Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 7/19/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CITY OF DINUBA et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S143326
v.
) Ct.App.
5
F046252
COUNTY OF TULARE et al.,
Tulare
County
Defendants and Respondents. )
Super. Ct. No. 03-205854

Counties are statutorily required to collect property taxes on behalf of local
taxing entities and then allocate and distribute the revenue to these entities
pursuant to a complex statutory scheme. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 95 et seq.; Health
& Saf. Code, § 33000 et seq.) The County of Tulare (County) improperly
computed the portion of tax revenue to which the City of Dinuba Redevelopment
Agency (Agency) was statutorily entitled and Agency now seeks to recover the
misallocated revenue.
We granted review to consider whether County is immune from suit under
Government Code section 860.2.1 We conclude that, because Agency does not
seek money damages for an “injury” as defined by the Tort Claims Act (Act),2
1
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Government Code.
2
The statutory scheme has also been referred to as the Government Claims
Act. (See e.g., Baines Pickwick v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 298,
309-310; Trend Homes, Inc. v. Central Unified School Dist. (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 102, 113.)
1

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section 810 et seq., section 860.2 does not bar Agency’s action. We further
conclude that because Agency is seeking to enforce a mandatory duty imposed by
statute, the remedy of mandamus is available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.)
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2002, Agency retained a private consultant to audit County’s property
tax assessment and allocation procedures.3 The audit discovered County had
failed to assign the proper tax rate code to certain parcels within the
redevelopment project, which resulted in Agency not receiving tax increment
revenue to which it was entitled for 2002 and the previous four years (1998-1999
tax year through 2001-2002 tax year). Those funds were instead divided up
among other entities in the area. When Agency brought these errors to County’s
attention, County made the appropriate corrections to the current assessment roll.
However, County refused to correct the miscoding retroactively and pay
previously misallocated tax increment revenue that had been distributed to other
entities.
In November 2002, Agency and the City of Dinuba (City) (collectively,
plaintiffs) filed a formal tort claim with County for payment of the full amount of
the tax increment funds Agency had been entitled to for the previous four years.
When County did not act on the claim, plaintiffs sued County, Tulare County
Board of Supervisors, Tulare County Assessor Gregory Hardcastle, and Tulare
County Auditor-Controller Jimmy Allen (collectively, defendants). The petition
and complaint, as amended, sought a writ of mandate compelling defendants to (1)
calculate and distribute the unpaid and underpaid tax increment funds for fiscal
years 1997-1998 through 2003-2004; (2) correct the tax rolls for all prior fiscal

3
The factual and procedural history is largely taken from the Court of
Appeal’s opinion.
2

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years in which defendants miscoded and/or failed to properly code parcels; and (3)
pay plaintiffs their respective shares of tax increment unlawfully withheld.
Plaintiffs also requested a declaration and determination that defendants were
required to (1) correct all previous fiscal year tax rolls in which defendants either
failed to code or miscoded certain parcels and deprived plaintiffs of their
respective share of tax increment revenue; and (2) calculate and pay to plaintiffs
their respective share of tax increment funds as corrected.
Defendants demurred to the petition and complaint on the grounds that: (1)
the disputed tax revenue had already been distributed to other taxing agencies and
defendants could not be required to either recover the funds or pay plaintiffs out of
County’s general fund; and (2) defendants were immune from liability under
section 860.2, which states: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is
liable for an injury caused by: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) An act or omission in the
interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.”
In their opposition, plaintiffs argued that if the trial court were to grant the
demurrer, “Petitioners should be granted leave to amend to put forth further causes
of action supported by the allegations for constructive trust, breach of contract,
and other non-tort causes of action.” At the hearing on defendants’ motion,
plaintiffs’ counsel discussed amending the complaint to add claims for “breach of
contract or the imposition of some type of equitable remedy, the constructive trust
type theory.”
The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer on both grounds. The court
ruled that plaintiffs had “not stated a statutory basis to impose liability upon these
public entities and their employees, and/or stated a case on point to overcome the
immunity afforded the public entities and their employees under Government
Code section 860.2.” However, the court granted leave to amend, noting that,
because plaintiffs were not required to file a tort claim under section 905,
3

