IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S133114
v.
) Ct.App.
6
H027483
GARY ROGERS KELLY,
Santa Clara County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. CC320855
Article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution provides that
“[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal that determine causes
shall be in writing with reasons stated.” In this case, we consider what this
constitutional mandate requires in a criminal appeal in which defense counsel files
a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no
issue for the appellate court’s review, the defendant files supplemental arguments,
and the appellate court identifies no arguable issue.
We conclude that a decision affirming the judgment in a Wende appeal
disposes of a cause within the meaning of article VI, section 14 of the California
Constitution, and therefore must be in writing with reasons stated. Because the
defendant in a Wende appeal has a right to file supplemental contentions, the Court
of Appeal must consider these contentions in the course of disposing of the cause.
Therefore, to comply with the constitutional mandate, the opinion must reflect the
defendant’s contentions and the reasons that they fail. We further conclude that,
1
in light of Wende’s requirement that Courts of Appeal review the entire record,
significant efficiency in the processing of subsequent proceedings, including
future habeas corpus proceedings, can be achieved if the Courts of Appeal include
in their Wende opinions a brief description of the facts and procedural history of
the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment
imposed. Therefore, in the exercise of our supervisory power over the courts of
this state, we direct the Courts of Appeal to include this information in their
opinions in Wende appeals. Finally, we encourage the Courts of Appeal to include
in their Wende opinions any other information from the record that they anticipate
will be relevant in further challenges to the judgment.
The Court of Appeal’s opinion in the present case does not satisfy the
constitutional requirement of a decision in writing with reasons stated. Rather
than reversing the judgment and remanding the matter to that court, however, we
have undertaken a review of the record and affirm the judgment with reasons
stated.
I.
The facts of the underlying case are fairly straightforward. On July 21,
2003, an off-duty San Jose police officer witnessed defendant driving a vehicle in
a reckless and erratic manner. The officer followed defendant and called for
backup assistance. A uniformed officer arrived just as defendant parked his car.
Defendant resisted the two officers and was handcuffed. After refusing to breathe
into a preliminary alcohol-screening device, he was transported to the police
department’s alcohol investigation bureau, where he declined tests of his blood,
breath, or urine.
At trial, the two police officers testified concerning defendant’s conduct
and appearance, and an expert testified regarding the effects of alcohol on the
human body. In addition, the parties stipulated that defendant had suffered a
2
felony conviction in December 1996 for driving under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152. The jury found
defendant guilty of one felony count of driving under the influence of alcohol after
having been convicted of a felony within 10 years (Pen. Code, §§ 23152, 23550.5,
subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing an
officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court imposed the midterm
sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the felony, and a six-month term for the
misdemeanor to be served concurrently with the felony sentence.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeal
appointed counsel to represent him. Appointed counsel, having found no arguable
issue in his own review of the record, filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25
Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that the appellate
court review the entire record on appeal. The brief indicated that counsel would
provide further briefing if requested by the court, but raised no specific issue.
Both counsel and the Court of Appeal advised defendant of his right to file a
supplemental brief to bring to the court’s attention any issue he believed deserved
review. Defendant filed a letter in the Court of Appeal setting forth 15 points for
the court’s consideration.
We set forth in its entirety the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal:
“Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one felony count of
driving under the influence of alcohol with a felony prior within 10 years [citation;
fn. omitted], and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing an
officer [citation]. As to count one, the jury found true the allegation that defendant
willfully refused a peace officer’s request to submit to chemical test [citation].
“We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Counsel filed
an opening brief that stated the case and the facts, but raised no specific issues.
3
Defense counsel requested we review the record pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
“We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own
behalf within 30 days. We have read and considered defendant’s written
argument.
“Pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the
entire record and have concluded that there are no arguable issues on appeal.
“Disposition
“The judgment is affirmed.”
Defendant then filed, in propria persona, a petition in this court seeking
review of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal, based on its failure to
address the contentions set forth in his supplemental brief. We granted
defendant’s petition, appointed new counsel to represent him, and limited briefing
and argument to the issue of what is required of the Court of Appeal in this context
under article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution.
II.
In order to construe present article VI, section 14 of the California
Constitution, we first review the history of that provision. The California
Constitution of 1849 established a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and
two associate justices, and granted the court appellate jurisdiction in a variety of
cases. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 4.) Amendments to the Constitution
in 1862 expanded the court’s membership to include a Chief Justice and four
associate justices, and described a wider range of cases in which the court had
appellate jurisdiction. (Id., art. VI, §§ 2, 4, as amended in 1862.) As amended, the
Constitution continued to require the Legislature to provide for publication of the
court’s decisions as the Legislature deemed expedient (id., art. VI, § 12), but did
not impose any requirement upon the court to provide reasons for its decisions.
4
In 1854, the Legislature enacted a statute requiring that “[a]ll decisions
given upon an appeal in any appella[te] Court of this State, shall be given in
writing, with the reason therefor, and filed with the Clerk of the Court.” (Stats.
1854, ch. 54, § 69, p. 72.) This court held in Houston v. Williams (1859) 13 Cal.
24 (Houston) that the Legislature was without authority to require the judicial
branch to provide reasons for its decisions in written opinions. “The Legislature
can no more require this Court to state the reasons of its decisions, than this Court
can require, for the validity of the statutes, that the Legislature shall accompany
them with the reasons for their enactment. The principles of law settled are to be
extracted from the records of the cases in which the decisions are rendered. The
reports are full of adjudged cases, in which opinions were never delivered. The
facts are stated by the Reporter, with the points arising thereon, and are followed
by the judgments rendered, and yet no one ever doubted that the Courts, in the
instances mentioned, were discharging their entire constitutional obligations.
