Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 12/1/03 Note to Publishers: This opinion should immediately follow People v. Stowell, S108187

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S107791
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F036844
WILLIE EARL BUTLER,
Kings
County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. 00CM1453

Penal Code section 1202.1 provides that upon conviction of certain sex
offenses against minors, a defendant shall be ordered “to submit to a blood . . . test
for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS)” “if the court finds that there is probable cause to
believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV
[human immunodeficiency virus] has been transferred from the defendant to the
victim: [¶] . . . [¶] For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding
on the court docket and minute order if one is prepared.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1,
subds. (a), (e)(6)(A), (B).) In the companion case of People v. Stowell (Dec. 1,
2003, S108187) ___ Cal.4th ___, we conclude that, absent a timely objection, a
defendant may not challenge such an order on appeal for lack of an express
finding of probable cause or a notation of such finding in the docket. In this
matter, we must determine whether a defendant also forfeits any challenge for
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insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of probable cause if he has failed
to make an appropriate objection in the trial court.
We conclude that since involuntary HIV testing is strictly limited by statute
and Penal Code section 1202.1 conditions a testing order upon a finding of
probable cause, a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence even in
the absence of an objection. Without evidentiary support the order is invalid. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant Willie Earl Butler of lewd and lascivious acts
with a minor under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), sexual battery (id.,
§ 243.4, subd. (d)), and attempted sexual penetration (id., §§ 664, 289, subd. (i)).
Only the first offense concerns us.
During a summer evening in June 2000, 13-year-old Cynthia B. was
visiting her mother’s friend, John Shoyer, when defendant arrived at the house.
Cynthia went home, but later returned after her father left for work. On the way
back to Shoyer’s house, Cynthia saw defendant, and he accompanied her. When
they arrived at Shoyer’s, Cynthia began watching television while defendant and
Shoyer talked.
At some point, defendant began to whisper in Cynthia’s ear, but she was
unable to understand what he said. He told her to follow him to the bathroom and
she complied, thinking he was going to tell her something. Once in the bathroom,
defendant began fondling her vagina through her clothing. Cynthia was frightened
and told him to stop, but he persisted and began touching her breasts. Defendant
asked her if he could “suck on her titties,” and she replied no. He then stated he
would not force her and left the bathroom.
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When Cynthia returned to the living room, Shoyer asked her if defendant
had touched her; and she said he had. After defendant left, Shoyer and Cynthia
went to a neighbor’s house and called the police.
Defendant testified in his own behalf and denied ever touching Cynthia.
The jury convicted defendant of lewd and lascivious acts, and the trial court
sentenced him to the upper term of eight years in prison. The court also ordered
that he submit to a blood test pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.1,
subdivisions (a) and (e)(6)(A).
On appeal, defendant challenged the testing order as unlawful. The
Attorney General contended the issue was forfeited “because it requires a factual
determination and was not raised at trial.” The Court of Appeal rejected the
contention on the basis of both “[t]he failure of the court to make the required
finding and the lack of any evidence on the record to support such a finding . . . .”
Since “there is nothing in the record to suggest even a possibility that bodily fluids
were transferred,” it determined the order was “unauthorized.” At the same time,
however, the court noted “that in the absence of an objection at trial, the
prosecutor had no notice that evidence would be needed to overcome a defense
objection. Therefore, we strike the AIDS testing order but remand the matter to
permit a further hearing on the issue if the prosecutor so requests.”
DISCUSSION
I.
As we explained in Stowell, Penal Code section 1202.1 provides in relevant
part that “[n]otwithstanding Sections 120975 and 120990 of the Health and Safety
Code, the court shall order every person who is convicted of . . . a sexual offense
listed in subdivision (e) . . . to submit to a blood . . . test for evidence of antibodies
to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
. . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (a).) Penal Code section 1202.1,
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subdivision (e)(6)(A)(iii), includes “[l]ewd or lascivious conduct with a child in
violation of Section 288,” but with the proviso that testing shall be ordered only
“if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any
other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the
defendant to the victim: [¶] . . . [¶] For purposes of this paragraph, the court
shall note its finding on the court docket and minute order if one is prepared.”
(Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subd. (e)(6)(A), (B).)1
In this case, as in Stowell, the trial court ordered HIV testing, but did not
make an express finding of probable cause.2 Nor did the court enter an appropriate

1
In 2002, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1202.1,
subdivision (e)(6), to expand the list of enumerated offenses. (See Stats. 2002,
ch. 831, § 1.) It now provides:

“(e)(6)(A) Any of the following offenses if the court finds that there is
probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of
transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim:

“(i) Sexual penetration in violation of Section 264.1, 266c, or 289.
“(ii) Aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of Section 269.
“(iii) Lewd or lascivious conduct with a child in violation of Section 288.
“(iv) Continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Section 288.5.
“(v) The attempt to commit any offense described in clauses (i) to (iv),
inclusive.

