Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S107616
Huskinson & Brown v, Wolf

Filed 2/23/04

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HUSKINSON & BROWN, LLP,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S107616
v.
Ct.App. 2/4 B147298
MERVYN H. WOLF et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. YC034318

This case concerns a dispute between two law firms over compensation for
legal services performed for a client who prevailed in a lawsuit against a third
party. Rule 2-200 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct (all further
references to rules are to these rules) bars law firms from dividing client fees
among themselves if the client has not given written consent to the agreed division
after a full written disclosure of its terms. (Rule 2-200(A)(1).) Here, plaintiff and
defendants had entered into a fee-sharing agreement without providing written
disclosure to the client or obtaining her written consent. Although rule 2-200
precludes enforcement of that agreement, may plaintiff nonetheless recover from
defendants the reasonable value of the legal services it rendered on the client’s
behalf? Consistent with the language and intent of rule 2-200, and with analogous
statutory and case law providing that attorneys may recover in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of their legal services from their clients when their
contractual fee arrangements are found to be invalid or unenforceable, we
1


conclude that plaintiff may. In holding that rule 2-200 does not preclude quantum
meruit recovery when its client disclosure and consent requirements are not met,
we emphasize that our decision in no way increases the attorney fees paid or owed
by the client in such a situation.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Huskinson & Brown is a law firm that specializes in defending
health care providers. Beverly Sanchez approached plaintiff with a potential
medical malpractice claim against a health care provider. Plaintiff referred the
matter to defendants Mervyn H. Wolf and the law firm of Appell & Wolf.
Although defendants took responsibility for prosecuting Sanchez’s action, plaintiff
paid $800 to a medical expert involved in her lawsuit. Plaintiff also performed 20
hours of legal services on Sanchez’s case, which the trial court later valued at
$250 per hour. In exchange for the referral, defendants orally agreed to pay
plaintiff 25 percent of any attorney fees recovered.
Following a $250,000 judgment in Sanchez’s favor, defendants received
attorney fees from Sanchez but failed to pay 25 percent of the fees to plaintiff in
accordance with their oral agreement. Plaintiff then sued defendants for, among
other things, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and recovery in quantum
meruit.
The matter was tried to the court. The trial court denied recovery on
plaintiff’s breach of contract cause of action, finding the fee-sharing agreement
unenforceable because it was not disclosed to Sanchez in writing and her written
consent was not obtained. On the unjust enrichment cause of action, however, the
court awarded $18,497.91, an amount equal to what plaintiff would have received
under the unenforceable fee-sharing agreement. As an alternative to the unjust
enrichment award, the court awarded plaintiff $5,800 in quantum meruit for the
legal services and costs it rendered on behalf of Sanchez.
2
The Court of Appeal agreed that breach of contract recovery was
unavailable, but reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to enter a new
judgment awarding plaintiff $800 in damages and an additional sum for costs and
disbursements under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. The appellate court
concluded that the unjust enrichment award was in error because the contractual
fee-sharing arrangement violated rule 2-200. It further found the alternative
quantum meruit award of $5,800 improper to the extent $5,000 of that award
represented fees for legal work.1
We granted plaintiff’s petition for review, and later ordered briefing limited
to the issue of quantum meruit recovery.
DISCUSSION
Rule 2-200 provides in relevant part that a member of the State Bar “shall
not divide a fee for legal services with a lawyer who is not a partner of, associate
of, or shareholder with the member unless . . . [¶] . . . [t]he client has consented in
writing thereto after a full disclosure has been made in writing that a division of
fees will be made and the terms of such division . . . .” (Rule 2-200(A)(1).) In
Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142 (Chambers), we held that an attorney may
not recover on an agreement with another attorney to divide contingent fees
generated from the successful prosecution of a client’s case in the absence of
compliance with rule 2-200’s written client consent requirement. The central issue
here is whether, in the absence of written client consent to an agreement between
law firms to divide fees, a law firm that is barred from dividing fees under rule 2-

1
Defendants do not dispute the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial
court’s award of $5,800 in quantum meruit actually represented two awards: one
for $800 in monies owed, and another for $5,000 for the reasonable value of legal
services rendered.
3


