Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 11/26/07

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

TARIQ CHAMBERS,
Petitioner,
S143491
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO
COUNTY,
Ct.App.
4/1
D047661
)
)
San
Diego
County
Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. GIC856399
)
SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT )
)
Real party in Interest. )

Here we consider whether derivative information, developed by independent
investigation after Pitchess1 disclosure in an earlier case, is subject to a protective
order under Evidence Code2 section 1045,3 subdivision (e) (section 1045(e)). We

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.
3 Section 1045 provides:
“(a) Nothing in this article shall be construed to affect the right of access to
records of complaints, or investigations of complaints, or discipline imposed as a
result of those investigations, concerning an event or transaction in which the
peace officer or custodial officer, as defined in Section 831.5 of the Penal Code,
participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which
he or she performed his or her duties, provided that information is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation.

(footnote continued on next page)
1

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hold that derivative information is not generally subject to the statutorily required
protective order when a subsequent defendant files his or her own Pitchess motion
and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative
information pertains. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant Tariq Chambers was charged with one count of resisting,
delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).)
According to the police report, on July 29, 2004, Officer E. and his partner
responded to a report of domestic violence at Chambers’s residence. Chambers

(footnote continued from previous page)

“(b) In determining relevance, the court shall examine the information in
chambers in conformity with Section 915, and shall exclude from disclosure:
“(1) Information consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring
more than five years before the event or transaction that is the subject of the
litigation in aid of which discovery or disclosure is sought.
“(2) In any criminal proceeding the conclusions of any officer investigating a
complaint filed pursuant to Section 832.5 of the Penal Code.
“(3) Facts sought to be disclosed that are so remote as to make disclosure of
little or no practical benefit.
“(c) In determining relevance where the issue in litigation concerns the
policies or pattern of conduct of the employing agency, the court shall consider
whether the information sought may be obtained from other records maintained by
the employing agency in the regular course of agency business which would not
necessitate the disclosure of individual personnel records.
“(d) Upon motion seasonably made by the governmental agency which has
custody or control of the records to be examined or by the officer whose records
are sought, and upon good cause showing the necessity thereof, the court may
make any order which justice requires to protect the officer or agency from
unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.
“(e) The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or
discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to Section
1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any
purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.”
2

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became belligerent and rushed toward Officer E. three times. Officer E. used
pepper spray to protect himself.
In January 2005, Chambers filed a Pitchess motion, seeking information in
Officer E.’s personnel file regarding “excessive force, aggressive conduct,
unnecessary violence, unnecessary force, false arrest or detention, false statements
in reports, false claims of probable cause or reasonable suspicion or any other
evidence of, or complaints of dishonesty, by Officer [E].” Defense counsel filed a
supporting declaration asserting that Officer E. overreacted and used excessive
force by spraying Chambers with pepper spray. Chambers denied rushing at or
physically threatening the officers, and asserted Officer E. lied when he reported
that conduct. After Chambers had been disabled by the spray, both officers
allegedly had their guns drawn and threatened to shoot him. Judge Willis found
good cause to inspect Officer E.’s personnel file, but found no relevant
information to disclose.
In August 2005, Chambers filed a supplemental Pitchess motion through his
public defender, Kristin Scogin. After being assigned to Chambers’s case, Scogin
was assigned to take over a case involving a Ms. Washington (People v.
Washington (Super. Ct. San Diego County, No. M947152) (Washington).). As a
result, Scogin learned Pitchess information about Officer E. that was ordered
disclosed in the Washington case, along with derivative information that had been
independently developed.
The trial court in the Washington case had imposed a protective order
limiting “[u]se of the information ordered disclosed from the officer’s personnel
3

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files” to “the defense of this criminal matter.”4 On Chambers’s behalf, and as
relevant here, Scogin asked the court to release the name of one of the
complainants that had been disclosed to Washington. She also asked permission
to use, on behalf of Chambers, the derivative information independently developed
after the complainant had been disclosed to Washington. In a sealed declaration,
Scogin described that derivative information, but did not refer to the complainant
by name.
The city attorney opposed the supplemental motion, and Chambers ultimately
sought reconsideration of his original Pitchess motion. The trial court concluded
the defense was “precluded from using information developed in other Pitchess
motions,” but reexamined the personnel file “to make sure that [it] did not miss
anything.” The trial court again found no relevant information regarding other
complainants.
Defendant’s petition for writ of mandate to the superior court appellate
division was denied, but he obtained writ relief from the Court of Appeal. The
Court of Appeal held that information regarding the complainant disclosed in the
Washington case should be disclosed by the trial court to Chambers subject to an
appropriate protective order under section 1045(e). It further held that because it
was ordering disclosure of the complainant’s identity to Chambers, the deputy
public defender would not violate the section 1045(e) protective order in the
Washington case if she used the derivative information acquired during
investigation of the Washington matter in the Chambers case.
We granted the San Diego Police Department’s petition for review.

