Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 11/15/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

YOSHI MOROHOSHI et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S120903
v.
Ct.App. 2/7 B159594
PACIFIC HOME et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. NC025395

Under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Lanterman
Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.1), care for the developmentally disabled is
provided by private contractors operating, among other services, residential care
facilities. The coordination of the delivery of such direct services is the
responsibility of “private nonprofit community agencies” called “regional
centers.” (§ 4620, subd. (b).) This case involves the tragic death of a
developmentally disabled individual resulting from the negligence of the staff of
the residential care facility in which he had been placed by a regional center. Two
questions are presented. (1) May the regional center be held vicariously liable for
the negligence of the residential care facility? The Court of Appeal, in the second
of its two opinions in this case, answered this question in the affirmative; we
disagree. (2) Did the Court of Appeal’s previous decision resolve the vicarious

1
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
1

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liability question, and is that decision controlling in this appeal under the law of
the case doctrine? We conclude the Court of Appeal’s previous decision did not
resolve the vicarious liability question and, thus, is not controlling.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bobby Morohoshi, plaintiffs’ adult son, was developmentally disabled; he
was also an insulin-dependent diabetic. In 1995, Harbor Regional Center (Harbor)
placed Bobby in Pacific Home, a residential care facility; Bobby resided there
until his death in 1998.
Harbor arranged for nurses to visit Bobby twice a day to test his blood
sugar and administer his insulin. Pacific Home’s owner and her sister, who were
registered nurses, originally performed this function. Later, this function was
performed by home health nurses and other members of Pacific Home’s staff.
In 1998, Pacific Home hired new staff, including Esther Sison. Sison was
responsible for testing Bobby’s blood-sugar level the night before he died. She
failed to do so. The next morning Bobby lay dead in his bedroom.
Prior to trial, the Morohoshis moved in limine for an order preventing
Harbor from contending the fault for Bobby’s death “may or should be
apportioned” between Harbor and Pacific Home. They based their motion on their
contention Harbor was vicariously liable for any negligence by Pacific Home in
providing care to Bobby. The trial court denied the motion. Harbor moved in
limine for an order prohibiting the Morohoshis from presenting any evidence or
arguing Harbor could be held vicariously liable for Pacific Home’s tortious
conduct; Harbor contended it could only be held liable for failure to discharge “its
own nondelegable statutory duties.” The trial court granted this motion.
Later, in a discussion of the special verdict form, the trial court repeated its
view Harbor could not be held vicariously liable for Pacific Home’s negligence
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and required the parties to draft a verdict form that would allow the jury to
apportion negligence.
The jury found Pacific Home liable for Bobby’s death on the basis of
negligence and found it guilty of abuse of a dependent adult. The verdict awarded
the Morohoshis economic damages of $5,644.36 and noneconomic damages in the
amount of $600,000.2 The jury found Harbor not negligent and awarded no
damages against it.3
On appeal by the Morohoshis, the Court of Appeal ordered the judgment
modified “to provide Harbor[] and Pacific Home are jointly and severally liable to
the Morohoshis for the economic and noneconomic damages sustained as a result
of Pacific Home’s negligence in the sum of $505,644.36 plus costs as provided by
law.” In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. The Morohoshis were
awarded their costs on appeal.
The Court of Appeal held “Harbor is vicariously liable to the Morohoshis
for Pacific Home’s negligence pursuant to its nondelegable duty of care to
Bobby.” In its view, the Court of Appeal had rendered the same holding in its
previous decision in this case. Therefore, the Court of Appeal concluded, this
appeal is governed by the law of the case doctrine.
We disagree; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

2
Counsel represented at oral argument that residential care facilities like
Pacific Home are not required to carry liability insurance.
3
This statement of the factual and procedural background is drawn from the
opinion below. Neither party petitioned for rehearing to suggest the Court of
Appeal omitted or misstated any material fact. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
28(c)(2).)
3

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II. DISCUSSION
Under the Lanterman Act, the state contracts with a network of regional
centers—“private nonprofit community agencies” (§ 4620, subd. (b))—in order
“to provide fixed points of contact in the community for persons with
developmental disabilities and their families, to the end that these persons may
have access to the services and supports best suited to them throughout their
lifetime” (§ 4620, subd. (a)). Regional centers are responsible for determining
through testing and evaluation whether an individual has a developmental
disability.4 (§§ 4642, 4643.) If a regional center determines that an individual has
a developmental disability and is eligible for services, a “[p]lanning team,”
comprised of the individual with the disability, his or her parents or guardian, one
or more regional center representatives, and any other person or entity invited to
participate, draws up an individual program plan (IPP). (§§ 4512, subd. (j), 4646,
subds. (c), (d).) The IPP must identify the developmentally disabled person’s
“goals, objectives, and [needed] services and supports,” taking into account the
individual needs and preferences of the person and his or her family. (§ 4646,
subds. (a), (d).) The IPP must include a schedule of the “type and amount of
services and supports to be purchased by the regional center or obtained from
generic agencies or other resources” in order to achieve the IPP’s goals and
objectives. (§ 4646.5, subd. (a)(4).)
The most important role of the regional centers is this “direct service
coordination.” (§ 4640.6, subd. (a).) “In approving regional center contracts, the

