Supreme Court of California Justia
Citation 42 Cal.4th 1142 original opinion
Olson v. Automobile Club

Filed 2/28/08

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CARL OLSON et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S143999
v.
Ct.App. 2/2 B168730
AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, )

Los Angeles County
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. BC 244326

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides, in pertinent part, that
“[u]pon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party . . . in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest if . . . a significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the general
public . . . .” We granted review in this matter to decide whether, under this
statute, a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney fees is also entitled to
recover expert witness fees. In Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 436
(Davis), we considered a similar issue, and concluded that Government Code
section 12965, former subdivision (b), which then provided for an award of
“ ‘reasonable attorney fees and costs’ ” to a prevailing party, did not permit an
award of expert witness fees. (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 438, 446; Gov.
Code § 12965, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1992, ch. 912, § 7.1,
p. 4276.) Consistent with Davis and the plain language of the statute, we hold that
1


a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to an award of expert witness fees in addition
to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
FACTS
Plaintiffs Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg sued defendant Automobile
Club of Southern California (Automobile Club), a nonprofit mutual benefit
corporation, primarily seeking various reforms to the Automobile Club’s
procedures for electing its board of directors. Plaintiffs retained three experts to
prove certain aspects of their case in a trial that lasted 24 days and included almost
1,000 exhibits.
Plaintiffs prevailed on several of their electoral process claims and obtained
a judgment mandating a number of election reforms. The trial court declared
plaintiffs to be the successful parties under Code of Civil Procedure section
1021.5.1 The trial court awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees to plaintiffs
based upon their election cause of action, concluding that plaintiffs achieved “an
election reform of significant benefit regarding the ability of the candidates to
communicate to the [Automobile Club’s] members and the members to choose
among the candidates.” The trial court also stated that “the Judgment and
Statement of Decision, and other aspects of the litigation, provide some guidance
for the future and therefore are likely to have a catalytic effect.” Plaintiffs were
awarded a total of nearly $1.1 million in attorney fees and $90,466.85 in expert
witness fees pursuant to section 1021.5.
The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1021.5 did not authorize an
award of expert witness fees, and modified that portion of the trial court’s
judgment. We granted review to decide whether, under section 1021.5, a

1
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless
otherwise indicated.
2


prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney fees is also entitled to an award of
expert witness fees.
DISCUSSION
Section 1021.5 provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]pon motion, a court may
award attorneys’ fees to a successful party . . . in any action which has resulted in
the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if . . . a
significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public . . . .” Section
1021.5 is one of many “statutory exceptions” that authorize a trial court to deviate
from the generally applicable “ ‘American rule’ ” that each party bears its own
costs and attorney fees. (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc. (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1252, 1257.) In 1975, the United States Supreme Court clarified the
limits of federal judicial discretion to alter the American rule in Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240, holding that it was the province of
the legislative branch to craft exceptions to the American rule, and courts were not
free to shift such costs on an ad hoc basis absent express legislative authorization.
(Id. at pp. 269-270.) Though this court and the California Legislature are
certainly not bound by federal authority, the Legislature’s 1977 enactment of
section 1021.5 — expressly authorizing an “award [of] attorneys’ fees” to a
prevailing party in a private attorney general action resulting in substantial public
benefit (§ 1021.5, added by Stats. 1977, ch. 1197, § 1, p. 3979) — appeared to be
“in significant measure . . . an explicit reaction to the United States Supreme
Court’s Alyeska decision.” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 934 (Woodland Hills).)
Plaintiffs contend that section 1021.5 authorizes an award of both attorney
fees and expert witness fees. “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation,
our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the
law’s purpose.’ (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.)” (People v. Cole
3
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.) Statutory interpretation begins with an analysis of
the statutory language. (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007)
42 Cal.4th 503, 507.) “If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning,
we need go no further.” (Id. at p. 508.) If the statute’s language is ambiguous, we
examine additional sources of information to determine the Legislature’s intent in
drafting the statute. (Ibid.; People v. Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Here,
neither the language nor the legislative history of section 1021.5 demonstrates that
the statute permits an award of expert witness fees.
The plain language of section 1021.5 authorizes an “award [of] attorneys’
fees” to a prevailing party. The statute is silent with respect to expert witness fees.
The Legislature’s omission of expert witness fees from the statutory language is
notable in light of the numerous statutes that expressly include language regarding
expert witness fees.2 The plain language of section 1021.5 does not indicate an
intent to authorize an award of expert witness fees. Indeed, expert witness fees are
not typically considered a subset of attorney fees; rather, attorney fees and expert

