IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S175907
v.
Ct.App. 2/3 B208691
INDIANA LUMBERMENS MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. SJ0969
____________________________________)
We granted review to resolve a conflict between the Second and Third
District Courts of Appeal. At issue is when a motion for relief from forfeiture of
bail must be made if an absconding defendant is arrested or surrendered in a
county other than the jurisdiction where the case is pending. We hold that such a
motion must be filed within 180 days of forfeiture, unless the time is extended as
the governing statute permits.
I. BACKGROUND
Robert Laimbeer repeatedly failed to appear in Los Angeles County
Superior Court on charges of driving with a suspended license and without proof
of insurance. He was apprehended on a bench warrant. On March 17, 2007, bail
in the amount of $35,000 was posted on his behalf by The Bail Hotline Bail
Bonds, as agent for appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company
(hereafter Lumbermens). Laimbeer failed to appear for his April 18, 2007 court
date. The court issued a bench warrant and ordered the bail forfeited. Notice was
mailed to Lumbermens.
On July 16, 2007, Lumbermens‘ bail agent surrendered Laimbeer to the
San Bernardino County sheriff‘s department, which booked him on drug charges
and placed a hold on him in the Los Angeles case. In September, Laimbeer was
sent to state prison from San Bernardino County. On October 23, 2007, the Los
Angeles County Superior Court notified Lumbermens that 180 days had elapsed
since bail was forfeited, and that payment was due. The notice stated that prompt
payment would avoid the filing of a summary judgment, and the associated costs
and interest. Lumbermens did not respond, and summary judgment was entered
against it on December 4, 2007.
On January 2, 2008, Lumbermens moved to vacate the summary judgment,
set aside the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. The trial court denied the motion.
However, the Court of Appeal reversed, noting that there was a division of
authority as to the timing requirements for motions for relief from bail forfeiture
when the defendant is arrested in another county. It decided the controlling statute
should be applied so as to avoid a forfeiture.
The statutory scheme governing bail is found in Penal Code section 1268 et
seq. 1 When a defendant released on bail fails to appear as required without
sufficient excuse, the court must declare the bond forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) If
the defendant appears in court or is returned to custody within 180 days, the
forfeiture must be vacated and the bond exonerated. (§ 1305, subd. (c).) 2
1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The 180-day period is extended by five days when notice of forfeiture is
required to be mailed, and in that event the period begins to run from the date of
mailing. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) Although the actual period is therefore usually 185
(footnote continued on following page)
2
Otherwise, the court enters summary judgment against the surety. (§ 1306, subd.
(a).)3
Under section 1305, a court appearance or return to custody in the county
where the case was filed is treated differently from a return to custody outside the
county. If the defendant appears during the 180-day period, ―the court shall, on its
own motion at the time the defendant first appears in court on the case in which
the forfeiture was entered, direct the order of forfeiture to be vacated and the bond
exonerated. If the court fails to so act on its own motion, then the surety‘s or
depositor‘s obligations under the bond shall be immediately vacated and the bond
exonerated.‖ (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).) The same disposition is required if the
defendant is returned to custody within 180 days in the county where the case was
filed, but released before making a court appearance. The court must act on its
own motion to reinstate and exonerate the bond, and if it fails to do so exoneration
is accomplished by operation of law. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(2).)
(footnote continued from previous page)
days, section 1305 repeatedly refers to a 180-day period, and we follow that
convention.
3
Section 1305 provides exceptions from the forfeiture requirement, none of
which is relevant here. Relief is available within the 180-day period if it is shown
that the defendant‘s nonappearance was the result of a permanent disability.
(§ 1305, subd. (d).) The period may be tolled in cases of temporary disability.
(§ 1305, subd. (e).) Subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 1305 permit relief from
forfeiture ―on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in similar
situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release,‖ without reference to the
180-day period, in circumstances where the defendant is apprehended outside the
jurisdiction and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition.
Section 1305.4 allows the surety to move for an extension of the 180-day
period, upon a showing of good cause.
3
On the other hand, when the defendant is returned to custody outside the
county within the 180-day period, the statute provides only that ―the court shall
vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail.‖ (§ 1305, subdivision (c)(3), hereafter
section 1305(c)(3).)4 In this circumstance, the court is not directed to act on its
own motion, and there is no provision for immediate exoneration if the court does
not act.