4
“ ‘Developmental disability’ ” means a substantial disability that
“originates before an individual attains age 18” and that can be expected to
continue. (§ 4512, subd. (a).) The term includes mental retardation, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, and autism. (Ibid.)
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[Department of Developmental Services] shall ensure that regional center staffing
patterns demonstrate that direct service coordination are the highest priority.”
(Ibid.) The regional centers play this coordinating role by “assist[ing] persons
with developmental disabilities and their families in securing those services and
supports which maximize opportunities and choices for living, working, learning,
and recreating in the community.” (§ 4640.7, subd. (a); see § 4648, subd. (a)(1).)
The regional centers secure the needed services by “purchasing or by obtaining
them” from direct service providers like Pacific Home. (§ 4647, subd. (a).) The
process of identifying and qualifying the vendors or contractors from which
services are purchased is known as “vendorization.” (§ 4648, subd. (a)(3).)
The role played by regional centers in coordinating the delivery of the
direct services indicated by a developmentally disabled person’s IPP is clearly a
vital one; indeed, the Legislature declared this coordinating role “is of such a
special and unique nature that it cannot be satisfactorily provided by state
agencies” (§ 4620, subd. (b)).
However, the Court of Appeal inflated Harbor’s role in coordinating
Bobby’s care beyond all recognition by holding Harbor had a nondelegable duty to
provide Bobby’s care itself, or to closely monitor Pacific Home’s provision of
Bobby’s care. A review of the applicable statutes and regulations reveals that (1)
direct provision of care is not a responsibility of regional centers; and (2) regional
centers are not intended to monitor the care provided by their contractors on the
day-by-day—indeed, hour-by-hour—basis that would have been required to
prevent Bobby’s tragic death.
A. Direct Provision of Care Is Not a Responsibility of Regional Centers
The Court of Appeal mistakenly concluded that Harbor had authority to
provide Bobby’s care itself in lieu of contracting with a provider such as Pacific
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Home: “On its face, the Lanterman Act clearly imposes mandatory duties on
Harbor to ensure the consumer receives proper care and services, whether or not
Harbor chooses to ‘vendorize’ the actual placement.”
To the contrary, the responsibility of a regional center is to “secure,” not
provide, care. (§ 4648, subd. (a)(1).) To read the list of services a regional center
may be required to secure for a developmentally disabled individual is to
understand that a regional center could not possibly be expected to provide those
services itself.5 Indeed, “[e]xcept in emergency situations, a regional center shall
not provide direct treatment and therapeutic services, but shall utilize appropriate
public and private community agencies and service providers to obtain those
services for its consumers.” (§ 4648, subd. (f).)
As Harbor suggests, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that regional centers
have the option of providing care themselves appears to have resulted from its

5
The phrase “[s]ervices and supports” refers to specialized services such as
“diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, personal care, day care, domiciliary care, special
living arrangements, physical, occupational, and speech therapy, training,
education, supported and sheltered employment, mental health services,
recreation, counseling of the individual with a developmental disability and of his
or her family, protective and other social and sociolegal services, information and
referral services, follow-along services, adaptive equipment and supplies,
advocacy assistance, including self-advocacy training, facilitation and peer
advocates, assessment, assistance in locating a home, child care, behavior training
and behavior modification programs, camping, community integration services,
community support, daily living skills training, emergency and crisis intervention,
facilitating circles of support, habilitation, homemaker services, infant stimulation
programs, paid roommates, paid neighbors, respite, short-term out-of-home care,
social skills training, specialized medical and dental care, supported living
arrangements, technical and financial assistance, travel training, training for
parents of children with developmental disabilities, training for parents with
developmental disabilities, vouchers, and transportation services necessary to
ensure delivery of services to persons with developmental disabilities.” (§ 4512,
subd. (b).)
6