2
(See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 3753.7, 6086.10, subd. (d), 7085.5, subd. (u);
Civ. Code, §§ 52.5, subd. (f), 987, subd. (e)(4), 989, subd. (f)(1), 1739.7, subd. (g),
1745, subd. (d), 3333.5, subd. (d); Code Civ. Proc. §§ 998, subds. (c)(1), (d),
1021.8, subd. (a), 1038, subd. (b), 1141.21, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1235.140, subd. (b),
1250.410, subd. (e), 1250.420, subd. (c)(2), 1273.020, subds. (a), (b), 1273.040,
subd. (b), 2034.440, 2034.450, 2034.470, subds. (a), (e), (f), (g); Corp. Code,
§§ 1305, subd. (e), 15679.7, subd. (e), 15911.26, subd. (e), 17606, subd. (e); Elec.
Code, § 14030; Fam. Code, §§ 7557, 7640; Fish & G. Code, § 2125, subd. (c);
Food & Agr. Code, §§ 24012, subd. (c), 55722.5, subd. (f), 56382.5, subd. (f),
56382.8, subd. (g)(11); Gov. Code, §§ 8670.56.5, subd. (f), 12598, subd. (b),
12965, subd. (b), 12987, subd. (a)(3), 12989.2, subd. (a), 12989.3, subd. (g),
77204, subd. (b); Harb. & Nav. Code, § 294, subd. (e); Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 14955, subd. (f), 19958.6, subd. (e)(1), (3), 25395.84; Ins. Code, § 11580.9,
subd. (g)(2); Pen. Code, §§ 423.4, subd. (a), 4751, subd. (b); Prob. Code, § 1963,
subd. (c); Pub. Resources Code, §§ 14591.3, 14591.6, subd. (d); Pub. Util. Code,
§§ 1801, 1802, subds. (a), (c), (g), (i), 1803; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 30165.1,
subd. (p); Sts. & Hy. Code, § 730.5.)
4


witness fees are viewed as distinct and independent subsets of the costs of
litigation. (See § 1033.5, subds. (a)(10), (b)(1).)
We reached a similar conclusion in Davis, holding that a statute expressly
authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party did not also authorize
an award of expert witness fees. (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 446.) In Davis,
we considered whether Government Code section 12965, former subdivision (b),
authorized an award of expert fees under a statutory provision providing that a
prevailing party was entitled to receive “ ‘reasonable attorney fees and costs.’ ”
(Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 438; Gov. Code, § 12965, former subd. (b), as
amended by Stats. 1992, ch. 912, § 7.1, p. 4276.)
In
Davis, we explained that the “ ‘costs’ of a civil action consist of the
expenses of litigation, usually excluding attorney fees. Under the common law
rule, parties to litigation must bear their own costs. The right to recover any of
such costs is determined entirely by statute.” (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
As we described in Davis, section 1033.5 is such a statute, describing the manner
in which costs may be awarded to a prevailing party. (Id. at p. 441.) Section
1033.5 describes three types of costs: (1) subdivision (a) describes items
allowable as costs to a prevailing party under section 1032;3 (2) subdivision (b)
describes items “not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by
law”; and (3) subdivision (c)(4) describes items that “may be allowed or denied in
the court’s discretion” if not enumerated in subdivisions (a) and (b). Pursuant to
subdivision (a)(10), attorney fees are allowable as costs if authorized by contract,
statute, or law. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).) Pursuant to subdivision (b)(1),
fees of expert witnesses not ordered by the court (see § 1033.5, subd. (a)(8)) are

3
Section 1032 defines a prevailing party and explains that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to
recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (§ 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b).)
5


not allowable as costs unless “expressly authorized by law.” (§ 1033.5, subd.
(b)(1).)
In
Davis, following our examination of section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(1)
and decisional authority prior to the passage of that statute, we concluded that “the
fees of experts not ordered by the court were not an item of allowable costs”
because such fees were not expressly authorized by law. (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th
at p. 442.) We noted that, pursuant to section 1033.5, if an award of expert
witness fees is not expressly authorized, “the trial court’s discretion . . . is limited
to determining whether any allowable costs were ‘reasonably necessary’ and
‘reasonable in amount’ [citation], and to awarding or denying additional items of
costs that are not mentioned as either allowable or nonallowable in . . . section
1033.5.” (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 442.) 4 Because the Legislature had not
elected to expressly authorize an award of expert witness fees in addition to
attorney fees and costs under Government Code section 12965, former subdivision
(b), we held that the statute did not authorize an award of expert witness fees.
(Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 442.)
The reasoning in Davis applies here. Section 1021.5 provides that a
prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees, as did Government Code section
12965, former subdivision (b). Section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(1) provides that,