[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 25.)
The decision in Houston, supra, 13 Cal. 24, acknowledged that the reasons
underlying the court’s judgments are “of great importance in the information they
impart as to the principles of law which govern the Court, and should guide
litigants.” (Id. at p. 26.) It added that “right-minded Judges, in important cases —
when the pressure of other business will permit — will give such opinions. It is
not every case, however, which will justify the expenditure of time necessary to
write an opinion. Many cases involve no new principles, and are appealed only
for delay. It can serve no purpose of public good to repeat elementary principles
of law which have never been questioned for centuries.” (Ibid.)
By the time the state’s second Constitutional Convention was convened in
1878, the Supreme Court’s workload was overwhelming. There was no provision
in either the original 1849 Constitution or the amendments of 1862 for
5
intermediate courts of appeal — all appeals from the “district courts,” as the trial
courts of general jurisdiction were called, went directly to the Supreme Court.
During the four years preceding the Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879, the
court had elected not to provide a written opinion in nearly one quarter of the more
than 2,200 cases it decided. (2 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal.
Const. Convention 1878-1879, p. 950 (Willis & Stockton).)
Although the court’s decision in Houston asserted that no court with “the
least respect for its own dignity and independence” could acknowledge a
legislative power to require written reasons for the court’s opinion (Houston,
supra, 13 Cal. at p. 25), the delegates to the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention
concluded that such a requirement should be imposed by the Constitution itself.
The convention’s Committee on Judiciary and Judicial Department (Committee)
proposed changes to address both the court’s burgeoning caseload and its practice
of deciding cases without written opinion. With some modifications, the
Committee’s proposals thereafter were adopted by the delegates and subsequently
by the electorate as part of article VI of the Constitution of 1879.
In order to increase the court’s capacity to decide cases, the Committee
proposed a seven-member court with two departments, each comprised of three
associate justices. (2 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p. 392.) Under the proposal,
each department would have “the power to hear and determine causes and all
questions arising therein, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained in relation
to the Court in bank.” (Ibid.) That same provision specified that the presence of
three Justices would be required “to transact any business in either of the
departments, except as may be done at chambers, and the concurrence of three
Justices shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment. The Chief Justice shall
apportion the business to the departments, and may, in his discretion, order any
cause pending before the Court to be heard and decided by the Court in bank.”
6
(Ibid.) Finally, the proposed new article VI also included a provision concerning
the court’s opinions: “In the determination of causes, all decisions of the Court in
bank or in departments shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision
shall be stated.” (Ibid.)
At the Constitutional Convention at which these new provisions were
proposed, delegate Samuel Wilson spoke concerning “the reasons which have
impelled the majority of the Committee on Judiciary to recommend section two
for adoption by the Convention as the new judicial system, as far as the Supreme
Court is concerned.” (2 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p. 950.) He explained that
the five-member court “has been unable to fully dispatch the business before it.”
(Ibid.) He noted that the court had decided 2,242 cases during the preceding four
years, “[b]ut in order to enable the Court to accomplish that work, it had to decide
five hundred and fifty-nine cases without giving any opinion in writing. If it is
proper and right that a Court of last resort should deliver opinions in writing,
giving the reasons for its decisions, we have it demonstrated that the Court, as
heretofore constituted and organized, could not possibly perform its duties, for it
could not have rendered that number of decisions and have delivered written
opinions upon them. The importance of requiring the Court to give written
opinions cannot be overrated. They not only become the settled law of the State,
and are precedents for subsequent cases, but in many causes where the litigation is
not ended by the decision of the Supreme Court, and new trials are consequent
upon a reversal, the decision of the Supreme Court should be given in writing, and
reasons assigned, for they are instructions to the Court below, and are the
controlling rule in the subsequent litigation.” (Ibid.)
Delegate Wilson continued: “Any gentleman who has practiced in the
Supreme Court knows that cases have been sent back for new trial, without written
opinions, and the Courts below have been unable to ascertain the full views of the
7
appellate Court upon the case. Four or five points may be presented. The
Supreme Court may reverse the case and send it back for a new trial upon some
one of these points, but upon which point the lawyers are unable to say — whether
on five points or on one. The result is that the new trial in the Court below takes
place without any light from above, and the case may be appealed a second time,
and again reversed upon some one of the same points, and so, ad infinitum;
whereas, if a written opinion were rendered, it might end the case without a second
appeal. That practice shows the inefficiency of any system where written opinions
are not required, and everywhere throughout the United States the courts are
required to deliver written opinions, stating the grounds of the decision, as we
have provided in this section. Undoubtedly it will insure a careful examination of
the cases, and result in well considered opinions, because they must come before
the jurists of the country and be subjected to the severest criticism. I think every
lawyer will agree with me, that in every case there should be an opinion in writing.
It tends to purity and honesty in the administration of justice.” (2 Willis &
Stockton, supra, at p. 951.)
Mr. Wilson reiterated that the recommended appellate system would
“enable the Court to . . . write opinions on all of the cases,” but acknowledged:
“Of course, there will always be some cases disposed of without written opinions.
