Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S124494

Dore v. Arnold Worldwide

Filed 8/3/06


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BROOK DORE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
S124494
v.
Ct.App. 2/7 B162235
ARNOLD WORLDWIDE, INC., et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. BC260637

Plaintiff alleges against his former employer various causes of action in
connection with his termination. The trial court granted the employer summary
judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed. We agree with the trial court and,
accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Background
Plaintiff Brook Dore was employed with an advertising agency in Colorado
as a regional account director specializing in automobile accounts. In late 1998,
Dore discussed with his employer the possibility of relocating to the employer’s
Los Angeles office.
In 1999, Dore learned that a management supervisor position was available
in the Los Angeles office of defendant Arnold Worldwide, Inc., formerly known
as Arnold Communications, Inc., (hereafter AWI). Dore interviewed with several
AWI officers and employees. According to Dore, he was never told during the
interview process that his employment would be terminable without cause or “at


will.” Dore alleges he was told that AWI had landed a new automobile account
and needed someone to handle it on a long-term basis. He also was told that, if
hired, he would “play a critical role in growing the agency,” that AWI was looking
for “a long-term fix, not a Band-Aid,” and that AWI employees were treated like
family. Dore alleges he learned that the two people previously holding the
position for which he was being considered had been terminated for cause—one
for committing financial indiscretions, the other because his work had not satisfied
a client. Dore states that AWI offered him the management supervisor position by
telephone in April 1999, and he orally accepted.
Later that same month, Dore received a three-page letter from Sharon
McCabe, senior vice-president of AWI, dated April 6, 1999 (AWI’s letter),
purporting to “confirm our offer to join us as Management Supervisor in our Los
Angeles office” and to state “[t]he terms of this offer.” AWI’s letter then listed, in
bullet-pointed sections, a commencement date, compensation details, and various
benefits (including reimbursement of relocation expenses, parking at the AWI
offices, various types of insurance, expense reimbursement, and vacation).
AWI’s letter also stated: “You will have a 90 day assessment with your
supervisor at which time you will receive initial performance feedback. This
assessment will also be the time that you will work with your supervisor to set
objectives against which you will be evaluated at the time of your annual review.
After your assessment is complete, you and your supervisor will have the
opportunity to discuss consideration for being named an officer of Arnold
Communications.”
In a separate paragraph central to the present dispute, AWI’s letter stated:
“Brook, please know that as with all of our company employees, your employment
with Arnold Communications, Inc. is at will. This simply means that Arnold
Communications has the right to terminate your employment at any time just as
2
you have the right to terminate your employment with Arnold Communications,
Inc. at any time.”
AWI’s letter requested that Dore sign and return the letter signifying his
acceptance of these employment terms. Dore read and signed the letter.
AWI terminated Dore’s employment in August 2001. Thereafter, Dore
sued AWI and a related entity, Arnold Worldwide Partners (AWP), alleging
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) fraud, and (5) negligent
misrepresentation. AWI and AWP each filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted AWI’s motion on the ground that Dore could not
establish the existence of either an express or an implied-in-fact agreement that his
employment was terminable only for cause. The trial court granted AWP’s
motion on the ground that AWP could not be held liable as Dore’s employer for
AWI’s personnel decisions and conduct. Dore appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
affirmed the judgment in favor of AWP as to liability and reversed the judgment in
favor of AWI. The court remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to
vacate its order granting summary judgment to AWI and enter a new order
granting summary adjudication to AWI only on Dore’s negligent
misrepresentation cause of action. We granted AWI’s petition for review.
Discussion
Dore alleges that AWI, by various oral representations, conduct, and
documents, led him reasonably to understand there existed between AWI and
himself an implied-in-fact contract that provided he would not be discharged from
his employment except for cause. AWI contends that its oral representations,
conduct, and documents could not reasonably have raised any such understanding
in Dore.
3
We take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it
ruled on AWI’s motion for summary judgment. We review the trial court’s
decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained. We
liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)
Dore acknowledges that a clear and unambiguous at-will provision in a
written employment contract, signed by the employee, cannot be overcome by
evidence of a prior or contemporaneous implied-in-fact contract requiring good
cause for termination. (See cases cited in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 340.) But he contends this rule cannot govern here because AWI’s
letter neither constitutes nor contains a clear and unambiguous agreement that his
employment would be terminable without cause.
A. Dore’s Contract Claims

