IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MARC ANGELUCCI et al.,
Plaintiffs
and
Appellants,
S136154
v.
Ct.App. 2/5 B173281
CENTURY SUPPER CLUB,
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Respondent
Super. Ct. No. BC278640
We granted review in the present case to determine whether, in order to
state a claim under Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a), the relevant remedial
provision of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq; also hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the Act), plaintiffs must demonstrate that they
affirmatively requested nondiscriminatory treatment and were refused.1
As we shall explain, we conclude that the text of the Act does not support
defendant’s and the Court of Appeal’s assertion that, in order to recover under the
Act, plaintiffs who are discriminated against when they present themselves at a
business establishment and pay the price of admission also must demand equal
treatment and be refused. Nor do we believe it would be consistent with the policy
of the Act, or with our case law, to read such a requirement into the language of
the Act. Accordingly, the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal is reversed.
1
Statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
1
I
Plaintiffs Marc Angelucci, Edgar Pacas, Elton Campbell, and Jeff Kent
filed a complaint against Century Supper Club (the club) for violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995 (§ 51.6).2 The
complaint alleged that plaintiffs patronized the club on several occasions in June
and July 2002, and were charged an admission fee higher than that charged to
women. Specifically, the complaint alleged that two of the plaintiffs were charged
$20 for admission on June 14, 2002, although the admission fee for women was
$15, that they again were charged $20 for admission two days later, although
women were admitted free, and that the other plaintiffs patronized the club on
several occasions and experienced similar treatment. Plaintiffs alleged they were
charged higher prices because they are men.3 They sought statutory damages
under section 52, subdivision (a) (section 52(a)), the relevant portion of the
remedy provision of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the related Gender Tax
Repeal Act.
The club moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs could
not recover under section 52(a) for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the
Gender Tax Repeal Act, because they had not alleged they had asked the club to
be charged at the same rate as female patrons.4 Defendant claimed that without
2
This statement of facts is based upon the recital contained in the Court of
Appeal’s opinion.
3
According to the Court of Appeal, shortly after filing the above complaint,
plaintiff Campbell sued the club and other establishments in another case. In that
case Campbell alleged that he went to the club on July 20, paid $20 admission
though women were admitted free, and was subjected to a search of his person
although women were not searched. The two cases were consolidated.
4
For the purposes of the motion, the parties agreed that plaintiffs had not
asked to be admitted at the rate charged to female patrons.
2
having made such requests, plaintiffs could not prevail. The trial court agreed
with defendant and entered judgment in its favor.
Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section
52(a) provides a remedy only to those plaintiffs who request nondiscriminatory
treatment and are refused. The appellate court relied principally upon language in
this court’s decision in Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 (Koire) and
characterized that case as “holding that there must be an affirmative assertion of
the right to equal treatment . . . based on the fact that there cannot be a
discrimination or a denial of services unless services are requested. The principle
is consistent with long-standing California law . . . which holds that a plaintiff
cannot sue for discrimination in the abstract, but must actually suffer the
discriminatory conduct.” The Court of Appeal added that the requirement that the
plaintiff demand equal treatment “ensures that the statutes will be used to redress
genuine grievances and to punish genuine misconduct, not by those who seek to
exploit the law for financial gain,” citing Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1999) 73
Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 (Reese). The Court of Appeal concluded that its analysis
would apply equally to plaintiffs’ claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the
Gender Tax Repeal Act, observing that the parties had not separately addressed
the Gender Tax Repeal Act.5
5
The parties do not dispute the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that
private actions for violations of section 51.6, the Gender Tax Repeal Act, are
governed by the same provision, section 52(a), that applies to Unruh Civil Rights
Act violations, and that plaintiffs’ claim under the Gender Tax Repeal Act is
subject to the same analysis and outcome with respect to the issues of notice and
injury. Thus we do not separately consider the latter act. Defendant asserts,
however, that the Gender Tax Repeal Act does not apply in the first instance to
plaintiffs’ claim, because defendant’s conduct did not involve the provision of
“services.” The record does not reflect that defendants raised this issue in the
(footnote continued on following page)
3
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review.
II
A
In an appeal from a motion granting judgment on the pleadings, we accept
as true the facts alleged in the complaint and review the legal issues de novo. “A
motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, tests the allegations
of the complaint or cross-complaint, supplemented by any matter of which the trial
court takes judicial notice, to determine whether plaintiff or cross-complainant has
stated a cause of action. [Citation.] Because the trial court’s determination is
made as a matter of law, we review the ruling de novo, assuming the truth of all
material facts properly pled.” (Leko v. Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Service
(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.)
B
In pertinent part, the Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction
of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual
orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever.” (§ 51, subd. (b).)
The Act includes an enforcement provision that authorizes individual
actions. Section 52(a) provides that “[w]hoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or
makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6 [the
(footnote continued from preceding page)
Court of Appeal, and that court did not reach the issue. Accordingly, we decline
to reach it.
4
Gender Tax Repeal Act], is liable for each and every offense for the actual
damages, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting
without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but
in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any attorney’s fees that
may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied
the rights provided in Section 51, 51.5, or 51.6.”6
As we have declared in past cases, the Act must be construed liberally in
order to carry out its purpose. (Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 28.) The Act
expresses a state and national policy against discrimination on arbitrary grounds.
(Burks v. Poppy Construction. Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 471.) Its provisions
were intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a
nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by
“banishing” or “eradicating” arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such
establishments. (Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72,
75-76 (Isbister) [referring to a legislative desire to “ ‘banish such [discriminatory]
practices from California’s community life’ ”]; Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 36
[observing that the purpose expressed by the Act and other enactments is the
“eradication” of discrimination based upon sex]; In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205,
6
Section 51.6 states in pertinent part that “[n]o business establishment of any
kind whatsoever may discriminate, with respect to the price charged for services
of similar or like kind, against a person because of the person’s gender.” (§ 51.6,
subd. (b).) In a provision inapplicable to the present case, the statute imposes
upon certain businesses a duty to disclose prices and post a notice confirming that
prices must not be discriminatory. (§ 51.6, subd. (f).) Failure to comply with the
disclosure duty subjects the enumerated business to a $1,000 civil penalty if the
business “fails to correct a violation of this subdivision within 30 days of receiving
written notice of the violation . . . .” (§ 51.6, subd. (f)(5).) In all other respects,
“the remedies for a violation of [section 51.6] are the remedies provided in
subdivision (a) of Section 52.” (§ 51.6, subd. (d).)
5
212 [speaking of a patent legislative purpose to “interdict” the arbitrary
discrimination targeted by the Act].)
