficient evidence the conviction was for the crime California
deems the serious felony of bank robbery, because the form does not clearly and
reliably specify which of the two forms of offense set forth in section 2113(a) was
committed. Hence, he insists, the 1976 conviction could not be used to subject
him to third strike sentences for his current offenses. (Pen. Code, § 667, subds.
(d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c).) For several reasons, we disagree.
In 1976, when defendant was convicted under section 2113(a), this
subsection provided a fine, or imprisonment up to 20 years, or both, for two
distinct categories of offenders.
The first paragraph of section 2113(a) described a person who, “by force
and violence, or by intimidation, [took], or attempt[ed] to take, from the person or
presence of another, any property or money or any other thing of value belonging
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association.” (Pub.L. No. 91-468 (Oct. 19, 1970)
84 Stat. 994, 1017.)
Then, as now, the second paragraph of section 2113(a) described a person
who “enter[ed] or attempt[ed] to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and
loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union,
or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit
union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so
used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan
association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny.”
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Then, as now, additional subsections of section 2113 listed further crimes
against banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. These offenses
included stealing or purloining money or property from such an institution
(§ 2113(b)) and the knowing receipt, concealment, sale, or disposal of money or
property stolen from such an institution (§ 2113(c)). Then, as now, the statute
provided additional punishment for one who, while committing an offense under
section 2113(a) or section 2113(b), assaulted any person or jeopardized a life by
use of a dangerous weapon (§ 2113(d)), or who, while committing any offense set
forth in the statute, or while avoiding apprehension or escaping arrest or
confinement therefor, killed any person or forced any person, against that person’s
will, to accompany the offender (§ 2113(e)). Section 2113, in its entirety,
appeared in the United States Code under the title “Bank robbery and incidental
crimes.”
Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c) sets forth the categories of
convictions California deems to be for serious felonies. Though there is no
California convictable offense of bank robbery, Penal Code section 1192.7,
subdivision (c) lists a crime of this name as a serious felony, a prior conviction for
which may enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense. (Id., subd. (c)(19).)
For this purpose, Penal Code section 1192.7 defines “ ‘bank robbery’ ” as “to take
or attempt to take, by force or violence, or by intimidation from the person or
presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association.” (Id., subd. (d).)
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The California serious felony of bank robbery substantially coincides with
the offense described in the first paragraph of section 2113(a) as in effect in 1976.5
However, there is no California serious felony that corresponds to the crime
described in the second paragraph of section 2113(a).6 Thus, evidence that the
defendant suffered a previous conviction under section 2113(a), standing alone,
cannot establish that the conviction was for a serious felony under California law.
The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566
(Tenner).) Where, as here, the mere fact of conviction under a particular statute
does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible evidence
from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.
(E.g., People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 222-223; People v. Guerrero (1988)
44 Cal.3d 1193, 1201.) This rule applies equally to California convictions and to
those from foreign jurisdictions. (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 453;
People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1198-1201.)