4 The protective order in the Washington case was not included in the
record here. We have obtained the record in Washington, and take judicial notice
of the order on our own motion.
4

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II. DISCUSSION
A. Background
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, “we held that a criminal defendant has a
limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure ‘a
fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably
accessible information.’ ”5 (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033,
1037, fn. 3 (Alford).) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges
and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ‘Pitchess motions’ . . .
through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code
sections 1043 through 1045.”6 (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49
Cal.3d 74, 81, fns. omitted (Santa Cruz).)
A Pitchess motion must describe “the type of records or information sought”
and include “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure
sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the
pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency
identified has the records or information from the records.” (§ 1043, subds. (b)(2)
& (3).) If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the records

5 Peace officer personnel records are defined as “any file maintained under
that individual’s name by his or her employing agency and containing records
relating to” certain categories, including “[c]omplaints, or investigations of
complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or
which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she
performed his or her duties.” (Pen. Code, § 832.8, subd. (e).)

6 Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) provides in part: “Peace
officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state
or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from these
records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil
proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the
Evidence Code.”
5

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in camera to determine what, if any, information should be disclosed. (§ 1045,
subd. (b); People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) In providing for in
camera review, “the Legislature balanced the accused’s need for disclosure of
relevant information with the law enforcement officer’s legitimate expectation of
privacy in his or her personnel records.” (Mooc, at p. 1220.)
“ ‘As a further safeguard,’ ” an order of disclosure ordinarily involves
revelation of only the “ ‘name, address and phone number of any prior
complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question.’ ”7 (Alford,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039.) Section 1045(e) requires the court to impose a
protective order providing that the “records disclosed or discovered may not be
used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.”8
(§ 1045(e).)
The “relatively low threshold for discovery embodied in section 1043 is
offset, in turn, by section 1045’s protective provisions which: (1) explicitly
‘exclude from disclosure’ certain enumerated categories of information (§ 1045,
subd. (b)); (2) establish a procedure for in camera inspection by the court prior to
any disclosure (§ 1045, subd. (b)); and (3) issue a forceful directive to the courts to
consider the privacy interests of the officers whose records are sought and take
whatever steps ‘justice requires’ to protect the officers from ‘unnecessary

7 We subsequently refer to these data as “complainant information.”
Under certain circumstances, courts have disclosed the actual complaint or
statement that is contained in the personnel file. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at
p. 537; Alvarez v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1112-1113.) We
do not address that situation here.

8 We note that under a separate subdivision (§ 1045, subd. (d)), the court
may issue additional orders if it concludes upon a specific showing of good cause
that further protection is needed.
6

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annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.’ (§ 1045, subds. (c), (d) & (e).)”
(Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84.)
B. Derivative Information
We consider a situation in which defense counsel has obtained complainant
information through the Pitchess process, and defense investigators have
interviewed that complainant. If that counsel later represents another defendant
and, pursuant to Pitchess, discovers the same complainant information, may the
lawyer refer to the derivative information obtained during the earlier follow-up
investigation without violating the section 1045(e) protective order?
As noted, section 1045(e) provides that when a court permits disclosure
pursuant to section 1043, it must also “order that the records disclosed or
discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding
pursuant to applicable law.” (§ 1045(e).) In Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1033, we
held the language “ ‘a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law’ ” refers to the
statutory Pitchess scheme, and restricts “use of the disclosed information to the
proceeding in which it was sought.” (Id. at pp. 1040, 1042, italics added.) This
“interpretation of section 1045(e) harmonizes the entire statutory scheme and
retains its effectiveness by furthering the legitimate interests of both the defendant
and the peace officer.” (Id. at pp. 1042-1043)
In reaching our conclusion, we rejected Alford’s argument that an order
limiting use of Pitchess material to the case in which it is sought “undermines fair
representation and encourages inefficiency and duplication of effort, in that
members of the public defender’s office must feign ignorance of Pitchess
information personally known to them and instead file repeated Pitchess motions
in subsequent cases, not ‘using’ previously disclosed information in making
showings of good cause for disclosure.” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1043.)
7

