Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/18/05

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
CUMMINS, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
S117726
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E032377
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
)
Respondent; )
)
EDWARD D. COX et al.,
Riverside
County
Real Parties in Interest.
Super. Ct. No. RIC 36195

The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (hereafter sometimes referred
to as the Act), Civil Code section 1791 et seq.,1 provides that if a manufacturer or
its representative in this state fails to repair a new motor vehicle to conform to any
express warranty after a reasonable number of attempts to repair, the manufacturer
must replace the vehicle or pay restitution. (§1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) The question
presented in this case is whether a buyer who resides in California may bring suit
against a manufacturer under the Act when the buyer purchased the vehicle in
another state, but brought the vehicle for repair to the manufacturer’s authorized
repair facility in California, and repeated attempts to repair the vehicle proved

1
All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
1

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unsuccessful. We conclude that the Act does not apply unless the vehicle was
purchased in California.
I.
During a visit to Idaho, plaintiffs Edward and Sandi Cox, who are
California residents, purchased a motor home manufactured by defendant
Winnebago and equipped with an engine made by defendant Cummins.2 Plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the Riverside County Superior Court against defendants,
alleging that the motor home did not conform to express warranties and that its
engine was defectively manufactured. The first cause of action was a claim for
breach of express warranty and violation of the Act. Plaintiffs alleged that their
vehicle was defective in numerous ways. The complaint alleged that the
manufacturers’ authorized repair facilities in Riverside County, California, had
failed to remedy these defects after numerous attempts, and that the manufacturers
violated the Act by not replacing the vehicle or providing a refund. The complaint
sought actual damages of $285,872.80 plus attorney fees and a civil penalty of up
to twice the amount of actual damages, the remedies provided in section 1794,
subdivision (e)(1). The complaint also alleged other claims, including a violation
of the federal “lemon law,” the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act. (15
U.S.C. § 2301 et. seq.)
Defendants moved for summary adjudication of the first cause of action on
the ground that plaintiffs had purchased the motor home in Idaho, arguing that the
Act applies only to vehicles purchased in California. In opposing the motion,
plaintiffs argued that the California statute applies if the manufacturer’s

2
Although Winnebago and Cummins are petitioners in this writ proceeding,
for clarity we shall refer to them as defendants, which is their status in the
underlying action.
2

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representative in California — that is, the authorized repair facility — fails after a
reasonable number of attempts to repair the vehicle to conform to the express
warranty. The trial court denied the motion for summary adjudication.
Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. That court
issued an alternative writ, but after briefing and argument denied the writ,
concluding that the Act applies whenever a manufacturer that sells goods in
California (or its representative) “fails to service or repair the good to conform to
its express warranty, even in cases when the particular good was purchased out of
state.” We granted review.
II.
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act was enacted to address the
difficulties faced by consumers in enforcing express warranties. Consumers
frequently were frustrated by the inconvenience of having to return goods to the
manufacturer for repairs and by repeated unsuccessful attempts to remedy the
problem. (See Comment, Toward an End to Consumer Frustration ⎯ Making
the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Work (1974) 14 Santa Clara L.Rev.
575, 580.) The Act protects purchasers of consumer goods by requiring specified
implied warranties, placing strict limitations on how and when a manufacturer
may disclaim those implied warranties, and providing mechanisms to ensure that
manufacturers live up to the terms of any express warranty. (See §§ 1792–1792.5,
1793, 1793.2.)
Among other provisions, the Act requires manufacturers of consumer
goods sold in California to make available to buyers service and repair facilities at
which goods can be repaired to conform to any express warranties provided by the
manufacturer. “Every manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for
which the manufacturer has made an express warranty” must “[m]aintain in this
state sufficient service and repair facilities” to carry out the terms of the express
3

