Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 5/29/08 (This opn. should publish preceding S140413, also filed this date.)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S141282
v.
Ct.App. 2/5 B180315
JESSE JOE DELGADO,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. YA055467

After a jury convicted defendant of felony offenses, a court trial was held
on the allegation, for purposes of enhancing his sentence, that he had a prior
serious felony conviction. The statute under which defendant was previously
convicted — Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (section 245(a)(1))1 —
punishes assault committed either by means “likely to produce great bodily
injury” (GBI), or by use of “a deadly weapon . . . other than a firearm.” Only the
latter version qualifies as a serious felony.
As sole proof of a prior serious felony conviction, the prosecution
introduced a package of certified documents pertaining to the conviction,
including the abstract of judgment. The abstract specified the statute violated as
“[Penal Code section] 245(A)(1)” and described the crime as “Asslt w DWpn.”

1
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1

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The trial court found the prior serious felony allegation true and lengthened
defendant’s prison sentence accordingly. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Defendant does not dispute that the abbreviated verbal notation on the
abstract of judgment stands for the words “assault with a deadly weapon.” The
notation contains no reference to the GBI prong of section 245(a)(1).
Nonetheless, defendant insists this notation was insufficient to prove his prior
conviction had occurred under the deadly weapon prong of section 245(a)(1), and
was thus for a serious felony. We agree with the Court of Appeal that the
evidence was sufficient. We will therefore affirm the judgment of that court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On June 23, 2003, defendant shoplifted several items, including a bottle of
liquor, from an Albertson’s market. The store’s loss prevention officer saw the
incident, followed defendant outside, and attempted to stop him in the parking lot.
Defendant pulled out a knife and told the officer to get away. When the officer
continue to pursue, defendant threw the liquor bottle, hitting the officer.
A jury convicted defendant of count 1, second degree robbery (§§ 211,
212.5, subd. (c)), and count 2, second degree commercial burglary (§§ 459, 460,
subd. (b)), as charged in the information. As to count 1, the jury found true the
allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a bottle.
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
The information also alleged, for purposes of sentence enhancement on
both counts, that defendant had suffered a prior conviction for violation of section
245(a)(1). This conviction, the information asserted, constituted a serious felony
for purposes of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) (consecutive five-year
enhancement for current “serious felony” when defendant has prior “serious
felony” conviction), and a serious or violent felony for purposes of the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c)). Further, the
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information alleged, defendant had served a prison term for this prior offense
(§ 667.5, subdivision (b) [one-year consecutive enhancement of current prison
term for prior prison term]).
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the prior offense allegations,
and they were tried to the court. As evidence of the prior conviction, its nature,
and the prison term served, the People introduced a package of documents
pertaining to the prior offense, as certified by a Department of Corrections
custodian of records. (§ 969b.) The documents included a prison chronological
history, an abstract of judgment, a fingerprint card, a photo of defendant, and a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) form.
The abstract of judgment indicated that, on May 18, 1999, defendant had
pled guilty to two felony counts. The second count — the one that concerns us
here — was specified by handwritten notations in three side-by-side boxes on the
form. In the leftmost box, entitled “CODE,” appeared the letters “PC.” In the
middle box, entitled “SECTION NUMBER,” appeared the notation “245(A)(1).”
In the rightmost box, entitled “CRIME,” appeared the notation “Asslt w DWpn.”
Defendant presented no evidence concerning the nature of the prior conviction.
The court found true that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony
conviction for violation of section 245(a)(1), “specifically assault with a deadly
weapon.” The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of three years for count
1, the current robbery conviction, with a concurrent midterm of two years for
count 2, the current burglary conviction. In light of the prior serious felony
conviction, the current robbery conviction was deemed a second strike under the
“Three Strikes” law, and the term for this offense was doubled accordingly.
Finally, the court added a five-year consecutive enhancement for the prior serious
felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for a total term of 11
years.
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On appeal, defendant raised the single contention that there was insufficient
evidence the prior conviction was for a serious felony. The Court of Appeal
disagreed and affirmed the judgment. We granted review. We now conclude the
Court of Appeal was correct.
DISCUSSION
Defendant urges, as he did in the Court of Appeal, that the abbreviated
notation “Asslt w DWpn” on the abstract of judgment for his prior conviction,
standing alone, is insufficient to permit the inference that the conviction was for a
serious felony. We review the relevant principles.
As noted above, the prison sentence for a current serious felony conviction
is subject to a five-year consecutive enhancement if the defendant suffered a prior
conviction for a serious felony. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).)2 A prior serious felony
conviction also counts as a strike, requiring that the prison sentence for a second
felony conviction be doubled. (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b),
(c)(1).)
Defendant’s alleged prior serious felony conviction was for violating
section 245(a)(1). That statute makes it a felony offense to “commit[ ] an assault
upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a
firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” (Ibid.,
italics added.)
“[A]ssault with a deadly weapon” is a serious felony. (§ 1192.7,
subd. (c)(31).) On the other hand, while serious felonies include all those “in
which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person” (id.,