1. “At any time”
The Court of Appeal below agreed with Dore that AWI’s letter, signed by
Dore, was not clear and unambiguous with respect to cause for termination.
Notwithstanding the letter’s statement that “your employment with Arnold
Communications, Inc. is at will,” the court reasoned, by going on to define the
term “at will” to mean that AWI had the right to terminate Dore’s employment “at
any time,” AWI impliedly relinquished the right to terminate Dore without cause.
We disagree.
The Courts of Appeal are in conflict over whether a provision in an
employment contract providing for termination “at any time” or upon specified
notice is, without more, reasonably susceptible to an interpretation allowing for
the existence of an implied-in-fact agreement that termination will occur only for
4


cause. The Court of Appeal in Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So.
California (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358 held such a provision is not thus
susceptible; those in Seubert v. McKesson Corp. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1514,
Wallis v. Farmers Group (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 718, and Bert G. Gianelli
Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1020 held it is. (See also
Sherman v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2d 782, 784
[applying California law].)
Seubert concerned a wrongful termination action brought by a regional
sales manager of a computer systems company against his employer for breach of
contract, misrepresentation, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Notwithstanding the plaintiff had signed an employment application
stating that, “ ‘if hired, my employment is for no definite period and may,
regardless of the date of payment of my wages and salary, be terminated at any
time without any prior notice’ ” (Seubert v. McKesson Corp., supra, 223
Cal.App.3d at p. 1517), the Court of Appeal, looking to other factors indicating the
application “was not intended to be the entire employment agreement between the
parties,” ruled that extrinsic evidence supported the existence of an implied
contract requiring cause for termination (id. at p. 1520).
In Wallis, an insurance agent entered into an agreement with the insurer she
represented that provided her agency could be “ ‘terminated by either the Agent or
[the insurance company] on three (3) months written notice.’ ” (Wallis v. Farmers
Group, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 730.) After she was terminated, the agent
brought an action alleging the parties had both an express oral and an implied-in-
fact agreement that she would be terminated only for cause. The Court of Appeal
found that, notwithstanding the contract was integrated on the subject of
termination, because its termination provision was silent as to whether good cause
was required, the language was reasonably susceptible of meaning either that no
5
cause was required or that a separate agreement requiring good cause existed.
Therefore, the court held, extrinsic evidence was admissible to determine the
meaning of the written agreement. (Id. at pp. 730-731.)
In Gianelli, independent local beer wholesalers and distributors brought an
action against a brewer of an imported brand of beer, alleging the brewer’s
termination of their distribution contracts without good cause breached those
contracts. Each complaining party had signed a distribution agreement providing
it would “ ‘continue in effect unless and until terminated at any time after
January 1, 1973 by thirty days written notice by either party to the other.’ ” (Bert
G. Gianelli Distributing Co. v. Beck & Co., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 1037.)
The Court of Appeal held the agreements could reasonably be interpreted as
consistent with an implied requirement of good cause for termination. (See id. at
pp. 1038-1039.)
The termination clause at issue in Bionghi provided that the agreement
“may be terminated by [the employer] hereto 30 days after notice in writing.”
(See Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1361-1362.) The Court of Appeal held that the plain language of the clause
was not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation requiring the employer to have
good cause for termination. (Id. at p. 1361.) “In our view,” the court stated, “a
contract which provides that it may be terminated on specified notice cannot
reasonably be interpreted to require good cause as well as notice for termination,
unless extrinsic evidence establishes that the parties used the words in some
special sense. Instead, such a contract allows termination with or without good
cause.” (Id. at p. 1369, italics added.)
We disagree with Dore that the verbal formulation “at any time” in the
termination clause of an employment contract is per se ambiguous merely because
it does not expressly speak to whether cause is required. As a matter of simple
6
logic, rather, such a formulation ordinarily entails the notion of “with or without
cause.”