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Alford identified no “impediment to the public defender’s ability to represent
him,” and the specific Pitchess judicial obligation arguably superseded a public
defender’s office rules concerning “attribution to all deputies of knowledge gained
by any one of them.” (Ibid., italics omitted)
Alford involved “the information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess motion.”
(Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1037, fn. 2.) We noted that the “parties have not
briefed, and we express no views concerning, the treatment of information
developed as a result of the receipt of information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess
motion.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 1063 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) That
issue is presented here.
Section 1045(e) refers to “records disclosed or discovered.” We conclude
that this language means the personnel file information that is ordered disclosed by
the trial court. As noted, this information is generally limited to the name, address
and telephone number of a prior complainant, other witnesses, and the date of the
incident. In that general situation, the statutory description of “records disclosed
or discovered” does not extend to information subsequently developed. However,
derivative information could reveal that a complaint had been made against a
particular officer and the name of the complainant. As a result, it could relate
back to information that was disclosed and fall under the protective order. In this
situation, however, there is no danger of an unjustified disclosure, as Chambers
will receive the name of the officer through his own Pitchess motion.
We adopt the rule formulated by the Court of Appeal for this narrow factual
situation. When complainant information has been ordered disclosed to counsel
who, when later representing a different defendant, succeeds under Pitchess in
discovering the same complainant information relating to the same officer, counsel
may then refer to the derivative information uncovered as part of the earlier
followup investigation.
8

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Application of the rule is illustrated by the following scenario: Counsel for
Defendant A files a Pitchess motion and receives complainant information. An
investigator then interviews that complainant, and perhaps other witnesses, thus
developing derivative information.
The same attorney later represents Defendant B. Even though the same law
enforcement officer may be involved in Defendant B’s case, counsel cannot
simply use the derivative information developed in Defendant A’s case. Doing so
would reveal complainant information from the officer’s record that is subject to
the section 1045(e) protective order under which the disclosure was made in
Defendant A’s case.
However, if counsel files a new Pitchess motion in Defendant B’s case,
seeking information about the officer and then receives the same complainant’s
name as he or she did in Defendant A’s case, the attorney is free to use derivative
information previously garnered during the followup investigation.
The section 1045(e) protective order is designed to ensure that disclosure of
confidential information is limited to the proceeding in which the disclosure is
ordered. Once a subsequent defendant obtains that same information under a valid
Pitchess order, there is little justification for precluding review of derivative
information. As the Court of Appeal observed, the second “litigant obtains
nothing beyond that which the Pitchess statutory scheme contemplates he is able
to obtain,” and counsel for the first Pitchess litigant “has not permitted the
information to be used for any court proceeding in which a Pitchess relevance
determination has not been made.”
This approach is consistent with the purpose of the Pitchess scheme to
balance the police officer’s privacy interest in his or her personnel records with the
criminal defendant’s interest in obtaining all pertinent information. As the Court
of Appeal observed, the “defendant remains able to prepare a defense, and the
9

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officer’s privacy interest in the data contained in his personnel file is not affected
beyond that which occurred when Pitchess disclosure was ordered.”
The San Diego Police Department relies on a line of cases holding that other
discovery methods cannot substitute for compliance with the Pitchess statutory
scheme. Here, however, Chambers followed the Pitchess process, and will receive
the complainant information that was also released in the Washington case. Our
resolution requires both defendants to bring Pitchess motions, and for a trial court
to find good cause and relevance in each case.
III. DISPOSITION
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.

10

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CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J.

I concur in the majority’s narrow holding that “[w]hen complainant
information has been ordered disclosed to counsel who, when later representing a
different defendant, succeeds under Pitchess [v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d
531] in discovering the same complainant information relating to the same officer,
counsel may then refer to the derivative information uncovered as part of the
earlier follow up investigation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8-9, italics added.) After
counsel has won a second Pitchess disclosure, involving the same officer and the
same complainant information, no purpose of the statutes and protective orders
that safeguard confidential police officer personnel records is served by requiring
counsel to perform a meaningless duplicate investigation before using, at trial,
derivative information counsel already possesses.
However, I do not interpret the majority’s opinion, or its judgment, to
imply that counsel may employ information learned as a direct result of the first
Pitchess disclosure to support a later request for Pitchess disclosure in a different
case. The statutory scheme, and the protective orders issued thereunder, restrict
“use of the . . . information [disclosed through a Pitchess motion] to the
proceeding in which it was sought.” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th
1033, 1042 (Alford), italics added.) In this context, I see no reason to distinguish
between direct and derivative “use.” Otherwise counsel could win Pitchess
disclosure against an officer in one case, obtain derivative information as a result,
1