4
Following our decision in Davis, the Legislature amended Government
Code section 12965, subdivision (b) to specifically provide that “the court, in its
discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,
including expert witness fees,” thereby assenting to our holding in Davis that an
award of expert witness fees must be expressly authorized by statute. (Gov. Code,
§ 12965, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 931, § 183, eff. Sept. 28, 1998,
italics added.) Indeed, it is within the Legislature’s prerogative to conclude that
expert witness fees should be awarded to a prevailing party bringing a private
attorney general action. As in Davis, section 1033.5 compels us to conclude that
expert witness fees may not be awarded to a prevailing party under section 1021.5
unless expressly authorized by statute.
6


unless expressly authorized by law, the fees of experts not appointed by the court
are not allowable as costs. As was the case in Davis with respect to Government
Code section 12965, former subdivision (b), nothing in the plain language of
section 1021.5 suggests that the Legislature intended to authorize an award of
expert witness fees in addition to attorney fees. (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at
p. 442.) Indeed, the Legislature has amply demonstrated its ability to expressly
authorize an award of expert witness fees when it so desires. (See fn. 2, ante.)
We therefore conclude here, as we did in Davis with respect to Government Code
section 12965, former subdivision (b), that section 1021.5 does not permit an
award of expert witness fees to a prevailing party.
Plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable from Davis because there
existed decisional authority prior to the enactment of section 1033.5 — La Raza
Unida v. Volpe (N.D.Cal. 1972) 57 F.R.D. 94 (La Raza Unida) — that expressly
authorized an award of expert witness fees under a private attorney general theory.
In Davis, we noted that the decisional authority we discussed in interpreting
Government Code section 12965, former subdivision (b), which predated the
enactment of section 1033.5, did not permit an award of expert witness fees.
(Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 439-440.) As we noted in Davis, section 1033.5
was intended to restate existing law and codify case law, clarifying and collecting
in one location “ ‘which costs are and which costs are not allowable.’ (Assem.
Jud. Com., 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 654 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.)
Apr. 17, 1986, p. 1.)” (Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 441; see id. at pp. 444-445.)
We stated that “nonallowable items of costs included the fees of experts not
ordered by the court.” (Id. at p. 440.) Plaintiffs here claim that because La Raza
Unida predated the enactment of section 1033.5 and constituted “existing law” at
the time section 1033.5 was enacted, section 1033.5’s requirement that an award
of expert witness fees be “expressly authorized” is satisfied.
7

Plaintiffs’ argument ignores the questionable precedential authority of La
Raza Unida at the time section 1033.5 was enacted. In Alyeska, the Supreme
Court “rejected” the holding of La Raza Unida, calling into doubt the continued
viability of the decision. (West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey (1991)
499 U.S. 83, 97 (Casey), legislatively reversed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as
recognized by Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1992) 780 F.Supp. 1302,
1306.) Although we have observed that the Legislature had in mind pre-Alyeska
authority when it responded to Alyeska by enacting section 1021.5 (see Woodland
Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 934), we cannot infer similar legislative intent with
respect to section 1033.5. Because La Raza Unida was not reliable authority when
section 1033.5 was enacted, plaintiffs’ contention that the award of expert witness
fees was “expressly authorized” by La Raza Unida is incorrect. Plaintiffs cite no
authority other than the La Raza Unida line of cases to support the contention that
an award of expert witness fees under section 1021.5 is expressly authorized as
required by section 1033.5. Accordingly, there appears to be no reason to interpret
section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(1) as meaning anything other than what is stated
by its plain language — “[f]ees of experts not ordered by the court” are “not
allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law.”
In
Davis, we expressly did not reach the question of whether section 1021.5
permitted an award of expert witness fees, as the Court of Appeal had held in
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1421 (Beasley).
(Davis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 446, fn. 5.) In light of the rationale in Davis and
the plain language of section 1021.5, we now conclude that Beasley was
improperly decided.
In
Beasley, the court concluded that “[b]ecause our Legislature relied
heavily on the pre-Alyeska federal decisions in enacting section 1021.5, we must
assume the Legislature intended to adopt the pre-Alyeska federal practice of
8
awarding expert witness fees . . . .” (Beasley, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1421,
italics added.) While it is indisputably correct that the Legislature considered pre-
Alyeska federal decisions in crafting section 1021.5 (see Woodland Hills, supra,
23 Cal.3d 917), the Beasley court erred in assuming that the Legislature intended
“to adopt the pre-Alyeska federal practice of awarding expert witness fees . . . .”
(Beasley, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1421.) Rather than interpret a statutory
provision based upon an assumption about the Legislature’s intent, courts must
analyze a statute’s plain language, and may look to the legislative history
underlying a statute’s enactment only if the plain language is ambiguous. (See
People v. Cole, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Indeed, Beasley was criticized by the
Court of Appeal below and in Benson v. Kwikset Corporation (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 1254, for making an assumption regarding the legislative intent
underlying section 1021.5 without relying on the plain language of the statute or
its legislative history. (Benson, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282.)
In reaching its erroneous conclusion regarding the legislative intent
underlying section 1021.5 — that the Legislature intended to resurrect the pre-
Alyeska authority permitting an award of expert witness fees to a prevailing party
in a private attorney general action — Beasley relied on our decision in Woodland
Hills. (Beasley, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1421-1422.) In Woodland Hills, we
considered whether section 1021.5 applied to cases pending prior to the passage of
the statute. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 925.) We concluded that
section 1021.5 should be applied retroactively, reversed the trial court’s judgment
denying attorney fees, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further
consideration in light of section 1021.5. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
p. 925.) In Woodland Hills, we discussed only whether attorney fees could be
awarded to prevailing parties bringing private attorney general actions; expert
witness fees were not discussed. We noted that “[i]t is clear from both the
9
statutory framework and language that in drafting section 1021.5 the Legislature
relied heavily on the pre-Alyeska federal private attorney general authorities . . . ;
indeed, we do not doubt that in significant measure the legislation was an explicit
reaction to the United States Supreme Court’s Alyeska decision. The statute
reflected a legislative declaration that, in California, courts do enjoy the authority
– exercised in numerous pre-Alyeska federal decisions – to award attorney fees on
a private attorney general theory. Because in framing the provisions of section
1021.5, the Legislature drew heavily upon the pre-Alyeska federal decisions, we
believe that such authorities — while no longer viable in the federal realm — will
often be helpful and reliable guides in interpreting the various provisions of the
California statutes.” (Id. at p. 934, italics added.) Our language was significant.
We did not state that pre-Alyeska federal decisions were dispositive interpretations
of section 1021.5. We stated only that such cases “will often be helpful and
reliable guides . . . .” (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 934.)
We cannot conclude, as the Beasley court did, that section 1021.5 was
intended to revive pre-Alyeska federal decisional authority permitting an award of
expert witness fees. As discussed below, the Legislature certainly intended that
attorney fees could be awarded to a prevailing party on a private attorney general
theory; however, section 1021.5’s legislative history does not support the
conclusion that expert fees may similarly be awarded.
In 1991, the same year that the Court of Appeal decided Beasley, the
United States Supreme Court examined an analogous issue in Casey. (Casey,
supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 92-102.) In Casey, the Supreme Court held that expert
witness fees could not be awarded to a prevailing party under 42 United States
Code former section 1988 — a federal statute similar to section 1021.5 — because
the statute then authorized only an award of attorney fees. (Casey, supra,
499 U.S. at p. 102, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as enacted by 90 Stat. 2641.) The
10
Casey court explained that numerous federal statutes authorized the award of both
attorney fees and expert witness fees, and to hold that expert witness fees could be
awarded under a statute providing only for attorney fees would render statutes
providing for both “an inexplicable exercise in redundancy.” (Casey, supra,
499 U.S. at p. 92.) Because 42 United States Code former section 1988 was “both
broader and narrower than the pre-Alyeska ‘regime,’ it had not been intended to
return the federal courts ‘precisely’ to the former law, and thus there was no
reason to depart from the ‘normal import’ of the statute’s text.” (Beasley, supra,
235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1421, quoting Casey, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 97.)

