Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S142546
Doe v. City of Los Angeles


Filed 11/1/07
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
S142546
v.
Ct.App. 2/4 B178689
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Los Angeles County
Defendants and Appellants.
Super. Ct. No. BC293484

)
JOHN DOE 2,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Los Angeles County
v.
Super. Ct. No. BC308146
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which extends the statute of
limitations within which a victim of childhood sexual abuse may sue a person or
entity who did not perpetrate the abuse but was a legal cause of it, requires that
such actions be brought before the victim’s 26th birthday, unless the defendant
“knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual
conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take
reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of
1



unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 340.1, subd. (b)(2).)
Plaintiffs, John Doe and John Doe 2, now in their 40’s, sued the City of Los
Angeles and the Boy Scouts of America alleging they had been sexually abused by
David Kalish, a police officer, while they were participants in the Los Angeles
Police Department Explorer Scout Program in the 1970’s.1 The superior court
dismissed their actions on the ground that the statute of limitations had lapsed
because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that defendants “knew or had reason
to know, or [were] otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct” by
Kalish. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
We granted review to examine whether the pleadings in these cases are
sufficient to invoke the extended statute of limitations set forth in subdivision
(b)(2). We conclude that subdivision (b)(2) is a remedial statute that the
Legislature intended to be construed broadly to effectuate the intent that
illuminates section 340.1 as a whole; to expand the ability of victims of childhood
sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their
injuries. This principle of broad construction is not consistent with language in the
opinion of the Court of Appeal below that imposed heightened pleading
requirements on plaintiffs seeking to bring their actions within this expansion of
the statute of limitations in childhood sexual abuse cases. However, even without
the stringent pleading requirements imposed by the Court of Appeal, we agree

1 We shall refer to plaintiffs as Doe 1 and Doe 2 or, collectively, plaintiffs; to the
City of Los Angeles as the City; to the Boy Scouts of America as BSA; to the Los
Angeles Police Department as LAPD, and; to David Kalish as Kalish. All further
unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure; section 340.1,
subdivisions (b)(2) and (c) are referred to as subdivision (b)(2) or subdivision (c).
2



with its conclusion that the statute requires more specific allegations than were
made by plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeal.
I. FACTS
A. Doe 1’s Complaint
Doe 1’s operative pleading is his fourth amended complaint. He alleges that
Kalish sexually abused him “between approximately 1974 through 1979” when he
was under 18 years old and a participant in the “Law Enforcement Explorer Scout
program” at LAPD’s Devonshire division. Kalish, who was a supervisor of that
program and allegedly used his position as supervisor to molest Doe 1, is not a
party to this appeal. The complaint further alleges causes of action against the
City, BSA, and “Law Enforcement Explorer Post 522” for negligent vetting,
supervision, training and retention of Kalish, negligent supervision and
management of the Explorer Scout program, negligent failure to warn and
negligent failure to supervise and protect Doe 1.2
Doe 1 alleges that he first met Kalish while Doe 1 was a participant in the
Deputy Auxiliary Police (DAP) program at LAPD’s Devonshire division. The
DAP program was sponsored by the police department and provided social and
athletic activities to at-risk children between the ages of 12 and 14. According to
Doe 1, it was common knowledge among LAPD officers that Kalish sought out
and befriended boys in the DAP program who “bec[a]me his eventual victims.”
Kalish encouraged some of these boys to join the Explorer Scout program after

2 The City pointed out in its demurrer that Law Enforcement Explorer Post 522
has no separate existence and no legal identity apart from the City itself and is
therefore a “nonsuable entity.”
3



they completed the DAP program “so that he could have further access to them in
subsequent years.” Doe 1 joined the Devonshire Explorer Scout program in 1975,
when he was 14 years old, and remained a participant until sometime in 1979,
when he was 17.
The Explorer Scout program was sponsored by BSA and LAPD. On
information and belief, Doe 1 alleges that BSA required law enforcement agencies
like LAPD to comply with guidelines that, among other things, required proper
vetting and supervision of adult leaders, prohibited fraternization between the
adult leaders and scouts outside of sanctioned events and also prohibited one-on-
one contact between adult leaders and scouts. The Explorer Scout program at
Devonshire was supervised by a lieutenant who was the designated community
relations officer. The lieutenant, in turn, reported to a captain. While the
community relations officer exercised supervision and oversight, advisors like
Kalish dealt directly with the participants.
Doe 1 alleges that a number of unqualified officers, including Kalish, were
involved in the Devonshire Explorer Scout program. Doe 1 also alleges that
Explorer Scouts were used for activities of questionable value to the community
such as refurbishing Kalish’s home. In exchange, Explorer Scouts, including Doe
1, were given beer, though none was old enough to drink alcohol legally.
Doe 1 alleges that Kalish was a pedophile and a friend of Vince Pirelli, a
known pornographer who specialized in pornographic movies featuring boys.
According to Doe 1, Pirelli was present at Kalish’s house at the same time as some
of the Explorer Scouts, and Kalish pressured Doe 1 to participate in Pirelli’s
pornographic movies. Another of Kalish’s victims was also pressured into making
pornographic movies for Pirelli. On information and belief, Doe 1 alleges that
Kalish filmed sexual encounters at his home with victims other than Doe 1 and
4