5
In 1986, after defendant’s federal conviction, the first paragraph of section
2113(a) was amended to include persons who “obtain[ ] or attempt[ ] to obtain by
extortion” money or property owned by, or in the care, custody, possession,
management, or control of a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association.
(Pub.L. 99-646 (Nov. 10, 1986) 100 Stat. 3592, 3616.) The California serious
felony of bank robbery, added two years later (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds.
(c)(19), (d), added by Stats. 1988, ch. 432, § 2, pp. 1815-1816), includes no
extortion form of the offense.
6
The second paragraph of section 2113(a) describes the crime of entering, or
attempting to enter, a bank, credit union, or savings and loan association with
felonious or larcenous intent. This would constitute burglary or attempted
burglary under California law. (Pen. Code, §§ 21a, 459, 664.) Penal Code section
1192.7 lists “any burglary of the first degree” as a serious felony (id.,
subd. (c)(18)), but only a burglary of an “inhabited dwelling house,” as defined, is
a first degree burglary in California (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a)).
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Such evidence may, and often does, include certified documents from the
record of the prior proceeding and commitment to prison. (Pen. Code, § 969b;
Evid. Code, 1280 [hearsay exception for contemporaneous official records];
People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 258-259; People v. Henley (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 555, 559-560 (Henley); People v. Haney (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 472,
475.) A court document, prepared contemporaneously with the conviction, as part
of the record thereof, by a public officer charged with that duty, and describing the
nature of the prior conviction for official purposes, is relevant and admissible on
this issue. (Delgado, supra, __ Cal.4th __ [pp. 5, 11].) Indeed, defendant does
not now seriously dispute that the 1976 federal judgment form was admissible
evidence of the fact and nature of his 1976 conviction.
However, if the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed
in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the
offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least
serious form of the offense. (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262
(Rodriguez); People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, 354-355; People v. Watts
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 589, 596; People v. Cortez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 276,
280; see People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 632 (Jones).) In such a case,
if the serious felony nature of the prior conviction depends upon the particular
conduct that gave rise to the conviction, the record is insufficient to establish that a
serious felony conviction occurred.
On the other hand, the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from
the record presented. Absent rebuttal evidence, the trier of fact may presume that
an official government document, prepared contemporaneously as part of the
judgment record, and describing the prior conviction, is truthful and accurate.
Unless rebutted, such a document, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of the
facts it recites about the nature and circumstances of the prior conviction. (E.g.,
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People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 27; Henley, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 555,
561.)
On review, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other
words, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence
enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. (E.g., Tenner, supra, 6 Cal.4th 559,
567; Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 631.)
Applying these principles, we hold in Delgado that the description of a
prior conviction, contained in the abstract of judgment there at issue, was
sufficient evidence the conviction was for a serious felony. The prior conviction
in Delgado occurred under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), which
punishes assault “with a deadly weapon . . . other than a firearm or by any means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” (Italics added.) Assault with “a
dangerous or deadly weapon” is a California serious felony (Pen. Code, § 1192.7,
subd. (c)(23)), but assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury is not.
In Delgado, as evidence that the prior conviction occurred under the deadly
weapon prong of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and was thus for a
serious felony, the People introduced the abstract of judgment. The abstract
described the conviction as for “ ‘PC’ ” “ ‘245(A)(1)’ ” “ ‘Asslt w DWpn.’ ”
(Delgado, supra, __ Cal. 4th __ [pp. 3, 9].) There was no dispute that these
notations stood, respectively, for “ ‘Penal Code, section 245, subdivision (a)(1),’ ”
and “ ‘assault with a deadly weapon.’ ” (Id., at p. __ [p. 10].) Nonetheless,
defendant Delgado urged that the “Asslt w DWpn” notation might simply be an
arbitrary form of clerical shorthand referring to Penal Code section 245,
subdivision (a)(1) in its entirety, and thus did not reliably indicate which prong of
the subdivision had been violated. (Delgado, supra, at p. __ [pp. 11-12].)
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The trial court and the Court of Appeal rejected Delgado’s contention.
Drawing reasonable inferences from the abbreviated notation, both courts
concluded it was meant to convey that the defendant had been convicted
specifically under the deadly weapon prong, and that he had thus suffered a
serious felony conviction. Our opinion in Delgado agrees.
Similarly here, defendant urges that the terse reference to “bank robbery”
on the 1976 federal judgment form may simply be a generic and undifferentiated
reference to section 2113(a), without further import as to the particular prong of
the provision that was violated. In resolving this contention, we face interpretive
issues not present in Delgado. There, the notation on the abstract of judgment
closely conformed to the specific “assault . . . with a deadly weapon” language in
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and to the similar “assault with a
deadly weapon” language in Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c), but it
omitted the “great bodily injury” language also set forth in Penal Code section
245, subdivision (a)(1). Thus, a direct inference arose that the notation was
intended as a specific reference to the deadly weapon prong of the subdivision.
By contrast, section 2113(a), as in effect in 1976, contained no clear
internal labels from which we can directly infer that the notation on the 1976
federal judgment form at issue here describes a California serious felony. As
noted above, one of the two offenses set forth in section 2113(a) constitutes the
California serious felony of bank robbery. However, section 2113 itself does not
use the terms “robbery” or “bank robbery” in connection with this or any other
particular form of offense set forth in the statute.
Hence, the express words of section 2113 give no direct clue to what Judge
Wilkins meant when he used the terms “armed bank robbery” and “kidnapping” to
describe the nature of defendant’s 1976 federal conviction. Nonetheless, there are
numerous bases for the reasonable inference that he intended to describe the
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forcible taking form of offense set forth in section 2113(a), and thus delineated a
California serious felony.
In the first place, as in Delgado, the relevant judgment record both specifies
the particular statute under which the defendant was convicted and includes a brief
description in words of the offense. Where, as here, the statutory provision
includes more than one form of offense, one may reasonably infer, absent contrary
indicia, that the additional prose notation is not mere surplusage, but an attempt to
delineate which form was violated. As the People suggest, this consideration
weighs against defendant’s premise that Judge Wilkins’s “robbery” notation on
the 1976 federal judgment form was simply a shorthand reference to section
2113(a) as a whole.
Moreover, though the word “robbery” does not appear in the body of
section 2113(a), one — but only one — of the two forms of the offense set forth in
the 1976 version of section 2113(a) closely corresponded to the crime referred to
in both legal and common parlance as robbery. This was the form of offense
described as the taking, or attempted taking, of bank property from the person of
another “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 211
[“[r]obbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of
another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear”]; Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999)
p. 1329, col. 1 [“robbery” is “[t]he illegal taking of property from the person of
another, or in the person’s presence, by violence or intimidation; aggravated
larceny”]; Garner, Dict. of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed. 1995) p. 774, col. 2
[“robbery” is “aggravated larceny, i.e., larceny from the person by violence or
intimidation”]; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2004) p. 1077, col. 2
[“robbery” is “larceny from the person or presence of another by violence or
threat”]; American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 1506, col. 1 [“robbery” is
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“[t]he act or an instance of unlawfully taking the property of another by the use of
violence or intimidation”]; 14 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 2, col. 2 [first
definition: “robbery” is “[t]he action or practice of feloniously seizing, by violence
or intimidation, property belonging to another”]; Webster’s New Internat. Dict.
(2d ed. unabridged 1958) p. 2157, col. 1 [“robbery” is “larceny of property from
the person or immediate presence of another in possession thereof accomplished
by violence or putting him in fear”].)
The other form of offense set forth in section 2113(a) — entry of a bank,
credit union, or savings and loan association with felonious or larcenous intent —
was, and is, a specialized form of the crime known in legal and common parlance
as burglary. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 459 [person who enters specified premises
“with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary”];
Black’s Law Dict., supra, p. 191, col. 2 [“burglary” is “[t]he common-law offense
of breaking and entering another’s dwelling at night with the intent to commit a
felony” or “[t]he modern statutory offense of breaking and entering any building
. . . with the intent to commit a felony” or sometimes also petit larceny]; Garner,
Dict. of Modern Legal Usage, supra, p. 122, col. 1 [“burglary,” in the modern
sense, is “the act of breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a
felony”]; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict., supra, p. 165, col. 2 [“burglary” is
“broadly: the entering of a building with the intent to commit a crime”]; American
Heritage Dict., supra, p. 248, col. 2 [“burglary” is “[t]he act of entering a building
or other premises with the intent to commit theft”]; 2 Oxford English Dict., supra,
p. 668, col. 3 [“burglary” is “[t]he crime of breaking (formerly by night) into a
house with intent to commit [a] felony. Now, a statutory crime of entering a
building by day or night with the intention of committing a theft or other serious
offence”]; Webster’s New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 358, col. 3 [at common law,
“burglary” is “[b]reaking and entering the dwelling house of another, in the
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nighttime, with intent to commit a felony therein,” though modern statutes may
“cover such offenses committed by day, or the like entering of shops, factories,
warehouses, etc.”].)
Consistent with these traditional understandings, when the forcible taking
offense now set forth in the first paragraph of section 2113(a) was first adopted in
1934, it was referred to in the marginal notes of the Statutes at Large as
“Robbery.” (Pub.L. No. 73-235 (May 18, 1934) 48 Stat. 783.) When this
provision was amended in 1937 to add the “entering” offense now set forth in the
second paragraph of section 2113(a), the marginal notation in the Statutes at Large
described the amended statute as “Bank robbery; burglary . . . added.” (Pub.L.
No. 75-349 (Aug. 24, 1937) 50 Stat. 749.)
The United States Supreme Court used similar distinguishing terminology
in two decisions recounting the early history and development of the statute now
codified as section 2113. In Jerome v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 101
(Jerome), the court explained: “Prior to 1934, banks organized or operating under
federal law were protected against embezzlement and like offenses by [various
federal statutes]. But such crimes as robbery, burglary, and larceny directed
against such banks were punishable only under state law. By 1934 great concern
had been expressed over interstate operations by gangsters against banks—
activities with which local authorities were frequently unable to cope. [Citation.]
The Attorney General, in response to that concern, recommended legislation
embracing certain new federal offenses.” (Id., at p. 102, fn. omitted.) Sections
dealing with “larceny” and “burglary” against banks were struck from the original
bill during the legislative process, but as finally enacted, the bill “retained the
robbery provision now contained in the first clause of § 2(a) of the Bank Robbery
Act [as amended, now the first paragraph of section 2113(a)]. (Jerome, supra, at
p. 103, fn. omitted.)
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“In 1937 the Attorney General recommended the enlargement of the Bank
Robbery Act ‘to include larceny and burglary of the banks’ protected by it.
[Citation.] The fact that the 1934 statute was limited to robbery was said to have
produced ‘some incongruous results[’]—a ‘striking instance’ of which was the
case of a man who stole a large sum from a bank but who was not guilty of
robbery because he did not display force or violence and did not put any one in
fear. [Citation.] The [1937] bill as introduced [citation] added to § 2(a) two new
clauses—one defining larceny and the other making it a federal offense to enter or
attempt to enter any bank with intent to commit therein ‘any larceny or other
depredation.’ For reasons not disclosed in the legislative history, the House
Judiciary Committee substituted ‘any felony or larceny’ for ‘any larceny or other
depredation.’ [Citation.] With that change and with an amendment to the larceny
clause distinguishing between grand and petit larceny [citation], § 2(a) was
enacted in its present form.” (Jerome, supra, 318 U.S. 101, 103-104, italics
added, fn. omitted.)
In Prince v. United States (1957) 352 U.S. 322 (Prince), the court noted
that section 2113 “creates and defines several crimes incidental to and related to
thefts from banks organized or insured under federal laws. Included are bank
robbery and entering a bank with intent to commit a robbery.” (Prince, supra, at
pp. 323-324, italics added, fn. omitted.) The court reiterated the statute’s history
as follows: “The original Bank Robbery Act was passed in 1934. It covered only
robbery, robbery accompanied by an aggravated assault, and homicide perpetrated
in committing a robbery or escaping thereafter. In 1937 the Attorney General
requested that the Act be amended. In his letter proposing the bill, the Attorney
General declared that ‘incongruous results’ had developed under the existing law.
He cited as a striking instance the case of ‘. . . a man [who] was arrested in a
national bank while walking out of the building with $11,000 of the bank’s funds
15