200 may nonetheless recover from the other law firm in quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of services it rendered to advance the client’s case.2
Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that “the law
implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing
that they were not gratuitously rendered.” (Long v. Rumsey (1938) 12 Cal.2d 334,
342.) To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a
contract (Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 449; Mayborne v.
Citizens Trust & Savings Bank (1920) 46 Cal.App. 178, 182), but it must show the
circumstances were such that “the services were rendered under some
understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be
made” (Estate of Mumford (1916) 173 Cal. 511, 523; see Long v. Rumsey, supra,
12 Cal.2d at p. 342; Crane v. Derrick (1910) 157 Cal. 667, 672; see generally 1
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 113, p. 138). Here, the
quantum meruit award reflects the trial court’s implicit determination that plaintiff
did not gratuitously offer the services covered by that award and that all parties
herein expected plaintiff would be compensated for its work in the event attorney
fees were recovered in Sanchez’s case. Nonetheless, defendants contend, in
essence, that they owe plaintiff nothing because allowing recovery on an implied

2
Chambers, supra, 29 Cal.4th 142, contained a discussion relating to
quantum meruit recovery, but it did not resolve the issue presented here. Upon
clarifying that it was not addressing whether or not an attorney may recover the
reasonable costs of services rendered in the absence of written client consent to an
agreed fee division (id. at p. 161, fn. 11), Chambers merely recognized that, to the
extent such recovery is available, the particular fee that two attorneys negotiate
without the client’s consent does not furnish a proper basis for calculating the
amount of recovery. (Id. at p. 162.)
4


promise to pay for plaintiff’s services is tantamount to permitting a division of
client fees in contravention of rule 2-200.3
To resolve this issue, we look first to rule 2-200 to ascertain what it seeks to
accomplish. By its terms, the rule expressly prohibits attorneys from “divid[ing] a
fee for legal services” when certain requirements, such as written client consent to
the fee division after a full written disclosure of its terms, have not been met.
Notably, however, rule 2-200 does not purport to restrict attorney compensation
on any basis other than a division of fees. Nor does it suggest that attorneys or law
firms are categorically barred from making or accepting client referrals, from
agreeing to a division of labor on a client’s case, or from actually working on a
case where labor is divided.
The question arises whether a quantum meruit award for services rendered
in reliance on a fee-sharing agreement that lacks written client consent constitutes
a division of fees within the rule’s contemplation. We think not. True, a quantum
meruit award as such would serve to compensate for legal services that have been
performed pursuant to an agreement rendered unenforceable under rule 2-200.
But when based on the reasonable value of those services, such an award involves
no apportionment of the fees that the client paid or has agreed to pay and therefore
is not a fee division subject to rule 2-200’s client disclosure and consent
requirements.

3
Defendants argue: “Even assuming that [plaintiff] did provide the services
[it] alleged, they were provided after the case was referred to [defendants] and
were provided either voluntarily, as Sanchez was a friend, or were provided with
the expectation that [plaintiff] would receive a percentage fee
.” (Italics added.)
To the extent defendants maintain here that plaintiff volunteered the 20 hours of
legal services covered by the trial court’s quantum meruit award, defendants
forfeited that issue by failing to raise it in the Court of Appeal.
5