The parties agree that the surety may not rely on operation of law, but must
affirmatively seek relief from forfeiture under section 1305(c)(3). Lumbermens
acknowledges that the statute does not require the court to take the initiative,
because the court may not know that the defendant is in custody outside the
county. Therefore, a motion by the surety is required. The question before us is
when the motion must be filed. The People contend the statutory 180-day period
is controlling. They rely on section 1305, subdivision (i) (hereafter
section 1305(i)), which states: ―A motion filed in a timely manner within the 180-
day period may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period.‖5
Lumbermens argues that section 1305(i) is not mandatory, and does not apply to
motions for relief from forfeiture under section 1305(c)(3). It asks us to hold that
4
Section 1305(c)(3) provides in full: ―If, outside the county where the case
is located, the defendant is surrendered to custody by the bail or is arrested in the
underlying case within the 180-day period, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and
exonerate the bail.‖
5
Section 1305(i) provides in full: ―A motion filed in a timely manner within
the 180-day period may be heard within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day
period. The court may extend the 30-day period upon a showing of good cause.
The motion may be made by the surety insurer, the bail agent, the surety, or the
depositor of money or property, any of whom may appear in person or through an
attorney. The court, in its discretion, may require that the moving party provide
10 days prior notice to the applicable prosecuting agency, as a condition precedent
to granting the motion.‖
4
a motion may be filed within a reasonable time after expiration of the 180-day
period.
The People‘s view was adopted in People v. Lexington National Ins. Co.
(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 370 (Lexington). Lumbermens‘ position finds support in
People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 867 (Ranger). The Court of
Appeal below followed Ranger. We reverse.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Court of Appeal Decisions
We begin by reviewing the Court of Appeal decisions. In Ranger,
Division 6 of the Second District noted that ―[o]rdinarily, a surety must file a
motion to exonerate the bond within 185 days of the mailing of the notice of
forfeiture. (§ 1305, subds. (b) & (i).)‖ (Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p.
869.) The court rejected the surety‘s argument that section 1305(c)(3) requires the
court to act on its own motion when the defendant is apprehended in a different
county. (Ranger, at p. 870.) However, it reasoned that section 1305(c)(3) ―does
not require that a motion to exonerate the bail be brought within 180 days. . . .
What is significant here is that the defendant was in custody within 180 days of
the notice of forfeiture. . . . [¶] Bail insures the accused‘s attendance at court
proceedings. The surety is guarantor of defendant‘s presence. When defendant is
in custody for the case in which bail is set, that guarantee is met. That is what
happened here. Defendant ‗showed up,‘ albeit not voluntarily. That is 100
percent success for the surety. The county does not gain a windfall.‖ (Ranger, at
p. 871.)
Ranger‘s reasoning is not entirely clear. If a surety must ordinarily file a
motion within the statutory period, the defendant‘s return to custody is not a
readily apparent justification for departing from the usual rule. Indeed, a return to
custody is the occasion for a motion seeking relief from forfeiture. In Lexington,
5
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 370, the Third District Court of Appeal concluded that
Ranger‘s holding was inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The court agreed
with Ranger that section 1305(c)(3) itself does not require a motion within 180
days, but observed that the reference to ―[a] motion filed in a timely manner
within the 180-day period‖ in section 1305(i) ―strongly suggests that the
Legislature intended that all motions to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate a bond
under section 1305 be filed within the statutory period.‖ (Lexington, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at pp. 374-375.)
The Lexington court also found support in the provisions of section 1306,
subdivision (a): ― ‗When any bond is forfeited and the period of time specified in
Section 1305 has elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court
which has declared the forfeiture . . . shall enter a summary judgment against each
bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the bondsman is bound.‘
(Italics added.) By requiring that courts enter summary judgment at the expiration
of the statutory period, the Legislature clearly contemplated that motions to vacate
the forfeiture and exonerate the bond, including those brought under section 1305,
subdivision (c)(3), be brought prior to the expiration of the statutory period.‖
(Lexington, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.)
In the case before us, the Court of Appeal reasoned as follows: ―The
disagreement between Ranger and Lexington demonstrates an ambiguity in the
statute with respect to the timing for filing a motion to vacate a forfeiture if the
defendant is surrendered to custody or arrested outside the county in which the
case is located.