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on his person. He had managed to gain possession of the money during a
momentary absence of one of the employees, without displaying any force or
violence and without putting anyone in fear—necessary elements of the crime of
robbery—and was about to leave the bank when apprehended. As a result, it was
not practicable to prosecute him under any Federal statute.’
“The Act was amended accordingly to add other crimes less serious than
robbery. Two larceny provisions were enacted: one for thefts of property
exceeding $50, the other for lesser amounts. Congress further made it a crime to
‘. . . enter or attempt to enter any bank, . . . with intent to commit in such bank or
building, or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny . . . .’
“Robbery, entering[,] and larceny were all placed in one paragraph of the
1937 Act.” (Prince, supra, 352 U.S. 322, 325-326, italics added, fn. omitted.)
Thus, we begin with a strong background for concluding that Judge
Wilkins’s official notation describing the offense committed under section 2113(a)
as “bank robbery” (italics added) most likely refers to the forcible taking form of
the offense, as it existed in 1976. Under the particular facts of this case, however,
we need not, and do not, rely exclusively on the phrase “bank robbery” considered
in isolation.
The complete notation on the 1976 federal judgment form indicates that
defendant pled guilty under sections 2113(a), 2113 (d), and 2113(e) to an “armed”
bank robbery that involved “kidnapping.” These additional references suggest
that defendant was adjudged, on his plea, to have “put[ ] in jeopardy the life of [a]
person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” within the meaning of section
2113(d),7 and to have “force[d] [a] person to accompany him without the consent