“(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the
court docket and minute order if one is prepared.”

Subdivision (e) also includes:
“(1) Rape in violation of Section 261 or 264.1.
“(2) Unlawful intercourse with a person under 18 years of age in violation
of Section 261.5 or 266c.

“(3) Rape of a spouse in violation of Section 262 or 264.1.
“(4) Sodomy in violation of Section 266c or 286.
“(5) Oral copulation in violation of Section 266c or 288a.”
An HIV testing order pursuant to these provisions does not require a finding of
probable cause.
2
For convenience throughout the remainder of the discussion, we will use
“probable cause” to denote “probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any
other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the
defendant to the victim.”
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notation in the docket or minute order. The Attorney General argues the failure to
object to these omissions precludes appellate review. For the reasons discussed in
Stowell, we agree that to the extent the Court of Appeal vacated the testing order
because the trial court failed “to make the required finding,” it erred in considering
defendant’s claim that the order was unlawful. (See People v. Stowell, supra, __
Cal.4th __ [at pp. 6-8].)
The Court of Appeal premised its ruling on an additional ground, however:
“the lack of any evidence on the record to support such a finding . . . .” This
determination implicates more than a recitation of the trial court’s probable cause
finding or a notation of the finding in the docket or minutes. It raises a
fundamental question of sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the order.3
Accordingly, we must decide whether general rules of forfeiture discussed in
Stowell apply in this distinct context. (Cf. People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
348.)
Notwithstanding the general statutory prohibition against involuntary HIV
testing (see Health & Saf. Code, § 120990, subd. (a)), a testing order is authorized
under Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6)(A) upon specified conditions:
conviction of an enumerated offense and a finding of probable cause. Under the
terms of the statute, these prerequisites are equivalent in that both together define
the substantive authority of the court to make the order. “Generally, points not
urged in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. [Citation.] The contention that
a judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, however, is an obvious
exception.” (Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 23, fn. 17.)

3
We requested supplemental briefing asking the parties specifically to
address this distinction. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.1(e).)
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This principle of appellate review is not limited to judgments,4 and we conclude it
should apply to a finding of probable cause pursuant to section 1202.1,
subdivision (e)(6). Just as a defendant could appeal an HIV testing order, without
prior objection, on the ground he had not been convicted of an enumerated offense
(see, e.g., People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1090; People v. Jillie
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 960, 963), he should be able to do so on the ground the
record does not establish the other prerequisite, probable cause. We perceive no
basis for distinguishing between the two statutory predicates.
The fact that a testing order is in part based on factual findings does not
undermine this conclusion. Probable cause is an objective legal standard—in this
case, whether the facts known would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence
to entertain an honest and strong belief that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid
capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim.
(Cf. People v. Adair (2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 [reasonable cause to establish
factual innocence]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410 [reasonable or
probable cause to arrest]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 151,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213-214
[reasonable cause to entertain suspicion of guilt].) Under the substantial evidence
rule, a reviewing court will defer to a trial court’s factual findings to the extent