had a preference for “young slight blond boys,” a description that fit at least two of
his victims from the Explorer Scout program.
Doe 1 alleges on information and belief that it was “commonly known” that
Kalish invited Explorer Scouts into his home outside of sanctioned program events
and activities. Kalish would pick up plaintiff and other Explorer Scouts, at least
one of whom Kalish also sexually abused, and drive them to his house. There, he
allowed Explorer Scouts to drink and watch pornography. On one occasion, a boy
who had been drinking at Kalish’s house became drunk and was involved in a
traffic incident that resulted in a police report.
Kalish also drank with some of his victims in the parking lot of Devonshire
station after his victims had completed their evening shift at the Communications
Division. On one occasion, Kalish became intoxicated and asked another victim,
who was an unlicensed 15 year old, to drive him home. Kalish took the same boy
to the police academy to watch Kalish complete his monthly firearm qualification,
and then bought his victim gifts at the police academy gift shop. At other times,
he took the boy to the police academy to play racquetball or jog, after which they
showered together, and then Kalish would take the boy home at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m.
Kalish showed favoritism to this boy and others, including Doe 1, by buying them
LAPD jackets and shirts, some of which were unavailable to the public, and
openly giving them these gifts at Devonshire station. He also showed favoritism
by providing “additional ride-alongs, ride-alongs in the downtown patrol division,
and commendations.”
Doe 1 alleges that other police officers from Devonshire station participated
in unauthorized activities and trips with Kalish and Explorer Scouts. Additionally,
it was “commonly known” that Kalish traveled to Thailand which is “a known
haven for pedophiles.” Doe 1 alleges on information and belief that, on one of
these trips, other LAPD officers observed Kalish with a young Thai boy.
5

Doe 1 alleges that on one occasion Kalish molested him at a sanctioned
Explorer Scout activity and on another occasion as Kalish was driving Doe 1
home from a sanctioned activity. A third incident occurred at Doe 1’s home. Doe
1 was afraid of what would happen to his Explorer Scout career and his hope to
become a police officer if he resisted Kalish. Additionally, Kalish had threatened
at least one other victim to keep him silent and constantly asked whether that
victim had confided in anyone.
On information and belief, Doe 1 alleges that nationwide there have been at
least 31 reported incidents of the sexual abuse of Explorer Scouts by police
officers participating in the Explorer Scout program. With respect to the
Devonshire program, Doe 1 alleges that, prior to the incidents involving Kalish,
there were “other instances of misconduct . . . between Advisors and Scouts
involving drinking and sexual fraternization” that should have put those in charge
of the program on notice of the need to make changes to protect the scouts against
sexual exploitation. He alleges further that “other LAPD officers viewed the
Explorer/Scout program as a ‘time bomb’ because of lax supervision and
inadequate oversight, the nature of the program, and other known incidents of
improper fraternization between officers and scouts.”
Based on Kalish’s improper conduct with scouts including unauthorized
fraternization, favoritism and engaging in prohibited one-on-one contact with
targeted scouts, “[d]efendants and each of them knew or should have known that
Kalish presented a risk of sexual exploitation to boys in the Devonshire
Explorer/Scout program. . . . [¶] Defendants and each of them further knew or
should have known that Kalish had a friendship and/or business interests with
known pornographer Vince Pirelli, and that Kalish traveled on more than one
occasion to Thailand, both of which should have prompted immediate inquiry as
6

the nature of those friendships and trips posed a risk to the young boys in the
Explorer/Scouts.”
B. Doe 2’s Complaint
Doe 2’s operative pleading is his first amended complaint. It contains the
same causes of action alleged in Doe 1’s fourth amended complaint against the
same defendants and its allegations closely track those made in Doe 1’s complaint.
Like Doe 1, Doe 2 alleges that he was molested by Kalish between 1974 and 1979
while he was a participant in the Explorer Scout program. The complaint also
identifies Doe 2 as the other victim referred to in Doe 1’s complaint whom Kalish
allegedly had drive him home because Kalish was too intoxicated to drive and
whom Kalish took to the police academy to watch Kalish complete his monthly
firearm qualifications and to play racquetball and jog.
Doe 2’s complaint contains additional allegations regarding defendants’
knowledge. Doe alleges that “BSA knew and the LAPD should have known, prior
to the incidents complained of here, that pedophiles were active in its organization
and the programs it sponsored.” Additionally, Doe 2 alleges on information and
belief that “since the early part of the last century — the BSA has maintained
‘Confidential Files’ on questionable scout leaders, including those suspected of
child molestation.” The complaint further alleges that since 1971, “more than half
of all leaders placed in the Confidential Files have been put there for child abuse,”
and these statistics “represent only a small number of the suspected pedophiles in
the BSA organization.” Doe 2 alleges that prior to his molestation by Kalish,
“numerous adults in BSA programs, were investigated, arrested and/or tried for
child sexual abuse.” He alleges further that statistics maintained by BSA since
1980 show “more than one incident of sexual abuse per week for the past two
decades involving scouts and scout leaders, that is, more than 1000 reported
7

incidents since 1980.” He alleges that BSA knew or had reason to know of
comparable numbers of sexual abuse occurring before 1980.
Doe 2 alleges that LAPD and BSA knew or should have known that, prior to
Kalish’s molestation of Doe 2, “sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of Explorer
Scouts had occurred in its Hollywood and Devonshire programs.” Specifically,
Doe 2 alleges that “in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s . . . Defendant LAPD knew
and Defendant BSA should have known of the following: a) that a police officer
was having sex with an Explorer Scout in the Hollywood Division’s Explorer
Scout Program[;] b) that another two police officers were having sex with a
different Explorer Scout in the Hollywood Division’s Explorer Scout Program;
and c) that another police officer had sex with an Explorer Scout in the Devonshire
Division’s Explorer Scout Program while on a sanctioned scout camping trip and
got her pregnant.”
Accordingly, Doe 2 alleges on information and belief that defendants “knew
or should have known, prior to the incidents complained of here, that numerous
incidents of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation occurred in BSA-sponsored
programs and in the LAPD Explorer Scout program; that pedophiles were active in
the BSA organization and the programs it sponsored; that the subject Explorer
Scout program is a program of such nature so as to create an especial risk of
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse to the minor scouts participating in them; that
pedophiles seduce their victims in ways similar to that of adults; and that training,
education, warnings and supervision would prevent or at least minimize the
likelihood of sexual exploitation and abuse.”
C. The Demurrers
Both the City and BSA demurred to the plaintiffs’ operative complaints. As
relevant here, BSA argued that the complaints were barred by the statute of
limitations, which ordinarily precludes an action against a nonperpetrator
8

