Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S105762
People v. Flores

Filed 6/12/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S105762
v.
Ct.App. 2/4 B148379
STEVEN A. FLORES,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant. )
Super.Ct.No.
BA204550

Subdivision (b) of section 987.8 of the Penal Code (section 987.8(b))1
provides that, upon the conclusion of criminal proceedings in the trial court, the
court may, after giving the defendant notice and a hearing, make a determination
of his present ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of the legal assistance
provided him. The subdivision further provides that the court may, in its
discretion, “hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion
of the criminal proceedings.” (Ibid.)
Defendant contends, the People concede, and the Court of Appeal held that
the reimbursement order in this case violated section 987.8(b) because it was made
without the requisite notice and hearing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal
remanded the case to the trial court to give it another opportunity to provide the
notice and conduct the hearing required by the statute.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references will be to the
Penal Code.
1



The question before us is whether, as defendant contends, the remand order
was erroneous because it occurred more than six months after judgment was
pronounced. Defendant’s contention lacks merit. Under section 1260, appellate
courts have the power to remand a cause to a trial court “for such further
proceedings as may be just under the circumstances,” and the language used in
section 987.8 does not, on the face of it, suggest the Legislature intended to carve
out an exception to section 1260 by placing a six-month time limit on the power to
remand for the correction of errors of the sort made in this case. Indeed, the
legislative history of the 1978 amendment to section 987.8, which authorized the
holding of “one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of the
criminal proceedings,” clearly reveals defendant’s contention to be meritless.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As defendant observes, the issue presented by this case does not turn on the
facts of the offense, so we simply note that defendant was convicted of unlawfully
driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision
(a), and was sentenced to prison for three years.
At sentencing, without having given him the notice or hearing required by
section 987.8(b), the trial court ordered defendant “to pay attorney’s fees of
$5,000, significantly less than those services are worth, and less than the public
defender schedule would indicate, just as a general rule for appointed counsel.
That’s subject to his ability to pay, out of state prison or other funds.”
The Court of Appeal remanded for notice and hearing under section
987.8(b), holding that such a remand is the proper remedy when a defendant has
been deprived of these statutorily required safeguards, and in all other respects it
affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeal added that “[t]he defendant’s ability
2


to pay must, of course, be determined with reference to his [] financial condition at
the time of sentencing or not later than six months after sentencing.”2
DISCUSSION
Section
987.8(b)
provides: “In any case in which a defendant is provided
legal assistance, either through the public defender or private counsel appointed by
the court, upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court, or upon
the withdrawal of the public defender or appointed private counsel, the court may,
after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of the
defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof. The court may, in its
discretion, hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of
the criminal proceedings. The court may, in its discretion, order the defendant to
appear before a county officer designated by the court to make an inquiry into the
ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the legal assistance provided.”
Recoupment statutes such as section 987.8(b) reflect a legislative concern
for “ ‘replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly
benefited from county expenditures.’ ” (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 27,
quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309.) “ ‘Recoupment proceedings
may protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets and false assertions of
indigency. Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets, and this
Court has required appointed counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases
and stages of prosecution. Such trends have heightened the burden on public
revenues, and recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the
added costs.’ ” (Amor, at p. 27, quoting James v. Strange (1972) 407 U.S. 128,
141.)
2
Subdivision (g)(2)(A), (B) of section 987.8 defines “ ‘[a]bility to pay’ ” as
including a defendant’s “reasonably discernible future financial position,” as well
as his “present financial position,” but stipulates that “[i]n no event shall the court
consider a period of more than six months from the date of the hearing for
purposes of determining the defendant’s reasonably discernible future financial
position.”
3