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having overlooked, through an unfortunate resort to ellipsis, key language in
section 4648, subdivision (a)(3). The Court of Appeal quoted the subdivision as
follows: “A regional center may, pursuant to vendorization or a contract, purchase
services or supports for a consumer . . . which the regional center . . . determines
will best accomplish all or any part of that consumer’s program plan.” When the
language deleted in the first ellipsis is restored, it becomes clear the only choice
facing regional centers, except in emergencies, is which vendor to hire, not
whether to hire a vendor at all. “A regional center may, pursuant to vendorization
or a contract, purchase services or supports for a consumer from any individual or
agency which the regional center and consumer or, where appropriate, his or her
parents, legal guardian, or conservator, or authorized representatives, determines
will best accomplish all or any part of the consumer’s program plan.” (§ 4648,
subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
B. Regional Centers Are Responsible for Only Periodic Monitoring
Regional centers have important but limited monitoring responsibilities. A
regional center representative is required to monitor the provision of care and
services supplied by a provider to ensure they are provided in accordance with the
developmentally disabled person’s IPP. (§§ 4742, 4743.) During monitoring
visits to a provider, the regional center liaison is required to, among other things,
review staff schedules for compliance with the approved service level
requirements, review staff personnel files to ensure compliance with the
regulations pertaining to training and testing, and select and review a randomly
chosen sample of 20 percent of the facility’s records to ensure that services are
being provided to the developmentally disabled persons in accordance with their
IPP’s. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 56048, subd. (d).) The regional center liaison
must inform the administrator of the facility of any substantial inadequacies found
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in the care and services provided, the specific corrective actions necessary, and the
date by which those actions must be completed. (§ 4745.) A regional center may
terminate its contract with a provider if it determines the provider has not
complied with the contract or with applicable law and regulations. (§ 4648.1,
subd. (d).) If conditions constituting an immediate danger to a developmentally
disabled person come to the attention of a regional center, the regional center must
investigate the situation immediately, and if the immediate danger cannot be
corrected within 24 hours of verification, the regional center must take immediate
steps to relocate the developmentally disabled person. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17,
§ 56053.)
However, the Legislature did not require of regional centers anything like
the hour-by-hour monitoring that would have been required to prevent Bobby’s
tragic death. A regional center is required to establish a “schedule of regular
periodic review and reevaluation to ascertain that planned services have been
provided, that objectives have been fulfilled within the times specified, and that
consumers and families are satisfied with the individual program plan and
implementation.” (§ 4646.5, subd. (a)(6), italics added.) A regional center
representative must meet with a developmentally disabled person at least quarterly
to review progress towards achieving the IPP objectives. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17,
§ 56047, subd. (a).) No fewer than two unannounced monitoring visits to a care
facility are to be conducted by a regional center each year. (§ 4648.1, subd. (a).)
The regional center liaison is required to visit the facility at least once a year.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 56048, subd. (d)(1).) A service coordinator may be
responsible for monitoring dozens of consumers.6 Stretched so thinly, the service

6
Section 4640.6, subdivision (c) states in part: “Contracts between the
department and regional centers shall require regional centers to have service

(footnote continued on next page)
8

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coordinators could not possibly provide the continuous monitoring contemplated
by the Court of Appeal.
C. The Doctrine of the Law of the Case Does Not Apply Here
Plaintiffs contend, and the Court of Appeal agreed, this appeal is governed
by the law of the case doctrine; this would preclude Harbor from taking issue with
the Court of Appeal’s holding in this appeal, which for purposes of this discussion
we will refer to as Morohoshi II, that “Harbor was vicariously liable under the
rationale of nondelegable duty for any negligence on the part of Pacific Home.”
“The doctrine of ‘law of the case’ deals with the effect of the first appellate
decision on the subsequent retrial or appeal: The decision of an appellate court,
stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes
that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any
subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed.
1997) Appeal, § 895, p. 928.)
The law of the case doctrine applies to this court even though the previous
appeal was before the Court of Appeal, and it applies even though this court may
conclude the previous Court of Appeal opinion was erroneous. (People v. Stanley
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) “Indeed, it is only when the former rule is deemed