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subdivision (i), the “new theories for recovery” were not barred.
Rather than appeal the trial court’s ruling, plaintiffs filed their second
amended complaint. The second amended complaint dropped the claim for a writ
of mandate and instead asserted claims for imposition of a constructive trust and
for money had and received against defendants and the nine taxing entities that
had been mistakenly allocated a portion of the tax increment due to Agency. 4
Defendants again demurred. The court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. The court stated: “No matter how Plaintiffs attempt to plead this
case, the facts are that the public entity and its officers have immunity under
Government Code section 860.2 for any act or omission in the interpretation or
application of any law relating to a tax. Plaintiffs have plead [sic] that the
Defendants miscoded the tax rate areas and collected taxes and failed to give them
the proper credit for their fair share of the tax increment revenue. Plaintiffs have
attempted to allege causes of action for money had and received and for a
constructive trust, but these fail as a matter of law. . . . [C]learly[,] the facts are
that the Defendants’ acts were either an interpretation or application of a law
relating to a tax, and thus the Defendants would have immunity for Plaintiff’s
injury. Therefore, no further leave to amend is granted.” Judgment was entered
dismissing defendants from the action with prejudice.5
Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court, contending that
their claims for relief are not encompassed by the Act (§ 810 et seq.). In reversing
4
Those entities are: Dinuba Unified School District, State Center
Community College District, Tulare County Office of Education, Tulare County
Air Pollution Control District, Tulare County Library Fund, Alta Healthcare
District, Tulare County Flood Control District, Alta Cemetery District, and Dinuba
Memorial District.
5
Dismissal was not entered as to the nine taxing entities, which were
substituted in the place of Doe defendants.
4

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the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiffs’ claims do not arise
from defendants’ breach of their statutory duty, but rather, are “based on breach of
a contractual duty. Accordingly, [defendants are] not immune under Government
Code section 820.6.”6 We granted defendants’ petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) Further,
we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not
assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Ibid.; Aubry v.
Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967 (Aubry).) When a demurrer
is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) And when it is
sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court
has abused its discretion and we reverse. (Ibid.)
B. Tax Increment Financing and County’s Obligations
As defendants acknowledge, counties have a mandatory duty to collect
property taxes, then allocate and distribute the appropriate amounts to various
taxing entities pursuant to a complex statutory scheme. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 95
et seq.) Allocation and distribution of property tax revenue is further subject to
the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL). (Health & Saf. Code, § 33000 et
seq.) The CRL sets forth the procedures for financing redevelopment projects.

6
The intended citation is to section 860.2, not section 820.6.
5

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(Health & Saf. Code, § 33670.) Under the CRL, such projects are financed by
“ ‘tax increment financing.’ ” (Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 68, 71.)7
Under tax increment financing, “[a]ll taxable property within the area to be
redeveloped is subject to ad valorem property taxes. The properties lying within a
redevelopment area have a certain assessed value as of the date a redevelopment
plan ordinance is adopted. A local taxing agency, such as a city or county,
continues in future years to receive property taxes on the redevelopment area
properties, but may only claim the taxes allocable to the base year value. If the
taxable properties within the redevelopment area increase in value after the base
year, the taxes on the increment of value over and above the base year value are
assigned to a special fund for the redevelopment agency.
“Once the redevelopment plan is adopted, the redevelopment agency may
issue bonds to raise funds for the project. As the renewal and redevelopment is
completed, the property values in the redevelopment area are expected to rise.
The taxes attributable to the increase in assessed value above the base year value
are assigned to the redevelopment agency, which then uses the funds to retire the
bonds. The local taxing agencies still receive taxes attributable to the base year
assessed value of the properties within the redevelopment area. This way, the
redevelopment project in effect pays for itself.” (Redevelopment Agency v. County
of Los Angeles, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 71; Redevelopment Agency v. County
of San Bernardino (1978) 21 Cal.3d 255, 259; Health & Saf. Code, § 33670 et
seq.)
7
The CRL was first adopted in 1951. After voter approval, it was made a
part of the California Constitution in 1952 as section 19 of article XIII, since
renumbered as article XVI, section 16. (Bell Community Redevelopment Agency
v. Woosley (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 24, 27, fn. 1.)
6