defendant after the plaintiff’s 26th birthday. BSA acknowledged that section
340.1, subdivisions (b) and (c) revived such actions against a nonperpetrator
defendant for a one-year period, but argued that plaintiffs had failed to comply
with the statute’s knowledge or notice requirements because they had not pled
“that Boy Scouts of America knew or had reason to know in advance of unlawful
sexual conduct by Kalish and that he was an employee, volunteer, representative,
or agent.” The City also cited plaintiffs’ failure to sufficiently allege knowledge
or notice as a ground for its demurrers.
The trial court agreed with the defendants and sustained the demurrers
without leave to amend.
D. The Court of Appeal’s Opinion
Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs’ claims were
time barred because plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead that their actions fell
within subdivision (b)(2). Because plaintiffs had conceded they were unable to
plead that defendants had actual knowledge of Kalish’s proclivity for the sexual
abuse of minors, the Court of Appeal focused on the sufficiency of the allegations
of constructive knowledge. For purposes of the statute, the Court of Appeal
defined constructive knowledge in the language of Civil Code section 19, which
states: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a
prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact
itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned
such fact.”
Characterizing subdivision (b)(2) as a defense to the statute of limitations, the
Court of Appeal stated that plaintiffs were required “to plead specific facts
sufficient to bring their actions within subdivision (b)(2).” “The key issue,
therefore, concerns the nature of the specific facts that appellants were required to
allege to invoke the defense provided by subdivision (b)(2). This poses a question
9

of law, namely, the proper interpretation of a statute.” As an exception to the
statute of limitations, the Court of Appeal concluded that subdivision (b)(2) should
be narrowly construed. “[T]his provision demands awareness — actual or
constructive — that the particular individual who is the target of the action
committed sexual abuse, and this awareness must be sufficiently firm to warrant
removing that individual from contact with children.” The Court of Appeal
concluded further that subdivision (b)(2) “imposes more stringent demands on
constructive knowledge than the concept of forseeability ordinarily applicable to
negligence claims.” Thus, “appellants may not merely allege that respondents
knew facts that raised a generalized prospect or possibility of sexual abuse by
Kalish. Rather, appellants were obliged to allege in specific terms that
respondents knew facts that — if acted upon in a reasonable manner — would
have prompted them to investigate Kalish with a thoroughness likely to establish
that he had engaged in unlawful sexual abuse.”
Applying this standard to plaintiffs’ complaints, the Court of Appeal held
that they failed to establish the requisite constructive knowledge. The reviewing
court stated that the bulk of material allegations “are improperly pled on
information and belief.” The Court of Appeal acknowledged the principle that
allegations on information and belief are proper where the allegations involve
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendants. Here, however, it
found that, to the extent certain allegations were purportedly commonly known,
they were not peculiarly within the knowledge of defendants. Other information
and belief allegations, involving facts that may have been peculiarly within the
knowledge of defendants, were improperly pled because they were “unsupported
by any ‘statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded.’ ” Regarding
allegations not founded on information and belief, the Court of Appeal stated that
they did no more than “reasonably support the conclusion that LAPD should have
10

made a general inquiry into alcohol- and chore-related misconduct by LAPD
officers within the programs, but not that LAPD should have launched an
investigation focused on Kalish that would have uncovered his sexual
misconduct.”
The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ action. We granted
review.
II. ANALYSIS
Because Does 1 and 2 filed their actions against the City and BSA after their
26th birthdays, their actions are barred by the statute of limitations unless they can
plead that defendants “knew or had reason to know, or [were] otherwise on
notice,” that Kalish had engaged in “unlawful sexual conduct” and failed “to take
reasonable steps, and to implement . . . safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful
sexual conduct in the future” by Kalish. (Subd. (b)(2).)3 The question here is
what the Legislature meant by this statutory language and whether, in light of that
meaning, plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants had knowledge or notice
that Kalish had engaged in past unlawful sexual conduct with minors prior to his
alleged abuse of them. Because this appeal arises from a judgment of dismissal
following the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend, we “ ‘give[] the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treat[] the demurrer as admitting all

3 We do not separately discuss whether plaintiffs’ complaints were timely under
the one-year revival of the statute of limitations set forth in subdivision (c).
Subdivision (c) revives only such actions that are “permitted to be filed pursuant
to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b)” (subd. (c)). Therefore, if plaintiffs’
complaints were properly dismissed because they were unable to meet the
knowledge or notice requirements of subdivision (b)(2), then whether their actions
were timely under subdivision (c) is moot.
11



material facts properly pleaded.’ ” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35
Cal.4th 797, 810, quoting Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962,
966-967.)
A. The Purpose and Scope of Subdivision (b)(2)
In construing statutory language our objective is to determine and effectuate
the Legislature’s intent. (People v. Yartz (2005) 37 Cal.4th 529, 537.) Such
language, however, is construed in the context of the entire law. “Courts properly
examine the manifest purpose of the statute as a whole in interpreting its
provisions. [Citations.] We examine the history and the background of the
statutory provision in order to ascertain the most reasonable interpretation of the
measure.” (Hellinger v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056-
1057.)
In Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910, the court
observed that the purpose of subdivision (b)(2) is to target “third party defendants
who, by virtue of certain specified relationships to the perpetrator (i.e., employee,
volunteer, representative, or agent), could have employed safeguards to prevent
the sexual assault. It requires the sexual conduct to have arisen through an
exploitation of a relationship over which the third party has some control.”
(Aaronoff, at p. 921.) The language of the provision expressly supports this
characterization. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified
School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632 [“In interpreting statutes, we follow the
Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the
law . . . .”].) Subdivision (b)(2) extends past a plaintiff’s 26th birthday claims
against a nonperpetrator defendant who is or was in a specified relationship with
the perpetrator — “employee, volunteer, representative, or agent” — and who,
“knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice” of the perpetrator’s
“unlawful sexual conduct” and “failed to take” preventative measures to “avoid
12

acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future” by that perpetrator. The statute’s
enumeration of the necessary relationship between the nonperpetrator defendant
and the perpetrator implies that the former was in a position to exercise some
control over the latter.
This interpretation of the statute is also confirmed by a review of the relevant
legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No.
1779), which added subdivision (b)(2).4 (Barratt American, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cucamonga (2005) 37 Cal.4th 685, 697 [“Although the plain language of the
statutes dictates the result here [citation], legislative history provides additional
authority”].) “[Senate Bill No. 1779] is intended to ensure that victims severely
damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those
responsible. [¶] . . . . [T]his bill provides that the extended statute of limitations in
childhood sexual abuse cases against a third party extends beyond age 26 of the
victim, when the third party knew, had reason to know, or was otherwise on
notice, of unlawful sexual conduct by the individual and the third party failed to
take reasonable steps and to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid future acts
of unlawful sexual conduct by that individual. . . . In support of the measure, the
author states: [¶] This bill is essential to ensure that victims severely damaged by
childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible.
While current law allows a lawsuit to be brought against a perpetrator within three

4 Plaintiffs, BSA and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles have all
asked that we take judicial notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1779.
“Because the [legislative history] materials are relevant to a material issue in this
case, we grant the request.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135, fn.
1.) Plaintiffs also request that we take judicial notice of the Court of Appeal’s file
in McVeigh v. Doe 1 (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 898, and portions of the legislative
history of Senate Bill No. 108 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.). Plaintiffs fail to
demonstrate the relevance of this material. We deny their request.
13



years of discovery of the adulthood aftereffects of the childhood abuse, current
law bars any action against a responsible third party entity (such as an employer,
sponsoring organization or religious organization) after the victim’s 26th
birthday. . . . [¶] . . . This arbitrary limitation unfairly deprives a victim from
seeking redress and unfairly and unjustifiably protects responsible third parties
from being held accountable for their actions that caused injury to victims.”
(Assem. Floor Analysis of Sen. Bill 1779, as amended June 17, 2002, pp. 3- 4.)
Clearly then, the Legislature’s goal in enacting subdivision (b)(2) was to
expand the ability of victims of childhood abuse to sue those responsible for the
injuries they sustained as a result of that abuse. This reading of subdivision (b)(2)
is also consistent with the Legislature’s larger purpose in enacting section 340.1,
the limitations statute of which subdivision (b)(2) is a part. “The overall goal of
section 340.1 is to allow victims of childhood sexual abuse a longer time period in
which to bring suit against their abusers. [Citation.] The legislative history makes
this abundantly clear. The statute has been amended numerous times since its
enactment in 1986, to enlarge the period for filing claims “ ‘to hold molesters
accountable for their behavior so that they are not ‘off the hook’ as soon as their
victims reach age 21,’ ” [citation] [and] to extend the expanded limitations period
to actions not just against molesters, but against ‘any person or entity who owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, where a wrongful or negligent act by that person or
entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual abuse . . . .’ [Citations.] Each
time, plaintiffs’ access to the courts was expanded.” (McVeigh v. Doe 1, supra,
138 Cal.App.4th at pp. 903-904; see Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42
Cal.4th 201, 207-208) [review of the history of section 340.1 from its original
enactment in 1986 through its 2002 amendments demonstrates a continual
expansion and enlargement of the statute in to allow sexual abuse victims to sue
perpetrators and nonperpetrator defendants].)
14

One caveat applies, however — in construing this, or any statute, we may not
broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does
not appear in it or reading out of it language that does. “Our office . . . ‘is simply
to ascertain and declare’ what is in the relevant statutes, ‘not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.’ ” (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v.
Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 573.) “ ‘[A] court . . . may not rewrite
the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its
language.’ ” (In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1002.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to subdivision (b)(2). The words of
subdivision (b)(2) create three conditions that must be met before it applies to a
particular case: (1) the nonperpetrator defendant “knew or had reason to know, or
was otherwise on notice”; (2) that the perpetrator — “an employee, volunteer,
representative, or agent” — had engaged in “unlawful sexual conduct”; and (3)
“failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid
acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not
limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or
environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or
environment.” Moreover, the “unlawful sexual conduct” refers to the acts
specified in section 340.1, subdivision (e), which defines “ ‘[c]hildhood sexual
abuse’ ” in terms of seven provisions of the Penal Code describing various
prohibited sexual acts against minors.
Although plaintiffs are focused on the words “knew,” “reason to know,”
and “otherwise on notice” in the statute, it bears emphasizing that these words
must, of course, be read in the context of the provision as a whole. Thus, the
subject of which the nonperpetrator defendant must have had knowledge or notice
is, the statute clearly tells us, the perpetrator’s unlawful sexual conduct as that
term is defined in the statute to encompass particular prohibited sexual acts with a
15

minor. As we shall demonstrate, it is the failure of plaintiffs to allege that either
the City or the BSA had knowledge or notice that Kalish had engaged in past
unlawful sexual conduct that dooms their complaint. Bearing this in mind, we
turn to the knowledge and notice language.
The words “knew,” “reason to know,” and “otherwise on notice” are not
defined in the statute. The parties agree that “knew” refers to actual knowledge.
They agree further that the phrase “reason to know” refers to a species of
constructive knowledge, but they disagree as to its exact type.
In their briefing, plaintiffs argued that the phrase imposes a duty of inquiry, a
view shared by the Court of Appeal, which defined the phrase in the language of
Civil Code section 19: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has
constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such
inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” In plaintiffs’ view, the allegations in
their complaints that defendants were aware of circumstances that, if investigated,
would have revealed Kalish was a child molester are sufficient to charge
defendants with constructive knowledge of that fact. At argument, however,
plaintiffs appeared to back away from the position and to agree that “reason to
know” in the statute has the same meaning we ascribed to that term in John B. v
Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1191. (Post, at p. 18.) They shifted their
argument regarding the inquiry notice to the “otherwise on notice” language, a
point we take up momentarily.
BSA, however, maintains that “reason to know” is a form of “presumed
actual knowledge” where “based on facts defendant actually knew, an inference
can be drawn that he/she must have realized child abuse was occurring, because a
reasonable person would have realized this under the circumstances.”
Accordingly, in BSA’s view, the constructive knowledge requirement in
16