―Our resolution of the issue is facilitated by basic principles governing bail
statutes. . . . [T]he law traditionally disfavors forfeitures and this disfavor extends
to forfeiture of bail. (People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. [(1971)] 5 Cal.3d [898,]
906.) Therefore, section 1305 must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to
6
avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture. (County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co.
[(1999)] 70 Cal.App.4th [10,] 16.) Accordingly, given a choice between
Lexington‘s interpretation of section 1305, which would compel a forfeiture
herein, and Ranger‘s interpretation of the statute, which would avoid one, our
choice is clear.
―Further, in this case, as in Ranger and Lexington, the defendant was in
custody in the underlying case within the [180]-day period, albeit in a different
county. (Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 869; Lexington, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at pp. 372, 375, fn. 6.) The delay merely related to [Lumbermens‘]
filing of a motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond. A forfeiture
under these circumstances, in which the purpose of bail has been served, would
amount to an improper windfall for the County. (People v. Wilcox [(1960)] 53
Cal.2d [651,] 657; Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 871.)‖
It is true as a general rule that the bail statutes are strictly construed to
avoid forfeiture. (See People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704,
714.) Furthermore, section 1305 is ambiguous, at least to a degree. Section
1305(c)(3) requires the court to grant relief from forfeiture if the defendant is
apprehended outside the county within 180 days. The statute does not require the
court to act on its own motion, but neither does it specify that the surety must
move for relief. No reference is made to the timing provisions of section 1305(i).
Section 1305.4, by contrast, specifies that a motion to obtain an extension of the
180-day period ―may be filed and calendared as provided in subdivision (i) of
Section 1305.‖ Section 1305(i) itself contemplates a motion filed within 180 days,
but its terms are not expressly mandatory. It simply states that ―[a] motion filed in
a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard within 30 days of the
expiration of the 180-day period.‖
7
While section 1305 is somewhat less than explicit regarding the timing of a
motion for relief from forfeiture under subdivision (c)(3), the most natural
construction would be to apply the provisions of subdivision (i) contemplating a
motion within the 180-day period. Nevertheless, the split between the Courts of
Appeal reflects uncertainty over that reading of the statute. We turn to the history
of the language now found in section 1305(i) to explore the Legislature‘s intent
with respect to motions for relief under section 1305(c)(3). (See People v.
Allegheny Casualty Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 708-709.) As discussed below,
that history as well as the broader statutory context leave no doubt that motions
under section 1305(c)(3) were meant to be filed within the 180-day period, unless
the period is extended. The policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the
plainly intended meaning of the statute. Contrary to the reasoning of the Ranger
court and the Court of Appeal below, failure to bring a timely motion results in a
statutory bar to relief, not a windfall to the county.
B. The Legislative History6
The provision contemplating ―[a] motion filed in a timely manner within
the 180-day period‖ first appeared in 1993, in a bill repealing and reenacting
section 1305, subdivision (c):
―(c) If the defendant appears in court within 180 days of the date of
forfeiture or within 180 days of the date of mailing of the notice if the notice is
required under subdivision (b), the court shall, on its own motion, direct the order
of forfeiture to be vacated and the bond exonerated. . . . [¶] Additionally, if the
defendant is surrendered to custody or to the court by the bail within the 180-day
6
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the legislative history
materials discussed in this section.
8
period, the court shall, on its own motion, direct the order of forfeiture to be
vacated and the bond exonerated. . . . [¶] In all other cases, an order vacating the
forfeiture shall not be made without 10 days‘ prior notice by the bail to the
applicable prosecuting agency, unless notice is waived by the agency. . . . A
motion filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard within 30
days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court may extend the 30-day
period upon a showing of good cause.‖ (Stats. 1993, ch. 524, § 2, pp. 2702-2703,
enacting Assem. Bill No. 734 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).)
An Assembly committee analysis notes: ―The main substantive portion of
this bill is the provision which extends the time during which a surety may appear
in court with a motion to vacate the forfeiture. According to the sponsor this
change is needed because sureties frequently receive notice toward the end of the
applicable 180 day notice period, giving them little time to either find the
defendant and cause him or her to appear, or file a motion to vacate the forfeiture.