(footnote continued from previous page)

coordinator-to-consumer ratios, as follows: [¶] (1) An average service
coordinator-to-consumer ratio of 1 to 62 for all consumers who have not moved
from the developmental centers to the community since April 14, 1993. In no case
shall a service coordinator for these consumers have an assigned caseload in
excess of 79 consumers for more than 60 days. [¶] (2) An average service
coordinator-to-consumer ratio of 1 to 45 for all consumers who have moved from
a developmental center to the community since April 14, 1993. In no case shall a
service coordinator for these consumers have an assigned caseload in excess of 59
consumers for more than 60 days.”
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erroneous that the doctrine of the law of the case becomes at all important.” (Tally
v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 421.) The doctrine is, we have recognized, harsh.
(Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202, 212.) Accordingly, we
have declined to adhere to it where its application would result in an unjust
decision, e.g., where there has been a manifest misapplication of existing
principles resulting in substantial injustice, or where the controlling rules of law
have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and
second appellate determinations. The unjust decision exception does not apply
when there is a mere disagreement with the prior appellate determination.
(Stanley, at p. 787.)
In invoking the law of the case doctrine in Morohoshi II, the Court of
Appeal misread its prior decision. The holding of Morohoshi II that “the trial
court erred in refusing to allow the jury to find defendant vicariously liable for
Bobby’s death caused by the negligence of defendant’s agent Pacific Home,” was
simply not a ground of the decision in Morohoshi I. Therefore, since the law of
the case doctrine is itself inapplicable here, we need not address the applicability
of exceptions to it.
In
Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (Aug. 21, 2001, B143379) [nonpub. opn.]
(Morohoshi I), Harbor moved for summary judgment, the trial court granted the
motion, and the Morohoshis appealed the dismissal of their action as to Harbor.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the Morohoshis had presented evidence of
multiple triable issues of material fact as to Harbor’s breach of duties imposed on
regional centers by the Lanterman Act.
However,
in
Morohoshi II, the Court of Appeal gave this description of its
holding in Morohoshi I: “In Morohoshi I we recognized Harbor could be held
liable for its own negligence toward Bobby but we also specifically held Harbor
was vicariously liable under the rationale of nondelegable duty for any negligence
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on the part of Pacific Home.” (Fns. omitted.) “The nondelegable duty rule,” the
Morohoshi II court noted, “is a form of vicarious liability. [Citations.]”
The opinion in Morohoshi I is 22 pages long. The “Discussion” portion of
the opinion is 14 pages long. The passage in Morohoshi I that is cited in
Morohoshi II appears on page 17 of the previous opinion. This passage, which is
entitled “HRC[7] Could Not Delegate To Pacific Home the Duties It Owed To
Decedent,” is only eight lines long. In full, it reads: “HRC contends it did not
have a nondelegable duty to decedent because the statutory scheme does not
envision it. HRC relies on Privette v. Superior Court [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 689];
however, Privette contains no such holding. [¶] As a matter of law, HRC’s duties
could not be delegated to Pacific Home. HRC’s duties under sections 4647, 4648,
and 4742 are found in Article Two of the Lanterman Act which is entitled,
‘Regional Center Responsibilities.’ The Legislature’s intent is clear and
unambiguous. The language [sic][8] of the statutes in Article Two are imposed
solely on regional centers as evidenced by the language of sections 4647, 4648,
and 4742.”
As Harbor contends, the Court of Appeal in Morohoshi I “did not analyze
the issue of ‘vicarious liability’ and it did not hint that Harbor Regional Center
could be liable for Pacific Home’s own negligence.” To the contrary, the passage
in question speaks only of “HRC’s duties.” The duties mentioned, the court
stressed, “are found in Article Two of the Lanterman Act which is entitled,
‘Regional Center Responsibilities.’ ” The duties arising under article II, the court
reiterated, “are imposed solely on regional centers as evidenced by the language of

7
In Morohoshi I, the Court of Appeal referred to Harbor as HRC.
8
Presumably, the Court of Appeal intended to say “duties,” not “language.”
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sections 4647, 4648, and 4742.”9 As Harbor points out, the Court of Appeal in
Morohoshi I “never suggested Harbor could be liable, even if it fulfilled its
obligations under these statutes (as the jury concluded it had), simply because
Pacific breached its independent duty of care.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BROWN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE,
C.J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
MORENO,
J.

9
Very briefly, the duties imposed upon regional centers by the cited sections
include the following: coordinating the services necessary to implement a
developmentally disabled person’s IPP (§ 4647); securing needed services,
advocating for clients, building support in the community, and increasing the
quality of services (§ 4648); and counseling facility staff regarding the care and
services required by clients, and monitoring the care and services to assure they
are provided in accordance with the IPP (§ 4742).
12

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Morohoshi v. Pacific Home
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 937
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S120903
Date Filed: November 15, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Judith A. Vander Lans

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Lange & Koncius, Joseph J. M. Lange and Jeffrey A. Koncius for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Frederic C. Cohen; Giovanniello & Michels, Alexander F.
Giovanniello, Helen A. Michels and Cristian L. Peirano for Defendant and Respondent Harbor Regional
Center.

