Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library

Filed 1/10/05

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL LEHMAN BURRIS,
Petitioner,
S109746
v.
) Ct.App.
4/3
G028636
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE
COUNTY, )
)
Orange
County
Respondent;
Super. Ct. No. 00SF0340
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.

Does the dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint bar all further prosecution
for the same offense, even a felony charge based on the same conduct? It does
not. Instead, two prior dismissals are required before felony prosecution will be
barred. Because charges against defendant Michael Lehman Burris were
dismissed only once, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s denial of writ relief.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Burris was charged with misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUI) and driving with a blood-alcohol level of at least 0.08 percent.
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b).) The complaint alleged two prior DUI
convictions. Before trial, the prosecutor discovered a third DUI prior. Under
Vehicle Code section 23550, subdivision (a), driving under the influence within
seven years of three or more DUI convictions is a “wobbler” and may be

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prosecuted as a misdemeanor or a felony at the prosecutor’s discretion. (See Pen.
Code, § 17, subd. (b)(4).)1 The prosecutor elected to refile Burris’s case as a
felony and moved to dismiss the misdemeanor complaint. The trial court granted
the motion,2 and the prosecution filed a felony complaint.
Relying on section 1387, Burris moved to dismiss the felony complaint.
The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal denied Burris’s ensuing
petition for a writ of mandate, holding that section 1387 does not bar a subsequent
felony prosecution when the same criminal act was originally charged as a
misdemeanor and was previously dismissed. In so holding, the Court of Appeal
expressly disagreed with People v. Nelson (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 135. We
granted Burris’s petition for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Interpretation of Section 1387
We begin with the text of the statute. (See Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21
Cal.4th 973, 977; People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 775.) Section 1387,
subdivision (a) provides: “An order terminating an action pursuant to this chapter,
or Section 859b, 861, 871, or 995, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense if it is a felony or if it is a misdemeanor charged together with a felony and
the action has been previously terminated pursuant to this chapter, or Section
859b, 861, 871, or 995, or if it is a misdemeanor not charged together with a
felony, except in those felony cases, or those cases where a misdemeanor is
charged with a felony, where subsequent to the dismissal of the felony or

1
All subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The statutory grounds were not specified, but the People concede the court
acted under section 1385.
2

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misdemeanor the judge or magistrate finds any of the following: [circumstances
not relevant here] . . . .” Both parties agree that for purposes of this statute, there
has been one prior termination of charges for the same offense.3
Burris argues that whether a future prosecution is barred hinges on the
character of the earlier dismissal. Under this interpretation of section 1387, the
pronoun “it” in the statutory phrase “is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense if it is a felony” (italics added) refers to the terminated action. Thus, if the
terminated action is, as here, a misdemeanor, section 1387 prohibits a second
prosecution for either a misdemeanor or a felony. If the terminated action is a
felony, a new prosecution will be barred only when there has been an additional
prior dismissal.4 This interpretation is consistent with usage in the second half of
the statute that appears to categorize cases according to the character of the
dismissed charge. (See § 1387, subd. (a) [creating exception for “those felony
cases, or those cases where a misdemeanor is charged with a felony, where

3
The parties agree that the identical criminal act, DUI (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subds. (a), (b)), underlies both the initial misdemeanor charge and the subsequent
felony charge against Burris. The two charged crimes have the same elements:
Vehicle Code section 23152 defines the elements of the substantive offense for
each, while Vehicle Code sections 23546 and 23550 define not elements but
conditions for imposition of sentencing enhancements. (See People v. Coronado
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 152, fn. 5 [Veh. Code, former § 23175, predecessor to Veh.
Code, § 23550, is a sentence enhancement statute, not a substantive offense
statute].) When two crimes have the same elements, they are the same offense for
purposes of Penal Code section 1387. (See Dunn v. Superior Court (1984) 159
Cal.App.3d 1110, 1118 [applying same elements test to determine whether new
charge is same offense as previously dismissed one for purposes of § 1387].)
4
The statute treats a misdemeanor charged with a felony the same as a
felony. (See § 1387, subd. (a).) For clarity’s sake, when we refer to felonies in
this discussion, we include misdemeanors charged with felonies.
3