Sometimes a case goes off on some formal motion, or is dismissed on a technical
question of practice. But I am speaking generally, of cases argued and submitted
upon their merits, and there the decision is of little account as settling the law,
unless the Court gives its reasons for the decision in writing.” (2 Willis &
Stockton, supra, at p. 951.)
Opposition to the Committee’s proposal focused on the power that the
restructuring of the court into two departments would give to the Chief Justice to
control which justices decided particular cases. All competing proposals included
8
the Committee’s requirement that decisions be in writing with reasons stated,
except one proposal that simply would have retained the existing provisions of the
Constitution of 1849, as amended in 1862. No opposition to the requirement of a
written opinion was expressed during the debates. (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at
pp. 1331-1333, 1447-1448, 1454-1457, 1499.) In responding to alternative
proposals concerning the structure of the court, Mr. Wilson focused on the
asserted “utter inability of the Supreme Court to decide the cases, and keep up
with the calendar, and write opinions . . . .” (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p.
1455.)
In further support of his proposal, delegate Wilson continued: “Now,
everybody knows who has reflected at all upon this subject, or knows anything at
all about it, that opinions must be written by a Court of last resort as matters of
precedent. It is a very different thing from sitting down and saying that the
judgment of the Court below is reversed or affirmed without giving any reasons,
because when that is published, nobody knows whether that decision is right or
wrong. But when the Judge has to sit down and write an opinion, or, in the
language of this amendment reported by us, that they must give their opinion in
writing, stating the grounds of the decision, then they are brought before the whole
bar of the State, and they are bound to present themselves in a position where law
and reason sustain the adjudication. Consequently it is the universal practice in
the Courts of last resort in the States, and the Supreme Court of the United States,
to render opinions addressing themselves to the intelligent judgment of the bar of
the State or of the country, and of the Judges of the country.” (3 Willis &
Stockton, supra, at p. 1455.)
Delegate Clitus Barbour, whose competing proposal also would have
required opinions in writing with reasons stated, offered the following comments
in that respect: “Now, when we require them to state the reasons for a decision,
9
we do not mean they shall write a hundred pages of detail. We [do] not mean that
they shall include the small cases, and impose on the country all this fine judicial
literature, for the Lord knows we have got enough of that already. To give us the
reason for it does not take three lines. I maintain that there is hardly a single case,
many points as may be made, that cannot be cleared up, and reasons given in five
pages. Many of the decisions now in the reports contain thirty pages. Let them
write short opinions in all cases, and I contend that it will not be difficult for them
to write up all the decisions of the Court.” (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at pp.
1455-1456.)
Thereafter, article VI, section 2, was adopted by the Constitutional
Convention delegates and subsequently approved by the electorate. It provided for
two departments within the Supreme Court, and required that “[i]n the
determination of causes, all decisions of the Court in bank or in department shall
be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be stated.” (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 2, as adopted 1879.)
Despite the efforts of the delegates to ease the burden on the Supreme
Court by providing for decisions to be rendered by three-justice panels in
departments, the court’s workload and backlog increased in the ensuing two
decades until finally, in 1903, the Legislature proposed a constitutional
amendment to add an intermediate Court of Appeal comprised of three appellate
districts, each with a three-justice District Court of Appeal. The proposal was
approved by the voters in 1904, and included a provision that “[i]n the
determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court and of the District
Courts of Appeal shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be
stated.” (Cal. Const., former art. VI, § 24, as amended Nov. 8, 1904, repealed
Nov. 8, 1966.)
10
As a result of the 1966 repeal and reenactment of article VI of the
California Constitution, the requirement of opinions in writing is now found in
article VI, section 14, and reads: “Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of
appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.” There is no
indication in the background materials prepared in the 1960’s for the members of
the California Constitution Revision Commission committee that was responsible
for proposed revisions to article VI, or elsewhere, that any change in substance
was intended with respect to the new wording of the “in writing” requirement.1
From this history, we discern a variety of purposes in the requirement that
appellate decisions be in writing. Of course, some decisions establish precedent
1
Background materials prepared for members of the commission’s
committee on article VI stated that “the written opinion requirement . . . has
received a narrow interpretation by the courts.” (Background Study for Cal.
Const. Revision Com., Com. on article VI, part 3 (Sept. 15, 1964) pp. 4-5.) None
of the authority cited in support of this statement suggests that a written decision
with reasons stated is not required in an appeal from a judgment of conviction
filed in the Court of Appeal. (See Funeral Dirs. Assn. v. Bd. of Funeral Dirs.
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 104, 106 [summary denial of a writ petition does not determine a
cause for purposes of the written opinion requirement]; Oak Grove School Dist. v.
City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 694 [only after alternative writ has
been issued does matter become a “cause” requiring a written decision]; People v.
Brown (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 175, 176 [appellate court summarily denied motion
to set aside conviction and summarily dismissed appeal from trial court’s denial of
similar motion; that petitioner filed a motion instead of a writ petition did not
affect rule that denial of such relief need not be accompanied by a written
opinion]; People v. Alberts (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 909, 912 [written
opinion requirement does not apply to appellate department of superior court];
People v. Corlett (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 59 [“We assume a court is not
warranted in extending an opinion to undue length to specifically pass upon 94
separate assignments [of error in evidentiary rulings], none of which, upon
examination, appears to have substantial merit”]; 31 Ops.Atty.Gen. 175 (1958) [no
authority requires a court upon request of a defendant to state its reasons for
increasing or decreasing bail once bail has been set].)