7 In 1976, as it does now, section 2113(d) enhanced the penalty for one who,
while committing any violation of section 2113(a) or section 2113(b), “assault[ed]
(Footnote continued on next page.)
16

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of such person” — in other words, to have taken a hostage — within the meaning
of section 2113(e).8
It is highly unlikely that one charged and convicted under section 2113(a)
only for entering a bank with felonious or larcenous intent, without an attempted
or actual taking of property by force and violence or intimidation, would also be
found, in the course of the offense, to have placed a victim’s life in jeopardy by
use of a dangerous weapon, and to have taken a hostage.9 In the absence of any

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

any person, or put[ ] in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device . . . .” (Italics added.) At the time of defendant’s 1976 federal
conviction in the Eastern District of California, the applicable Ninth Circuit case
law specified that putting life in jeopardy with a dangerous weapon, for purposes
of section 2113(d), required “ ‘a holdup involving the use of a dangerous weapon
actually so used during the robbery that the life of the person being robbed is
placed in an objective state of danger.’ ” (United States v. Coulter (9th Cir. 1973)
474 F.2d 1004, 1005, cert. den. sub nom. Coulter v. United States, 414 U.S. 483,
quoting Wagner v. United States (9th Cir. 1959) 264 F.2d 524, 530, cert. den. 360
U.S. 936, italics added.)
8
In 1976, as it does now, section 2113(e) enhanced the penalty for one who,
“in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to
avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in freeing himself or
attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense, kill[ed] any
person or force[d] any person to accompany him without the consent of such
person . . . .” (Italics added.)
9
Indeed, we would reach a similar conclusion even were we to assume that
we could not rely on the 1976 commitment form’s verbal descriptions of the
violations of sections 2113(d) and 2113(e) to determine which alternative prong of
each of those provisions was violated. In other words, even if the section 2113(d)
violation involved an assault, rather than dangerous use of a weapon, and the
section 2113(e) violation involved a homicide rather than a kidnapping, we would
still be persuaded that defendant’s violations of those subdivisions made it
unlikely his conviction under section 2113(a) was merely for felonious or
larcenous entry of a bank.
17