Declining to adopt the Casey court’s analysis, Beasley held that section
1021.5 “was an explicit reaction to Alyeska” and therefore authorized the award of
expert witness fees. (Beasley, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1420.) The high
court’s interpretation of a federal statute does not, of course, inform our
interpretation of the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 1021.5. Nonetheless,
the Beasley court would have been well served by adopting the Casey court’s
analysis regarding a statute nearly identical to section 1021.5, instead of
improperly assuming that section 1021.5 was intended to restore the pre-Alyeska
federal authority permitting an award of expert witness fees to a prevailing party
in a private attorney general action. (Beasley, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1421.)
Indeed, the Casey court considered a similar argument with respect to 42 United
States Code former section 1988. (Casey, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 92-102.) The
Casey court examined the legislative history underlying the federal statute at issue,
which referenced the La Raza Unida decision.5 The dissent in Casey contended,

5
One version of Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), a precursor of
Assembly Bill No. 1310 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.), which ultimately enacted section
1021.5, appeared to adopt portions of the La Raza Unida holding. As is discussed
more fully below, although the Legislature may have intended to codify the La
Raza Unida
holding in Senate Bill No. 664, that bill failed to make it out of the
(footnote continued on next page)
11


as plaintiffs do here, that references to cases like La Raza Unida in legislative
history indicate an intent to return to a pre-Alyeska regime. (Casey, supra,
499 U.S. at p. 109 (dis. opn. of Marshall, J.).) As the Supreme Court recognized
in Casey, and we also recognize with respect to section 1021.5, that is simply not
the case. (Casey, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 97-98.) Neither 42 United States Code
former section 1988, nor section 1021.5 was intended to resurrect the entire body
of pre-Alyeska federal authority.6
As we note above, the plain language of section 1021.5 does not expressly
authorize an award of expert witness fees. Plaintiffs contend that the legislative
history of section 1021.5 supports awarding expert witness fees in addition to
attorney fees because “La Raza Unida, which awarded expert-witness fees, was
referred to with approval numerous times.”
While section 1021.5’s legislative history includes references to La Raza
Unida, plaintiffs’ argument that such references demonstrate an intent to codify
the holding of La Raza Unida in section 1021.5 is incorrect. Section 1021.5,
enacted in 1977, was introduced as Assembly Bill No. 1310 (1977-1978 Reg.
Sess.) by Assemblyman Berman. (See Stats. 1977, ch. 1197, § 3979.) Two
previous bills on the same subject, Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.)
and Assembly Bill No. 3257 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.), failed to pass out of their
respective houses. The references to La Raza Unida alluded to by plaintiffs