4 See,
e.g.,
First Nat. Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co. (1912) 162 Cal. 61, 72-73
(challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to support finding on which insurance
liability was predicated is not forfeited by lack of objection); In re Brian P. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 (same, challenge to sufficiency of the evidence to support
finding of adoptability); In re Joy M. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 11, 18 (same,
challenge to sufficiency of the evidence of mental health professional’s
qualifications in submitting evidence on which the trial court denied reunification
services pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5); Robinson v. Leigh (1957) 153
Cal.App.2d 730, 733 (same, challenge to sufficiency of the evidence supporting
findings on which judgment was predicated); Gapin v. City of Los Angeles (1939)
34 Cal.App.2d 660, 662 (same).
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they are supported in the record, but must exercise its independent judgment in
applying the particular legal standard to the facts as found. (See, e.g., Adair, at
pp. 905-906 [finding of factual innocence under Pen. Code, § 851.8]; People
v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 893-894 [finding of reasonable diligence under
Evid. Code, § 240]; People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 [finding of
reasonable search and seizure under Pen. Code, § 1538.5].)
As these principles of appellate review apply to Penal Code section 1202.1,
if the trial court orders testing without articulating its reasons on the record, the
appellate court will presume an implied finding of probable cause. (See People v.
Stowell, supra, __ Cal.4th __ [at pp. 7-8].) Nevertheless, because the terms of the
statute condition imposition on the existence of probable cause, it can sustain the
order only if it finds evidentiary support, which it can do simply from examining
the record. Moreover, even if the prosecution could have established probable
cause, in the absence of sufficient evidence in the record, the order is fatally
compromised. (See People v. Guardado (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.)
Indeed, even in the case of an express finding of probable cause, the question—
being one of law rather than fact—would be considered de novo on appeal.
(Cf. People v. Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 908-909.)
This result is consistent with Court of Appeal decisions addressing
sufficiency of the evidence for a Penal Code section 1202.1 order. In virtually
every instance, the reviewing court either expressly declined to adopt a forfeiture
rule (see People v. Hall (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017) or assumed the
question was viable despite the lack of objection. (See People v. Caird (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 578, 590; People v. Adames (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 198, 211-214;
People v. Green, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089; People v. Guardado, supra, 40
Cal.App.4th at p. 763; see also People v. Barriga (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 67, 69-70
[postincarceration order, no objection to omission by the People at trial].) In In re
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Khonsavanh S. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 532, the Court of Appeal acknowledged
that People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331, might otherwise control but found that
“under the peculiar circumstances here, we conclude waiver principles do not
preclude appellate review.” (In re Khonsavanh S., at p. 537.) Paramount was the
circumstances that “ ‘[i]nvoluntary AIDS or human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) testing is strictly limited by statute. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see
Hall, at p. 1018; Guardado, at p. 763.) This consensus reinforces the
determination that questions of sufficiency of the evidence are not subject to
forfeiture.5
Our conclusion also conforms Penal Code section 1202.1 to the terms of
Health and Safety Code section 121055, which authorizes a preconviction HIV
testing order when the defendant has been charged with an enumerated sexual
offense and the victim petitions the court. (See People v. Guardado, supra, 40
Cal.App.4th at pp. 764-765.) Before issuing an order, the superior court must
conduct a hearing on the petition and make a finding of probable cause. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 121055.) Since such a finding is the sole predicate, a preconviction
order lacking sufficient evidence of probable cause would plainly be unlawful and
subject to appeal even without an objection.
We note further that applying a forfeiture rule in this circumstance would
likely have the effect of converting an appellate issue into a habeas corpus claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to preserve the question by timely
objection. Although habeas corpus proceedings might provide the prosecution