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then invade the hapless officer’s confidential file again and again, in
circumvention of Alford, simply by bringing an infinite number of subsequent
Pitchess motions, using the previously obtained information to demonstrate the
need for new disclosure.
As Alford explained, the statutes’ “careful[] balanc[ing] [of] peace officers’
privacy interests in their personnel records against defendants’ rights of access to
information relevant to their defense” requires that Pitchess disclosure be ordered
“only on a showing of materiality to a particular case.” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 1042, italics added.) To establish such materiality, and obtain in camera
inspection of the officer’s files, the defendant need only present a “plausible
factual foundation” for a claim that, in his or her case, the officer lied or
committed other relevant misconduct. (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1011, 1025.) The in camera determination whether the files contain
relevant and discloseable information should similarly be guided by the
circumstances of the particular case in which disclosure is sought. Accordingly,
the statutory balance would be upset by allowing counsel to “pile on” against the
officer by using, in later Pitchess proceedings, information obtained as the result
of an earlier Pitchess disclosure.
On the assumption that the majority opinion and judgment are thus
circumscribed, I concur in both.
BAXTER, J.
2

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CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.

I fully concur with the majority’s holding that derivative information
developed through investigation after Pitchess disclosure (Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)) in an earlier case is not generally subject
to a protective order under Evidence Code, section 1045, subdivision (e),1 when a
subsequent defendant files a Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same
complainant to which the derivative information pertains. (Maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 1-2.) I write separately to express my continuing disagreement with the notion
that section 1045, subdivision (e), restricts “ ‘use of the disclosed information to
the proceeding in which it was sought.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, citing Alford v.
Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1042 (Alford).)
As I explained in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Alford, supra, 29
Cal.4th at pages 1057-1063, such a conclusion is neither prescribed by the plain
language of section 1045, subdivision (e), nor is it supported by the legislative
history. Both support the conclusion that Pitchess disclosure “may be used in any
court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 1059 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).)

1
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
1

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Nor was the court’s conclusion in Alford necessitated by the concededly
legitimate privacy interests of law enforcement. The Pitchess process contains
adequate safeguards if disclosed records were to be admitted in a subsequent
proceeding. (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1061 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno,
J.).) As I noted in Alford, the screening process preceding the initial disclosure
and the requirement that admission in a subsequent proceeding comport with
various Evidence Code statutes (e.g., §§ 210 [relevance], 352 [prejudice])
sufficiently protect officers’ privacy. (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1061 (conc.
& dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) Additionally, a trial court in a subsequent proceeding
could order any records filed under seal pending its ruling on the records’
admissibility. (§ 1045, subd. (d).)
On the other hand, the court’s interpretation in Alford “forces defense
attorneys, city attorneys and trial judges to ‘reinvent the wheel’ with each ‘new’
Pitchess request regarding the same peace officer — defense attorneys must write
motions, city attorneys must scour records, and judges must conduct in-chambers
hearings, simply to make the same Pitchess determination over and over again. . . .
Repetitive Pitchess motions are an unnecessary and enormous waste of scant
judicial and governmental resources.” (Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1061-1062
(conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).)
Accordingly, I remain of the opinion that section 1045, subdivision (e)
allows defendants to use Pitchess discovery in any “court proceeding pursuant to
applicable law.”
MORENO, J.
2

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Chambers v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Diego County
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

XXX NP opn. filed 5/4/06 – 4th Dist., Div. 1
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S143491
Date Filed: November 26, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Stephanie Sontag

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Kristin Scogin and Matthew Braner, Deputy Public Defenders, for
Petitioner.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Albert J. Menaster and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public
Defenders, for Los Angeles County Public Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Mary Greenwood, Public Defender (Santa Clara) and Kelley Paul Kulick, Deputy Public Defender, for
California Public Defenders Association and Public Defender of Santa Clara County as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Petitioner.
__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael J. Aguirre, City Attorney, and David M. Stotland, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

Dennis Barlow, City Attorney (Burbank) and Juli C. Scott, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for League of
California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Matthew Braner
Deputy Public Defender
233 “A” Street, Suite 800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 338-4705

David M. Stotland
Deputy City Attorney
1200 Third Avenue, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101-4100
(619) 533-5800

Juli C. Scott
Chief Assistant City Attorney
275 E. Olive Avenue
Burbank, CA 91510
(818) 238-5707

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Petition for review after the Court of Appeal granted a petition for peremptory writ of mandate. This case includes the following issue: Is information developed as a result of the receipt of information disclosed pursuant to a Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) subject to the same protective order as the information disclosed pursuant to the motion (Evid. Code, ? 1045, subd. (e); see Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033) , or can such derivative information be disclosed to and used by a defendant in a separate criminal proceeding?