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rebuttal evidence as to the nature of the prior conviction, the trial court was
entitled, prima facie, to draw the more reasonable inference that it was for
committing the California serious felony of bank robbery.10
As support for his claim that the words “bank robbery” on the 1976 federal
judgment form do not adequately specify the forcible taking prong of section
2113(a), defendant cites U.S. v. Olson (8th Cir. 2001) 262 F.3d 795. Olson held
that an indictment charging the defendant with committing “bank robbery” in
violation of section 2113(a) by “tak[ing] [money] from the person and presence of
the victim teller” was insufficient to allege the elements of the forcible taking
prong of the subdivision. (Olson, supra, at pp. 798-799.) Among other things, the
court of appeals reasoned that the words “bank robbery” in the charging language
did not supply the required elements of force and violence or intimidation, because
“all of § 2113 is entitled ‘bank robbery.’ ” (Olson, supra, at p. 799.)
But whatever its merits on the narrow issue there presented, Olson does not
determine what Judge Wilkins meant by the words he used on the 1976 federal
judgment form at issue here. For the multiple reasons set forth above, we remain

10
One can perhaps conceive of a scenario in which violations of sections
2113(d) and 2113(e) might attach to a charged violation of section 2113(a) that
did not involve an attempted or actual taking of property. For instance, such a
charge and conviction might theoretically occur if defendant had entered the bank
brandishing a weapon, was confronted by security guards before he could take or
demand money or property, then assaulted or killed someone, or seized and moved
a hostage, while attempting to escape. But, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, a
trial court assessing a prior conviction described as for “armed bank robbery” was
not required to parse such remote possibilities. It could, as indicated, accept the
more reasonable inference that the conviction was for what California would deem
the serious felony of bank robbery. (Cf., People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682,
706 [relevant inquiry is whether record discloses “realistic[ ]” possibility that prior
conviction “may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious
felony under California law”].)
18

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persuaded it was most reasonable for the trial court to infer that the form’s
denomination of defendant’s 1976 offense as “bank robbery” was not a mere
general reference to section 2113(a).
We note, as an aside, that the indictment at issue in Olson injected
ambiguity by alleging facts that constituted at most, not forcible taking under
section 2113(a), but mere larcenous taking under section 2113(b). Under the
circumstances, the Olson court’s uncertainty about the offense actually charged
was perhaps understandable.
No similar basis for uncertainty exists here. Judge Wilkins both specified
defendant’s 1976 offense under section 2113(a) as “bank robbery” — the
colloquial term that most closely describes the form of offense set forth in the first
paragraph of that provision — and indicated that defendant had further violated
the “armed” and “kidnapping” provisions of the statute. Judge Wilkins’s notation
said nothing to cast doubt on whether, in describing the conviction under section
2113(a), he was referring to the specific offense of forcible taking, or some other
set forth in the statute. In the circumstances before us, the most reasonable
inference is that he intended to describe the “force and violence, or . . .
intimidation” form of offense set forth in section 2113(a).
Reaching a similar conclusion, the Court of Appeal reasoned, inter alia, that
the modern title of section 2113 — “Bank robbery and incidental crimes” (italics
added) — indicates a statutory intent to distinguish the crime traditionally deemed
robbery from related, but “incidental,” nonrobbery offenses. (But see Carter v.
United States (2000) 530 U.S. 255, 267.) Defendant responds that, to the extent
the title is relevant, Judge Wilkins would have understood “bank robbery” to
encompass both the offenses set forth in section 2113(a), and perhaps the
larcenous crimes now set forth in section 2113(b). The phrase “incidental crimes,”
defendant maintains, logically refers only to the associated offenses of receiving
19

