Supreme Court of California Justia
Docket No. S107126
Co. of Riverside v. Super. Ct.

Filed 4/21/03

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al.,
Petitioners,
S107126
v.
Ct.App. 4/2 E030454
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE )
COUNTY, )

Respondent;
RIVERSIDE SHERIFF’S ASSOCIATION, )
)
Riverside
County
Real Party in Interest.
Super. Ct. No. 361250

The Legislature recently enacted Senate Bill No. 402 (1999-2000 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 402), which requires counties and other local agencies to
submit, under certain circumstances, to binding arbitration of economic issues that
arise during negotiations with unions representing firefighters or law enforcement
officers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1299 et seq.) We must determine whether this
legislation violates either or both of two provisions of article XI of the California
Constitution.1 Section 1, subdivision (b), states that a county’s “governing body
shall provide for the . . . compensation . . . of employees.” Section 11, subdivision
(a), forbids the Legislature to “delegate to a private person or body power to . . .

1
All further section references are to article XI of the California Constitution
unless otherwise indicated.
1


interfere with county or municipal corporation . . . money . . . or perform
municipal functions.”
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, that Senate Bill 402 violates both
constitutional provisions. It deprives the county of its authority to provide for the
compensation of its employees (§ 1, subd. (b)) and delegates to a private body the
power to interfere with county financial affairs and to perform a municipal
function (§ 11, subd. (a)).
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Riverside County (the County) and the Riverside Sheriff’s Association
(Sheriff’s Association) engaged in negotiations over compensation for employees
of the probation department. In May 2001, they reached an impasse. The
Sheriff’s Association requested that the dispute be submitted to binding arbitration
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1299 et seq. The County refused,
claiming that those provisions violate the California Constitution. The Sheriff’s
Association filed an action in the superior court to compel arbitration. The court
ordered arbitration. It found the binding arbitration law constitutional, explaining,
“The matters at issue, to wit, the possible disruption of law enforcement and
firefighter services, are not matters of purely local concern but rather are of
statewide concern. This statewide concern authorizes the Legislature to act and
supports the constitutionality of this legislation.”
The County filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal
asking that court to order the superior court to set aside its order compelling
arbitration and enter a new order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The
Court of Appeal granted the petition. It found that Senate Bill 402 violates both
section 1, subdivision (b), and section 11, subdivision (a). We granted the
Sheriff’s Association’s petition for review.
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background
Senate Bill 402, entitled “Arbitration of Firefighter and Law Enforcement
Officer Labor Disputes,” added section 1299 et seq. to the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Stats. 2000, ch. 906, § 2.) The Court of Appeal opinion describes the
bill: “Senate Bill 402 empowers unions representing public safety employees to
declare an impasse in labor negotiations and require a local agency to submit
unresolved economic issues to binding arbitration. Each party chooses an
arbitrator, who together choose the third arbitrator. The panel then chooses,
without alteration, between each side’s last best offer, based on a designated list of
factors. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1299.4, 1299.6.)” The bill applies to any local
agency or any entity acting as an agent of a local agency, but it does not apply to
the State of California even acting as such an agent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1299.3,
subd. (c).)
Senate Bill 402 includes legislative findings. “The Legislature hereby finds
and declares that strikes taken by firefighters and law enforcement officers against
public employers are a matter of statewide concern, are a predictable consequence
of labor strife and poor morale that is often the outgrowth of substandard wages
and benefits, and are not in the public interest. The Legislature further finds and
declares that the dispute resolution procedures contained in this title provide the
appropriate method for resolving public sector labor disputes that could otherwise
lead to strikes by firefighters or law enforcement officers. [¶] It is the intent of
the Legislature to protect the health and welfare of the public by providing
impasse remedies necessary to afford public employers the opportunity to safely
alleviate the effects of labor strife that would otherwise lead to strikes by
firefighters and law enforcement officers.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1299.)
3
The County argues that the Legislature’s compelling it to enter into binding
arbitration of compensation issues violates section 1, subdivision (b), and section
11, subdivision (a). At the outset, we emphasize that the issue is not whether a
county may voluntarily submit compensation issues to arbitration, i.e., whether the
county may delegate its own authority, but whether the Legislature may compel a
county to submit to arbitration involuntarily. The issue involves the division of
authority between the state and the county, not what the county may itself do.
(See Adams v. Wolff (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 435, 442 [the predecessor version of
section 11, subdivision (a), “is a restraint on the state Legislature’s right to
interfere with municipal affairs and in no way regulates what may be done by a
municipal corporation by charter provision”].)
In deciding whether the Legislature has exceeded its power, we are guided
“by well settled rules of constitutional construction. Unlike the federal
Constitution, which is a grant of power to Congress, the California Constitution is
a limitation or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. [Citations.] Two
important consequences flow from this fact. First, the entire law-making authority
of the state, except the people’s right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the
Legislature, and that body may exercise any and all legislative powers which are
not expressly or by necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution.
[Citations.] In other words, ‘we do not look to the Constitution to determine
whether the legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it is
prohibited.’ [Citation.] [¶] Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the
Legislature’s plenary authority: ‘If there is any doubt as to the Legislature’s
power to act in any given case, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
Legislature’s action. Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the
Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and are not to be extended to include
matters not covered by the language used.’ ” (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v.
4
Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691; accord, Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 180.) On the other hand, “we also must enforce the
provisions of our Constitution and ‘may not lightly disregard or blink at . . . a clear
constitutional mandate.’ ” (Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th
1243, 1252.)
We discuss the two provisions in the order in which they appear in the
California Constitution, mindful, however, that ultimately we must view them
together as a whole and not in isolation. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45
Cal.3d 727, 735.)
B. Section 1, subdivision (b)
Section 1, subdivision (b), provides as relevant: “The governing body [of
each county] shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure, and appointment
of employees.”2 The County argues that Senate Bill 402 violates this provision by
compelling it to submit to binding arbitration of compensation issues. We agree.
The constitutional language is quite clear and quite specific: the county, not the
state, not someone else, shall provide for the compensation of its employees.
Although the language does not expressly limit the power of the Legislature, it
does so by “necessary implication.” (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor,
supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 691.) An express grant of authority to the county necessarily
implies the Legislature does not have that authority. But Senate Bill 402 compels