Formal Opinion No. 1994-138 of the State Bar Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct (State Bar, Formal Opinion No. 1994-
138) clarifies that rule 2-200 does not apply where there is no direct division of
client-paid fees. For example, if a law office that works directly with a client
agrees to pay an “outside” lawyer $50 per hour for his or her services, and bills
that work to the client at $70, the proposed compensation would not trigger rule 2-
200’s requirements because the outside lawyer would not be paid a percentage of
the fees collected from the client. (State Bar, Formal Opn. No. 1994-138, supra,
at pp. 3-4.) That is, “the amount paid to the outside lawyer is not tied to specific
legal fees received by the law office.” (Id. at p. 4.) Like an hourly fee
arrangement, an award of compensation based on the number of hours plaintiff
worked on Sanchez’s case would not divide or be otherwise tied to the specific
legal fees she paid.
We next examine whether allowing recovery in quantum meruit would
undermine compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct. As we recently
explained, the purpose of rule 2-200’s disclosure and consent requirements is to
safeguard the right of clients to know how their legal fees will be determined and
the extent of, and the basis for, their attorneys’ sharing of fees. (Chambers, supra,
29 Cal.4th at pp. 156-157.) In the case of pure referral fee arrangements,
“ ‘[k]nowledge of these matters helps assure the client that he or she will not be
charged unwarranted fees just so that the attorney who actually provides the client
with representation on the legal matter has “sufficient compensation” to be able to
share fees with the referring attorney.’ ” (Id. at p. 157.) Similarly, in cases where
a division of legal services prompts the fee division, written disclosure of such
information “is indispensable to the client’s ability to make an informed decision
regarding whether to accept the fee division and whether to retain or discharge a
particular attorney.” (Ibid.) In both instances, requiring the client’s written
6
consent to fee sharing “impresses on the client the importance of consent and the
right to reject a fee division.” (Ibid.) In holding that attorneys may not recover on
a fee-sharing agreement in contravention of rule 2-200, Chambers refused to
“countenanc[e] and contribut[e] to a violation of a rule we formally approved in
order ‘to protect the public and to promote respect and confidence in the legal
profession.’ ” (29 Cal.4th at p. 158, quoting rule 1-100(A), 1st par.)
Allowing recovery in quantum meruit would not discourage compliance
with rule 2-200. Attorneys who negotiate contingent fee-sharing agreements,
which take into account the risk that the client pays no fee if the client does not
prevail in his or her case, understandably prefer to receive their negotiated fees
rather than the typically lesser amounts representing the reasonable value of the
work performed. Consequently, even if quantum meruit recovery is available
when the absence of client notification or consent renders a fee-sharing agreement
unenforceable, such attorneys have no less incentive to comply with rule 2-200.
The facts of this case illustrate the point precisely. If the parties had obtained
Sanchez’s written consent to the agreed fee sharing as rule 2-200 requires, plaintiff
might have received $18,497.91 in fees. As determined by the trial court,
however, the reasonable value of plaintiff’s 20 hours of legal services was only
$5,000. Because the negotiated fee far exceeds the amount of quantum meruit
recovery, we may logically assume that, notwithstanding the availability of
quantum meruit recovery, plaintiff and all other similarly situated law firms and
attorneys remain fully motivated to see that all of their future fee-sharing
agreements comply with rule 2-200.
The Legislature’s regulation of fee agreements between attorneys and
clients favors the availability of quantum meruit recovery. Business and
Professions Code section 6147 requires attorneys who represent clients on a
contingent fee basis to obtain signed, written fee agreements from their clients.
7
(Id., subd. (a).) Similarly, Business and Professions Code section 6148 generally
requires attorneys in noncontingent fee cases to procure signed, written contracts
from clients reflecting rates, fees, and charges whenever it is reasonably
foreseeable that their legal expenses will exceed $1,000. (Id., subd. (a).)
Like rule 2-200, both Business and Professions Code provisions operate to
ensure that clients are informed of and agree to the terms by which the attorneys
who represent them will be compensated. But while both statutes provide that a
failure to comply with their requirements renders an agreement voidable at the
client’s option, both also specify that, where an agreement is voided, the attorney
remains “entitled to collect a reasonable fee.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6147, subd.