Under this bill, the surety will have a five day grace period at the end of the 180
days, and the court will have until 30 days after that period to hear any motion.‖
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 734 (1993-1994 Reg.
Sess.), as amended Apr. 29, 1993, p. 2.) Both the language of the bill and the
committee analysis reflect the Legislature‘s understanding that motions would be
filed within the 180-day period.
The next year, the Legislature made additional changes to section 1305.
The current subdivisions began to take shape:
―(c)(1) If the defendant appears either voluntarily or in custody after
surrender or arrest in court within 180 days of the date of forfeiture or within 180
days of the date of mailing of the notice if the notice is required under subdivision
(b), the court shall, on its own motion at the time the defendant first appears in
court on the case in which the forfeiture was entered, direct the order of forfeiture
9
to be vacated and the bond exonerated. If the court fails to so act on its own
motion, then the surety‘s or depositor‘s obligations under the bond shall be
immediately vacated and the bond exonerated. . . .
―(2) If, within the county where the case is located, the defendant is
surrendered to custody by the bail or is arrested in the underlying case within the
180-day period, and is subsequently released from custody prior to an appearance
in court, the court shall, on its own motion, direct the order of forfeiture to be
vacated and the bond exonerated. If the court fails to so act on its own motion,
then the surety‘s or depositor‘s obligations under the bond shall be immediately
vacated and the bond exonerated. . . .
―(3) If, outside the county where the case is located, the defendant is
surrendered to custody by the bail or is arrested in the underlying case within the
180-day period, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail.
―(4) Except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2), the court, in its
discretion, may require that the bail provide 10 days‘ prior notice to the applicable
prosecuting agency, as a condition precedent to vacating the forfeiture. . . . A
motion filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period may be heard within 30
days of the expiration of the 180-day period. The court may extend the 30-day
period upon a showing of good cause.‖ (Stats. 1994, ch. 649, § 1, pp. 3134-3135,
enacting Assem. Bill No. 3059 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).) Again, it is clear the
Legislature meant to require sureties to move for relief within the statutory period
in cases where the court was not required to act on its own motion.7
7
The only relevant comment in the committee materials for this legislation is
at odds with the terms of the amended statute: ―In addition to existing law, this
bill would further require the court, on its own motion, to vacate the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond if either the defendant is surrendered or arrested within the
(footnote continued on following page)
10
The latest relevant amendment occurred in 1999. The Legislature removed
the language governing motions and extensions of time from section 1305,
subdivision (c)(4), and placed it by itself in section 1305(i). (Stats. 1999, ch. 570,
§ 2, pp. 3225-3226, enacting Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.).) A
Senate committee analysis explains the reason for this change:
―The sponsor, in discussions with Committee staff, has indicated that the
current statutes and applicable court decisions are overly restrictive as to
exoneration of bail.
―A recent decision of the Court of Appeal of California — [County] of Los
Angeles v. National Automobile & Casualty [Ins. Co.] (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
[271] — held that a motion to toll the 180-day period during which forfeited bail
may be exonerated must be heard and granted before the expiration of the 180-
(footnote continued from previous page)
county where the case located and is subsequently released from custody prior to
an appearance in court, or if the defendant is surrendered or arrested outside the
county where the case is located. AB 3059 would provide that if the court fails to
so act, the bond shall be vacated and exonerated automatically.‖ (Sen. Floor
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3059 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 8,
1994, p. 2, italics added.) The italicized comments failed to recognize that in this
version of section 1305, subdivision (c)(4) contemplated the filing of a motion and
subdivision (c)(3) did not include the provisions for automatic relief found in
subdivision (c)(1) and (2).
The same misreading appeared in the Legislative Counsel‘s Digest. (See
Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 3059 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) 5 Stats.
1994, Summary Dig., p. 242; Ranger, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 871.) As the
Ranger court observed, ―[o]ften, the Legislative Counsel‘s Digest is helpful in
construing a statute. But when the plain words of the statute are unambiguous,
they are the sole source of legislative intent, not the Digest.‖ (Ranger, at p. 871.)
The Ranger and Lexington courts agreed that a motion is required for relief to be
granted under section 1305(c)(3). (Ranger, at p. 871; Lexington, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at p. 374.) That conclusion is sound.