2. AWI’s letter
That the phrase “at any time” is not in itself ambiguous with respect to
cause for termination does not preclude the possibility that AWI’s letter, when
considered as a whole, contains ambiguity on the topic. As California courts
previously have observed, the “meaning of language is to be found in its
applications. An indeterminacy in the application of language signals its
vagueness or ambiguity. An ambiguity arises when language is reasonably
susceptible of more than one application to material facts. There cannot be an
ambiguity per se, i.e., an ambiguity unrelated to an application.” (California State
Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 855, 859,
fn. 1; see also Herzog v. National American Ins. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 192, 199,
fn. 5 [“language which might be considered ambiguous as applied to some
circumstances is not necessarily ambiguous per se”].)
Accordingly, “[e]ven if a contract appears unambiguous on its face, a latent
ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence which reveals more than one
possible meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably
susceptible.” (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) “The test of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument
is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but
whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language
of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W.
Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37, citing numerous authorities.)
In this case, the trial court recognized that the presumption of at-will
employment codified in section 2922 of the Labor Code can be overcome by an
express or implied agreement to the contrary. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.,
7


supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 336.) Nevertheless, the court ruled that because the express
written contract—i.e., AWI’s letter—controls, it need not consider whether Dore’s
proffered extrinsic evidence establishes the existence of an earlier implied
agreement to terminate only for cause.
The Court of Appeal, in reaching the contrary conclusion, relied primarily
on the fact that AWI’s letter, after stating that Dore’s employment is “at will,”
defines “at will” in a manner that refers expressly only to the duration of the
contract (i.e., as meaning “that Arnold Communications has the right to terminate
your employment at any time”) and does not state explicitly whether cause is
required.1 The Court of Appeal also relied on evidence extrinsic to the letter, in
particular, that AWI required Dore to sign a postemployment noncompetition and
nondisclosure agreement.
The trial court’s ruling was correct. The language of the parties’ written
agreement is unambiguous. AWI’s letter plainly states that Dore’s employment
with AWI was at will. Indeed, as the trial court observed, Dore admitted as much
and further admitted that he “read, signed, understood and did not disagree with
the terms of the letter.” Even the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the term “at
will” when used in an employment contract normally conveys an intent
employment may be ended by either party “at any time without cause.” Although
AWI’s letter also states that AWI would provide Dore a “90 day assessment” and
“annual review,” these provisions, in describing AWI’s employee evaluation
schedule, neither expressly nor impliedly conferred on Dore the right to be
terminated only for cause.

1
The court also noted that AWI’s letter states that Dore would be considered
for a position as an officer of AWI after a 90-day assessment period.
8