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warranty. (§ 1793.2, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The manufacturer may maintain its own
repair facility or may designate and authorize an independent repair facility to
meet its responsibilities under its express warranties. (§ 1793.2, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
In addition, the Act specifies time frames within which repairs under an
express warranty must be provided. Service and repair at the manufacturer’s
authorized repair facility in the state must be commenced “within a reasonable
time.” (§ 1793.2, subd. (b).) Goods must be repaired to comply with the warranty
within 30 days, unless delay is caused by conditions beyond the control of the
manufacturer or its representative. (Ibid.)
In those instances when the goods cannot be repaired to conform to an
express warranty after a “reasonable number of attempts,” the Act specifies a
remedy, in what has been referred to as the “refund-or-replace” provisions.
(§1793.2., subd. (d)(1) & (2); see Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.
(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174.) For consumer goods generally, the manufacturer
must either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the
purchase price, less a reasonable amount for the buyer’s use of the goods during
the period preceding detection of the nonconformity. (§ 1793.2., subd. (d)(1).) A
buyer who “is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation” under the Act
may bring an action for damages and other relief. (§ 1794, subd. (a).)
The Legislature has amended the Act and adopted additional provisions
that address the special problems experienced by consumers in enforcing
warranties on new motor vehicles. (See Stats. 1982, ch. 388, § 1, p. 1720; Stats.
1987, ch. 1280, § 2, p. 4557; Stats. 1992, ch. 1232, § 6, p. 5788; Stats. 1999, ch.
448.) These provisions frequently are referred to as the lemon law. In any case
involving a new motor vehicle, there is a rebuttable presumption that a reasonable
number of attempts have been made to repair the vehicle if, within 18 months or
18,000 miles, whichever comes first, either (1) the same problem has been subject
4

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to repair four or more times (or, if the problem is likely to cause death or serious
bodily injury, two or more times) and the buyer has notified the manufacturer
directly of the need for the repair, or (2) the vehicle is out of service for more than
30 calendar days because of repair under the warranty. (§ 1793.22, subd. (b).) If
the buyer prevails in an action involving a new motor vehicle, the buyer may
recover damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs and, under some
circumstances, a “civil penalty of up to two times the amount of damages.”
(§ 1794, subd. (e)(1).) The lemon law also provides manufacturers with the option
of establishing a third party dispute resolution process to address disputes over the
enforcement of express warranties. A manufacturer that maintains such a process
receives certain advantages, including an exemption from the civil penalty unless
the manufacturer has willfully violated the law. (§ 1794, subds. (c) and (e)(2).)
The substance of current section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), was added in
1987. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1280, § 2, p. 4558.) The 1987 amendment addressed
continuing problems experienced by automobile buyers in enforcing the refund-
or-replace remedy. It gave the buyer of a new motor vehicle the option of
selecting reimbursement rather than a replacement vehicle, and specified in detail
how the amount of reimbursement is to be calculated. (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).)
The issue presented here is whether the refund-or-replace provisions
contained in subdivision (d)(2) of section 1793.2 apply to vehicles purchased
outside of California. In arguing that they do not, defendants rely primarily on the
language of subdivision (a) of section 1793.2, which imposes the duty upon
“[e]very manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the
manufacturer has made an express warranty” to provide facilities for repair of its
goods “reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold.” (Italics
added.) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “consumer goods
sold in this state” in section 1793.2, subdivision (a) is a limitation only on the
5

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category of manufacturers that must provide repair facilities in this state. Because
section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), which provides the refund-or-replace remedy
for new motor vehicles, does not include an express limitation to vehicles sold in
the state, plaintiffs contend that the provisions of that subdivision should not be
limited to vehicles purchased in California.3 Plaintiffs argue that if the Legislature
had intended to limit the remedy to goods sold in the state, it would have included
in subdivision (d) an express limitation to in-state sales, just as it did in
subdivision (a) and other portions of the Act. (See, e.g., §§ 1792 [every “sale of
consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state” is accompanied by an implied
warranty of merchantability], 1792.1 [specifying when the implied warranty of
fitness applies to the “sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state”].)
In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature
so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. (Olmstead v. Arthur J. Gallager
& Co. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 804, 811.) We look first to the words of the statute,
which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature’s intent (Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1037.) We
construe the words of a statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an
enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory

3
In addition, none of the definitional provisions of the Act contains language
limiting section 1793.2 to buyers who purchased their vehicles in California or to
vehicles that were sold in California. A “ ‘[b]uyer’ ” is defined as “any individual
who buys consumer goods from a person engaged in the business of
manufacturing, distributing, or selling consumer goods at retail.” (§ 1791, subd.
(b).) The term “ ‘consumer goods’ ” means “any new product or part thereof that
is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” (§ 1791, subd. (a).) The term
“ ‘[n]ew motor vehicle’ ” is defined as “a new motor vehicle that is bought or used
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)
6