11
day period or the court loses jurisdiction to act in the bail matter. (Bail is forfeited
at the time the defendant fails to appear for a scheduled court appearance and bail
may thereafter be reinstated if the defendant returns to court.) While the National
case involved a request to toll the 180-day forfeiture exoneration time limit
because of a temporary disability of the defendant [under] Penal Code section
1305, subdivision (e), there appears to be no reason that such a ruling would not
apply under the more general tolling/extension provision in Penal Code section
1305.4.[8]
―Thus it appears that if the court has not tolled and extended the 180-day
period, the court can neither toll the forfeiture period nor vacate forfeiture of the
bail. A summary judgment against the surety shall be entered after the 180 days
8
Section 1305, subdivision (e) has not changed since the National case was
decided. It states: ―In the case of a temporary disability, the court shall order the
tolling of the 180-day period provided in this section during the period of
temporary disability, provided that it appears to the satisfaction of the court that
the following conditions are met: [¶] (1) The defendant is temporarily disabled
by reason of illness, insanity, or detention by military or civil authorities. [¶] (2)
Based upon the temporary disability, the defendant is unable to appear in court
during the remainder of the 180-day period. [¶] (3) The absence of the defendant
is without the connivance of the bail. [¶] The period of the tolling shall be
extended for a reasonable period of time, at the discretion of the court, after the
cessation of the disability to allow for the return of the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the court.‖ (Ibid.; see County of Los Angeles v. National
Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 278, fn. 3.)
Section 1305.4, as amended by the 1999 legislation that also created section
1305(i), provides: ―Notwithstanding Section 1305, the surety insurer, the bail
agent, the surety, or the depositor may file a motion, based upon good cause, for
an order extending the 180-day period provided in that section. The motion shall
include a declaration or affidavit that states the reasons showing good cause to
extend that period. The court, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, may
order the period extended to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order. A
motion may be filed and calendared as provided in subdivision (i) of Section
1305.‖ (Stats. 1999, ch. 570, § 3, p. 3956.)
12
has run. A summary judgment filed thereafter cannot be set aside.[9] Where the
summary judgment remains unpaid after 20 days, the surety may not provide bail.
―The sponsor states that bail agents often are not aware that a defendant has
absconded until very close to the end of the 180-day period. Agents may be hard
pressed to file a motion to toll and extend the 180-day period within those 180
days. The provisions requiring the bail agent to give 10 days notice to the
prosecutor prior to the hearing of any motions also impair the bail agent‘s ability
to obtain exoneration of bail.‖ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 6, 1999, pp. 6-7, italics
added.)
Thus, the Legislature moved the provision allowing a 30-day grace period
for hearings from subdivision (c) to subdivision (i) of section 1305, in order to
make it available to sureties moving to toll or extend the 180-day period. In the
judicial decision prompting this change, the court had reasoned that former
subdivision (c)(4) of section 1305 provided a grace period only for hearing
motions to vacate forfeiture. (County of Los Angeles v. National Automobile &
Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 278.) When the Legislature
responded to this ruling in 1999, it did not alter the provisions contemplating a
motion filed within the 180-day period. Application of the timing provisions of
section 1305(i) was expanded to include motions to toll or extend the 180-day
period. It was not contracted to exclude motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate
the bond under section 1305(c)(3).
9
This statement is incorrect. Relief is available from a summary judgment
that is inconsistent with the consent given in the undertaking. (County of Los
Angeles v. American Bankers Ins. Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 792, 795; see People
v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 663-664.)
13
This legislative history confirms the Lexington court‘s interpretation of the
statutory scheme. The evolution of the statute makes it plain that the provisions of
section 1305(i) govern motions for relief under section 1305(c)(3). The statutory
changes and committee reports discussed above show that from the time the
Legislature first contemplated motions ―filed in a timely manner within the 180-
day period,‖ it had motions for relief from forfeiture in mind. And if such motions
could be made within any reasonable time after the 180-day period, as
Lumbermens would have it, there would have been no reason for the Legislature
to provide a 30-day grace period for hearings.
Furthermore, as both the Lexington court and the 1999 Senate committee
report noted, summary judgment is to be entered against the surety after the
expiration of the 180-day period unless the forfeiture of bail has been set aside.