The Act stands as a bulwark protecting each person’s inherent right to “full
and equal” access to “all business establishments.” (§ 51, subd. (b); Isbister,
supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 75.) The Act, like the common law principles upon which it
was partially based, imposes a compulsory duty upon business establishments to
serve all persons without arbitrary discrimination. (Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 738; see also Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 594, 607-608.) The Act serves as a preventive measure, without
which it is recognized that businesses might fall into discriminatory practices.
(Isbister, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 75.)
C
In interpreting a statute, we first consider its words, giving them their
ordinary meaning and construing them in a manner consistent with their context
and the apparent purpose of the legislation. (Fitch v. Select Products Co. (2005)
36 Cal.4th 812, 818.)
As can be seen from the statutory language quoted above, the Act does not
contain express language requiring that before a legal action may be filed, the
victim of the asserted discrimination must have demanded equal treatment and
have been refused. Unlike some other remedy statutes, the Act, and specifically
section 52(a), does not establish as a condition of instituting a lawsuit that the
defendant have been given notice and an opportunity to correct the asserted
violation. (Compare § 51.6, subd. (f)(5) [under the Gender Tax Repeal Act, a 30-
day notice is required prior to filing suit premised upon the failure of a business
establishment of a specified type to post notice of its prices and of its
nondiscriminatory pricing policy]; see also § 1782, subd. (a) [specifically
requiring that one seeking damages for unfair or deceptive practices under the
6
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (§ 1750 et seq.) notify the person responsible for
the violation and demand rectification 30 days prior to filing suit]; Health & Saf.
Code, § 25249.7, subd. (d)(1) [requiring that private persons seeking damages for
violation of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Health & Saf.
Code, § 25249.5 et seq.) provide notice to certain public entities and the alleged
violator 60 days prior to filing suit].)
According to the Court of Appeal, however, plaintiffs were not “denied”
their rights within the meaning of the Act, because they did not suffer refusal of an
express demand that defendant accord them equal treatment. The Court of Appeal
pointed to statutory language it believed supported its conclusion. Section 52(a)
provides for a civil action against “[w]hoever denies, aids or incites a denial, or
makes any discrimination or distinction contrary to” the Unruh Civil Rights Act
(or the Gender Tax Repeal Act). According to the appellate court, “there cannot
be a discrimination or denial of services unless services are requested.” In
essence, the Court of Appeal posited that the word “denies” as used in section
52(a) connotes only a responsive measure — a business establishment’s response
to a demand for equal accommodation.
This linguistic argument is unpersuasive. Dictionaries define the term
“deny” as commonly meaning to “withhold” (Ballentine’s Law Dict. (3d ed. 1969)
p. 334) or to “deprive.” (Garner’s Dict. of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed. 1995) p.
265 [complaining that, although this usage is common, it is inaccurate].) We note
that the federal Constitution uses the term “deny” in the equal protection clause
and other provisions, but we are unaware of any authority supporting the startling
proposition that a right acknowledged by these provisions is not “denied” if the
victim is a passive sufferer of discrimination rather than a person who expressly
demands his or her rights and is refused. (See U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [“nor
shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
7
the laws”]; see also id., 15th Amend. [“The right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude”]; id., 19th Amend. [“The right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be denied
or abridged . . . on account of sex”]; id., 26th Amend. [“The right of citizens . . .
who are eighteen years of age or older . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged
. . . on account of age”].) And the language of section 52(a) permitting a private
action against any business establishment that “makes any discrimination or
distinction” in violation of the Act, contains no implication whatsoever that a
business establishment violates the Act only if it refuses an express demand for
equal treatment.
The interpretation offered by the Court of Appeal and endorsed by
defendant also would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to “eradicate” or
“eliminate” arbitrary, invidious discrimination in places of public accommodation.
As we have explained, the Act imposes a duty upon business establishments to
refrain from arbitrary discrimination. If businesses are held not to violate the Act
or inflict injury unless they are challenged by a patron, their ordinary practice may
revert to discrimination, with special exceptions being made for individuals who
happen to challenge the practice. Contrary to the purpose of the Act to eradicate
discrimination, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation leaves business establishments
free to advertise and provide gender-based discounts and, presumably, to engage
in other forms of discrimination that violate the Act, so long as these
establishments agree to provide equal treatment to those customers knowledgeable
and assertive enough to demand it.
It is instructive to consider early examples of unequal treatment on the basis
of race that we found to constitute violations of the Act’s predecessor civil rights
statutes. In these cases, instances of racial segregation in the provision of
accommodations were held to violate California’s antidiscrimination laws.
8
Violations occurred when African-American ticket holders were admitted to a
movie theater or racetrack clubhouse or gained access to a soda fountain, but,
because of their race, were restricted to a segregated or otherwise substandard
area. (See Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 283, 287; Hutson
v. The Owl Drug Co. (1926) 79 Cal.App. 390, 392; Jones v. Kehrlein (1920) 49
Cal.App. 646, 651.) It would be absurd to conclude that such civil rights act
violations occurred only where the African-American patrons expressly demanded
that their treatment be equivalent to that accorded the White patrons in those
situations. Actionable discrimination obviously occurred in these early cases —
and such conduct would constitute discrimination under the current Act.
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation also would leave without redress those
persons who discover only after the fact that they have suffered discrimination in
violation of the Act. For example, an African-American family seeking to
purchase a home may not realize that the real estate agency they employed has
discriminated against them on the basis of race by failing to disclose to them
eligible homes in a White-majority neighborhood until after the agency has
concluded its services. At that point a demand for equal treatment and a refusal on
the part of the agency would be pointless. Also denied redress under the foregoing
interpretation would be persons discriminated against on an occasion when there
was no one present to receive and answer a demand for equal treatment (for
example, persons encountering, as they did in past decades, racially segregated
drinking fountains or restroom facilities at an unattended structure).
D
In support of its argument that relief under section 52(a) is limited to
persons who demand equal treatment and are refused, defendant relies upon
certain early decisions that also formed the basis for the Court of Appeal’s
holding. These decisions are of no assistance to defendant. They arose in the
9
context of a business establishment’s asserted discriminatory exclusion of patrons
and stand at most for the proposition that persons who were not patrons of a
business establishment or who did not present themselves for service or access as
a patron and tender the price of admission did not adequately allege injury under
the predecessor to the Act.
In Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses (1948) 32 Cal.2d 833, the
plaintiff alleged that he waited in line to purchase a ticket to the Rose Bowl
football game but was unable to obtain one, because fewer tickets were available
for sale than had been promised. The plaintiff sought to bring an action on behalf
of all persons who stood in line for tickets but were unable to purchase them
because of the shortfall. This court concluded the case was not actionable as a
representative suit because the question, as to each individual plaintiff, was
whether he or she presented himself or herself, demanded admittance to the game,
and tendered the price of a ticket. (Id. at p. 838.) Thus the issue in Weaver was
whether the plaintiff, who properly had presented himself, sought admittance, and
tendered the price of the ticket, could represent a class of persons who may not
have done so. By contrast, in the present case, each plaintiff presented himself for
admittance, paid the price of admission, and entered the establishment. (See also
Bartlett v. Hawaiian Village, Inc. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 435, 438-439 & fn. 6
[denying class certification in litigation under the Act because individual issues
would predominate — issues such as whether each individual presented himself or
herself for admission at the defendant nightclub].)
In Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 340, the plaintiff
was ejected from a racetrack and was told he would not be admitted in the future.
He sued under a predecessor to the Act, seeking damages for his nonadmission on
each day the track was open, claiming he was entitled to damages for the days he
did not seek admission. The court rejected his claim for damages for days on
10
which he had not presented himself for admission and tendered the price of a
ticket, commenting that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff under the Act
until the plaintiff tendered either an admission ticket or the price of admission.
(Id. at pp. 342-343.) By contrast, again, in the present case plaintiffs did present
themselves for admission and paid the price charged by defendant. It cannot be
said that defendant had no duty to refrain from discriminating under these
circumstances.
Defendant also claims its interpretation of the Act is consistent with
Crowell v. Issacs (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 755 (Crowell) and Hales v. Ojai Valley
Inn & Country Club (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 25 (Hales). In Crowell, plaintiffs,
White persons, filed suit against their real estate agent, under the predecessor to
the Act, for failing to seek out qualified African-American purchasers for their
home. The court held that the agent’s mere failure to seek out African-American
purchasers did not constitute discrimination against the plaintiff sellers. The court
also observed that circumstances might exist in which “mere quiescent inaction”
could constitute discrimination, providing the example of an agent’s failure to
show a home to African-American potential purchasers who contact the agent
seeking a purchase in the style and price range of the home. (Crowell, at p. 757.)
From this example of a situation not actually presented by the Crowell case,
defendant derives the rule that the plaintiffs must “seek the very rights or access he
or she claims was denied.” But plaintiffs did seek access to defendant’s club.
They do not accuse defendant in the present case of mere inaction, and the
Crowell decision does not support defendant’s view that a plaintiff must demand
expressly that his or her rights be honored. The court’s example in Crowell of
potentially actionable conduct posited African-American purchasers who desired a
certain type of home, but did not suggest such purchasers would be required to
demand that they be shown homes on the same basis as White potential
11
purchasers. In addition, the court announced in Crowell that the more significant
ground for its decision was that the reason the plaintiffs were not entitled to a
remedy was that it was not they who had been denied the rights guaranteed by the
civil rights act, and that they did not purport to sue as representatives of other
aggrieved persons. (Crowell, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 757.) The White sellers
in Crowell were not the victims of any discrimination against African-American
persons, whereas in the present case plaintiffs were the persons who were
disadvantaged by defendant’s discriminatory pricing.
Defendant’s citation to Hales, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d 25, is equally
unhelpful. There the court determined that the plaintiff could state a claim under
the Act by alleging that when he entered a restaurant seeking food and drink, he
was told he could not be served unless he wore a tie, but that at the same time the
restaurant permitted female patrons to be served in less formal attire. Nothing in
the decision indicates that the plaintiff demanded that he receive the same
treatment as female patrons, nor does the decision in any way establish such a
requirement. (73 Cal.App.3d at pp. 28, 30.)7
7
Defendant claims “other states that have judicially abolished discounts for
women have similarly decreed that it is the failure to give an advertised discount
to men that is improper, not merely the offer of a ‘Ladies’ Day’ discount or
preference.” The authorities cited in support do not assist defendant. In Ladd v.
Iowa West Racing Association. (Iowa 1989) 438 N.W.2d 600, 602, the court
actually declared that the promotional campaign itself “was clearly violative of the
statute” because of the advantage given to women. Peppin v. Woodside
Delicatessen (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1986) 506 A.2d 263 similarly does not support
defendant’s position. On the contrary, that case involved a challenge to the
practice of a business establishment. The court affirmed an administrative
agency’s determination that the defendant’s promotional campaign offering
discounts for persons wearing skirts constituted a discriminatory practice, because
the “overwhelming majority of discount recipients” were female and the evidence
demonstrated that the defendant’s practice of requiring patrons to wear a skirt in
(footnote continued on following page)
12
According to the Court of Appeal, the requirement that a plaintiff request
equal treatment and suffer denial “ensures that the statutes will be used to redress
genuine grievances and to punish genuine misconduct, not [to assist] those who
seek to exploit the law for financial gain.” In support of this conclusion, the Court
of Appeal cited Reese, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 1225.
In Reese, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 1225, the plaintiff filed a motion for class
certification in an action alleging violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the
Gender Tax Repeal Act, based upon Wal-Mart’s practice of offering a “Ladies’
Day” discount at facilities that offered automotive oil changes. Wal-Mart moved
for summary judgment in the underlying action on the ground that the plaintiff
deliberately had refrained from requesting to receive the discount, but the trial
court denied the motion for summary judgment (Reese at p. 1232), and the issue
was not reached on appeal. Rather, the issue on appeal was the propriety of the
trial court’s order denying the plaintiff’s motion to certify the class. The Court of
Appeal held that the trial court appropriately determined the plaintiff had not
demonstrated that substantial benefits would accrue to the litigants or the courts
from class treatment. The trial court appropriately could doubt that class
certification was necessary to avoid multiple lawsuits. A multiplicity of claims
was unlikely, because no other aggrieved party had brought suit over the years the
discount had been offered and the plaintiff himself had generated his own injury
by patronizing Wal-Mart for the purpose of being denied the “Ladies’ Day”
discount. Stating it would not express an opinion on the propriety of the plaintiff’s
(footnote continued from preceding page)
order to receive the discount was intended to and did have the same effect as a
“Ladies’ Night.” (Id. at p. 266.)
13
substantive claim, the Court of Appeal concluded “the trial court could reasonably
conclude that it would likely not have to adjudicate a multiplicity of actions if the
class was not certified.” (Id. at p. 1236.)
As our description of the case makes plain, the decision in Reese did not
suggest that a plaintiff must demand equal treatment and be refused in order to be
able to state a claim under the Act. Moreover, the court’s discussion in Reese
demonstrates that the safeguard proposed by the Court of Appeal in the present
case might not meet its salutary goal. As the court in Reese pointed out, the
plaintiff in that case consulted his lawyer for the purpose of finding a lawsuit, and
only subsequently presented himself to Wal-Mart for service on “Ladies’ Day.”