That AWI’s letter went on to define at-will employment as employment
that may be terminated at any time did not introduce ambiguity rendering the letter
susceptible of being interpreted as allowing for an implied agreement that Dore
could be terminated only for cause. In defining at-will employment, AWI used
language similar to the language the Legislature used in our statutory provision.
Labor Code section 2922 says that an “employment, having no specified term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.” (Italics
added.)
“An at-will employment may be ended by either party ‘at any time without
cause,’ for any or no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory
requirement of notice.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 335.) For the parties to specify—indeed to emphasize—that Dore’s
employment was at will (explaining that it could be terminated at any time) would
make no sense if their true meaning was that his employment could be terminated
only for cause. Thus, even though AWI’s letter defined “at will” as meaning “at
any time,” without specifying it also meant without cause or for any or no reason,
the letter’s meaning was clear.
Nor did Dore’s proffered extrinsic evidence render AWI’s letter ambiguous
concerning whether he could be terminated only for cause. As noted, Dore
declared that he was told his role would be “critical” because AWI “needed a
long-term fix” of certain problems and wanted Dore to “build a relationship” with
an important new client. He also testified that he learned in interviews that some
people at AWI had been employed there for long periods and he was assured the
company had a family atmosphere. Even if credited, such evidence would not
support an inference that Dore reasonably understood AWI’s letter as consistent
with a promise not to terminate him without cause. “When a dispute arises over
the meaning of contract language, the first question to be decided is whether the
9
language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by the party. If it
is not, the case is over.” (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 839, 847.)
We conclude, in sum, that AWI’s letter contained no ambiguity, patent or
latent, in its termination provisions. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that
no triable issues of fact exist with respect to Dore’s causes of action for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
B. Dore’s Fraud Claim
Dore alleges that AWI induced him to leave his long-standing, secure
employment with an advertising agency in Denver and relocate to Los Angeles by
promising him that his employment with AWI would continue indefinitely so long
as he performed in a proper and competent manner, that he would not be demoted
or discharged except for good cause, and that he would be given notice and a
meaningful opportunity to respond to any unfavorable evaluations of his
performance. Dore alleges these promises were false in that AWI had no intention
of performing them at the time they were made and that he justifiably relied on
AWI’s promises and suffered damages when AWI failed to perform them. (See
generally Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638-649.)
AWI contends it was entitled to summary judgment on Dore’s promissory
fraud cause of action because Dore produced insufficient evidence of
misrepresentation, intent not to perform, and reliance. As we agree with AWI on
the reliance point, we need not address the others.
Dore conceded in his deposition that no one at AWI specifically told him he
would be employed there so long as his work was satisfactory or that he could be
fired only for good cause. Dore admits, moreover, that he read, signed, and
understood AWI’s letter stating “the terms” of his employment. As demonstrated
above, the letter did not contain promises of long-term employment or that
10
termination would be only for cause; AWI expressly and unambiguously stated that
Dore’s employment was at will. For all these reasons, we agree with the trial court
that Dore’s admission he signed AWI’s letter stating his employment was at will and
terminable at any time as a matter of law defeats any contention that he reasonably
understood AWI to have promised him long-term employment.
In accordance with the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that there exists
no triable issue of fact with respect to Dore’s cause of action for fraud.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.2
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

2
Seubert v. McKesson Corp., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1514, Wallis v.
Farmers Group, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d 718, and Bert G. Gianelli Distributing Co.
v. Beck & Co.
, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 1020, are disapproved to the extent they are
inconsistent with this opinion.
11



CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.

I agree with the result reached by the majority and with the bulk of their
reasoning. Dore signed, and admitted he read, understood, and did not disagree
with, Arnold Worldwide’s (AWI) letter stating the terms of his employment. This
letter could hardly have made it clearer that the employment was “at will.” The
letter used that exact phrase, the meaning of which admits no ambiguity. Nor did
the letter introduce ambiguity by saying further that this meant Dore could be
terminated “at any time[,] just as [Dore] ha[d] the right to terminate [his]
employment with [AWI] at any time.” On the contrary, that is precisely how our
statutory law explains the concept of “at will” employment. (See Lab. Code, 2922
[“An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of
either party on notice to the other.” (italics added)].)
No rational person could believe this language meant both parties were
obliged to continue the employment relationship except upon “good cause.” The
words “at will” and “at any time,” as used in the letter, would make no sense if the
parties really meant the opposite — that good cause was required for termination.
It follows beyond doubt that the letter expressed the parties’ mutual
understanding the relationship could be terminated by either party as desired, for
any or no reason. I therefore concur in the majority’s conclusion that the letter
contained no ambiguity, patent or latent, and that the extrinsic evidence proffered
by Dore could not contradict the letter’s plain meaning.
1