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framework as a whole. (Renne J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743;
Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32.)
When considered in the context of the other portions of section 1793.2,
subdivision (d) is most reasonably interpreted as applicable only to vehicles sold
in California. The language employed throughout section 1793.2 strongly
suggests that no single subdivision can be read independently of the others. Each
subsequent subdivision employs language that can be fully understood only by
reference to previous subdivisions. The language used thus indicates that all the
subdivisions of section 1793.2 were intended to apply to the same universe of
goods — those sold in this state.
Subdivision (a) of section 1793.2 provides that manufacturers of “consumer
goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express
warranty” must maintain or designate repair facilities in this state.4 These

4
Section 1793.2, subdivision (a) provides in full:
“(a) Every manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which
the manufacturer has made an express warranty shall:

“(1)(A) Maintain in this state sufficient service and repair facilities
reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the
terms of those warranties or designate and authorize in this state as service and
repair facilities independent repair or service facilities reasonably close to all areas
where its consumer goods are sold to carry out the terms of the warranties.

“(B) As a means of complying with this paragraph, a manufacturer may
enter into warranty service contracts with independent service and repair facilities.
The warranty service contracts may provide for a fixed schedule of rates to be
charged for warranty service or warranty repair work. However, the rates fixed by
those contracts shall be in conformity with the requirements of subdivision (c) of
Section 1793.3. The rates established pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section
1793.3, between the manufacturer and the independent service and repair facility,
do not preclude a good faith discount that is reasonably related to reduced credit
and general overhead cost factors arising from the manufacturer’s payment of
warranty charges direct to the independent service and repair facility. The
warranty service contracts authorized by this paragraph may not be executed to
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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facilities must be located “reasonably close to all areas where its consumer goods
are sold.” (§1793.2, subd.(a)(1)(A).). Subdivision (b) states that if “those service
and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods
is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties,”
the manufacturer or its representative in this state must commence repairs “within
a reasonable time.” (§1793.2, subd. (b), italics added.)5 The references to “those”
facilities, “the” goods, and “the” warranties in subdivision (b) only can be to the
facilities, goods, and warranties discussed previously in subdivision (a). Therefore
“the goods” as used in subdivision (b) must refer to the same goods described in
subdivision (a) — that is, “consumer goods sold in this state and for which the
manufacturer has made an express warranty.”

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

cover a period of time in excess of one year, and may be renewed only by a
separate, new contract or letter of agreement between the manufacturer and the
independent service and repair facility.

“(2) In the event of a failure to comply with paragraph (1) of this
subdivision, be subject to Section 1793.5.

“(3) Make available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient
service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express
warranty period.”
5
Section 1793.2, subdivision (b) provides in full: “(b) Where those service
and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods
is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties,
service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the
manufacturer or its representative in this state. Unless the buyer agrees in writing
to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the
applicable warranties within 30 days. Delay caused by conditions beyond the
control of the manufacturer or its representatives shall serve to extend this 30-day
requirement. Where delay arises, conforming goods shall be tendered as soon as
possible following termination of the condition giving rise to the delay.”
8

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Subdivision (c) of section 1793.2 goes on to specify that the buyer must
“deliver nonconforming goods to the manufacturer’s service and repair facility
within this state,” unless “delivery cannot reasonably be accomplished.”6
Subdivision (c) repeatedly uses the phrase “nonconforming goods” without
further definition or explanation. That phrase draws its meaning from subdivision
(b), which refers to goods that “do not conform with the applicable express
warranties.” Thus, the phrase “the nonconforming goods” was meant to
incorporate the same meaning of “goods” that is used in subdivisions (a) and
(b) — consumer goods that are “sold in this state and for which the manufacturer
has provided an express warranty,” and that do not conform to that warranty.
Subdivision (d)(1) of section 1793.2 sets out the manufacturer’s general
duty to replace goods or reimburse the buyer if “the manufacturer or its
representative in this state does not service or repair the goods to conform to the