(b), 6148, subd. (c).) Allowing quantum meruit recovery when two law firms
negotiate a fee-sharing agreement without complying with rule 2-200’s written
client consent requirement is consistent with the Legislature’s policy
determination that, even if a particular fee or compensation agreement is not in
writing or signed by the client, a law firm laboring under such an agreement
nonetheless deserves reasonable compensation for its services.
Permitting quantum meruit recovery as between law firms is also consistent
with case law holding or otherwise recognizing that attorneys may recover from
their clients the reasonable value of their legal services when their fee contracts or
compensation agreements are found to be invalid or unenforceable for other
reasons. (See, e.g., Calvert v. Stoner (1948) 33 Cal.2d 97 (Calvert); Rosenberg v.
Lawrence (1938) 10 Cal. 2d 590 (Rosenberg); Wiley v. Silsbee (1934) 1
Cal.App.2d 520 (Wiley).)
In Rosenberg, supra, 10 Cal.2d 590, an importer (the client) hired a custom
house broker to obtain refunds on importation duties paid to the government. The
broker arranged for two attorneys to handle the matter on a contingent fee basis
whereby the attorneys would receive 50 percent of any amount recovered. (Id. at
8
p. 593.) Without the client’s knowledge or consent, however, the broker and the
attorneys agreed that the broker would receive a portion of any fees the attorneys
received. (Ibid.)
Rosenberg held that, assuming the agreement between the client and the
attorneys was invalid because of the provision calling for payment of a portion of
the fee to the broker, the attorneys nevertheless were entitled to recover against the
client in quantum meruit. (Rosenberg, supra, 10 Cal.2d at p. 594.) Notably,
Rosenberg reached this conclusion over the objection of three dissenting justices
that “ ‘[a] champertous agreement being unlawful, it would seem clear that
compensation for services rendered under it could not be recovered upon a
quantum meruit, any more than upon the agreement itself, without overturning the
very foundations upon which the rule refusing to enforce unlawful agreements is
based.’ ” (Id. at p. 602, dis. opn. of Houser, Seawell, & Curtis, J.J.)
A similar result obtained in Wiley, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d 520. In Wiley, an
attorney and his client negotiated a contingent fee contract to secure a divorce for
the client. Rejecting the client’s contentions to the contrary, Wiley held that, even
though case law firmly established that the subject contract was void as against
public policy, “there arises an implied contract to pay for services rendered
thereunder, and the remedy of action sounding in quantum meruit is available to
recover the reasonable value thereof.” (1 Cal.App.2d at p. 522; see also Ayres v.
Lipschutz (1924) 68 Cal.App. 134, 139 [opinion by the California Supreme Court
denying review but stating its conclusion that, although the contract at issue was
void as against public policy because “under it the attorneys were directly and
financially interested in preventing a reconciliation and in bringing about a
divorce,” recovery “could have been had . . . upon a quantum meruit”].)
Calvert, supra, 33 Cal.2d 97, is in accord. In that case, a client had alleged
that his attorney’s fee agreement contained an improper provision that
9
unreasonably limited his ability to settle. (Id. at p. 103.) Calvert observed in
dictum that, even assuming the challenged provision rendered the entire contract
invalid, the attorney “would be entitled to compensation based on the reasonable
value of services performed.” (Id. at p. 105; see also Magee v. Brenneman (1922)
188 Cal. 562, 571 [even though attorney did not rebut presumption of unfairness
in having obtained client’s execution of promissory note and mortgage to secure
payment of legal fees, thus rendering the transaction voidable, trial court could
properly find that attorney had been compensated a reasonable fee for services
performed].)
Defendants do not address the analogous statutory and case law allowing
attorneys to recover the reasonable value of their legal services from their clients
when their fee agreements are found to be invalid or unenforceable. Instead they
urge us to follow Finnegan v. Schrader (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 572 (Finnegan).
In Finnegan, a public official violated the conflicts-of-interests prohibitions
of Government Code section 1090 by accepting an appointment as district
manager of a sanitary district before resigning his position as a member of the
district’s board of directors. The trial court had ordered the public official to
restore to the district all wages and benefits he had received under his district
manager employment contract, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that order.
Emphasizing that the employment contract violated Government Code section
1090 and was “against the express prohibition of the law,” the appellate court
reiterated the oft-cited rule that “ ‘ “courts will not entertain any rights growing