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subsequent to the dismissal of the felony or misdemeanor” certain findings are
made].)
In contrast, the People contend that whether a future prosecution is barred
under section 1387 hinges on the character of the later charge: one prior
qualifying dismissal5 will bar a later misdemeanor charge, but will not bar a later
felony charge. They argue that under an established canon of construction, the last
antecedent rule (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680), the
pronoun “it” in the phrase “is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if
it is a felony” (italics added) refers to the future “other prosecution for the same
offense.” Thus, according to the People, under section 1387 an order terminating
an action bars a future prosecution for a misdemeanor, but bars a future
prosecution for a felony only when there has been an additional prior dismissal.
We do not find these grammatical arguments dispositive here. The rules of
grammar and canons of construction are but tools, “guides to help courts
determine likely legislative intent. [Citations.] And that intent is critical. Those
who write statutes seek to solve human problems. Fidelity to their aims requires
us to approach an interpretive problem not as if it were a purely logical game, like
a Rubik’s Cube, but as an effort to divine the human intent that underlies the
statute.” (J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred (2001) 534 U.S. 124, 156 (dis.
opn. of Breyer, J.); see Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School
Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 920 [“[T]he rules of statutory construction are merely

5
Not every dismissal qualifies as a dismissal for purposes of section 1387.
The statute spells out various circumstances in which a prior dismissal will be
excused and not count towards a prosecution bar. (See § 1387, subds. (a)-(c).)
Those circumstances are not present here; it is undisputed the dismissal in this
case is a qualifying dismissal.
4

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aids and sometimes can be used to reach opposite results”].) Here, these tools do
not reveal a clear legislative intent. The statute has been amended nine times since
its adoption in 1872, and the resulting 108-word, 13-comma, no period subdivision
is hardly pellucid, as all parties readily concede. The syntax of the statute is such
that “it” could readily refer to either the terminated action or the future
prosecution. Nor does the legislative history behind the statute and its substantive
revisions contain evidence the Legislature chose a particular construction in order
to implement one rule or the other. Consequently, we must consider the human
problems the Legislature sought to address in adopting section 1387—“ ‘the
ostensible objects to be achieved [and] the evils to be remedied.’ ” (Wilcox v.
Birtwhistle, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 977, quoting People v. Woodhead (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1002, 1008.)
Section 1387 implements a series of related public policies. It curtails
prosecutorial harassment by placing limits on the number of times charges may be
refiled. (Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14; People v. Peters
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 749, 758-759 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Superior Court
(Martinez) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 738, 744; Sen. Rules Com., Rep. on Sen. Bill
No. 487 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 8, 1975, p. 1 [“Proponents claim the bill
[amending § 1387 to limit felony refilings] will prevent possible abuses by
prosecutors who dismiss and reinstate felony prosecutions in order to harass
defendants”].) The statute also reduces the possibility that prosecutors might use
the power to dismiss and refile to forum shop. (Landrum v. Superior Court, at
p. 14; People v. Peters, at p. 759 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Carreon (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 804, 808.) Finally, the statute prevents the evasion of speedy trial
rights through the repeated dismissal and refiling of the same charges. (See
People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 206-207; Barker v. Municipal Court
5

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(1966) 64 Cal.2d 806, 811; Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728,
738; Paredes v. Superior Court (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 24, 28.)
The statute’s differential treatment of misdemeanors and felonies reflects a
different set of public policies. On the one hand, society has an interest in the
expeditious resolution of lesser charges. Section 1387 reflects a judgment that
scarce prosecutorial resources should not be expended in multiple attempts to
punish misdemeanor conduct and mere misdemeanants should not be subjected to
serial prosecutions. (See Necochea v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1012,
1016 [noting “clear policy of the law favoring an expeditious resolution of
misdemeanor charges”]; Alex T. v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 24, 31-32
[“In the case of misdemeanors . . . other considerations may reasonably justify
giving the People only one bite at the apple”]; cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 480, fn. 7 [characterizing misdemeanors as “those ‘smaller faults
and omissions of less consequence’ ”].)
On the other hand, there is a heightened societal interest in the prosecution
of more serious crimes. Compared to a misdemeanor violation, “[i]f the offense is
potentially a felony, society has a much greater interest in its punishment . . . .”
(Necochea v. Superior Court, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 4.) As we once
colorfully explained, the Legislature’s differential treatment of misdemeanors and
felonies in section 1387 is justified by the fact that felonies include crimes “so
heinous in character that to [their] frequent and unchecked commission might be
attributed the origin of a possible statewide disaster, or eventually, the downfall of
organized society,” while many misdemeanors “may be insignificant as far as
[their] effect on the body politic is concerned.” (People v. Dawson (1930) 210
Cal. 366, 370; see also Alex T. v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 31.)
Indeed, until 1975, the interest in prosecuting felonies was considered so much
greater that, while a one-dismissal rule applied to misdemeanors, felony charges
6