2
In its entirety, section 1, subdivision (b), provides: “The Legislature shall
provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney,
an elected assessor, and an elected governing body in each county. Except as
provided in subdivision (b) of Section 4 of this article, each governing body shall
prescribe by ordinance the compensation of its members, but the ordinance
prescribing such compensation shall be subject to referendum. The Legislature or
the governing body may provide for other officers whose compensation shall be
prescribed by the governing body. The governing body shall provide for the
number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees.”
5


the county to enter into mandatory arbitration with unions representing its
employees, with the potential result that the arbitration panel determines employee
compensation. Senate Bill 402 permits the union to change the county’s
governing board from the body that sets compensation for its employees to just
another party in arbitration. It thereby deprives the county of authority section 1,
subdivision (b), specifically gives to counties.
Any doubt in this regard is dispelled on reviewing the history behind
section 1, subdivision (b). (See Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911-
912.) That provision “was originally enacted in June of 1970, as part of a
comprehensive revision of article XI, governing the constitutional prerogatives of
and limitations on California cities and counties.” (Voters for Responsible
Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 772.) Its immediate
predecessor, former section 5, had been amended in 1933 “to give greater local
autonomy to the setting of salaries for county officers and employees, removing
that function from the centralized control of the Legislature.” (Voters for
Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, supra, at p. 772, italics added.)3
“The 1933 amendment transferred control over the compensation of most county
employees and officers from the Legislature to the boards of supervisors.” (8
Cal.4th at p. 774.) The Court of Appeal in this case explained further: “The ballot
argument in favor of the 1933 amendment (put to the voters as Proposition 8)
informs the voters that, ‘This is a county home rule measure, giving the county
board of supervisors . . . complete authority over the number, method of
appointment, terms of office and employment, and compensation of all . . .

3
As amended in 1933, former section 5 provided in relevant part: “The
boards of supervisors in the respective counties shall regulate the compensation of
all officers in said counties . . . and shall regulate the number, method of
appointment, terms of office or employment, and compensation of all deputies,
assistants, and employees of the counties.” (Stats. 1933, p. xxxv.)
6


employees.’ (Ballet Pamp., Special Elec. (June 27, 1933) argument in favor of
Prop. 8, p. 10.)” The ballot argument adds that taking “these powers from the
State Legislature . . . will bring the matter closer home, and will make possible
adjustments of salaries and personnel in accordance with local desires . . . .”
(Ballet Pamp., Special Elec. (June 27, 1933) argument in favor of Prop. 8, pp. 10-
11.)
The Sheriff’s Association argues that Senate Bill 402 is valid because it
involves a matter of “statewide concern.” It cites the legislative findings in
support of the bill, including that “strikes taken by firefighters and law
enforcement officers against public employers are a matter of statewide concern,”
and that the “dispute resolution procedures” the bill establishes “provide the
appropriate method for resolving public sector labor disputes that could otherwise
lead to strikes by firefighters or law enforcement officers.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1299.) These findings are entitled to great weight. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32
Cal.3d 128, 136.) But they are not controlling. A court may not simply abdicate
to the Legislature, especially when the issue involves the division of power
between local government and that same Legislature. The judicial branch, not the
legislative, is the final arbiter of this question. (San Francisco Labor Council v.
Regents of University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, 790; Sonoma County
Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296,
316, 317, fn. 22.) “[I]t may well occur that in some cases the factors which
influenced the Legislature to adopt the general laws may likewise lead the courts
to the conclusion that the matter is of statewide rather than merely local concern.”
(Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63.) But the Legislature’s view “is
not determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs . . . . [T]he
Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair
nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern.” (Ibid.)
7
The Sheriff’s Association cites two cases that permitted the Legislature to
regulate relations between local governmental entities and their employees. In
Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128, we held that the Public Safety Officers’
Procedural Bill of Rights Act, which, as its name suggests, provides procedural
protections to public safety officers, applies to chartered cities despite the home
rule provisions of the current section 5, subdivision (b).4 Citing Professional Fire
Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, we said that “general
laws seeking to accomplish an objective of statewide concern”—in that case,
creating uniform fair labor practices—“may prevail over conflicting local
regulations even if they impinge to a limited extent upon some phase of local
control.” (Baggett v. Gates, supra, at p. 139, italics added.) We found that “the
maintenance of stable employment relations between police officers and their
employers is a matter of statewide concern.” (Id. at pp. 139-140.)5 Similarly, in
People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36
Cal.3d 591, we held that a charter city is subject to the meet-and-confer
requirements of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.).

4
As relevant, section 5, subdivision (b), gives charter cities authority “to
provide . . . for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police
force . . . and (4) . . . for the compensation, method of appointment, qualifications,
tenure of office and removal of . . . [their] employees.” (See Baggett v. Gates,
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 137 & fn. 11.)
5
We explained why in greater detail: “The consequences of a breakdown in
such relations are not confined to a city’s borders. These employees provide an
essential service. Its absence would create a clear and present threat not only to
the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the city, but also to the hundreds, if
not thousands, of nonresidents who daily visit there. Its effect would also be felt
by the many nonresident owners of property and businesses located within the
city’s borders. Our society is no longer a collection of insular local communities.
Communities today are highly interdependent. The inevitable result is that labor
unrest and strikes produce consequences which extend far beyond local
boundaries.” (Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 140.)
8