subdivision (b)(2) refers not to facts defendants could have discovered upon
inquiry, but facts they actually knew and from which known facts they could
reasonably have inferred the ultimate fact of Kalish’s deviant propensities.
We recently had occasion to discuss the meaning of “reason to know.”
“Under the reason-to-know standard, ‘the actor has information from which a
person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would
infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct
upon the assumption that such fact exists.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 12, subd. 1.) In other
words, ‘the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man of ordinary
intelligence or one of the superior intelligence of the actor would either infer the
existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly
probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact
did exist.’ (Id., § 12, com. a, p. 20.)” (John B. v. Superior Court, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 1191, fn. omitted.)
Thus, contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, and the conclusion of the Court of
Appeal, the Legislature’s use of a “reason to know” standard is not the same as the
inquiry notice described in Civil Code section 19. Rather, in determining whether
an actor was in possession of the constructive knowledge described by the “reason
to know” standard, we ask whether, after examining the facts in the actor’s
possession, a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence — or, in the particular
circumstance, a person of superior intelligence — would have inferred the
existence of the ultimate fact at issue or regarded its existence as so highly
probable as to conduct himself or herself as if it did exist.
Nonetheless, contrary to BSA’s formulation, having a “reason to know”
something is not the same as actual knowledge. In light of the Legislature’s
explicit inclusion of an actual knowledge standard, to construe the “reason to
know” standard as simply a restatement of actual knowledge impermissibly
17

creates surplusage in the statute. “We must, of course, avoid any construction that
would create such surplusage.” (Navellier v. Stetten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 95.) A
“reason to know” standard does not require proof that a person must have inferred
the existence of the ultimate fact but only, under the circumstances described
above, that a person would have inferred the existence of the ultimate fact or
would have regarded the existence of the ultimate fact as so highly probable as to
have behaved in conformity with that belief.
The parties also disagree about the meaning of the phrase “otherwise on
notice.” Plaintiffs argue that the phrase, juxtaposed “against actual notice and
inquiry (i.e. constructive) notice . . . is reasonably interpreted as an even broader
form of constructive knowledge,” that “encompasses facts and behaviors
inconsistent with the protection of minors, while not fully rising to the level of
‘childhood sexual abuse,’ as that term is defined in subdivision (e) of § 340.1.”
Thus, as plaintiffs made clear at argument, it is their position that “otherwise on
notice” imposes a duty of inquiry on nonperpetrators triggered when, in the words
of their brief, the nonperpetrator is in possession of “facts [that] suggest the minor
was at risk.” At that point, according to plaintiff, “the policy must be for
non-perpetrator defendants to have reasonably reacted to that risk and determined
its nature and scope.” This position is consistent with their pleadings in which, in
Doe 1’s complaint, for example, it is alleged that, based on the various types of
improper conduct by Kalish, that “[d]efendants and each of them knew or should
have known that Kalish presented a risk of sexual exploitation to boys in the
Devonshire Explorer/Scout program.”
18

BSA, by contrast, argues that “otherwise on notice” means imputed actual
notice — that is, actual knowledge imputed to a principal based on actual or
constructive knowledge, including both inquiry notice and reason to know, in the
possession of the principal’s agent.
Because the phrase is admittedly ambiguous, we consult the legislative
history. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003 [“[I]f
the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may
consider various extrinsic aids, including . . . the legislative history . . . .”].) “The
language ‘or was otherwise on notice’ was added . . . to address a concern that an
entity might be able to avoid responsibility if a formal complaint had not been
filed.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1779, as amended June
6, 2002, p. 10-.) The apparent purpose of this language was to prevent a
nonperpetrator defendant from disclaiming knowledge of the unlawful sexual
conduct of the perpetrator on the grounds that it had not been notified of this
conduct through a formal complaint process where the evidence demonstrates that
some other form of notice was provided.
Thus, the legislative history does not support either plaintiffs’ claim that the
“otherwise on notice” language imposes a duty of inquiry or BSA’s claim that
what the Legislature intended was imputed actual knowledge. We need not
determine the precise contours of the phrase, however, because even if we were to
assume arguendo that plaintiff’s interpretation is tenable, they have failed to
satisfy the further requirement that the nonperpetrator defendant have knowledge
or notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual conduct.
19

It is not enough, under the statute, as plaintiffs maintain, that knowledge or
notice of conduct that does not amount to unlawful sexual conduct is sufficient to
trigger a duty of inquiry, even if we assume that “otherwise on notice” refers to
such a duty. The preliminary reference in subdivision (b)(2) to “unlawful sexual
conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent,” is clarified by the
subsequent language regarding the nonperpetrator defendant’s failure to take
preventative action “to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that
person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that
person” in circumstances involving contact with children. (Italics added.)
Thus, construing the subdivision as a whole, the knowledge or notice
requirement refers to knowledge or notice of past unlawful sexual conduct by the
individual currently accused of other unlawful sexual conduct. Again, this
construction of the statute is supported by the legislative history. In an analysis of
the policy reasons supporting Senate Bill No. 1779, it was noted: “According to
the proponents, many of the victims that would be covered under this bill were
abused for years during their childhood, enduring hundreds of assaults from
employees or agents that the employer knew or had reason to know had committed
past unlawful sexual conduct but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent future
occurrences.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1779, as
amended June 6, 2002, p. 9.)
Fairly construed, then, subdivision (b)(2) requires the victim to establish
that the nonperpetrator defendant had actual knowledge, constructive knowledge
(as measured by the reason to know standard), or was otherwise on notice that the
perpetrator had engaged in past unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and,
possessed of this knowledge or notice, failed to take reasonable preventative steps
or implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of future unlawful sexual
conduct by the perpetrator.
20