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To determine which local entities are entitled to the tax revenue collected
from any given parcel of property, the county assigns each parcel to a certain tax
rate area. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 252.) A tax rate area is “a specific
geographic area all of which is within the jurisdiction of the same combination of
local agencies and school entities for the current fiscal year.” (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 95, subd. (g).) Property tax revenue from parcels assigned to a certain tax rate
area is allocated by the county to the local agencies having jurisdiction in the tax
rate area. (See id., § 96.1, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, if a particular parcel of property is
assigned to a tax rate area that does not include a particular entity, no allocation is
made for that entity and it will not receive any of the tax revenue collected from
that parcel.
With the statutory scheme in mind, we consider the scope of governmental
immunity under the Act and whether relief is available.
1. Government Code Section 860.2 Does Not Bar Recovery
Defendants argue plaintiffs’ action to recover misallocated tax revenue is
barred by the Act. (§ 810 et seq.) Specifically, defendants contend section 860.2,
which states, “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) An act or omission in the interpretation or application of
any law relating to a tax,” immunizes County from having to pay defendants
previously misallocated revenue. We disagree.
First, section 860.2 is concerned with limiting governmental liability for an
injury, which is defined in section 810.8 as “death, injury to a person, damage to
or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable
if inflicted by a private person.” Defendants’ failure to comply with their statutory
duty to correctly allocate and distribute tax revenue to other public entities does
7

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not constitute an “injury” within the narrow meaning of sections 810.8 and 860.2.
(Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 968-970; see Forbes v. County of San Bernardino
(2005) 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 55.) The wrong plaintiffs complain of “is one which
by its very nature could not exist in an action between private persons . . . . [a]s a
result, the injury alleged in this case is not included within the Tort Claims Act’s
definition of injury.” (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 968.) Accordingly, section
860.2, which only provides immunity from liability for an “injury” as defined by
the Act, does not apply here.
Second, the immunity provisions of the Act are only concerned with
shielding public entities from having to pay money damages for torts. (Schooler v.
State of California (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1013.) Section 814 explicitly
provides that liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than
money damages is unaffected by the Act. Plaintiffs do not seek damages; they
seek only to compel defendants to perform their express statutory duty. While
compliance with the duty may result in the payment of money, that is distinct from
seeking damages. (Board of Administration v. Wilson (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
1109, 1125-1126 [mandamus to compel transfer of payments is not equivalent to
seeking money damages].) For example, had plaintiffs sought compensatory
damages for a downgraded bond rating or increased interest rates as a result of
defendants’ failure to disburse the funds to which plaintiffs were entitled, such
damages would likely be precluded. But plaintiffs do not seek such damages and
thus section 860.2 does not bar their action.8

8
The routine reference to “damages” in plaintiffs’ pleadings does not control
whether the action seeks money damages or simply the release of funds as
required by statute. (See County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d
576, 588 (Lackner).)
8