The Sheriff’s Association argues, “It is well established that the Legislature
may regulate labor relations in the public sector because it is a matter of statewide
concern.” We agree that the Legislature may regulate as to matters of statewide
concern even if the regulation impinges “to a limited extent” (Baggett v. Gates,
supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 139) on powers the Constitution specifically reserves to
counties (§ 1) or charter cities (§ 5). However, regulating labor relations is one
thing; depriving the county entirely of its authority to set employee salaries is
quite another.
In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 317, we noted that section 5 expressly gives charter cities
authority over their employees’ compensation. Because of this constitutional
mandate, as well as prior authority, we held that “the determination of the wages
paid to employees of charter cities as well as charter counties is a matter of local
rather than statewide concern.” (Sonoma County Organization of Public
Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, at p. 317.) Accordingly, we found
unconstitutional Government Code section 16280, which prohibited the
distribution of certain state funds to local public agencies that granted their
employees cost-of-living increases, despite a legislative declaration that the statute
was a matter of statewide concern. (Sonoma County Organization of Public
Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, at pp. 302, 316.) For similar reasons, and
despite a similar legislative declaration, we later invalidated legislation requiring
the University of California to pay its employees at least prevailing wages. (San
Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of University of California, supra, 26 Cal.3d
at pp. 789-791.)
Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma,
supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, and San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of University
of California, supra, 26 Cal.3d 785, control this case. In Baggett v. Gates, supra,
9
32 Cal.3d at page 137, we distinguished those two cases by noting that the Public
Safety Officers’ Procedural Bill of Rights Act, which was limited to providing
procedural safeguards, “impinges only minimally on the specific directives of
section 5, subdivision (b).” Especially pertinent here, we stressed “that the act
does not interfere with the setting of peace officers’ compensation.” (Ibid.) By
contrast, Senate Bill 402 does not minimally impinge on a specific constitutional
directive; it contravenes that directive entirely. Section 1, subdivision (b),
specifically directs that counties have authority over the compensation of their
employees; Senate Bill 402 takes that authority away from counties.
Similarly, in People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal
Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d 591, the law in question did not establish a binding
process but merely imposed procedural requirements. “While the Legislature
established a procedure for resolving disputes regarding wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, it did not attempt to establish standards for the wages,
hours and other terms and conditions themselves.” (Id. at p. 597.) We found no
conflict between the city’s constitutional powers and the limited state regulation.
“Although the [law in issue] encourages binding agreements resulting from the
parties’ bargaining, the governing body of the agency . . . retains the ultimate
power to refuse an agreement and to make its own decisions.” (Id. at p. 601.)
Here, the county’s governing body does not retain the ultimate power; Senate Bill
402 gives that power to an arbitration panel at the behest of the union.
We have “emphasize[d] that there is a clear distinction between the
substance of a public employee labor issue and the procedure by which it is
resolved. Thus there is no question that ‘salaries of local employees of a charter
city constitute municipal affairs and are not subject to general laws.’ (Sonoma
County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d
at p. 317.) Nevertheless, the process by which the salaries are fixed is obviously a
10
matter of statewide concern and none could, at this late stage, argue that a charter
city need not meet and confer concerning its salary structure.” (People ex rel. Seal
Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach, supra, at pp. 600-601, fn. 11;
accord, Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 781.) Senate Bill 402 is not merely procedural; it is substantive. It
permits a body other than the county’s governing body to establish local salaries.
The Sheriff’s Association also notes that section 1, subdivision (b), states
that the governing body shall “prescribe” the compensation of its members
(subject to referendum) but shall “provide” for the compensation of its employees.
It argues that the word “ ‘prescribe’ . . . empower[s] the designated entity to
determine the amount of compensation for the designated officials. However,
‘provide’ means to compensate so they are available for use, and not necessarily
determine the amount of compensation.” Thus, the Sheriff’s Association appears
to argue that the Legislature, or someone else, may set salaries for county
employees, and section 1, subdivision (b), merely empowers the county to pay
those salaries. It relies on historical evidence indicating that the Constitution
Revision Commission had used the words “prescribe” and “provide”—rather than
“regulate,” as in the 1933 amendment to former section 5—to differentiate
between those matters that may, and those that may not, be delegated. (See
County of Madera v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 665, 669-670 & fn. 3.)
The argument fails.
Whether the county may delegate its own authority is irrelevant here. This
county has chosen not to delegate its authority over employee salaries. As noted,
the issue involves the distribution of authority between county and state, not what
the county itself may do. Use of the words “prescribe” and “provide” did not
change the previous law regarding the respective powers of the Legislature and
counties. Section 13, adopted at the same time as section 1, subdivision (b),
11
provides: “The provisions of Sections 1(b) (except for the second sentence) . . . of
this Article relating to matters affecting the distribution of powers between the
Legislature and cities and counties . . . shall be construed as a restatement of all
related provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to the effective
date of this amendment, and as making no substantive change.” (Italics added.)
The language of section 1, subdivision (b), empowering the county to provide for
the compensation of employees, is in its last sentence, not its second.
Accordingly, section 1, subdivision (b), did not change the law regarding the
distribution of power between the counties and the Legislature. (See Voters for
Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 775.)
Former section 5 used the single word “regulate,” which, as its history
demonstrates, includes the setting of salaries.
The Sheriff’s Association also cites an unpublished 1992 decision by the
Court of Appeal that decided this case that it believes somehow supports its
position. Unpublished opinions, however, generally may not be cited or relied on
in another action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 977(a).) The Sheriff’s Association
invokes an exception to this general rule, claiming the opinion is relevant under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 977(b).) However,
for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue necessarily decided in the previous action
must be identical to the one in the current action. (County of Santa Clara v.
Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 873, 879, fn. 7; People v. Sims (1982) 32
Cal.3d 468, 484.) The issue here is whether Senate Bill 402 is constitutional.
That bill, or anything like it, did not even exist in 1992. Although the 1992
opinion contains some language that might be pertinent to this case, and that either
party might have cited had the opinion been published, the issue it decided—
involving the local referendum power—was quite different than the one here.
12
Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not apply, and the unpublished opinion may
not be cited.
For these reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal: “Senate Bill 402
removes from local jurisdictions, at the option of public safety unions, the
authority to set the compensation of public safety employees that is expressly
given to them by section 1, subdivision (b). This clearly violates section 1,
subdivision (b).”6
C. Section 11, subdivision (a)
Section 11, subdivision (a), provides: “The Legislature may not delegate to
a private person or body power to make, control, appropriate, supervise, or
interfere with county or municipal corporation improvements, money, or property,
or to levy taxes or assessments, or perform municipal functions.” The county
argues that in enacting Senate Bill 402, the Legislature has impermissibly
delegated to a private body—the arbitration panel—the power to interfere with

6
The Chief Justice claims we are “reach[ing] out” to decide this question.
(Conc. opn. of George, C.J., post, at p. 1.) However, section 1, subdivision (b), is
as much a part of this case as section 11, subdivision (a). The County argued at all
times in the trial court, the Court of Appeal, and this court that Senate Bill 402
violates section 1, subdivision (b); the parties fully briefed the question in the trial
court, the Court of Appeal, and this court; the trial court and the Court of Appeal
decided the question; and the question is within the scope of our grant of review.
We see nothing peculiar in the language of either section 1, subdivision (b), or
section 11, subdivision (a), that makes the latter but not the former ripe for
decision. Indeed, the cases closest on point all involve home rule provisions
comparable to those of section 1, subdivision (b). (People ex rel. Seal Beach
Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach
, supra, 36 Cal.3d 591; Baggett v.
Gates
, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128; and Sonoma County Organization of Public
Employees v. County of Sonoma
, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296.) Moreover, because we
must view the two constitutional provisions together as a whole and not in
isolation, it would be difficult to decide the section 11, subdivision (a), question
without reference to section 1, subdivision (b).

It should be apparent that we are deciding only the question before us—the
constitutionality of Senate Bill 402.
13


county money (by potentially requiring the county to pay higher salaries than it
chooses) and to perform municipal functions (determining compensation for
county employees). Again, we agree. This constitutional provision expressly
denies the Legislature the power to act in this way. (Methodist Hosp. of
Sacramento v. Saylor, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 691.)
The Sheriff’s Association primarily argues that this delegation of authority
to the arbitration panel is permissible because the delegation does not involve a
purely municipal function but a matter of statewide concern. In People ex rel.
Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, we upheld legislation
designed to encourage regional planning in the Lake Tahoe area, including
creation of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency with jurisdiction over the entire
multicounty region. The County of El Dorado contended, among other things, that
the legislation violated former section 13, the predecessor version of section 11,
subdivision (a), by impermissibly delegating authority to a special commission.7
Noting that the Lake Tahoe region crosses county lines, we stated that “our cases
have recognized ‘that [former section 13] was intended to prohibit only legislation
interfering with purely local matters.’ ” (People ex rel. Younger v. County of El
Dorado, supra, at p. 500.) It does not invalidate delegation “to accomplish
purposes of more than purely local concern.” (Id. at p. 501.)