11
for future cases. Others provide guidance only to the parties and to the judiciary in
subsequent litigation arising out of the same “cause.” In all instances, the
requirement of a written opinion promotes a careful examination of the facts and
the legal issues, and a result supported by law and reason.
III.
To evaluate the relevance and function of written decisions in the context of
Wende appeals, we next review the constitutional underpinnings of the
requirement of independent judicial review in such appeals, and the nature of the
review required by Wende.
The federal Constitution does not require a state to afford appellate review
of a judgment of conviction (McKane v. Durston (1894) 153 U.S. 684), but every
state has chosen to provide a right of appeal in criminal cases. (In re Sade C.
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 966; Pen. Code, § 1237.2) Having provided criminal
defendants with an appeal as a matter of right, the states must provide indigent
defendants with the assistance of counsel on appeal, “[f]or there can be no equal
justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of
money he has.’ [Citation.]” (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 355.)
The right of an indigent defendant to appellate counsel gave rise to the
issue considered in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders): “the
2
Penal Code section 1237 provides: “An appeal may be taken by the
defendant: [¶] (a) From a final judgment of conviction except as provided in
Section 1237.1 and Section 1237.5. A sentence, an order granting probation, or
the commitment of a defendant for insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a
defendant as a mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a
defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to be a final
judgment within the meaning of this section. Upon appeal from a final judgment
the court may review any order denying a motion for a new trial. [¶] (b) From
any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”
12
extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal
from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that
there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal.” (Id. at p. 739.) Anders explained that
“[t]he constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his
client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. . . . Of course, if counsel finds his case
to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise
the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court — not counsel —
then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether
the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or
proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if
it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not
frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to
argue the appeal.” (Id. at p. 744.)
Our decision in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, approved a modified
procedure to ensure an indigent criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance
of counsel. In Wende, the defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief summarizing
the proceedings and the facts with citations to the record, raised no specific issues,
and called upon the appellate court to review the entire record in order to
determine whether there was any arguable issue. Counsel also advised his client
of the nature of the brief and informed the defendant that he would be allowed to
file a brief on his own behalf. Counsel did not assert that the appeal was frivolous,
13
nor did he request to withdraw, but he did state his intention to advise his client
that he could move to have counsel relieved. The defendant did not file a brief.
This court’s decision in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, interpreted Anders to
require the appellate court “to conduct a review of the entire record whenever
appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes the
appeal as frivolous. This obligation is triggered by the receipt of such a brief from
counsel and does not depend on the subsequent receipt of a brief from the
defendant personally.” (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.) The court
“recognize[d] that under this rule counsel may ultimately be able to secure a more
complete review for his client when he cannot find any arguable issues than when
he raises specific issues, for a review of the entire record is not necessarily
required in the latter situation. [Citations.]” (Id. at 442.) Finally, the decision in
Wende concluded that “counsel may properly remain in the case so long as he has
not described the appeal as frivolous and has informed the defendant that he may
request the court to have counsel relieved if he so desires.” (Ibid.)
The United States Supreme Court approved this court’s Wende procedure in
Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259 (Robbins). In the course of its analysis,
Robbins identified four ways in which the Wende procedure is superior to other
approaches that have been disapproved. First, Wende “requires both counsel and
the court to find the appeal to be lacking in arguable issues, which is to say,
frivolous.” (Id. at p. 280.) Second, “the court orders briefing if it finds arguable
issues.” (Ibid.) Third, “[c]ounsel’s summary of the case’s procedural and factual
history with citations to the record, both ensures that a trained legal eye has
searched the record for arguable issues and assists the reviewing court in its own
evaluation of the case.” (Id. at p. 281.) Fourth, the Wende procedure requires two
tiers of review, by counsel and by the appellate court. (Ibid.)
14
In Robbins the court further concluded that the Wende procedure is in some
ways superior to Wisconsin’s procedure, which the high court found valid in
McCoy v. Wisconsin (1988) 486 U.S. 429. Wisconsin’s Rules of Appellate
Procedure require counsel to file a brief referring to parts of the record that
arguably support the appeal and to discuss why the identified issue lacks merit.
Wende, the high court observed, “requires a more thorough treatment of the record
by both counsel and the court” than do Wisconsin’s rules. (Robbins, supra, 528
U.S. at p. 283.) The high court also observed that Wisconsin’s procedure “might
divert the court’s attention from more meritorious unmentioned issues . . . [and]
may predispose the court to reach the same conclusions [as counsel]. The Wende
procedure reduces these risks, by omitting from the brief [those] signals that may
subtly undermine the independence and thoroughness of the second review of an
indigent’s case.” (Id. at p. 284.)
In summary, the constitutional right to assistance of counsel entitles an
indigent defendant to independent review by the Court of Appeal when counsel is
unable to identify any arguable issue on appeal. California’s procedure for
securing this right requires counsel to file a brief summarizing the proceedings and
the facts with citations to the record, and requires the appellate court to review the
entire record to determine whether there is any arguable issue. The high court’s
decision in Robbins ⎯ validating California’s procedure ⎯ highlights the
importance of the appellate court’s responsibility in Wende appeals to perform a
thorough review of the record.
IV.