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could be refiled ad infinitum. (See Stats. 1975, ch. 1069, § 1, p. 2615 [amending
§ 1387 to add felony dismissal limit]; People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614,
623.)
Section 1387 reflects a legislative judgment that because of the heightened
threat to society posed by serious crimes, more filings should be permitted for
serious crimes than for minor ones.6 In turn, the best measure of the seriousness
of a crime—and the corresponding societal interest in its prosecution and
punishment—is not how the crime was originally charged, based on possibly
limited evidence, but how the prosecution currently seeks to charge it, based on
the most current and best available evidence. It follows that, for purposes of
categorizing a crime as subject to a one-dismissal or two-dismissal rule, what
matters is the current charge, not the one previously dismissed. The interpretation
of section 1387 that most closely comports with these underlying legislative goals
is this: Misdemeanor prosecutions are subject to a one-dismissal rule; one
previous dismissal of a charge for the same offense will bar a new misdemeanor
charge. Felony prosecutions, in contrast, are subject to a two-dismissal rule; two
previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a new felony charge.
We note that because what matters is the nature of the current charge, the
nature of any prior charges is immaterial to application of these dismissal rules.
Thus, either a misdemeanor or a felony dismissal will bar a subsequent

6
As further proof of this intent, while two filings are allowed for most
felonies, section 1387.1 carves out the most serious category of felonies, violent
felonies, and allows a third filing for these crimes under certain circumstances.
7

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misdemeanor charge, while either two felony dismissals or one misdemeanor and
one felony dismissal7 will bar a subsequent felony charge.
The consequences of this interpretation are consistent with the Legislature’s
purposes. (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [“Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the
consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation”].) When new
evidence comes to light that suggests a crime originally charged as a misdemeanor
is in fact graver and should be charged as a felony, section 1387 allows the People
to do so. “Often the district attorney doesn’t have enough information to make a
firm election before filing the complaint or in the prosecution’s early stage. New
knowledge may reveal that mitigation of the charge [to a misdemeanor] was a
regrettable choice.” (Malone v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 313, 317.)
To hold, as Burris argues, that a single misdemeanor filing and dismissal could
preclude subsequent felony prosecution, even when new evidence demonstrates
that the crime committed was a felony, would be inconsistent with the
Legislature’s intent to permit more dismissals for serious crimes.
On the other hand, as the People concede, our interpretation of section 1387
also dictates that a qualifying dismissal of a felony charge will bar the refiling of a
misdemeanor charge. But nothing about this more lenient treatment of true
misdemeanants is fundamentally inconsistent with the Legislature’s goals in
enacting section 1387.
To illustrate these points, consider the cases of two individuals charged
with misdemeanors. Each has previously been charged, one for a misdemeanor

7
Or, for that matter, two misdemeanor dismissals, in those rare cases where
a section 1387 exception would permit successive misdemeanor prosecutions.
(See § 1387, subd. (b).)
8

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and one for a felony, but had those initial charges dismissed. The societal interest
in prosecution, given the current understanding of their respective crimes, is the
same. The countervailing interests in avoiding harassment, delay, and forum
shopping recognized by the Legislature in section 1387 also are the same—each
defendant potentially is facing a second prosecution. Thus, the treatment of these
two defendants should be the same. The interpretation we adopt treats these cases
identically: in each, the further prosecution is barred. The interpretation pressed
by Burris would allow reprosecution of one defendant, but not the other, despite
the fact the legislative policy considerations in each case are indistinguishable.
Consider the corresponding cases of two individuals charged with felonies.
Each has previously been charged, one for a misdemeanor and one for a felony,
but had those initial charges dismissed. As before, the societal interest in
prosecution, given the current understanding of their respective crimes, is the
same. As before, the countervailing interests in avoiding harassment, delay, and
forum shopping recognized by the Legislature in section 1387 also are the same—
each defendant potentially is facing a second prosecution. Thus, the treatment of
these two defendants should be the same. Once again, the interpretation we adopt
treats these cases identically: in each, the further prosecution is permitted. Once
again, the interpretation pressed by Burris would allow reprosecution of one
individual, but not the other, despite the fact the legislative policy considerations
in each case are indistinguishable.
Our interpretation of section 1387 is consistent with the results we have
reached when applying earlier versions of the statute. In People v. Smith (1904)
143 Cal. 597, we applied the original version of section 1387, which imposed a
one-dismissal rule for misdemeanors but allowed for unlimited refiling of
9