7
Former section 13 provided, as relevant: “The Legislature shall not
delegate to any special commission, private corporation, company, association or
individual any power to make, control, appropriate, supervise or in any way
interfere with any county, city, town or municipal improvement, money, property,
or effects . . . , or to levy taxes or assessments or perform any municipal function
whatever . . . .” (At Stats. 1969, p. A-59, repealed June 2, 1970; see People ex rel.
Younger v. County of El Dorado
, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500.) Section 11,
subdivision (a), the successor provision, no longer prohibits delegation of powers
to special commissions, so the legislation at issue in that case would clearly have
been valid under the current provision. (People ex rel. Younger v. County of El
Dorado
, supra, at p. 500, fn. 22.)
14


The Sheriff’s Association argues that because of “the threat to the public
safety caused by work stoppages,” all matters concerning fire fighters and peace
officers are of statewide concern that the state may delegate as it thinks best. We
disagree. Section 5, subdivision (a), gives charter cities general authority over
“municipal affairs.” Although the term “municipal affairs” is slightly different
than section 11, subdivision (a)’s term “municipal functions,” we believe that
cases interpreting what are “municipal affairs” provide guidance in deciding what
are “municipal functions.” We have stated that “the various sections of article XI
fail to define municipal affairs,” and, accordingly, the courts must “decide, under
the facts of each case, whether the subject matter under discussion is of municipal
or statewide concern.” (Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 294; accord, Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 136, fn.
10.) By this we meant that article XI contains no global definition of what are
municipal affairs (or functions). But it is not entirely silent on the subject, and it is
not silent here. “[T]his is not the usual case in which the courts are without
constitutional guidance in resolving the question whether a subject of local
regulation is a ‘municipal affair’ . . . .” (Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10
Cal.3d 129, 132, quoted in Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v.
County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 316.) Section 1, subdivision (b), states
that the county shall provide for employee compensation. Viewing, as we must,
sections 1, subdivision (b), and 11, subdivision (a), together and not in isolation,
they clearly provide that compensating county employees is a municipal function.
In Ector v. City of Torrance, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 132, we had “the
benefit of a specific directive in subdivision (b) of [section 5], which grants
‘plenary authority’ to charter cities to prescribe in their charters the
‘qualifications’ of their employees.” Accordingly, we said that questions
involving the qualifications of city employees are municipal affairs with which the
15
Legislature may not interfere. (Id. at p. 133.) Similarly, in Sonoma County
Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page
317, we cited section 5’s reference to compensation of employees to conclude that
determining the wages of employees of charter cities and counties is a matter of
local rather than statewide concern. Thus, establishing compensation for its
employees is for the county to do, and section 11, subdivision (a), prohibits the
Legislature from delegating that function to a private body.
In People ex rel. Younger v. Co El Dorado, supra, 5 Cal.3d 480, the
Legislature had established a special commission with jurisdiction over a regional
problem. At that time, although no longer, the Constitution prohibited the
delegation of authority to a special commission as well as to a private party. (See
fn. 7, ante.) We upheld commissions that performed a function that “ ‘would be
impossible for any one of the constituent municipal or suburban units to
perform.’ ” (People ex rel. Younger v. Co El Dorado, supra, at p. 501.) No single
county or other local agency could coordinate planning for the entire Lake Tahoe
region. By contrast, a county may easily provide for the compensation of its own
employees. Thus, neither the constitutional language nor the rationale of People
ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado applies here.
As with section 1, subdivision (b), the Sheriff’s Association argues that the
Legislature’s power to regulate labor relations as to matters of statewide concern
permits it to delegate this regulatory authority to an arbitration panel. The
argument fails for the same reasons: Senate Bill 402 does not just permit the
arbitration panel to impinge minimally on the county’s authority; it empowers the
panel actually to set employee salaries. The Sheriff’s Association also argues that
binding arbitration is a “quid pro quo for the lack of a right to strike.” (See Lab.
Code, § 1962; County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees’
Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564, 586.) This may (or may not) provide a policy
16
argument in favor of binding arbitration, but it provides no reason to disregard a
clear constitutional mandate. Moreover, like the Court of Appeal, we note that the
state has exempted itself from this binding arbitration requirement. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1299.3, subd. (c).) We are skeptical that awarding binding arbitration as a
quid pro quo can be of statewide concern to everyone except the state.
The Sheriff’s Association argues that the arbitration panel is a public, not
private, body within the meaning of section 11, subdivision (a). We disagree. The
statute requires the two parties to select a “person” to be a member of the panel.
These two then select “an impartial person with experience in labor and
management dispute resolution to act as chairperson of the arbitration panel.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1299.4, subd. (b).) If the two do not agree on the third person,
the statute has other provisions for selecting that person, but it continually uses the
word “person” or “persons” to describe who may be the chairperson. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1299.4, subd. (c).) Nothing in the statute requires the arbitrators to be
public officials; indeed, the statute appears to contemplate, and the parties assume,
they will be private persons.
The Sheriff’s Association agrees that the members of the arbitration panel
may be private persons, but it argues that empowering them to render binding
arbitration decisions makes them a public body. It relies on a Rhode Island case
that involved a similar mandatory arbitration law. (City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen’s Ass’n (R.I. 1969) 256 A.2d 206.) In that case, the court
reasoned that the Legislature gave the arbitration panel “the power to fix the
salaries of public employees . . . without control or supervision from any
superior,” and, therefore, each member of the panel “is a public officer and . . .
collectively the three constitute a public board or agency.” (Id. at pp. 210-211.)
The Sheriff’s Association seeks to apply this reasoning here. But the
constitutional provision in that case was very different than the one here. The
17
Rhode Island Constitution merely stated that the “legislative power . . . shall be
vested” in the senate and house of representatives. (City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen’s Ass’n, supra, 256 A.2d at p. 208, fn. 1.) It contained no
language limiting the Legislature’s delegation power like that of section 11,
subdivision (a). As pointed out in a case involving the power to tax, if delegating
to private persons the power to do a public act makes them a public body for
purposes of section 11, subdivision (a), then “the constitutional provision would
never be violated. Anyone to whom the Legislature delegated the power to tax [or
any other power specified in section 11, subdivision (a)] would automatically
cease being a ‘private person or body.’ ” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. v.
Fresno Metropolitan Projects Authority (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1387.)
Section 11, subdivision (a), is not self-canceling. The act of delegation does not
change a private body into a public body and thereby validate the very delegation
the section prohibits. The Legislature has, indeed, delegated authority to a private
body.
Both parties cite decisions from other states in support of their positions.
The only cases that are relevant are those that involve statutory and constitutional
provisions comparable to California’s. These cases generally support the County.
Section 11, subdivision (a), “was taken from Article III, section 20 of the 1873
Pennsylvania Constitution.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Fresno
Metropolitan Projects Authority, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377, citing Peppin,
Municipal Home Rule in California: IV (1946) 34 Cal.L.Rev. 644, 677.) The
Pennsylvania courts originally invalidated binding arbitration legislation under
their constitutional provision. (Erie Firefighters Local No. 293 v. Gardner (Pa.
1962) 178 A.2d 691.) As the Sheriff’s Association notes, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has since upheld binding arbitration. (Harney v. Russo (Pa. 1969)
255 A.2d 560.) But that was after the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended
18
specifically to permit such arbitration. (Id. at p. 562; see also City of Washington
v. Police Department (Pa. 1969) 259 A.2d 437, 441-442, fn. 6 [“A constitutional
amendment was necessary for this provision because it had previously been held
that a statute making an arbitration award binding on a public employer would be
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power”].) The California Constitution
has not been amended to permit the Legislature to impose binding arbitration on
counties. Thus, the Pennsylvania experience supports the County’s position.
Two other states have also invalidated arbitration provisions under
constitutional provisions similar to section 11, subdivision (a). (City of Sioux
Falls v. Sioux Falls, etc. (S.D. 1975) 234 N.W.2d 35 [binding arbitration]; Salt
Lake City v. I.A. of Firefighters, etc. (Utah 1977) 563 P.2d 786 [arbitration that is
partially binding, but advisory only as to salary and wage matters].) One court
reached a contrary result, but it was unable to achieve a majority opinion. (State v.
City of Laramie (Wyo. 1968) 437 P.2d 295 (plur. opn.).) We find the Wyoming
case unconvincing. As recognized in City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls, etc.,
supra, at page 36, the Wyoming court cited Pennsylvania law but failed to note
that the Pennsylvania Constitution had been amended to permit binding
arbitration. In any event, California’s constitutional history, including that behind
section 1, subdivision (b), distinguishes California from Wyoming. This history,
and the two California constitutional provisions, read together, make clear that, in
California, the county, not the state or anyone else, sets compensation for its
employees.
The Sheriff’s Association also cites our opinion in Fire Fighters Union v.
City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608. In that case, we interpreted “a provision for
arbitration in a city charter affecting public employees.” (Id. at p. 611.) We
summarily rejected an argument by an amicus curiae “that the disputed issues are
not arbitrable because submission of them to arbitration constitutes an
19
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Arbitration of public
employment disputes has been held constitutional by state supreme courts in State
v. City of Laramie (Wyo. 1968) 437 P.2d 295 and City of Warwick v. Warwick
Regular Firemen’s Ass’n (1969) 106 R.I. 109 [256 A.2d 206]. [¶] To the extent
that the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter
there is no unlawful delegation of legislative power.” (Id. at p. 622, fn. 13.) That
case does not aid the Sheriff’s Association. As noted, this case involves the
division of authority between state and county, not what a local agency may itself
choose to do. Our citations to the Wyoming and Rhode Island decisions cannot be
read as a blanket endorsement of everything in those cases, including matters
irrelevant to the issue before us. Our opinion did not even mention section 1,
subdivision (b), or section 11, subdivision (a).
III. CONCLUSION
John Donne wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself.” (Donne,
Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, No. 17.) So, too, no county is an island,
entire of itself. No doubt almost anything a county does, including determining
employee compensation, can have consequences beyond its borders. But this
circumstance does not mean this court may eviscerate clear constitutional
provisions, or the Legislature may do what the Constitution expressly prohibits it
from doing.
20