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2. Mandamus is Available to Compel Compliance With Duty
A party may seek a writ of mandate “to compel the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) In order to obtain writ relief, a
party must establish “ ‘(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part
of the respondent . . . ; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner
to the performance of that duty . . . .’ ” (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn.
v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539-540 (Woodside).) It is undisputed that
defendants had a duty to correctly calculate and distribute the tax revenue. Nor
can it be disputed that plaintiffs had a beneficial right in defendants doing so. It
follows then that mandamus provides an appropriate remedy for defendants’
failure to comply with their statutory duty.
Courts have frequently found mandamus to be available in cases similar to
the one at bar, where one public entity seeks to force another to release funds in
accordance with a statutory duty. In Lackner, the county sued the director of the
state agency administering the Medi-Cal program seeking to force the release of
reimbursement monies allegedly withheld in violation of statute. The state agency
argued that the county’s failure to properly present a tort claim for damages
prevented the trial court from awarding payment of the funds. (Lackner, supra, 97
Cal.App.3d at pp. 586-587.) Rejecting the state agency’s contention, the Court of
Appeal explained that “[a]n action in traditional mandamus, which seeks an order
compelling an official to perform a mandatory duty, is not an action against the
state for money, even though the result compels the public official to release
money wrongfully detained.” (Id. at p. 587; accord, County of Los Angeles v.
Riley (1942) 20 Cal.2d 652 [mandamus appropriate to force state to recalculate
credit for aid payments]; County of L.A. v. State Dept. Pub. Health (1958) 158
9

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Cal.App.2d 425 [mandamus appropriate to force state agency to release
tuberculosis subsidies].)9
Defendants argue that being forced to correct their mistake and pay
plaintiffs misallocated revenue would “inject uncertainty in the public fisc” and
have a “detrimental impact.” “It appears elementary that courts may not frustrate
the creation of a statutory duty by refusing to enforce it through the normal
judicial means. What public policy reasons there are against enforcement of a
statutory duty are reasons against the creation of the duty ab initio, and should be
addressed to the Legislature.” (Woodside, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 540.) Indeed, as
both parties note, the Legislature has on occasion enacted statutes forgiving
counties’ misallocations in exchange for prospective compliance. (E.g., Rev. &
Tax. Code, §§ 96.18, 96.19, 96.27.) Defendants may similarly seek the
Legislature’s intervention here; courts, however, cannot refuse to enforce the
statutory duty simply because of an alleged hardship it would pose to a county.
Additionally, several provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code appear
to limit any hardship. Revenue and Taxation Code section 96.1, subdivision
(c)(3), curtails the amount County would have to pay in a single year by providing
that if “it is determined that . . . a reallocation is required for previous fiscal years,
the cumulative reallocation or adjustment may not exceed 1 percent of the total
amount levied at a 1 percent rate of the current year’s original secured tax roll.
The reallocation shall be completed in equal increments within the following three

9
Mandamus has frequently been issued to compel assessors and other taxing
officials to perform duties required by tax laws. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed.
1997) Extraordinary Writs, § 85, p. 873, and cases cited therein.) Indeed, writs
have issued specifically in the context of redevelopment agencies seeking to
compel taxing officials to perform their statutory functions. (E.g., Redevelopment
Agency v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 21 Cal.3d 255 [agency sought to
compel county to recalculate tax allocation].)
10

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fiscal years . . . .”10 Revenue and Taxation Code section 4831, subdivision (a),
contains a four-year statute of limitations for the correction of the rolls.
Defendants also have available to them any appropriate defenses such as laches
and unclean hands. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Extraordinary Writs, §§
148, 153, pp. 943-946, 950-951.)
We also note plaintiffs added as named defendants the taxing entities that
received misallocated revenue and which continue to be parties in this action.
Should plaintiffs succeed, County’s obligation may be offset by voluntary
repayment by the taxing entities or by direct recourse against them by plaintiffs or
by County itself.11 Alternatively, as suggested during oral argument, County may
correct the tax rolls that resulted in overpayments to the entities and explore
offsetting future payments to recover any amounts now owed to plaintiffs. (See
Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4831; Health & Saf. Code, § 33677.) Whatever County does,
it is clear that what it may not do is refuse to comply with its statutory duty to
correctly allocate and distribute revenue owed to plaintiffs.
Accordingly, we conclude mandamus may issue to compel a county to
comply with its duty to calculate and distribute tax revenue. In light of our
holding, we need not resolve whether plaintiffs could have maintained claims for
quasi-contract or constructive trust had mandamus not been available.
C. Plaintiffs May Amend Their Complaint to Seek Writ of Mandate
In assessing whether plaintiffs should be allowed leave to amend, we
determine de novo whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of

