Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S134253

Internat. Prof. & Tech. Engineers v. Super. Ct.

Filed 8/27/07 (follows in sequence companion case, S134072, also filed 8/27/07)


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA




INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION

OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL )
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 21, AFL-CIO et al., )


Petitioners,

S134253

v.

Ct.App.

1/3

A108488

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

ALAMEDA COUNTY,

Alameda

County

Respondent;

Super. Ct. No. RG04166830

CONTRA COSTA NEWSPAPERS,

INC., et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.



This case presents the question whether the names and salaries of public

employees earning $100,000 or more per year, including peace officers, are

exempt from public disclosure under the California Public Records Act (Gov.

Code, § 6250 et seq.).1 The Court of Appeal concluded they are not, because

“well-established norms of California public policy and American public

employment exclude public employee names and salaries from the zone of


1

All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless

otherwise noted.

1


financial privacy protection.” For the reasons explained below, we affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I.

Reporters employed by Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. (the Newspapers)

requested under the California Public Records Act (the Act) that the City of

Oakland (the City) provide them with the names, job titles, and gross salaries of all

city employees who earned $100,000 or more in fiscal year 2003-2004, including

those individuals whose base salary equaled or exceeded that amount and those

who earned a lower base salary but were paid $100,000 or more because of

overtime work. The City agreed to disclose salary and overtime information for

each job classification, but refused to provide salary information linked to

individual employees, claiming that individually identified salary information is

exempt from disclosure. The Newspapers sought a writ of mandate in the superior

court to compel the City to disclose the requested salary records.

The City’s refusal was a departure from its past practice. At least during

the years 1996 through 2003, the City’s personnel director disclosed the names,

job titles, and salaries of all city employees, and this information was published in

a local newspaper. The City changed its policy in May 2004, citing as factors

supporting this decision (1) two appellate court decisions that recognized a privacy

right in public employee salary information (Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless,

LLC (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1500 (Priceless) and City of Los Angeles v. Superior

Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 883 (City of Los Angeles)); (2) increased concerns

regarding financial privacy; and (3) strong opposition to its prior policy from two

unions that represented city employees. In addition, because the City has a merit-

based compensation system, it concluded that disclosing the salaries of public

employees by name each year would permit members of the public to construct a

2

performance evaluation of each employee by calculating the percentage increase

in his or her salary from year to year, which would invade the employees’ privacy.

The superior court granted leave to intervene to two employee unions, the

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21 (Local

21) and the Oakland Police Officers Association (the Police Officers Association).

The superior court granted the Newspapers’ petition and ordered the City to

disclose the requested salary information. The court concluded that the City and

the intervening unions had failed to establish that city employees who earn

$100,000 or more have any protected privacy interest in information related to

their salary, and found that such salary information consistently had been

disclosed in the past, both by the City and by federal, state, and other local

governments. Although the City and some other cities recently had refused to

disclose individually identified salary information, the court concluded that these

refusals appeared to reflect “uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the

[Act] in light of recent court decisions.”

The superior court also concluded that, even assuming a privacy interest

existed, that interest is outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. The court

found “extremely speculative” the fears expressed by two declarants that identity

fraud and unwanted solicitations would ensue in the event information disclosing

their salaries were to be released. Furthermore, the superior court found, the

evidence presented by the Newspapers supports their contention that disclosure of

the names of employees in connection with their individual salaries is “in many

cases necessary to disclose inefficiency, favoritism, nepotism, and fraud with

respect to the government’s use of public funds for employee salaries.” The court

also rejected the Police Officers Association’s contention that a different result is

required under Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 with regard to its members

because those statutes render peace officer personnel records confidential, the

3

court concluding that salary information is not included within the definition of

“personnel records” under the latter statute.

The City chose not to appeal from the judgment rendered by the superior

court. Local 21 and the Police Officers Association (collectively, the Unions)

filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. After issuing an order

to show cause, that court denied the Unions’ petitions. The Unions then

successfully sought review in this court.

II.

A.

Openness in government is essential to the functioning of a democracy.

“Implicit in the democratic process is the notion that government should be

accountable for its actions. In order to verify accountability, individuals must

have access to government files. Such access permits checks against the arbitrary

exercise of official power and secrecy in the political process.” (C.B.S., Inc. v.

Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651, fn. omitted (Block).) In adopting the Act, the

Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the

people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this

state.” (§ 6250.) As the result of an initiative adopted by the voters in 2004, this

principle is now enshrined in the state Constitution: “The people have the right of

access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and

therefore, . . . the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public

scrutiny.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1).)

The Legislature has been “mindful of the right of individuals to privacy.”

(§ 6250.) Set forth in the Act are numerous exceptions to the requirement of

public disclosure, many of which are designed to protect individual privacy. (See

4

§ 6254.)2 In addition, a catchall exception applies if “on the facts of the particular

case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the

public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (§ 6255, subd. (a).) Unless

one of the exceptions stated in the Act applies, the public is entitled to access to

“any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s

business owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency.” (§ 6252, subd.

(e); § 6253, subd. (a).)

The parties agree that the records at issue meet the definition of public

records contained in the Act. (§ 6252, subd. (d); § 6253, subd. (a).) The records

therefore must be disclosed unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. The

party seeking to withhold public records bears the burden of demonstrating that an

exception applies. (See § 6255.) At issue here is the exemption for “[p]ersonnel,

medical or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” (§ 6254, subd. (c).) The Unions contend that the

salaries of named public employees are “personnel . . . or similar files” and that

their disclosure constitutes an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under

this exception.

We need not decide whether the records of a public entity’s payroll

expenditures constitute “personnel . . . or similar files” because, assuming for

purposes of discussion that they do, the exemption does not apply; the disclosure

here does not constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (§ 6254,

subd. (c).) This exemption requires us to balance two competing interests, both of

which the Act seeks to protect — the public’s interest in disclosure and the


2

The 2004 initiative that amended the state Constitution to include a right of

access to public records explicitly preserves such statutory exceptions. (Cal.
Const., art.1, § 3, subd. (b)(5).)

5

individual’s interest in personal privacy. Balancing these interests, we conclude

that disclosure of the salary information at issue in the present case would not

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

“A particular class of information is private when well-established social

norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination

and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” (Hill v. National

Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35 (Hill).)3 The parties agree that

individuals have a legally recognized privacy interest in their personal financial

information. Even before the explicit incorporation of the right of privacy into our

state Constitution, we recognized that “the protection of one’s personal financial

affairs and those of his (or her) spouse and children against compulsory public

disclosure is an aspect of the zone of privacy which is protected by the Fourth

Amendment and which also falls within that penumbra of constitutional rights into

which the government may not intrude absent a showing of compelling need and

that the intrusion is not overly broad.” (City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268.) The financial disclosure statute at issue in City of

Carmel required every public officer and every candidate for state or local office

to disclose the nature and extent of his or her investments in excess of $10,000 as

well as those of his or her spouse and their minor children. We held that the law


3

As we stated in Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v.

Superior Court (Aug. 27, 2007, S134072) ___ Cal.4th ___, ___, footnote 11 [at p.
25, fn. 11] (Commission on Peace Officer Standards): “Our decision in Hill,
supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, defined the elements that must be proved in order to establish a
claim for invasion of the state constitutional right of privacy. Although we find
the definition of privacy used in Hill to be useful in the present context, we do not
intend to suggest that an intrusion upon a privacy interest must rise to the level of
an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy in order to be recognized under
. . . section 6254, subdivision (c).”

6

was an overbroad intrusion into the right of privacy and thereby invalidly

restricted the right to seek or hold public office or employment. “[T]he right of

privacy concerns one’s feelings and one’s own peace of mind [citation] and

certainly one’s personal financial affairs are an essential element of such peace of

mind.” (Ibid.) In City of Carmel, we balanced the government’s need to minimize

conflicts of interest against the individual’s right to maintain privacy in his or her

personal financial affairs, concluding that the financial disclosure statute at issue

was unconstitutional because it made no attempt to link the disclosure

requirements to the dealings or assets that might be expected to give rise to a

conflict. (Id. at p. 269; but see County of Nevada v. MacMillan (1974) 11 Cal.3d

662 [upholding later enacted, more narrowly drawn financial disclosure law].)

The statute at issue in City of Carmel required disclosure of personal

financial matters unrelated to the individual’s public employment. The present

case, in contrast, involves disclosure of financial matters directly related to the

individual’s public employment. Of course, we recognize that many individuals,

including public employees, may be uncomfortable with the prospect of others

knowing their salary and that many of these individuals would share that

information only on a selective basis, even within the workplace. Nor do we

question that public disclosure of an individual’s salary may cause discomfort or

embarrassment. Nonetheless, in light of the strong public policy supporting

transparency in government, an individual’s expectation of privacy in a salary

earned in public employment is significantly less than the privacy expectation

regarding income earned in the private sector.

To the extent some public employees may expect their salaries to remain a

private matter, that expectation is not a reasonable one and is, accordingly, entitled

to diminished weight in the balancing test we apply under section 6254,

subdivision (c). The “customs, practices, and physical setting surrounding

7

particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy.”

(Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 36.) “A ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an

objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community

norms.” (Id. at p. 37.) The “broadly based and widely accepted community

norm[]” applicable to government employee salary information is public

disclosure.

Well before the Act was adopted, the Attorney General stated that “the

name of every public officer and employee, as well as the amount of his salary, is

a matter of public record.” (State Employees’ Retirement Act, 25

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 90, 91 (1955) [concluding that state-paid retirement benefits

are public records].) Following adoption of the Act, the Attorney General

consistently has maintained that same position. (See County Payroll Records as

Public Records, 60 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 110 (1977) [county payroll records of

names and amounts received by retirees are public records]; Records for

Performance Awards, 68 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 73 (1985) [records of the amounts

and reasons for performance awards granted to executive managers of a city are

subject to disclosure under the Act].)