2
Defendant does not dispute that he was convicted of a serious felony,
robbery, in the current proceeding. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19).)
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subd. (c)(8), italics added), assault merely by means likely to produce GBI,
without the additional element of personal infliction, is not included in the list of
serious felonies. Hence, as the parties acknowledge, a conviction under the deadly
weapon prong of section 245(a)(1) is a serious felony, but a conviction under the
GBI prong is not.
The People must prove each element of an alleged sentence enhancement
beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566 (Tenner).)
Where, as here, the mere fact that a prior conviction occurred under a specified
statute does not prove the serious felony allegation, otherwise admissible evidence
from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.
(People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 222-223 (Reed); People v. Guerrero
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355 (Guerrero); see People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193,
1201.)
A common means of proving the fact and nature of a prior conviction is to
introduce certified documents from the record of the prior court proceeding and
commitment to prison, including the abstract of judgment describing the prior
offense. (Pen. Code, § 969b; Evid. Code, § 1280 [hearsay exception for
contemporaneous official record]; see, e.g., People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th
226, 258-259 (Prieto); People v. Henley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 555, 559-560
(Henley); People v. Haney (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475 (Haney).)
“[The] trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from certified
records offered to prove a defendant suffered a prior conviction . . . .” (Henley,
supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 555, 561; see also Haney, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475.)
“[O]fficial government records clearly describing a prior conviction presumptively
establish that the conviction in fact occurred, assuming those records meet the
threshold standards of admissibility. (See Evid. Code, § 664 [‘It is presumed that
official duty has been regularly performed’].) Some evidence must rebut this
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presumption before the authenticity, accuracy, or sufficiency of the prior
conviction records can be called into question.” (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th
19, 27.)
Thus, if the prosecutor presents, by such records, prima facie evidence of a
prior conviction that satisfies the elements of the recidivist enhancement at issue,
and if there is no contrary evidence, the fact finder, utilizing the official duty
presumption, may determine that a qualifying conviction occurred. (Prieto, supra,
30 Cal.4th 226, 258; Haney, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475-476.)
However, if the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed
in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the
offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least
serious form of the offense. (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262
(Rodriguez); Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, 354-355; People v. Watts (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 589, 596; People v. Cortez (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 276, 280; see
People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 632 (Jones).) In such a case, if the
statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that
does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and
the People have failed in their burden. (Ibid.)
On review, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other
words, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence
enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. (Tenner, supra, 6 Cal.4th 559, 567;
Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 631.)
Several cases have considered whether particular clerical notations on the
abstracts of judgment for prior convictions under section 245(a)(1) were sufficient
to support the inference that the convictions qualified as serious felonies. In
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Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th 253, the prosecution alleged a prior serious felony
conviction for violation of former section 245, subdivision (a) (now § 245(a)(1)).
As its sole evidence on this issue, the prosecution introduced the abstract of
judgment for the prior conviction. The abstract labeled the offense as “ ‘ASLT
GBI/DLY WPN.’ ” (Rodriguez, supra, at p. 261.) The court found the serious
felony allegation true, but we reversed.
As we explained, section 245(a)(1) covers all assaults committed with a
deadly weapon other than a firearm, or by means likely to produce GBI.
However, at the time Rodriguez was decided (and when defendant Rodriguez’s
prior serious felony was alleged and found true), the relevant sections of the
serious felony statute listed only crimes in which the defendant personally
inflicted GBI on a person other than an accomplice, or personally used a firearm
or a dangerous or deadly weapon. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), (23).)3
Thus, Rodriguez noted, section 245(a)(1) could be violated in ways that did
not constitute serious felonies; the defendant could use force likely to produce
GBI without personally inflicting it, and could be guilty as an aider and abettor of
an assault with a deadly weapon without personally using such a weapon. But the
abstract of judgment there at issue simply included, in abbreviated form, an
accurate reflection of section 245(a)(1)’s general language. It did not indicate that
the defendant had personally used a deadly weapon or had personally inflicted
GBI. Thus, Rodriguez determined, the abstract proved only the defendant’s
conviction of the least adjudicated elements of a section 245(a)(1) offense and was