(§ 1306, subd. (a); Lexington, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 375; Sen. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 476 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 7.) It
follows from this requirement that the surety must seek relief from forfeiture
before the 180-day period lapses.10
C. Conclusion
Lumbermens and amicus curiae sureties advance a number of policy
reasons why a motion for relief under section 1305(c)(3) should be permitted
beyond the statutory period. These arguments would be better addressed to the
Legislature. We note, in any event, that the existing statutory scheme has been
designed to avoid undue hardship for bail sureties. A surety undertakes to
guarantee the defendant‘s timely appearance in court. If the defendant fails to
10
We disapprove the contrary holding of People v. Ranger Ins. Co., supra,
141 Cal.App.4th 867.
14
appear, the surety is contractually obligated to the government in the amount of its
bond. (See People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 657-658.) Section 1305 allows the surety 180 days, a generous period, to
obtain relief by locating the defendant and bringing him to custody, or by showing
the court that the defendant‘s absence is due to disability or out-of-state custody.
The surety may obtain an extension of the 180-day period upon a timely showing
of good cause. (§ 1305.4.)
The surety‘s contractual obligation on its bond is the same whether the
defendant eventually returns to custody in the county where bail was granted, or
elsewhere. The statutory 180-day period is also the same, and the Legislature has
reasonably required that when the defendant is returned to custody outside the
county, it is incumbent on the surety to bring a motion for relief from forfeiture.
The deadlines and procedures for seeking relief have been tailored to
accommodate the interests of the surety, which appropriately bears the burden of
compliance with the statutory requirements. (See People v. Fairmont Specialty
Group (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 146, 152.) Certainly, in this case Lumbermens had
a more than adequate opportunity to obtain relief from forfeiture within the
statutory period. The nonstatutory ―reasonable time‖ it urges us to accept is
inconsistent with a surety‘s contractual and statutory obligations.
15
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
16
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 175 Cal.App.4th 1426
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S175907Date Filed: June 10, 2010
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Los Angeles
Judge: Richard S. Kemalyan
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.Peter A. Botz, Robert Tomlin White and Toni L. Martinson for Two Jinn, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Robert L. Rosato, Assistant County Counsel, Brian T. Chu,Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Jason C. Carnevale, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
E. Alan NunezNunez & Bernstein
4836 North First Street, Suite 106
Fresno, CA 93726
(559) 227-2373
Robert Tomlin White
Two Jinn, Inc.
1959 Palomar Oaks Way, Suite 200
Carlsbad, CA 92011
(760) 692-9216
Brian T. Chu
Principal Deputy County Counsel
648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012-2713
(213) 974-1956
18
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying a motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond in a criminal case. This case presents the following issue: When a criminal defendant is surrendered into custody or arrested in another county within 180 days of the date of notice that the bail bond has been forfeited, does Penal Code section 1305 require the surety on the bond to file its motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond within that period of 180 days in order to obtain relief?
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: | Category: | Status: |
| Thu, 06/10/2010 | 49 Cal. 4th 301, 231 P.3d 909, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 4 | S175907 | Review - Civil Appeal | scheduled for argument |
| 1 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Jason Christopher Carnevale Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel 500 W. Temple Street, Room 648 Los Angeles, CA |
| 2 | The People (Plaintiff and Respondent) Represented by Brian Thomas Chu Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel 500 W. Temple Street, Room 606 Los Angeles, CA |
| 3 | Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (Defendant and Appellant) Represented by E. Alan Nunez Nunez & Bernstein 4836 N. First Street, Suite 106 Fresno, CA |
| 4 | Two Jinn, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Robert Tomlin White Two Jinn, Inc. 1959 Palomar Oaks Way, Suite 200 Carlsbad, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Justice Carol A. Corrigan |
| Dockets | |
| Aug 31 2009 | Petition for review filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu The People, Plaintiff and Respondent Brian Chu, County Counsel |
| Aug 31 2009 | Record requested |
| Sep 1 2009 | Received Court of Appeal record one 2" dh |
| Oct 21 2009 | Petition for review granted Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ. |
| Oct 22 2009 | Letter sent to: counsel regarding Certificate of Interested Persons. |
| Nov 5 2009 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed submitted by E. ALan Nunez counsel for appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company |