The Attorney General’s long-standing position that government payroll

information is public is consistent with the widespread practice of federal, state,

and local governments.4 Evidence submitted to the superior court by the


4

Local 21 cites a line of federal cases, decided under analogous provisions of

the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552), that have
recognized a privacy interest in the salaries of employees of private companies
who are paid with public funds. (See, e.g., Painting Industry of Hawaii v. Dept. of
Air Force
(9th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 1479, 1483-1484; Painting and Drywall Work
Preservation Fund v. HUD
(D.C. Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 1300, 1303; Hopkins v. U.S.
Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev.
(2d Cir. 1991) 929 F.2d 81, 87-88; Sheet Metal
Workers v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs
(3d Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 891, 903; see also

(footnote continued on next page)

8

Newspapers demonstrates that disclosure of salary information has been the

practice of both the state and of local governments, including not only the City of

Oakland itself but also the nearby City of Berkeley, the City and County of San

Francisco, as well as Contra Costa County. The Newspapers’ evidence also

establishes that it is a policy of the State Controller to consider the name and

salary of every public employee a matter of public record and to disclose this

information to any member of the public upon request. Additionally, federal

regulations require that the salary rates, including special performance awards and

bonuses, of most employees be made public. (5 C.F.R. § 293.311 (2007).) The

Court of Appeal in the present case, undertaking a review of case law from other

jurisdictions, observed that “disclosure of public employee names and salaries is

overwhelmingly the norm.”5


(footnote continued from previous page)

Campbell v. United States Civil Service Commission (10th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 58,
62.) These cases are distinguishable from the present one because they do not
involve public employees.

5

The Court of Appeal cited the following cases: Local 1264 v. Municipality

of Anchorage (Alaska 1999) 973 P.2d 1132 (disclosure of municipal employees’
names and salaries does not violate their constitutional right of privacy or
municipal code provision exempting personnel records from disclosure);
Richmond County Hospital Authority v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp. (Ga.
1984) 311 S.E.2d 806 (county hospital authority required to disclose names and
salaries of employees earning $28,000 or more per year); Magic Valley
Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center
(Idaho 2002) 59 P.3d
314 (names and salaries of employees earning more than $50,000 per year not
exempt from disclosure under public records law); People ex rel. Recktenwald v.
Janura
(Ill.App.Ct. 1978) 376 N.E.2d 22 (county forest preserve district required
to disclose names and salaries of employees); Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids
(Iowa 1999) 601 N.W. 2d 42 (compensation of city employees, including amount
of sick leave used, subject to disclosure under open records act); State Dept. of
SRS v. PERB
(Kan. 1991) 815 P.2d 66 (statute exempted personnel records but
required disclosure of employee names, salaries, and length of employment);

(footnote continued on next page)

9


(footnote continued from previous page)

Caple v. Brown (La. 1975) 323 So.2d 217 (sheriff required to disclose records of
salary fund); Moberly v. Herboldsheimer (Md. 1975) 345 A.2d 855 (hospital
required to disclose salary of director); Hastings & Sons Pub. Co. v. City
Treasurer
(Mass. 1978) 375 N.E.2d 299 (city required to disclose payroll records,
including payroll records of police department); Penokie v. Mich. Technological
University
(Mich.Ct.App. 1980) 287 N.W.2d 304 (public university required to
disclose salaries and wages of university employees); Ms. Dept. of Wildlife v.
Wildlife Enf. Off.
(Miss. 1999) 740 So.2d 925 (state agency required to disclose
amount of compensation time accrued by each of its employees); Pulitzer Pub. v.
MOSERS
(Mo.App. 1996) 927 S.W.2d 477 (statute requiring disclosure of public
employees’ salaries also required disclosure of retirees’ pensions); Mans v.
Lebanon School Board
(N.H. 1972) 290 A.2d 866 (school board required to
disclose teachers’ salaries); Winston v. Mangan (Sup. Ct. 1972) 338 N.Y.S.2d 654
(list of park district employees and their salaries subject to disclosure); State ex
rel. Petty v. Wurst
(Ohio Ct.App. 1989) 550 N.E.2d 214 (county required to
provide names and salary rates or total compensation of its employees); Moak v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
(Pa.Commw.Ct. 1975) 336 A.2d 920 (city finance
department required to disclose police department payroll records); Cleveland
Newspapers, Inc. v. Bradley
(Tenn.Ct.App.1981) 621 S.W.2d 763 (hospital
required to disclose payroll records); Redding v. Brady (Utah 1980) 606 P.2d 1193
(state college required to disclose names and gross salaries of employees); but cf.
Redding v. Jacobsen (Utah 1981) 638 P.2d 503 (statute prohibiting disclosure of
salary information for employees of institutions of higher education is not
unconstitutional); Tacoma Public Library v. Woessner (Wn.Ct.App. 1998) 951
P.2d 357 (records of employee names, salaries, benefits, and vacation and sick
leave pay not exempt from disclosure); but see Smith v. Okanogan County
(Wn.Ct.App. 2000) 994 P.2d 857 (list of persons employed by county prosecutor’s
office, including titles and rates of compensation, not within scope of public
records act); Board of School Dir. of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Com’n
(Wis. 1969) 168 N.W.2d 92 (names, addresses, and salaries of public school
teachers are public record).


Neither Local 21 nor the Police Officers Association challenges the Court

of Appeal’s conclusions regarding the prevailing norm in other states. We note
that an American Law Reports Annotation on the subject identified only two cases
in which records disclosing the salaries of current government employees were
held to be exempt from disclosure under state public records laws: Priceless,
supra
, 112 Cal.App.4th 1500, and Smith v. Okanogan County, supra, 994 P.2d
857. (Annot., Payroll Records of Individual Government Employees as Subject to

(footnote continued on next page)

10

Counterbalancing any cognizable interest that public employees may have

in avoiding disclosure of their salaries is the strong public interest in knowing how

the government spends its money. As we have observed in the context of the

public’s right of access to court proceedings and documents, public access makes

it possible for members of the public “ ‘to expose corruption, incompetence,

inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism.’ ” (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v.

Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1211, fn. 28, quoting Estate of Hearst

(1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777.)

In the analogous context of open meeting laws, a distinction has been

drawn between personnel matters, which may be discussed in sessions closed to

the public, and salaries, which must be discussed in open session.6 (San Diego

Union v. City Council (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 947.) California’s open meetings

law, the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act), requires that the meetings of local

legislative bodies be open to the public, except as otherwise provided. (§ 54953.)

The Brown Act permits a closed session for the consideration of “the appointment,

employment, evaluation of performance, discipline, or dismissal of a public

employee . . . .” (§ 54957, subd. (b)(1).) Accordingly, the San Diego Union case

held that the Brown Act permitted a city council to discuss, in closed session, the

performance of various city management employees, but that any discussion or


(footnote continued from previous page)

Disclosure to Public (1980) 100 A.L.R.3d 699, 705-706, § 3[b], and later cases
(2006 Supp.) p. 80, § 3[b].)

6

The Brown Act serves the same democratic purposes as the California

Public Records Act: “The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their
public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is
not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they
may retain control over the instruments they have created.” (§ 54950.)

11

decision about salary increases for those employees must take place in open

session. The court rejected the argument that salary fell within the exception for

discussions of “employment” or “evaluation of performance” because an

employee’s salary was a term and condition of the employee’s continued

employment and closely related to performance. “Salaries and other terms of

compensation constitute municipal budgetary matters of substantial public interest

warranting open discussion and eventual electoral . . . ratification. Public visibility

breeds public awareness which in turn fosters public activism[,] politically and

subtly encouraging the governmental entity to permit public participation in the

discussion process. It is difficult to imagine a more critical time for public

scrutiny of its governmental decision-making process than when the latter is

determining how it shall spend public funds.” (San Diego Union, supra, 146

Cal.App.3d at p. 955.)7

These same considerations support the conclusion that salary information

should not be exempt from disclosure under the Act. The Newspapers submitted

to the trial court numerous examples of articles published throughout the state that

used information concerning public employee salaries to illustrate claimed

nepotism, favoritism, or financial mismanagement in state and local government.


7

The only portion of the Act that addresses public employee compensation

directly is section 6254.8, which provides that “[e]very employment contract
between a state or local agency and any public official or public employee is a
public record which is not subject to” the exemptions specified in sections 6254
and 6255. Although the Newspapers do not contend that Oakland’s employees
come within the terms of section 6254.8, this statute indicates that the Legislature
viewed the amount of compensation paid to public employees in the context of
employment contracts as a matter of public interest so substantial that it could not
be outweighed by any claim of privacy (under § 6254, subd. (c)) or other public
interests (under § 6255, subd. (a)).

12

For instance, one article disclosed that a city department manager’s wife was

earning $80,000 as an information technology specialist assigned to that

department while the department was suffering a budget shortfall requiring

layoffs. Another article exposed the circumstance that a city assessor hired a

number of individuals who had contributed to (or worked on) her election

campaign. Other articles revealed numerous additional instances of questionable

use of public funds. Changes in a school district pension system resulted in large

pension increases to some of the district’s top administrators. Legislation

reclassified an increasing number of state employees as safety workers eligible for

pensions higher than those received by other state workers. A University of

California executive received a substantial pay raise at the same time the

university was laying off other employees and raising student tuition. A city

firefighter, a police officer, and a transit supervisor were the city’s highest

grossing employees due to overtime pay. These examples, even when they reveal

no impropriety, amply illustrate that disclosure of government salary information

serves a significant public interest.

In upholding the trial court’s order requiring disclosure, the Court of

Appeal expressly declined to follow Priceless, supra, 112 Cal.App. 4th 1500, a

case that, as noted above, contributed to the City of Oakland’s decision to

discontinue its historical practice of disclosing the salaries of its employees. Like

the Court of Appeal, we find Priceless to be unpersuasive.

In that case, a newspaper requested, from a number of cities, disclosure of

the names and salaries of city employees. The appellate court upheld a trial court

order granting a preliminary injunction, sought by a number of employee unions,

requiring the cities to withhold such records pending resolution of the case. In that

procedural posture and limited context, the appellate court concluded that the

13

unions were likely to prevail on their claim that the records were exempt from

disclosure under section 6250, subdivision (c).