B. Are Plaintiffs’ Pleadings Sufficient to Satisfy the Knowledge or Notice
Requirements of Subdivision (b)(2)?
Preliminarily, the parties disagree as to the level of specificity required of
plaintiffs’ knowledge and notice pleadings. Characterizing subdivision (b)(2) as a
“defense” to the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs must
allege specific facts, although it did not explain what this entailed. Defendants
adopt this position. Plaintiffs, by contrast, contend that the doctrine of “less
particularity” applies to the knowledge and notice pleadings. This doctrine
provides that “[l]ess particularity [in pleading] is required when it appears that
defendant has superior knowledge of the facts, so long as the pleading gives notice
of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Okun v. Superior
Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.) Thus, plaintiffs contend that “pleading ultimate
facts is sufficient since the particularized knowledge lies with the defendant and
the defendant does not need more information for evaluation of the action brought
against it.”
We disagree with any implication in the Court of Appeal’s analysis that
plaintiffs seeking the shelter of subdivision (b)(2) are required to plead
evidentiary, as opposed to ultimate facts, and may not include allegations based on
information and belief. Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s characterization, the
subdivision is not a defense to a statute of limitations but, as we have observed, an
expansion of the limitations period, the purpose of which is to expand access to
the courts by victims of childhood sexual abuse. (McVeigh v. Doe 1, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at pp. 903-904.) It would be inconsistent with this purpose, or with
the mandate to broadly construe these provisions, to apply more stringent rules of
pleading than those that ordinarily apply. (See § 425.10, subd. (a) [a complaint is
sufficient if it contains “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action,
in ordinary and concise language.”].) Thus, the complaint ordinarily is sufficient
21

if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. (Burks v. Poppy Construction
Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 473-474; Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn. Inc.
v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099 [“It has been
consistently held that ‘ “a plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of
his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a
defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action” ’ ”].)
Moreover, “[p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are
not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe
that the allegations are true.” (Pridonoff v. Balokovich (1951) 36 Cal.2d 788,
792.)
Furthermore, we agree with plaintiffs that the doctrine of less particularity
may be especially appropriate in this setting. The legislative history of Senate Bill
No. 1779 demonstrates the Legislature was particularly sensitive to cases of
childhood sexual abuse in which the nonperpetrator defendant concealed from
victims of that abuse its knowledge of the perpetrator’s past acts of unlawful
sexual conduct. “[C]laims of some victims were delayed because the employer
withheld information from victims or lied to victims so the employers’ negligence
and wrongful conduct would not be discovered. This is a key distinction and
policy justification for holding these wrongdoing employers liable past the
victim’s 26th birthday. In these cases, the evidence is not lost because the
perpetrator of the abuse could not be found or his memories faded. Instead, the
evidence is in the possession of the wrongdoing employer or third party, who
knew or had reason to know of complaints of sexual misconduct against the
employee or agent but failed to take reasonable steps to avoid future unlawful acts
by that employee or agent.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No.
1779, as amended June 6, 2002, p. 9.)
22

This recognition by the Legislature that one reason a plaintiff may remain
ignorant of the nonperpetrator defendant’s wrongdoing is because that defendant
has withheld or concealed evidence of its wrongdoing argues strongly in favor of
broader, rather than more restrictive, standards of pleading where subdivision
(b)(2) is alleged to apply. In the appropriate case, a plaintiff should be able to rely
on the doctrine of less particularity where he or she can plausibly allege that the
nonperpetrator defendant withheld or concealed evidence of its knowledge or
notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual conduct with minors.5
Nothing in the foregoing discussion, however, assists these plaintiffs
because no degree of broad construction of their pleadings can supply what is
missing from them — allegations that defendants knew, had reason to know, or
were otherwise on notice of past incidents of unlawful sexual conduct by Kalish
with minors that triggered the duty on defendant’s part to take preventive measure
to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct by Kalish in the future.
Plaintiffs’ repetitive and rambling allegations regarding the knowledge or
notice requirement can be distilled into five categories. First, there are numerous
allegations to the effect that defendants inadequately supervised the Explorer
Scout program at Devonshire station during the time period that plaintiffs
participated in the program and, as a result, it was staffed by unqualified officers

5 On the other hand, the pleading must conform to “the general rule that a
complaint must contain only allegations of ultimate facts as opposed to allegations
of . . . legal conclusions . . . . ” (Burke v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 276,
279, fn. 4.) Thus a pleading that did no more than assert boilerplate allegations
that defendants knew or were on notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual
conduct would not be sufficient nor would allegations of information and belief
that merely asserted the facts so alleged without alleging such information that
“lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.” (Pridonoff v.
Balokovic, supra,
36 Cal.2d at p. 792.)
23



who engaged in improper activity with the participants. Second, there are general
allegations that the BSA was aware of past incidents involving sexual molestation
of scouts by scout leaders along with more specific allegations that, prior to
Kalish’s molestation of plaintiffs, defendants were aware of incidents of sexual
misconduct by other officers involved in the Explorer Scout programs at the
Hollywood and Devonshire stations. Third, there are general allegations that BSA
was aware that sexual predators were active in its programs. In this connection,
plaintiffs allege that there were significant reported incidents of sexual misconduct
by scout leaders after 1980 from which they infer that a comparable number of
such incidents was known to the BSA before 1980. Fourth, there are allegations
that other police officers were aware of Kalish’s pedophilic tendencies — these
are the “commonly known” allegations — because of his open interest in young
boys, the favoritism he showed to certain of the scouts, including the plaintiffs, his
inappropriate fraternization with some scouts, including plaintiffs, both on the job
and at his home, his alleged association with a known pornographer, and his trips
to Thailand where he was observed in the company of a young boy, among other
allegations. Fifth, there are the allegations pertaining to Kalish’s molestation of
plaintiffs while he was on duty.
Plaintiffs argue that these allegations satisfy the knowledge or notice
requirement of subdivision (b)(2) because that subdivision requires nothing more
than constructive knowledge or notice by the nonperpetrator defendant of a single
incident of sexual misconduct “no matter how minor,” by “any of [the
nonperpetrator defendant’s] employees, volunteers, representatives or agents” to
“subject [the defendant] to the provisions of subdivision (b)(2).” This argument,
however, wrenches out of context particular words in the provision — “any
unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent” —
in a manner incompatible with the principles of statutory construction to which we
24