The independent judicial review mandated by Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738,
applies only to a defendant’s first appeal as of right. (Pennsylvania v. Finley
(1987) 481 U.S. 551, 557; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 972-974.) The
right to a direct appeal of a final judgment gives rise to a “cause” within the
15
meaning of California Constitution article VI, section 14. (See Powers v. City of
Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 91, fn. 1 [right to “direct appeal” affords right to
oral argument and written decision on the merits]; id. at p. 141 (dis. opn. by Lucas,
C.J.) [resolution of an appeal determines a “cause” within the meaning of the “in
writing” provision]; People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 489-490 [important
incident of right to appeal from a superior court’s judgment is the right to a written
opinion pursuant to Cal. Const. art. VI, § 14].) Therefore, when a Court of Appeal
affirms a judgment in a Wende appeal, it is disposing of a “cause” within the
meaning of article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution, and must do so “in
writing with reasons stated.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)
The Court of Appeal disposed of defendant’s cause in writing, but stated
only that “there are no arguable issues” — it did not expressly address (or even
describe) defendant’s contentions. Both Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 744, and
Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 440, recognize the defendant’s right in a Wende
appeal to file supplemental contentions. This right stands in contrast to the general
rule that a represented defendant has no right personally to present supplemental
arguments. (In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 469.) Therefore, when a Court
of Appeal affirms a judgment in a Wende appeal in which the defendant has filed
supplemental contentions, the appellate court necessarily must have considered
and rejected those contentions. In accordance with the constitutional requirement
of “reasons stated,” such an opinion must reflect the contentions and the reasons
that they fail, just as the opinion would reflect these points if they were raised by
counsel.
Although the written decision in a Wende appeal typically will not be
certified for publication in the Official Reports and thus will not establish
precedent for future cases, it will serve the other significant purposes identified in
the constitutional debates — (1) providing guidance to the parties and the judiciary
16
in subsequent litigation arising out of the same “cause,” and (2) promoting a
careful examination of each case and a result supported by law and reason.
Having devoted its resources to reviewing the entire appellate record, the Court of
Appeal is well positioned to forestall the unnecessary expenditure of additional
judicial resources by gathering and setting forth in its opinion the bare information
necessary for other courts to recognize which contentions asserted by the
defendant have been considered and found lacking in arguable merit and which
were considered unreviewable due to an inadequate record. Brief written reasons
for the appellate court’s decision also may assist federal courts, which otherwise
would be unable to determine whether claims have been exhausted in the state
courts. Finally, the appellate court’s explanation of why the defendant’s
contentions fail may, in some circumstances, persuade the defendant that counsel’s
conclusions are correct and thus prompt the defendant to abandon his or her efforts
to obtain further judicial review.3
3
In addition to promoting the purposes of California Constitution article VI,
section 14, and conserving judicial resources, our conclusion that this
constitutional provision applies in the Wende context facilitates the purposes of
Wende review. As noted above, our Wende procedure relies on the efforts of the
appellate court in resolving the appeal to a greater extent than does the United
States Supreme Court’s Anders procedure, in that our procedure requires counsel
only to describe the facts and procedures, while calling upon the Court of Appeal
to review the entire record. The requirement that the Court of Appeal set forth its
reasons in writing ensures the fulfillment of the more significant role played by
that court as contemplated by Wende. (Cf. Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 81,
fn. 4 [“simply putting pen to paper can often shed new light on what may at first
appear to be an open-and-shut issue”].) Accordingly, the requirement of a written
opinion with reasons stated fulfills the goal of article VI, section 14, conserves
public resources in the longer term (cf. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. 259, 277-278
[one goal underlying procedures for screening frivolous appeals is to prevent
needless public expenditures]), and serves Wende’s directive that all appeals
receive careful examination by our appellate courts.
17
A written decision does not require an extended discussion of legal
principles. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262 [a written
decision is a statement of conclusions and of principal reasons; an opinion
sufficiently states reasons if it sets forth grounds or principles]; People v. Rojas
(1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 278, 289 [brief written decision stating only essential facts
and deciding only essential legal issues is adequate].) Moreover, a recitation of
each of the defendant’s assertions will not be necessary in all cases; the purposes
of the constitutional requirement may in some circumstances be satisfied by a
summary description of the contentions made and the reasons they fail. In order to
serve the purpose of providing information sufficient to determine the scope of the
contentions raised and resolved, however, the written decision must disclose
whether the contentions failed on the merits or for some other specified reasons.
In doing so, the opinion enables the defendant to learn, and the courts in
subsequent proceedings to determine, whether particular contentions are subject to
any procedural bar. (See, e.g., In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225
[arguments raised and rejected on appeal may not be raised again through habeas
corpus proceeding]; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [“writ [of habeas
corpus] will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised
upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction”].)4
4
After describing the contention, the written decision’s reasons, concluding
that no arguable issue is raised by a contention, may consist of a brief statement
identifying the flaw in the contention. Alternatively, a citation to pertinent case or
statutory authority may be a more efficient way of identifying the reason a
contention raises no arguable issue, as long as the citation clearly reveals the basis
upon which the Court of Appeal so finds. For example, if a defendant contends he
or she desired but was not provided substitute counsel, and it appears the
defendant failed to indicate on the trial court record a desire for new counsel, the
court may describe the contention and cite People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th
130, 157 (“Although no formal motion is necessary [to seek substitution of
(footnote continued on next page)
18
The constitutional requirement that an appellate court state reasons for its
decision does not require the inclusion of information or analysis beyond that
necessary to apprise the reader of the contention considered and the reasons
underlying that court’s conclusion that the contention fails. The constitutional
language itself refers only to the provision of “reasons,” and the constitutional
debates of 1878-1879 focused on the purpose of requiring a reasoned basis for the
judgment rendered by an appellate court. When this mandate was added to our
Constitution, there was no intermediate Court of Appeal, no Anders or Wende
review, and far less habeas corpus litigation. The delegates thus had no reason to
propose further requirements in connection with appellate opinions.