6
Section 1793.2, subdivision (c) provides in full: “(c) The buyer shall
deliver nonconforming goods to the manufacturer's service and repair facility
within this state, unless, due to reasons of size and weight, or method of
attachment, or method of installation, or nature of the nonconformity, delivery
cannot reasonably be accomplished. If the buyer cannot return the nonconforming
goods for any of these reasons, he or she shall notify the manufacturer or its
nearest service and repair facility within the state. Written notice of nonconformity
to the manufacturer or its service and repair facility shall constitute return of the
goods for purposes of this section. Upon receipt of that notice of nonconformity,
the manufacturer shall, at its option, service or repair the goods at the buyer's
residence, or pick up the goods for service and repair, or arrange for transporting
the goods to its service and repair facility. All reasonable costs of transporting the
goods when a buyer cannot return them for any of the above reasons shall be at the
manufacturer’s expense. The reasonable costs of transporting nonconforming
goods after delivery to the service and repair facility until return of the goods to
the buyer shall be at the manufacturer’s expense.”
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applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts.”7 Again, it is
most reasonable to interpret the references to “the manufacturer,” “the goods,” and
“the express warranties” to signify the manufacturer, goods, and warranties as
these terms have been employed in the previous subdivisions. Therefore, it
appears that the general duty to replace goods that cannot be repaired is limited to
goods that are “sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has provided an
express warranty.” (§ 1793.2, subd. (a).)8
Subdivision (d)(2) of section 1793.2 sets out the manufacturer’s duty to
replace a new motor vehicle or reimburse the buyer if “the manufacturer or its
representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to
conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of
attempts.”9 Subdivision (d)(2), unlike subdivision (d)(1), does not use the phrase

7
Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(1) provides in full: “(d)(1) Except as
provided in paragraph (2), if the manufacturer or its representative in this state
does not service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either
replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price
paid by the buyer, less that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to
the discovery of the nonconformity.”
8
This conclusion is consistent with an opinion of the Legislative Counsel,
dated January 5, 1971, responding to several questions concerning the Act. The
opinion states: “In our opinion, the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act would
not apply to sales by a California manufacturer outside of this state where the
goods are sold at retail outside the state nor to a sale by a California manufacturer
within this state where the goods are resold at retail outside the state.” (Ops. Cal.
Legis. Counsel, No. 18909 (Jan. 5, 1971) Consumer Goods Transactions, p. 13.)
In support of this conclusion, the opinion cites sections 1792, 1792.1, and 1793.2,
each of which contains an express limitation to goods sold in this state. (Ops. Cal.
Legis. Counsel, No. 18909, supra, at p. 13.)
9
Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) provides in full:
“(2) If the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service
or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of
(Footnote continued on next page.)
10

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(Footnote continued from previous page.)

subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express
warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either
promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or
promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B).
However, the buyer shall be free to elect restitution in lieu of replacement, and in
no event shall the buyer be required by the manufacturer to accept a replacement
vehicle.

“(A) In the case of replacement, the manufacturer shall replace the buyer's
vehicle with a new motor vehicle substantially identical to the vehicle replaced.
The replacement vehicle shall be accompanied by all express and implied
warranties that normally accompany new motor vehicles of that specific kind. The
manufacturer also shall pay for, or to, the buyer the amount of any sales or use tax,
license fees, registration fees, and other official fees which the buyer is obligated
to pay in connection with the replacement, plus any incidental damages to which
the buyer is entitled under Section 1794, including, but not limited to, reasonable
repair, towing, and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.

“(B) In the case of restitution, the manufacturer shall make restitution in an
amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, including any
charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed options, but excluding
nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer or the buyer, and including any
collateral charges such as sales tax, license fees, registration fees, and other
official fees, plus any incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled under
Section 1794, including, but not limited to, reasonable repair, towing, and rental
car costs actually incurred by the buyer.