The Court of Appeal correctly held that Senate Bill 402 violates sections 1,
subdivision (b), and 11, subdivision (a). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeal.
CHIN,
J.
WE CONCUR:

KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
BROWN, J.

21





CONCURRING OPINION BY GEORGE, C.J.

I agree that the legislation before us is constitutionally impermissible in
light of article XI, section 11, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution
(article XI, section 11(a)), which prohibits the Legislature from delegating “to a
private person or body” a county’s power to “perform municipal functions.” In
my view, however, the majority should base its decision solely upon that relatively
narrow constitutional provision, and need not and should not reach out to decide
the distinct and potentially much more far reaching question whether the
legislation also violates article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), of the California
Constitution (article XI, section 1(b)), which provides simply and generally that
“[t]he governing body [of a county] shall provide for the number, compensation,
tenure, and appointment of employees.” As I shall explain, the issue whether the
general “home rule” provisions of article XI, section 1(b) preclude the Legislature
from adopting the legislation at issue presents a much closer question than the
majority acknowledges, and I believe that traditional principles of judicial restraint
should lead the court to refrain from prejudging that broader constitutional issue
when there is a narrower and fully adequate alternative ground upon which to rest
its decision. Accordingly, I cannot join the majority opinion.
I
Article XI, section (1)(b), provides in relevant part: “The Legislature shall
provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney,
1