The Court of Appeal in Priceless rejected the newspaper’s argument that

public employees had no right to control the dissemination of their individually

identified salary information. The appellate court reasoned that the Act recognizes

a right of privacy in one’s personnel files. (§ 6254, subd. (c); Priceless, supra,

112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1514-1515.) Because the parties had stipulated that the

details of the city employees’ salaries were maintained in confidential personnel

files, the Court of Appeal found support for “the trial court’s recognition that a

privacy interest was at stake and that the expectation of privacy was reasonable

under the circumstances.” (Priceless, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516, fn.

omitted.) Weighing the individual’s privacy interests against the public’s right to

disclosure, the appellate court found no evidence in the trial record to support the

newspaper’s contention that “revealing the individuals’ names would shed light on

government conduct.” (Id. at p. 1522.) The reviewing court concluded that on the

record before it, the public interest in knowing how public money is spent and in

being informed of the earnings of government employees at various levels was

met by the bare disclosure of the staff positions and of the compensation set for

each position, without the need to disclose the names of the employees occupying

those positions. The court characterized as “speculative” the newspaper’s

contention that revealing the names of employees might disclose improprieties,

but also noted that both sides would have the “opportunity to present additional

evidence” on the issue. (Id. at pp. 1522-1523.) Ultimately, the appellate court

upheld the preliminary injunction “in light of the limited evidence before the trial

court.” (Id. at p. 1523.)

Because of the procedural posture of the case, the precedential value of

Priceless is slight. In contrast to the limited record available to the court in

14

Priceless, the present case was decided after a full hearing. As noted above, the

Newspapers presented substantial evidence demonstrating that disclosure of the

names and salaries of public employees would serve the public interest sought to

be protected by the Act. The Newspapers also presented evidence concerning the

historic practices of other governmental entities, which supported the conclusion

that any expectation of privacy that public employees may have that their salaries

will be confidential is not reasonable.

To the extent the decision in Priceless may be read to stand for the

proposition that the practice of particular governmental entities in refusing to

disclose salary information can create a privacy interest in those records that must

be recognized under the Act, we disagree. The appellate court in Priceless

concluded that because the cities that were parties in that case kept salary

information confidential, the employees’ expectation of privacy in their salary

information was reasonable. The court’s decision focused narrowly on the

practice of the particular cities whose records were being sought in that case,

apparently because those practices were the only ones in evidence. The practice of

a few cities does not, however, demonstrate a “broadly based and widely accepted

community norm[].” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37.) The Act should apply in the

same way to comparable records maintained by comparable governmental entities.

Whether or not a particular type of record is exempt should not depend upon the

peculiar practice of the government entity at issue — otherwise, an agency could

transform public records into private ones simply by refusing to disclose them

over a period of time.

Local 21 also contends that before individually identified salary

information may be disclosed, section 6254, subdivision (c) must be applied on a

case-by-case basis, taking into account the privacy interest peculiar to the

individual employee as well as the particular public interest in being informed of

15

the salary of that employee.8 The approach proposed by Local 21 would reverse


8

In support of this argument, Local 21 relies upon the decision of the United

States Supreme Court in National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish (2004)
541 U.S. 157 (Favish), interpreting the FOIA. As explained below, because the
provision of the FOIA interpreted in Favish is dissimilar to section 6254,
subdivision (c), that case is inapposite.
Favish denied relief to an individual seeking to compel the production of
death-scene photographs of the body of the President’s deputy counsel, whose
death resulted from an apparent suicide. The high court considered the FOIA’s
exemption for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes”
when their production “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy
.” (5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C), italics added.) In
recognizing that the deceased’s surviving family members had a privacy interest in
the photographs of his body, the high court took an expansive view of the concept
of personal privacy. It specifically relied upon the circumstance that the language
used in the law enforcement records exemption — “ ‘could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ ” — was “in
marked contrast to” the language used in the exemption for personnel records,
which applies only when the disclosure “ ‘would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.’ ” (Favish, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 165, quoting 5
U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), (7).)


The high court held that “[w]here the privacy concerns addressed by [the

law enforcement records] exemption are present, the exemption requires the
person requesting the information to establish a sufficient reason for the
disclosure. First, the citizen must show that the public interest sought to be
advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the
information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is
likely to advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.”
(Favish, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 172.) The court in Favish stated that the exemption
in 5 United States Code section 552 (b)7(C) “requires us to protect, in the proper
degree, the personal privacy of citizens against the uncontrolled release of
information compiled through the power of the State.” (Favish, at p. 172.) When,
as in Favish, the requesting party seeks the disclosure in order to show that the
responsible government officials acted improperly, “the requestor must establish
more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure.” (Id. at p. 174.)


The law enforcement records exemption at issue in Favish is not

comparable to the personnel records exemption of the Act, and shifting the burden
of proof to the party seeking disclosure under the Act would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the payroll records here at issue, unlike information collected and

(footnote continued on next page)

16

the presumption of openness contained in the Act. The records at issue are

presumptively open because they contain “information relating to the conduct of

the public’s business.” (§ 6252, subd.(e).) The burden is on the agency

maintaining the records to demonstrate that the record in question is exempt.

(§ 6255.) The City and the Unions failed to present any evidence establishing that

the City’s consistent past practice of disclosing its employees’ salaries created any

safety or privacy problems for those employees that would outweigh the public

interest in disclosure.

Claims for exemption based upon facts and circumstances peculiar to an

individual and his or her duties could, of course, be considered either under

section 6254, subdivision (c) or under the catchall exemption, which applies when

“on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the

record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”

(§ 6255, subd. (a).) For example, the Police Officers Association contends that

officers who are working undercover often receive large amounts of overtime pay,

and that disclosure of their names and salaries could reveal their identities and

endanger their safety. If an officer’s anonymity is essential to his or her safety, the

need to protect the officer would outweigh the public interest in disclosure and

would justify withholding the officer’s name. (Commission on Peace Officer

Standards, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at p. 26].) “The public has a strong

interest in maintaining the safety and efficacy of its law enforcement agencies.

But ‘[t]he prospect that somehow this information in the hands of the press will

increase the danger to some . . . cannot alone support a finding in favor of

(footnote continued from previous page)

maintained solely for law enforcement purposes, plainly are relevant to the
business of the government.

17

nondisclosure as to all.’ (CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 652.) The

means for protecting such officers is to segregate the information relating to them

from the records that are disclosed.” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards,

supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at pp. 26-27]; see also Gov. Code, § 6257; American

Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982) 32 Cal.3d 440, 453, fn.

13.) Neither the City nor the Unions offered any evidence in the superior court

that salary information pertaining to particular individuals should be exempted

under section 6254, subdivision (c) or 6255, subdivision (a).

B.

Local 21 argues that even if the salaries of government employees are a

matter of public record, “limitations on the method of disclosure of that

information . . . are appropriate to prevent intrusions upon constitutionally

protected privacy rights.” Local 21 contends that the mass, indiscriminate

disclosure of salary information related to all City of Oakland employees earning

$100,000 or more constitutes an invasion of their right of privacy under article I,

section 1 of the California Constitution, because providing the information in that

form could contribute to the accumulation of information concerning these

individuals that might be exploited by commercial interests. For example, Local

21 asserts that “[a] database of government employees who make $100,000 a year

or more would obviously be of great commercial interest to marketers of certain

kinds of investments and insurance policies,” who could supplement this

information with addresses, phone numbers, or e-mail addresses obtainable on the

Internet and contact employees to solicit their business. Therefore, Local 21

argues, the issue whether the salaries of government employees must be disclosed

should be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular

privacy interest of the individual involved and the asserted public interest in the

disclosure of that individual’s salary.

18

The party claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy

established in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution must establish (1) a

legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the

circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest. (Hill, supra, 7

Cal.4th at pp. 39-40.) As discussed above, we conclude that public employees do

not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the amount of their salaries.

Furthermore, Local 21 offered no evidence in the superior court supporting its

assertion that the information at issue was likely to be exploited by commercial

interests in a manner that would invade the privacy of employees. As the superior

court observed, Local 21 has not introduced any evidence of adverse consequences

resulting from the disclosure of this information in the past, although the

information regularly was published in a local newspaper.

Even were we to assume that Local 21 is correct in asserting that the

information at issue might be exploited by commercial enterprises, that

circumstance alone would not render disclosure of the information here at issue a

violation of the constitutional right of privacy. In order to determine whether an

alleged invasion of privacy is sufficiently serious to constitute a violation of that

constitutional right, the competing privacy and nonprivacy interests must be

balanced. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37.) “Invasion of a privacy interest is not a

violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a

competing interest.” (Id. at p. 38.)

As discussed above, the public has a strong, well-established interest in the

amount of salary paid to public employees. Indeed, Local 21 does not dispute that

the job classifications of individual employees and the range of pay associated

with those classifications should be available to the public. The interest of

employees in avoiding unwanted solicitations or marketing efforts is, on the other

hand, comparatively weak. The City has not been asked to disclose any contact

19

information for these employees, such as home addresses or telephone numbers.

(Cf. San Jose v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1021 [city not

required to disclose names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons who

made complaints about airport noise, because invasion of privacy not outweighed

by public interest in disclosure under section 6255]; see also Department of

Defense v. FLRA (1994) 510 U.S. 487 [FOIA does not require federal agencies to

disclose employees’ home addresses to union].)

Local 21 cites Westbrook v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th

157 (Westbrook) and provisions of the California Rules of Court as demonstrating

a constitutionally cognizable privacy interest in preventing commercial enterprises

from employing government records to compile and exploit personal information.

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.500 et seq.) Neither Westbrook nor the California

Rules of Court support such an expansive view of the constitutional right of

privacy. In Westbrook, a person in the business of selling criminal offender

background information brought an action to compel a municipal court to sell him

computer tapes containing copies of the court’s information system. The system

contained a plethora of information obtained from criminal case files, including

not only information concerning the charges and their disposition but also personal

identifying information such as the date of birth, race, sex, personal description,

and Social Security number of each defendant. (Westbrook, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th

at p. 161.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the distribution of such

information would violate Penal Code section 13300, which generally prohibits a

local criminal justice agency, including a court, from distributing information that

relates a person’s criminal history. The court reasoned that although the public

was entitled to access individual court files, providing electronic access in the

form of the court’s information system would permit the compilation and

20

distribution of criminal histories, in violation of the statute. (Westbrook, supra, at

pp. 163-165.)