Anahid Hoonanian and Daniel Juárez for Protection & Advocacy, Inc., and Capitol People First as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Harbor Regional Center.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, James M. Humes, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas M. Press and
Susan M. Carson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Department of Developmental Services as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Harbor Regional Center.

Reed Smith, Kathy M. Banke, Bette B. Epstein and Mary L. Perry for Association of Regional Center
Agencies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Harbor Regional Center.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Pacific Home.

13

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Joseph J. M. Lange
Lange & Koncius
222 North Sepulveda Boulevard, Suite 1560
El Segundo, CA 90245
(310) 414-1880

Frederic C. Cohen
Horvitz & Levy
15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th Floor
Encino, CA 91436
(818) 995-0800
14

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 11/15/2004	S120903

Disposition
Nov 15 2004	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Dec 1 2003	Petition for review filed   respondent Harbor Regional Center
Dec 4 2003	Petition for review filed   Harbor regional Center, respondent.
Dec 4 2003	Record requested
Dec 23 2003	Answer to petition for review filed   plaintiffs and appellants (Yoshi Morohoshi and Hikaru John Morohoshi)
Jan 8 2004	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse.
Jan 22 2004	Letter sent to:   all parties with enclosures: grant order and certification of interested entities or persons form.
Jan 22 2004	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown, and Moreno, JJ.
Feb 2 2004	Request for extension of time filed   by Respondent Harbor Regional Center's Opening Brief on the Merits to and including 3/22/2004.
Feb 4 2004	Extension of time granted   On application of Respondent Harbor Regional Center and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the Opening Brief on the Merits is extended to and including 3-22-2004.
Feb 6 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for respondent, Harbor Regional Center.
Feb 9 2004	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by counsel for appellants (Morohoshi et al.)
Mar 5 2004	Received:   Notice of address change for LANGE & KONCIOUS, LLP, counsel for plaintiffs and appellants (Morohoshi et al)
Mar 22 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed   by Respondent Harbor Regional Center
Apr 22 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed   by plaintiffs and appellants CRC40k
Apr 22 2004	Received:   Appellants' Unopposed Application for Calendar Preference; Declaration of Jeffrey A. Koncius
May 3 2004	Request for extension of time filed   by resp to file the reply brief on the merits, to 5/26.
May 10 2004	Extension of time granted   to 5-26-04 for resp Harbor Regional Center to file the reply brief on the merits.
May 27 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   (CRC 40N/FedEx)
Jun 8 2004	Request for extension of time to file amicus curiae brief   to file Application of and Amicus Curiae Brief by Association of Regional Center Agencies (ARCA) to and including July 19, 2004.
Jun 10 2004	Extension of time granted   The aplication of amicus curiae Association of Regional Center Agencies (ARCA) and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its application and amicus curiae brief in support of respondents herein is extended to and including July 9, 2004. No further extensions of time will be granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jun 25 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief of Protections & Advocacy, Inc. and Capitol People First - under same cover ac supports resp. Harbor Regional Center .
Jun 25 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief (separate) by the Attorney General on behalf of the Department of Developmental Disabiities Services (in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center)
Jul 7 2004	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The aplication of the Attorney General for the California Department of Developmental Services for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent Harbor Regional Center is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jul 7 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed   by the Attorney General for the California Department of Developmental Services in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center.
Jul 7 2004	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Protection & Advocacy, Inc. and Capitol People First for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and fled by any party within twenty days of the fiing of the brief.
Jul 7 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed   Protection & Advocacy, Inc. and Capitol People First in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center.
Jul 8 2004	Change of contact information filed for:   Helen A. Michels, Giovanniello & Michels, LLP, 1470 South Valley Vista Drive, Suite 200, Diamond Bar, CA 91765. Telephone and Fax numbers unchanged.
Jul 12 2004	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   and brief of Association of Regional Center Agencies (ARCA) in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center.
Jul 15 2004	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Association of Regional Center Agencies (ARCA) for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jul 15 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed   Association of Regional Center Agencies (ARCA) in support of Respondent Harbor Regional Center.
Aug 11 2004	Case ordered on calendar   9-9-04, 9am, S.F.
Sep 9 2004	Cause argued and submitted
Nov 15 2004	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   Opinion by Brown, J. -----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, & Moreno, JJ.
Dec 16 2004	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Dec 29 2004	Received:   receipt for remittitur CA 2/7.

Briefs
Mar 22 2004	Opening brief on the merits filed
Apr 22 2004	Answer brief on the merits filed
May 27 2004	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Jul 7 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jul 7 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jul 15 2004	Amicus curiae brief filed

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