an elected assessor, and an elected governing body in each county. . . . The
governing body shall provide for the number, compensation, tenure and
appointment of employees.” (Italics added.)
The majority states that the language of article XI, section (1)(b) “is quite
clear and quite specific: the county, not the state, not someone else, shall provide
for the compensation of its employees” (maj. opn., ante, p. 5), and concludes that
the legislation in question — Senate Bill No. 402 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.)
(enacting Code. Civil Proc. § 1299 et seq.) (hereafter Senate Bill 402) — conflicts
with this language because it “compels the county to enter into mandatory
arbitration with unions representing its employees, with the potential result that the
arbitration panel determines employee compensation.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 6.)
In my view, the issue is not nearly as simple or clear-cut as the majority
suggests. Although article XI, section (1)(b) gives all counties (including
noncharter counties) the authority to control the appointment and compensation of
their own employees (prior to 1933, the Legislature exercised that authority over
the employees of noncharter counties), other sections of article XI provide that
charter counties and charter cities have similar or even broader authority to
control the appointment, compensation, and dismissal of their employees. (See
art. XI, §§ 4, subd. (f), 5, subd. (b)(4).) Despite these explicit constitutional
provisions establishing broad home rule authority of charter counties and charter
cities over their own public employees, over the last half-century the Legislature
has enacted a host of laws that govern various aspects of the labor relations of
local public entities, and numerous cases have upheld the right of the state to enact
such legislation  which takes precedence over contrary rules established by local
entities.
For example, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900
et seq.) prohibits counties and other local entities (along with most other
2
employers) (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (c)) from discriminating in employment
on the basis of the categories enumerated in the act, and the provisions of that
act  for example those barring discrimination on the basis of disability or marital
status — obviously limit a local entity’s authority over the appointment or tenure
of its employees. Perhaps most relevant to the present case is the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.) (MMB Act), which places upon local
entities the obligation to meet and confer in good faith with their employees on
wages and other conditions of employment, and which grants public employees a
variety of remedies to enforce such protections. As the majority recognizes, in
People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36
Cal.3d 591 this court specifically upheld the validity of the MMB Act as applied
to a charter city, concluding that in light of the statewide concern addressed by the
act — the establishment of “fair labor practices, uniform throughout the state” (id.
at p. 600) — application of the act did not violate the home rule provisions of
article XI, section 5, subdivision (b). Of course, the majority does not suggest that
the provisions of article XI, section 1(b) — setting forth the home rule authority of
noncharter counties — place any greater restrictions on the Legislature’s authority
than the even broader constitutional home rule provisions applicable to charter
counties and charter cities.
Once it is recognized that the provisions of article XI, section 1(b) do not
preclude the Legislature from promulgating a detailed collective bargaining
regime that counties are required to follow in negotiating over compensation with
all of their employees — the type of structure set forth in the MMB Act — it
seems evident that the question whether the legislation at issue in this case violates
article XI, section 1(b), is not as clear as the majority suggests. Although the
majority asserts emphatically that “Senate Bill 402 is not merely procedural; it is
substantive” (maj. opn., ante, p. 11), that characterization of the legislation is
3
hardly self-evident. In enacting Senate Bill 402, the Legislature did not undertake
itself to set the compensation for county firefighters or police officers, but instead
prescribed a dispute resolution procedure that is to be employed when the county
and its firefighters or police officers are unable to reach agreement on economic
issues that fall within the “meet and confer” requirement of the MMB Act.
Furthermore, although the procedure set forth in the act calls for binding
arbitration, the particular form of binding arbitration prescribed by the act does not
afford the arbitrators free rein to resolve the dispute by setting compensation at
whatever level the arbitrators deem appropriate. Instead the act limits the
arbitrators’ discretion to choosing between the “last best offer” of each of the
parties on each unresolved issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1299.6.)
It is true, of course, that the binding arbitration procedure established in
Senate Bill 402 impinges directly upon the county’s general authority to retain the
last word on employee compensation. But it is not at all clear that this
circumstance is necessarily fatal to the validity of state legislation under article XI,
section 1(b). As noted above, the relevant language of this constitutional
provision provides that “[t]he governing body [of the county] shall provide for the
number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees.” (Ibid., italics
added.) Thus, under article XI, section 1(b), a county’s constitutionally granted
authority over the compensation of its employees appears no greater than the
county’s authority over the appointment or tenure of its employees. Under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission (FEHC) is granted the authority to resolve a claim that a county has
engaged in unlawful employment discrimination in the appointment or dismissal
process (Gov. Code, § 12960 et seq.), and a decision of the FEHC against the
county clearly has the effect of “trumping” the authority the county otherwise
would have to refuse to appoint or dismiss a person on the basis, for example, of
4
his or her marital status or sexual orientation. (See Gov. Code, § 12940.) The
circumstance that the FEHC has the authority in such instances to displace the
ultimate decision that a county otherwise would be empowered to make regarding
the appointment or tenure of a particular applicant, however, never has been
viewed as casting any constitutional doubt on the application of the FEHA to
counties or other local public entities. If the state properly may impinge upon a
county’s power to appoint or dismiss employees in order to serve the statewide
concern of protecting employees from discrimination, it is not immediately
apparent why the state, to serve the statewide concern of protecting the public
from the widespread risks posed by strikes by firefighters or police officers, may
not similarly impinge upon a county’s authority to have the last word on employee
compensation.
For these reasons, I find the question whether Senate Bill 402 violates
article XI, section 1(b) to be much closer and more difficult than the majority
acknowledges.
II
Moreover, as noted at the outset, there is no need for the majority to resolve
the question whether Senate Bill 402 violates article XI, section 1(b), in light of
the majority’s conclusion that Senate Bill 402 violates the entirely distinct
provisions of article XI, section 11(a). The majority’s holding under section XI,
section 11(a) clearly is sufficient in itself to resolve this case. And because article
XI, section 11(a) is a more focussed provision than article XI, section 1(a), and is
directed at the particular “evil or mischief” reflected in Senate Bill 402 — which is
a measure enacted by the Legislature delegating to a private body the power to
perform a municipal function that otherwise would be performed by a county —
that constitutional provision unquestionably provides a much narrower ground of
decision than the broad and more general provisions of article XI, section 1(b).
5
Article 11, section 11(a) reads in full: “The Legislature may not delegate to
a private person or body power to make, control, appropriate, supervise, or
interfere with county or municipal corporation improvements, money, or property,
or to levy taxes or assessments, or perform municipal functions.”
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that in enacting Senate Bill 402 the
Legislature violated this provision by delegating to a private body (the arbitration
panel) the power to perform a municipal function (establishing the level of
compensation for certain county employees). Contrary to the argument of the
Riverside Sheriff’s Association, an arbitration panel cannot properly be viewed as
a “public body” exempt from the restrictions of article XI, section 11(a), simply
because the panel is empowered to perform a public function, because such
reasoning would vitiate the fundamental purpose and scope of this constitutional
provision. And I agree with the majority that the case of People ex rel. Younger v.
County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480 provides no support for the Riverside
Sheriff’s Association’s argument. The decisionmaking body to which
governmental functions have been delegated in the present case  unlike the body
in El Dorado  is not charged with the responsibility of taking into account
statewide or regional concerns in making its decisions, but instead is granted the
authority to decide a quintessentially local question.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that  in view of the wording of
article XI, section 11(a)  the Legislature may not compel an unwilling local
public entity to submit a municipal function to binding arbitration by a private
body.
III
By reaching out unnecessarily to rest its decision on the broad provisions of
article XI, section 1(b), when a decision based upon the more focussed provisions
of article XI, section 11(a) would suffice, the majority not only fails to heed
6
traditional principles of judicial restraint, but also creates an unfortunate precedent
that may improperly restrict the Legislature’s authority in the future to fashion a
remedy for statewide or regional safety or health problems resulting from strikes
or other labor-related actions of local public health or safety employees. Although
article XI, section 11(a), prohibits the Legislature from enlisting a private
arbitration panel to resolve a local police or firefighter labor conflict that threatens
to endanger neighboring communities, that constitutional provision would not
preclude the Legislature from granting a public body — perhaps like the Public
Employment Relations Board (Gov. Code, § 3541) — the authority to review and
resolve a local labor dispute that poses a significant risk to public safety or health
beyond the borders of the local public entity. In my view, it is improper to
prejudge the question of the validity or invalidity of such a legislative measure that
is not before us, and we should avoid an unnecessarily broad holding that may
have the effect of prematurely resolving that question and restricting the options
available to the other two branches of government.
GEORGE, C.J.
7




CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.