(Reese, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236 [“Whereas most litigants consult with a
lawyer after an injury to seek judicial redress, this client went to his lawyer to seek
an injury for which he could claim judicial redress”].) It is precisely such a well-
instructed professional plaintiff, in contrast to the untutored victim of
discrimination, who would possess the information necessary to enable him or her
to comply with the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that plaintiffs be required to
demand equal treatment and secure a refusal.
E
According to the Court of Appeal, under the circumstances alleged in the
complaint, plaintiffs did not suffer an injury. But our decision in Koire, supra, 40
Cal.3d 24, held that a business establishment’s policy of affording price discounts
to female patrons purely on the basis of gender ordinarily constitutes unlawful
discrimination against male patrons within the meaning of the Act, and we
concluded the plaintiffs in that case were injured within the meaning of the Act
14
when they presented themselves for admission and were charged the
nondiscounted price.8
In Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d 24, the plaintiff, a male, alleged that he had
visited several car wash establishments on “Ladies’ Day” and requested services at
the discounted rate offered to female customers. The businesses refused. The
plaintiff also alleged that he visited bars that offered discounted admission prices
to female patrons and that on one occasion, he visited a bar and asked for the free
admission that was being accorded to female patrons, but was refused. The trial
court granted judgment in favor of the defendant business owners after trial on the
plaintiff’s Unruh Civil Rights Act claims, concluding that the discounts did not
violate the Act.
This court reversed the judgment rendered in favor of the defendants. We
concluded that the language of the statute encompasses not solely access to
business establishments, but also treatment of patrons. We also set forth the
examples noted above of cases in which courts identified racial segregation within
theaters and eating establishments as violative of the predecessor to the Act. Our
opinion concluded: “The Act’s proscription is broad enough to include within its
scope discrimination in the form of sex-based price discounts.” (Koire, supra, 40
Cal.3d at p. 30.)
We rejected the defendants’ claim that gender-based price discounts do not
constitute arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of the Act. Acknowledging
the existence of circumstances in which either the patron’s conduct or the nature
of the business establishment might warrant an exception to the Act (Koire, supra,
8
Amicus curiae for defendant, Pacific Legal Foundation, has asked us to
reconsider our conclusion in Koire. However, that issue is not within the scope of
review and, accordingly, is not properly before us.
15
40 Cal.3d at pp. 31-32), we declined to extend such exceptions to gender-based
price discounts of the type challenged in the case. (Id. at pp. 32-33.)
In response to the Koire defendants’ claim that their gender-based price
discounts did not injure either men or women and, specifically, did not injure the
plaintiff, we commented that the Act renders “arbitrary sex discrimination by
businesses . . . per se injurious.” (Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 33.) As we stated,
“Section 51 provides that all patrons are entitled to equal treatment. Section 52
provides for minimum statutory damages . . . for every violation of section 51,
regardless of the plaintiff’s actual damages.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, we explained, the plaintiff suffered actual damage. Referring to
circumstances that also occurred in the present case, we observed: “The plaintiff
was adversely affected by the price discount. His female peers were admitted to
the bar free, while he had to pay. On the days he visited the car washes, he had to
pay more than any woman customer, based solely on his sex.” (Koire, supra, 40
Cal.3d at p. 34, fn. omitted.)
Finally, we predicted that our holding would not put an end to proper,
nondiscriminatory promotional price discounts, and we described policies
permitting, for example, discounts based upon age for children or older persons.
(Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 36-38 [“the fact that sex-based discounts are not
permissible does not have an impact on the validity of age-based discounts”]; see
also Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1175.) We
also acknowledged there might be public policies warranting differential treatment
of male and female patrons under some circumstances, but “[t]he plain language of
the Unruh Act mandates equal provision of advantages, privileges and services in
business establishments of this state. Absent a compelling social policy
supporting sex-based price differentials, such discounts violate the Act.” (Koire,
supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 38.)
16
In sum, Koire interpreted the Act as broadly condemning any business
establishment’s policy of gender-based price discounts. Further, Koire determined
that injury occurs when the discriminatory policy is applied to the plaintiff — that
is, at the time the plaintiff patronizes the business establishment, tendering the
nondiscounted price of admission.
Even in light of the Koire decision’s broad definition of injury, of course, a
plaintiff must have standing to bring an action under the Act. We do not dispute
the Court of Appeal’s admonition that “a plaintiff cannot sue for discrimination in
the abstract, but must actually suffer the discriminatory conduct.”
In general terms, in order to have standing, the plaintiff must be able to
allege injury ⎯ that is, some “invasion of the plaintiff’s legally protected
interests.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 862, p. 320; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 367 [“Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute”].)
Standing rules for actions based upon statute may vary according to the
intent of the Legislature and the purpose of the enactment. (Midpeninsula Citizens
for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1385; see
also Librers v. Black (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 114, 124.) In essence, an individual
plaintiff has standing under the Act if he or she has been the victim of the
defendant’s discriminatory act. (Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v.
Westwood Investors, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1383, 1386 [standing under the
Act extends to persons “actually denied full and equal treatment by a business
establishment” ⎯ that is, to “victims of the discriminatory practices”].)
Plaintiffs adequately alleged they had suffered an “invasion of legally
protected interests” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleading, § 862, p. 320)
sufficient to afford them an interest in pursuing their action vigorously. According
to their allegations, each of the plaintiffs was subjected to, and paid, defendant’s
17
gender-based price differential. Accepting plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true, as
we are required to do in reviewing a judgment entered on the pleadings, plaintiffs
must be considered “person[s] denied the rights provided in Section 51.”
(§ 52(a).)
F
The Court of Appeal and defendant assert that in Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d
24, we actually adopted their view of the nature of an injury under the Act. In
support, they rely upon a single sentence contained in a footnote appearing in the
Koire decision’s statement of facts. This reliance is unwarranted.9 Not only is it
unreasonable to suppose that such a reference in a footnote in our statement of
facts was intended to establish a new and essential element of a cause of action
under the Act, the conclusion advanced by defendant — that a violation or injury
occurs only after a demand for equal treatment has been refused — is contrary to
our legal analysis in Koire and to the purpose of the Act.