The court in Westbrook also concluded that the “state constitutional right of

privacy extends to protect defendants from unauthorized disclosure of criminal

history records.” (Westbrook, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 165-166, citing Craig

v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 76-77.) In support of this

conclusion, Westbrook cited U. S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee (1989)
489 U.S. 749, which held that the FOIA did not require the disclosure of an

individual citizen’s rap sheet compiled by the Department of Justice. The high

court in that case concluded that such disclosure “can reasonably be expected to

invade that citizen’s privacy, and that when the request seeks no ‘official

information’ about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government

happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is ‘unwarranted.’ ” (Id. at p. 780.)

The decisions in Westbrook and Reporters Committee protect sensitive

information contained in governmental records that does not, when separated from

those records and compiled, contribute to the public’s understanding of

government operations.

The California Rules of Court cited by the Police Officers Association

similarly serve to prevent the compilation of private information contained in

court records. The rules limit internet access to (and bulk distribution of)

electronic court records, except for the calendar, register of actions, and index.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.503, subds. (b), (f), and (g); but see id., rule 2.503,

subd. (f) [exception to prohibition on internet access to criminal case files in which

public interest is extraordinary].) These limitations are designed to prevent courts

from distributing their records in a manner that permits the compilation of

“personal information culled from any document, paper, or exhibit filed in a

lawsuit.” (Advisory Com. Com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.503, subds. (f) & (g).)

21

Otherwise, “[t]his type of aggregate information may be exploited for commercial

or other purposes unrelated to the operations of the courts, at the expense of

privacy rights of individuals.” (Ibid.)

The salary information sought by the Newspapers in the present case, in

contrast to the type of information addressed in Westbrook, Reporters Committee,

and the California Rules of Court, is not private information that happens to be

collected in the records of a public entity. Rather, it is information regarding an

aspect of government operations, the disclosure of which contributes to the

public’s understanding and oversight of those operations by allowing interested

parties to monitor the expenditure of public funds. The disclosure of such

information under the Act does not violate the right of privacy protected by the

California Constitution.

C.

As to employees who are peace officers, the Police Officers Association

contends that Penal Code section 832.7 bars disclosure of the amount of an

officer’s salary. The Act exempts from disclosure any records “the disclosure of

which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law.” (Gov. Code

§ 6254, subd. (k).) Penal Code section 832.7 provides that “[p]eace officer . . .

personnel records, . . . or information obtained from [those] records, are

confidential.” Because peace officer personnel records and information obtained

from such records are made confidential by Penal Code section 832.7, they are

exempt from disclosure under Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k).

(Commission on Peace Officer Standards, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at p. 8];

Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1284-1286;

§ 6276.34.)

The phrase “personnel records” is defined in Penal Code section 832.8 to

include “any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing

22

agency and containing records relating to any of the following: [¶] (a) Personal

data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment

history, home addresses, or similar information. [¶] (b) Medical history. [¶]

(c) Election of employee benefits. [¶] (d) Employee advancement, appraisal, or

discipline. [¶] (e) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an

event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived,

and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. [¶]

(f) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” The Police Officers Association contends that

salary information constitutes “personal data” under Penal Code section 832.8,

subdivision (a). It argues that salary is “personal” because it relates to the

individual and because most persons view their salary as a private matter. We

disagree.

We begin with the ordinary meaning of the word in question. “ ‘Personal’

generally is defined to mean ‘of or relating to a particular person.’ (Webster’s 3d

New Internat. Dict. (2002), p. 1686; American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000)

p. 1311.) The word ‘personal,’ however, also carries a connotation of ‘private,’

meaning ‘peculiar or proper to private concerns,’ ‘not public or general’

(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 1686), or ‘[c]oncerning a particular

person and his or private business, interests, or activities; intimate’ (American

Heritage Dict., supra, at p. 1311).” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards,

supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at p. 18] [names of peace officers are not personal

information within the meaning of Pen. Code § 832.8, subd. (a)].) A public

employee’s salary relates to a particular person, but, as discussed above, it is a

matter of public interest and not primarily a matter of the individual’s private

business.

23

Furthermore, considering the language of Penal Code section 832.8,

subdivision (a) as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend the

words “personal data” to carry their broadest possible meaning, encompassing any

and all information related to a particular officer. Because subdivision (a)

includes a general term — “personal data” — followed by a nonexhaustive list of

specific examples — “marital status, family members, educational and

employment history, home addresses” — the principle of ejusdem generis

provides guidance in discerning the Legislature’s intent. “Ejusdem generis applies

whether specific words follow general words in a statute or vice versa. In either

event, the general term or category is ‘restricted to those things that are similar to

those which are enumerated specifically.’ ” (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors

XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1160, fn. 7.) “The canon presumes that if the

Legislature intends a general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not

also offer as examples peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions

then would be surplusage.” (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000)

23 Cal.4th 116, 141; see also Civ. Code, § 3534 [“Particular expressions qualify

those which are general”]; Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment

& Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 46 [statute authorizing commission to take

“such action” as it believes will effectuate the purposes of the Fair Employment

and Housing Act, “including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading

of employees, with or without back pay, and restoration to membership in any

respondent labor organization,” does not authorize commission to award

compensatory damages]; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council

of Carpenters (1979) 25 Cal.3d 317, 330-331 [statute’s reference to “ ‘conduct

that is unlawful, including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, the unlawful

blocking of access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, or other

similar unlawful activity’ ” does not apply to peaceful picketing, which, unlike the

24

listed examples, “does not involve violence or substantially impair the rights of

others”].)

The examples of “personal data” listed in Penal Code section 832.8,

subdivision (a) do not include information, such as salary, arising from the

officer’s employment with the agency that maintains his or her personnel file.

“Rather, they are the types of personal information that commonly are supplied by

an employee to his or her employer, either during the application process or upon

employment.” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards, supra, ___ Cal. 4th ___,

fn. omitted [at p. 16]; compare, e.g., Garden Grove Police Department v. Superior

Court of Orange County (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 430, 434 [birth date of peace

officer is “personal data” under Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a)].) In

contrast, categories of information that arise out of the employment relationship —

employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline, and complaints — are listed

separately, in subdivisions (d) and (e) of Penal Code section 832.8. Had the

Legislature intended the word “personal” to be employed in its broadest sense, the

listing of examples in subdivision (a) would have been unnecessary; indeed, there

would have been no need to include items (b) through (e), each of which relates to

the individual officer.

In view of the foregoing history and widespread practice of disclosure of

public salary information, had the Legislature intended Penal Code section 832.7

to change the law in that respect we would expect to see specific language to that

effect in the statute. The Legislature easily could have added “salary” to the list of

personnel records set forth in Penal Code section 832.8. Indeed, the Legislature’s

inclusion of one form of compensation — “election of employee benefits” — is a

strong indication that the omission of “salary” was deliberate. Ordinarily, the

enumeration of one item in a statute implies that the Legislature intended to

exclude others. (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 588.) Although this

25

principle is not applied if the result would be contrary to legislative intent or when

no manifest reason appears for excluding one matter and including another (see

People v. Anavalone (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1074, 1079; Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21

Cal.3d 527, 539, fn. 10), in the present context there is an obvious rationale for the

Legislature’s decision to include election of benefits but not salary as part of a

peace officer’s confidential personnel record. Absent unusual circumstances, an

employee’s selection of benefits — such as the type of medical insurance, the

number of family members covered, and the choice whether to obtain life or

disability insurance — reveals information concerning the individual’s personal

life and financial decisions but little, if anything, about the operations of the

government agency that would not be revealed by making public the types of

benefits offered generally by the agency to its employees. The amount of salary

paid to a particular individual, on the other hand, does provide information

concerning the governmental agency in which the public has a legitimate and

traditionally recognized interest.

The Police Officers Association alternatively contends that peace officers’

salary information is “obtained from” information in personnel records. In

support, the Police Officers Association observes that (1) the City of Oakland

employs a merit-based compensation system, and the amount of salary paid is

based on an appraisal of the officer’s performance; (2) education, training, and

special abilities such as bilingualism also can result in an increase in

compensation; and (3) the payment of overtime wages is based on time sheets,

which assertedly also are protected personnel records (see Guthrey v. State of

California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, fn. 5). Because information in a

personnel file is used to establish a peace officer’s rate of earnings and, thereby, to

calculate his or her salary rate, the Police Officers Association contends that salary

information is “obtained from” the personnel file.

26

The Police Officers Association’s proposed interpretation of the phrase

“obtained from” is strained. In its ordinary sense, to obtain information means to

come into possession of it. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. supra, at p.

1589.) The phrase “information obtained from personnel files” is most reasonably

read to encompass information that was acquired from a personnel file maintained

by the employer. Thus, Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 do not mandate that

city payroll records reflecting peace officer salary information be excluded from

disclosure merely because some of the facts relied upon in determining the amount

of salary may be recorded in the agency’s personnel files.

Amicus Curiae Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 argues that peace

officers’ salary information falls under subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 832.8,

which includes “[a]ny other information the disclosure of which would constitute

an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” We reject the argument for the same

reasons that led us to conclude above that the disclosure of public employee salary

information does not constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”

under the Act. (Gov. Code § 6254, subd. (c).) In this context, we reject the notion

that peace officers in general have a greater privacy interest in the amount of their

salaries than that possessed by other public employees, and we observe that the

public interest in disclosure is equally strong as between peace officers and other

public employees. As noted above, individual peace officers, such as those

working undercover, may have a legitimate interest in maintaining their anonymity,

and that interest would warrant exempting their names from disclosure under the

Act. This circumstance, however, does not support the conclusion that peace

officers as a general category have a privacy interest in their identity sufficient to

render salary records confidential under Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (f)

whenever those records include individually identified officers. (See Commission

on Peace Officer Standards, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [at pp. 26-27].)

27

We disagree with the contrary conclusion reached in City of Los Angeles,

supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 883. In that case, a peace officer’s wife subpoenaed her

husband’s payroll records in a marital dissolution proceeding, requesting

information concerning all sums paid to him for any reason, records of his interest

in a retirement plan, savings plan, or stock plan, any interest in any insurance plan

or program, and any sums held in a savings plan, credit union, deferred

compensation plan, or elsewhere. (Id. at p. 886.) The husband challenged the

subpoena, claiming the records were confidential peace officer personnel records

pursuant to Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and therefore could be disclosed

only upon a showing of good cause pursuant to the procedures established in

Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. The Court of Appeal in City of Los

Angeles agreed that a peace officer’s payroll records are “personnel records” as

defined in Penal Code section 832.8, but held that the spouse of a peace officer is

not required, in a marital dissolution proceeding, to comply with those Evidence

Code sections in order to obtain such information, because “peace officers owe

their spouses the same fiduciary duty to reveal financial information as any other

citizen of this state.” (City of Los Angeles, at p. 885.)