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stolen property, assault, jeopardizing life with a dangerous weapon, killing, and
forced accompaniment, as set forth in subsequent provisions.
The body of section 2113 does not expressly indicate which statutory
offenses are considered “bank robbery,” and which are “incidental” crimes.
However, as indicated above, the common understanding of the word “robbery”
suggests most strongly that, as used in the statute’s title, it means the forcible
taking offense set forth in the first paragraph of section 2113(a), leaving the
related but distinct crimes contained elsewhere in the statute, including the crime
of felonious or larcenous entry set forth in the second paragraph of section
2113(a), as the “incidental” offenses.
This assumption is reinforced by the statute’s history. As recounted in
Jerome and Prince, the predecessor of section 2113 originally included only the
forcible taking offense that now comprises the first paragraph of section 2113(a),
plus the crimes of assault and homicide associated with that core offense. The
distinct crime of felonious or larcenous entry, as set in the second paragraph of
section 2113(a), as well as the crimes of nonforcible taking, receipt or possession
of stolen property, use of a deadly weapon, and kidnapping, were added later, to
fill in perceived gaps in the statute’s effectiveness. Thus, contrary to defendant’s
suggestion, it seems logical to assume that the reference to “[b]ank robbery” in the
statute’s title would most likely be understood as describing the original forcible
taking offense in the first paragraph of section 2113(a), while the remainder of the
statutory offenses, including the crime described in the second paragraph of
section 2113(a), are “incidental.”11

11
We realize that the term “robber” has occasionally, and casually, been used
to refer to one convicted under the “larcenous taking” provisions of section
2113(b) as distinct from a forcible taker convicted under section 2113(a). As
(Footnote continued on next page.)
20

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In any event, as we have indicated, we do not rely exclusively on the
isolated phrase “bank robbery” included in the 1976 federal judgment form. In
our view, the additional references to aggravated conduct committed under
sections 2113(d) and 2113(e) bolster the inference that the crime for which
defendant was convicted under section 2113(a) is a California serious felony.
Defendant notes decisions suggesting that sections 2113(a), 2113(b), and
2113(c) do not create separate crimes, but delineate more or less aggravated
gradations, or ways, of committing the basic crime of stealing money or property
from a federally insured institution. All these forms of the single crime, defendant
insists, rightly may be called “bank robbery.”
But the decisions cited are inapposite to the issue before us. They all
concern only whether one may be charged, convicted, and punished for more then
one count, or under more than one provision of section 2113, for the same
criminal act or transaction. (See, e.g., Prince, supra, 352 U.S. 322 [crime of
entering bank with intent to rob is merged into consummated robbery]; United
States v. Marzano (7th Cir. 1976) 537 F.2d 257, 272 [when theft from vault is of

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

recounted in Heflin v. United States (1959) 358 U.S. 415, section 2113(c), which
punishes the knowing receipt or possession of money or property stolen from a
bank, credit union, or savings and loan association in violation of section 2113(b),
came into the law in 1940. A Senate report for the amendment was captioned
“ ‘Punishment of Receivers of Loot From Bank Robbers.’ ” (Heflin, supra, at
p. 419.) The Heflin majority itself, rejecting a claim that one could be convicted
and punished under both sections 2113(b) and 2113(c), opined that “it seems clear
that subsection (c) was not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs
a bank but only to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the
robber.” (Ibid.; see also United States v. Gaddis (1976) 424 U.S. 544, 547-548
[following Heflin].) In this case, however, there is no confusion whether
defendant was convicted under section 2113(a) or section 2113(b).
21

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funds belonging to multiple banks, defendant may be charged with one violation
of section 2113(b) for each bank whose funds were taken]; Wright v. United States
(7th Cir. 1975) 519 F.2d 13, 15 [defendant cannot be separately sentenced under
sections 2113(a) (entry or forcible taking), 2113(b) (larcenous taking), and
2113(d) (violation of section 2113(a) or section 2113(b) with assault or use of
deadly weapon) for same bank robbery]; United States v. Gaddis (5th Cir. 1975)
506 F.2d 352, 354 [defendant cannot be convicted and punished for both taking
(§ 2113(a) or § 2113(b)) and possessing (§ 2113(c)) money or property taken in
same bank robbery].)12 None suggests that both the felonious entering and
forcible taking forms of offense set forth in section 2113(a) constitute “bank
robbery.”
Defendant urges that the notation on the 1976 federal judgment form
cannot be considered a full, freestanding description of the nature of his 1976
conviction, because it stated that the conviction was “as charged in the First Count
of the Indictment.” He reasons that the federal judgment form thus referred to,
and incorporated by reference, what must be a more detailed specification in the
indictment of the facts underlying the charges. Therefore, he insists, the
indictment must be consulted to determine the exact nature of the conduct for
which he was convicted. The People not having produced that document, he
concludes, the evidence was insufficient to prove a serious felony.
We are not persuaded. That the 1976 federal judgment form indicated
defendant had pled to the full extent of the charges set forth in “the First Count of
the Indictment” does not detract from the description of those charges set forth on

12
The judgment in United States v. Gaddis, supra, 506 F.2d 352, was vacated
by the United States Supreme Court and remanded by that court on the issue of
remedy only. (United States v. Gaddis, supra, 424 U.S. 544, 548-551.)
22