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felonies.8 The defendant, Smith, was charged with petit larceny, a misdemeanor.
New evidence revealed that Smith had previously been convicted of burglary, a
prior conviction that elevated the petit larceny to a felony. The prosecution
obtained an order dismissing the misdemeanor complaint and refiled felony
charges. (People v. Smith, at pp. 598-599.)
On appeal following Smith’s conviction, we rejected the notion that former
section 1387 would bar refiling in these circumstances. We held that the judgment
of dismissal was not a bar to subsequent felony prosecution because the offense, as
presently charged, was a felony. (People v. Smith, supra, 143 Cal. at pp. 598-
599.) We concluded: “It was never intended that [a misdemeanor] dismissal
should be a bar to a prosecution for a felony.” (Id. at p. 599.) That conclusion
remains sound today.
Seventy years later, in Leaming v. Municipal Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 813,
the defendant raised a speedy trial claim when, after repeated continuances of his
misdemeanor trial, on the date of trial the misdemeanor complaint against him was
abandoned and he was arraigned on felony charges. After summarily rejecting the
defendant’s speedy trial claim on the ground he had requested the continuances,
we noted as well that the defendant could not complain about the new felony
charges because “[d]ismissal of a misdemeanor complaint does not bar a felony
prosecution.” (Id. at p. 818, fn. 3, citing former § 1387.)
The holdings of People v. Smith, supra, 143 Cal. 597, and Leaming v.
Municipal Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 813, are consistent with the interpretation we
reach today. So too are those few Court of Appeal decisions to have considered

8
In 1904, former section 1387 provided: “[A]n order for the dismissal of the
action as provided in this chapter is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense, if it is a misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony.”
10

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the statute in the context of misdemeanor-to-felony prosecutions. (Malone v.
Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at p. 317; Necochea v. Superior Court,
supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016; People v. Mitman (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 490,
494; People v. Brown (1919) 42 Cal.App. 462, 464-465.)
Burris and amicus curiae the Los Angeles County Public Defender rely on
one Court of Appeal decision, People v. Nelson, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d 135
(Nelson), that reached the opposite conclusion in the context of a felony-to-
misdemeanor prosecution. The defendant was charged with felony manslaughter
and felony drunk driving. (Pen. Code, former § 192, subd. 3(a); Veh. Code,
former § 23101.) These charges were dismissed twice, and charges for
misdemeanor manslaughter and misdemeanor drunk driving were filed. (Pen.
Code, former § 192, subd. 3(b); Veh. Code, former § 23102.) The defendant
challenged the new charges under Penal Code former section 1387.9 The Nelson
court rejected the challenge, concluding: “The words ‘if it is a misdemeanor’ refer
to the complaint which was dismissed, not to the new complaint which was filed.”
(Nelson, at p. 137.) Thus, Nelson allowed felony charges to be followed by
misdemeanor charges.
Nelson offered no explicit explanation for its interpretation. As best one
can discern, the court viewed the syntax of section 1387 as dictating its result. But
as we have discussed, the syntax of the statute offers no clear answer, while the
legislative policies underlying the statute point to a conclusion opposite the one
reached by Nelson. To the extent People v. Nelson, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d 135,

9
In 1964, former section 1387 provided: “An order for the dismissal of the
action, made as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the
same offense if it is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony.” (Stats. 1951, ch.
1674, § 142, p. 3857.)
11

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holds that the determination of which dismissal rule to apply hinges on the nature
of the dismissed charge, rather than the new charge, we disapprove it.
II. Retroactive Application
Burris argues that even if we interpret section 1387 to allow prosecution of
a felony after dismissal of a misdemeanor, under the rule of lenity he should be
shielded from the application of that ruling and have the Nelson interpretation of
the statute applied to his case. We disagree.
The rule of lenity, under which “ambiguous penal statutes are construed in
favor of defendants[,] is inapplicable unless two reasonable interpretations of the
same provision stand in relative equipoise, i.e., that resolution of the statute’s
ambiguities in a convincing manner is impracticable.” (People v. Jones (1988) 46
Cal.3d 585, 599; see also People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 627.) The rule
does not automatically grant a defendant “the benefit of the most restrictive
interpretation given any statute by any court” when there is a split of authority.
(People v. Spurlock (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132.) Neither does it require a
statutory interpretation in a defendant’s favor when, as here, a court “can fairly
discern a contrary legislative intent.” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.)
Nor does the rule of lenity apply when, as here, an interpretive issue poses a
“Whose ox is gored?” problem. However we construe section 1387, one class of
defendants will benefit and another will be burdened. Section 1387 shields either
defendants charged first with a misdemeanor and then a felony, or those charged
first with a felony and then a misdemeanor, but not both groups. The legislative
intent underlying the statute is more consistent with protection of the latter group.
Finally, the rule of lenity does not bar application of a statutory
interpretation reached in a given case to the defendant in that case. The rule is one
of construction, not one governing retroactivity. Our retroactivity rules dictate
that this decision be applied to Burris. “The general rule that judicial decisions are
12