Our statement of facts in Koire recounted that the plaintiff visited several
car wash establishments on “Ladies’ Day” and was refused when he asked to be
charged the same price as women customers. The plaintiff in that case also asked
to be charged the same night club admission fee as women patrons and was
refused. We footnoted the circumstance that in the instance of one of the car wash
establishments, it was clear the plaintiff asked for equal treatment, but there was a
factual dispute as to whether the defendant explicitly refused. The dispute was
inconsequential, we explained, because whether or not defendant refused a
request, it was undisputed that the car wash advertised a “Ladies’ Day” policy that
9
Accordingly, we reject the view of the Court of Appeal that the Legislature
has acquiesced in that interpretation of Koire.
18
forced male customers who sought the discount to ask for it affirmatively. We
employed the following language: “There was conflicting testimony at trial about
whether defendant State College Car Wash refused to wash plaintiff’s car for the
reduced ‘Ladies’ Day’ price. The trial court did not resolve the factual dispute,
since it held as a matter of law that ‘Ladies’ Day’ discounts do not violate the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. State College Car Wash does not deny that it advertises
special ‘Ladies’ Day’ prices. At a minimum, men who wish to be charged the
same price as women on ‘Ladies’ Day’ must affirmatively assert their right to
equal treatment.” (Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 27, fn. 3.)
The Court of Appeal declared: “The Supreme Court made the statement in
a footnote, and the footnote appended to the sentence that tells us that most of the
car washes refused plaintiff’s request for the discounted price. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded the case to
the trial court ‘for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.’
The Court thus directed the trial court to resolve the factual dispute in light of the
holding that sex-based price discounts violate the Unruh [Civil Rights] Act. By so
doing, it implicitly held that a denial of services . . . is necessary to state a claim
for sex-based price discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Further, the
‘at a minimum’ language, following as it does the statement that ‘[defendant] does
not deny that it advertises special “Ladies’ Day” prices,’ establishes that mere[ly]
advertising a sex-based price discount does not violate the Unruh Civil Rights
Act.”
The Court of Appeal misread our footnote in several ways. The quoted
footnote cannot be construed as a holding, implicit or otherwise, on any point of
law. The footnote appears in a statement of facts, not in the context of any legal
analysis. Moreover, our point was not that a violation or injury would not occur
under the Act unless the defendant refused the plaintiff’s request to grant a
19
discount. We found that the factual dispute concerning whether a particular
defendant refused to grant the plaintiff a discount was of no consequence, because
it was undisputed that the defendant had a discriminatory policy that would force
men to ask for the discount if they wanted to receive it. The words “[a]t a
minimum” noted that a man would be required to request to be treated equally if
he was to have any chance of avoiding discriminatory treatment, the implication
being that even such a request might not secure equal treatment. (Koire, supra, 40
Cal.3d at p. 27, fn. 3.) Our remand order responded to the circumstance that the
trial court (apparently sitting as the trier of fact) had granted judgment for the
defendants primarily upon a legal ground ⎯ that is, its belief that gender-based
price discounts do not violate the Act. The trial court’s legal error in concluding
that the Act did not apply to gender-based price discounts undermined the entire
judgment it rendered. Our reversal signified that the entire matter could be retried.
We did not direct the trier of fact to resolve any particular factual dispute.
Most significantly, in the present case the Court of Appeal’s interpretation
of the Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the legal analysis contained in our
Koire decision. As noted, our actual discussion and analysis of the applicable
legal principles concluded that gender-based price discounts, such as were alleged
in that case, violated the Act, that arbitrary gender discrimination is per se
injurious, and that the particular plaintiff suffered actual injury because he paid
more for admission or services than female patrons. (Koire, supra, 40 Cal.3d at
pp. 33-34.) Nothing in our discussion of the legal issues suggested the Act is not
violated and an injury does not occur unless the victim of discrimination not only
tenders the price of admission but also demands equal treatment and is refused.
III
The trial court’s and the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 52(a)
reflects in part defendant’s assertion that Angelucci and the other men involved in
20
the present case are professional plaintiffs who “shake down” business entities on
the basis of assertedly technical violations of civil rights laws and similar
enactments, and that they and their attorneys engage in this practice simply to
make a living — unmotivated by any desire to eliminate discrimination or to
redress any actual injury. Defendant claims that plaintiffs made repeated
unannounced visits to defendant’s business establishment in order to increase the
statutory damages they could seek for multiple violations of the Act, and
defendant accuses plaintiffs and their attorneys of being “bounty hunters” who
have been involved in numerous similar lawsuits. Defendant also contends that
meritless, abusive litigation of this type is proliferating in California and generally
results in the extortion of a settlement on the basis of the plaintiff’s unsupported
factual allegations.10
10
We are aware that legislators, courts, and commentators at the state and
national level have been troubled that the enactment of a private right of action
intended to enforce certain types of civil rights legislation may have led to an
explosion of assertedly unwarranted or unduly burdensome individual lawsuits
brought by professional plaintiffs and bounty-hunting attorneys against business
establishments. Much of the debate arises in the context of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (ADA) and specifically in the
context of claims against private property owners for alleged denial of access.
Some writers have argued that compliance with the ADA remains elusive,
justifying the continued use of the private right of action in spite of occasional
abuse. (See Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The
Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation (2006) 54 UCLA L.Rev. 1, 15, 21 [“whether a
class of litigation unduly burdens the courts necessarily depends on a normative
assessment of the importance of that class”].)
Other commentators chronicle instances in which a single plaintiff or law
firm filed hundreds of ADA claims, some alleging assertedly technical or de
minimis variations from applicable accessibility standards, and the authors
consider whether such asserted litigation abuse warrants restriction of remedies
under the ADA. (See Becker, Private Enforcement of the Americans with
Disabilities Act via Serial Litigation: Abusive or Commendable? (2006) 17
Hastings Women’s L.J. 93, 97-99, 113 [describing assertedly abusive ADA
(footnote continued on following page)
21
Although we share to some degree the concerns voiced by the trial court
and the appellate court below and by defendant and its amici curiae regarding the
potential for abusive litigation being brought under the Act, these concerns do not
supply a justification for our inserting additional elements of proof into the cause
of action defined by the statute. It is for the Legislature (or the People through the
(footnote continued from preceding page)
litigation in Pennsylvania, Florida, and California and suggesting adoption of “safe
harbor” provision in the ADA to protect businesses that undertake good faith
efforts to make premises accessible]; McCabe, California Disability Anti-
Discrimination Law: Lighthouse in the Storm, or Hunt for Buried Treasure?
(2005) 36 McGeorge L.Rev. 661, 679-681, 686-689 [noting the problem and
describing the debate]; see also Milani, Go Ahead, Make My 90 Days: Should
Plaintiffs Be Required to Provide Notice to Defendants Before Filing Suit under
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act? (2001) 2001 Wisc. L.Rev. 107,
185 [arguing that title III of the ADA already incorporates a notice provision from
another statute].)