However, I cannot join the majority’s general endorsement of Pacific
Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33 (Pacific
Gas). Pacific Gas essentially abrogated the traditional rule that parol evidence is
not admissible to contradict the plain meaning of an integrated agreement by
concluding that, even if the agreement “appears to the court to be plain and
unambiguous on its face,” extrinsic evidence is admissible to expose a latent
ambiguity, i.e., the possibility that the parties actually intended the language to
mean something different. (Id. at p. 37.)
Read in its broadest sense, Pacific Gas thus stretched the unremarkable
principle that extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual ambiguity
into a rule that parol evidence is always admissible to demonstrate ambiguity
despite facial clarity. The effect is that, despite their best efforts to produce a clear
written agreement, parties can never confidently conduct their affairs on the basis
of the language they have drafted.
Predictably, the Pacific Gas decision has drawn strong criticisms. (See,
e.g., Karlin & Karlin, The California Parol Evidence Rule (1992) 21 Sw.U.L.Rev.
1361, 1374-1385.) Judge Kozinski succinctly expressed them in Trident Center v.
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1988) 847 F.2d 564: “Under Pacific
Gas, it matters not how clearly a contract is written, nor how completely it is
integrated, nor how carefully it is negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses the
issue before the court; the contract cannot be rendered impervious to attack by
parol evidence. If one side is willing to claim that the parties intended one thing
but the agreement provides for another, the court must consider extrinsic evidence
of possible ambiguity. If that evidence raises the specter of ambiguity where there
was none before, the contract language is displaced and the intention of the parties
must be divined from self-serving testimony offered by partisan witnesses whose
2

recollection is hazy from passage of time and colored by their conflicting
interests.” (Trident Center, supra, at p. 569.)1
To their credit, it appears the majority here have declined to apply Pacific
Gas quite so broadly. On the one hand, they repeat mischievous statements from
Pacific Gas and its progeny that extrinsic evidence of intent may be admissible
even when the contract’s language appears “ ‘unambiguous on its face.’ ” (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. ___ [at p. 7].) On the other hand, however, they assert that “ ‘an
ambiguity arises [only] when language is reasonably susceptible of more than one
application to material facts.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)
If I understand the majority’s premise, a “latent” ambiguity is simply one
that becomes manifest when one attempts to apply the contract’s language to the
specific facts that gave rise to the parties’ legal dispute. Even then, extrinsic
evidence is admissible only to prove a meaning the contract’s language will
reasonably accommodate. Thus here, the majority are able to say, in effect, that
the language of AWI’s letter is not ambiguous as applied to the particular facts
(i.e., Dore’s termination) that gave rise to the dispute between AWI and Dore.

1 In this court, Justice Mosk soon stated his own misgivings about his
participation in the Pacific Gas majority, noting that the decision had
“contributed” “toward emasculation of the parol evidence rule.” (Delta Dynamics,
Inc. v. Arioto
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 525, 531 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Expressing
sentiments later echoed by Judge Kozinski, Justice Mosk observed that “it has
become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to draft a
written contract that will produce predictable results in court. The written word,
heretofore deemed immutable, is now at all times subject to alteration by self-
serving recitals based upon fading memories of antecedent events. This, I submit,
is a serious impediment to the certainty required in commercial transactions.” (Id.
at p. 532.)

3



I entirely agree that Pacific Gas should be limited at least to the extent the
majority imply. I hope the majority’s limiting “gloss” will be noted by the bench
and bar, and will signal that written agreements whose language appears clear in
the context of the parties’ dispute are not open to claims of “latent” ambiguity.
Still, it may be time for a fuller reconsideration of the meaning and scope of
Pacific Gas. I am open to undertaking such a comprehensive reexamination in an
appropriate case. With that caveat, I concur in the majority’s reasoning and result.