To reiterate, defendant contends the remand order was erroneous under
section 987.8(b) because, by the time it was made, more than six months had
passed since the pronouncement of judgment.
The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with
the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th
237, 240; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621.) To determine
legislative intent, we turn first, to the words of the statute, giving them their usual
and ordinary meaning. (Trevino, at p. 241; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274,
280.) When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However,
when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we
look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved,
the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.
(Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; People v. Woodhead
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008.)
Defendant relies primarily upon People v. Turner (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
1690 (Turner). In Turner, as in this case, the People conceded that the trial court
violated section 987.8(b) by ordering reimbursement of attorney fees without
holding a hearing to determine the defendant’s ability to pay. “The more difficult
question,” in the Court of Appeal’s view, was “whether the trial court retain[ed]
jurisdiction to modify its order, following the issuance of our remittitur.” (Turner,
at p. 1695.)
In
Turner, the Court of Appeal began by reciting “the general rule that
‘[t]he filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the
appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur’
(People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554), thereby divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment. (People v. Lockridge (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 1752, 1757; People v. Schulz (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.)
4
Jurisdiction survives, however, where provided by statute. (People v. Karaman
[(1992)] 4 Cal.4th 335, 351-352; People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p.
1757.) In such cases, the jurisdictional period generally is not tolled during the
pendency of an appeal. (See People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1755, 1757-1758.)” (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695.)
In
Turner, both parties agreed that “section 987.8 constitutes a statutory
exception to the general rule.” (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695.) The
Court of Appeal agreed. “Under the plain language of the statute at issue here, the
ability-to-pay hearing need not be held on the date judgment is pronounced; rather,
the statute empowers the court to hold such hearing within six months of the
pronouncement of judgment. . . . Since, from a practical standpoint, such reports
could not always be prepared and filed on the day of judgment, it must be
concluded that the Legislature intended the trial court to retain jurisdiction over
the matter of attorney fees for a reasonable period of time—that is, a six-month
period—following the pronouncement of judgment. [¶] A notice of appeal,
however, must be filed within 60 days of judgment. Hence, if we were to apply
the general rule divesting the trial court of jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice
of appeal, that provision of the statute providing for an additional hearing within
six months of judgment would be effectively defeated in every case where an
appeal was filed. Such a result would frustrate the intent of the Legislature and
render the provision surplusage. Thus we agree with the parties that the trial court
is not divested of jurisdiction to act on the question of attorney fees under section
987.8 upon the filing of a notice of appeal.” (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p.
1696.)
This brought the Court of Appeal “to the crucial question of whether the
six-month period prescribed in the statute for the ability-to-pay hearings is
jurisdictional—in other words, does the court lose jurisdiction to conduct further
proceedings under section 987.8 once the six-month period has expired?”
(Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696.) An affirmative answer to this
5
question, the Court of Appeal recognized, “would deprive the trial court of the
opportunity to correct error in the imposition of attorney fees in virtually every
case where an appeal is filed.” (Id. at pp. 1696-1697.) Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeal concluded that “the Legislature intended the six-month period specified by
the statute to be jurisdictional.” (Id. at p. 1697.)
Ordinarily, an appellate court has, among others, the power to remand a
cause to the trial court “for such further proceedings as may be just under the
circumstances.” (§ 1260.) In effect, defendant is contending, and the Turner court
held, that in enacting the 1978 amendment to section 987.8, the Legislature
intended to carve out an exception to the remand power of appellate courts by
placing a six-month time limit on their ability to order the correction of errors of
the sort made by the trial court in this case. Indeed, as the Turner court conceded,
the practical effect of so interpreting section 987.8 would be the nullification of
the reimbursement statute in cases such as this because criminal appeals typically
take more than six months.3
If that is what the Legislature intended, it certainly does not appear on the
face of the statute. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of section 987.8(b)
suggests the Legislature intended the six-month time limit to be jurisdictional or to
have any effect on the traditional power of an appellate court to remand to the trial
court for a hearing following the finding of a due process violation. To the
contrary, the legislative history of section 987.8(b) clearly reveals the Legislature
intended to increase the ability of the trial courts to order reimbursement, not to
limit it, much less to nullify it.
3
For the fiscal year 2000-2001, in a criminal case, 440 days was the median
time from the filing of the notice of appeal to the filing of the opinion by a Court
of Appeal. (Judicial Council of Cal., AOC, Rep. on Court Statistics: Statewide
Caseload Trends 1991-1992 Through 2000-2001 (2002) p. 27
<www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2002.PDF> [as of June 12,
2003].)
6