“(C) When the manufacturer replaces the new motor vehicle pursuant to
subparagraph (A), the buyer shall only be liable to pay the manufacturer an
amount directly attributable to use by the buyer of the replaced vehicle prior to the
time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its
authorized service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to
the nonconformity. When restitution is made pursuant to subparagraph (B), the
amount to be paid by the manufacturer to the buyer may be reduced by the
manufacturer by that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the
time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its
authorized service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to
the nonconformity. The amount directly attributable to use by the buyer shall be
determined by multiplying the actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or
payable by the buyer, including any charges for transportation and manufacturer-
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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“the goods.” Thus, subdivision (d)(2) does not directly incorporate the limitation
on “goods” contained in subdivision (a) of section 1793.2. Instead, it refers to “a
new motor vehicle,” a phrase employed for the first time in subdivision (d)(2).
Nevertheless, we conclude that subdivision (d)(2) of section 1793.2, like
subdivision (d)(1), was not meant to be read independently of the other
subdivisions and likewise is limited to new motor vehicles sold in this state. A
“new motor vehicle” is just one type of “consumer goods.” The statute treats the
special provisions applicable to new motor vehicles in subdivision (d)(2) as an
exception to the general provision applicable to all consumer goods in subdivision
(d)(1). The latter subdivision states that a manufacturer who cannot repair a
consumer good to comply with express warranties must replace it or make
restitution, “except as provided in paragraph (2).” Subdivision (d)(2) provides the
same remedies for new motor vehicles, except that the buyer has the option of
selecting restitution instead of replacement and the statute provides additional
specifications for both the refund and restitution remedies. (See § 1793.2, subd.
(d)(2)(A) – (C).)
Although the Act treats motor vehicles differently from other types of
consumer goods in several ways, we find no indication that the Legislature
intended to treat motor vehicles differently with respect to the limitation on the

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

installed options, by a fraction having as its denominator 120,000 and having as its
numerator the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time
the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its
authorized service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to
the nonconformity. Nothing in this paragraph shall in any way limit the rights or
remedies available to the buyer under any other law.”
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Act’s coverage to goods sold in California. As noted above, special provisions
governing motor vehicles were added to the Act, beginning with the adoption of
the lemon law in 1982. (Stats. 1982, ch. 388, § 1, p. 1720.) That law added new
provisions to section 1793.2 specifying the circumstances under which a
presumption would arise that a reasonable number of attempts have been made to
conform a new vehicle to the express warranties, and also provided for a third
party dispute resolution process to resolve disputes between buyers and
manufacturers. 10 Under the lemon law as originally adopted in 1982, there was
no special provision establishing a manufacturer’s duty to refund or replace a
nonconforming motor vehicle; rather, that duty was established by then-
subdivision (d), the general duty to refund or replace nonconforming consumer
goods. Thus, all consumer goods, including motor vehicles, came under then-
subdivision (d), which, under the above analysis, encompassed only goods sold in
this state.
The substance of current subdivision (d)(2) was adopted in 1987. The 1987
amendments to subdivision (d) added special provisions that delineate the remedy
to be provided if the manufacturer cannot repair a new motor vehicle. Subdivision
(d) was renumbered as (d)(1), without changing its substance, and subdivision
(d)(2) was added. Subdivision (d)(2) tracks the general refund-or-replace
provision of (d)(1) but contains additional specifications that apply when a new
motor vehicle is involved. The buyer has the option of selecting reimbursement
instead of replacement. (§1793.2, subd.(d)(2).) If replacement is selected, the

10
As originally adopted, these provisions were added to subdivision (e) of
section 1793. The substance of that subdivision later was moved to section
1793.22, which now is identified as the Tanner Consumer Protection Act.
(§ 1793.22, subd. (a); Stats. 1992, ch. 1232, § 6, p. 5788.)
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replacement vehicle must be substantially identical to the one replaced, and the
manufacturer is required to pay specified incidental damages. (§1793.2,
subd.(d)(2)(A).) If restitution is selected, the amount is to be calculated as
specified by the statute. (§ 1793.2, subd.(d)(2)(B).) Nothing in subdivision (d)(2)
suggests the Legislature intended to broaden the coverage of the statute to vehicles
sold outside the state.
Another part of the Act, the notice requirement in section 1793.1, also
provides support for the conclusion we reach. That statute specifies the contents
of a notice of rights that must be included in every “work order or repair invoice”
for warranty repairs. The notice must state: “ ‘A buyer of this product in
California has the right to have this product serviced or repaired during the
warranty period.’ ” (§ 1793.1, subd. (a)(2), italics added.) The notice also must
describe the rights provided to buyers under section 1793.2, subdivision (d). The
phrase “a buyer of this product in California” indicates that the Legislature
believed those rights applied only to a buyer who purchased the product in
California. The quoted language in section 1793.1 was adopted in 1982, before
the 1987 amendments that added subdivision (d)(2) but after the original adoption
of the general refund-or-replace requirements now contained in subdivision (d)(1).
(Stats. 1982, ch. 381, § 1, p. 1709.) Although an expression of legislative intent in
a later enactment is not binding upon a court in its construction of an earlier
enacted statute, it is a factor that may be considered. (West Pico Furniture Co. v.
Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 610; Botello v. Shell Oil Co. (1991)
229 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1136) Furthermore, we may presume that when the
Legislature adopted subdivision (d)(2) in 1987, it was aware of the language in
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section 1793.1 and understood the scope of the Act to be limited to products
purchased in California.11
If the refund-or-replace provisions of the Act were applicable to goods
purchased outside of the state, uncertainties would be created as to the precise
reach of the law. In the present case, plaintiffs are California residents and all of
the repair attempts took place in California. Section 1793.2 is not limited to
California residents, however. And although the statute requires the buyer to
deliver the nonconforming goods to “the manufacturer’s service and repair
facilities within this state,” it does not explicitly require that all of the “reasonable
number” of repair attempts be made within this state. (§ 1793.2, subds. (c) and
(d)(2).) Could a nonresident sue under the Act if he or she brought a vehicle to