The appellate court in City of Los Angeles concluded that the records at

issue came within the definition of peace officer personnel records, because they

constituted “information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.” (Pen. Code § 832.8, subd. (f).) The court stated:

“Payroll information is personal. Ask any ordinary reasonable person if he or she

would want their payroll information routinely disclosed to parties involved in

litigation and one would hear a resounding, ‘No.’ [Citation] Even though the pay

scale of public employees is generally a matter of public record, it is quite a

different thing to know with precision another person’s salary, selection of

benefits, and potential retirement income. Few records are deemed more personal.

28

Of all records kept by employers, it is the disclosure of payroll records that would

constitute one of the greatest ‘unwarranted invasions of personal privacy.’ ” (City

of Los Angeles, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 892.)

Because City of Los Angeles ultimately upheld the subpoena of the officer’s

financial records, the foregoing comments in that opinion are dicta. In addition,

the records at issue in that case encompassed far more than the peace officer’s

salary; they included information concerning his selection of benefits, insurance

plans, and investments. Because such records reveal information related to the

individual’s personal financial decisions but little, if anything, about the operations

of the employing entity, the appellate court reasonably could conclude that their

disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The

same cannot be said regarding the amount of a public employee’s salary. The

appellate court in City of Los Angeles did not consider the long-standing and

widespread practice of disclosing government salary expenditures and did not

address the question of whether any invasion of privacy resulting from the

disclosure of such information might be warranted in light of the public interest in

knowing the salary expenditures of government entities. Accordingly, we do not

consider City of Los Angeles persuasive and, to the extent it is inconsistent with

this opinion, it is disapproved.

The Police Officers Association urges us to conclude that even if salary is

not included within any of the categories of information enumerated in Penal Code

section 832.8, that statute nevertheless renders confidential not only the types of

information specified, but also any information “related to” the types of

information enumerated in section 832.8. The Police Officers Association relies

upon language in the statute defining “personnel records” to include “any file

maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing agency and

containing records relating to” the enumerated items. Specifically, the Police

29

Officers Association argues, salary information is confidential because it is related

to matters listed in the statute such as benefits (Pen. Code § 832.8, subd. (c)) and

employee performance (id., subd. (d)).

We agree with the Court of Appeal below that “this reading of the statute is

demonstrably overbroad. It would make confidential not only the kinds of

information specified by the Legislature, but also any information from any file

containing any item ‘relating to’ confidential information. We do not believe the

Legislature intended to paint with so broad a brush. The term ‘records relating’ to

the kinds of information specified in Penal Code section 832.8 is more reasonably

understood as a reference to records that actually reflect the enumerated items.”

Records of salary expenditures do not reflect any of the items enumerated in the

statute. Thus, Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 do not mandate that peace

officer salary information be excluded from disclosure under the Act.

III.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is

affirmed.

GEORGE, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

WERDEGAR, J.
MORENO, J.
KRIEGLER, J.*

* Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

30












CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.



The majority holds that the names and salaries of public employees are

records that are subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act.

(Gov. Code, § 6250, et seq.) I agree. And I agree with the majority that public

employees serving as peace officers have no statutory right to prevent disclosure

of their names and salaries; but unlike the majority I would simply rely on the

plain language of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 in reaching that

conclusion.

I

The scope of confidentiality accorded a peace officer’s personal

information is properly determined by construing two statutory schemes as well as

certain provisions of our state Constitution. I briefly discuss the pertinent law

below.



In 1968, the Legislature enacted the California Public Records Act (Gov.

Code, § 6251), a statutory scheme affirming every Californian’s fundamental right

of “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.” (Gov.

Code, § 6250, added by Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2946.) But public access is

not unlimited. The act does not require disclosure of records that are “exempted

or prohibited pursuant to . . . state law.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k), added by

Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2947; see also id., subd. (c) [exempting from

disclosure “[p]ersonnel . . . or similar files, the disclosure of which would

1

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”], added by Stats. 1968,

ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2946.)

A decade later, in 1978, the Legislature enacted Penal Code sections 832.7

and 832.8, as part of a statutory scheme mandating confidentiality of peace officer

personnel records. (Added by Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 5, 6, p. 2083.) Peace

officer “personnel records” made confidential by subdivision (a) of Penal Code

section 832.7 are defined in a companion statute, section 832.8. (Pen. Code,

§ 832.8, subds. (a)-(e), added by Stats. 1978, ch. 630, § 6, p. 2083, amended by

Stats. 1990, ch. 264, § 1, p. 1535.) Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 832.8

defines a personnel record as any file kept by the employing agency under the

name of the officer and containing records relating to: “[p]ersonal data, including

marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home

addresses, or other similar information.”

Thereafter, in November 2004, the voters through the power of initiative

passed Proposition 59, which amended the California Constitution to affirm the

“right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business.”

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1).) Added to the state Constitution was this

provision: “Nothing in this subdivision . . . affects the construction of any statute

. . . to the extent that it protects [the state Constitution’s] right to privacy,

including any statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of

information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a

peace officer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(3).) The initiative also directed:

“A statute, . . . including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision,

shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people’s right of access, and narrowly

construed if it limits the right of access.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).)

II

As I stated at the outset, I have no quarrel with the majority’s reasoning and

its conclusion that the California Public Records Act does not shield from

disclosure the salaries paid to named public employees. I also agree with the

2

majority that such disclosure applies to peace officers as well. But unlike the

majority I would reach the latter conclusion based on the plain language of Penal

Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, which govern the confidentiality of peace officer

personnel records.

The majority reasons that disclosing the salaries of named public

employees is permissible because public employees have no reasonable

expectation of privacy as to their salaries in light of article I, section 1 of the

California Constitution. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) In contrast, the majority

observes, peace officers do have privacy protections created by statute.

Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), makes confidential the

“personnel records” of peace officers. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section

832.8 states that files containing “[p]ersonal data, including marital status, family

members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar

information” are personnel records. Responding to a claim that peace officer

salaries fall within that provision’s definition of “personal data,” the majority

concludes that the definition pertains to employees as they come to the job. (Maj.

opn., ante, at p. 25.) That is, salary does not fall within “the types of personal

information that commonly are supplied by an employee to his or her employer,

either during the application process or upon employment.” (Commission on

Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court (Aug. 27, 2007,

S134072) ___ Cal.4th ___, fn. omitted [at p. 16].) In contrast, the majority

observes, the salary being paid to a peace officer relates to current rather than prior

employment. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.) My analysis differs.

I would simply follow the mandate of the initiative the voters passed in

2004 amending the California Constitution to, among other things, direct courts to

construe narrowly any statute limiting the people’s right of access to public

records. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).) Penal Code sections 832.7 and

832.8 do limit public access to peace officer personnel records. But they are silent

on the question of peace officer salaries, and they do not make officer names

3

confidential. Therefore, an officer’s salary is not exempt from disclosure under

the California Public Records Act. (Gov. Code, §§ 6253, subd. (b), 6254, subd.

(k).) And the public interest in disclosure of a named officer’s salary is not clearly

outweighed by any public interest in withholding disclosure. (Gov. Code, § 6255,

subd. (a).) Accordingly, the annual pay of peace officers is subject to public

disclosure.

With respect to disclosure of peace officer names, I find nothing in Penal

Code section 832.8 that would bring that information within the category of

“personal data” deemed confidential under that section; nor do I find any statutory

provision exempting such information from public disclosure. Nondisclosure of

peace officer names is permissible only when the public interest in withholding

disclosure “clearly” outweighs the public interest in disclosure. (Gov. Code,

§ 6255, subd. (a).) I agree with the majority that the public interest exception to

disclosure may apply to certain undercover officers, but that, as a general rule,

peace officers do not have a privacy interest in the confidentiality of their names

that outweighs the public interest in disclosing the names. (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 27.)

KENNARD,

J.

4












CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.




Except as to peace officers, I agree with the majority that the names and

salaries of public employees earning $100,000 or more per year are not exempt

from public disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov.

Code, § 6250 et seq.).

With regard to peace officers, I also agree with the majority’s conclusion

that the salaries of peace officers earning $100,000 or more per year, as a general

matter, are not exempt from public disclosure under the CPRA. However, I have

joined Justice Chin’s dissenting opinion in Commission on Peace Officer

Standards and Training v. Superior Court (Aug. 27, 2007, S134072) ___ Cal.4th

___ (dis. opn. of Chin, J.), which, contrary to the majority view in that case,

recognizes that peace officers’ names themselves fall into the category of

confidential “[p]ersonal data,” within the meaning of Penal Code section 832.8,

subdivision (a), when the names are recorded in peace officer personnel records.1


1

Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 are part of the statutory scheme

mandating confidentiality of peace officer personnel records. (Stats. 1978, ch.
630, §§ 5, 6, p. 2083.) Peace officer “personnel records” made confidential by
subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 832.7 are defined in subdivision (a) of
section 832.8, the companion statute, as any file kept by the employing agency
under the name of the officer and containing records relating to “[p]ersonal data,

(footnote continued on next page)

1

Accordingly, I agree with Justice Chin here that where a request is made for

disclosure of peace officers’ names in connection with a request for disclosure of

peace officer salary information, “names may not be disclosed to the extent the

source of that information is a ‘file maintained under [the peace officer’s] name by

his or her employing agency.’ (Pen. Code, § 832.8.)” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Chin,

J., ante, at p. 1.)

BAXTER, J.


(footnote continued from previous page)

including marital status, family members, educational and employment history,
home addresses, or other similar information.”

2











CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J.