10
This provision also seems to belie defendants’ contention that the
Legislature intended to shield counties from having to repay previously
misallocated revenue.
11
Indeed, plaintiffs indicated at oral argument that several taxing entities have
entered into settlement agreements.
11

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action under any possible legal theory. (Leonte v. ACS State & Local Solutions,
Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 521, 525.) We are not limited to plaintiffs’ theory of
recovery or “form of action” pled in testing the sufficiency of the complaint.
(Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 103.) It is clear that
plaintiffs’ complaint states facts sufficient to state a claim for a writ of mandate.
It is true that plaintiffs sought mandamus in their first amended complaint,
but failed to seek it in their second amended complaint after the trial court granted
defendants’ demurrer. In general, plaintiffs who amend a complaint rather than
appeal the trial court’s order waive the right to appeal any error in sustaining the
first demurrer. (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 966, fn. 2.) However, that rule does
not apply if the trial court denied plaintiffs leave to include those causes of action
in an amended complaint. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General
Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 209 (Children’s Television).) We conclude
this exception applies here.
When the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the first amended
complaint (including the request for mandamus) and granted plaintiffs leave to add
“new theories for recovery,” it made clear that it believed plaintiffs could not
“state a cause of action for mandate.” Considering plaintiffs’ pleadings, the
discussion at the hearing, and the trial court’s order, it is clear that the trial court
granted plaintiffs leave to add contractual and equitable claims, not to reassert
mandamus. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiffs’ failure to seek writ relief in
the second amended complaint or to appeal the trial court’s dismissal of the first
amended petition does not now preclude them from amending the complaint to
seek mandamus. (Children’s Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 209.)
12

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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
MORENO, J.

WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD,
J.
BAXTER,
J.
WERDEGAR,
J.
CHIN,
J.
CORRIGAN,
J.
13

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 137 Cal.App.4th 1387
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S143326
Date Filed: July 19, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Tulare
Judge: Patrick J. O’Hara

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Steven R. Mayers, Andrea J. Saltzman, Joseph M. Quinn; Tuttle
& McCloskey and Daniel T. McCloskey for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

McDonough Holland & Allen, T. Brent Hawkins and Daniel M. Wolk for California Redevelopment
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jarvis, Fay & Doporto and Benjamin P. Fay for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Thomas F. Winfield III and Michael H. Wallenstein for Defendants and
Respondents.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Joseph M. Quinn
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson
575 Market Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 421-3711

Michael H. Wallenstein
Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1500
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3125
(213) 687-2100