In light of the subsequent evolution of the law and the appellate court
system, an opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal has come to serve additional
purposes. In connection with a petition for review, the intermediate appellate
court’s opinion informs this court of the nature of the case as well as the
(footnote continued from previous page)
counsel], there must be ‘at least some clear indication by defendant that he wants a
substitute attorney’ ”). Other examples of cases a court might cite in response to
common contentions raised on appeal are People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15
Cal.4th 264, 267 (an appellate court should not find ineffective assistance of
counsel unless all facts relevant to that claim have been developed in the record);
People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 859-860 (“A disagreement concerning
tactics is . . . insufficient to compel the discharge of appointed counsel, unless it
signals a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship”); People v. Holt
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667 (“the test of whether evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”); and People v. Turner (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 116, 125 (“a plea of guilty waives any right to raise questions
regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, and this is true
whether or not the subsequent claim of evidentiary error is founded on
constitutional violations”).
19
contentions considered. The opinion also may be a significant source of
information in future collateral proceedings in which only a limited record is
provided. A brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, as
well as the crimes of which the defendant was convicted and the punishment
imposed, will allow any court in a subsequent proceeding to focus more quickly
on the contentions without having to expend resources gathering and reviewing
the record to apprise itself of this information. A synopsis of the case will be
particularly helpful when the defendant, as is frequently the situation, 5 pursues
challenges in propria persona, after providing an incomplete or confused
description of the prior proceeding.
Because the Court of Appeal in a Wende proceeding is required to review
the entire record, it must perform the essential tasks necessary to gather the
relevant facts, and it appears that summarizing this basic information in its written
opinion will add little to the burden imposed upon the appellate court.6 This is
5
Although statistics are not available concerning the total volume of direct
and collateral proceedings that challenge judgments rendered in Wende appeals,
the numbers appear to be significant. This court receives a substantial number of
petitions for review of Wende opinions each year, despite the absence of any
arguable issue on appeal and the consequent lack of a right to the assistance of
counsel. These petitions seeking review by this court are filed even though the
time within which to seek review is strictly limited, and even though such
defendants most likely have been informed by counsel of the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeal and that their contentions may be raised only by way of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, this court regularly receives habeas
corpus petitions following Wende opinions. Thus, these litigants have
demonstrated significant motivation in pursuing their contentions. Presumably,
California’s trial courts and Courts of Appeal, as well as the federal courts, also
receive numerous such filings.
6
An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of retired California appellate
justices in Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259 described the internal procedures
for processing Wende appeals as follows: “When a California appellate court
(footnote continued on next page)
20
particularly so because, as noted above, counsel’s Wende brief must set forth all of
this information, with citations to the record. Finally, our examination of Wende
opinions from all six appellate districts has disclosed that a large majority of these
opinions already include most of this information, and many set forth additional
information and analysis when the nature of the case suggests that a more
extensive explanation would be useful. Accordingly, it appears that requiring
basic information beyond the constitutional minimum to be provided — namely,
the contentions made and the reasons they fail — has at most a minimal impact on
the workload of the appellate courts.
These circumstances establish that significant efficiency in the processing
of subsequent proceedings, including habeas corpus matters, can be achieved if the
Courts of Appeal include in their Wende opinions a brief description of the facts
and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was
convicted, and the punishment imposed.7 Therefore, in the exercise of our
(footnote continued from previous page)
receives a Wende brief, it assigns the case to a staff attorney who prepares a
memorandum analyzing all possible legal issues in the case. Typically, the staff
attorney then makes an oral presentation to the appellate panel and explains
whether the case presents any arguable issues for appeal. See J. Clark Kelso,
Special Report on California Appellate Justice: A Report on the California
Appellate System, 45 Hastings L. J. 433, 461 (1994). Thus, as Professor J. Clark
Kelso remarked in a report prepared for California’s Appellate Courts Committee,
Commission on the Future of the Courts, ‘the Wende process duplicates in all
relevant aspects the exact process that appellate counsel must follow in evaluating
the merits of the case.’ (Id.)” (Smith v. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. 259, Brief for
Amici Curiae Retired Justices, 1999 WL 414236.)
7
Not only does a description of the punishment imposed provide a useful
context in which to evaluate the claims raised in subsequent proceedings, but a
large portion of these claims raise issues challenging the defendant’s sentence or
asserting his or her right to credits against the prescribed term of imprisonment.
21
supervisory power over the courts of this state (see, e.g., People v. Pena (2004) 32
Cal.4th 389, 403 [directing the appellate court to refrain from employing a
particular type of oral-argument-waiver notice]; In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d
921 [directing trial courts to render a brief statement of reasons in support of an
order denying a motion for bail on appeal]), we direct the Courts of Appeal to
include this information in their opinions in Wende appeals. We are sensitive to
the possible burden this rule may impose in some instances, and we emphasize
that such additional information may be set forth in a very brief manner.