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given retroactive effect is basic in our legal tradition.” (Newman v. Emerson
Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973, 978.) This general rule extends fully to
decisions such as this that resolve Court of Appeal conflicts or establish the
meaning of a statutory enactment. (See Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3
Cal.4th 758, 794; People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 549; Donaldson v.
Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 36-37.) Our decision neither overrules
controlling authority or a uniform body of law that might be justifiably relied on,
nor judicially enlarges a criminal statute in an unforeseeable manner (see People v.
Billa (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1064, 1073; People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91-
92); thus, our interpretation of section 1387 applies to Burris.
Burris has been charged with a felony. (See Veh. Code, § 23550, subd.
(a).) He has had charges for the same offense dismissed once before. Because
felony charges are subject to a two-dismissal rule, Penal Code section 1387 does
not bar the instant charges.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

13

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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Burris v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted

XXX 100 Cal.App.4th 1006
Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No.

S109746
Date Filed: January 10, 2004
__________________________________________________________________________________

Court:

Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Gail Andrea Andler

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Appellant:

Law Offices of Marlin G. Stapleton, Jr., Marlin G. Stapleton, Jr.; Law Offices of Robert M. Dykes and
Robert M. Dykes for Petitioner.

Carl C. Holmes, Public Defender (Orange), Deborah A. Kwast, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Kevin J.
Phillips and Lee Blumen, Deputy Public Defenders, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender (Los Angeles) and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defender, as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys for Respondent:

No appearance for Respondent.

Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Brian N. Gurwitz, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in
Interest.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons,
Assistant Attorney General, Patti W. Ranger and Lise Jacobson, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

14

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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Marlin G. Stapleton, Jr.
Law Offices of Marlin G. Stapleton, Jr.
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 114
Tustin, CA 92780
(714) 832-8003

Law Offices of Robert M. Dykes
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 114
Tustin, CA 92780
(714) 430-0034

Brian N. Gurwitz
Deputy District Attorney
401 Civic Center Drive West
Santa Ana, CA 92701
(714) 347-8790

15

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Opinion Information

Date:	Docket Number:
Mon, 01/10/2005	S109746

Disposition
Jan 10 2005	Opinion: Affirmed

Dockets
Sep 6 2002	Petition for review filed   counsel for petitioner
Sep 10 2002	Record requested
Sep 12 2002	Received Court of Appeal record   yellow plastic file
Oct 16 2002	Petition for Review Granted (criminal case)   Votes: George C.J., Kennard, Werdegar & Chin JJ.
Nov 12 2002	Request for extension of time filed   petitioner Michael Lehman Burris
Nov 14 2002	Received:   (fax copy) declaration of counsel for petitioner in support of request for extension - per the courts request . 11/19/02 hard copy received. Petitioner asking to Jan. 14, 2003 to file opening brief on the merits.
Nov 19 2002	Extension of time granted   On application of petitioner and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the opening brief on the merits is extended to and including Jan. 14, 2003.
Jan 14 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed   petitioner Michael Lehman Burris
Feb 14 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed   by counsel for RPI (The People). (timely filed per rule 40k)
Mar 10 2003	Received application to file amicus curiae brief; with brief   Los Angeles County Public Defender
Mar 17 2003	Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted   Los Angeles County Public Defender
Mar 17 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:   The application of the Los Angeles County Public Defender for permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner is hereby granted. Answer due by any party within 20 days.
Apr 1 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed   by counsel for real party in interest. Answer to amicus brief filed by Los Angeles Public Defender.
Oct 4 2004	Case ordered on calendar   11/4/04 @ 1:30pm, Sacramento
Oct 13 2004	Filed:   Request of petitioner to divide oral argument time.
Oct 26 2004	Filed:   The request of petitioner to allocate to Marlin G. Stapleton 20 minutes of petitioner's 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted.
Oct 26 2004	Filed:   The request of counsel for petitioner to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of petitioner at oral argument is hereby granted.
Nov 4 2004	Cause argued and submitted
Jan 10 2005	Opinion filed: Judgment affirmed in full   CA judgment affirmed & remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Majority Opinion by Werdegar, J. joined by George C.J., Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Brown & Moreno, JJ.
Feb 14 2005	Remittitur issued (criminal case)
Feb 25 2005	Received:   Receipt for remittitur from CA4/3

Briefs
Jan 14 2003	Opening brief on the merits filed
Feb 14 2003	Answer brief on the merits filed
Mar 17 2003	Amicus Curiae Brief filed by:
Apr 1 2003	Response to amicus curiae brief filed

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