3
In 2000, the voters adopted Proposition 21, which, among other things,
added subdivision (c)(31) to section 1192.7. Under this provision, all assaults
with deadly weapons are serious felonies.
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insufficient to establish that the conviction was for a serious felony. (Rodriguez,
supra, 17 Cal.4th 253, 261-262.)
In People v. Luna (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 395 (Luna), the abstract of
judgment for the defendant’s prior section 245(a)(1) conviction described the
conviction as for “ ‘PC 245(a)(1)’ ” “ ‘ASSLT GBI W/DLY WPN.’ ” (Luna,
supra, at p. 397.) A Department of Corrections fingerprint card, also introduced in
evidence, similarly described the offense as “ ‘ PC 245 (a)(1) ASSLT GBI W/DL
WPN.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held this was sufficient evidence defendant
had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a serious felony.
Distinguishing Rodriguez, which had involved a similar abstract notation, the
Luna court observed that the problem identified in Rodriguez — the absence of
any indication that the defendant had personally used a deadly weapon or inflicted
GBI, as then required for a serious felony — had since been resolved by
Proposition 21, which made all assaults with deadly weapons serious felonies,
regardless of personal use. (Luna, supra, at pp. 397-398.)
Disagreeing with Luna, the Court of Appeal in People v. Banuelos (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 601 (Banuelos) reached a contrary result on similar facts. There,
the abstract of judgment for the prior section 245(a)(1) conviction described the
offense as “ ‘ASSAULT GBI W/DEADLY WEAPON.’ ” (Banuelos, supra, at p.
605.) As in Rodriguez and Luna, the notation thus mentioned both prongs of
section 245(a)(1). The Court of Appeal observed that this description could mean
the defendant violated both prongs, and thus committed a serious felony. On the
other hand, the court reasoned, the notation’s reference to both prongs of the
subdivision was ambiguous, and, as in Rodriguez, might simply constitute a
shorthand description of section 245(a)(1) itself. Hence, the court concluded, the
notation “[was] not substantial evidence — evidence that is ‘reasonable, credible,
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and of solid value’ — that a deadly weapon was in fact used during the
commission of that offense. [Citation.]” (Banuelos, supra, at p. 606.)
To similar effect is People v. Williams (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1405
(Williams). There, the abstract of judgment for defendant’s prior conviction
recited only that he had pled guilty to “one count of assault on a peace officer in
violation of section 245, [former] subdivision (b) [(see now § 245, subd. (c)]).”
(Williams, supra, at p. 1409.) Section 245, former subdivision (b) criminalized
such assaults either by use of a deadly weapon or instrument, or by means likely to
produce GBI. Only the deadly weapon form of the offense was a California
serious felony. The Court of Appeal held that by referring only to the statutory
subdivision, the abstract of judgment did not reliably indicate whether a deadly
weapon had been involved. (Williams, supra, at p. 1412.)
Moreover, the Williams court concluded, a noncontemporaneous
Department of Corrections fingerprint card, which designated the conviction as for
“ ‘ADW on P/O (245(b) PC),’ ” (Williams, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1409)
was not reliable evidence that the prior conviction involved use of a deadly
weapon. “We know of no reasonable basis,” said the court, “to believe that the
Department of Corrections employee who made the notation had any information
concerning the underlying conviction other than that revealed in the abstract of
judgment.” (Id., at p. 1413.) Moreover, the court noted, the prosecutor at the
sentencing hearing that addressed the prior conviction stated his recollection that
no deadly weapon had been used in the earlier offense. (Ibid.)
None of these decisions precludes a finding that the evidence of a prior
serious felony, as contained solely in the abstract of judgment for defendant’s
1999 conviction, was sufficient here. Indeed, Luna found sufficient evidence of a
serious felony on the basis of the abstract of judgment alone, and even though the
abstract made apparent reference to both prongs of section 245(a)(1). (But see
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discussion, post.) On the other hand, Rodriguez, Banuelos, and Williams do not
suggest that a description included on an abstract of judgment cannot be credible
and reliable, and thus sufficient, evidence of the factual basis upon which the prior
conviction was obtained. On the contrary, those cases held only that the particular
descriptions there at issue were too ambiguous to constitute substantial evidence
of the precise factual nature of the prior convictions.
Here, we do not face the substantial ambiguities at issue in the prior
decisions. The official abstract of judgment for defendant’s prior conviction first
identifies the statute under which the conviction occurred as “PC” “245(A)(1),”
then separately describes the offense as “Asslt w DWpn.” Defendant does not
dispute that these notations stand, respectively, for “Penal Code section 245(a)(1)”
and “assault with a deadly weapon.”
This latter description tracks one, but only one, of the two specific, discrete,
disjunctive, and easily encapsulated forms of aggravated assault set forth in
section 245(a)(1). Unlike those at issue in Rodriguez, Luna, and Banuelos, the
instant abstract does not mention the other specific, discrete, and disjunctive form
of section 245(a)(1) violation, involving force likely to produce GBI. And unlike
the abstract at issue in Williams, it does not simply cite the statute violated,
without any reference to the underlying conduct. Any inference that this notation
simply refers to the statute generally is thus sharply diminished.
The People therefore presented prima facie evidence, in the form of a clear,
presumptively reliable official record of defendant’s prior conviction, that the
conviction was for the serious felony of assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant
produced no rebuttal evidence. Utilizing the presumption of official duty, and
drawing reasonable inferences from the official record, the trial court, as a rational
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trier of fact, could thus properly find beyond reasonable doubt that a prior serious
felony conviction had occurred.4
Defendant notes correctly that the abstract of judgment is not itself the
judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment to the extent the two conflict. (§§ 1213, 1213.5; People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; People v.
Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14.) However, the abstract is a
contemporaneous, statutorily sanctioned, officially prepared clerical record of the
conviction and sentence. It may serve as the order committing the defendant to
prison (§ 1213), and is “ ‘the process and authority for carrying the judgment and
sentence into effect.’ [Citations.]” (In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890.) As
such, “the Legislature intended [it] to [accurately] summarize the judgment.”
(Mitchell, supra, at p. 186, citing with approval People v. Hong (1998)