These minimal requirements are in no way intended to discourage the
Courts of Appeal from preparing opinions that describe the underlying litigation in
greater detail and that analyze the contentions at greater length when doing so
appears to the appellate court to be appropriate and useful. Depending upon the
particular facts, procedures, and contentions, a more thorough opinion may
promote the purposes of explaining why the defendant’s contentions fail and of
apprising other courts of the facts and principles that establish the correctness of
the judgment. Moreover, in the course of reviewing the record, the Court of
Appeal may discern that certain motions, stipulations, or other aspects of the trial
court proceedings predictably might become relevant in, for example, a
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, if the defendant continues to challenge the
judgment. We encourage the Courts of Appeal to include such information in
their opinions when, in their view, it may be helpful in a future proceeding.
Finally, as is currently the practice of each of the Courts of Appeal, a
Wende opinion affirmatively should note that counsel filed a Wende brief raising
no arguable issue, that the defendant was apprised of his or her right to file a
supplemental brief, that the defendant did or did not file such a brief, and that the
court has reviewed the entire record and found no arguable issue.
22
Accordingly, in affirming the judgment rendered in a Wende appeal, the
Court of Appeal must prepare a written opinion that describes the contentions
personally raised by the defendant and the reasons those contentions fail. In
addition, the Court of Appeal must provide a brief description of the underlying
facts, the procedural history, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and
the punishment imposed. Finally, we encourage the Courts of Appeal to include
any further information they deem appropriate. We emphasize that what
constitutes an adequate written opinion “necessarily is a subjective determination.
[Citation.] ‘The author of an opinion must follow his [or her] own judgment as to
the degree of elaboration to be accorded to the treatment of any proposition and as
to the questions which are worthy of notice at all.’ ” (Lewis v. Superior Court,
supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262.)
V.
The decision rendered by the Court of Appeal in the present case did not
meet the constitutional requirement of a written opinion with reasons stated.
Although the decision adequately set forth the charges of which defendant was
convicted, reviewed the Wende procedures followed, and noted that defendant
exercised his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, it did not
describe the contentions made by defendant or the reasons why his contentions
were rejected by the appellate court. For these reasons, the decision below is
inadequate. Rather than remand the appeal, however, we proceed to resolve this
case on its merits, as we did in Wende.
As noted above, on July 21, 2003, a police officer witnessed defendant
driving erratically, and when the officer and a second officer confronted
defendant, he resisted them and thereafter declined to submit to alcohol tests. A
felony complaint was filed three days later, but on October 15, 2003, a
competency evaluation was ordered and criminal proceedings were suspended.
23
(Pen. Code, § 1368.) On December 3, 2003, the court found defendant competent
to stand trial.
The matter was tried before a jury on January 6, 7, and 8, 2004. The two
arresting officers testified concerning defendant’s conduct and appearance, and an
expert testified as to the effects of alcohol on the human body. The parties
stipulated that defendant had suffered a felony conviction in December 1996 for
driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code
section 23152. The jury found defendant guilty on two counts: (1) driving under
the influence of alcohol and drugs with a prior felony conviction committed within
10 years (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a)); and (2) resisting,
delaying, or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). In connection
with the first count, the jury found true the allegation that defendant willfully
refused a peace officer’s request to submit to a chemical test (Veh. Code,
§§ 23612, 23577, subd. (a)). On May 7, 2004, the trial court imposed the midterm
sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the felony, and a six-month term for the
misdemeanor to be served concurrently with the felony sentence. It ordered
defendant not to possess a firearm, revoked his driving privileges, and imposed a
$400 general-fund fine plus a penalty assessment, a restitution-fund fine of $200,
and a $20 court security fee. An additional restitution-fund fine was imposed, but
was suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that the
appellate court review the entire record on appeal, but raising no specific issue. In
response to notice from his counsel and the Court of Appeal of his right to file a
supplemental brief, defendant submitted in writing 15 points for the appellate
court’s consideration. We have reviewed the entire record and defendant’s written
contentions, and have not found any arguable issue. Defendant’s assertions
24
concerning the evidence admitted against him raise only a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim. The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the jury’s
verdict. (See People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.) His assertions
concerning facts that were not presented to the jury are not part of the appellate
record and hence cannot be reviewed on the record before us. To the extent
defendant challenges his prior felony conviction for driving under the influence of
an alcoholic beverage, that challenge is barred by his stipulation at trial to that
conviction. To the extent his contentions allege ineffective assistance of counsel,
this claim cannot be resolved on the present record. (People v. Mendoza Tello,
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267.) Finally, defendant’s allegation of bias on the part of
the jurors is not supported by the appellate record.
The judgment is affirmed.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
25
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J.
I concur in part. I agree with the majority’s conclusions that a Wende
appeal (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436) constitutes a “cause,” and that a
Wende opinion must summarily describe and respond to any contentions raised by
the defendant after counsel fails to find any arguable issues. (Maj. opn., ante, at p.
1.)
Where I part company with the majority is in its exercise of this court’s
supervisory power to impose additional requirements on the Courts of Appeal.
While I do not object to asking the courts to identify the crimes of which the
defendant was convicted and the punishment imposed, I would not require them to
describe any facts or procedural details that are not directly relevant to claims
made by the defendant. I would certainly not encourage them to anticipate future
habeas corpus petitions; in the vast majority of Wende appeals this would simply
be a waste of time. Collateral attack is most uncommon in these cases.