11
In support of their argument that section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) applies
only to vehicles sold in California, defendants cite letters from the staff of Senator
Song, a co-author of the Act, stating the Senator’s belief that the Act applies only
to goods sold in California. Because our interpretation relies on the language of
the Act, we find it unnecessary to consider these letters. In addition, as we have
observed, “the statements of an individual legislator, including the author of a bill,
are generally not considered in construing a statute, as the court’s task is to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a whole in adopting a piece of
legislation.” (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th. 1049, 1062;
see People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 394; cf. Gavaldon v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1257 [noting that letter from staff
of the author of a bill to amend the Act, explaining the purpose of amendments,
supported court’s interpretation of those amendments, but without discussing
whether letter was brought to the attention of the Legislature].) Defendants have
not provided any evidence that similar views were presented to the Legislature
when it acted. Furthermore, the author’s opinions, as stated in these letters, were
expressed in response to particular questions and do not address the specific issue
that is before us in the present case. We note, however, that neither party has
brought to our attention anything in the legislative history of the Act or the lemon
law that is inconsistent with our interpretation of section 1793.2, subdivision
(d)(2).
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California for a single repair attempt after unsuccessful attempts to repair in the
state of sale? If the statute were interpreted to apply to vehicles purchased outside
of the state, its provisions would not provide an answer.12 The circumstance that
the Act does not contain any provision that would clarify its territorial scope if it
were applied to goods sold outside the state is another factor that supports our
conclusion that the Legislature contemplated that the Act would apply only if the
goods were purchased in California.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeal in the present case
relied upon the absence of any express language in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)
limiting the subdivision to goods sold in this state, concluding that the subdivision
should be interpreted broadly in light of the remedial purposes of the Act. We
agree that the Act is a remedial measure whose terms properly should be
interpreted broadly to effectuate its purposes. (See, e.g., National R.V., Inc. v.

12
Some states whose lemon laws are not limited to vehicles sold in the state
have addressed such problems by requiring that the vehicle be licensed or
registered in the state. (See Alaska Stat. § 28.10 [applies to vehicles registered in
the state]; Ark. Code Ann. § 4-90-403(11) [applies to vehicles licensed or
purchased in the state]; Del. Code Ann., tit. 6, § 5001(5) [defines an automobile to
include any vehicle sold or registered in the state]; D.C. Stat. § 50-501(9) [applies
to vehicles sold or registered in the District of Columbia]; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 681.102(15) [applies to vehicles sold in the state]; Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-
782(11) [applies to vehicles sold or registered in the state]; Idaho Code § 48 –
901(7) [applies to any motor vehicle sold or licensed in the state]; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 50-645(a)(2) [applies to vehicles sold or registered in the state]; N.J. Laws
§ 56:12-30 [applies to vehicles purchased or registered in the state]; N.Y.
Gen.Bus.L. § 198-a, subds. (a)(1) and (b)(2) [applies to any vehicle sold or
registered in the state]; Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 901(A)(2) [applies to vehicles
registered in the state]; Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.315(2) [applies to vehicles sold in the
state]; 73 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1952 [applies to motor vehicles purchased and
registered in the state]; Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 9, § 4171(9) [applies to vehicles
purchased or registered in the state]; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101(a)(ii) [applies to
vehicles sold or registered in the state].)
16