(footnote continued from previous page)
Senate. Assembly Bill No. 1310 significantly departed from the amended
language of Senate Bill No. 664, and there is no indication that Assembly Bill
No. 1310 — enacted as section 1021.5 — was intended to codify the holding of La
Raza Unida
.
6
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, is disapproved
to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding.
12


predominantly appeared in legislative history materials connected to an amended
version of failed Senate Bill No. 664, not Assembly Bill No. 1310.
Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) was first introduced by Senator
Song. Amendments to this bill, made in the Senate, may have been intended to
codify the decision in La Raza Unida. La Raza Unida held that a court had
authority to award attorney fees and expert witness fees to a prevailing plaintiff
absent specific statutory authorization when an action was brought under a private
attorney general theory. (La Raza Unida, supra, 57 F.R.D. at pp. 101, 102.) The
court used three factors to determine when attorney fees should be awarded to a
prevailing plaintiff: “1) the effectuation of strong public policies; 2) the fact that
numerous people received benefits from plaintiffs’ litigation success; [and] 3) the
fact that only a private party could have been expected to bring [the] action . . . .”
(Id. at p. 101.) Finding that the plaintiffs satisfied all three factors, the court
permitted an award of attorney fees and expert witness fees. (Id. at pp. 101-102.)
Consistent with the holding in La Raza Unida, the amended version of
Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) proposed authorizing the award of
“attorney’s fees, costs, and other expenses . . . .” (Sen. Bill No. 664 (1975-1976
Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 11, 1975, italics added.)7 The language of the
amended version of Senate Bill No. 664 also closely mirrored the three factors
outlined in La Raza Unida. Indeed, if section 1021.5 had been enacted by Senate

7
The amended version of Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.)
proposed to add section 1021.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure as follows: “Upon
motion, a court shall award attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses to a prevailing
plaintiff against a defendant in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of
an important right, if a significant benefit has been conferred on a large class of
persons and the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as
make the award essential. [¶] As used in this section, ‘significant benefit’
includes a nonpecuniary, as well as a pecuniary, benefit.” (Sen. Bill No. 664
(1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 11, 1975.)
13


Bill No. 664 as amended, plaintiffs would have a strong argument that the
Legislature intended the statute to be a codification of the holding of La Raza
Unida. However, Senate Bill No. 664 failed to pass out of the Senate and died.
The following year, 1976, Assembly Bill No. 3257 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.)
was introduced by Assemblyman Miller. Assembly Bill No. 3257 differed in two
significant respects from the amended version of Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976
Reg. Sess.). First, Assembly Bill No. 3257 omitted reference to “costs, and other
expenses” and, instead, mentioned only the award of attorney fees. (Compare Sen.
Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 11, 1975 with Assem. Bill
No. 3257 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 31, 1977.) Second,
Assembly Bill No. 3257 modified the La Raza Unida factors articulated in the
amended version of Senate Bill No. 664, instead requiring an additional
affirmative demonstration of financial burden and a showing that attorney fees
could not be paid out of a recovery before such fees would be authorized.
Assembly Bill No. 3257 also failed to pass out of the Assembly and died.
Finally, in 1977, Assemblyman Berman introduced Assembly Bill
No. 1310 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.). Assembly Bill No. 1310 mirrored almost
exactly the language used in Assembly Bill No. 3257 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).
Like Assembly Bill No. 3257, Assembly Bill No. 1310 did not include the phrase
“costs, or other expenses,” and it included a list of factors significantly modified
from the factors articulated in the La Raza Unida decision. The final enrolled
version of Assembly Bill No. 1310 is significantly different from the amended
version of Senate Bill No. 664 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.). We cannot conclude,
therefore, that the Legislature intended Assembly Bill No. 1310 to codify La Raza
Unida’s holding permitting an award of expert witness fees, particularly in light of
the plain language of the statute demonstrating otherwise.
14