Except as to peace officers, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that

names and salaries of public employees earning $100,000 or more per year are not

exempt from public disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA)

(Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.).1 As explained below, however, my analysis of this

question is somewhat different from the majority’s and I do not endorse all of the

majority’s reasoning. Regarding peace officers, I agree with the majority’s

conclusion that salary information is not exempt from disclosure. However, as

explained in my dissenting opinion in Commission on Peace Officer Standards

and Training v. Superior Court (Aug. 27, 2007, S134072) ___ Cal.4th ___ (dis.

opn. of Chin, J.), I believe that peace officers’ names are “[p]ersonal data” within

the meaning of Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a). Thus, I would hold that

where, as here, a request is made for disclosure of names linked to salary, officers’

names may not be disclosed to the extent the source of that information is a “file

maintained under [the peace officer’s] name by his or her employing agency.”

(Pen. Code, § 832.8.) I dissent to the extent the majority holds otherwise.


1

All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Government Code.

1

I. THE NAMES AND SALARIES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN PEACE

OFFICERS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.

The CPRA makes all “[p]ublic records . . . open to [public] inspection . . .

except as” expressly provided by statute. (§ 6253, subd. (a).) Because, as the

parties agree, the records in question are “public records” within the meaning of

the CPRA (§ 6254, subd. (d)), they are subject to inspection unless some statutory

exception applies. As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 5), the

exception principally at issue here is found in section 6254, subdivision (c), which

provides that nothing in the CPRA requires disclosure of “personnel, medical, or

similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy.”

In the 40 years since the Legislature enacted this CPRA disclosure

exception, we have said little about it. However, that fact does not leave us

without significant guidance. The federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ( 5

U.S.C. § 552 et seq.) contains an almost identical disclosure exception. Known as

exemption 6, the FOIA exception provides for nondisclosure of “personnel and

medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6).) “Because the

FOIA provided a model for the [CPRA], and because they have a common

purpose,” they “ ‘should receive a parallel construction.’ [Citation.] Therefore,

federal decisions under the FOIA may be used to construe the [CPRA].

[Citations.]” (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1350.)

Giving the CPRA a construction parallel to the FOIA’s, I first conclude that

the records at issue constitute “personnel . . . or similar files” under section 6254,

subdivision (c). Based on evidence of congressional intent, the high court has

broadly interpreted the scope of the term “personnel and medical files and similar

files” in exemption 6 (5 U.S.C. §552, subd. (b)(6)) to “ ‘cover [all] detailed

2

Government records on an individual [that] can be identified as applying to that

individual.’ [Citation. Fn. omitted.]” (Department of State v. Washington Post

Co. (1982) 456 U.S. 595, 602 (Washington Post).) The records sought here—the

name of each employee of the City of Oakland (the City) who earned at least

$100,000 in fiscal year 2003-2004 linked to the employee’s gross salary—clearly

qualify under that definition. I see no basis for reaching a different conclusion in

applying section 6254, subdivision (c). Indeed, in seeking disclosure, Contra

Costa Newspapers, Inc. (the Newspapers), has never argued that the requested

records are not “personnel . . . or similar files” under section 6254, subdivision (c);

on the contrary, the Newspapers’ assertion in its brief that the trial court

“employed the proper ‘statutory balancing analysis’ ” implicitly concedes that the

requested records are “[p]ersonnel . . . or similar files” to which the balancing test

applies. (§ 6254, subd. (c).) For the reasons stated above, I agree with this view,

and thus will now proceed to the balancing the statute requires.2

Like the high court in applying exemption 6, I begin the balancing inquiry

under section 6254, subdivision (c), by considering “the privacy interest at stake.”

(Department of State v. Ray (1991) 502 U.S. 164, 175 (Ray).) As the majority

correctly notes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6), almost 40 years ago, we held that “the

protection of one’s personal financial affairs . . . against compulsory public

disclosure is an aspect of the [protected] zone of privacy . . . .” (City of Carmel-

by-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 (Young).) A person’s salary

generally falls within this protected category of information. (See Moskowitz v.

Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 313.) As we have explained, “the


2

The majority merely assumes, without deciding, that the records are

“[p]ersonnel . . . or similar files” under section 6254, subdivision (c). (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 5.)

3

newspaper publication of a [person’s] assets . . . can be expected to bring

unwanted solicitation from a variety of [salespeople] and others, could well

encourage harassment lawsuits or demands of like nature, and could expose the

[person] . . . to various criminal elements in our society.” (Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d

at p. 270.) The high court, in applying exemption 6, has similarly recognized “the

individual privacy interest” at stake when disclosed information makes a person an

inviting target of “commercial advertisers and solicitors.”3 (Department of

Defense v. FLRA (1994) 510 U.S. 487, 501 (FLRA); see also Painting Industry of

Hawaii v. Dept. of Air Force (9th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 1479, 1483 [“invasion of

privacy . . . can result from release of a list of names and addresses coupled with a

characteristic susceptible to commercial exploitation”]; National Assn. of Retired

Federal Emp. v. Horner (D.C.Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 873, 878 [“there is a substantial

probability that the disclosure will lead to the threatened invasion: one need only

assume that business people will not overlook an opportunity to get cheaply from

the Government what otherwise comes dearly, a list of qualified prospects for all

the special goods, services, and causes likely to appeal to financially secure

retirees”]; Aronson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev. (1st Cir. 1987) 822

F.2d 182, 186 [“[w]hen it becomes a matter of public knowledge that someone is


3

The majority acknowledges the “interest” of public employees “in avoiding

unwanted solicitations or marketing efforts,” but finds that interest “comparatively
weak” absent disclosure of other contact information, such as home address or
telephone number. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.) Given that publicly available
databases on the Internet make it easy to link a name to an address or telephone
number, I find the absence of disclosure of contact information to be of little, if
any, significance. (See Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 9 v. U.S. Air Force (10th
Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 994, 998 [“redaction of addresses alone, leaving names on the
payroll records and thereby directly linking detailed financial information about
workers . . . to those workers, does not materially lessen the substantial privacy
interest involved”].)

4

owed a substantial sum of money, that individual may become a target for those

who would like to secure a share of that sum by means scrupulous or otherwise”].)

I find the majority’s analysis of the privacy interest at stake unpersuasive in

several respects. To begin with, for the most part, the majority asks not whether

there are privacy interests at stake, but whether a public employee’s “expectation

of privacy” is “reasonable.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7). The two questions are not

the same; notably, the high court, in applying both exemption 6 and another FOIA

exemption that looks to whether disclosure “could reasonably be expected to

constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)),

has consistently considered only the nature of the privacy interest at stake, and has

never considered whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.4 (National

Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish (2004) 541 U.S. 157, 160 [public interest

must be balanced against any “personal privacy interest recognized by the

statute”]; FLRA, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 497 [analysis requires court to “weigh the

privacy interest”]; Ray, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 175 [proper to begin analysis “by

considering the significance of the privacy interest at stake”]; Washington Post,

supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 602-603 [remanding for lower court “to consider the effect

of disclosure upon . . . privacy interests”]; Reporters Committee, supra, 489 U.S.


4

The majority’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry derives from the

test we announced in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1
for determining whether a person’s constitutional right of privacy has been
violated. (See Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6, fn. 3, 7-8, 19.) However, the issue under
section 6254, subdivision (c), is not whether disclosure would violate the
constitutional right of privacy, but whether it would be “an unwarranted invasion
of privacy” under section 6254, subdivision (c). (Cf. U.S. Dept. of Justice v.
Reporters Committee
(1989) 489 U.S. 749, 762, fn. 13 (Reporters Committee)
[“[t]he question of the statutory meaning of privacy under the FOIA is . . . not the
same as . . . the question whether an individual’s interest in privacy is protected by
the Constitution”].)

5

at p. 762 [court must “balance the privacy interest . . . against the public interest

in” disclosure]; Dept. of Air Force v. Rose (1976) 425 U.S. 352, 381 [discussing

“the risk to . . . privacy interests”].)

I also question the majority’s conclusion that public employees have no

reasonable expectation of privacy in their salary information. (Maj. opn., ante, at

p. 7.) Nongovernmental employees most certainly have a reasonable expectation

of privacy regarding this information and, as we have stated, “[t]he mere status of

being employed by the government should not compel a citizen to forfeit his or her

fundamental right of privacy. Public employees are not second-class citizens

within the ken of the Constitution. [¶] . . . [L]egal distinctions between public and

private sector employees that operate to abridge basic rights cannot withstand

judicial scrutiny unless justified by a compelling governmental interest.

[Citation.] However much public service constitutes a benefit and imposes a duty

to uphold the public interest, a public sector employee, like any other citizen, is

born with a constitutional right of privacy. A citizen cannot be said to have

waived that right in return for the ‘privilege’ of public employment, or any other

public benefit, unless the government demonstrates a compelling need.

[Citation.]” (Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41

Cal.3d 937, 951-952). Moreover, although the majority cites evidence and

authorities supporting the view that disclosure of the salaries of public employees

is widespread (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8-9), there is published authority in

California and elsewhere recognizing that public employees have at least some

reasonable expectation of privacy in their personnel records, including salary

information.5 Notably, in a decision involving exemption 6, the high court held


5

People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1220 [statutory scheme recognizes

a peace officer’s “legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her personnel

(footnote continued on next page)

6

that the “privacy interest” of federal employees in nondisclosure of their home

addresses “outweigh[ed] the relevant public interest” in disclosure, even though

that information was “publicly available through sources such as telephone

directories and voter registration lists . . . .” (FLRA, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 500.)

Ultimately, I need not resolve this question because I agree with the

majority that “any cognizable [privacy] interest . . . public employees may have” is

insufficient to justify nondisclosure. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) Section 6254,

subdivision (c), does not preclude all “invasions of personal privacy,” only

“unwarranted” ones. Borrowing again from the high court’s discussion of

exemption 6, whether an invasion of privacy would be “unwarranted” within the

meaning of section 6254, subdivision (c), depends on “the extent to which

disclosure of the information sought would ‘shed light on an agency’s


(footnote continued from previous page)

records”]; BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 756 [“[p]ublic
employees have a legally protected interest in their personnel files”]; Versaci v.
Superior Court
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 805, 821; Teamsters Local 856 v.
Priceless, LLC
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1516 [public employees have “a
legally protected privacy interest” in their personnel files, including “salary
details”]; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 883, 892
[disclosure of peace officer’s payroll records, including his salary, “would
constitute one of the greatest ‘unwarranted invasions of personal privacy’ ”]; San
Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097
[“personnel records . . . are within the scope of the protection provided by the state
and federal Constitutions”]; Eastbank Consolidated Special Service Fire
Protection Dist. v. Crossen
(La.App. 2004) 892 So.2d 666, 670; Beck v.
Department of Justice
(D.C.Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 1489, 1494 [“A government
employee has at least some privacy interest in his own employment records”];
Campbell v. U.S. Civil Service Commission (10th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 58, 62
[disclosure of federal employees’ salary “would be a serious invasion of privacy”];
Columbia Packing Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agri. (D.C. Mass. 1976) 417 F.Supp.
651, 655 [recognizing “privacy interest in nondisclosure” of federal employees’
“earnings statements reflecting” their “remuneration”].)