Courts in this state have expressed similar concerns in the context of
litigation under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Health &
Saf. Code, § 25249.5; see Consumer Defense Group v. Rental Housing Industry
Members (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1215-1219 [referring to attorneys engaged
in a “shakedown” through bringing and settling frivolous lawsuits under that act])
and the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). (See People ex rel.
Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1316-1317 [discussing the Attorney
General’s effort to prevent the defendant from engaging in a “shakedown” through
the filing of frivolous lawsuits over “ridiculously minor violations” of the unfair
competition law].)
We note as well that in 2004 the California electorate enacted legislation
restricting previously broad standing requirements for a private right of action
under the state unfair competition and false advertising laws (Bus & Prof. Code,
§§ 17200 et seq., 17500 et seq.), stating in the preamble to the measure that the
broader standard had encouraged frivolous litigation, had been abused by
attorneys who were motivated only by private financial gain, and negatively had
affected many businesses. (See Prop. 64, § 1, subds. (b), (c) & (e) as enacted at
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) [see Bus & Prof. Code, § 17204, amended by Prop. 64
to limit standing to “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money
or property as a result of . . . unfair competition”].)
22
initiative process) to determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to
afford business establishments protection against abusive private legal actions and
settlement tactics. It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations on
the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken enforcement of
the Act or place unwarranted barriers in the way of those persons who suffer
discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act.
A question was raised at oral argument regarding the extent of the damages
that could accrue for repeated unannounced visits to an establishment offering
discounts to women. A hypothetical case involving daily visits for a period of a
year was invoked. Without purporting to answer this question concerning the
speculative damages suffered in such a context, there may be equitable
considerations. Although equitable principles may not be applied in opposition to
statutory enactments or to defeat public policy established by the Legislature (13
Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Equity, § 3, p. 285; see McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 352, 360-362), such
principles have been applied to reduce ordinary tort damages imposed for
violation of antidiscrimination laws. (McKennon, supra, 513 U.S. at pp. 360-362
[“unclean hands” doctrine may reduce damages awarded a wrongfully discharged
employee]; State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1026, 1042-1046 [“avoidable consequences” doctrine may reduce damages
awarded an employee subjected to sexual harassment]; see also Lusardi
Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 996-997 [equitable considerations
barred assessment of certain statutory penalties for the employer’s failure to pay
prevailing wages].)
In addition, there are constitutional constraints on the accrual of statutory
penalties. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th
707, 728-731 [triable issues remained whether due process principles or the
23
constitutional prohibition against excessive fines should reduce an accrued fine of
$14,826,200 for ongoing violation of a statute governing distribution of
cigarettes]; Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388 [same constitutional provisions
limited accrual of a $100 per day statutory penalty that was payable to a tenant
whose landlord shut off his utilities].)
The advisability and propriety of the foregoing legislative and judicial
responses to perceived instances of litigation abuse are not presently before us, nor
is our task now to review defendant’s potential equitable defenses or to examine
any constitutional limitations on damage awards that are based upon violation of a
statute. The issue raised in defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
reached by the trial court was a limited one. The question, in the words of the trial
court, was whether, in order to state a cause of action for violation of the Act,
plaintiffs were required to express their “wish to be charged the same price as
women on Ladies’ Day.” Although defendant supported its interpretation of the
statute with an equitable argument that plaintiffs intentionally sought unequal
treatment in order to create a cause of action and collect damages and attorney fees
for each visit (and in passing mentioned this point again in its brief in the Court of
Appeal), the claim was not developed as an independent basis for judgment, nor
did the trial court or the Court of Appeal consider the applicability of specific
equitable defenses. Our undertaking has been to determine whether plaintiffs
adequately alleged a cause of action under the Act. On that point, we have
concluded that existing law does not support the restriction that the Court of
Appeal placed upon the statutory private right of action established by section
52(a). We make plain, however, that nothing we have said in this opinion should
be interpreted as a restriction on potential equitable or constitutional defenses with
respect to any damages that may be sought pursuant to section 52(a).
24
III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed
and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
25
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I fully agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion. I write separately
because I cannot join the majority’s conjectural discussion (ante, at p. 23) of
equitable defenses to hypothetical claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.
Code, § 52, subd. (a)). As the majority explains (ante, at p. 24), no such issue is
before us. That nothing the majority says on the subject has any precedential force
necessarily follows. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 915; Hart v.
Burnett (1860) 15 Cal. 530, 598-599.)
WERDEGAR, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Angelucci v. Century Supper Club
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 130 Cal.App.4th 919
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No.
S136154Date Filed: May 31, 2007
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court:
SuperiorCounty: Los Angeles
Judge: Joseph R. Kalin*
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
The Rava Law Firm, Alfred G. Rava; Law Offices of Morse Mehrban and Morse Mehrban for Plaintiffsand Appellants.
The Sturdevant Law Firm, James C. Sturdevant and Monique Olivier for Consumer Attorneys of California
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jennifer C. Pizer; Christine P. Sun, Hector P. Villagra; David Blair-Loy; and Tamara Lange for Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern
California, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties and American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Harry Crouch for National Coalition of Free Men, Los Angeles Chapter, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Respondent:
Law Offices of Steven L. Martin and Steven L. Martin for Defendant and Respondent.
Payne & Fears, Daniel L. Rasmussen and Julie J. Bisceglia for Corinthian Colleges as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Deborah J. La Fetra and Timothy Sandefur for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Respondent.
*Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Alfred G. RavaThe Rava Law Firm
311 Fourth Avenue, Suite 312
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 238-1993
Monique Olivier
The Sturdevant Law Firm
475 Sansome Street, Suite 1750
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 477-2410
Steven L. Martin
Law Offices of Steven L. Martin
100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 260-6055
| Date: | Citation: | Docket Number: |
| Thu, 05/31/2007 | 41 Cal. 4th 160, 158 P.3d 718, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 | S136154 |
| 1 | Angelucci, Marc (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Alfred Gerard Rava The Rava Law Firm 3667 Voltaire Street San Diego, CA |
| 2 | Century Supper Club (Defendant and Respondent) Represented by Steven L. Martin Attorney at Law 100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 200 Santa Monica, CA |
| 3 | Campbell, Elton (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Alfred Gerard Rava The Rava Law Firm 3667 Voltaire Stree San Diego, CA |
| 4 | Pacas, Edgar (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Alfred Gerard Rava The Rava Law Firm 3667 Voltaire Street San Diego, CA |
| 5 | Kent, Jeff (Plaintiff and Appellant) Represented by Alfred Gerard Rava The Rava Law Firm 311 Fourth Avenue, Suite 312 San Diego, CA |
| 6 | Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae) Represented by Monique Olivier The Sturdevant Law Firm 475 Sansome Street, Suite 1750 San Francisco, CA |
| 7 | Consumer Attorneys Of California (Amicus curiae) Represented by James C. Sturdevant The Sturdevant Law Firm 475 Sansome Street, Suite 1750 San Francisco, CA |
| 8 | Pacific Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae) Represented by Timothy Mason Sandefur Pacific Legal Foundation 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 Sacramento, CA |
| 9 | Pacific Legal Foundation (Amicus curiae) Represented by Deborah Joyce Lafetra Pacific Legal Foundation 3900 Lennane Drive, Suite 200 Sacramento, CA |
| 10 | National Coalition Of Free Men (Amicus curiae) P.O. Box 41291 Los Angeles, CA 90041 |
| 11 | Lambda Legal Defense And Education Fund, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Jennifer Carol Pizer Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. 3325 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 Los Angeles, CA |
| 12 | Lambda Legal Defense And Education Fund, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Amber Dawn Garza Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. 3325 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 Los Angeles, CA |
| 13 | Aclu Foundation Of Southern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Christine Patricia Sun ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1616 Beverly Boulevard Los Angeles, CA |
| 14 | Aclu Foundation Of Southern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Hector Oscar Villagra ACLU Foundation of Southern California 2140 W. Chapman Avenue, Suite 209 Orange, CA |
| 15 | Aclu Foundation Of San Diego & Imperial Counties, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by John David Blair-Loy ACLU Foundation of San Diego & Imperial Counties P. O. Box 87131 San Diego, CA |
| 16 | Aclu Foundation Of Northern California, Inc. (Amicus curiae) Represented by Tamara Alice Lange ACLU of Northern California 1663 Mission Street, Suite 460 San Francisco, CA |
| 17 | Corinthian Colleges (Amicus curiae) Represented by Julie J. Bisceglia Greenberg Glusker et al., LLP 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2100 Los Angeles, CA |
| 18 | Corinthian Colleges (Amicus curiae) Represented by Daniel L. Rasmussen Payne & Fears 4 Park Plaza, Suite 1100 Irvine, CA |
| Opinion Authors | |
| Opinion | Chief Justice Ronald M. George |
| Concur | Justice Kathryn M. Werdegar |
| Disposition | |
| May 31 2007 | Opinion: Reversed |
| Dockets | |
| Aug 3 2005 | Petition for review filed by counsel for aplts. (Marc Angelucci, et al.,) |
| Aug 5 2005 | Record requested |
| Aug 5 2005 | Received: from counsel for aplt. copy of Substitution of Attorney filed in CA 2/5 |
| Aug 5 2005 | Received Court of Appeal record one doghouse. |
| Aug 11 2005 | Request for depublication (petition for review pending) by the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Coalition of Free Men. |
| Aug 15 2005 | Received: Substitute of Attorney for March Angelucci, Elton Campbell and Edgar Pacas for the Court of Appeal. |
| Aug 17 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file answer to petition respondents Century Supper Club asking to Oct. 7, 2005. |
| Aug 19 2005 | Extension of time granted to serve and file the answer to petition for review to and including October 7, 2005. |
| Aug 22 2005 | Received: Amicus letter in support of Petition from Review from James C. Sturdevant (Consumer Attorneys of California) |
| Aug 29 2005 | Request for depublication filed (another request pending) Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundations of Southern California; Northern California; and San Diego & Imperial counties by counsel. 40.1(b) |
| Sep 27 2005 | Time extended to grant or deny review to and including November 1, 2005. |
| Oct 4 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file answer to petition for review asking to October 14, 2005. |
| Oct 6 2005 | Opposition filed by appellant to respondent's application for extension of time to file the answer to petition for review. |
| Oct 7 2005 | Extension of time denied Respondent's request for an extension of time to file Respondent's Answer to Petition for Review. |
| Oct 7 2005 | Answer to petition for review filed respondent [CENTURY SUPPER CLUB] |
| Oct 14 2005 | Reply to answer to petition filed Appellants (Angelucci et al.). |
| Oct 19 2005 | Petition for review granted (civil case) Kennard, J., was absent and did not participate. Votes: George, C.J., Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. |
| Oct 27 2005 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Attorney Alfred Rava for Appellants ( Angelucci , et al.). |
| Oct 28 2005 | Certification of interested entities or persons filed Attorney Steven L. Martin for Respondents (Century Supper Club) |
| Nov 14 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed Appellants ( Angelucci, et al.) |
| Dec 5 2005 | Request for extension of time filed to file answer brief/merits asking to 02-10-06 Century Supper Club, respondents |
| Dec 7 2005 | Extension of time granted to Century Supper Club, respondent, to file answer brief on the merits is extended to February 10, 2006. |
| Feb 14 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed respondent, Century Supper Club |
| Feb 15 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) respondent, Century Supper Club. |
| Feb 22 2006 | Extension of time granted to April 5, 2006, to file the reply brief. |
| Feb 22 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to April 5, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief. |
| Feb 23 2006 | Extension of time granted to April 5, 2006 to file appellant's reply brief. |
| Apr 4 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) Marc Angelucci, Elton Campbell, and Edgar Pacas, Appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| Apr 4 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) Marc Angelucci, Elton Campbell, and Edgar Pacas, Appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| May 1 2006 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief National Coalition of Free Men, Los Angeles Chapter in support of appellants. |
| May 1 2006 | Request for extension of time filed Requesting a 14-day extension to and including May 18, 2006 Consumer Attorneys of California, Amicus Curiae by Monique Oliver, counsel |
| May 3 2006 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California The Ameircan Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties supporting appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. (brief & app. under separate covers) |
| May 3 2006 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Pacific Legal Foundation in support of respondent. |
| May 4 2006 | Extension of time granted to May 18, 2006, Consumer Attorneys of California, to file Amicus Curiae by Monique Oliver, counsel. |
| May 4 2006 | Filed: Objections to respondent's request to take judicial notice. Marc Angelucci, Elton Campbell, and Edgar Pacas, Appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| May 8 2006 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Pacific Legal Foundation in support of respondent. |