BAXTER, J.
I CONCUR:
CORRIGAN, J.
4



CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize one
point.
The majority opinion devotes substantial attention to employment
agreements that authorize termination “upon notice,” or after a specified notice
period. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4-7, discussing Bionghi v. Metropolitan Water
Dist. of So. California (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1358 and Wallis v. Farmers Group
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 718.) But the written agreement before us did not use the
words “upon notice,” or any equivalent phrasing. Instead, the agreement allowed
for termination “at any time.” Our analysis is properly directed at this “at any
time” language. The majority opinion has no occasion to express, and does not
express, any view as to whether providing for termination “upon notice” also
connotes a mutual intention to create an at-will employment arrangement. (See
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7.)
In my view, a provision that allows for termination “upon notice” does not,
by itself, shed light on whether the parties intended an at-will employment
contract, or a relationship terminable only for cause. I concur in the majority
opinion with the understanding that it takes no position on this issue.
MORENO, J.
1



See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 3/24/04 – 2d Dist., Div. 7
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S124494
Date Filed: August 3, 2006
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Jane L. Johnson

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Magana, Cathcart & McCarthy, Clay Robbins III and Marc Carlson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow and Jeffrey K. Winikow for California Employment Lawyers
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Bergman & Dacey, Gregory M. Bergman, Mark W. Waterman, Beth D. Orellana and Robert M. Mason III
for Defendants and Respondents.

Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal and Lloyd C. Loomis for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents.

Atlantic Legal Foundation, Martin S. Kaufman; Jackson Lewis, D. Gregory Valenza and Erika M. Barbara
for Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents.

Seyfarth Shaw, Stacy D. Shartin and Dennis DePalma for California Employment Law Council as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

1



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Clay Robbins III
Magana, Cathcart & McCarthy
1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600
Los Angeles, CA 90067-5801
(310) 553-6630

Robert M. Mason III
Bergman & Dacey
10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900
Los Angeles, CA 90024-4101
(310) 470-6110

2


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 08/03/2006S124494

Parties
1Dore, Brook (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Clay Robbins
Magana Carthcart & McCarthy
1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600
Los Angeles, CA

2Dore, Brook (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Marc Stephen Carlson
Magana Cathcart & McCarthy
1801 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600
Los Angeles, CA

3Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Gregory Mark Bergman
Bergman & Dacey, Inc.
10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900
Los Angeles, CA

4Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Robert M. Mason
Bergman & Dacey, Inc.
10880 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900
Los Angeles, CA

5Employers Group (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Lloyd Clark Loomis
Sonnenschein Nath et al.
601 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA

6Association Of Corporate Counsel (Amicus curiae)
Represented by D. Gregory Valenza
Jackson Lewis, LLP
199 Fremont Street, 10th Floor
San Francisco, CA

7Association Of Corporate Counsel (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Martin S. Kaufman
Atlantic Legal Foundation, Inc.
60 East 42nd Street, Suite 2102
New York, NY

8California Employment Lawyers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Jeffrey Keith Winikow
Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow
1801 Century Park East, Suite 1520
Los Angeles, CA

9California Employment Law Council (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Stacy Dion Shartin
Seyfarth Shaw
2029 Century Park East, Suite 3300
Los Angeles, CA


Disposition
Aug 3 2006Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Apr 30 2004Petition for review filed
  counsel for respondents Arnold Worldwide, Inc.
May 3 2004Record requested
 
May 6 2004Received Court of Appeal record
  one doghouse.
Jun 23 2004Time extended to grant or deny review
  To July 29, 2004.
Jul 21 2004Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ.
Jul 21 2004Received Court of Appeal record
 