7

performance of its statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their

government is up to.’ [Citation.]” (FLRA, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 497.) “[T]he

public has a legitimate interest in knowing how public funds are spent” (Copley

Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 367, 376), and the names and

compensation paid to public employees directly relate to that issue. Disclosure of

this information would directly reflect on the City’s management of public funds

and its employees’ performance of public duties. I therefore conclude that any

invasion of privacy from disclosure of this information would not be

“unwarranted” within the meaning of section 6254, subdivision (c), and that the

information therefore is not exempt from disclosure under that provision.

Like the majority, but for a different reason, I reject the view that balancing

under section 6254, subdivision (c), must be done on a case-by-case basis, taking

into account the particular privacy interests of each public employee. (Maj. opn.,

ante, at pp. 15-17.) As the high court has explained in construing the FOIA,

“categorical decisions” regarding disclosure of records “may be appropriate and

individual circumstances disregarded when a case fits into a genus in which the

balance characteristically tips in one direction.” (Reporters Committee, supra, 489

U.S. at p. 776.) Regarding salary information of public employees, for the reasons

stated above, the balance characteristically tips in the direction of disclosure.

Thus, as to this information, case-by-case balancing under section 6254,

subdivision (c), is unnecessary.

The claim that disclosure of public employees’ names linked to their

salaries violates the state constitutional right to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1)

fails for similar reasons. The state constitutional right to privacy is not absolute;

“it is subject to a balancing of interests. . [¶] . . ‘Invasion of a privacy interest is

not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified

by a competing interest.’ [Citation.].” (Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40

8

Cal.4th 948, 961.) For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that any invasion

of a public employee’s privacy interest that would result from disclosure of the

requested information would be justified by the public’s competing interest in

knowing what the government is up to and how the government is spending public

funds.6 Thus, as to public employees other than peace officers, I agree with the

majority’s holding that the names and salaries of public employees earning

$100,000 or more per year are not exempt from disclosure under the CPRA.



II. THE NAMES AND SALARIES OF PEACE OFFICERS.




The Oakland Police Officers Association (Police Officers Association),

which intervened in this action, does not object to disclosure of the actual salary

paid to each peace officer, so long as the officers are identified only by job title. It

does, however, object to disclosures that link the actual salary paid to the officer’s

name. It asserts that the latter disclosure would violate Penal Code section 832.7,

subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part that “[p]eace officer . . . personnel

records . . . or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall

not be disclosed” except as otherwise provided by statute. According to the Police

Officers Association, individually identifiable salary information constitutes either

a confidential “personnel record[]” or “information obtained from” personnel

records within the meaning of Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), by virtue

of Penal Code section 832.8. The latter defines the term “personnel records” in

Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), as “any file maintained under [a peace

officer’s] name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to

any of the following: [¶] (a) Personal data, including marital status, family

members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar


6

In light of this conclusion, I need not decide whether public employees

have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their specific salaries.

9

information. [¶] (b) Medical history. [¶] (c) Election of employee benefits. [¶]

(d) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline. [¶] (e) Complaints, or

investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she

participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which

he or she performed his or her duties. [¶] (f) Any other information the disclosure

of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”7 (Pen.

Code, § 832.8.)

In making its argument, the Police Officers Association first emphasizes

that an officer’s actual pay is based on the following information that is expressly

included within the term “personnel records” in Penal Code section 832.7:

“educational and employment history” (id., § 832.8, subd. (a)), and “[e]mployee

advancement” and “appraisal” (id., § 832, subd. (d)). Because of this fact, the

Police Officers Association asserts, an officer’s actual pay constitutes

“information obtained” from personnel records within the meaning of Penal Code

section 832.7. It also qualifies independently as a confidential personnel record

under Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a), because it is, in the words of

Penal Code section 832.8, “relat[ed] to” the information specified elsewhere in the

section. I agree with the majority’s analysis and rejection of these arguments.

(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27, 29-30.)

The Police Officers Association also argues that individualized salary

information qualifies for protection because it “constitutes ‘[p]ersonal data’ or

‘other similar information’ under Penal Code section 832.8[, subdivision] (a).” It

asserts that anything “unique to the person . . . qualif[ies]” as “[p]ersonal data”

under Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a), and that a particular officer’s


7

Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 establish a disclosure exception under

the CPRA by virtue of Government Code sections 6254, subdivision (k), and
6276.34. (See Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272,
1283.)

10

salary is unique because it depends on the officer’s years of service, performance,

education and specialties.

Like the majority, I reject this argument. As the majority explains, because

all of the information specified in subdivisions (b) through (e) of Penal Code

section 832.8 also is unique to the individual officer, those subdivisions would be

unnecessary were we to construe the term “[p]ersonal data” in subdivision (a) to

include everything that is unique to the person. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.) Well-

established canons of statutory construction preclude us from interpreting statutory

language so as to render other parts of the statute unnecessary. (Manufacturers

Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274.) As the majority also

explains, that the Legislature expressly specified another form of compensation—

“election of employee benefits”—in a separate subdivision of the statute (Pen.

Code, § 832.8, subd. (c)) counsels against adopting an interpretation of the term

“[p]ersonal data” in subdivision (a) that includes an officer’s salary. (Maj. opn.,

ante, at pp. 25-26.) For these reasons, I agree that salary information does not

constitute “[p]ersonal data” within the meaning of section 832.8, subdivision (a).8

Amicus curiae Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 argues that

individualized salary information regarding peace officers qualifies for protection

under subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 832.8, because disclosure of this

information “would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” I

reject this argument because, as explained above in connection with Government

Code section 6254, subdivision (c), I do not believe that any invasion of privacy

from disclosure of the requested salary information would be unwarranted.

Regarding the names of peace officers, as explained in my dissenting

opinion in Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior


8

Except as expressly noted above, I do not join the majority’s analysis of

this issue.

11

Court (Aug. 27, 2007, S134072) ___ Cal.4th ___ (dis. opn. of Chin, J.), I believe

that peace officers’ names are “[p]ersonal data” within the meaning of Penal Code

section 832.8, subdivision (a). Thus, I would hold that where, as here, a request is

made for disclosure of names linked to salary, officers’ names may not be

disclosed to the extent the source of that information is a “file maintained under

[the peace officer’s] name by his or her employing agency.” (Pen. Code, § 832.8.)

Where, however, the request identifies officers by name and asks for disclosure of

their salaries, Penal Code section 832.7 does not preclude disclosure.

CHIN,

J.

12



See lasext page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 128 Cal.App.4th 586
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.
S134253
Date Filed: August 27, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:
Superior
County: Alameda
Judge: Steven Brick

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Davis & Reno and Duane W. Reno for Petitioners.

Carroll, Burdick & McDonald, Ronald Yank, David M. Rice and Troy M. Yoshino for CDF Firefighters as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners and Real Party In Interest Oakland Police Officers’ Association.

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Antonio Ruiz and M. Suzanne Murphy for Operating Engineers Local
Union No. as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners and Real Party In Interest Oakland Police Officers’
Association.

Mastagni, Holstedt, Amick, Miller, Johnsen & Uhrhammer, David E. Mastagni, Will M. Yamada and
Stesha R. Hodges for California Correctional Peace Officers Association, Legal Defense Fund of the Peace
Officers’ Research Association of California, CAUSE-Statewide Law Enforcement Association, Deputy
Sheriffs’ Association of Alameda County, Placer County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association, Sacramento County
Deputy Sheriffs’ Association, Sacramento Police Officers’ Association, Stockton Police Officers’
Association, San Mateo County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association and San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs’
Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners and Real Party In Interest Oakland Police Officers’
Association.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent

Attorneys for Real Party Interest:

Levy, Ram & Olson, Karl Olson and Erica L. Craven for Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers,
Inc.




1






Page 2 – counsel continued – S134253

Attorneys for Real Party Interest:

Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson and Allison Berry Wilkinson for Real Party in Interest Oakland Police Officers’
Association.

Davis Wright Tremaine and Thomas R. Burke for Coalition of University Employees as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.

Trevor A. Grimm, Jonathan M. Coupal and Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.

Law Office of Judy Alexander and Judy Alexander for ANG Newspapers, Bakersfield Californian,
California Newspaper Publishers Association, The Copley Press, Inc., Embarcadero Publishing Company,
Gannett, Hearst Corporation, Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, McClatchy Company, Metro
Newspapers, New York Times, Orange County Register, The Press Enterprise Company and San Jose
Mercury News as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.

Alan L. Schlosser, Mark Schlosberg; Peter Eliasberg; Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz, Amitai Schwartz,
Lisa Sitkin; and Jordan C. Budd for ACLU of Northern California, ACLU Foundation of Southern
California and ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real
Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.