5
Our conclusion in this case is controlled not only by the specific terms of
section 1202.1 but also by the general mandate that involuntary HIV testing is
strictly limited by statute. For this reason, nothing in our analysis should be
construed to undermine the forfeiture rule of People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th 331,
that absent timely objection sentencing determinations are not reviewable on
appeal subject to the narrow exception articulated in People v. Smith (2001) 24
Cal.4th 849.
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with the opportunity to come forward with additional evidence and thus negate
prejudice, we would be loath to invoke a rule that would proliferate rather than
reduce the nature and scope of legal proceedings. (Cf. People v. Norwood (1972)
26 Cal.App.3d 148, 153.) After all, judicial economy is a principal rationale of the
forfeiture doctrine. (See People v. Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 852.)
The Attorney General argues that in any event the question is moot since it
is likely defendant has been tested and the results disclosed to the victim, which
will generally be the case in any appeal. Even assuming compliance with the trial
court’s directive, testing and disclosure are not the only consequence of a Penal
Code section 1202.1 order. Under specified circumstances, test results must also
be disclosed to defense counsel and the prosecutor. (Pen. Code, § 1202.1,
subd. (c).) If the defendant has tested positive for HIV, that fact may be used to
enhance the punishment on commission of another sexual offense. (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.85.) It may also elevate prostitution to a felony. (Pen. Code, § 647f.)
Without a valid order, enforcement of these additional provisions would be
precluded. (See, e.g., Health & Saf. Code, §§ 120980, 121015, subd. (f), 121025.)
II.
The question remains whether any remedy should be available when a
defendant successfully challenges an HIV testing order for insufficiency of the
evidence of probable cause. Penal Code section 1202.1 is part of a broader
statutory scheme of health and safety legislation intended to combat the further
spread of HIV infection and promote prompt medical treatment for those already
infected. “The rapidly spreading AIDS epidemic poses an unprecedented major
public health crisis in California, and threatens, in one way or another, the life and
health of every Californian.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 121250, subd. (a); see also
id., §§ 121200, 121050; People v. Hall, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018-1019;
In re Khonsavanh S., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.)
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Given the significant public policy considerations at issue, we conclude it
would be inappropriate simply to strike the testing order without remanding for
further proceedings to determine whether the prosecution has additional evidence
that may establish the requisite probable cause. As the Court of Appeal observed,
“in the absence of an objection at trial, the prosecutor had no notice that such
evidence would be needed to overcome a defense objection.” (Cf. People
v. Green, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1091 [appropriate to remand where testing
order was unlawful under Pen. Code, § 1202.1 but could have been made pursuant
to Health & Saf. Code, § 121055].) Given the serious health consequences of HIV
infection, it would be unfair to both the victim and the public to permit evasion of
the legislative directive if evidence exists to support a testing order. Accordingly,
we concur in the Court of Appeal’s determination that it is appropriate to remand
the matter for further proceedings at the election of the prosecution. (Cf. Boyle v.
Hawkins (1969) 71 Cal.2d 229, 232, fn. 3 [“The ordinary disposition upon a
finding by the appellate court that the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict is simply to reverse, giving the respondent a right to a new trial”].)
This remedy should not, however, be seen to encourage or condone
inattention on the part of either the trial court or counsel at the time an HIV testing
order is imposed. In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeal in In re
Khonsavanh S., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at page 537, which stressed “the
importance of raising timely objections at . . . court hearings in order to reduce the
number of unnecessary appellate claims. Moreover, ‘ “it is unfair to the trial
judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it
could easily have been corrected at the trial.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
KENNARD,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
MORENO,
J.
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CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.
The forfeiture rule for sentencing error is a judicially created doctrine
invoked as a matter of policy to ensure the fair and orderly administration of
justice. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.) Today, the court has chosen
not to prevent a defendant from challenging an HIV testing order imposed under
Penal Code section 1202.1 for the first time on appeal where the defendant asserts
that the order is unsupported by probable cause to believe that bodily fluids
capable of transmitting HIV have been transferred from the defendant to the
victim. At the same time, the majority cautions that “nothing in our analysis
should be construed to undermine the forfeiture rule of People v. Scott, supra, 9
Cal.4th 331, that absent timely objection sentencing determinations are not
reviewable on appeal subject to the narrow exception articulated in People v.
Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8, fn. 5.) I join in both
conclusions and write separately only to make explicit what is implicit in the
majority opinion.
Thus, despite our ruling today, it remains the case that other sentencing
determinations may not be challenged for the first time on appeal, even if the
defendant claims that the resulting sentence is unsupported by the evidence. This
includes claims that the record fails to demonstrate the defendant’s ability to pay a
fine (e.g., People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1072; People v.
Gibson (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468-1469; People v. McMahan (1992) 3
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Cal.App.4th 740, 750; see generally People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 352, fn.
15), that the record fails to support the imposition of the upper term or consecutive
terms (e.g., People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8; see People v. Mustafaa
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 357, fn. 19), that
the record fails to support the probation conditions imposed (e.g., People v. Welch
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 969-
971 [drug and alcohol testing condition]), and that the record fails to support the
requirement that the defendant register as a sex offender (e.g., People v. Marchand
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060-1061). All of these cases are consistent with
Scott’s observation that “claims deemed waived on appeal involve sentences
which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or
factually flawed manner.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354, italics added.) A
“narrow exception” to this general rule exists only for “obvious legal errors at
sentencing that are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or
remanding for further findings.” (People v. Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 852.)
Our decision today also confirms that, except for HIV testing ordered under
Penal Code section 1202.1, we generally will not extend the rules governing
challenges to the factual sufficiency of criminal convictions or civil judgments to
challenges to the factual sufficiency of orders made at sentencing. As the Court of
Appeal has explained, “[a] challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the
imposition of a restitution fine to which defendant did not object is not akin to a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, to which
defendant necessarily objected by entering a plea of not guilty and contesting the
issue at trial.” (People v. Gibson, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1468-1469.)
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With this understanding, I join in the judgment.