4
Because the dispositive facts of this case differ materially from those of
Luna and Banuelos, we are not directly called upon to resolve any conflict
between those decisions. We note, however, that Luna’s attempt to distinguish
our Rodriguez decision is unpersuasive. In both Rodriguez and Luna, as in
Banuelos, the notations on the abstracts of judgment referred to both the deadly
weapon and GBI prongs of section 245(a)(1) in a manner that left unclear whether
one, the other, or both, of the statutory forms of offense underlay the conviction.
To find that the abstract there at issue showed a serious felony, Luna relied on the
provision of Proposition 21 which, after our Rodriguez decision, made serious
felonies of all assaults with deadly weapons, not just those in which the defendant
personally used a deadly weapon. But Proposition 21 made no change that
renders conviction under the GBI prong of section 245(a)(1) a serious felony. As
in Rodriguez, a defendant can violate this prong, by using force likely to inflict
GBI, without committing the serious felony of personally inflicting GBI. Any
implication in Luna that section 245(a)(1) now states serious felonies in both its
prongs, or that an abstract of judgment which contains ambiguous references to
both prongs of the statute can nonetheless be sufficient evidence of a serious
felony, is therefore incorrect, and will be disapproved to that extent.
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64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080.) When prepared by the court clerk, at or near the time
of judgment, as part of his or her official duty, it is cloaked with a presumption of
regularity and reliability. (Evid. Code, §§ 660, 664; see id., § 1280.)
Defendant raises no basis for a conclusion that a contemporaneous,
officially prepared abstract of judgment which clearly describes the nature of the
prior conviction should not, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, be presumed
reliable and accurate. Nor has he presented any evidence to rebut the presumption
of accuracy and reliability in this case.
Defendant does suggest the notation in this case, like those in Rodriguez
and Banuelos, may simply be a clerk’s shorthand nickname for section 245(a)(1)
in general. Thus, he urges, no significance can attach to the particular words
included or omitted. He stresses that, when the instant abstract was prepared in
1999, there was no penal reason to identify which specific prong of section
245(a)(1) had been violated, for it was not until the year 2000 that the statutory
scheme was amended to include all assaults with a deadly weapon, and thus all
acts violating the deadly weapon prong of section 245(a)(1), as serious felonies.
Hence, he urges, we cannot assume that the clerk who prepared the 1999 abstract
attached any importance to the form of notation used to describe defendant’s
conviction.
We disagree. Whatever the penal significance of the abstract’s description,
the trial court was entitled to infer that it had been accurately prepared. Where, as
here, the abstract first identified the statute by section number, then separately and
clearly described only one of the two means by which the statute can be violated,
the court was not required to assume the descriptive language was mere
surplusage. Absent any rebuttal evidence, the court could reasonably infer that the
12