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Foreman (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080; Music Acceptance Corp. v. Lofing
(1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 610, 619; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc. ,
supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 184.) Nevertheless, we must interpret the language of
the statute as it has been written, not as it might have been drafted had the
Legislature contemplated and chosen to address, the specific concerns of
California buyers who purchased their vehicle in another state. As we have
explained, the structure and language of the existing statutory provisions indicate
that the Legislature intended the Act to apply only to vehicles sold in California.
III.
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Court of Appeal is
reversed.
GEORGE, C.J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
17

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 109 Cal.App.4th 1385
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S117726
Date Filed: July 18, 2005
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Dallas Holmes

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Foley & Lardner, Tami S. Smason, Leila Nourani and Shauhin Talesh for Petitioner Cummins, Inc.

Sutton & Murphy, Thomas M. Murphy, Patrick J. Wehage and Kody J. Diaz for Petitioner Winnebago
Industries, Inc.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Superior Court.

Law Offices of Lawrence J. Hutchens, Lawrence J. Hutchens and Michael S. Humphries for Real Parties in
Interest.

---

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Tami S. Smason
Foley & Lardner
2029 Century Park East, 35th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 277-2223

Thomas M. Murphy
Sutton & Murphy
26056 Acero
Mission Viejo, CA 92691
(949) 206-0550

Michael S. Humphries
Law Offices of Lawrence J. Hutchens
9047 Flower St.
Bellflower, CA 90706
(562) 804-0600

---

Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 07/18/2005	S117726

Disposition
Jul 18 2005	Opinion: Reversed

Dockets
Jul 24 2003	Petition for review filed   petitioner Cummins, Inc.
Jul 24 2003	Joinder to petition filed   petitioner Winnebago Industries, Inc.
Jul 25 2003	Record requested
Jul 29 2003	Received Court of Appeal record   1-doghouse
Jul 30 2003	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   by counsel for petitioner (Cummins).
Aug 4 2003	Opposition filed   by (non-party) The Anderson Law Firm. Opposition to depub request.
Aug 4 2003	Request for depublication filed (another request pending)   by (non-party) Monaco Coach Corporation.
Aug 8 2003	Answer to petition for review filed   real party in interest Edward D. Cox and Sandi R. Cox.
Sep 10 2003	Petition for Review Granted (civil case)   Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Brown and Moreno, JJ.
Sep 10 2003	Letter sent to counsel re:   certification of interest
Sep 26 2003	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   by petitioner (Cummins, Inc.).
Oct 10 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   by counsel for petnr Winnegabo Industries, Inc.
Oct 10 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   By counsel for petitioner {Cummins, Inc.,}.
Nov 24 2003	Received:   Notice of intent to rely on Court of Appeal brief for answer- from counsel for RPI. (Late. Answer brief on the merits was due 11/9/03)
Nov 24 2003	Application for relief from default filed   from counsel for RPI (Edward D. Cox et al.) regarding late filing of Intent to rely on CA brief for answer.
Nov 24 2003	Notice of intent to rely on CA brief (as answer brief)   by counsel for RPI (Edward D. Cox et al.). (filed with permission)
Dec 10 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   by counsel for petitioner.
May 3 2005	Case ordered on calendar   6/1/05, 9am, LA
May 18 2005	Filed:   Request of petitioners to divide oral argument time.
May 23 2005	Order filed   The request of counsel for petitioners to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of petitioners at oral argument is hereby granted.
May 23 2005	Order filed   The request of petitioners to allocate to Tami S. Mason 20 minutes and Thomas Murphy 10 minutes of petitioners 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
May 31 2005	Filed:   Letter dated 5/27/05 from counsel for petitioner requesting that attorney Shauhin Talesh be added as an attorney of record for Foley & Lardner LLP. (Name has been added.)
Jun 1 2005	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 18 2005	Opinion filed: Judgment reversed   Majority Opinion by George, C.J. joined by Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, JJ.
Aug 1 2005	Request for modification of opinion filed   Attorney John A. Taylor, Jr. (Horvitz & Levy LLP)
Aug 17 2005	Request for modification denied   Werdegar, J., was absent and did not participate.
Aug 18 2005	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Sep 1 2005	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from CA4/2

Briefs
Oct 10 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Oct 10 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Nov 24 2003	Notice of intent to rely on CA brief (as answer brief)
Dec 10 2003	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)

If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website