I concur in the majority’s result. I write separately because I believe the
majority’s analysis requires some qualification.
The majority recognizes that the governing body of counties are expressly
authorized under article XI, section 1, subdivision (b) of the California
Constitution to provide for the “compensation . . . of employees,” and that, by
necessary implication, the Legislature is not constitutionally authorized to set
employee compensation. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) The majority further
recognizes that the Legislature may nonetheless regulate to some degree the
process by which such compensation is negotiated. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.) The
critical distinction for the majority is between “regulating labor relations” and
“depriving the county entirely of its authority to set employee salaries.” (Ibid.,
italics omitted.) This distinction explains, for example, our upholding the
imposition of labor relations statutes such as the Meyers- Milius-Brown Act on
local public agencies (see People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City
of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal. 591) while holding unconstitutional a law denying
certain state funds to such agencies that grant their employees cost of living
increases (Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of
Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 317-318 (County of Sonoma)).
Although this analysis may be useful, it should not be employed inflexibly.
Even in the area of local employee compensation, the distinction between matters
1


of local and statewide concern are not necessarily invariable. As we have stated,
the “ ‘constitutional concept of municipal affairs . . . changes with the changing
conditions upon which it is to operate. What may at one time have been a matter
of local concern may at a later time become a matter of state concern controlled by
the general laws of the state.’ ” (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56,
63.) Although article XI, section 1, subdivision (b) appears to preclude the
Legislature from setting outright the compensation of county employees, I am not
persuaded that state regulation of wage setting procedures, even when that
regulation intrudes upon the county’s autonomy as much as it does in the present
case, is forever forbidden. The question we left open in County of Sonoma, supra,
23 Cal.3d at page 318, is whether similarly intrusive legislation may nonetheless
be justified by the existence of a statewide emergency, which the legislation is
reasonably designed to address.
That same question is, I believe, left open in this case. There can be no
doubt that satisfactory labor relations between local governments and public safety
employees is a matter that may transcend local concerns. We need not decide
whether some kind of statewide emergency might constitutionally justify the
legislation at issue here. No such emergency has been alleged. Senate Bill No.
402 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) appears to be prophylactic rather than responsive to an
actual crisis in public safety officer wages, recruitment, or job performance. Thus,
even if the presumption of unconstitutionality for legislation such as Senate Bill
No. 402 may be rebutted by an adequate showing of extraordinary state interest,
that presumption was not rebutted in this case.
MORENO, J.
2
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion County of Riverside v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 1103
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S107126
Date Filed: April 21, 2003
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Riverside
Judge: Sharon J. Waters
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Petitioners:

William C. Katzenstein, County Counsel, Robert M. Pepper, Principal Deputy County Counsel; Howard,
Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin, Steven L. Mayer and Kimberly A. Bliss for Petitioners.

JoAnne Speers for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel (Tulare), Teresa M. Saucedo, Deputy County Counsel; J. Dennis
Crabb, County Counsel (Alpine); Bernard C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel (Kern), Steven L. Sanders,
Deputy County Counsel; Alan K. Marks, County Counsel (San Bernardino), Carol A. Greene, Deputy
County Counsel; John J. Sansone, County Counsel (San Diego), Diane Bardsley, Assistant County
Counsel; and Frank O. Sieh, County Counsel (Ventura) for County of Tulare, County of Alpine, County of
Kern, County of San Bernardino, County of San Diego and County of Ventura as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Petitioners.

Timothy A. Bittle for Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest:

No appearance for Respondent.

Olins, Foerster & Hayes and Dennis J. Hayes for Real Party in Interest.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Andrea Lynn Hoch, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher E.
Krueger, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Silver, Hadden & Silver, Stephen H. Silver; Carroll, Burdick & McDonough and Ronald Yank for Ventura
County Deputy Sheriffs' Association et al., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.


1


Page 2 - counsel continued - S107126

Attorneys for Real Party in Interest (continued):

Olson, Hagel, Waters & Fishburn, Olson, Hagel & Fishburn, George Waters, N. Eugene Hill, Thomas E.
Gauthier; Woodley & McGillivary and Thomas A. Woodley for California Professional Firefighters, Peace
Officers Research Association of California and International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO,
C.L.C., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Green & Shinee and Helen L. Schwab for the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff’s, the Pasadena
Police Officers Association, the Torrance Police Officers Association, the Glendale Police Officers
Association, the Bell Police Officers Association and the West Covina Police Officers Association as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Lackie & Dammeier, Dieter C. Dammeier and Michael A. Morguess for Los Angles Police Protective
League, et al., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Davis & Reno and Alan C. Davis for Daly City Firefighters, Local 1879, et al., as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Real Party in Interest.


2

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):


Steven L. Mayer
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111-4024
(415) 434-1600

Dennis J. Hayes
Olins, Foerster & Hayes
2214 Second Avenue
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 238-1601

3


Opinion Information
Date:Docket Number:
Mon, 04/21/2003S107126

Parties
1Riverside Sheriffs Association (Real Party in Interest)
Represented by Dennis J. Hayes
Olins, Foerster & Hayes
2214 Second Avenue
San Diego, CA

2Superior Court Of Riverside County (Respondent)
4050 Main Street, Dept. 6
Riverside, CA 92501

3County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Steven L. Mayer
Howard Rice Nemerovski Et Al
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

4County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Kimberly A. Bliss
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, et al.
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

5County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by William C. Katzenstein
Office Of The County Counsel
3535 Tenth Street, Suite 300
Riverside, CA

6County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Robert M. Pepper
Office Of The County Counsel
3535 10th Street, 3rd floor
Riverside, CA

7Board Of Supervisors Of The County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Steven L. Mayer
Howard Rice Nemerovski Et Al
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

8Board Of Supervisors Of The County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Robert M. Pepper
Office Of The County Counsel
3535 10th Street, 3rd floor
Riverside, CA

9County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Steven L. Mayer
Howard Rice Nemerovski Et Al
Three Embarcadero Center, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA

10County Of Riverside (Petitioner)
Represented by Robert M. Pepper
Office Of The County Counsel
3535 10th Street, Suite 300
Riverside, CA

11Association For Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1000
Encino, CA

12Pasadena Police Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd #1000
Encino, CA

13Torrance Police Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd #1000
Encino, CA

14Glendale Police Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd #1000
Encino, CA

15Bell Police Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd #1000
Encino, CA

16West Covina Police Officers Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Helen L. Schwab
Green & Shinee
16055 Ventura Blvd #1000
Encino, CA

17Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Stephen H. Silver
Silver, Hadden & Silver
1428 2nd St #200
Santa Monica, CA

18Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs Association (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Ronald Yank
Carroll, Burdick And Mcdonough
44 Montgomery St #400
San Francisco, CA

19County Of Tulare (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

20County Of Alpine (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

21County Of Kern (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

22County Of San Bernardino (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

23County Of San Diego (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

24County Of Ventura (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Teresa M. Saucedo
Deputy County Counsel
2900 W Burrel Avenue
Visalia, CA

25International Association Of Firefighters, Afl-Cio, C.L.C. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by N. Eugene Hill
Olson Hagel & Fishburn
555 Capitol Mall #1425
Sacramento, CA

26California Professional Firefighters (Amicus curiae)
Represented by N. Eugene Hill
Olson Hagel Leidigh Waters & Fishburn
555 Capitol Mall #1425
Sacramento, CA

27California Legal Defense Fund (Amicus curiae)
Represented by N. Eugene Hill
Olson Hagel Leidigh Waters & Fishburn
555 Capitol Mall #1425
Sacramento, CA

28Daly City Firefighters, Local 1879 (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Alan C. Davis
Davis & Reno
22 Battery St #1000
San Francisco, CA