Plaintiffs also argue that section 1021.5 necessarily authorizes the award of
expert witness fees because the Legislature acquiesced in the decision in Beasley
because it amended section 1021.5 after the Beasley decision without altering the
attorney fees provision. While plaintiffs’ contention is not without some weight,
there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate legislative acquiescence.
The Court of Appeal rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Legislature
acquiesced in the Beasley decision by noting that our decision in People v. Salas
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 979 (Salas), stood for the proposition that a legislative
acquiescence argument is most compelling when a decision invites the Legislature
to act and the Legislature declines to do so. Plaintiffs argue that the Court of
Appeal misread our opinion in Salas. We disagree.
In
Salas, we considered the meaning of a provision of the Corporate
Securities Law of 1968, which we had last examined 10 years earlier. (Salas,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 979.) In our earlier decision, we had “invited the
Legislature to clarify” a provision of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968.
(Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 979.) Though the law had been amended numerous
times in the 10 years between our prior decision and Salas, the Legislature never
clarified the provision at issue. We concluded that because the Legislature had
declined to amend the statute to abrogate our prior decision despite making
numerous other amendments in the intervening years, and because the prior
decision had been followed on many occasions during the intervening years, the
Legislature had acquiesced in our initial interpretation. (Id. at pp. 979-981.)
Plaintiffs urge us to consider our decision in People v. Bouzas (1991)
53 Cal.3d 467 (Bouzas), in which we concluded that “[w]hen a statute has been
construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without
changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is
presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of
15
that statute.” (Id. at p. 475.) The facts of Bouzas are distinguishable from the
facts here. In Bouzas, the statutes at issue were amended “at least 10 times
between 1903 and 1976 without altering the courts’ consistent interpretation” of
the provisions at issue. (Ibid.) The statutes were finally merged, still without
indicating that the Legislature intended to alter the “courts’ consistent
interpretation.” (Ibid.) Under such circumstances, we were “compelled to
conclude that the Legislature acquiesced in and ratified the judicial interpretation
of the prior versions of [the statutes] and intended that the present version of [the
newly merged statute] receive a like interpretation.” (Ibid.)
This case does not present facts as compelling as those present in Salas or
Bouzas. Here, in 1993, the Legislature amended a portion of section 1021.5
unrelated to the definition of attorney fees two years after a single Court of Appeal
decision (Beasley) had interpreted that statute. (Stats. 1993, ch. 645, § 2, p. 3747.)
Plaintiffs cite no case, and we are aware of none, that cited Beasley, approvingly
or otherwise, in the intervening two years. While it may sometimes be true that
legislative inaction signals acquiescence when there exists both a well-developed
body of law interpreting a statutory provision and numerous amendments to a
statute without altering the interpreted provision, that is not the case here.
Accordingly, we find plaintiffs’ legislative acquiescence argument unpersuasive.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that policy considerations support the conclusion
that section 1021.5 authorizes an award of expert witness fees. Plaintiffs contend
that section 1021.5’s “purpose is to encourage private lawsuits that enforce
important public rights or help large classes.” Regardless of the merit of
plaintiffs’ argument, public policy alone is insufficient to permit this court to craft
such a rule, in direct contravention of the statute’s plain meaning. The plain
language of section 1021.5 simply does not support plaintiffs’ position that section
1021.5 permits an award of expert witness fees.
16
CONCLUSION
Nothing
in
Davis or the plain language of section 1021.5 indicates that the
statute authorizes the award of expert witness fees. Accordingly, we affirm the
Court of Appeal’s judgment, and conclude that section 1021.5 does not permit an
award of expert witness fees.
MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
CORRIGAN,
J.

17



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 139 Cal.App.4th 552
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S143999
Date Filed: February 28, 2008
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: James R. Dunn

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Office of Thomas K. Bourke, Thomas K. Bourke, Rizwan R. Ramji; Law Office of Lorraine L. Loder,
Lorraine L. Loder; Law Office of Richard M. Pearl and Richard M. Pearl for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Brad Seligman, Julia Campins, Edith Matthai; David Blair-Loy; Peter Eliasberg; Alan Schlosser; Ken
Kresse; Luke W. Cole; Linda Kilb; Irma Herrera; Adrienne Bloch; Trent Orr; David Greene; Alan Ramo;
Luz Buitrago; Matthew Goldberg; Marci Seville; Julia R. Wilson; Richard Rothschild; John O’Toole, Dara
Schur; Lisa Jaskol; Michael Wall; John Affeldt; Kyra Kazantzis; Michael Rawson; and Alice Bussiere for
The Impact Fund, Los Angeles County Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union, California Center
for Law and the Deaf, Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment, Communities for Better Environment,
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center-Civil Rights Litigation
Project, Earthjustice, Equal Rights Advocates, First Amendment Project, Golden Gate University School of
Law-Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Law Center for Families, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley,
Legal Aid Association of California, Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center, National Center for
Youth Law, Natural Resources Defense Council, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Public Advocates, Public
Counsel, Public Interest Law Project, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Women’s Employment Rights
Clinic of Golden Gate University School of Law and Youth Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant and Mark T. Johnson for National Association of
Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Steven G. Ingram for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Morrison & Foerster, Charles E. Patterson, John Sobieski, Howard B. Soloway and Phillip Bronson for
Defendant and Appellant.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Thomas K. Bourke
Law Office of Thomas K. Bourke
601 West Fifth Street, Eighth Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071-2094
(213) 623-1092

Edith Matthai
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue, Suite 102
Berkeley, CA 94710
(510) 845-3473

Howard B. Soloway
Morrison & Foerster
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500
Los Angeles, CA 90013-1024
(213) 892-5200


Petition for review after the Court of Appeal modified and affirmed the judgment in a civil action. The court limited review to the following issue: Is a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney's fees under the private attorney general statute (Civ. Code, section 1021.5) entitled to recover expert witness fees?