| Nov 19 2009 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed submitted by Brian T. Chu counsel for respondent, The People. |
| Nov 20 2009 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Amended Certification Brian Chu, Principal Deputy County Counsel |
| Nov 20 2009 | Opening brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu |
| Dec 17 2009 | Answer brief on the merits filed Defendant and Appellant: Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance CompanyAttorney: E. Alan Nunez |
| Jan 7 2010 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu (CRC, rule 8.25(b)) |
| Feb 4 2010 | Application to file amicus curiae brief filed Two Jinn, Inc., in support of appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company. |
| Feb 10 2010 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted The application of Two Jinn, Inc. for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellant is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief. |
| Feb 10 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Two Jinn, Inc.Attorney: Robert Tomlin White Answer is due within Twenty (20) days |
| Mar 3 2010 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu (CRC, rule 8.25(b)) |
| Mar 30 2010 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued on Monday, May 3, 2010, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco |
| Apr 8 2010 | Application filed request to divide oral argument time, filed by E. Alan Nunez, counsel for appellant Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company; asking to share 10 minutes with amicus curiae Two Jinn, Inc. |
| Apr 12 2010 | Order filed The request of appellant to allocate to amicus curiae Two Jinn, Inc. 10 minutes of appellant's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted. |
| Apr 28 2010 | Letter sent to: each non-amicus party counsel appearing at oral argument, from the Clerk of the Court: "The court has asked me to inform counsel in cases that will be argued at the May 3-6, 2010, oral argument calendar in San Francisco that Justice Joyce L. Kennard will be unable to be present at argument due to unexpected surgery. Upon stipulation of all parties in a case, Justice Kennard will participate in the deliberations and decision in this matter by reviewing the complete videotape recording of the argument and considering all of the written materials in each case. In the absence of the court's receipt of a written stipulation by all parties in a case, the court will decide whether to continue the matter to a future oral argument calendar or to ask the Chief Justice to assign a justice pro tempore who will participate in place of Justice Kennard at the May 3-6, 2010, sessions. "Please telephonically inform Steve Rockwell, Senior Deputy Clerk, at (415) 865-7011 as soon as possible whether the party(ies) you represent will or will not stipulate to Justice Kennard's participation in the case, even though she will not be present at oral argument. Please execute the attached written stipulation and returning it by fax on or before Friday, April 30, 2010. Submit the original signed stipulation to the court either by overnight mail or by bringing the document to the court on the day of argument." |
| Apr 28 2010 | Stipulation filed Stipulation by counsel Brian T. Chu, that respondent has no objection to Justice Kennard's participation in the deliberations and decision in this matter notwithstanding her absence from oral argument. |
| Apr 29 2010 | Stipulation filed Stipulation by counsel E. Alan Nunez, that appellants have no objection to Justice Kennard's participation in the deliberations and decision in this matter notwithstanding her absence from oral argument. |
| Apr 29 2010 | Received: Stipulation by counsel Robert Tomlin White, that amicus curiae Tow Jinn, Inc. has no objection to Justice Kennard's participation in the deliberations and decision in this matter notwithstanding her absence from oral argument. |
| Jun 9 2010 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted To be filed Thursday, June 10, 2010 at 10 a.m. |
| Briefs | |
| Nov 20 2009 | Opening brief on the merits filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu |
| Dec 17 2009 | Answer brief on the merits filed Defendant and Appellant: Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance CompanyAttorney: E. Alan Nunez |
| Jan 7 2010 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu |
| Feb 10 2010 | Amicus curiae brief filed Amicus curiae: Two Jinn, Inc.Attorney: Robert Tomlin White |
| Mar 3 2010 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Plaintiff and Respondent: The PeopleAttorney: Brian Thomas Chu |
| Brief Downloads | |
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| May 9, 2011 Annotated by Will Edelman | Facts Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Company (“Lumbermens”) posted Robert Laimbeer’s $35,000 bail with the Los Angeles County Superior Court. When Laimbeer subsequently failed to appear, the court issued a bench warrant and ordered the bail forfeited. Approximately 90 days later, Lumbermens’ bail agent surrendered Laimbeer to the San Bernardino County sheriff’s department, where a hold was placed on him in the Los Angeles County case. The Los Angeles court notified Lumbermens 180 days after bail was forfeited that payment was due to avoid summary judgment. Lumbermens did not respond to the notice, and did not move to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bail until after summary judgment had been entered against it, more than 180 days after forfeiture. Procedural History The trial court denied Lumbermens’ motion to vacate