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Thu, 07/19/2007	S143326

Disposition
Jul 19 2007	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 8 2006	Petition for review filed   respondent County of Tulare, Tulare County Board of Supervisors, Gregory Hardcastle & Jimmy Allen Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
May 11 2006	Record requested
May 18 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   one doghouse
May 26 2006	Answer to petition for review filed   City of Dinuba and City of Dinuba Redevelopment Agency, plaintiffs Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
May 26 2006	Request for depublication (petition for review pending)   County of Tulare, defendant and respondent Michael H. Wallenstein, counsel
May 31 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to file reply to 6-16-06; Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorneys Michael H. Wallenstein, etal
Jun 8 2006	Reply to answer to petition filed   Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein, retained
Jun 14 2006	Opposition filed   to depublication request City of Dinuba, Dinuba Redevelopment Agency, appellants Joseph M. Quinn, counsel ...filed with permission...
Jun 22 2006	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including August 4, 2006, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Jul 11 2006	Opposition filed   to request for depublication California Redevelopment Association, amicus curiae T. Brent Hawkins, counsel ...filed with permission...
Jul 12 2006	Petition for review granted (civil case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Jul 12 2006	Letter sent to:   Counsel - Certification of Interested Entities or Persons
Jul 21 2006	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   County of Tulare, respondent Michael Harry Wallenstein, counsel
Jul 26 2006	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   City of Dinuba, appellant Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
Aug 10 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed   Respondents County of Tulare, Tulare County Board of Supervisors, Gregory Hardcastle and Jimmy Allen Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
Sep 5 2006	Request for extension of time filed   30-days to file the answer brief on the merits, until October 10, 2006. City of Dinuba, appellants Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
Sep 8 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of appellant City of Dinuba, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 10, 2006.
Oct 4 2006	Request for extension of time filed   to October 17, 2006 (7-day extension) to file the appellant's answer brief on the merits City of Dinuba, et al., appellants Steven R. Meyers, counsel
Oct 10 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of the City of Dinuba, et al., and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the appellant's answer brief on the merits is extended to and including October 17, 2006.
Oct 18 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed   City of Dinuba, et al., plaintiffs Joseph M. Quinn, counsel (CRC 40.1B)
Oct 25 2006	Request for extension of time filed   reply brief/merits to 11-29-06 Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
Oct 27 2006	Extension of time granted   On application of the County of Tulare, et al., and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the respondents' reply brief on the merits is extended to and including November 29, 2006.
Nov 27 2006	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California Redevelopment Association, amicus curiae T. Brent Hawkins, counsel
Nov 27 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
Dec 1 2006	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of California Redevelopment Association for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Dec 1 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed   California Redevelopment Association, amicus curiae T. Brent Hawkins, counsel
Dec 26 2006	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   League of California Cities in support of appellant.
Jan 2 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   League of California Cities (non-party)
Jan 2 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   The application of League of California Cities for permission to file an amicus curiae in support of appellant is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Jan 22 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   to AC brief of League of California Cities Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
Jan 25 2007	Request for judicial notice filed (granted case)   City of Dinuba, et al., Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
Apr 11 2007	Additional issues ordered   The parties are requested to address these additional issues: (1) In light of the parties' agreement that the County has a statutory duty to properly allocate and distribute property taxes, may the City seek relief via a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., ? 1085)? (2) If so, what disposition would be appropriate here given that no writ of mandate claim was made in the City's second amended co complaint? The parties are to submit simultaneous letter briefs by April 25, 2007 and may submit reply briefs by May 2, 2007. George, C.J., was absent and did not participate.
Apr 17 2007	Change of contact information filed for:   Attorneys for Appellants City of Dinuba and City of Dinuba Redevelopment Agency Joseph M. Quinn
Apr 25 2007	Supplemental brief filed   Respondents County of Tulare, Tulare County Board of Supervisors, Gregory Hardcastle and Jimmy Allen Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
Apr 25 2007	Supplemental brief filed   City of Dinuba, et al., appellants Joseph M. Quinn, counsel
Apr 27 2007	Supplemental brief filed   California Redevelopement Association Amicus Curiae T. Brent Hawkins, counsel ...filed with permission...
May 2 2007	Supplemental brief filed   (reply) City of Dinuba, et al., appellants Michael O'Flannigan, counsel
May 2 2007	Supplemental brief filed   Supplemental reply brief Respondents County of Tulare, etal Attorney Michael H. Wallenstein
May 2 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued on Wednesday, May 30, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
May 30 2007	Cause argued and submitted
Jul 18 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Jul 19 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Majority Opinion by Moreno, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Corrigan, JJ.
Aug 22 2007	Remittitur issued (civil case)
Aug 29 2007	Received:   Receipt for Remittitur from the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Briefs
Aug 10 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed
Oct 18 2006	Answer brief on the merits filed
Nov 27 2006	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Dec 1 2006	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jan 2 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Jan 22 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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