Opinion Information

Date:	Citation:	Docket Number:	Category:	Status:
Mon, 11/26/2007	42 Cal.4th 673 original opinion	S143491	Review - Criminal Original (non-H.C.)	closed; remittitur issued

Disposition
Nov 26 2007	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
May 18 2006	Request for publication filed (initial case entry)   Tariq Chamber, petnr. Steven Carroll, counsel/Pub. Defender
Jun 8 2006	Petition for review filed   San Diego Police Department, real party in interest David Storland, dep. city attorney
Jun 12 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   file jacket/two volumes of exhibits
Jun 14 2006	2nd record request   additional records requested.
Jun 15 2006	Received Court of Appeal record   three red envelopes
Aug 2 2006	Time extended to grant or deny review   to and including September 6, 2006, or the date upon which review is either granted or denied.
Aug 16 2006	Petition for review granted (criminal case)   Votes: George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Sep 6 2006	Certification of interested entities or persons filed   counsel for RPI
Sep 13 2006	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for respondent requests extension of time to 10-30-06, to file the opening brief on the merits.
Sep 20 2006	Extension of time granted   Respondent's time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including October 30, 2006.
Oct 30 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed   counsel for Real Party in Interest
Nov 7 2006	Received:   3 Manila envelopes filed under seal.
Nov 28 2006	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for petnr. requests extension of time to 1-15-07 to file the answer brief on the merits.
Dec 11 2006	Extension of time granted   On application fo petitioner and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to and including January 15, 2007.
Jan 11 2007	Request for extension of time filed   Counsel for petitioner requests a second extension of time to February 5, 2007, to file the answer brief on the merits.
Jan 18 2007	Extension of time granted   On application of petitioner and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on merits is extended to and including February 2, 2007.
Feb 2 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed   Tariq Chambers, Petitioner Matthew Braner, Counsel
Feb 22 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)   counsel for resp. (City of San Diego)
Mar 20 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   Los Angeles coutn yPublic Defender in support of petitioner Tariq Chambers Application and Brief under same cover Attorney Albert J. Menaster
Mar 22 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   California Public Defenders Association and the Public Defender of Santa Clara County by Kelley Paul Kulick, counsel
Mar 23 2007	Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief   League of California Cities, in support of RPI, San Diego Police Department. Application and Brief under separate covers.
Mar 27 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Calif. Public Defenders Assoc. and the Public Defender of Santa Clara County in support of petitioner.
Mar 27 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   California Public Defenders Association and the Public Defender of Santa Clara County. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Mar 28 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   The application of Los Angeles County Public Defender for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within twenty days of the filing of the brief.
Mar 28 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   Los Angeles County Public Defender in support of petitioner. by Deputy Public Defender, Mark Harvis.
Apr 6 2007	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   League of Calif. Cities in support of Real Party in Interest.
Apr 6 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed   The application of League of California Cities for permission to file a amicus curiae brief in support of real party in interest is hereby granted. An answer thereto may be served and filed by any party within 20 days of the filing of the brief.
Apr 17 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   counsel for resp. San Diego Police Dept. to a/c brief of Calif. Pub. Defenders Assoc., the Santa Clara Co.Pub. Defender and the L.A. Co. Pub. Defender. *** w/permission ***
Apr 25 2007	Issues ordered limited   The issues to be argued by the parties are limited to the first issue raised in the in the petition for review, which is whether derivative information developed after Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 disclosure in an earlier case is subject to a protective order under Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e) when a later defendant, represented by the same attorney as the first defendant, files a Pitchess motion regarding the same law enforcement officer and obtains the name of the same complainant. (Calif. Rules of Ct., rule 8.516(a)(1).)
Apr 26 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   counsel for (Chambers) to a/c brief of League of Calif. Cities.
Aug 8 2007	Case ordered on calendar   to be argued on Wednesday, September 5, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco
Aug 20 2007	Filed letter from:   counsel for real party in interest San Diego Police Department requesting permission to divide oral argument time, asking to share 10 minutes with amicus curiae League of California Cities.
Aug 21 2007	Order filed   The request of counsel for the real party in interest in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of the real party in interest at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of the real party in interest to allocate to amicus curiae League of California Cities 10 minutes of real party's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Sep 5 2007	Cause argued and submitted
Nov 21 2007	Notice of forthcoming opinion posted
Nov 26 2007	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   Opinion by Corrigan, J. ----joined by George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, & Moreno, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Baxter, J. Concurring Opinion by Moreno, J.
Dec 27 2007	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Jan 4 2008	Received:   receipt for remittitur from CA 4/1

Briefs
Oct 30 2006	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 2 2007	Answer brief on the merits filed
Feb 22 2007	Reply brief filed (case fully briefed)
Mar 27 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Mar 28 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 6 2007	Amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 17 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed
Apr 26 2007	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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