Section 987.8 was originally enacted in 1971. (Stats. 1971, ch. 744, § 1, p.
1480.) Again, the provision allowing a trial court to “hold one such additional
hearing within six months of the conclusion of criminal proceedings” was added in
1978. (Stats. 1978, ch. 1134, § 1, p. 3488.)4 It was included in a bill the overall
purpose of which was “to allow counties to recover additional money from
indigents whose financial position will improve.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1807 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 1.)
Indeed, the author of the bill, Senator Bob Wilson of San Diego County, estimated
that the changes made by the bill would enable his county to more than double the
sum it recouped annually. (Id. at p. 3.) The operative changes made by the bill
included amending “the term ‘ability to pay’ so that a defendant’s future earning
potential can be considered.” (Id. at p. 2.) Senator Wilson’s concern was that “the
current ‘present ability to pay’ standard does not reach a portion of criminal
defendants who are seasonal workers (construction, farm workers, etc.) who are
truly indigent at the time of the proceeding but who are likely to be employed after
the proceeding has terminated.” (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1807 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 2.) The provision for
holding a second hearing, six months after the conclusion of criminal proceedings,
was intended to permit the trial court to take such changed circumstances into
consideration.
In
Turner, the Court of Appeal did not discuss the legislative history of the
1978 amendment. Instead, in seeking to support its conclusion that the trial court
had lost jurisdiction under section 987.8(b), the Court of Appeal relied upon two
opinions that it characterized as having “implied that the time period is
jurisdictional.” (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1697, italics added.) In
People v. Spurlock (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 323, the trial court sentenced the
4
This provision, which is now part of subdivision (b) of section 987.8, was
originally enacted as part of subdivision (a) of the section. (Stats. 1978, ch. 1134,
§ 1, p. 3488.)
7
defendant to a prison term, stayed execution of the sentence, and placed the
defendant on probation, the terms of which included 15 months in county jail with
credit for 38 days previously served. The court reserved jurisdiction over the
matter of attorney fees, stating that it would hold a section 987.8 hearing on the
defendant’s ability to pay 60 days after his release from actual custody. (Id. at pp.
326-327.) The trial court “erred in providing for a hearing 60 days after release
from actual custody,” the Court of Appeal held, “since under any conceivable
circumstances (short of a reduction in the confinement condition of the probation
order, which the record does not show to have come about), such a hearing would
have to take place over 6 months after the sentence.” (Id. at p. 329.) “This,” the
Court of Appeal held, “the statute forbids.” (Ibid.) In distinguishing Spurlock, the
Court of Appeal in the present case correctly observed: “Spurlock clearly does not
stand for the proposition that a reviewing court’s only option is to strike an order
made in violation of Penal Code section 987.8. Nor does it stand for the corollary
that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct an error on remand on appeal.”
The other case relied upon by the Turner court was one of its own earlier
decisions—People v. Faatiliga (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1276. (Turner, supra, 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 1697.) In Faatiliga, the trial court required reimbursement of
attorney fees as one of the conditions of probation, and since such a condition is
prohibited in California,5 the Court of Appeal struck it. (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.) It
was too late, the Court of Appeal held, for the trial court to base its reimbursement
order on an alternative ground by conducting a hearing under section 987.8,
5
“Imposing reimbursement of attorney fees as a condition of probation is
absolutely prohibited in California courts. (In re Elizabeth S. (1982) 138
Cal.App.3d 450, 454; In re Allen (1969) 71 Cal.2d 388, 391-392.) The Supreme
Court so held in In re Allen, supra, 71 Cal.2d 388. While the United States
Supreme Court criticized that case when upholding an Oregon statute permitting
collection of attorney fees from defendants who can afford to pay, In re Allen has
not been overruled. (Fuller v. Oregon (1974) 417 U.S. 40, 51-52; People v. Amor
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 25-26.)” (People v. Faatiliga, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p.
1280.)
8
“[s]ince more than six months have elapsed since the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings . . . .” (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.) As it did in Turner, the Court of
Appeal in Faatiliga relied on Spurlock. (Faatiliga, at p. 1280.)6
Finally,
the
Turner court found significance in the fact that section 987.8
differs in certain respects from other recoupment statutes, particularly section
1203.1b (cost of probation) and section 1203.1c (cost of local incarceration). “In
contrast to section 987.8, which refers to a defendant’s present ability to pay,
section 1203.1b speaks only of an ‘ability to pay.’ In contrast to section 987.8,