2







Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Duane W. Reno
Davis & Reno
22 Battery Street, Suite 1100
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 274-8700

Karl Olson
Levy, Ram & Olson
639 Front Street, 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 433-4949

Allison Berry Wilkinson
Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson
2300 Contra Costa Boulevard, Suite 230
Pleasant Hill, CA 94523
(925) 609-1699


3

Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 08/27/2007S134253

Parties
1International Federation Of Professional & Tech. Engineers (Petitioner)
Represented by Duane W. Reno
Davis & Reno
22 Battery Street, Suite 1000
San Francisco, CA

2Superior Court Of Alameda County (Respondent)
3Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Karl Olson
Levy Ram & Olson, LLP
639 Front Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA

4Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Erica Lee Craven-Green
Levy Ram & Olson, LLP
639 Front Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA

5Oakland Police Officers Association (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Alison Berry Wilkinson
Rains Lucia & Wilkinson, LLP
2300 Contra Costa Boulevard, Suite 230
Pleasant Hill, CA

6City Of Oakland (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Eric Walter Danly
Meyers Nave et al.
401 Mendocino Avenue, Suite 100
Santa Rosa, CA

7Cdf Firefighters (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Troy Masami Yoshino
Carroll Burdick & McDonough LLP
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA

8Cdf Firefighters (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Ronald Yank
Carroll Burdick & McDonough LLP
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA

9Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Mary Suzanne Murphy
Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200
Alameda, CA

10Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Antonio Ruiz
Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld
1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200
Alameda, CA

11Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Timothy A. Bittle
Harvard Jarvis Taxpayers Association
921 Eleventh Street, Suite 1201
Sacramento, CA

12Aclu Foundation Of Northern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Mark Andrew Schlosberg
ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc.
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA

13Aclu Foundation Of Northern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alan L. Schlosser
ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc.
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA

14Aclu Foundation Of Northern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Amitai Schwartz
Attorney at Law
2000 Powell Street, Suite 1286
Emeryville, CA

15Ang Newspapers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

16Coalition Of University Employees (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Thomas Rohlfs Burke
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1 Embarcadero Center, Suite 600
San Francisco, CA

17California Correctional Peace Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by David E. Mastagni
Mastagni Holstedt Amick et al.
1912 "I" Street
Sacramento, CA

18Aclu Foundation Of Southern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Peter J. Eliasberg
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
1616 Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA

19Aclu Foundation Of San Diego & Imperial Counties, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by John David Blair-Loy
ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties
P.O. Box 87131
San Diego, CA

20Aclu Foundation Of San Diego & Imperial Counties, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jordan Charles Budd
ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties
P.O. Box 87131
San Diego, CA

21Bakersfield Californian (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

22California Newspaper Publishers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

23Copley Press, Inc. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

24Embarcadero Publishing Company (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

25Gannett (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

26Los Angeles Times Communications, Llc (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

27Mcclatchy Company (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

28Metro Newspapers (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

29New York Times (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

30Orange County Register (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

31Press Enterprise Company (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

32San Jose Mercury News (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Judy Alexander
Winn & Alexander, LLP
820 Bay Avenue, Suite 109
Capitola, CA

33Peace Officers Research Association Of California (Amicus curiae)
Represented by David E. Mastagni
Mastagni Holstedt Amick et al.
1912 "I" Street
Sacramento, CA


Disposition
Aug 27 2007Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 27 2005Petition for review filed
  by counsel for petnr c/a rec req
May 31 20052nd petition for review filed
  by RPI Oakland Police Officers' Association
Jun 1 2005Record requested
 
Jun 10 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. to Oakland Police Officers' Association's Petition for Review
Jun 10 2005Answer to petition for review filed
  RPI Contra Costa Newspapers to International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21's Petition for Review
Jun 10 2005Request for judicial notice received (pre-grant)
  RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. [Holding for 8 additional copies]
Jun 20 2005Reply to answer to petition filed
  by counsel for petitioner (IFPTE Local 21)
Jun 30 2005Received:
  Letter from counsel for RPI dated June 30, 2005.
Jul 19 20052nd record request
 
Jul 20 2005Received Court of Appeal record
 
Jul 27 2005Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Request for judicial notice denied. Petitions for review GRANTED. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 2 2005Received Court of Appeal record
  additional parts of the record in A108488 -- original documents
Aug 10 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for RPI {Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.}
Aug 15 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by Davis Reno , attorneys for Petitioner Internatinal Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO
Aug 15 2005Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by Rains Lucia & Wilkinson LLP, counsel for RPI Oakland Police Officers Association
Aug 26 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  Petitioner (IFPTE Local 21) by counsel.
Aug 29 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
  Petitioners (Oakland Police Officers Association) by counsel.
Sep 21 2005Request for extension of time filed
  for an additional two-week e.o.t. by RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. to file the answer briefs on the merits
Sep 29 2005Extension of time granted
  To October 12, 2005 to file RPIs Answer Brief on the Merits.
Oct 11 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  by RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.
Oct 12 2005Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  by RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.
Oct 12 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
  RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. to Oakland Police Officers' Association's Opening Brief on the Merits.
Oct 31 2005Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed)
  Petitioner International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers [IFPTE Local 21]
Oct 31 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Petitioner Oakland Police Officers' Association
Nov 7 2005Filed:
  RPI Oakland Poilce Officers' Association's Motion and application for leave to file an Amended Reply Brief on the Merits (O+13)
Nov 14 2005Order filed
  The application of Real Party in Interest Oakland Police Officers' Association for leave to file an Amended Reply Brief on the Merits is hereby granted.
Nov 14 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  Amended Reply Brief on the Merits by RPI Oakland Police Officers' Association
Nov 18 2005Request for extension of time to file amicus curiae brief
  an additional 15 days by the ACLU Northern California, ACLU Southern California, ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties in support of real parties (IFPTE Local 21 et al.)
Nov 29 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  and brief of CDF Firefighters in support of real parties
Dec 1 2005Extension of time granted
  For good cause shown, it is ordered that any application to file an amicus curiae brief under rule 29.1(f) in this matter must be filed and served, accompanied by the proposed brief, on or before December 15, 2005.
Dec 1 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 in support of petitioners [ IFPE ]
Dec 9 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of Operation Engineers Local Union No. 3 for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the fiilng of the brief.
Dec 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 in support of petitioners.
Dec 9 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of CDF Firefighters for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  CDF Firefighters in support of petitioner.
Dec 14 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.
Dec 14 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  and brief of ACLU Foundation of Northern California, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, and the ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.
Dec 14 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Media Amici Curiae in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. [Amici Curiae ANG Newspapers; Bakersfield Californian; California Newspaper Publishers Association; The Copley Press, Inc.; Embarcadero Publishing Company (The Almanac, Danville Weekly, Mountain View Voice, Pacific Sun, Palo Alto Weekly, Pleasanton Weekly); Gannett (The Desert Sun); Hearst Corporation (San Francisco Chronicle); Los Angeles Times Communications LLC d/b/a Los Angeles Times and dba Times Community News; McClatchy Company; Metro Newspapers; New York Times (Santa Rosa Press Democrat); Orange County RegisterThe Press Enterprise Company; and San Jose Mercury News ]
Dec 15 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  and brief of California Correctional Peace Officers Association, et al. in support of IFPTE Local 21 and RPI OPOA
Dec 16 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  and brief of Coalition of University Employees in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. [ -- See request to file one day late amicus brief ]
Dec 19 2005Request for extension of time filed
  Contra Cosat Newspapers, Inc., Real Party in Interest, joined by petitioners, request permission to file a consolidated Response to all Amicus Briefs and that the time to file the responses be extended to and including January 11, 2006.
Dec 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  Howrd Jarvis Taxpayers Association in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers.
Dec 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  On application of ACLU Foundation of Northern California, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, and ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  ACLU Foundation of Northern California, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, and ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers.
Dec 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of California Correctional Peace Officers Assn., Legal Defense Fund of the Peace Officers Research Assn. of California, et. al., for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioner IFPTE Local 21 and Real Party in Interest OPOA is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  California Correctional Peace Officers Assn., Legal Defense Fund of the Peace Officers Research Assn. of California, CAUSE-Statewide Law Enforcement Assn., Deputy Shseriffs' Assn. of Alameda County, Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn., Sacramento Police Officers' Assn., San Mateo County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn., San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs' Assn., and Sacramento Area Fire Fighters, Local 522 in support of Petitioner IFPTE Local 21 and Real Party OPOA.
Dec 22 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  The application of Coalition of University Employees for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc., is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  Coalition of University Employees in support of RPI Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.
Dec 28 2005Extension of time granted
  On application of both parties, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file a Consolidated Response to All Amicus Curiae Briefs is hereby extended to and including January 11, 2006.
Jan 11 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  Contra Costa Newspaper, Inc., Real Party in Interest by Karl Olson, Counsel.
Jan 11 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  International Federation of Prof. Engineers, petitioner Duane Reno, counsel Consolidated answer to amici
May 4 2006Received:
  Notice of substitution of counsel for David Blair-Loy in place of Jordan Budd as counsel for Amicus Curiae ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties
May 5 2006Change of contact information filed for:
  Alan L. Schlosser and Mark Schlosberg
May 2 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Wednesday, May 30, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
May 11 2007Application filed to:
  divide oral argument time, filed by counsel for petitioner International Federation etc. and real party Oakland Police Officers Association. Requesting 15 minutes for International Federation etc., and 15 minutes for Oakland Police Officers Association.
May 11 2007Received:
  Letter from counsel for petitioner International Federation etc., confirming request to divide oral argument time & requesting cout's preference as to which issue should be argued first.
May 16 2007Received:
  Petitioner IFPTE LOCAL 21'S List of Additional Authorities to be Cited at Oral Argument by Duane W. Reno of Davis & Reno.
May 16 2007Order filed
  The request of counsel for petitioner in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of petitioner at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of petitioner to allocate to real party in interest Oakland Police Officers Association 15 minutes of petitioner's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 18 2007Supplemental brief filed
  Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc. by Karl Olson of Levy, Ram & Olson, LLP.
May 18 2007Received:
  Letter dated 5-18-2007 from Karl Olson, counsel for real parties re cites
May 22 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Petitioner Oakland Police Officers' Association by Alison Berry Wilkinson of Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson, LLP.
May 30 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Aug 22 2007Request for judicial notice granted
  The Request for Judicial Notice filed by Real Party in Interest Contra Costa Newspapers on October 12, 2005, is granted. The Request for Judicial Notice filed by Petitioner Oakland Police Officers' Association on May 22, 2007, is granted.
Aug 24 2007Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
 
Aug 27 2007Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Court of Appeal judgment is affirmed. Opinion by George, C.J. -- joined by Werdegar, Moreno,JJ and Kriegler, JPT* Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Kennard, J. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Baxter, J. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chin, J. [*Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, assigned.]
Sep 27 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Oct 2 2007Received:
  Acknowledgment of receipt for remittitur fro Frist District, Div. 3, signed for by Phil T. Acosta, Deputy.

Briefs
Aug 26 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Aug 29 2005Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 11 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 12 2005Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 31 2005Reply brief filed (case not yet fully briefed)
 
Oct 31 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Nov 14 2005Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Dec 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Dec 9 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Dec 22 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 11 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Jan 11 2006Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website