Opinion Information
Date:Citation:Docket Number:Category:Status:
Thu, 02/28/200842 Cal.4th 1142 original opinionS143999Review - Civil Appealclosed; remittitur issued

Parties
1Olson, Carl (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Thomas K. Bourke
Attorney at Law
601 W. Fifth Street, 8th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

2Olson, Carl (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Richard M. Pearl
Attorney at Law
1816 Fifth Street
Berkeley, CA

3Automobile Club Of Southern California (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by John Sobieski
Morrison & Foerster, LLP
555 W. Fifith Street, Suite 3500
Los Angeles, CA

4Automobile Club Of Southern California (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Howard B. Soloway
Morrison & Foerster, LLP
555 W. Fifith Street, Suite 3500
Los Angeles, CA

5Public Advocates (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

6Lawyers Committe For Civil Rights Of San Francisco (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

7Communities For A Better Environment (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

8Center For Environmental Health (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

9Environmental Law Foundation (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

10Center For Law In The Public Interest (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

11Sierra Club (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

12Environmentl Law & Justice Clinic At Golden Gate Univ. (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

13Impact Fund (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

14Los Angeles County Bar Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Edith R. Matthai
Robie & Matthai
500 S. Grand, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA

15Los Angeles County Bar Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

16American Civil Liberties Union (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

17California Center For Law & The Deaf (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

18Center On Race, Poverty & The Environment (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

19Communities For A Better Environment (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

20Disability Rights Education And Defense Fund (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

21Disability Rights Legal Center-Civil Rights Litigation Proje (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

22Earthjustice (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

23Equal Rights Advocates (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

24First Amendment Project (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

25Golden Gate University School Of Law (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

26Law Center For Families (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

27Law Foundation Of Silicon Valley (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

28Legal Aid Association Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

29Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

30National Center For Youth Law (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

31Natural Resources Defense Council (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

32Protection & Advocacy, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

33Public Counsel (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

34Public Interest Law Project (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

35Western Center On Law & Poverty (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

36Youth Law Center (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Brad S. Seligman
The Impact Fund
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA

37Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Steven Gregory Ingram
Consumer Attorneys of California
770 "L" Street, Suite 1200
Sacramento, CA

38Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Raymond Paul Boucher
Consumer Attorneys of California
770 "L" Street, Suite 1200
Sacramento, CA

39National Association Of Consumer Advocates (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Mark Thomas Johnson
The Sturdevant Law Firm
354 Pine Street, 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA

40Seidenberg, Mark (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Thomas K. Bourke
Attorney at Law
601 W. Fifth Street, 8th Floor
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Feb 28 2008Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Jun 1 2006Received premature petition for review
  appellants, Carol Olson Thomas K. Bourke, Esq. , retained.
Jun 6 2006Received Court of Appeal record
 
Jun 6 2006Record requested
 
Jun 16 2006Case start: Petition for review filed
 
Jun 16 2006Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  The Impact Fund et al., non party by Brad Seligman, counsel
Jul 7 2006Answer to petition for review filed
  Respondent Automobile Club of Southern California [rule 40.1] Attorneys John Sobieski, etal, retained
Jul 17 2006Reply to answer to petition filed
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Jul 26 2006Petition for review granted; issues limited (civil case)
  Petition for review granted. The issue to be briefed and argued is limited to the following: is a prevailing plaintiff who is awarded attorney's fees under the private attorney general statute (Civ. Code, section 1021.5) entitled to recover expert witness fees? Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jul 27 2006Received Court of Appeal record
 