which imposes a six-month limitations period for the ability-to-pay hearing,
section 1203.1b permits an additional hearing at any time during the probationary
period. Similarly, section 1203.1c . . . also speaks of the defendant’s ‘ability to
pay,’ and provides for additional hearings any time within the probationary
period.” (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1697-1698, fn. omitted.) The
Turner court, in our view, read too much into the dissimilarities among the
recoupment statutes. While these dissimilarities may “evidence a particular
6
Defendant brings three other cases to our attention, although he
acknowledges that the question presented here was not addressed in any of them.
In In re Elizabeth S., supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 450, 455, as in People v. Faatiliga,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1276, the Court of Appeal struck a condition of probation
requiring reimbursement for legal assistance. Noting that the trial court had not
imposed a fine on the minor, and that the reimbursement condition may have been
in lieu of a fine, the Court of Appeal remanded the case “so that the trial court will
have an opportunity to determine whether a fine should be imposed.” (Elizabeth
S.
, at p. 455.) The question whether the trial court had lost jurisdiction to order
reimbursement under section 987.8 was not discussed. In People v. Heath (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 892, the Court of Appeal reversed “the imposition of attorney
fees” because the defendant had not been given the notice required by section
987.8. (Heath, at pp. 902-903.) Whether the case might have been remanded to
give the trial court an opportunity to correct its error was not discussed. In People
v. Poindexter
(1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 803, the Court of Appeal struck the
reimbursement order because the procedural safeguards embedded in section
987.8 had not been observed in a number of respects, but again the question
whether the case might have been remanded for correction of the errors was not
discussed.
9
concern on the part of the Legislature to complete the proceedings conducted
under section 987.8, and to limit the time within which a defendant’s financial
status may be evaluated” (Turner, at p. 1698), they do not suggest that the
Legislature intended the result in Turner—“depriv[ing] the trial court of the
opportunity to correct error in the imposition of attorney fees in virtually every
case where an appeal is filed.” (Id. at pp. 1696-1697.)
In summary, we conclude that the provision of section 987.8(b) in question,
allowing a trial court to hold a second hearing within six months of “the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings” to determine a defendant’s present ability
to reimburse the cost of the legal assistance provided, was not intended to limit the
authority of an appellate court to remand a case to the trial court for the correction
of its error in failing to give a defendant the notice and hearing required by the
statute. People v. Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th 1690, and People v. Faatiliga,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1276, are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with
this conclusion.
Defendant contends that even if the passage of more than six months since
the pronouncement of judgment does not automatically deprive a trial court of
jurisdiction under section 987.8 to correct its errors upon remand, remand would
be pointless in the circumstances of this case because defendant has been
sentenced to prison and is, therefore, obviously unable to comply with any
reimbursement order.
Defendant correctly notes there is a presumption under the statute that a
defendant sentenced to prison does not have the ability to reimburse defense costs.
Subdivision (g)(2)(B) of section 987.8 provides in pertinent part: “Unless the
court finds unusual circumstances, a defendant sentenced to state prison shall be
determined not to have a reasonably discernible future financial ability to
reimburse the costs of his or her defense.”
Because it held no hearing into the matter, the trial court made no finding
as to whether defendant’s circumstances were unusual. In the Court of Appeal,
10
the People argued that a showing of unusual circumstances was conceivable
because, according to the probation report, defendant possessed $1,500 worth of
jewelry at the time of sentencing. The Court of Appeal was dubious as to whether
such a showing could be made. “This seems unlikely given that [defendant] has a
child to support.” On the other hand, the probation report does indicate that
defendant was then “stable and employed.” Defendant may not be able to pay the
$5,000 ordered by the trial court, but he may be able to pay something, and if he
can, he is obligated by the statute to do so. In any event, as the Court of Appeal
observed, whether defendant’s financial circumstances are unusual for someone
sentenced to prison is not the issue on appeal, and rather than speculate about it,
we affirm the Court of Appeal’s remand order so that the trial court may, after
having conducted a hearing into the question, make an informed decision.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal, remanding this matter for notice and
hearing under section 987.8(b), is affirmed.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
MORENO,
J.
11