29League Of California Cities (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Joanne Speers
League Of California Cities
1400 K Street, Suite 400
Sacramento, CA

30Los Angeles Police Protective League, Et Al. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Michael Alan Morguess
Attorney at Law
367 N 2nd Ave
Upland, CA

31Los Angeles Police Protective League, Et Al. (Amicus curiae)
Represented by Dieter C. Dammeier
Attorney at Law
367 N 2nd Ave
Upland, CA


Disposition
Apr 21 2003Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 29 2002Petition for review filed
  In San Diego by counsel for RPI {Riverside Sheriff's Association}.
May 30 2002Record requested
 
Jun 4 2002Received Court of Appeal record
  two doghouses
Jun 19 2002Answer to petition for review filed
  by counsel for petitioners (County of Riverside & Board of Supervisors of the County of RIverside and Larry Parrish). (timely-40k)
Jun 27 2002Reply to answer to petition filed
  by counsel for Real Party in Interest (Riverside Sheriff's Assoc.)
Jul 17 2002Petition for Review Granted (civil case)
  Brown, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, CJ., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin and Moreno, JJ.
Jul 17 2002Letter sent to:
  counsel re grant order (29.3).
Aug 15 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
  in San Diego by counsel for RPI (Riverside Sheriff's Assoc.).
Sep 11 2002Request for extension of time filed
  petitioners requesting to October 14, 2002 to file answer brief on the merits. (ok to grant - order being prepared)
Sep 16 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of petitioners and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 14, 2002.
Oct 15 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
  by counsel for petitioners (County of Riverside, Board of Supervisors of the County of Riverside and Larry Parrish).
Oct 15 2002Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by counsel for petitioners (County of Riverside, Board of Supervisors of the County of Riverside and Larry Parrish).
Oct 25 2002Request for extension of time filed
  in San Diego by counsel for RPI (Riverside Sheriff's Assoc.) requesting to Nov. 25, 2002 to file reply brief on the merits. (*ok to grant - order being prepared*)
Oct 29 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of real party in interest and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the reply brief on the merits is extended to and including November 25, 2002.
Nov 22 2002Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
  in San Diego by counsel for RPI Riverside Sheriff's Association.
Nov 27 2002Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Assn for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, etal ["ALADS", etal]
Dec 5 2002Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Supports RPIS // Amici Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Association, et al., application is under separate blue cover.
Dec 6 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Assoc. for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff's et al.
Dec 6 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff's, Pasadena Police Officers Association, Torrance Police Officers Association, Glendale Police Officers Association, Bell Police Officers Association, and West Covina Police Officers Association in support of real party in interest. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Dec 13 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Association (VCDSA), et al.
Dec 13 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Association (VCDSA), et al. in support of real party in interest. Answer due within 20 days.
Dec 17 2002Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by County of Tulare, County of Alpine et al. in support of petitioners.
Dec 19 2002Extension of time granted
  On application of petitioners and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer to amicus curiae brief on behalf of Ventura County Deputy Sheriff's Association et al. is extended to and including January 22, 2003.
Dec 19 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  County of Tulare, County of Alpine et al. in support of petitioners.
Dec 19 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  by County of Tulare, County of Alpine, County of Kern, County of San Bernardino, County of San Diego, and County of Ventura in support of petitioners. Answer due within 20 days.
Dec 20 2002Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  Los Angeles Police Protective League, etal [support of real party Riverside Sheriff's Assn]
Dec 20 2002Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by League of California Cities in support of petitioners.
Dec 23 2002Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief
  by Daly City Firefighters, Local 1879, et al., in support of real party in interest.
Dec 23 2002Application filed to:
  appear pro hac vice. Thomas A. Woodley of the District of Columbia for admission pro hac vice to appear on behalf of amicus International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC. (recv'd in Sacto) (Application granted - see order filed 12/31/02)
Dec 23 2002Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief
  by Calif. Professional Firefighters, Peace Officers Research Assoc. of Calif., and International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC in support of RPI. (recv'd in Sacto).
Dec 23 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  the Attorney General. (recv'd in Sacto)
Dec 31 2002Order filed
  The application of Thomas A. Woodley of the District of Columbia for admission Pro Hac Vice to appear on behalf of an amicus is hereby granted.
Dec 31 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Calif. Professional Firefighters, Peace Officers Research Assoc. of Calif., and International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC.
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  by Calif. Professional Firefighters, Peace Officers Research Assoc. of Calif., and International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC in support of RPI. Answer due within 20 days.
Dec 31 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Daly City Firefighters, Local 1879, et al.
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  by Daly City Firefighters, Local 1879, et al., in support of real party in interest. Answer due within 20 days.
Dec 31 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  League of California Cities
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  by League of California Cities in support of petitioners. Answer due within 20 days.
Dec 31 2002Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted
  Los Angeles Police Protective League, et al.
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
  by Los Angeles Police Protective League, et al. in support of real party in interest. Answer due within 20 days.
Jan 7 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by RPI requesting extension to Jan. 28, 2003 to file answer to amicus brief by County of Tulare et al filed on 12/19/02. (recv'd in San Diego) (Ok to grant to Jan. 21, 2003 only. Order being prepared. )
Jan 7 2003Case ordered on calendar
  2-4-03, 9am, Sacramento
Jan 8 2003Request for extension of time filed
  by petitioner requesting extension to file answer to amicus briefs and one month continuance of oral argument set for Feb. 4, 2003.
Jan 9 2003Extension of time granted
  The application of petitioners for an extension of time to file an answer to the amicus curiae briefs is GRANTED IN PART. Petitioners may serve and file an answer to all amicus curiae briefs on or before January 28, 2003. Petitioners' request for a continuance of oral argument, scheduled for February 4, 2003, is hereby DENIED.
Jan 13 2003Extension of time granted
  On application of real party in interest and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer to amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of County of Tulare et al., is extended to and including January 21, 2003.
Jan 29 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
  by petitioners (County of Riverside et al.) (timely filed per rule 40k)
Jan 29 2003Request for judicial notice filed (in non-AA proceeding)
  by counsel for petitioners.
Jan 29 2003Request for judicial notice granted
  The requests for judical notice filed on October 15, 2002, and January 29, 2003 are hereby granted.
Feb 4 2003Cause argued and submitted
 
Apr 21 2003Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full
  Majority Opinion By Chin, J. -----Joined by Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar and Brown, JJ. Concurring Opinion By George, CJ., Concurring Opinion by Moreno, J.
May 23 2003Remittitur issued (civil case)
  CA4/2
Jun 3 2003Received document entitled:
  Receipt for remittitur from CA4/2.

Briefs
Aug 15 2002Opening brief on the merits filed
 
Oct 15 2002Answer brief on the merits filed
 
Nov 22 2002Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
 
Dec 6 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 13 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 19 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 23 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Dec 31 2002Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
 
Jan 29 2003Response to amicus curiae brief filed
 
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website