have previously referred and also with the legislative intent behind the subdivision
as expressed in the plain language of the statute and the legislative history.
Plaintiffs’ argument impliedly concedes what is plain on the face of their
complaints: that their complaints fail to allege that defendants had knowledge of
Kalish’s past unlawful sexual conduct with minors, which is the prerequisite for
imposing upon these defendants liability for his subsequent sexual abuse of
plaintiffs. That plaintiffs had knowledge or notice of misconduct by Kalish that
created a risk of sexual exploitation is not enough under the express terms of the
statute. In the absence of sufficient allegations of knowledge or notice on the part
of these defendants, their demurrers were correctly sustained and the actions
against them properly dismissed.6

6 We are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ claim that the requirement of a certificate of
corroborative fact set forth in section 340.1, subdivisions (m) and (n) has any
bearing whatsoever on the pleading requirements for subdivision (b)(2). The
former subdivisions — which, collectively, require that a plaintiff submit a
certificate of corroborative fact before the court allows substitution of a named
defendant for a Doe defendant — are, along with the certificate of merit
requirement in section 340.1, subdivision (h), statutory safeguards that operate to
prevent “frivolous and unsubstantial claims.” (McVeigh v. Doe 1, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 904.)
25



III. DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
MORENO, J.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
CORRIGAN,
J.
26

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Doe v. City of Los Angeles
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion


Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
XXX 137 Cal.App.4th 438
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S142546
Date Filed: November 1, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Robert L. Hess

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Zalkin & Zimmer, Devin M. Storey, Irwin M. Zalkin; Taylor & Ring, David M. Ring, John C. Taylor;
Bennett, Johnson & Galler, Todd A. Walburg and William C. Johnson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Janet G. Bogigian, Assistant City Attorney, and Amy Jo Field,
Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent City of Los Angeles.

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Christina J. Imre, Orly Degani, Gregory H. Halliday and Thomas A.
Delaney for Defendant and Respondent Boy Scouts of America.

Hennigan, Bennett & Dorman, J. Michael Hennigan and Lee W. Potts for Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Los Angeles and Defense Laison Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Boy
Scouts of America.

Sweeney & Greene, James F. Sweeney and Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr., for California Catholic
Conference as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Boy Scouts of America.



Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Devin M. Storey
Zalkin & Zimmer
12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 260
San Diego, CA 92130
(858) 259-3011

Irwin M. Zalkin
Zalkin & Zimmer
12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 260
San Diego, CA 92130
(858) 259-3011

Amy Jo Field
Deputy City Attorney
200 North Main Street, 600 City Hall East
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 978-6925

Christina J. Imre
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold
801 South Figueroa Street, 19th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5556
(213) 426-6900


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Thu, 11/01/2007S142546

Parties
1Doe, John (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by David M. Ring
Taylor & Ring, LLP
10900 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 920
Los Angeles, CA

2Doe, John (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by William Charles Johnson
Bennett & Johnson
1901 Harrison Street, Suite 1650
Oakland, CA

3Doe, John (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Devin Miles Storey
Zalkin & Zimmer, LLP
12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 260
San Diego, CA

4Doe, John (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by Irwin Myron Zalkin
Zalkin & Zimmer, LLP
12555 High Bluff Drive, Suite 260
San Diego, CA

5City Of Los Angeles (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Amy Jo Field
Office of the City Attorney
200 N. Main Street, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA

6Boy Scouts Of America (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Thomas Anthony Delaney
Sedgwick Detert Moran et al.
3 Park Plaza, 17th Floor
Irvine, CA

7Boy Scouts Of America (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Orly Degani
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, LLP
801 South Figueroa Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

8Boy Scouts Of America (Defendant and Respondent)
Represented by Christina J. Imre
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, LLP
801 South Figueroa Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, CA

9Roman Catholic Archbishop Of Los Angeles (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Lee W. Potts
Hennigan Bennett & Dorman
865 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2900
Los Angeles, CA

10Clergy I & Ii (Pub/Depublication Requestor)
Represented by Raymond Paul Boucher
Kiesel Boucher & Larson, LLP
8648 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA

11Doe 2, John (Plaintiff and Appellant)
Represented by David M. Ring
Taylor & Ring, LLP
10900 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 920
Los Angeles, CA

12California Catholic Conference (Amicus curiae)
Represented by James F. Sweeney
Sweeney & Grant, LLP
9381 E. Stockton Boulevard, Suite 218
Elk Grove, CA


Disposition
Nov 1 2007Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Apr 5 2006Received premature petition for review
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2
Apr 7 2006Case start: Petition for review filed
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorney David M. Ring, Retained
Apr 7 2006Request for judicial notice received (pre-grant)
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 David M. Ring, retained counsel
Apr 7 2006Request for depublication (petition for review pending)
  Clergy I & II (JCCP 4286, 4297), depub requestor Raymond P. Boucher, Liaison Counsel
Apr 12 2006Received Court of Appeal record
 
Apr 19 2006Opposition filed
  to request for depublication Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles Lee W. Potts, counsel (filed with permission)
Apr 21 2006Received:
  letter from non-party Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles concerning non-service to parties of original request to depublish. Lee W. Potts, Defense Liaison Counsel
Apr 25 2006Answer to petition for review filed
  Respondent Boy Scouts of America Attorney Thomas A. Delaney, Retained
Apr 27 2006Received Court of Appeal record
 