See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Flores
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 96 Cal.App.4th 1081
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S105762
Date Filed: June 12, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Dale S. Fischer

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C.
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Cook, Mary Sanchez and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


1


Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Sharon Fleming
P.O. Box 157
Ben Lomond, CA 95005
(831) 336-5920

David A. Voet
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 576-1338

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 06/12/2003S105762

Parties
1Flores, Steven A. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Sharon Fleming
Attorney At Law
P. O. Box 157
Ben Lomond, CA

2The People (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by David A. Voet
Office of the Attorney General
300 S. Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Jun 12 2003Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Apr 9 2002Petition for review filed
  by counsel for aplt c/a rec req
Apr 19 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  1 doghouse
May 15 2002Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)
  Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
May 16 2002Telephone conversation with:
 
May 16 2002Note:
 
Jul 29 2002Counsel appointment order filed
  Attorney Sharon Fleming. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Aug 28 2002Received:
  Appellant's application for extension of time to 9/27/2002 to file the brief on the merits [ Received by fax the corrected E.O.T. request to 9/27/2002.]
Sep 24 2002Request for extension of time filed
  by counsel for appellant Steven A. Flores, an additional 30-day extension, to and including 10/28/2002 to file the opening brief on the merits. E.O.T. granted (10/28/2002) -- order prepared.
Sep 26 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including October 28, 2002.
Oct 18 2002Request for extension of time filed
  Second request by appellant for a 30-day extension to and including 11/27/2002 to file the opening brief on the merits.
Oct 22 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 13, 2002 only. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Nov 14 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
  by appellant (CRC 40k)
Nov 14 2002Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by appellant
Dec 9 2002Request for extension of time filed
  to file resp's. answer brief/merits asking to 1/17/03 faxed to sf
Dec 11 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Answer Brief on the Merits is extended to and including January 17, 2003. No further extensions of time will be granted.
Jan 16 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
  respondent's.
Jan 29 2003Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Fleming
Jan 30 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by appellant to file the reply brief on the merits to and including 2/10/2003.
Feb 6 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file Appellant's Reply Brief on the Merits is extended to and including February 10, 2003.
Feb 13 2003Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  Appellant's Second Request for Judicial Notice
Feb 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  (40k/Certified Mail)
Feb 13 2003Request for Judicial Notice received (in non-AA proceeding)
  Second Request
Apr 9 2003Case ordered on calendar
  5-7-03, 1:30pm, S.F.
Apr 24 2003Request for judicial notice granted
  Appellant's requests for judicial notice filed on November 14, 2002, and February 13, 2003, are granted.
May 7 2003Cause argued and submitted
 
Jun 12 2003Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion By: Brown, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Jul 14 2003Remittitur issued (criminal case)
 
Jul 24 2003Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from Second Appellate District, Division Four, signed for by S. Veverla, Deputy Clerk
Aug 13 2003Compensation awarded counsel
  Atty Fleming

Briefs
Nov 14 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 16 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Feb 13 2003Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website