BAXTER, J.
I CONCUR:
CHIN, J.
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Butler
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

NP opn. filed 5/14/02 - 5th Dist.
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S107791
Date Filed: December 1, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Kings
Judge: Lynn C. Atkinson

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Bradley A. Bristow, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Ann Hopkins, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves,
Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Weinberger, Ruth M. Saavedra, Patrick J. Whalen, Janet E. Neeley,
Stephen G. Herndon and David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Bradley A. Bristow
Central California Appellate Program
2407 J Street, Suite 301
Sacramento, CA 95816
(916) 441-3792

David Andrew Eldridge
Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
(916) 324-6291


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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 12/01/2003	S107791

Disposition
Dec 1 2003	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 24 2002	Petition for review filed   By counsel for appellant {Willie Earl Butler}.
Jun 25 2002	Record requested
Jun 27 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   1-doghouse
Aug 21 2002	Petition for Review Granted; issues limited (criminal case)   The issues to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether defendant waived any objection to the absence of findings required by Penal Code, ? 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6), in support of the trial court's order requiring defendant to undergo HIV testing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2(b).) Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Moreno, JJ.
Sep 24 2002	Counsel appointment order filed   The Central California Appellate Program is hereby appointed to represent appellant on his appeal now pending in this court. Appellant's brief on the merits shall be served and filed on or before thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Oct 17 2002	Request for extension of time filed   counsel for appellant requests extension to November 25, 2002 to file the brief on the merits.
Oct 22 2002	Extension of time granted   appellant's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including November 25, 2002. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.
Nov 25 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for appellant (W. Butller)
Nov 25 2002	Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)   by counsel for appellant (W. Butler)
Dec 26 2002	Request for extension of time filed   by (AG) counsel for respondent (People) requesting an extension to January 27, 2003 to file the answer brief.
Jan 6 2003	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 27, 2003. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS WILL BE GRANTED.
Jan 21 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for respondent (People)
Feb 7 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   counsel for appellant (W. Butler)
Mar 26 2003	Supplemental letter briefs requested   To assist in the resolution of this case, the court hereby orders the parties to brief the following issues: In the absence of a timely objection, may a defendant who has been ordered to submit to a blood test pursuant to Penal Code Section 1202.1, subdivision (a) and (e)(6), appeal such order on the ground that the record contains insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or other bodily fluid capable of transmitting human immunodeficiency virus has been transferred from the defendant to the victim? If the defendant may appeal on such ground without a timely objection, what is the appropiate remedy if the reviewing court finds insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause? Supplemental letters brief shall be filed simultaneously by both parties on or before April 7, 2003.
Apr 7 2003	Filed:   by (AG) counsel for respondent (People) Supplemental Letter Brief.
Apr 7 2003	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for appellant requests extension to April 21, 2003. to file the supplemental letter brief.
Apr 9 2003	Extension of time granted   Appellant's time to serve and file the supplemental letter brief is extended to and including April 21, 2003. No further extensions will be granted.
Apr 21 2003	Supplemental brief filed   by counsel for appellant (Butler).
Aug 5 2003	Case ordered on calendar   9-3-03, 1:30pm, S.F.
Aug 7 2003	Filed:   Letter from counsel for appellant, re oral argument
Aug 20 2003	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Bristow
Sep 3 2003	Cause argued and submitted
Dec 1 2003	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   OPINION BY: Brown, J. -- joined by: George, C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ. CONCURRING OPINION BY:Baxter, J. -- joined by: Chin, J.
Jan 2 2004	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jan 7 2004	Received:   receipt for remittitur CA 5
Feb 24 2004	Compensation awarded counsel   Atty Bristow

Briefs
Nov 25 2002	Opening brief on the merits filed
Jan 21 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 7 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website