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the face of the form. For the reasons we have explained, the notation on the
federal judgment form, in and of itself, gives rise to the strong prima facie
inference that defendant pled to, and was convicted of, a crime California
considers a serious felony. In the absence of rebuttal evidence, the instant trial
court was entitled to draw that inference. Indeed, if the 1976 indictment cast
doubt on the apparent meaning of Judge Wilkins’s notation, defendant was free to
introduce the indictment in his own defense. He made no effort to do so.13
Defendant cites Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 616 for the proposition that a
reference to “bank robbery” in a federal judgment record does not reliably
establish the defendant’s conviction under section 2113(a) was for taking bank
property by force and violence or intimidation. In Jones, the only evidence the
prosecution presented concerning the nature of the defendant’s prior section
2113(a) conviction was (1) a “ ‘Judgment and Commitment’ ” form, indicating he
had pled guilty “ ‘to the lesser included offense of violation of . . . Section[ ]
2113(a) [the Indictment herein charging a violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2113(d)]” and (2) a fingerprint card, signed by
defendant, indicating that the charge was “ ‘Bank Robbery.’ ” (Jones, supra, at p.
631.)

13
By referring to offenses “as charged” in the first count of the indictment,
the federal judgment form eliminated any concern that the conviction or
convictions under sections 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2113(e) might simply represent
an illogical negotiated compromise, pursuant to which, by agreement, the section
2113(a) conviction was under the “felonious or larcenous entry” prong of the
provision. On the contrary, the federal commitment form recites that the sections
2113(a), 2113(d), and 2113(e) convictions were for the offenses of “ armed bank
robbery and kidnapping, as charged in the First Count of the Indictment” (italics
added), and further declared that “Count II of the Indictment is dismissed,” thus
suggesting that any compromise concerned the elimination of these unspecified
additional charges.
23

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The Jones court first noted that the “Judgment and Commitment” form, by
simply recording a conviction under section 2113(a), did not reliably disclose
anything beyond a plea to the least adjudicated elements set forth in that statute.
This was so, the court said, even though the form recited that the defendant’s plea
was to a lesser included offense under section 2113(a) after he was charged under
both subsections (a) and (d) of the statute. Such language, the court said, could
mean either that he had pled under section 2113(a) (felonious entry or forcible
taking) as a lesser included offense of section 2113(d) (felonious entry or forcible
taking with assault or use of a deadly weapon), or that he pled to the lesser of the
two offenses (i.e., felonious entry) under section 2113(a). (Jones, supra,
75 Cal.App.4th 616, 634.)
Addressing the issue of the fingerprint card, the Court of Appeal in Jones
concluded that even if the card was admissible over the defendant’s hearsay and
relevance objections, its reference to “Bank Robbery” was also not a reliable
indicator of conviction under the first (forcible taking) paragraph of section
2113(a). This, said the court, was because “[the] statute is entitled ‘Bank Robbery
and Incidental Crimes’ and the reference on the fingerprint card is on its face only
a reference to the statute as a whole.” (Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 633-
634.)
We agree, for the reasons expressed by the Jones court, that the ambiguous
references on the “Judgment and Commitment” form there at issue did not
constitute evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant had been convicted for conduct constituting
the California serious felony of bank robbery. The form merely recorded a plea
and conviction under section 2113(a), without additional language appearing to
describe the specific nature of the convictions. Further uncertainty was injected
by the form’s indication that the defendant was pleading to a lesser included
24

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offense within the original charges, themselves identified only by statutory
numbers.
Here we do not confront such ambiguities. The 1976 federal judgment
form at issue in this case specified that defendant’s conviction under section
2113(a) was for a “bank robbery” that involved additional aggravating conduct,
described as “arm[ing]” and “kidnapping,” under sections 2113(d) and 2113(e).
Nor, in contrast with Jones, was there any confusing suggestion that the
conviction was for a lesser offense included within the original charge. On the
contrary, the judgment form stated that the charges to which defendant was
pleading were those originally set forth in the indictment. (See fn. 12, ante.)
We also agree that the fingerprint card considered in Jones was not reliable
evidence of the nature of the conviction. There was no evidence the card had been
prepared contemporaneously with the judgment by a court official charged with
the duty of recording it accurately. (See Delgado, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __
[pp. 5, 11, 13-14].) For similar reasons here, the 1986 federal prison fingerprint
card, describing defendant’s 1976 conviction as for “ARMED BANK ROBBERY
& KIDNAP,” does not constitute reliable evidence of the nature of the conviction.
On the other hand, we need not, and do not, decide whether Jones was
correct in suggesting that a bare reference to “bank robbery” in the official record
of a prior conviction under section 2113(a) can never reliably evidence a
California serious felony. Here, as we have explained, defendant’s 1976 federal
judgment form not only described the offense as “bank robbery,” but also
indicated that the conviction involved aggravating conduct set forth in sections
2113(d) and 2113(e). Viewing the official record at issue here in its entirety, and
absent any rebuttal, the instant trial court was entitled to conclude that defendant
25