| May 8 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed Pacific Legal Foundation in support of respondent. |
| May 8 2006 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted National Coalition of Free Men, Los Angeles Chapter in support of appellants. |
| May 8 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed National Coalition of Free Men, Los Angeles Chapter in support of appellants. |
| May 11 2006 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California The Ameircan Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties supporting appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. |
| May 11 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California The Ameircan Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties supporting appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. An aswer may be served and filed by any party within twenty (20) days of of the filing of the brief. |
| May 18 2006 | Received application to file Amicus Curiae Brief Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. |
| May 18 2006 | Request for extension of time filed by respondents Century Supper Club to answer amicus briefs. Requesting to & including 6/30/06 |
| May 22 2006 | Extension of time granted to June 30, 2006, to respondent to file answer to all amicus briefs. |
| May 22 2006 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. |
| May 22 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed Consumer Attorneys of California in support of appellants Marc Angelucci, et al. |
| May 23 2006 | Request for extension of time filed to June 30, 2006, by appellants, Marc Angelucci, Elton Campbell, and Edgar Pacas to file answer to amicus brief of Pacific Legal Foundation. |
| May 30 2006 | Extension of time granted to June 30, 2006, by appellants, Marc Angelucci, Elton Campbell, and Edgar Pacas to file answer to amicus brief of Pacific Legal Foundation. |
| Jun 13 2006 | Request for extension of time filed by respondents Century Supper Club to file answer all a/c briefs to and including July 28, 2006. Rec'd Declaration Of Alfred G. Ravia supporting appln. |
| Jun 19 2006 | Extension of time granted to July 28, 2006, to respondent Century Supper Club to file answer to all amicus curiae briefs. |
| Jun 30 2006 | Received: Untimely amicus curiae from Corinthian Colleges in support of respondent. Julie J. Bisceglia, Counsel. |
| Jul 3 2006 | Application for relief from default filed to file application for permission to file amicus curiae and amicus curiae brief. |
| Jul 7 2006 | Permission to file amicus curiae brief granted Corinthian Colleges in support of respondent. Julie J. Bisceglia, Counsel |
| Jul 7 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed Corinthian Colleges in support of respondent. Julie J. Bisceglia, Counsel. |
| Jul 7 2006 | Received: Appellants answer to Corinthian College's Application for relief from default and declaration of Steven Surrey. |
| Jul 7 2006 | Request for judicial notice filed (granted case) Corinthian Colleges, amicus curiae with exhibits 1-39 Julie J. Bisceglia, Counsel. |
| Jul 26 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Amicus Curiae: Pacific Legal Foundation Angelucci, et al., appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| Jul 26 2006 | Received: Declaration and exhibts supporting answer to amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in support of respondent. |
| Jul 27 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Amicus Curiae: Corinthian Colleges Angelucci, et al., appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| Jul 27 2006 | Received: Declaration and exhibts supporting answer to amicus curiae of Corinthian Colleges support of respondent. |
| Jul 31 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed Answer Of Respondent (Century Supper Club) to a/c briefs of National Coalition Of Free Men, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Consumer Attorneys Of California. (40.1) Steven L. Martin, counsel |
| Feb 8 2007 | Case ordered on calendar to be argued Wednesday, March 7, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., in San Francisco |
| Feb 13 2007 | Order filed The request for judicial notice filed on February 15, 2006, by respondent Century Supper Club is granted as to exhibits A-H and denied as to exhibits I-K. The request for judicial notice filed on April 4, 2006, by appellants Marc Angelucci et al. is granted as to exhibits A and B and denied as to exhibit C. The request for judicial notice filed on July 7, 2006, by amicus curiae Corinthian Colleges is granted except for exhibits 21 and 39, as to which the request is denied. |
| Feb 20 2007 | Application filed to: divide oral argument time. Appellants Angelucci et al. requesting to share 15 minutes with amicus curiae Consumer Attorneys of California. |
| Feb 21 2007 | Order filed The request of counsel for appellants in the above-referenced cause to allow two counsel to argue on behalf of appellants at oral argument is hereby granted. The request of appellants to allocate to amicus curiae Consumer Attorneys of California 15 minutes of appellants' 30-minute allotted time for oral argument is granted. |
| Mar 7 2007 | Cause argued and submitted |
| May 30 2007 | Notice of forthcoming opinion posted |
| May 31 2007 | Opinion filed: Judgment reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. -----Majority Opinion by: George, C.J. -----Joined by: Kennard, Baxter, Chin, Moreno, Corrigan, J.J. -----Concurring Opinion by: Werdegar, J. |
| Jun 4 2007 | Received: Letter from Alfred G. Rava, Counsel for appellant |
| Jun 5 2007 | Letter sent to: Alfred G. Rava, Counsel for appellant Response by Office of the Reporter of Decisions to letter dated June 1, 2007. |
| Jun 14 2007 | Note: Mail returned (unable to forward) Julie J. Bisceglia Steven L. Martin |
| Jun 15 2007 | Request for modification of opinion filed Marc Angelucci et al, appellants Alfred G. Rava, Counsel |
| Jun 20 2007 | Note: Mail returned (unable to forward) Tamara Alice Lange |
| Jun 27 2007 | Request for modification denied Petitioners' request for modification of the opinion is denied. |
| Jun 27 2007 | Change of contact information filed for: Alfred G. Rava |
| Jul 3 2007 | Remittitur issued (civil case) |
| Jul 11 2007 | Received: Receipt for remittitur - CA2/5 |
| Briefs | |
| Nov 14 2005 | Opening brief on the merits filed |
| Feb 14 2006 | Answer brief on the merits filed |
| Apr 4 2006 | Reply brief filed (case fully briefed) |
| May 8 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
| May 8 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
| May 11 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
| May 22 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
| Jul 7 2006 | Amicus curiae brief filed |
| Jul 26 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
| Jul 27 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
| Jul 31 2006 | Response to amicus curiae brief filed |
| Jul 3, 2011 Annotated by megan worman | Facts Procedural History Issues Holding Analysis Prior precedent stood only for the proposition that all individuals alleging discrimination must actually patronize the business of the one engaged in unequal treatment (so, it is not sufficient under this analysis that the class representative alone did so), and must have done so on each and every instance for which damages are claimed. -- Allegations of paying a different price based solely on one's gender are sufficient to justify standing. One must suffer an invasion of a legally protected interest to have standing, and, for suits under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, being subjected to discriminatory action is sufficient. Thus, anyone who has alleged a price differential based solely on membership in a protected class will have standing, as they have been denied the equal treatment the Act is meant to protect. -- Even if plaintiffs deliberately seek to manufacture lawsuits without any actual concern for the right being violated, that should not alter analysis under the statute. Although such abusive litigation, carried out solely for the sake of profit, may be harmful and of significant concern, it is for the legislature to alter the cause of action accordingly. Additionally, requiring an affirmative request might actually favor plaintiffs with questionable motives, as they would be more likely to know what the law required. Key Related Cases Tags |