the summary judgment order, set aside the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. The Court of Appeal reversed, noting a split among appellate districts on the issue, and held that the controlling statute did not require a motion for relief from forfeiture to be brought within 180 days when the defendant is arrested in another county. The Supreme Court of California granted Los Angeles County’s petition for review. Issue When an absconding defendant is arrested or surrendered in a county other than the jurisdiction where the case is pending, when must a motion for relief from forfeiture be made? Holding A motion for relief from forfeiture must be made within 180 days of forfeiture when an absconding defendant is arrested or surrendered in a county other than the jurisdiction where the case is pending, unless the time is extended as the governing statute permits. Analysis The controlling statutory scheme is found in Penal Code section 1268 et. seq. Under section 1305, appearances and returns to custody in the county where the case was filed are treated differently from appearances and returns to custody that occur outside of the filing county. Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) require courts, on their own motion, to reinstate and exonerate bonds for in-county returns to custody within 180 days of forfeiture, and provide the same result by operation of law even absent the required sua sponte action by the court. On the other hand, section 1305(c)(3) does not direct courts to act on their own motion, nor does it provide for exoneration absent court action, for out-of-county returns to custody within the 180-day period. The parties agreed that, in light of these differences, a surety is not entitled to relief by operation of law under section 1305(c)(3). The issue here is when the requisite motion for relief must be filed for out-of-county returns to custody. Prior to this case, the two Courts of Appeal to consider the issue reached opposite conclusions. Compare People v. Ranger Ins. Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 867 (2006), with People v. Lexington Nat'l Ins. Co., 158 Cal. App. 4th 370 (2007). In Ranger, the court emphasized that “[w]hat is significant here is that the defendant was in custody within 180 days of the notice of forfeiture. . . . Defendant ‘showed up,’ albeit not voluntarily. That is 100 percent success for the surety. The county does not gain a windfall.” Ranger, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 871. The reasoning is unclear. If the statute requires a surety to file a motion within the statutory period, the defendant’s return to custody is irrelevant to whether the surety has met its obligations. Indeed, a return to custody is the occasion for filing the motion at issue. In Lexington, the court noted that section 1305(i) refers to “[a] motion filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period,” which “strongly suggests that the Legislature intended that all motions to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate a bond under section 1305 be filed within the statutory period.” Lexington, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 374-75. The Lexington court also found support for its conclusion in the code provision addressing the entry of summary judgment against bondsmen. Because that provision requires courts to enter summary judgment at the expiration of the 180-day statutory period, the Legislature clearly contemplated that motions to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond would be brought prior to the expiration of that period. See Lexington, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 375. The court below reasoned that the opposing outcomes in Lexington and Ranger demonstrate the ambiguity of the statute. Relying on the general principle governing bail statutes that the law disfavors forfeitures, the court below sided with Ranger. Section 1305 is, at least to a degree, ambiguous as to the timing requirements of the motion for relief from forfeiture. The legislative history and broader statutory context, however, leave no doubt that the Legislature intended motions under section 1305(c)(3) be filed within the 180-day period, unless the period is extended as provided in the statute. The amendment history of the statute, and related committee reports, show that the Legislature had motions for relief from forfeiture in mind when it enacted section 1305(i)’s language concerning motions “filed in a timely manner within the 180-day period.” The summary judgment provision emphasized by the Lexington court further demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that motions for relief from forfeiture be filed before the 180-day period lapses. The policy disfavoring forfeiture cannot overcome the plainly intended meaning of the statute. Lumbermens’ policy arguments for why a motion for relief under section 1305(c)(3) should be permitted beyond the statutory period would be better addressed to the Legislature. In any event, the current scheme has been designed with the interests of bail sureties in mind. Section 1305 allows the surety 180 days, a generous period, to obtain relief—or seek an extension. The nonstatutory “reasonable time” Lumbermens urges the Court to read into the law is inconsistent with a surety’s contractual and overall statutory obligations. Related Authority People v. Ranger Ins. Co., 141 Cal. App. 4th 867 (2006) People v. Lexington Nat'l Ins. Co., 158 Cal. App. 4th 370 (2007) Tags bail exoneration Annotation by Will Edelman |