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had been convicted of conduct constituting the California serious felony of bank
robbery.14
We therefore hold that defendant’s 1976 federal judgment form constituted
sufficient evidence his conviction under section 2113(a) was for the California
serious felony of bank robbery and thus qualified to enhance his sentences for the
current offenses. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the People’s
alternative contention that the judgment form’s additional references to “arm[ing]”
and “kidnapping” under sections 2113(d) and 2113(e) independently established
his convictions for other California serious felonies. (See, e.g., Pen. Code,
§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(20) [kidnapping], (23) [personal use of dangerous or deadly
weapon]; (31) [assault with deadly weapon].)

14
By the same token, however, we do not concur with the reasoning of
People v. Guerrero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 401, a case with which Jones
disagreed. In People v. Guerrero, the federal judgment recited that the defendant
had been convicted of “ ‘robbery of a bank in violation of Title 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a).’ ” (People v. Guerrero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 403, italics added.)
The Court of Appeal held that this was sufficient evidence of a California serious
felony, but it did not rely on the “robbery of a bank” notation to do so. Instead,
the Court of Appeal concluded simply that by pleading guilty to a violation of
section 2113(a), the defendant “necessarily admit[ted] every element of the crime
charged.” (People v. Guerrero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 407.) As Jones
observed, that analysis is at odds with our subsequent decision in Rodriguez,
supra, 17 Cal.4th 253, where we held that mere reference in the record of
conviction to a statute that can be violated in more than one way establishes only
the “least adjudicated elements” of the statutory offense, and does not disclose
which way the statute was violated. (Id. at p. 261.) We will disapprove the
analysis of People v. Guerrero to that extent. On the other hand, for reasons set
forth above, we need not decide whether People v. Guerrero reached the correct
result on the particular facts of that case, i.e., whether the “robbery of a bank”
notation in the federal judgment there at issue was sufficient to establish a
conviction under the forcible taking prong of section 2113(a), and thus a
California serious felony.
26

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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. The reasoning of
People v. Guerrero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 401 is disapproved to the extent it is
inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

27

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Miles
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 12/14/05 – 3d Dist.
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S140413
Date Filed: May 29, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Joaquin
Judge: Bernard J. Garber

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Scott Conklin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and John Hardesty, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General,
Robert R. Anderson and Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant
Attorney General, Mathew K. Chan, Virna L. DePaul, Janet E. Neeley, Stephen G. Herndon and Rachelle
A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Scott Conklin
2205 Hilltop Drive, No. PMB-116
Redding, CA 96002
(530) 243-8510

Stephen G. Herndon
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I street, Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-5320

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses.

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:
Thu, 05/29/2008	43 Cal. 4th 1074, 183 P.3d 1236, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 270	S140413	Review - Criminal Appeal	closed; remittitur issued

Disposition
May 29 2008	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jan 17 2006	Petition for review filed   Richard Alex Miles, appellant John Hardesty, counsel
Jan 17 2006	Record requested
Jan 19 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
Mar 1 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   two doghouse (volume 2 & 3)
Mar 8 2006	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including April 17, 2006
Mar 29 2006	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
May 22 2006	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, Scott Concklin is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Jun 21 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to July 21, 2006, to file Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits
Jul 24 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed   Richard Alex Miles, Appellant, by Scott Concklin, Supreme Court appointed counsel. CRC 40.1(b)
Aug 16 2006	Request for extension of time filed   The People, Respondent by Rachelle A. Newcomb, counsel
Aug 31 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file respondent's answer brief on the merits is hereby extended to and including September 22, 2006. No further extensions of time are contemplated.
Sep 19 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed   The People, respondent by Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorney General - Sacto (Filed in Sacramento)
Oct 12 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Richard Alex Miles, defendant and appellant (CRC 40.1(b))
Feb 6 2008	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Wednesday, March 5, 2008, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
Mar 5 2008	Cause argued and submitted
May 28 2008	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
May 29 2008	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. The reasoning of People v Guerrero, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 401 is disapproved to the extent it is inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Opinion by: Baxter, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan. JJ.
Jul 10 2008	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jul 14 2008	Received:   Acknowledgment of receipt for remittitur from Third Appellate District, signed for by Kathy Wojnarowski, Deputy Clerk.

Briefs
Jul 24 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed
Sep 19 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed
Oct 12 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website