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words were there for a reason, that they meant what they said, and that they
accurately set forth the form of violation for which the defendant was convicted.5
Defendant also insinuates, for the first time on appeal, that the abstract of
judgment might be inadmissible hearsay. As an out-of-court declaration, admitted
for the truth of the information contained therein, the abstract is hearsay, but it is
nonetheless presumptively admissible for its truth, as a report of the conviction it
summarizes, under various exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Pen. Code 969b
[certified copy of defendant’s prison records are admissible prima facie evidence
of defendant’s conviction and service of prison term]; Evid. Code, § 1280 [public
employee’s official, contemporaneous, trustworthy written record of act,
condition, or event admissible as exception to hearsay rule]; see People v. Wheeler
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 300, fn. 13.)6
Defendant points to an untitled and unidentified FBI document also
introduced in evidence, which describes the conviction with the notation

5
We have said that the prosecution may not go beyond the record of the
prior conviction itself when, in a later proceeding, it seeks to prove the fact and
nature of that conviction for purposes of enhancing a sentence. (E.g., Reed, supra,
13 Cal.4th 217, 222-223; Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, 355-356.) We need not
and do not decide here whether the defendant might have greater latitude in
rebutting the prosecution’s evidence. (See Reed, supra, at p. 229 [stating a similar
disclaimer].) We note, however, that the prior record itself will often offer ample
means of showing, if it be true, that the conviction was not for the conduct
indicated by the prosecution’s evidence. Such evidence might include the
charging documents, the preliminary hearing or trial transcripts (see Reed, supra,
at pp. 223-229), and the transcript of any hearing on a negotiated plea (see
§ 1192.5).
6
Even if no hearsay exception existed, we have held that the trier of fact may
look to an official record from the prior case for the nonhearsay purpose of
determining whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that qualifies as a
serious felony. (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 459.)
13