Apr 28 2006Received:
  Original Proof of Service to depub request on April 7, 2006 Clergy I & II, depub requestor Raymond P. Boucher, Liaison Counsel
May 5 2006Reply to answer to petition filed
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorney David M. Ring
May 22 2006Time extended to grant or deny review
  to and including July 6, 2006, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Jun 21 2006Petition for review granted (civil case)
  Request for judicial notice granted. Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jun 21 2006Letter sent to:
  counsel - Certification of Interested entities or persons
Jun 30 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  City of Los Angeles, respondent Amy Jo Field, counsel
Jun 30 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  Boy Scouts of America, respondent Christina J. Imre, counsel
Jul 6 2006Certification of interested entities or persons filed
  John Doe, John Doe 2, plaintiffs Daivd M. Ring, counsel
Jul 11 2006Request for extension of time filed
  Opening Brief/Merits to 8-21-06 Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorney David M. Ring, retained
Jul 18 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of appellant and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including August 21, 2006.
Aug 21 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorneys Devin M. Storey & David M. Ring
Aug 21 2006Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorneys Devin M. Storey & David M. Ring
Aug 21 2006Association of attorneys filed for:
  Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorneys Devin M. Storey & David M. Ring
Sep 18 2006Request for extension of time filed
  to file the answer brief on the merits, 45-days until November 4, 2006 Boy Scouts of America, respondent Orly Degani, counsel
Sep 20 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent Boy Scouts of America, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 20, 2006
Sep 20 2006Request for extension of time filed
  answer brief/merits to 11-20-06 Respondent City of Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney Amy Jo Field
Oct 4 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of respondent City of Los Angeles, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 20, 2006.
Oct 12 2006Request for extension of time filed
  15-day extension until November 4, 2006, to file the respondents anwer briefs on the merits Orly Degani, counsel
Oct 13 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of the City of Los Angeles and the Boy Scouts of America, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the respondents' answer briefs on the merits is extended to and including November 4, 2006.
Nov 6 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
  Respondent City of Los Angeles
Nov 7 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
  Boy Scouts of America, respondents Orly Degani, counsel (CRC 40.1B)
Nov 7 2006Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Boy Scouts of America, respondents Orly Degani, counsel (CRC 40.1B)
Nov 14 2006Filed:
  Notice of Errata - Missing page 61 City of Los Angeles, respondent Amy Jo Field, counsel
Nov 16 2006Request for extension of time filed
  45 days to file plaintiffs reply brief on the merits until January 11, 2007. John Doe, et al., plaintiffs Devin M. Storey, counsel
Nov 21 2006Extension of time granted
  On application of John Doe and John Doe 2 and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the plaintiffs reply brief on the merits is extended to and including January 11, 2007.
Jan 11 2007Application to file over-length brief filed
  John Doe, et al., plaintiffs Devin M. Storey, counsel
Jan 16 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  John Doe, et al., plaintiffs Devin M. Storey, counsel
Jan 16 2007Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  John Doe, et al., plaintiffs Devin M. Storey, counsel
Feb 13 2007Request for extension of time filed
  ten (10) days to and including February 25, 2007, to file Amicus Curiae brief. California Catholic Conference, Amicus Curiae James F. Sweeney, counsel
Feb 13 2007Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, Amicus Curiae Lee W. Potts, counsel
Feb 14 2007Extension of time granted
  On application of amicus curiae California Catholic Conference and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file its amicus curiae brief in support of Boy Scouts of America is hereby extended to and including February 25, 2007.
Feb 15 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, amicus curiae Lee W. Potts, counsel
Feb 15 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, amicus curiae Lee W. Potts, counsel One volume of Legislative History of SB1779 submitted in support of amicus curiae brief of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles
Feb 26 2007Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  California Catholic Conference, Amicus Curiae James F. Sweeney, counsel
Mar 1 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
  California Catholic Conference in support of Boy Scouts of America James F. Sweeney, counsel
Mar 8 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  John Doe, John Doe 2, appellants Devin M. Storey, counsel
Mar 21 2007Request for extension of time filed
  to file response to AC brief of California Catholic Conference to 3-28-07 Appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 Attorneys Irwin M. Zalkin & David M. Ring
Mar 22 2007Extension of time granted
  On application of appellants John Doe and John Doe 2 and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer to the amicus curiae brief of the California Catholic Conference is extended to and including March 28, 2007.
Mar 28 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  John Doe, John Doe 2, appellants Devin M. Storey, counsel
Mar 28 2007Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)
  John Doe, John Doe 2, appellants Devin M. Storey, counsel
Aug 8 2007Case ordered on calendar
  to be argued on Wednesday, September 5, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Aug 14 2007Filed:
  Application to divide oral argument time filed by counsel for appellants John Doe et al., asking to divide time (10 and 20 minutes) between associated counsel.
Aug 17 2007Filed:
  Letter from counsel for respondent Boy Scouts of America, advising that they will be requesting division of oral argument time.
Aug 17 2007Application filed to:
  divide oral argument time, filed by counsel for respondent City of Los Angeles. requesting equal division of time between respondent City and respondent Boy Scouts of America.
Aug 17 2007Order filed
  The request of counsel for appellants in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellants at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellants to allocate to counsel David M. Storey 10 minutes and counsel Irwin M. Zalkin 20 minutes of appellants' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Aug 20 2007Received:
  document dated August 16, 2007, concerning Assembly Bill 1724 City of Los Angeles, respondent Amy Jo Field, Deputy City Attorney
Aug 21 2007Order filed
  The joint request of counsel for respondents in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of respondents at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of respondents to allocate to respondent Boy Scouts of America 15 minutes & respondent City of Los Angeles 15 minutes of respondents' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Sep 5 2007Cause argued and submitted
 
Nov 1 2007Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion by Moreno, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Corrigan, JJ.
Dec 18 2007Remittitur issued (civil case)
 
Dec 26 2007Received:
  Receipt for Remittitur from the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four.

Briefs
Aug 21 2006Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 6 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 7 2006Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Jan 16 2007Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Feb 15 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Mar 1 2007Amicus curiae brief filed
 
Mar 8 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
Mar 28 2007Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
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