Jul 21 2004Letter sent to:
  Parties regarding Certification of Interested Entities or Persons.
Jul 29 2004Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  By counsel for appellant {Dore}.
Aug 5 2004Request for extension of time filed
  to file opening brief/merits respondent Arnold Worldwide asking to October 19, 2004.
Aug 5 2004Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  respondent, Arnold Worldwide LLC
Aug 9 2004Extension of time granted
  respondent's opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Sept. 20, 2004. At that time, the court will entertain a further application for extension of time, if necessary, for good cause shown.
Sep 13 2004Request for extension of time filed
  respondent Arnold Worldwide, LLC requesting to October 11, 2004 (court holiday) to file opening brief on the merits
Sep 16 2004Extension of time granted
  To October 11, 2004 to file respondent's opening brief on the merits. No further extensions will be granted.
Oct 12 2004Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  respondent, Arnold Worldwide LLC
Oct 12 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
  respondent, Arnold Worldwide LlC
Nov 8 2004Request for extension of time filed
  counsel for appellant requesting a 30-day extension to and including December 13, 2004.
Nov 10 2004Extension of time granted
  To December 13, 2004 to file appellant's answer brief on the merits.
Dec 10 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
  APPELLANT, BROOK DORE
Dec 30 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  respondent Arnold Worldwide, LLC
Jan 27 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  EMPLOYERS GROUP in support of resp.( Arnold Worldwide).
Jan 28 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel in support of respondent
Jan 28 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  The California Employment Law Council (CELC) [supporting respondent Arnold Worldwide LlC) application and brief under same cover.
Jan 28 2005Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  The California Employment Lawyers Association (CELA) (supporting appellant Brook Dore) application and brief under same cover.
Jan 31 2005Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice (granted case)
  Martin S. Kaufman on behalf of amicue curiae Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel.
Jan 31 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  EMPLOYERS GROUP.
Jan 31 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  EMPLOYERS GROUP in support of respondent. Answer due within 20 days.
Feb 4 2005Application to appear as counsel pro hac vice granted
  Martin S. Kaufman of the State of New York to appear on behalf of AC Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel.
Feb 4 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel in support of respondent.
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  Southern California Chapter of the Association of Corporate Counsel in support of Respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Feb 4 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Employment Law Council in support of respondent.
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  California Employment Law Council in support of Respondent. Answer is due within twenty days.
Feb 4 2005Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  California Employment Lawyers Association in support of appellant.
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
  California Employment Lawyers Association in support of appellant. Answer is due within twenty days.
Feb 16 2005Request for extension of time filed
  and request to consolidate, filed by appellant Brook Dore asking for an extension to March 28, 2005.
Feb 24 2005Extension of time granted
  To March 28, 2005 to file appellant's Consolidated Response to Amicus Curiae Briefs.
Mar 30 2005Received:
 
Apr 5 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  By appellant {Brook Dore}. Filed w/ perm.
Apr 4 2006Case ordered on calendar
  Wednesday, May 3, 2006, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Apr 7 2006Application filed to:
  Continue Oral Argument by Clay Robbins, III, counsel for respondent Brook Dore
Apr 13 2006Request for judicial notice granted
  Arnold Worldwide LLC, Respondent
Apr 17 2006Argument rescheduled
  to be called and continued to the late May or June calendar.
Apr 19 2006Request for Extended Media coverage Filed
  By Michael Breyer of Courtroom Connect.
Apr 26 2006Order filed
  Courtroom Connect's request to photograph, record, or broadcast, filed April 19, 2006, is denied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 980, subds. (b)(2), (e)(3)(B).)
May 2 2006Case ordered on calendar
  May 30, 2006, at 1:00 p.m., in San Francisco
May 30 2006Cause argued and submitted
 
Aug 3 2006Opinion filed: Judgment reversed
  Opinion by: Werdegar -----joined by: George, C.J. Kennard, Chin, Moreno, J.J. Concurring opinion by: Baxter, J. -----joined by: Corrigan, J. Concurring opinion by: Moreno, J.
Aug 11 2006Request for modification of opinion filed
  Lawrence N. Taylor, Santa Monica Collection, Santa Monica Collection II, Christina Development Corporation, and 1066 Corporation Jeremy B. Rosen, Counsel
Aug 30 2006Request for modification denied
 
Oct 20 2006Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Oct 30 2006Received:
  Receipt for remittitur. from CA2 Div. 7

Briefs
Oct 12 2004Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 10 2004Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Dec 30 2004Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Jan 31 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Feb 4 2005Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Apr 5 2005Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website