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“FORCE/ADW NOT FIREARM: GBI.” Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude
this document does not render insufficient the evidence of a prior serious felony.
The FBI document’s origin and purpose are unclear. There is no indication it was
prepared as a reliable, contemporaneous official record of the nature of
defendant’s conviction. Insofar as it conflicts with the abstract of judgment —
prepared by a superior court clerk as an official, contemporaneous record of the
judgment — the trial court was entitled to rely on the abstract.
Therefore, we hold, sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding
that defendant’s prior conviction was for a serious felony. On this basis, the Court
of Appeal correctly affirmed the enhanced sentence imposed upon defendant for
his current felony convictions.
We stress that confusion in future cases can be avoided if judgment records
are prepared with utmost care and sensitivity to their possible relevance in later
criminal proceedings. When a defendant is convicted under a statute, such as
section 245(a)(1), that covers in the alternative two slightly different offenses,
only one of which is defined as a serious felony, and the issue whether the
conviction was for the serious or the nonserious form may thus have substantial
penal consequences if the defendant suffers a subsequent felony conviction, it is
necessary that the abstract of judgment specify, with scrupulous accuracy, the
crime of which the defendant was actually charged and convicted.
Moreover, we note, an accusatory pleading may specify that a charged
offense involves facts making the offense a serious felony. The serious felony
issue will then be tried unless the defendant separately admits it as part of a guilty
plea. (§ 969f.) By this means as well, the serious felony nature of the offense will
become an explicit part of the record of conviction, leaving no room for confusion
if and when the issue becomes relevant to the sentence for a subsequent felony.
We encourage the use of this procedure wherever it is deemed appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. People v. Luna, supra,
113 Cal.App.4th 395, is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with the views
expressed in this opinion.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Delgado
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 1/23/06 – 2d Dist., Div. 5
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S141282
Date Filed: May 29, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Laura C. Ellison

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

William D. Farber, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Robert F. Katz and Robert C. Schneider,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

William D. Farber
P.O. Box 2026
San Rafael, CA 94912-2026
(415) 472-7279

Robert C. Schneider
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2059

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses.

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:
Thu, 05/29/2008	43 Cal. 4th 1059, 183 P.3d 1226, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259	S141282	Review - Criminal Appeal	closed; remittitur issued

Disposition
May 29 2008	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Feb 23 2006	Petition for review filed   Jesse Joe Delgado, defendant and appellant William Farber, c/a appointed counsel c/a rec req
Mar 3 2006	Received Court of Appeal record
Mar 29 2006	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Apr 13 2006	Counsel appointment order filed   Upon request of appellant for appointment of counsel, William D. Farber is hereby appointed to represent appellant on the appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on teh merits must be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
May 11 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed   Appellant Jesse Joe Delgado
Jun 2 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to file respondent's brief asking to July 10, 2006 Deputy A.G. Robert C. Schneider
Jun 8 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file answer brief on the merits is extended to and including July 10, 2006.
Jun 28 2006	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Farber
Jul 10 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed   by respondent (The People) Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorney General
Jul 31 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to August 30, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief on the merits.
Aug 4 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including August 30, 2006.
Aug 31 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Jesse Joe Delgado, defendant and appellant, CRC 40.1(b) by William D. Farber, Supreme Court appointed counsel
Feb 6 2008	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued Wednesday, March 5, 2008, at 1:30 p.m., in San Francisco
Mar 5 2008	Cause argued and submitted
May 28 2008	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
May 29 2008	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. People v. Luna, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 395, is disapproved to the extent it conflicts with the views expressed in this opinion. Opinion by Baxter, J. -- joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jun 25 2008	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Farber
Jul 10 2008	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jul 18 2008	Received:   Acknowledgment of receipt for remittitur from Second District, Div. 5, signed for by D. Nolan, Deputy Clerk

Briefs
May 11 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jul 10 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed
Aug 31 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website