Aug 10 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  Attorney Jon Sobieski of Morrison & Foerster for Appellant Auto Club of So. Calif.
Aug 15 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Opening brief/merits to 9-25-06 Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Aug 15 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Aug 17 2006Extension of time granted
  to Sept. 25, 2006 for appellants ( Olson et al.) to file the opening brief on the merits.
Sep 19 2006Request for extension of time filed
  opening brief/merits to 10-10-06 Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Sep 22 2006Extension of time granted
  to October 10, 2006 to file appellants (Carl and Mark Seidenberg) opening brief on the merits.
Oct 10 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Oct 16 2006Received:
  Notice of Errata to Opening Brief/Merits Appellants Car Olson and ark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Nov 3 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to file Answer Brief/Merits to 12-11-06 Respondent Automobile Club of Southern California
Nov 8 2006Extension of time granted
  to December 11, 2006 for appellant ( Automobile Club of Southern California) to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 7 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to file Answer Brief/Merits to 1-8-07 Respondent Automobile Club of Southern California Attorney John Sobieski
Dec 21 2006Extension of time granted
  to January 8, 2007 to file defendant and appellant Automobile Club of Southern California answer brief on the merits.
Jan 9 2007Answer brief on the merits filed
  Appellant, Automobile Club of Southern California by counsel, John Sobieski.
Jan 22 2007Request for extension of time filed
  reply brief/merits to 3-12-07 Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg
Jan 24 2007Extension of time granted
  to March 12, 2007 to file appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg reply brief on the merits.
Mar 6 2007Request for extension of time filed
  to file reply brief/merits to 04-02-2007 Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg
Mar 13 2007Extension of time granted
  to April 2, 2007 to file appellants reply brief on the merits.
Apr 2 2007Association of attorneys filed for:
  associating in Richard M. Pearl Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorneys Thomas K. Bourke and Richard M. Pearl
Apr 2 2007Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorneys Thomas K. Bourke and Richard M. Pearl
Apr 2 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorneys Thomas K. Bourke and Richard M. Pearl
May 1 2007Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  The Impact Fund in support of appellant, Carl Olson, et al. by counsel, Brad Seligman.
May 2 2007Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  By National Association of Consumer Advocates in support of appellants.
May 2 2007Request for extension of time filed
  Consumer Attorneys of California to file an application to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants, Carl Olson, et al. Asking to May 8, 2007. by counsel, Raymond Paul Boucher.
May 7 2007Extension of time granted
  to May 8, 2007 for Consumer Attorneys of California to serve and file their amicus curiae brief.
May 7 2007Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of The Impact Fund, Los Angeles County Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union, California Center for Law and the Deaf, Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment, Communities for a Better Environment, Disability rights Education and Defense Fund, Disability Rights Legal Center- Civil Rights Litigation Project, Earthjustice, Equal Rights Advocates, First Amendment Project, Golden Gate University School of Law-Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Law Center for Families, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, Legal Aid Association of California, Legal Aid Society- Employment Law Center, National Center for Youth Law, Natural Resources Defense Council, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., Public Advocates, Public Counsel, Public Interest Law Project, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Women's Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate University School of Law, Youth Law Center for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants, Carl Olson, et al., is hereby granted.
May 7 2007Note:
  ( previous entry continued ) An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 7 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
  The Impact Fund, et al. by counsel, Brad Seligman.
May 8 2007Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The National Association of Consumer Advocates in support of appellants. Answer is due within twenty days.
May 8 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
  The national Association of Consumer Advocates in support of appellants. Answer is due within twenty days.
May 9 2007Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellant. by counsel, Steven G. Ingram.
May 10 2007Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of Consumer Attorneys of California for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of appellants, Carl Olson, et al., is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
May 10 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
  Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellants, Carl Olson, et al.
May 29 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to AC briefs of Nat'l Assn of Consumer Advocates, Consumer Attorneys of Calif & The Impact Fund, etal Appellant Automobile Club of Southern California Attorney John Sobieski
May 29 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  to AC briefs of Nat'l Assn of Consumer Advocates and Consumer Attorneys of America Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorney Thomas K. Bourke
Jul 9 2007Filed:
  letter from appellant, Automobile Club of Southern California re: related Court of Appeal decision by counsel, John Sobieski.
Aug 8 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Appellants Carl Olson and Mark Seidenberg Attorneys Thomas K. Bourke, etal
Aug 23 2007Opposition filed
  to appellants' Reqt for Judicial Notice by Appellant Automobile Club of Southern California Attorneys John Sobieski, etal
Oct 24 2007Received Court of Appeal record
 
Dec 4 2007Case ordered on calendar
  Wednesday, January 9, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Dec 14 2007Application filed
  Plaintiffs/Appellants Olson et al. asking to share 10 minutes of argument time with associated counsel (Edith Matthai) for amici curiae.
Dec 26 2007Order filed
  The request of counsel for appellants Carl Olson et al. in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellants at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellants to allocate to amicus curiae Los Angeles County Bar Association et al. 10 minutes of appellants' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Dec 31 2007Filed:
  appellants', Olson et al, additional authoirties. by counsel, Thomas K. Bourke and Richard M. Pearl.
Jan 9 2008Cause argued and submitted
 
Jan 15 2008Received:
  request from Thomas Bourke, counsel for appellants, for permission to file amplification of response to Court's questions about CCP 1033.5.
Jan 18 2008Order filed
  The application of counsel for appellants filed January 15, 2008, for permission to file the short amplification in response to the Court's question regarding California Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 is hereby denied.
Feb 7 2008Order filed
  Plaintiff's requests for judicial notice, filed on April 2, 2007, and August 8, 2007, are granted.
Feb 27 2008Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Feb 28 2008Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment, and conclude that section 1021.5 does not permit an award of expert witness fees. Opinion by Moreno, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin & Corrigan, JJ.
Apr 4 2008Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Apr 21 2008Received:
  receipt for remittitur CA 2/2.

Briefs
Oct 10 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 9 2007Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Apr 2 2007Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
May 7 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 8 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 10 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 29 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
May 29 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website