I hesitate to reach back to the 19th century for words of wisdom on a 21st
century problem; as the majority notes, the constitutional debates of 1878-1879
involved nothing akin to Wende review. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 19.) However, Clitus
Barbour was onto something when he made the following remarks about the
requirement of a statement of reasons: “We [do] not mean that they shall include
the small cases, and impose on the country all this fine judicial literature, for the
Lord knows we have got enough of that already. To give us the reason for it does
1
not take three lines.” (3 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal. Const.
Convention 1878-1879, pp. 1455-1456; see maj. opn., ante, pp. 9-10.)
We should bear in mind that Wende appeals are by definition meritless. In
the exceptional case where Wende review discloses an arguable issue, briefing is
sought and a conventional opinion is issued. When there are no arguable issues,
the reviewing court should be permitted to dispose of the case with a minimum of
“judicial literature.” It should be sufficient to note the crimes committed, the
sentence imposed, the filing of a Wende brief, whether the defendant raised any
claims of his or her own and if so, the nature of those claims and the reasons they
fail. Every case is important, but for these appeals, in which repeated review by
appointed counsel and the court has revealed no meritorious issue, Mr. Barbour’s
prescription for a succinct statement of reasons should be followed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
2
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Kelly
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
XXX NP opn. filed 3/15/06 – 6th Dist.Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S133114Date Filed: November 27, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Santa Clara
Judge: James C. Emerson
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
J. Courtney Shevelson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Thea Greenhalgh, under appointmentby the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Donald E. de Nicola,Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler,
Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Kelly M. Croxton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
J. Courtney ShevelsonPMB 187
316 Mid Valley Center
Carmel, CA 93923-8516
9831) 625-6581
Kelly M. Croxton
Deputy Attorney General
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004
(415) 703-5970
| Date: | Docket Number: |
| Mon, 11/27/2006 | S133114 |
| 1 | Kelly, Gary Rogers (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by J. Courtney Shevelson Attorney at Law 316 Mid Valley Center, PMB 187 Carmel, CA |
| 2 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Kelly Michelle Croxton Office of the Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA |
| Disposition | |
| Nov 27 2006 | Opinion: Affirmed |
| Dockets | |
| Apr 18 2005 | Petition for review filed by appellant (Gary Rogers Kelly) in pro per |
| Apr 18 2005 | Record requested |
| Apr 20 2005 | Received Court of Appeal record file jacket/briefs/accordian file |
| Jun 8 2005 | Petition for review granted; issues limited (criminal case) Petition for review GRANTED. The issues to be briefed and argued are limited to the following issues: (1) Does article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution, which provides that "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated," set the same standard for a criminal appeal in which defense counsel files a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 raising no issue and the defendant submits written argument on his or her own behalf as the standard that applies to a criminal appeal in which one or more specific claims of error is raised by defense counsel? (2) Did the Court of Appeal opinion in this case satisfy the requirements of article VI, section 14? Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ. |
| Jun 15 2005 | Counsel appointment order filed J. Courtney Shevelson for Appellant (Kelly). Appellant's brief on the merits must be served and filed on or before thirty days from the date of this order. |
| Jul 15 2005 | Request for extension of time filed Appellant (Kelly) by counsel. |
| Jul 18 2005 | Extension of time granted to file the Appellants Opening Brief on the Merits is extended to and including August 15, 2005. |
| Aug 12 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file Opening Brief on the Merits to September 14, 2005. |
| Aug 15 2005 | Extension of time granted to serve and file the opening brief on the merits to and including September 14, 2005. |
| Sep 14 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits to and including September 29, 2005. |
| Sep 15 2005 | Extension of time granted to file the Appellant's Opening Brief on Merits to and including September 29, 2005. |
| Sep 30 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed Appellant (Kelly) by counsel. 40.1(b) |
| Oct 19 2005 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Shevelson |
| Oct 24 2005 | Request for extension of time filed By cousel for respondent requesting a 30 day extension to and including Nov. 30, 2005 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. |
| Oct 27 2005 | Extension of time granted To November 30, 2005 to file the respondent's answer brief on the merits. |
| Nov 23 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to Dec. 30, 2005 for the respondent to file the answer brief on the merits. |
| Nov 30 2005 | Extension of time granted To December 30, 2005 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. |
| Dec 28 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to January 6, 2006 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. |
| Dec 30 2005 | Extension of time granted to January 6, 2006 to file respondent's answer brief on the merits. |
| Jan 6 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed The People, Respondent Kelly M. Croxton, Deputy Attorney General |
| Jan 24 2006 | Request for extension of time filed 20 day extension to February 15, 2006 to file reply brief on the merits. |
| Jan 26 2006 | Extension of time granted to February 15, 2006 to file the reply brief on the merits. |
| Feb 15 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to February 22, 2006, to file reply brief on the merits. |
| Feb 16 2006 | Extension of time granted to February 22, 2006 to file reply brief on the merits. |
| Feb 23 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Gary Rodgers Kelly, Appellant J. Courtney Shevelson, Counsel (CRC 40.1b) |
| Aug 3 2006 | Case ordered on calendar September 6, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
| Sep 6 2006 | Cause argued and submitted |
| Nov 27 2006 | Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full Majority Opinion by George, CJ., ----- Joined by Kennard, Werdegar and Moreno, JJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Corrigan, J. ----- Joined by Baxter and Chin, JJ. |
| Jan 4 2007 | Remittitur issued (criminal case) |
| Jan 24 2007 | Compensation awarded counsel Atty Shevelson |
| Briefs | |
| Sep 30 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Jan 6 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Feb 23 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