out of [an illegal contract], or permit a recovery upon quantum meruit or quantum
valebat.” ’ ” (Finnegan, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.)
Finnegan does not aid defendants’ position. That decision acknowledged
that the matter before it involved the application of “settled law that where a
contract is made in violation of [Government Code] section 1090, the public entity
10
involved is entitled to recover any compensation that it has paid under the contract
without restoring any of the benefits it has received.” (Finnegan, supra, 91
Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) Nothing in Finnegan, however, warrants reconsideration
of the equally settled principle that an attorney who is barred from recovering
against a client under an invalid or unenforceable compensation agreement may
nonetheless recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his or her legal
services. (See Calvert, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 105; Rosenberg, supra, 10 Cal.2d at
594; Magee v. Brenneman, supra, 188 Cal. at p. 571; Wiley, supra, 1 Cal.App.2d
at p. 522.)
Defendants do not convince us that their unconsented-to fee-sharing
agreement with plaintiff is sufficiently analogous to the employment contract at
issue in Finnegan so as to justify similar treatment. As Finnegan makes clear,
public officials who fail to adhere to Government Code section 1090 act in
violation of an express statutory prohibition and any contract resulting from such a
violation is considered illegal. (Finnegan, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 583.) By
contrast, although we approved rule 2-200 in order “to protect the public and to
promote respect and confidence in the legal profession” (rule 1-100(A), 1st par.),
and although the rule is binding on attorneys (ibid.), attorneys do not act in
violation of an express statutory prohibition when providing legal services
pursuant to a fee-sharing agreement lacking written client consent. Where
services are rendered under a contractual compensation arrangement that is
unenforceable as against public policy, but the subject services are not otherwise
prohibited, quantum meruit may be allowed. (See, e.g., Lawn v. Camino Heights,
Inc. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 973, 980-983 [consulting services pertaining to
subdivision development]; Trumbo v. Bank of Berkeley (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 704,
710 [preincorporation services provided to promoters of a bank]; Wiley, supra, 1
Cal.App.2d at p. 522 [legal services].) On this last point, we emphasize once
11
again that rule 2-200 does not purport to categorically prohibit attorneys from
making or accepting client referrals, from agreeing to divide the labor on a client’s
case, or from working on cases with attorneys from other law firms. By its terms,
the rule merely bars attorneys who engage in such conduct from dividing client
fees among themselves when certain requirements, such as written client consent
to the fee division, have not been met.
Finally, we have found cases in which courts have disallowed quantum
meruit recovery to attorneys who violated one of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Those cases, however, involved violations of a rule that proscribed the
very conduct for which compensation was sought, i.e., the rule prohibiting
attorneys from engaging in conflicting representation or accepting professional
employment adverse to the interests of a client or former client without the written
consent of both parties. (E.g., Jeffry v. Pounds (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 6, 12
[barring quantum meruit recovery from the time that attorney undertook to
represent a wife in her marital dissolution proceedings against her husband, the
current client of the attorney’s law firm, in violation of former rule 5-102, a
predecessor to rule 3-310]; Goldstein v. Lees (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 614 [finding
quantum meruit recovery inappropriate where former corporate counsel labored
under a conflict of interest in representing a minority shareholder and director of
his former client in a proxy battle in violation of predecessor rule to rule 3-310].)
Here, of course, rule 2-200 does not bar the services plaintiff rendered on
Sanchez’s behalf; it simply prohibits the dividing of Sanchez’s fees because she
was not provided written disclosure of the fee-sharing agreement and her written
consent was not obtained.
12
CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
We conclude that, even though rule 2-200 precludes plaintiff from
recovering on its fee-sharing agreement with defendants, plaintiff may nonetheless
recover from defendants the reasonable value of the legal services it rendered on
the client’s behalf.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed
herein.
BAXTER,
J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C.J.
KENNARD, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.


13
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 98 Cal.App.4th 113
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S107616
Date Filed: February 23, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Deanne Smith Myers

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Offices of Marc Appell, Appell & Wolf, Marc J. Appell and Brent I. Rosenweig for Defendants and
Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Huskinson & Brown and Clark L. McCutchen for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Werchick & Werchick and Arne Werchick for Arthur Cambers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Jerome Fishkin for Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and
Respondent.


14

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Brent I. Rosenweig
Appell & Wolf
15760 Ventura Blvd., Suite 920
Encino, CA 91436
(818) 990-0650

Jerome Fishkin
369 Pine Street #627
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 403-1300

15


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 02/23/2004S107616

Parties
1Huskinson & Brown (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by Clark L. Mccutchen
Huskinson & Brown
865 Manhattan Beach Blvd
Manhattan Beach, CA

2Huskinson & Brown (Plaintiff and Respondent)
Represented by David Wayne Taft Brown
Huskinson & Brown
865 Manhattan Beach Blvd #200
Manhattan Beach, CA

3Wolf, Mervyn H. (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Brent Ian Rosenzweig
Appell & Wolf
15760 Ventura Blvd, Suite 920
Encino, CA

4Appell & Wolf (Defendant and Appellant)
Represented by Marc J. Appell
Law Offices of Marc Appell
15760 Ventura Blvd, Suite 920
Encino, CA

5Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jerome Fishkin
Attorney at Law
369 Pine St #627
San Francisco, CA

6Chambers, Arthur (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Arne Werchick
Werchick & Werchick
12386 Stockholm Way
Truckee, CA


Disposition
Feb 23 2004Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jun 11 2002Petition for review filed
  respondent Huskinson & Brown
Jun 20 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  1 envelope
Jul 3 2002Received:
  late answer to petn for review from counsel for appellants (Wolf) shipped o/n to sf
Jul 8 2002Answer to petition for review filed with permission
  by counsel for appellants Mervyn H. Wolf and Appell & Wolf.
Jul 24 2002Review Granted/briefing deferred (Rule 29.3) - civil case
  Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Chambers v. Kay, S098007 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2(c)), or pending further order of the Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.3, is deferred pending further order of the court. Werdegar, J, and Brown, J., were absent and did not participate. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
Aug 9 2002Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  respondent Huskinson & Brown
Jan 22 2003Issues ordered limited
  Review was granted in this case on July 24, 2002, and further action was deferred pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Chambers v. Kay, or pending further order of the court. This court's decision in Chambers is now final ((2002) 29 Cal.4th 142.) Respondent is now ordered to serve and file, on or before February 21,2003, a Brief on the Merits. Additional briefing is to be served and filed in a timely fashion. (See rule 29.1, formerly rule 29.3, Cal. Rules of Court.). The issue to be briefed and argued shall be limited to whether, in the absence of written client consent to an agreement between law firms to divide attorney fees (see Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 2-200), a law firm that is not otherwise entitled to share in such fees may nonetheless recover from the other law firm in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services it rendered on behalf of the client.
Jan 22 2003Note:
  Conflict letter and form sent to counsel for appellant.
Feb 13 2003Filed document entitled:
  Substitution of Attorney - Civil. Attorney Brent I. Rosenzweig substitutes in as counsel for appellant. (Former attorney - Marc J. Appell)
Feb 13 2003Note:
  Conflict letter, form and order dated 1/22/03 sent to counsel (Brent I. Rosenzweig) for appellant.
Feb 18 2003Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  by counsel for appallents (Mervyn H. Wolf et al.).
Feb 20 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by respondent (Huskinson & Brown) requesting to 3/17/03 to file opening brief/merits. (ok to grant - order being prepared)
Feb 26 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including March 17, 2003.
Mar 17 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
  respondent Huskinson & Brown
Apr 16 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
  appellants Mervyn H. Wolf and Appell & Wolf
Jun 12 2003Application for relief from default filed
  by amicus curiae Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel.
Jun 12 2003Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by counsel for Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel in support of respondent (Huskinson & Brown). (Late - should have been submitted by 6/5/03. To court for permission to file)
Jun 13 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel
Jun 13 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  The application of Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Jun 13 2003Application for relief from default filed
  by amicus Arthur Chambers.
Jun 13 2003Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by counsel for Arthur Chambers in support of respondent (Huskinson & Brown, LLP). (Late - should have been submitted by 6/5/03. To court for permission to file.)
Jun 18 2003Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Arthur Chambers
Jun 18 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  The application of Arthur Chambers for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondent is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Nov 25 2003Case ordered on calendar
  1-6-04, 9am, S.F.
Dec 29 2003Filed:
  Additional cases that amicus wishes the court to consider - from counsel for amicus curiae Attorney Discipline Defense Counsel.
Jan 6 2004Cause argued and submitted
 
Feb 23 2004Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  and matter remanded to CA2/4. Majority Opinion by Baxter, J. joined by Geroge C.J., Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Brown & Moreno, JJ.
Mar 25 2004Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Apr 5 2004Received:
  Receipt for remittitur from 2 DCA Division Four
Apr 9 2004Returned record
  to 2 DCA Court of Appeal, Division four.
Apr 13 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse

Briefs
Mar 17 2003Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Apr 16 2003Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jun 13 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Jun 18 2003Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website